Ryan Vlcko Roman History from 200 80 B.C.

Essay #2

WAS THE HANNIBALIC WAR A WAR AGAINST A MARAUDING GENERAL, A RIVAL STATE, OR REBELLIOUS TERRITORY?

It is a fascinating question to consider who the real enemy of Rome was during the Second Punic War, or, as it will be referred to here, the Hannibalic War. When one looks at the causes of the war, one can see that, according to Polybius, there are two major entities who are possessed with hatred towards Rome, namely the Barcids and the Carthaginian people. However, one can see that during his campaign in Italy, Hannibal received aid from various peoples other than Carthaginians. The main question of who Romes enemies were during the Hannibalic War will be confined to an inquiry into three entities: 1) the Barcids, and mostly Hannibal himself, 2) Carthage, and 3) the people assumed to be under Romes dominion. I. THE BARCIDS AND CARTHAGE Using Polybius to trace Barcid hatred for Rome, one can see plainly that it goes back at least to Hamilcar, Hannibals father and a Carthaginian general during the First Punic War. Both Polybius and Livy give an account of why Hamilcar despised the Romans. He conducted military operations in Sicily during the First Punic War, and he believed that the Carthaginians had ordered him to surrender Sicily far too easily and prematurely. In addition, he was deeply angered by the unjust Roman seizure of Sardinia, taking advantage of the weak state of the Carthaginians. What is important is that Polybius claims Hamilcar, who was given control of the Carthaginian forces in Iberia, had such a deep seated hatred for Rome that he planned for a long time on a second war. Polybius writes that Hamilcar conquered Iberia in order to use it as a base of operations against Rome (3.10). In addition to this, he passed his hatred to his son, Hannibal, making him swear an oath never to be friends with Rome. Hannibals contemptuous attitude towards the Romans is sufficient evidence of his hatred. After he took control of Carthaginian military operations in Iberia, and he won several decisive battles, the only obstacle to his complete control of the Iberian Penninsula south of the river Erbo was Saguntum. The Romans warned him not to attack Saguntum, but he ignored this and captured the city. As a result, Rome declared war on Carthage. The question arises as to how much support Hamilcar first, and then Hannibal, received from Carthage, and how many people knew of their aims at a second war with Rome. Livy describes the Barcids as a political party who had the support of the majority of the populous, their main opponents being an anti-Barca faction within the nobility (21.3). He quotes a speech by Hanno, the leader of the anti-Barca party, saying that they were in essence hereditary commanders of the military, not by law,

but by popular support (21.3). Long before he was of age, it was assumed that Hannibal would eventually take control of the Carthaginian military forces, and he was exposed at an early age to war, as Livys account of the debate in the Carthaginian Senate highlights (21.3). In addition, Carthage certainly could have prevented the transport of Libyan troops to Hannibal in Iberia during the winter when he was preparing for war with Rome1. And there is also the obvious fact that when Rome sent an envoy to Carthage to give them a choice between either giving them Hannibal or going to war, Carthage chose to go to war. One could argue that Carthage was compelled into war by Hannibal, who never disclosed that his true purpose in Iberia was to use it as a base of operations against Rome, and who attacked Saguntum without Carthaginian approval, knowing that it would cause war with Rome. And after he had accomplished all these things, he had so much control over Iberia and the military that the Carthaginians feared what he might do if they were to attempt to hand him over to the Romans. There are several reasons why this is not likely to be true. There are good reasons to believe that the Carthaginians despised Rome long before Hannibal took command of the military. Polybius writes that the Carthaginians shared in Hamilcars bitterness over the loss of Sicily and the great naval defeat Rome won over them2. In addition, they were angry at Romes unjust seizure of Sardinia at a time when they were in no position to resist. Moreover, Polybius writes that before he attacked Saguntum, Hannibal sent word to Carthage informing them of Romes warning not to touch Saguntum, and he asked for instructions on how to act (3.15). This is made more plausible when one looks at the fact that it was the Carthaginian Senate, not Hannibal, who debated whether he should abandon his campaign in Italy and return to Carthage after Scipio Africanus destroyed the armies of Syphax and Hasdrubal. With these things in mind, one must view the Carthaginian reaction to Hannibals success in Iberia the same way that Polybius describes it, namely, as encouragement to avenge their losses to Rome. II. REBELLIOUS TERRITORIES Polybius does not mention any instance where Carthage sent supplies or reinforcements to Hannibal during his campaign in Italy. In fact, he did not even
1 2

