SPE-174009-MS

Retrieval of Misfired Perforating Systems from Shallow Well Operations:

Potential Thermal Cookoff Hazard
Justine M. Davidson, and James M. Barker, Halliburton

Copyright 2015, Society of Petroleum Engineers

This paper was prepared for presentation at the SPE Western Regional Meeting held in Garden Grove, California, USA, 27–30 April 2015.

This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
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Abstract
During perforating operations, the vast majority of perforating runs are executed without issue. It is
possible, however, for misfires to occur. A special case of misfire can result when guns partially fire,
leaving an unknown state of the remaining ballistic train. This type of misfire warrants deeper consid-
eration, particularly for shallow well perforating on wireline. This paper examines how a partially fired
gun can create a potentially hazardous situation based on the mechanism of delayed thermal cookoff.
A relevant scenario for wireline perforating operations is used to simulate the delayed cookoff process.
It begins with the initiation of a portion of the explosive train and the resulting release of heat. This raises
the internal temperature and pressure of the gun, further accelerating thermal decomposition of the
remaining explosive components. This continues to add heat and pressure to the system, potentially
creating a situation of runaway reaction. The outcome of the process during gun retrieval can range from
quiet decomposition to gun burst, depending on the starting conditions and reaction kinetics.
Decomposition calculations and the accompanying pressure response are made using multi-step time
iterations that show the progression of the decomposition process over time. Several factors can affect the
decomposition reaction, such as downhole temperature, the amount of explosives that initially react,
explosive type, and the free air volume inside the gun. For the case of runaway reaction, which can result
in violent gun burst, proper job planning must be considered beforehand to help prevent damage to
equipment and injury to personnel, should the event occur upon retrieval of guns to surface. To help
mitigate risk, it is critical to advantageously use time and cooler temperatures in these situations.
Moreover, to reduce uncertainty, the benefits of taking quantitative surface measurements are discussed.
This paper describes the mechanism for delayed thermal cookoff and its potentially hazardous impact
when retrieving misfired guns. The paper additionally shows how field personnel can determine if it is
occurring at surface. A recommended procedure for retrieving these guns is suggested, which is wholly
consistent with OSHA Process Safety Management.
Background
Many hundreds of wireline perforating operations are performed annually in shallow wells. For the
purposes of this paper, shallow wells considered here are those that are around 2,000ft deep or less, such
that the retrieval time on wireline is relatively fast. The vast majority of these types of perforating jobs
2 SPE-174009-MS

are accomplished without problem: the guns are correctly positioned on depth, the detonator is activated
with the proper firing signal, and the complete ballistic train functions as designed. It is possible, however,
for misfires to occur. The causes are varied, with downhole outcomes ranging from simple no-fires to
unplanned deflagration events of the entire perforating system.
A special case of misfire occurs when guns partially fire downhole, leaving an unknown state of the
remaining ballistic train. This type of scenario warrants deeper consideration because the partial fire may
have generated sufficient internal heat to begin a thermal cookoff process of the remaining explosives
inside the gun, which causes the internal pressure to increase. This is especially important when
perforating shallow wells because the guns can be retrieved quickly on wireline, usually on the order of
5–10 minutes. In this situation, the timing of thermal cookoff may potentially coincide with gun retrieval
to surface, thus exposing personnel to the hazard of an unplanned gun rupture.
To investigate this phenomenon more fully, it is necessary to understand the underlying fundamentals
associated with thermal decomposition of explosives [Economedies 1998, Manelis 2003]. This is a
thermochemical process that releases energy, thereby generating heat and gaseous byproducts. If the heat
generated by decomposition can be balanced by heat dissipation to the surroundings, the explosives will
decompose quietly until none remains. This is sometimes referred to as “slow cookoff.” If, however, the
heat generated by decomposition is not removed quickly enough, then it is possible for the process to
become unstable, and the reaction can accelerate uncontrollably until an explosion occurs. This is
designated as “thermal runaway” or “fast cookoff.”
Eq. 1 shows a general mathematical expression, known as the Frank-Kamenetskii equation [Mader
1979], that is used to describe thermal decomposition for an explosive.
(1)

