Professional Documents
Culture Documents
a trajectory unchanged
RAJESH BASRUR
7
Rahul Mukherji, Globalization and deregulation: ideas, interests and institutional change (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2014), pp. 63–107.
8
Chris Ogden, Hindu nationalism and the evolution of contemporary Indian security (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2014); Sumit Ganguly, Hindu nationalism and the foreign policy of India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (Washington
DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2015).
9
Ian Hall, ‘Multialignment and Indian foreign policy under Narendra Modi’, Round Table 105: 3, 2016, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2016.1180760; Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash
Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan, Nonalignment 2.0 (New
Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012); M. K. Narayanan, ‘Non-alignment to multi-alignment’, Hindu,
5 Jan. 2016, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indian-diplomacy-nonalignment-to-multialignment/
article8065319.ece?homepage=true.
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International Affairs 93: 1, 2017
Building capability
India’s GDP has grown rapidly since the turn to liberalization—rising from
$274.84 billion in 1991 to $2.07 trillion in 2015.36 Consequently, it has been able to
raise its aggregate military spending sharply without undue stress on its resources.
Indian military spending, which in 1998 stood at US$13.95 billion, rose thereafter
to a hefty US$42.95 billion in 2015, with India topping the list of global arms
importers for the period 2010–2014.37 During the Cold War, it had been heavily
dependent on the Soviet Union for weapons; more recently, it has attempted to
balance its purchases so as to avoid dependence. Contrary to popular belief, Russia
still accounts for the largest proportion of Indian arms imports, accounting for
69.8 per cent during 2010–2014.38 However, the balance is shifting: the United
States is now a major source of contracted orders, though Russia is by no means
out of the running. In August 2014, Defence Minister Arun Jaitley told the Lok
Sabha that over the preceding three years, the United States had overtaken Russia
as the largest supplier of weapon systems to India, accounting for nearly 40 per
cent of contracted imports, with Russia trailing at 30 per cent, followed by France
at 14 per cent.39 But late December 2015 saw a Russian comeback, with agree-
35
Satish Kumar, S. D. Pradhan, Kanwal Sibal, Rahul Bedi and Bidisha Ganguly, India’s strategic partners: a compar-
ative assessment (New Delhi: Foundation for National Security Research, Nov. 2011), http://fnsr.org/files/
Indias_Strategic.pdf.
36
World Bank, National Accounts Data, and OECD national accounts data files, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
37
For 1998 spending, see International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The military balance, 2000–01 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 299 (constant 1999 prices); for 2015 spending, see IISS, The military balance,
2016 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 486 (current prices); for import ranking, see Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2015 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
38
SIPRI Yearbook 2015, p. 420.
39
Ramananda Sengupta, ‘How America replaced Russia as India’s largest arms supplier’, Swarajya, 27 Sept.
2015, http://swarajyamag.com/politics/how-america-replaced-russia-as-indias-largest-arms-supplier/. This
appears to refer to commitments rather than actual transfers.
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Networking
India has built close security relationships between itself and all its major strategic
partners, while also engaging with China. Bilaterally, it has signed security cooper-
ation agreements, established security dialogues and engaged in joint military
exercises with the United States, Russia and Japan. The relationships with the US
and Japan are clearly a response to the rise of China, though policy-makers are
predictably chary of saying as much. In August 2016, India and the US signed a path-
breaking Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that enables
the two countries to provide logistics support, including berthing and refuelling,
to each other’s warships and military aircraft.41 In September 2015, the strategic
dialogue between India, Japan and the United States was raised to the ministerial
level.42 After blowing hot and cold on the issue during the Singh regime, India
under Modi revived the trilateral Malabar naval exercise with the US and Japan in
October 2015. Does this mark the beginnings of a new ‘triple alliance’?43 That is
an overstatement. But there appears to be an objective of creating an environment
in which, to quote an Indian expert on Japan, major democracies try to ‘shape
China’s rise in a peaceful way’.44 This is one area in which Modi’s policy has been
somewhat different: he appears less inclined to worry about China’s reaction to
the emerging entente than was Manmohan Singh.
India’s relations with Russia might seem to be cooling, especially given the shift
in India’s arms purchasing pattern and Russia’s decision to sell arms to Pakistan.
But India has been careful not to support sanctions against Moscow or even to
40
‘Indian and Russian leaders praise partnership’, BBC News, 20 Dec. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-india-35178225.
