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Analyzing subjectivity in therapeutic discourse: Rogers, Perls,

Ellis, and Gloria revisited

Article  in  Psychotherapy Theory Research & Practice · June 1990

DOI: 10.1037/0033-3204.27.2.271

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Psychotherapy
ANALYZING SUBJECTIVITY IN THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE:
ROGERS, PERLS, ELLIS, AND GLORIA REVISITED
TODD S. ESSIG* AND ROBERT L. RUSSELL
The New School for Social Research
The classic interviews between Gloria
and Rogers, Perls, and Ellis were
analyzed using Essig and Russell's
(1988) "Categories for Analyzing
Psychological Relations between
Subjects and Events in Discourse," a
new category system for identifying
self-disclosing features of discourse. A
focus on objective discourse features is
presented.
Therapeutic discourse invites each participant
to know and share in the subjective experience
and point of view of the other. It is packed with
what narratologists call "signs of the T " (Prince,
1982), discursive structures that disclose the inner
world of the participants. Training as a therapist
includes becoming a sensitive reader of the lan-
guage through which patients disclose who they
are. Moreover, therapist-disclosing language is
also present, as an intervention strategy, a violation
of technique, or as a means to build an alliance.
Numerous questionnaire, participant-report, and
observational studies of self-disclosure in psy-
chotherapy have documented its importance to
both process and outcome (Chelune, 1979; Derlega
& Berg, 1987). Moreover, constructs such as ac-
curacy of interpretation (Crits-Christoph, Cooper
& Luborsky, 1988; Silberschatz, Fretter & Curtis,
1986) entail the therapeutic skill of abstracting
from patients' discourse information about their
experience and point of view,regardlessof whether
* The first author's address is now Todd S. Essig, Kings
County Hospital Center, Psychology Department—Annex 3,
451 Clarkson Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11203.
The authors thank Alan Hack and Debra Rothchild for then-
patient and knowledgeable assistance throughout this project.
Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed
to Robert L. Russell, New School for Social Research, De-
partment of Psychology, 65 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.
10003.
Volume 27/Summer 1990/Number 2
interpretations are concerned with veridical his-
torical reconstruction or with narrative consistency,
scope, and cohesiveness (Edelson, 1971; Levenson,
1983; Schafer, 1981).
Although the importance of self-disclosure in
therapy is evident, scant attention has been paid
to how therapeutic discourse functions to provide
participants access to subjective experiences and
points of view. Process researchers seem reluctant
to ask two basic questions: What is it about the
discourse itself that facilitates this therapeutically
central process of one person coming to know
another, and how can it be investigated? In order
to address these questions (a) we contrast our
focus on self-disclosing features of discourse with
the traditional focus on intentions and introspective
access1 as defining characteristics of self-disclosure;
(b) we identify and operational ize self-disclosing
discourse features at the sentential level of dis-
course; and (c) we illustrate our approach in an
analysis of the Rogers, Perls, and Ellis therapy
sessions (Shostrom, 1966). Our overall purpose
is to offer a new descriptive option for process
researchers, for both traditional hypothesis testing
paradigms and newly emerging discovery-oriented
procedures (Elliot, 1983; Mahrer, 1988; Pea &
Russell, 1987; Rice & Greenberg, 1984; Russell,
1987a).
Self-Disclosing Discourse Features vs.
the Intention/Introspective Access Approach
to Self-Disclosure
The traditional literature on self-disclosure differs
from our focus on self-disclosing discourse features.
1
In the philosophical literature, what we term "introspective
access" isreferredto as "privileged access." Our terminology
is meant only to indicate a change in emphasis, not a change
in the concept of privileged access (i.e., that there is an epistemic
superiority in the type of access an individual has to his/her
own mental states that others do not and cannot have). We
want to stress the privatization of experience implied in this
concept as much as the epistemic superiority (Eagle, 1982;
Habermas, 1971; Volosinov, 1976).
271
 T. S. Essig & R. L. Russell
Self-disclosure, though definitionally ambiguous
(Derlega & Berg, 1987), is typically seen as a
process of telling another person about oneself.
The verbal actions that function as self-disclosures,
however, have been taken for granted, especially
when questionnaire and participant report methods
are employed (Chelune, 1979; Cozby, 1973;
Strassberg, Roback, D'Antonio & Gabel, 1977).
When investigators have attempted to tie acts of
self-disclosure to discourse, they have been defined
as utterances intentionally designed to reveal in-
formation available only to the speaker's intro-
spection (Stiles, 1987). In this intention/intro-
spective access approach, discourse is assumed
to directly reflect both the speaker's intention to
disclose information and it's status as information
to which the speaker alone has introspective access.
"I feel depressed today" and "My thoughts are
bad" are examples of mis type of utterance.
The concept of self-disclosing discourse features
has a different focus and conceptual basis. It refers
to any feature of discourse mat can provide a
listener access to the speaker's subjective expe-
rience and point of view. Rather man defining
acts of self-disclosure in terms of the speaker's
mental states (i.e., intentions and the objects of
introspection), self-disclosing discourse features
are defined in terms of the functions the utterance
could serve in the discourse. This functional ap-
proach requires viewing the discourse as an object
of study rather than as a transparent window through
which familiar therapeutic events, such as self-
disclosure, can be viewed directly.
Once the discourse is considered nontransparent,
an intent to communicate private information is
not necessary for the utterance to perform the
function of self-disclosure. For example, "I seldom
go out at night" is not considered a self-disclosure
(Stiles, 1987). However, this phrase does disclose
information about the subjective experience and
point of view of the speaker, even though the
apparent intent is to convey objective information
concerning a behavioral event and not private ex-
perience. "Seldom" functions as a subjective ap-
praisal of the frequency of a behavioral event,
even though the event of going out at night is
public, and could have occurred once a week, on
weekends, or once an entire season. Understanding
the meaning of "seldom," and, by extension, the
utterance, depends on "reading" it as a clue to
the experience and point of view of the speaker.
Furthermore, it's presence is not required by
grammar, discourse rules, or politeness. It is an
272
added detail included by the speaker, and it marks
the discourse with the speaker's individual way
of approaching events like going out at night.
Including "seldom" gives the statement evaluative
meaning which is contingent on the subjective
experience and point of view of the speaker. This
simple example illustrates that self-disclosing in-
formation can be present in therapeutic discourse
even when there is no apparent intention to disclose.
Self-disclosing discourse features can and in fact
do range across most utterance types, and are not
constrained in any simple way by communicative
intents.
Another difference concerns introspective ac-
cess, that is, that a self-disclosing utterance must
be about a private, subjective experience to which
only the speaker has some sort of privileged, con-
scious access. This view invites philosophical
problems about the criteria demarcating public
from private experience, and also assumes that
people do not, or cannot, disclose aspects of
themselves to which conscious, introspective access
has been blocked. Furthermore, reflection on as-
pects of the internal structure of utterances shows
this to be a limited view. For example, in the
utterance discussed above, self-disclosing infor-
mation about the speaker's subjective relation to
events like going out at night would also be avail-
able if the speaker was talking about someone
else's going out at night (e.g., "My wife seldom
goes out at night"). "Seldom" functions similarly
here as it did in the context of the first person
utterance and discloses information about the sub-
jective experience and point of view of the speaker.
Consider another utterance: a patient says "You
want me to act just like they do." The therapist's
subjective state (i.e., wanting) is the topic, not
an experience of the patient to which the latter
has privileged, introspective access. The utterance
also concerns the relation of the therapist's in-
tentional state to the patient's activity. The patient
discloses momentary, and perhaps unconscious,
information about his/her subjective experience
and point of view by Unking the therapist's intention
to his/her own action. The patient has disclosed
information about his/her subjective construal of
autonomy and power in the therapeutic relationship,
just the type of information relevant to clinical work
(Luborsky, 1984; Strupp & Binder, 1984; Weiss &
Sampson, 1986). Introspective access and an apparent
intention to disclose private information seem suspect,
singly or taken together, as criteria for identifying
instances of self-disclosure.

