G.R. No.

108461 October 21, 1996

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs. HON. PRESIDING

JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, et. al.

Facts:
Philippine International Trading Corporation( PITC) is a branch of the DTI with
the function of regulating imports and exports. AO no. SOCPEC 89-08-01 requires that
application for import of goods from People's Republic of China(PROC) should be
balanced by an export of Philippine products of equal value. When Remington and
Firestone failed to adhere to the export of Philippine products requirement, their
applications to import from PROC were subsequently denied by PTIC. However, when a
new trade agreement was entered into between Philippines and PROC encouraging
liberalization of trade, the DTI was directed to cease the implementation of SOCPEC.
Thereafter, PTIC did away with the trade balancing requirement and allowed
respondents to import anew from PROC. The lower courts held that PTIC’s authority to
process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules and
regulations has already been repealed by EO 133 (Feb 27, 1987).

Issue: whether or not PTIC’s authority to process and approve applications for imports
from SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations has already been repealed by EO 133.

Held:
EO 133 did not repeal PTIC’s authority to issue rules and regulations. In issuing
Executive Order 133, the President intended merely to reorganize the Department of
Trade and Industry to cope with the need of a streamlined bureaucracy. Thus, there is
not real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is, admittedly, a rearranging
of the administrative functions among the administrative bodies affective by the edict,
but not an abolition of executive power. Consistency in statutes as in executive
issuances, is of prime importance, and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all
laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. Furthermore, the fact that a later
enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of
itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative
or a continuation of the old one.
G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997

ALEX L. DAVID, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Petitioner Alex David filed two (2)

consolidated petitions against the respondent. One, acting as the Barangay Chairman
of Kalookan, and the other as President of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas. Both
petitions sought for the prohibition of the holding of Barangay Elections by the
COMELEC. He raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and
questions the COMELEC s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May
1997. The COMELEC s basis is R.A. 7160 or the Local Government Code which
mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Petitioner David contends that an earlier
law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides that barangay elections
should be held every 5 years.

Whether or not RA 6679 should govern the term of office of Barangay Officials?

Held:

No. Under the principle of Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, It is basic that
in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later
enactment prevail. Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials
was fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994." This provision is clearly inconsistent with
and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term shall be for five years.
Furthermore, RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted on 1991 and RA 6679
on the other hand was enacted on 1989. Applying the aforementioned principle, 7160
should govern term of office of Barangay Officials for being enacted later than RA 6679.
G.R. No. L-29131             August 27, 1969

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL.

FACTS:

On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in
Civil Case No. 20520 (Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,) The National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all
the properties, assets, rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation
filed a complaint against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered
in said Case No. 20520.  Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of the
Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December 21,
196, but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days. Plaintiff
forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it
was filed two days too late.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute
of limitations.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and Court of
Appeals dismissing the complaint as it is beyond the 10-year period pursuant to ART114
of CCP that an action upon judgement "must be brought within 10years from the right
of action accrues" and Art13 "when the law speaks of years...it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty five days each" - and 1960 and 1964 being leap years,
the month of February in both had 29days, so that ten years of 365 days each, or an
aggregate of 3650 days, from December 21, 1955 expired on December 19, 1965.
G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE

AIRLINES LIMITED

Facts:

Laureano instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Singapore
Airline moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the
complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, Laureano filed the instant case for damages due
to illegal termination of contract of services before the RTC. CA reversed the decision of
the RTC, it held that the action has already prescribed, the prescriptive period was 4
years and action was filed beyond the prescriptive period. Petitioner now raises the
issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil
Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982,
was based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should
prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the
appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an
error.

ISSUES :

W/N action has already prescribe.

RULING

YES. Neither Article 1144 nor Article 1146 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. In illegal
dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the
Civil Code may not  be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general
application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now
Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW. Applying the rule in statutory construction that "where
two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefore should prevail. Article 291 of the Labor Code should prevail. In the light of
Article 291, aforecited, petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed
again on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his
dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already prescribed. Where the money claim was
based on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held that
the language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to 'money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers all money claims arising from
an employee-employer relations.
G.R. No. L-108208 March 11, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION

FACTS:

An information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor with RTC of Quezon City
against private respondent Alexander Dionisio, a member of the PNP, charging him with
the crime of homicide when he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang
during an operation. In 1992, the respondent Judge dismissed case "for re-filing with
the Sandiganbayan". Petitioner maintains that the term "regular courts" does
not include the Sandiganbayan. Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that
"criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts." He further claimes that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over members of the PNP.
ISSUE
Whether or the term "regular courts" includes the Sandiganbayan.
RULING
Yes. The term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There
could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to
remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of
the PNP and to vest it in the courts within the judicial system, the civil courts which, as
contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular courts. Under the amendments
introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the “offenses or
felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.” Hence,
the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975. There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by P.D. No. 1861, because: First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption that
the Sandiganbayan, being a special court, is not a regular court within the
contemplation of Section 46. Second, both provisions are not irreconcilable and the
presumption against an implied repeal has not been overcome. Implied repeal may be
indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant
as to be irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made
to harmonize the two laws as provided under the law of statutory construction.
G.R. No. 149848             November 25, 2004

ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP et. al. vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SIMEON A. DATUMANONG