41
Rajat Pandit, ‘Indian bases to open doors to US warships, planes’, Times of India, 13 April 2016, http://timesof‑
india.indiatimes.com/india/Indian-bases-to-open-doors-to-US-warships-planes/articleshow/51802543.cms.
42
‘India–US–Japan trilateral talks raised to foreign min-level’, Times of India, 24 Sept. 2015, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/India-US-Japan-trilateral-talks-raised-to-foreign-min-level/articleshow/49071236.cms.
43
Daniel Twining, ‘Asia’s new Triple Alliance’, Foreign Policy, 24 Feb. 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/24/
asias-emerging-triple-alliance-india-china-japan-modi-obama/. A strong case for a balancing linkage between
the three states vis-à-vis China is made in Satoru Nagao, ‘Japan, the United States, and India as key balancers
in Asia’ (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d. [2015]), https://www.csis.org/
programs/japan-chair/strategic-japan-working-papers.
44
Dinakar Peri, ‘“India, Japan and US can shape China’s peaceful rise”’, Hindu, 22 July 2015, http://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/india-japan-and-us-can-shape-chinas-peaceful-rise/article7449033.ece.
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Avoiding dependence
The diversification of arms imports is one dimension of India’s preference for opti-
mizing its strategic autonomy. Another is visible in the nature of military coop-
eration. Despite the rapid growth in defence cooperation with the United States,
India has been careful about signing ‘foundational agreements’ which would
strengthen military cooperation with America. Like Singh before him, Modi has
been cautious about inking the Communications and Information Security Agree-
ment and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on geospatial
intelligence, both of which are still pending at the time of writing (October 2016).
With regard to logistics, the finalization of LEMOA in August 2016, noted earlier,
took place after prolonged negotiations. Reasons for this hesitancy include linger-
ing suspicions that the United States might somehow gain undue advantage over
India (for instance, by means of intrusive intelligence operations).48 More broadly,
Indian policy-makers are acutely aware that dependence on the United States has
had unwelcome effects on some critical policies. India’s once close relationship with
Iran has been eroded by American pressure: India has had perforce to reduce its
purchases of oil and gas from Iran, and has for all practical purposes dropped out
of the Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline project. From India’s standpoint, the situation
has changed for the better with the signing of a nuclear deal between the US and
Iran, but New Delhi remains conscious of its vulnerability to American pressure.
Concerns about the possible undesirable effects of American dominance remain.49
These anxieties underlie India’s periodically expressed preference for a ‘polycentric’
global order, within which its relationship with Russia is—and is likely to remain—
an important component.50 France, too, plays a significant role. As noted above, it
is a major arms supplier. The invitation extended to François Hollande to be the
chief guest at India’s January 2016 Republic Day parade, an important symbolic
event, was the fifth such occasion on which this honour had been extended to a
French president, the highest for any country. A French troop contingent was also
invited to participate in the parade; this again was unprecedented.
Avoiding entanglement
Like virtually all parties to strategic partnerships, India is careful to avoid being
dragged into the security disputes of its partners. On Taiwan, which has long
been a major issue for the United States, India continues to keep a diplomatic
distance and does not take an anti-Chinese stance. Similarly, while occasionally
critical of North Korea, India does not involve itself in that country’s tensions
48
Narayan Lakshman, ‘Foundational agreements won’t compromise India’s security: US’, Hindu, 16 May 2015,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/foundational-agreements-wontcompromise-indias-security-
us/article7213305.ece.
49
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The American hug’, Indian Express, 2 April 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/
opinion/columns/the-american-hug-indo-us-relations-narendra-modi-barack-obama-indias-foreign-
policy/; M. K. Narayanan, ‘All about the Obama Doctrine’, Hindu, 16 April 2016, http://www.thehindu.
com/opinion/lead/indias-foreign-policy-all-about-the-obama-doctrine/article8480472.ece.
50
Priya Chacko, ‘Ukraine crisis: why India backs Russia’, East Asia Forum, Gateway House, Mumbai, 7 May
2014, http://www.gatewayhouse.in/ukraine-crisis-why-india-backs-russia/.