More generally, the intention/introspective ac-
cess approach to self-disclosure seems based on
a concept of self that differs from the concept of
self implied by widely held beliefs about self-
knowledge and the centrality of dialogue as a way
to achieve it. Learning to recognize and coming
to own one's previously disavowed phenomenal
states (e.g., anger, envy, joy) or dispositional
states (e.g., wishes, desires, plans) is a key aim
in most therapies. Therapists frequently recognize
mental states (e.g., "You seem angry" or "Perhaps
you didn't want that job.") that are not intro-
spectively accessible to the patient at that moment.
The self-knowledge achieved in such dialogue
extends self-knowledge beyond the limits of pre-
vious conscious mental states. The concept of self
implied by defining self-disclosure exclusively in
terms of individual intents and conscious, intro-
spective access seems more compatable with the
subjectivism and narcissism that frequently leads
to problems in living than with the concept of
self implied by most therapeutic practices.
In summary, the intention/introspective access
approach to self-disclosure is incompatable, not
only with facts concerning linguistic function, but
also with clinical premises about the dialogic pro-
cess through which self-knowledge is acquired
(Loewald, 1960; Russell & Trull, 1986). The
question of how therapeutic discourse functions
to facilitate one person coming to know him/her
self or the other through self-disclosures will remain
essentially unaddressed, unless an alternative to
the intention/introspective access approach is de-
vised and adopted.
Categories for Analyzing Subjective
Relations between Subjects and Events
in Discourse
In order to identify and describe self-disclosing
discourse features in therapeutic discourse, we
built upon constructs developed in linguistic, lit-
erary, and narrative studies (Bruner, 1986; Chafe,
1986; Du Bois, 1986; Martin, 1987; Mitchell,
1984; Todorov, 1977; Urmson, 1952). Studies
such as these are currently exerting a growing
influence on psychotherapeutic theory, research,
and practice (Brandell, 1984; Frank, 1987; Lu-
borsky, 1984; Luborsky, Crits-Christoph & Mel-
lon, 1986; Russell, 1987*; Russell & van den
Broek, 1988; Schafer, 1980, 1981;Spence, 1982;
Strupp & Binder, 1984). Although the literary
process involves readers and characters rather than
therapists and patients, and although it studies
Analyzing Subjectivity
literary texts rather than spontaneous conversation,
insights gained into how literary discourse functions
can be relevant to understanding psychotherapeutic
processes.
Literary theorists have analyzed how readers
gain access to characters' subjective experience
and point of view. The events being narrated
are transformed within that experience and point
of view and made into subjective, contingent
facts—not unlike the impact of the word "seldom"
in the example in the previous section. Todorov
(1977) suggested a typology of relations between
events and the inner worlds of characters that
could be used to differentiate among present, and
even potential, narrative genres. This typology
was a basic narrative semantics for describing
subjective relations between events and the par-
ticipants within them.
Recently, Bruner (1986) used Todorov's (1977)
typology of rhetorical devices to study differences
between scientific and narrative discourses. When
a scientific text was compared with a narrative,
the narrative was shown to include more instances
where events were related to the inner world of
the participants than did the scientific text. The
"landscape of consciousness" upon which both
events and their transformative psychological
elaborations took shape, was highlighted in the
narrative but not in the scientific text. This work
suggested that a writer's representation of and a
reader's access to the inner worlds of characters,
and the transformation of events in their minds,
can be studied using those discourse features orig-
inally identified by Todorov.
In order to adapt this work for process research,
an expanded set of language categories and coding
procedures were developed (Essig & Russell,
1988). The categories were limited to those dis-
course features present at the utterance/sentential
level of organization. This level of discourse or-
ganization roughly corresponds to an independent
clause and attendant dependent clauses.2 There
are three reasons for selecting the utterance level
2
It is obvious, however, that information concerning a
speaker's subjective experience and point of view can be
found at all levels of discourse organization, ranging from
silences and pauses (Gilani, Bucci & Freedman, 1985; Mahl,
1987) through the organization of entirefieldsof text (Bransford,
1970; Russell, 1987*). Thus, different strategies of description
will be needed at these different levels of discourse organization
if the full range of self-disclosing discourse features are to be
studied.