See Polybius Book 3, Chapter 33. See Book 3.

have access to any harbors in Italy. Therefore one must ask where he received his troops and his supplies. The obvious answer to this question is that the territory under Romes dominion contributed to the Carthaginians at every stage of the Hannibalic War. It is safe to say that the people Polybius refers to as the Celts, who inhabited Cisalpine Gaul, gave Hannibal the most help of anyone south of the Alps. In the beginning of the war, the Celts assisted Hannibal in crossing the Alpine Mountains. Many of them were captured by Scipio and forced to fight for the Roman army, but Polybius relates the story of how they killed many Romans at night and defected to Hannibals army. In addition, they recruited other Celts to fight after being sent to their homes by Hannibal for this purpose. The exact number who fought for Hannibal is not clear, but there were many of them, and they bore large casualties in the battles, as Polybius mentions on several occasions. For it was Hannibals policy to put the Celts on the front line, realizing that they were more expendable than his Iberian and Libyan troops. If one were to question whether Cisalpine Gaul was considered a Roman territory at that point in history, it seems that at least the Romans themselves thought so, because they established two colonies thereCremona and Placentia. Romes Italian allies, however, offered no such assistance to Hannibal for years, until he had dealt his greatest blow to Roman hegemony at the battle of Cannae. Even then, they remained for the most part neutral in the war, contributing hardly anything to Hannibals forces. Capua was the first ally to defect to Hannibal, and the one who proved to be the biggest annoyance to Rome. According to Livy, the agreement reached between the Campanians and Hannibal was that they should be autonomous and not be compelled to pay tribute or contribute soldiers to the Carthaginians, except for their cavalry who were stationed in Sicily. In this respect Capua helped Hannibal insofar as it ceased to help Rome. But the Campanians did even more damage when Rome tried to reassert her rule over Capua. The Campanians resisted and the result was a siege that drew away from Roman resources at a critical time. Another city in Italy that rebelled from Roman rule was Tarentum. For clearly, though Hannibal took the city by force, the inhabitants, once the Roman garrison was isolated, were determined to remain independent of Rome. But Tarentum also did not contribute anything to Hannibals forces, and in the end the city was more of

a distraction than anything else, due to Hannibals unsuccessful attempts to gain control of her harbor. It should be mentioned also that Etruria fell into unrest late in the war, but Van Son makes a good case that this was due to religious reasons rather than any sympathy for Hannibal. Other than the Celts and these and a few other cities, the Romans had remarkably loyal allies. This was a source of great strength for them, and it hindered Hannibals main purpose in Italy, which was not so much to capture Rome right awaysince this was not possiblebut rather to first to dissolve Roman hegemony in Italy, as Erskine asserts. And in the end, Rome managed to gather enough allies to defeat the Carthaginians first in Iberia, then in Africa. III. CONCLUSION It is clear that Hannibal, with all the hatred his father passed down to him, waged war on Rome with the approval and support of the Carthaginian people. In addition, the Celts occupying Cisalpine Gaul gave him necessary local support in fighting the Roman legions in Italy. Among the territory under Roman dominion, Tarentum, along with some other Greek cities (i.e. Syracuse), and Capua asserted their independence, thus strengthening Hannibals efforts. Even so, with all these things against them, it is truly remarkable that Rome was able to prevail in the end and even to emerge stronger and conquer the entire Mediterranean world.