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Engaging China
India’s relationship with China is often viewed as a ‘protracted rivalry’ perpetuated
by longstanding differences over the border and a history of balance-of-power
politics during and after the Cold War.53 It is, however, a complicated relationship,
marked by a simultaneous and extraordinary rise in economic engagement, trade
between the two countries having risen from US$791 million in 1991 to US$72.22
billion in 2015.54 Whether one characterizes the relationship as predominantly one
of rivalry or as one of increasing cooperation depends on whether one takes the
perspective of a strategic analyst or an economist. For India, even a very limited
‘strategic partnership’ with China which includes small-scale military exercises is a
useful device to try to ease the tensions that bedevil the relationship. Indeed, Modi
was optimistic about setting ‘a new milestone’ on his trip to China in May 2015;55
but the visit did not meet expectations and mutual wrangling persists. Overall,
the pattern of Indian–Chinese relations bears a remarkable resemblance to that
observed in previous decades.
Strategic restraint
Even as it has enhanced its military capabilities, India has gained respectability
because it has been less inclined than before to use its power for intervention
overseas. Since the end of the Cold War there has been no major instance of India
wielding its armed forces abroad for political ends, even at the height of periodic
tensions with Pakistan, when ‘limited war’ was declared to be a viable strategy.
This is in contrast to the preceding period, when India projected its military
power abroad from time to time, for example by breaking up Pakistan in 1971,
by intervening forcefully in Sri Lanka in 1987, and by acting to prevent coups
in the Seychelles in 1986 and the Maldives in 1988.65 The combination of rising
61
Modi’s ambition, noted earlier, is echoed by Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar. See ‘India, the United States
and China’, IISS-Fullerton Lecture, 20 July 2015, IISS, Singapore, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/
archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-jaishankar-f64e.
62
Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without aiming (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
63
Happymon Jacob, ‘The role of nuclear weapons in contemporary Indian strategic thinking’, in Happymon
Jacob, ed., Does India think strategically? Institutions, strategic culture and security policies (New Delhi: Manohar,
2014), p. 315.
64
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Indian nuclear forces, 2015’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71: 5,
2015, pp. 77–83.
65
Sandeep Dikshit, ‘When India drew top secret “red line” in Mauritius’, Hindu, 10 March 2013, http://www.
thehindu.com/news/national/when-india-drew-top-secret-red-line-in-mauritius/article4492148.ece. A simi-
lar episode in Mauritius in 1983 ended without actual military intervention.
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69
No Indian leader has represented this in social hierarchy terms. The perception that has come closest is the
view expressed by BJP leader Jaswant Singh that the nuclear order centred on the NPT is a form of ‘apartheid’.
See Jaswant Singh, ‘Against nuclear apartheid’, Foreign Affairs 77: 5, 1998, pp. 41–52.
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Conclusion
This portrait of Narendra Modi’s strategic approach to foreign policy shows essen-
tial continuity with respect to three basic elements: the use of power, diversity
of security relationships and the pursuit of status. Its key findings are as follows.
First, while it is commonplace to associate a predilection for muscular policy with
‘Hindu nationalism’, the notion of a Hindu element in Modi’s foreign policy is not
very useful. The evidence shows no particular pattern of foreign policy thought or
action undertaken by Modi (or indeed his BJP predecessor Vajpayee) that reflects a
Hindu nationalist bias, so evident in the domestic arena, in Indian foreign policy
under the BJP. This is a divergence that clearly needs explanation, but limita-
tions of space prevent that from being attempted here. On the contrary, and this
too needs separate explanation, considerably more aggressive policies were the
hallmarks of Congress prime ministers—Indira and Rajiv Gandhi—who were
prepared to use military force when they felt India’s security was threatened.
Second, Modi has not altered the framework of India’s relations with the major
powers. The most substantial change came much earlier, in the 1990s, when India
began to shift from a policy orientation that was fearful of the power of the big
players to one of growing confidence about its capacity to deal with the power
structures of the system.71 Narendra Modi did not initiate the change, but is contin-
uing on the same path. His post-Cold War predecessors crafted an approach to
security suited to an era in which a high degree of cooperation in conditions of
global economic integration coexist with rising tensions generated by changes in
the global distribution of capabilities. This took the form of multiple strategic
partnerships. Modi has not deviated significantly from the path set by them. Finally,
like Vajpayee and Singh before him, Modi has continued to press India’s claims for
higher status in the society of states through the acquisition of symbols of power,
restrained strategic behaviour and networking for seats at multiple tables.
70
GDP comparisons are taken from the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
CD. Military expenditure comparisons are from IISS, Military balance 2016 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016).
71
For a detailed study of this change, see Rajesh Basrur, ‘Paradigm shift: India during and after the Cold War’,
in Ian Hall, ed., The engagement of India: strategies and responses (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press,
2014).
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