Where,
␳ ⫽ density
C ⫽ specific heat
T ⫽ temperature
t ⫽ time
Q ⫽ heat released by decomposition
Z ⫽ reaction rate frequency, also called pre-exponential factor
Ea ⫽ activation energy
R ⫽ universal gas constant
␭ ⫽ thermal conductivity
ⵜ2 ⫽ Laplacian operator
The first term on the right-hand side gives the rate of heat generation owing to decomposition. It is an
exponential function of temperature, but the second term describing conductive heat loss is not. Therefore,
as temperature increases, the heat generated by decomposition can quickly dominate, which potentially
leads to a catastrophic explosion. To aggravate the process further, it is possible for the gaseous
byproducts generated by decomposition to serve as catalysts to the reaction, thereby increasing the rate
even more. Moreover, in situations inside confined gun carriers the explosive components are exposed to
the simultaneous effects of temperature and pressure, which may cause the decomposition kinetics to
proceed even faster.
It is notable that the exponential function given in Eq. 1 is reflected in time-temperature curves
published by oil and gas service companies for perforating systems. This relationship appears as a straight
SPE-174009-MS 3

line on a semi-logarithmic graph for each explosive type, as shown in Fig. 1. In this graph the line for each
explosive represents the approximate location of the transition between slow and fast cookoff. The region
below the lines reflects the space of slow decomposition (and correspondingly, proper performance of the
perforating system). Once the lines are exceeded, however, decomposition can proceed uncontrollably.

Figure 1—Time-temperature curves for oilfield explosive systems

This paper will provide a relevant example of how a partially fired gun can create a potentially
hazardous situation based on the mechanism of delayed thermal cookoff. The paper additionally shows
how field personnel can determine if cookoff is occurring at surface and how OSHA Process Safety
Management principles can be used to formulate a plan for retrieving misfired perforating guns.

Methodology

Fig. 2 illustrates the logic of the scenario. The process occurs over multiple steps and begins with the
initiation of a portion of the explosive train and the resulting release of heat. This raises the internal
temperature and pressure of the gun, further contributing to thermal decomposition of unreacted explosive
components. An incubation period is now underway where heat is continually added to the system, and
unless this heat is removed by sufficient conduction and/or convection, the internal temperature and
pressure will continue to rise. Eventually, if the situation remains thermally imbalanced, the process will
progress to a runaway reaction, resulting in gun overpressure and potential burst.
4 SPE-174009-MS

Figure 2—Logic flow

While the detailed physics of the interrelated steps are complex, for the purpose of this paper
simplifying assumptions are made to permit basic, straightforward mathematical calculations that dem-
onstrate the decomposition cycle. These include:
1. A given quantity of explosives initially reacts. The adiabatic flame temperature associated with
this reaction is 3894 K [Cheetah 1998].
2. There is no heat loss to the external surroundings (i.e., heat that is generated stays within the gun.
This is a reasonable assumption for fast cookoff).
3. The decomposition kinetics can be approximated by a series of finite time/cycle increments.
4. Static pressure calculations are used to predict burst.
Using these assumptions, the six-step process illustrated in Fig. 2 is used to calculate gun system
response.
The first step is determining the amount of energy initially released. This is done by using Eq. 2 to
calculate heat.
(2)

Where,
Q ⫽ heat released
m ⫽ mass reacted
H ⫽ heat of explosion
The second step calculates the incubation temperature, Tf, and accounts for the heat absorbed by the
shaped charge cases and unreacted explosives using Eq. 3. The incubation temperature will be updated in
the succeeding time increments to determine additional thermal decomposition.
(3)

Where,
Tf ⫽ incubation temperature
Q ⫽ heat released
mc ⫽ mass of case
Cpc ⫽ specific heat for the case
mu ⫽ mass of unreacted explosives
Cpu ⫽ specific heat for the unreacted explosives
SPE-174009-MS 5

To ⫽ downhole or initial temperature

Step 3 defines the reaction’s thermochemistry. Thermochemistry describes the changes in the chemical
state or composition of molecules. Decomposition is an oxidation reaction, and it is common practice for
energetic compounds that are composed of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen (CHNO) atoms to use
the Kistiakowsky-Wilson rules to determine decomposition products [Akhavan 2011]. These rules assume
that the reactant initially breaks down to its elemental state, which is CxHyNwOz¡xC⫹yH⫹wN⫹zO, and
then recombine to molar amounts of N2, H2O, and CO. For one mole of explosive HMX, cyclotetram-
ethylenetetranitramine, the decomposition reaction is described by:
1. Elemental break down: C4H8N8O8¡4C⫹8H⫹8N⫹8O
2. Kistiakowsky-Wilson rules: 4C⫹8H⫹8N⫹8O¡ 4CO⫹4H2O⫹4N2
The reaction products are critical, as they dictate the number of moles evolved by the reaction which
drives the volume of gas being produced. This is especially significant in a closed vessel such as a
perforating gun.
This brings us to step 4, pressure calculations. After determining the number of moles produced by the
reaction, we can determine the occupied volume using Eq. 4 at the standard conditions of 0°C and 1 atm,
where one mole of gas will occupy 22.4 dm3 or 22,467 cm3/g mole [Akhavan 2011]. Most commonly, the
ideal gas law, PV⫽nRT, is used to calculate pressure, however, for elevated pressure ranges exceeding
10,000 psi, the ideal gas law becomes less accurate. For ballistic applications, the most common equation
of state (EOS) is Eq. 4, the Noble-Able EOS. This modification to the ideal gas law accounts for the
compression that occurs between gas molecules at higher pressures.
(4)