273
T. S. Essig & R. L. Russell
of discourse organization: (1) it is the least complex
unit that lexicalizes both actor and event and thereby
can include a subjective relation between the two;
(2) it is the main constituent through which a
variety of larger textual organizations are realized;
and (3) it is easily recognized, aiding coder re-
liability. Two classes of utterances, specifications
and predications, provide information at this level
about the speaker's subjective experience and point
of view.
A specification requires the presence of a gram-
matical subject, an event (inclusive of state, pro-
cess, and action case designations), and some
linguistic indicator elaborating a subjective relation
between the two. These different indicators, usually
adverbs, auxiliary verbs, and prepositional phrases,
portray different psychological aspects of the sub-
jective elaboration (see Appendix A for a list of
the eight specification subtypes). For example,
consider the utterances "He left the hospital" and
"He wanted to leave the hospital." The first ut-
terance, not a specification, is an unadorned basic
event, providing little information about any sub-
jective relation between the actor and the event.
The second utterance is a specification, since, in
addition to the basic event, it has a linguistic
indicator specifying a subjective relation between
the actor and the hospital-leaving event. In this
example, a specification of intention, the speci-
fication indicator "wanted" makes the hospital-
leaving event contingent on the intention of the ac-
tor; the subjective, intentional state is highlighted
relative to the event itself.
A predication involves the addition of a new
verb phrase to the one encoding the basic event.
In contrast to specifications where there is one
grammatical subject, predications always have
more than one, the subject of the new verb phrase
whose subjectivity is being commented upon and
the agent of the event being talked about. This
allows greater complexity inrelatingevents, actors,
and the actor's subjective experience and point
of view. Like specifications, these verb phrases
portray different psychological aspects of subjective
elaboration (see Appendix B for a listing of the
eight predication subtypes). Consider the utterance
"I realized that he left the hospital." A new verb
phrase indicating that the speaker gained an
awareness of the hospital-leaving event is added
to the basic event of leaving the hospital. This
utterance, a predication of knowledge, highlights
the speaker's acquisition of awareness of the event.
274
Any utterance with minimal clausal structure
can have a specification or a predication, or a
combination of specifications and predications.
Since specifications and predications rely on op-
tional rather than necessary lexical choices, the
distribution of specifications and predications in
discourse can indicate the manner and degree to
which speakers disclose information about their
subjective experience and point of view, as well
as their attitude toward that disclosure.
Rogers, Perls, Ellis, and Gloria Revisited
The Gloria interviews (Shostrom, 1966) consist
of Gloria being interviewed by Carl Rogers, dem-
onstrating client-centered therapy, Albert Ellis,
demonstrating rational—emotive therapy, and Fritz
Perls, demonstrating Gestalt therapy. They are
useful in illustrating our analyses of self-disclosing
discourse features because specific differences in
the therapists' verbal behavior can be expected to
follow from their theoretical orientation (Hill,
Thames & Rardin, 1979; Meara, Pepinsky, Shan-
non & Murray, 1981; Meara, Shannon & Pepinsky,
1979; Mercier & Johnson, 1984; Shostrom & Riley,
1968; Zimmer & Cowles, 1972).
Rogers' theory of psychotherapy emphasizes
the client's subjective experience and its acceptance
by the therapist. A Rogerian therapist uses his/
her own subjective experience and point of view
to affirm and authentically accept that of the client,
while at the same time communicating a disin-
clination to appear to know authoritatively what
the client's subjective experience of events is or
should be. Thus, the subjective experience and
point of view of both participants, as well as how
the two relate, are central in Rogerian therapy.
Insofar as Rogers' verbal behavior is consistent
with his theoretical stance, we expect Rogers'
speech to be the most self-disclosing, in comparison
to the other therapists, where the actor and per-
spective-taker can be different such as in predic-
ations.
Ellis' rational-emotive therapy is also concerned
with how Gloria psychologically elaborates the
events of her life, although in a narrowly focused
way. Ellis believes that there are mistakes in how
clients think about events that need to be "con-
sistently attacked, discouraged, and rooted out"
(Ellis, 1974). For Ellis, although there is an em-
phasis on subjective thought processes, the ther-
apist's primary contribution is the corrective ap-

