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Samnite Wars

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The First, Second, and Third Samnite Wars (343–341 BC, 326–304 BC and 298–290 BC) were fought
between the Roman Republic and the Samnites, who lived on a stretch of the Apennine Mountains to
the south of Rome and the north of the Lucanians. The first of these wars was the result of Rome's
intervening to rescue the Campanian city of Capuafrom a Samnite attack. The second one was the result
of Rome's intervention in the politics of the city of Naples and developed into a contest over the control
of much of central and southern Italy. The third war also involved a struggle over the control of this part
of Italy. The wars extended over half a century and the peoples to the east, north and west
of Samnium (land of the Samnites) as well as the peoples of central Italy north of Rome (the Etruscans,
Umbrians and Picenti) and the Senone Gauls got involved to various degrees and at various points in
time. The Samnites were one of early Rome's most formidable rivals.

Samnite Wars

Map showing expansion of Roman sphere of influence from the Latin War (340–338 BC) to the defeat of
the Insubres (222 BC)Date

1st: 343–341 BC2nd: 326–304 BC3rd: 298–290 BC

Location
Central Italy and parts of southern Italy

ResultRoman control over much of central Italy and part of southern Italy (the modern regions of Lazio,
Abruzzo, Molise, Campania and Basilicata and Northern Apulia)BelligerentsRoman Republic, Latin allies,
CampaniansSamnites, Aequi, some Hernici, Etruscans, Umbrians, Senone Gauls, some northern Apulian
towns

Background

First Samnite War (343 to 341 BC)Edit

Livy is the only preserved source to give a continuous account of the war which has become known in
modern historiography as the First Samnite War. In addition, the Fasti Triumphales records two Roman
triumphs dating to this war and some of the events described by Livy are also mentioned by other
ancient writers.

OutbreakEditLivy's accountEdit

According to Livy, the First Samnite War started not because of any enmity between Rome and the
Samnites, but due to outside events.[3]The spark came when the Samnites without provocation
attacked the Sidicini,[4] a tribe living north of Campania with their chief settlement at Teanum
Sidicinum.[5] Unable to stand against the Samnites, the Sidicini sought help from the Campanians.
[6] However, Livy continues, the Samnites defeated the Campanians in a battle in Sidicine territory and
then turned their attention toward Campania. First they seized the Tifata hills overlooking Capua (the
main Campanian city) and, having left a strong force to hold them, marched into the plain between the
hills and Capua.[7] There they defeated the Campanians in a second battle and drove them within their
walls. This compelled the Campanians to ask Rome for help.[8]

At Rome, the Campanian ambassadors were admitted to an audience with the Senate. In a speech, they
proposed an alliance between Rome and the Campanians, noting how the Campanians with their
famous wealth could be of aid to the Romans, and that they could help to subdue the Volsci, who were
enemies of Rome. They pointed out that nothing in Rome's treaty with the Samnites prevented them
from also making a treaty with the Campanians, and warning that if they did not, the Samnites would
conquer Campania and its strength would be added to the Samnites' instead of to the Romans'.[9]After
discussing this proposal, the senate concluded that while there was much to be gained from a treaty
with the Campanians, and that this fertile area could become Rome's granary, Rome could not ally with
them and still be considered loyal to their existing treaty with the Samnites, and for this reason they had
to refuse the proposal.[10] After being informed of Rome's refusal, the Campanian embassy, in
accordance with their instructions, surrendered the people of Campania and the city of Capua
unconditionally into the power of Rome.[11] Moved by this surrender, the Senators resolved that
Rome's honour now required that the Campanians and Capua, who by their surrender had become the
possession of Rome, be protected from Samnite attacks.[12]

Envoys were sent to the Samnites with the introductions to request that they, in view of their mutual
friendship with Rome, spare territory which had become the possession of Rome and, if this was not
heeded, to warn them to keep their hands off the city of Capua and the territory of Campania.[13] The
envoys delivered their message as instructed to the Samnites' national assembly. They were met with a
defiant response, "not only did the Samnites declare their intention of waging war against Capua, but
their magistrates left the council chamber, and in tones loud enough for the envoys to hear, ordered
[their armies] to march out at once into Campanian territory and ravage it."[14] When this news
reached Rome, the fetials were sent to demand redress, and when this was refused Rome declared war
against the Samnites.[15]