FACTS
Republic Act No. 6734, "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law on 1 August 1989. Four
provinces voted for inclusion in ARMM. In accordance with it, EO 426 was issued by
Pres. Cory Aquino. The same devolved to the ARMM the power of the DPWH.
Consequently, DO 119 entitled "Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office."
was issued by DPWH Sec. Vigilar last in accordance with the E.O 124. It created a
DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and
Lanao del Sur. Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality and validity of DO 119 on the ground that it contravenes the
constitution and the organic acts of the ARMM.
ISSUE
WON DO 119 is invalid and constitutionally infirm
HELD
Yes. The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a
duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under
the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have
been previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the
provisions of E.O. 426. The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O.
124—signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powers is of
no moment. It is finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that general
legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable,
that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of
equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail. In the present case, E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a
general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a
special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to
the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-
ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426.
G.R. No. 149110            April 9, 2003

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN

GR. No. 149110, April 9, 2003

Facts: PETITIONER napocor, a government-owed and controlled corporation created

under Commonwealth Act 120 is tasked to undertake the “development of hydroelectric
generations of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal, and
other sources, as well as, the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis.”
For many years now, NAPOCOR sells electric power to the resident Cabanatuan City,.
Pursuant to Sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92, the respondent assessed the petitioner a
franchise tax. Petitioner, whose capital stock was subscribed and wholly paid by the
Philippine Government, refused to pay the tax assessment. It argued that the
respondent has no authority to impose tax on government entities. Petitioner also
contend that as a non-profit organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms
of taxes, charges, duties or fees in accordance with Sec. 13 of RA 6395, as amended.
The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC of Cabanatuan City, demanding that
petitioner pay the assessed tax, plus surcharge. Respondent alleged that petitioner’s
exemption from local taxes has been repealed by Sec. 193 of RA 7160 (Local
Government Code).

ISSUE:
Whether or not NAPOCOR’s exemption from all forms of taxes repealed by the
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC)?

(2) YES. One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket
exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the National Government from the
coverage of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees,
or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
this rule now admits an exception, i.e. when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the
LGUs to impose taxes, fees, or charges on the aforementioned entities. The legislative
purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing laws or charter is clearly
manifested by the language used on Sec. 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such
exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be tedious and
impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax
exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of
such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used.
G.R. No. 196201               June 19, 2012

FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III vs. FLORENTINO VELOSO

Facts:

Respondent FLORENTINO VELOSO,  District Supervisor of Quedan and Rural Credit

Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was administratively
charged with three (3) counts of dishonesty in connection with his unauthorized
withdrawals of money. He was found guilty of the said charges and dismissed from the
service. The respondent appealed and cited several mitigating circumstances which was
approved by the court of appeals and just dismissed him to one year of service without
pay. The comelec on the other hand, argued that there is no mitigating circumstance to
warratnt the reduction of the penalty.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules is the applicable provision in
the present case.

Held:

No. It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules provides the application of
mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances in the imposition of administrative
penalties. However, it applies only when clear proof is shown, using the specific
standards set by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case justify the
mitigation of the prescribed penalty. In the present case, the supreme court found that
factors against mitigation are present for the offense committed by the respondent is
serious or grave. Since the offense committed was serious, Section 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules should be the applicable provision for it provides that the commission of
an administrative offense classified as a serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable
by dismissal from the service even for the first time. Furthermore, under statutory
construction principle, a special provision prevails over a general provision. Applying the
said principle, Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, a general provision must thus
yield to the provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules.
G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979

JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA,

PANGASINAN, ET AL.

Facts:

FACTS:
JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS, was driving his car within the jurisdiction of
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta's Municipal Police asked him to stop for violating
Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, "and more particularly, for overtaking a
truck." Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Urdaneta
against Primicias for violation of said ordinance. He filed for an annulment of said
ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining the
Municipality of Urdaneta to enforce said ordinance and from further proceeding in the
criminal case. The Court of First Instance declared the ordinance null and void and had
been repealed by Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code.

ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,

Pangasinan is valid.

HELD:

No. By express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law.
However, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is, among others, that it "must not
contravene . . . the statute”. It is a "fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state." Thus, whenever there is a
conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way. In the
present case, the court stated that the appellants fail to note that Act No. 3992 has
been superseded by Republic Act No. 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which became effective on June 20, 1964, about three months after the questioned
ordinance was approved by Urdaneta's Municipal Council. However, an explicit repeal of
the Act 3992 is embodied in Section 63, Republic Act No. 4136. Pursuant to this section,
the ordinance at bar is thus placed within the ambit of Republic Act No. 4136, and not
Act No. 3992. Therefore, the ordinance being derived from the Act 3992, and the latter
being repealed by the4136, renders the Ordinance void.
G.R. No. 158885               October 2, 2009

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE, et. Al.

Facts:

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development

Corporation’s presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory on the basis
of Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC
3-96). However, the Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict
with the law. It held that the CIR had no power to limit the meaning and coverage of
the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis and
justification to make such limitation.

Issues:
Whether or not a Revenue Regulation may contravene the provisions of the NIRC on
the description or definition of the term “goods”?
Ruling:

Yes. Article 7 of the Civil Code provides an administrative rule or regulation cannot
contravene the law on which it is based. The rules and regulations that administrative
agencies promulgate, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by
the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not be in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. Furthermore,
while administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue
regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the
statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms,
or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law. In case of a discrepancy between
the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails. In
the present case, RR 7-95 restricted the application of Section 105 in the case of real
estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to their beginning
inventory. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and the Secretary of
Finance. Applying the discussed rule, Revenue Regulation contravenes the provisions of
the NIRC on the description or definition of the term “goods. Hence, the Court is correct
to strike down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law.