plication of, and instruction in, logic and problem-
solving. Therefore, we do not expect his speech
to differ from Rogers' speech in the overall presence
of psychologically elaborated utterances, since both
therapists focus on how Gloria's subjective relation
to events infuses them with psychological meaning.
However, since his concern is meeting her inner
world with an objective logic, rather than by making
his statements contingent on his own or somebody
else's experience or point of view, we expect that
his use of predications, where the inner world of
one subject can be related to the events undertaken
by another subject, will be significantly less than
Rogers'.
Perls' approach involves confronting the patient
with the here-and-now, with his apparent goal
being enactment rather than narration. For him
"verbal communication is usually a lie . . . real
communication is beyond words" (Perls, 1969).
The dualism between events and their psychological
elaboration implied by the concepts of subjectivity
and point of view is the problem that therapy
should transcend. His theory would proscribe the
frequent use of specifications and predications since
the goal is to eliminate the distinction between
experience and assertions about experience implied
by subjective, contingent meanings of events.
Therefore, we expect his speech to be the least
densely packed with specifications and predica-
tions.
To further illustrate the utility of our approach,
Gloria's language is also analyzed. It is reasonable
to expect both that the different speech situations
will pull for linguistic variation and, at the same
time, that Gloria as an individual speaker with a
characteristic expressive style, as well as con-
sistencies among the speech situations (e.g., male
talking to female, older person talking to younger,
expert talking to novice), will pull for similarities.
Analyses of Gloria's use of self-disclosing discourse
features will thus be descriptive.
Method
Materials
The film Three Approaches to Psychotherapy
(Shostrom, 1966) consists of Carl Rogers, Fritz
Perls, and Albert Ellis interviewing the same client,
Gloria. Transcripts of the verbal exchanges between
the participants were used as the data for the current
study.
Analyzing Subjectivity
Measures and Reliability
Segmentation Units. Transcripts were seg-
mented into independent clauses and attendant
dependent clauses; isolated phrases and sentence
fragments; terms of address, greeting, and
acknowledgment. Three coders independently
segmented each of the three sessions. The average
percent agreement among all pairs of coders was
83% (85% for Perls/Gloria, 83% for Rogers/Gloria,
and 80% for Ellis/Gloria). All discrepancies were
resolved by joint agreement prior to coding. This
resulted in a total of 168, 283, and 278 scorable
segments for Rogers, Perls, and Ellis, respectively;
and 499, 352, 175, for Gloria in interviews with
Rogers, Perls, and Ellis, respectively.
Contextual Units. Coders were instructed to
use as much of the text as possible as context
when making scoring decisions.3
Classification Categories. The two main cat-
egories, specifications and predications, each have
8 subtypes (see Appendices A and B). Specifi-
cations and predications are identified on the basis
of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic information.
A segment can receive multiple scores when ap-
propriate (see Appendices). All coding was per-
formed by the first author and two other graduate
students, one male and one female, trained in the
use of the typology. Training consisted of a thor-
ough introduction to the scoring manual (Essig &
Russell, 1988), followed by approximately 16
practice sessions on speech samples unrelated to
the present investigation. Training proceeded until
the judges reached at least 80% agreement on all
categories.
The first author coded all segments. Afterward,
segments 50 through 200 of each of the three
sessions were selected and coded by the other two
coders, both of whom were blind to the hypotheses
of the study. This yielded an assessment of re-
liability on 26% of all segments. Reliability for
coding specifications and predications was assessed
using Cohen's kappa, a coefficient of interjudge
3
Although Mercier and Johnson (1984) have argued using
context results in "muddying the waters," our approach relies
heavily on the use of context. Using context in category as-
signment, like its use in everyday conversation, disambiguates
more than it confuses. When context is not taken into account,
the resulting specific meaning attributed to the utterance will
frequently miss the actual function the utterance is serving in
the discourse (Russell & Trull, 1986).
275
T. S. Essig & R. L. Russell