Modern viewsEdit

The historical accuracy of Livy's account is disputed among modern historians. They are willing to accept
that while Livy might have simplified the way in which the Sidicini, Campani and Samnites came to be at
war, his narrative is here, at least in outline, historical.[16][17][18][19] The Sidicini's stronghold at
Teanum controlled an important regional crossroads, which would have provided the Samnites with a
motive for conquest.[20][5][19]The First Samnite War might have started quite by accident, as Livy
claimed. The Sidicini were located on the Samnite river side of the Liris, and while the Roman-Samnite
treaty might only have dealt with the middle Liris, not the lower, Rome does not appear to have been
overly concerned for the fate of the Sidicini. The Samnites could therefore go to war with Sidicini
without fear of Roman involvement. It was only the unforeseen involvement of the Campani that
brought in the Romans.[16]
Many historians have however had difficulty accepting the historicity of the Campanian embassy to
Rome, in particular whether Livy was correct in describing the Campani as surrendering themselves
unconditionally into Roman possession.[21][17][18] That Capua and Rome were allied in 343 is less
controversial, as such a relationship underpins the whole First Samnite War.[22]

Historians have noted the similarities between the events leading to the First Samnite War and events
which according to Thucydides caused the Peloponnesian War,[23] but there are differences as well.
[24] It is clear that Livy, or his sources, has consciously modelled the Campanian embassy after the
"Corcyrean debate" in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War.[18][25] There are many parallels
between the speech given by the Campanian ambassador to the Roman senate in Livy and the speech of
the Corcyrean ambassador to the Athenian assembly in Thucydides. But while Thucydides's Athenians
debate the Corcyreans' proposal in pragmatic terms, Livy's senators decide to reject the Campanian
alliance based on moral arguments.[18][25] Livy might well have intended his literary educated readers
to pick up this contrast.[18] The exaggerated misery of the surrendering Campani contrast with the
Campanian arrogance, a stock motif in ancient Roman literature.[26] It is also unlikely that Livy's
description of the Samnite assembly is based on any authentic sources.[27] However it does not
necessarily follow that because the speeches are invented, a standard feature in ancient historians, the
Campanian surrender must be invented as well.[22]

The chief difficulty lies in how rich Capua in 343 can have been reduced to such dire straits by the
Samnites that the Campani were willing to surrender everything to Rome.[22]During the Second Punic
War (218 to 201 BC) Capua famously sided with Carthage, but after a lengthy siege she had to surrender
unconditionally in 211 BC, after which the Capuans were harshly punished by Rome. Salmon (1967,
p. 197) therefore held that the Campanian surrender in 343 is a retrojection by later Roman historians.
This invention would serve the double purpose of exonerating Rome from treaty-breaking in 343 and
justifying the punishment handed out in 211. What Rome agreed to in 343 was an alliance on terms
similar to the treaties she had with the Latins and the Hernici. Cornell (1995, p. 347) accepts the
surrender as historical. Studies have shown that voluntary submission by one party was a common
feature in the diplomacy of this period. Likewise Oakley (1998, pp. 286–9) does not believe the
surrender of 343 to be a retrojection, not finding many similarities between the events of 343 and 211.
The ancient historians record many later instances, whose historicity are not doubted, where a state
appealed to Rome for assistance in war against a stronger enemy. The historical evidence shows the
Romans considered such supplicants to have technically the same status as surrendered enemies, but in
practice Rome would not want to abuse would-be allies. Forsythe (2005, p. 287), like Salmon, argues
that the surrender in 343 is a retrojection of that of 211, invented to better justify Roman actions and
for good measure shift the guilt for the First Samnite War onto the manipulative Campani.
Livy portrays the Romans as selflessly assuming the burden of defending the Campani, but this is a
common theme in Roman republican histories, whose authors wished to show that Rome's wars had
been just. Military success was the chief road to prestige and glory among the highly competitive Roman
aristocracy. Evidence from later, more well documented time periods shows a Roman senate quite
capable of manipulating diplomatic circumstances so as to provide just cause for an expansionary war.
There is no reason to believe this was not also the case in the second half of the 4th century.[28] There
are also recorded examples of Rome rejecting appeals for help, implying that the Romans in 343 had the
choice of rejecting the Campani.[5]