Where,
P ⫽ pressure
V ⫽ free air volume of the vessel
␣ ⫽ covolume of the gas
␻ ⫽ weight of the gas
n ⫽ number of moles of gas
R ⫽ universal gas constant
T ⫽ absolute temperature
The Noble-Able EOS can also be expressed on a molar basis rather than a weight basis, Eq. 5, where
␣ is now represented as an empirical average from experimental data [Cooper 1996].
(5)

Where,
P ⫽ pressure
V ⫽ free air volume of the vessel
n ⫽ number of moles of gas
T ⫽ absolute temperature
The fifth step begins the thermal feedback loop and uses Tf from E q. 3 in conjunction with Eq. 6
[Cooper 1996], which is known as the Arrhenius equation, to determine the additional fraction of
explosive to thermally decompose. This additional amount of decomposition is then fed back into Steps
1 and 2 to begin a new cycle.
6 SPE-174009-MS

(6)

Where,
k ⫽ reaction rate constant
t ⫽ time
A’/A ⫽ ratio of initially reacted vs. unreacted material
Z ⫽ reaction rate frequency, alternately called the pre-exponential factor
Ea ⫽ activation energy
R ⫽ universal gas constant
T ⫽ absolute temperature at each time step
The final step involves stress calculations for the pressurized gun under burst conditions. In this
instance the geometry for the gun tube is cylindrical and the ends are closed by threaded connections. The
external pressure acting on the gun is zero since the gun has been retrieved to surface. The maximum
stresses occur at the inner surface of the gun and are represented by Eq. 7-10:
(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

Where,
␴h ⫽ circumferential stress at inner surface
␴r ⫽ radial stress at inner surface
␴a ⫽ axial stress at inner surface
␴VM ⫽ von Mises stress
Pi ⫽ internal pressure
ro ⫽ outside radius of gun tube
ri ⫽ inside radius of gun tube
rthd ⫽ inside radius of thread relief (represents thinnest cross section of gun and it will be subjected
to the full axial load)
rmid ⫽ midpoint radius between inside radius of gun tube and thread relief, equal to ½(ri ⫹ rthd)
The midpoint radius, rmid, was chosen because the thinnest cross section occurs at the thread relief, but
the length of the thread relief is so short (ca. 0.25-in), that some hoop support will come from the thicker
section of the gun tube.
The three stresses are then combined to give the von Mises stress. Failure of the gun is defined to occur
when the von Mises stress exceeds the yield point of the gun steel at temperature.

Postulated Example
Consider a postulated example where a 4-5/8-in OD x 10-ft long perforating gun containing 50 shaped
charges at 5 shots/ft, is deployed in a shallow well operation on wireline. The total explosive in this gun
system is 2,100 g of HMX; each shaped charge contains 40 g of HMX with approximately 100 g of HMX
in the initiation train (detonator and detonating cord). The downhole temperature is 100 oC, and the
retrieval time is typically around 10 minutes with another 10 minutes or so for handling the gun at surface
SPE-174009-MS 7

afterward. The gun steel is taken to be hot-finished material with a typical yield strength of 122,000 psi
at 100 oC.
It is assumed that a misfire has occurred and 300 g of explosives, the initiation train and five charges,
have deflagrated. The six-step calculation process is then used to predict the response. Table 1 gives the
values of parameters used in the equations and the results for the first time step calculation. Comments
for these steps are:

Table 1—Values of initial decomposition cycle.

(continued on next page.)

8 SPE-174009-MS

Table 1 (Continued)—Values of initial decomposition cycle.