agreement for nominal scales based on the pro-
portion of agreement between judges after chance
agreement is removed (Cohen, 1960). The kappa
values ranged from .78 to .92 for each of the
three sessions between the different pairs of judges
with all scores falling within 95% confidence limits.
These are well within the range of acceptability,
and suggest minimum introduction of experimenter
bias through the first author's codings.
Data Analyses
The number of segments with 0, 1, 2 or more
specifications, with 0, 1, or 2 or more predications,
and with 0, 1, 2, or 3 or more specifications plus
predications were calculated. For example, an ut-
terance with a predication and a specification in-
dicator would be scored as 1 for specifications,
1 for predications, and 2 for specifications plus
predications. These three sets of frequency counts
were compared using chi-squares. In the first
analysis, each therapist was compared with the
other in terms of his use of specifications, pred-
ications, and specifications plus predications, re-
sulting in nine separate chi-square analyses. To
guard against Type I errors, alpha was set at .0056
(.05 divided by 9 = .0056). In the second set of
analyses, Gloria's language across the three dif-
ferent sessions was similarly analyzed, again
yielding nine separate analyses with a reduced
alpha level of .0056.
Results
Therapist Comparison
A comparison of the degree to which each ther-
apist used specifications and/or predications es-
sentially confirmed expectations (see Table 1).
Chi-square analyses comparing their total score
density (specifications plus predications) indicated
that Perls was significantly different than Rogers
(X2 [3, N = 451] = 69.63, p < .0001) and Ellis
(X2 [3, AT = 561] = 63.39, p < .0001) while
Rogers and Ellis did not significantly differ (x2
[3, N = 446] = 1.2, p > .75). A further ex-
amination of Table 1 suggests that, as expected,
Perls had relatively more segments without any
specifications or predications than did Rogers or
Ellis (56% of total segments compared to 32%
and 35%, respectively). Furthermore, of the seg-
ments where there was a specification or predic-
ation, 79% (99/125) of Perls' scored segments
had only one score, compared to 41% (47/115)
for Rogers and 45% (82/182) for Ellis. Apparently,
Perls accomplished his communicative and ther-
apeutic goals by using fewer utterances with a
specification or a predication, or, alternatively,