Three Roman victoriesEdit

Samnite soldiers from a tomb frieze in Nola 4th century BC

According to Livy, the two Roman consuls for 343, Marcus Valerius Corvus and Aulus Cornelius Cossus,
both marched with armies against the Samnites. Valerius led his army into Campania and Cornelius his
into Samnium where he camped at Saticula.[29] Livy then goes on to narrate how Rome won three
different battles against the Samnites. Valerius won the first battle, fought at Mount
Gaurus near Cumae, only after a last desperate charge in fading daylight finally routed the Samnites
after a day of hard fighting.[30] The second battlealmost ended in disaster for the Romans when the
Samnites attempted to trap the other consul, Cornelius Cossus, and his army in a mountain pass.
Fortunately for them, one of Cornelius' military tribunes, Publius Decius Mus was able to lead a small
detachment to seize a hilltop, distracting the Samnites and allowing the Roman army to escape the trap.
Decius and his men slipped away to safety during the night, the morning after the unprepared Samnites
were attacked and defeated by the Romans.[31] Still determined to seize victory, the Samnites collected
their forces and laid siege to Suessula at the eastern edge of Campania. Leaving his baggage behind,
Marcus Valerius took his army by forced marches to Suessula. Low on supplies, and underestimating the
size of the Roman army, the Samnites scattered their army to forage for food. This gave Valerius the
opportunity to win a third Roman victory when he first captured the Samnites' lightly defended camp
and then scattered their foragers.[32]These Roman successes against the Samnites convinced Falerii to
convert her forty year's truce with Rome into a permanent peace treaty, and the Latins to abandon their
planned war against Rome and instead campaign against the Paeligni. The friendly city-state
of Carthage sent a congratulatory embassy to Rome with a twenty-five pound crown for the Temple of
Jupiter Optimus Maximus. Both consuls then celebrated triumphs over the Samnites.[33] The Fasti
Triumphales records that Valerius and Cornelius celebrated their triumphs over the Samnites on 21
September and 22 September respectively.[34]

Modern historians have doubted the historical accuracy of Livy's description of these three battles. Livy's
battle-scenes for this time period are mostly free reconstructions by him and his sources, and there are
no reasons why these should be different.[35] The number of Samnites killed and the amounts of spoils
taken by the Romans have clearly been exaggerated.[36] Historians have noted the many similarities
between the story of Publius Decius Mus, and an event said to have taken place on Sicily in 258 when
the Romans were fighting the First Punic War against Carthage. According to the ancient sources, a
Roman army was in danger of being trapped in a defile when a military tribune led a detachment of 300
men to seize a hilltop in the middle of the enemy. The Roman army escaped, but of the 300 only the
tribune survived. It is unlikely that this latter, in ancient times more famous, episode has not influenced
the descriptions of the former.[37]

Salmon(1967) also found several other similarities between the campaigns of 343 and later events which
he considered to be doublets. Both the First and the Second Samnite War starts with an invasion of
Samnium by a Cornelius, the way in which a Roman army was led into a trap resembles the famous
disaster at the Caudine Forks in 321, and there are similarities to the campaigns of Publius Cornelius
Arvina in 306 and Publius Decius Mus (the son of the hero of Saticula) in 297. He also thought Valerius
Corvus' two Campanian victories could be doublets of Roman operations against Hannibal in the same
area in 215[38]On the other hand, the entries in the Fasti Triumphales supports some measure of
Roman success. In Salmon's reconstruction therefore there was only one battle in 343, perhaps fought
on the outskirts of Capua near the shrine of Juno Gaura, and ending with a narrow Roman victory.[39]

Oakley(1998) dismisses these claims of doublets and inclines towards believing there were three battles.
The Samnites would have gained significant ground in Campania by the time the Romans arrived and
Valerius' two victories could be the outcome of twin Samnite attacks on Capua and Cumae. And while
Samnite ambushes are somewhat of a stock motif in Livy's narrative of the Samnite wars, this might
simply reflect the mountainous terrain in which these wars were fought.[40] The story of Decius as
preserved has been patterned after that of the military tribune of 258, but Decius could still have
performed some heroic act in 343, the memory of which became the origin of the later embellished tale.
[41]

Forsythe(2005) considers the episode with Cornelius Cossus and Decius Mus to have been invented, in
part to foreshadow Decius' sacrifice in 340. P. Decius might have performed some heroic act which then
enabled him to become the first of his family to reach the consulship in 340, but if so no detail of the
historical event survives. Instead later annalists have combined the disaster at the Caudine Forks with
the tale of the military tribune of 258 to produce the entirely fictitious story recorded by Livy, the
difference being that while in the originals the Romans suffered defeat and death, here none of Decius'
men are killed and the Romans win a great victory.[42]