Step 1: The initial heat released from the initiation train and five charges is 1859 kJ. This represents
14.3% decomposition (⫽300/2100 g).
Step 2: The incubation temperature for the unreacted charges inside the gun increases from 100°C to
238°C due to the heat absorbed.
Step 3: The 14.3% decomposed explosive increases the number of moles of gas inside the gun from
0.82 to 12.96 g-moles.
Step 4: The evolved gas inside the gun raises the internal pressure to 205 atm or 3017 psi.
Step 5: The incubation temperature from Step 2, 238°C (⫽511 K) generates an additional 0.06%
decomposition over the next 45 seconds. This is fed back into Steps 1 and 2 to continue the process
for the next 45 second interval.
Step 6: The internal pressure of 3017 psi is used to calculate internal stresses at the thread relief. For
the first time cycle the von Mises stress is 20,852 psi which is well below the yield strength of the
steel.
Table 2 shows the time history of decomposition and gives the percent decomposed and corresponding
incubation temperature and pressure at 45 second intervals. The runaway aspect of the process occurs just
SPE-174009-MS 9

after 23 minutes and is clearly seen in Fig. 3. At this time the gun has already been retrieved to surface
and the pressure has escalated to 18,836 psi giving the following stresses:

Table 2—Time iteration history

Percent initially reacted: 14.3%

Cycle No. Time [Min] Decomposition [%] Temperature [°C] Pressure [psi]

1 0.75 14.3% 238 3017

2 1.50 14.4% 238 3027
3 2.25 14.5% 239 3037
4 3.00 14.5% 239 3047
5 3.75 14.6% 240 3058
6 4.50 14.7% 241 3069
7 5.25 14.7% 241 3080
8 6.00 14.8% 242 3093
9 6.75 14.9% 242 3106
10 7.50 15.0% 243 3119
11 8.25 15.1% 244 3134
12 9.00 15.2% 245 3149
13 9.75 15.3% 245 3165
14 10.50 15.4% 246 3182
15 11.25 15.5% 247 3200
16 12.00 15.6% 248 3220
17 12.75 15.8% 249 3241
18 13.50 15.9% 250 3265
19 14.25 16.1% 252 3290
20 15.00 16.3% 253 3318
21 15.75 16.5% 254 3349
22 16.50 16.7% 256 3385
23 17.25 17.0% 258 3425
24 18.00 17.4% 261 3472
25 18.75 17.8% 263 3528
26 19.50 18.4% 267 3597
27 20.25 19.1% 271 3686
28 21.00 20.3% 277 3809
29 21.75 22.7% 287 4001
30 22.50 31.2% 306 4374
31 23.25 100% 1477 18836
10 SPE-174009-MS

Figure 3—Decomposition vs. Elapsed Time.

The von Mises equivalent stress is 130,184 psi, which exceeds the yield strength of the material,
122,000 psi. Thus, in the postulated example, the gun would have ruptured.
In support of the postulated example, Fig. 4 is a photograph of a gun system that has undergone burst
owing to fast cookoff conditions. The failure occurred at the thread relief.
SPE-174009-MS 11

Figure 4 —Gun system that has burst owing to thermal decomposition.

Finally, it should be recognized that if one of the initial conditions is changed, such as the downhole
temperature or the quantity of explosives that initially react, the decomposition kinetics change signifi-
cantly, as shown in Fig. 5.

Figure 5—Reaction examples having various initial conditions.

12 SPE-174009-MS

The outcomes span the entire range of thermal response from quiet decomposition to runaway reaction
in less than three minutes.
Recommended Practices for Field Operations
As the preceding example illustrates, misfired guns are filled with uncertainty. Nonetheless, retrieval
operations must begin at some point, and this activity has to be done safely. To aid in this operation, it
is recommended that methodologies, such as Process Safety Management (PSM), be used to create a
planned response [OSHA 1910.119]. Some key elements from PSM include:
Process Hazard Analysis: identifies worst-case scenarios and allows for a quantitative risk assessment.
● Operating Procedures: maintain consistency and provide clear and concise instruction to the
operator.
● Training: creates subject-matter experts who are comfortable and knowledgeable with the pro-
cesses they perform.
● Pre-Startup Safety Review: documents that all of the proper checks, equipment, and other
requirements have been completed before starting a task.
● Management of Change: allows for responsible flexibility to the situation as it changes.
● Emergency Planning and Response: establishes a pre-planned set of actions that are used as a
response to an incident.
While all of these elements are important and warrant full consideration when developing individual
company plans, the remainder of this paper will concentrate on emergency planning and response for the
wellsite when retrieving misfired guns. Fig. 6 is a flow chart that describes one such process. Using this
procedure the first step in emergency planning and response for a misfire would be the for the explosive
user-in-charge to identify the last firing attempt and then start a safety standdown for a minimum wait time
of 30 minutes. During this period several things should be initiated:

Figure 6 —Procedure Logic Flow Diagram for Retrieving Misfired Perforating Gun
SPE-174009-MS 13

1. Raise the gun to a region of cooler temperature, typically 200-ft (61-m) below the surface or
seafloor,
2. conduct a tailgate safety meeting to inform personnel of the situation,
3. refresh all parties with the misfire procedure,
4. identify the laydown area for the gun, and
5. obtain other necessary items such as an infrared thermometer that will be needed for the retrieval
process.
It is important that relevant personnel have been trained on the proper measurement techniques for the
infrared thermometer, such as avoiding scallops or reflective areas and taking measurements at the same
place on the gun body to ensure consistency.
After the 30-min wait time has elapsed, the gun should be retrieved to surface and then a short section
be exposed to permit temperature measurement. The presence of a lubricator or wellhead should be used
to keep the rest of the gun covered while the temperature measurement is being made. Up to four
measurements are taken:
T1: this is a baseline temperature. If it is above a predetermined value, the gun is lowered back into the
well to the 200-ft (61-m) depth for the next 24 hours. A suggested critical temperature is 225°F. This is
100°F lower than the 1-hr rating for RDX perforating systems. If the gun temperature is above this level
after having resided in a cooler region of the wellbore during the 30-min standdown time, then it could
be an indication that thermal cookoff is actively underway. (Certainly the critical temperature should be
lower if using explosives less thermally stable than RDX, such as PETN).
T2: this temperature is taken 15-min after T1.
T3: this temperature is taken 15-min after T2. If T3 is less than T2, then the measurements indicate the
gun is cooling and the risk of thermal cookoff has abated. At this stage the gun can be removed from the
wellbore/lubricator and disarmed. It is important to remember that there may still be trapped pressure
inside the gun due to the misfire. If, however, T3 is greater than T2, delayed thermal cookoff may be
underway and the gun should be lowered to 200-ft (61-m) for two additional hours.
T4: this temperature is taken after the two-hour wait period. If T4 is less than T3, the gun can be
removed and disarmed. If T4 is greater than T3, this indicates an abnormal condition and the gun should
be returned to 200-ft (61-m) for 24-hr.
The time period of 24-hr is chosen as a safe maximum time based on experience in the oilfield
explosives industry. The hazard due to thermal cookoff is over, provided, of course, that the temperature
at the 200-ft (61-m) depth is truly “cool”. This would not apply in special cases such as when perforating
steam wells. Also, other recognized hazards such as the ␤¡␦ HMX phase transition may still need to be
considered when handling guns at surface [Gessel 1994].
Summary
The following conclusions are a result of this work:
● Misfires with perforating guns do occur in the field. A special case of misfire occurs when guns
partially fire downhole, leaving an unknown state of the remaining ballistic train. This type of
scenario warrants deeper consideration because the partial fire may have generated sufficient
internal heat to begin a thermal cookoff process of the remaining explosives inside the gun.
● The thermal cookoff process is exponentially driven by temperature. The decomposing explosives
generate additional heat, which continues to drive the temperature further. If there is insufficient
time for the heat to be removed by conduction and convection, the cookoff process will eventually
accelerate to a runaway reaction.
● The thermal cookoff process causes the internal pressure of the gun to increase. This is especially
important when perforating shallow wells because the guns can be retrieved quickly on wireline.
14 SPE-174009-MS

In this situation, the timing of runaway thermal cookoff may coincide with gun retrieval to surface,
thus exposing personnel to the hazard of an unplanned gun rupture.
● The incubation period of thermal cookoff creates a false sense of security when retrieving misfired
guns. This is actually the time that Process Safety Management actions stemming from emergency
planning and response should be employed. The retrieval process should include:
– Implementing a minimum wait period of 30 minutes with the gun positioned in a cooler portion
of the wellbore.
– Taking temperature measurements at fixed time intervals to reduce uncertainty for decision
making.
– Using additional time and cooler temperature as needed to further mitigate the decomposition
process.
Future Work
The authors recommend that future studies be continued to add to the body of knowledge regarding
thermal cookoff of misfired perforating guns. These include:
1. Incorporating the effects of conduction and convection to the perforating gun.
2. The decomposition kinetics of other explosive systems: RDX, HNS, and PYX.
3. The cookoff process under a slow retrieval process, such as that which would occur with
tubing-conveyed perforating.

Acknowledgments
The authors thank Halliburton for permission to publish this paper. The authors also acknowledge the
technical contributions and field operations insight provided by Thomas Burky, Eric Robey, Gary
Craddock, Bill Dillon, and Richard Housden from Halliburton.

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