TABLE 1. Percentage of Segments for Each Therapist at Different

Levels of Density

Frequencies and Percentages of Segments with:

Therapist 1 3 or more

Specifications Plus Predications

Rogers 53 (32%) 47 (28%) 36 (21%) 32 (19%)
Perls 158 (56%) 99 (35%) 21 ( 7%) 5 ( 2%)
Ellis 96 (35%) 82 (30%) 57 (20%) 43 (15%)
Specifications Only
Rogers 81 (48%) 55 (33%) 32 (19%)
Perls 198 (70%) 80 (28%) 5 ( 2%)
Ellis 105 (38%) 107 (38%) 66 (24%)
Predications Only
Rogers 88 (52%) 57 (34%) 23 (14%)
Perls 220 (78%) 60 (21%) 3 ( 1%)
Ellis 200 (72%) 68 (24%) 10 ( 4%)

Note. The total number of segments used in calculating percentages are 168
for Rogers, 283 for Perls, and 278 for Ellis.
"Categories for 2 or 3 or more were collapsed for specifications and predications
alone to get expected probabilities of sufficient magnitude.

276
 Analyzing Subjectivity

TABLE 2. Percentage of Segments for Gloria across Session at Different Levels of Density

Frequencies and Percentage of Segments with:

Speaker 1 3 or more

Specifications Plus Predications

Gloria talking to Rogers 191 (38%) 159 (32%) 92 (18%) 57(11%)
Gloria talking to Perls 164 (47%) 99 (28%) 59 (17%) 30 ( 8%)
Gloria talking to Ellis 93 (53%) 51 (29%) 23 (13%) 8 ( 5%)
Specifications Only
Gloria talking to Rogers 279 (56%) 155 (31%) 65 (13%)
Gloria talking to Perls 220 (62%) 102 (30%) 30 ( 8%)
Gloria talking to Ellis 107 (61%) 52 (30%) 16 ( 9%)
Predications Only
Gloria talking to Rogers 301 (60%) 162 (33%) 36 ( 7%)
Gloria talking to Perls 217 (62%) 119(34%) 16 ( 4%)
Gloria talking to Ellis 140 (80%) 32 (18%) 3(2%)

Note. The total number of Gloria's segments used in calculating percentages are 499 talking
with Rogers, 352 talking with Perls, and 175 talking with Ellis.
"Categories for 2 or 3 or more were collapsed for specifications and predications alone to
get expected probabilities of sufficient magnitude.

using more utterances, relative to the total number
of utterances, with only one score. Overall, it
appears that Perls was different than Rogers and
Ellis—who could not be distinguished from each
other in this analysis—in that his language was
less densely packed with specifications and pre-
dications.
A similar pattern of difference between the
therapists emerged when only specifications were
examined. Significant differences between Perls
and Rogers (x 3 [2, N = 451] = 47.14, p < .0001)
and Perls and Ellis ft2 [2, N = 561] = 84.81,
p < .0001) were again found, although the differ-
ence between Rogers and Ellis was too small to
be statistically significant (\2 [2, N = 446] =
4.74, p > .09). Furthermore, the direction of
difference appears similar. In accomplishing their
communicative goals, Rogers and Ellis distributed
specifications throughout their speech to a greater
degree than did Perls.
The expected pattern of difference also emerged
among the therapists when predications alone were
analyzed. For the first time Ellis and Perls were
not significantly different (x2 [2, N = 561] =
5.18, p > .07) and Ellis and Rogers were sig-
nificantly different (x2 [2, N = 446] = 23.97, p
< .0001). Perls and Rogers were again different
(X2 [2, N = 451] = 45.68, p < .0001). A more
qualitative look reveals that almost half (48%) of
Rogers' segments contained at least one predic-
ation; Perls included at least one predication in
only 22% and Ellis in only 28% of their utterances.
These data suggest that the density with which
Ellis packed his speech with predications (i.e.,
segments where the subjective world of one subject
can be related to the activity of another) was less
than Rogers' and comparatively similar to Perls',
who downplayed psychologically elaborated ut-
terances throughout.
The obtained probability levels for the statis-
tically significant comparisons were quite small.
The average effect size for these comparisons
(M = .113, SD = .037) was slightly larger than
what has been considered a medium effect size
value (i.e., . 10) for contingency tables with more
than 1 degree of freedom (e.g., Cramer's <)>' ranged
from .23 to .39, which corresponds to values
ranging from .05 to .15 on the effect size index
e; see Cohen, 1969, pp. 210-220).
Gloria Compared with Gloria across Sessions
Table 2 compares Gloria's language across the
three different sessions. Gloria with Rogers differed
from Gloria with Ellis (x 2 [2, N = 674] = 23.49,
p < .0001) and Gloria with Ellis differed from Glo-
ria with Perls (x2 [2, AT = 527] = 18.24, p <
.0001) in her use of predications. Gloria with
Perls, however, did not differ in her use of pred-

277
T. S. Essig & R. L. Russell
ications from Gloria with Rogers (\ 2 [2, N =
851] = 2.58, p > .05. Apparently, while talking
to Ellis she used relatively more predications than
while talking to either Rogers or Perls. In addition,
when the total of all scores is considered, Gloria
talking to Rogers was significantly different than
Gloria talking to Ellis tf [3, N = 674] = 15.54,
p < .002), with the major difference apparently
being more segments with no score at all while
talking to Ellis. At the level of specifications alone,
none of ihe comparisons of her language across
sessions achieved significance. The average effect
size (M = .031, SD = .007) associated with the
significant differences in Gloria's speech to the
different therapists was small (e.g., Cramers <)>'
ranged from .152 to .187, which corresponds to
values ranging from .02 to .04 on the effect size
index e, with .05 considered a small effect size).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to introduce the
concept of self-disclosing discourse features and
a coding system that can be applied to psycho-
therapeutic discourse (Essig & Russell, 1988).
Limitations in the intention/introspective access
approach to self-disclosure were noted; specifically,
an inaccurate portrayal of the linguistic processes
involved in one person coming to know and share
in the subjective experience and point of view of
another and an incompatability with the process
of gaining self-knowledge as construed in the psy-
chotherapy literature. Our main contribution is
overcoming those limitations. Previously unstudied
and therapeutically relevant features of how dis-
course operates to disclose therapist and patient
to each other can now be investigated.
In our illustrative study of the Rogers, Perls,
and Ellis demonstration sessions, specific expec-
tations concerning therapist language use were
supported. Positive findings indicated that pre-
dictable patterns in how therapists of different
theoretical orientations represent subjectivity in
discourse can be discerned with these categories.
This replicates, using a different dependent mea-
sure, findings from earlier studies (Hill, Thames
& Rardin, 1979; Meara, Pepinsky, Shannon &
Murray, 1981; Meara, Shannon & Pepinsky, 1979;
Mercier & Johnson, 1984; Shostrom & Riley,
1968; Zimmer & Cowles, 1972). Future studies
will be needed on larger samples of therapists to
see if these findings can be validated.
Our analyses also revealed, however, a striking
departure from previous findings. For example,
278
Hill, Thames & Rardin (1979) compared the verbal
responses of each therapist, including self-disclo-
sure. They reported no difference in the use of
self-disclosure across the three therapists. No
therapist had more than 1% of all his utterances
categorized as self-disclosing. Since the intention/
introspective access approach to self-disclosure
assumes that subjective experience is primarily
revealed through those utterances with an apparent
intent to communicate private experience, these
results suggest a similarity in the degree to which
the experience and point of view of each therapist
was present in the session. In our analysis, at
least 44% of therapist utterances were marked
with a specification or predication, both defined
as self-disclosing discourse features (see Table
1). Our results indicate that all three therapists
use self-disclosing discourse features but that they
differ significantly and in ways consistent with
their different theoretical orientations. Moreover,
these differences were associated with a slightly
larger than medium average effect size. From our
perspective, the negative results concerning self-
disclosure reported by Hill et al. (1979) seems a
result of the limits inherent in the intention/in-
trospective access model.
More specifically, Rogers seemed quite present
throughout the interview, using his experience
and point of view to affirm Gloria's experience
and point of view. Utterances that illustrate this
are "you kind of feel like blaming them for the
feeling you have" or his frequent introduction of
what he thinks by saying "I guess I hear that. . . ."
Ellis' perspective was also quite present throughout
the interview. However, his was an attempt to
instruct, not affirm, subjectivity. Events were typ-
ically made contingent on what was possible or
required for Gloria, rather than on either person's
experience as the evidential basis for what is said.
For example, Ellis frequently says to Gloria things
like "if you really would accept yourself as you
are" or '^rou have to eventually be yourself." Perls'
perspective was least present in the discourse:
Events were not, in comparison to the others,
presented as contingent on experience. The dis-
course he constructed was a challenge to subjec-
tivity, trying to present current happenings as
noncontingent on subjective experience and point
of view. For example, he says to her "You say
you are creative, you laugh, and you giggle, and
you squirm. It is phony." (There is only one score,
a predication of description, in these five seg-
ments!).

Analyses of Gloria's speech suggest that there
are both stable and situationally sensitive features
in the self-disclosing features of her discourse.
The stable stylistic features of Gloria's self-dis-
closing discourse were at the level of specifications
and the variable situationally sensitive features
were at the level of predications. Predications
allow more complex and varied relations between
events and the actors involved in them. This greater
complexity may allow speakers to creatively adjust
their self-disclosing style to the specific demand
characteristics of different discourse situations.
Future research will be needed to see if this pattern
is a general one, especially since the average effect
size associated with significant differences in her
speech was small.
The goal of this study was to select and op-
erationalize features of language that facilitate ac-
cess to the inner world of the participants in ther-
apeutic discourse. The relatively high agreement
between judges suggests that two general classes
of self-disclosing features (i.e., specifications and
predications) have been reliably operationalized.
The replication and the extension of previous find-
ings give theoretical credence to our interpretation
of how the rhetorical devices function. Future
research will need to address several shortcomings
in the present study (e.g., questions concerning
the generalizability and clinical significance of the
findings). However, this system seems to have
both clinical relevance and methodological merit,
and offers psychotherapy researchers a new ap-
proach for analyzing clinical material.
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Appendix A
The following is a list of the eight different
specifications subtypes and a brief description of
multiple specifications. Each subtype includes a
description of the subtype and two examples using
the same basic events.
1. Specification of Intention. The event is
present as an object or goal of the subject's in-
tention, will, or desire or is present as a plan to
perform the action: "He wanted to leave the min-
istry"; "They tried to make it work."
2. Specification of Mode. The event is made
contingent on some notion of necessity or pos-
sibility (includes concepts such as permission,
obligation, verification, etc.): "He can't leave the
ministry"; "They might make it work."
3. Specification of Degree. The truthfulness
or actuality of the subject's participation in the
event is either attenuated or accentuated: "He kind
of left the ministry"; "They really make it work."
4. Specification of Manner. The subject's
evaluation of or perspective toward an event is
represented as being included within the subject's
performance of that event: "He gladly left the
ministry"; "They enthusiastically make it work."
5. Specification ofAspect. The subject's par-
ticipation within the event is presented as ongoing
with respect to the internal temporal organization
of the event: "He is leaving the ministry"; "They
continue to make it work."
6. Specification of Result. The event is rep-
resented as completed from the perspective of the
subject's participation within it: "He finished
leaving the ministry"; "They no longer make it
work."
7. Specification of Initiation. The event is
represented as beginning from the perspective of
the subject's participation within it: "He started
to leave the ministry"; "They began to make it
work."
8. Specification of Duration. A temporal
perspective toward the event is included that is
nonobjective (i.e., not measured by clocks, cal-
endars, etc.): "He never left the ministry"; "They
occassionally make it work."
9. Multiple Specifications. A single segment
can have more than one specification: "He really
tried to leave the ministry." (specifications of degree

and intention); "They must continue to make it
work." (specifications of mode and aspect).
Appendix B
The following is a list of the eight different
predication subtypes including a description of
the subtype and two examples. Also included are
several examples of segments with multiple pre-
dications and with a mix of predications and spec-
ifications. Different basic events will be used in
these examples because of the additional com-
plexity of predications.
1. Predication of Appearance. The subject
of one event is making it seem as though another
event took place or is taking place: "Donna pre-
tended that she loved him"; "The kids played at
being pilots."
2. Predication of Knowlege. The subject of
one event performs some cognitive work to acquire
knowledge or awareness of some other event: "Bill
learned that she didn't love him"; "She remembered
when she was a child."
3. Predication of Description. The subject of
one event performs an act of public description
or behavioral display to transmit knowledge of
an event to another subject: "The candidate told
his supporters that they had helped during the
election"; "His grimace showed her how upset he
was."
4. Predication of Retelling. The subject of
one event performs what is typically an act of
public description or behavioral display that is in
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Analyzing Subjectivity
the form of a direct quotation to transmit knowledge
of an event to another subject: "The candidate
told his supporters, 'We made a good run at it'";
"She said to herself, 'I didn't work hanl enough.'"
5. Predication of Subjectivation. A point of
view or perspective toward an event not located
in the future is formulated: "He thinks he won";
"John believes he is John the Baptist."
6. Predication of Supposition. The subject has
an awareness of, knowledge of, or perspective
toward an event located in the future: "He thinks
he will win"; "He expected Mary to leave the
party."
7. Predication of Attitude. A subject adopts
a perspective toward an event and the content of
that perspective is the result of that event: "John
enjoyed it when he went to the gym for the after-
noon"; "He was confused when she left him."
8. Predication of Entreaty. A subject ex-
presses an intention, wish, or desire that is linked
to the action of some other subject: "My first
doctor wanted me to kill myself"; "I want you to
go to the store."
9. Multiple predications and mixed specifica-
tion/predications. A segment can have multiple
predications: "He thinks that she said that it was
too late" (predications of subjectivation and de-
scription). A segment can also have a mix: "She
occassionaly thinks he studies"; "She thinks he
occassionally studies" (specification of degree in
each of the two possible positions within a pre-
dication of subjectivation).
281