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Nature and Sources of International Law (Case Digests)

Juris Doctor (San Beda University)

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NATURE AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 

 
CUSTOMARY LAW: JUS COGENS AND ERGA OMNES 
 
Vinuya v. Exec. Sec. Romulo (2010) 
Petitioners are members of the MALAYA-LOLAS, an organization established for the purpose of providing aid 
to the victims of rape by Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during WWII. Petitioners have been 
approaching the Executive Department since 1998, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the 
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in 
the Philippines. Public Respondents, represented by Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, declined to assist 
the Petitioners, reasoning that such claims for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s 
compliance with the Treaty of Peace between the Philippines and Japan. 
Petitioners pray for the Court to declare that the Respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in 
refusing to assist them in their claims, and to compel them to espouse their claims for an official apology and 
other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other 
international tribunals. Petitioners interposed the following arguments: 
● The general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace is void. 
● The Japanese military committed crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture, which are 
international crimes. The prohibition against international crimes is a ​jus cogens​ norm, from which no 
derogation is allowed. 
● In 2001, the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) found Japan guilty of crimes 
against humanity 
○ However, WIWCT’s judgment is not legally binding since the tribunal was organized by private 
citizens 
● In 2007, the European Parliament issued a Resolution demanding that the Japanese government 
formally acknowledge its responsibility and remove the legal obstacles preventing the compensation 
to be awarded to Petitioners. The Canadian and Dutch Parliaments similarly issued Resolutions in 
favor of Petitioners. 
● In 2008, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament also produced a Report concluding that 
Japan should formally acknowledge the pain caused by the “comfort women” issue, in order to 
ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea. 
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the Bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. 
RULING: There is no merit in the petition, because: 
● It refers to a political question. The Executive has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to 
espouse Petitioners’ claims against Japan. 
○ Political questions​ refer to those questions in which, under the Constitution, are to be 
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary 
authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government. These 
are questions concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, and not the legality, of a 
particular measure. (​Tanada v. Cuenco​) 
● There are still no generally accepted criteria for identifying whether or not a rule is a j​ us cogens​ norm, 
therefore, the SC cannot rule on this basis. 
● Allowing individual claims such as this one will cause friction between the two States. 
 
Mijares v. Ranada 
Petitioners are martial law victims. They filed a complaint against the estate of former President Ferdinand 
Marcos with the US District Court of the District of Hawaii, and were awarded a total of USD2.25 billion by 
final judgment. Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC of Makati for the enforcement of the foreign 
judgment. The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, that Petitioners failed to pay 
the correct filing fees. 
 
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● Petitioners: An action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary 
estimation, hence, a filing fee of P410 was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141 
● Marcos Estate: The payment of only 410 Pesos as filing fee for a monetary claim for damages 
amounting to USD2.25 billion is in violation of the Supreme Court Circular No. 7 
● RTC Judge (Santiago Javier Ranada): Section 7(a) of Rule 141 applies for money claims against an 
estate not based on judgment, therefore, the filing fee must be P472 million. 
RULING: Although the complaint filed by Petitioners is essentially for the purpose of enforcing a foreign 
judgment, it is still in the nature of a claim for a sum of money. However, the filing fee by the Petitioners is 
correct, and it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Ranada to have applied a clearly 
inapplicable rule and to dismiss the petition. Therefore, ​Rule 7(b)(3) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure​ applies in this case. 
○ Rule 141, Section 7(b)(3): “For filing… actions not involving property, P600. In a real action, 
the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be 
alleged by the complainant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.” 
The SC explained that it cannot immediately adopt the foreign judgment without granting the Marcos Estate 
the opportunity to challenge such judgment. 
● Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39, Section 48​: “The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign 
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) in case of a judgment upon a 
specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; in case of a judgment against a 
person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their 
successors-in-interest by subsequent title...” 
● There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action i​ n rem a ​ nd one ​in personam​. 
For an action i​ n rem​, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an 
action ​in personam​, the foreign judgment is only presumptive of a right as between the parties and 
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment 
is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. 
● There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to 
recognize foreign judgments or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. 
○ There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the 
standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but these have not 
borne fruition. The ​Judgments Convention of 1978​ and the ​Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1966​ were aimed 
towards the removal of obstacles to the recognition of foreign judgments, but these have not 
received the ratification needed to have it take effect in the Philippines. Neither the 
Philippines nor the USA are signatories to these conventions. 
○ However, while the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with 
certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of 
international law. This is because generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue 
of the Incorporation Clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land, even if they 
do not derive from treaty obligations. 
 
STATE PRACTICE: DURATION, CONSISTENCY, AND GENERALITY 
 
Paquete Habana Case (1900) 
Two fishing smack vessels, running in and out of Habana and sailing under the Spanish flag, were seized by a 
US gunboat. The US District Court condemned the two fishing vessels and their cargoes as prizes for war. 
The owners appealed to the decree of the US District Court, contending the following: 
● They were not even aware of the existence of a war until they were stopped by the US squadron 
● No incriminating materials, like firearms or other types of weapons, were found in the vessels 
● They made no attempt to run the blockade after learning of its existence, nor did they resist arrest 

 
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● Coastal fishing vessels are exempt from seizure at wartime, based on customary international law 
and the writings of leading international scholars 
RULING: It is an established rule of international law that coastal fishing vessels, unarmed and honestly 
pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fish, are exempt from capture as prizes of war. This 
doctrine has been known by the US from the time of the War of Independence, and has been explicitly 
recognized by the French and British governments. Although such rule has not been reduced into a treaty or 
statutory law, courts must still take notice of and give effect to the rule. 
● International law is part of American law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of 
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented 
for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. 
And as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who, by years of labor, research, 
and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well-acquainted with the subjects of which they 
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors 
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 
 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) 
Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance principle (A-B and 
C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary became difficult because Denmark and 
Netherlands wanted this prolongation to take place based on the Equidistance Principle (B-E and D-E), 
whereas Germany found that these boundaries would be inequitable for it. Because Germany has a 
concave-shaped coastline, the line would result in the loss of its share of the Continental Shelf, based on the 
proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline.  
● Equidistance Principle​ - legal concept that a nation’s maritime boundaries should conform to a 
median line that is equidistant from the shores of neighboring nations 
Netherlands and Denmark insisted that the Equidistance Principle must be followed, based on ​Article 6 of the 
Geneva Convention of 1958​. Germany is a signatory of the Geneva Convention, however, it did not ratify the 
same. Germany therefore insists that it is not a party to the Convention and it cannot be compelled to follow 
Article 6 thereof. 
● Article 6: “Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose 
coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf… shall be determined by 
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless other boundary line is justified by 
special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is 
measured…” 
Netherlands and Denmark had the following contentions: 
● Even if Germany did not ratify the Geneva Convention, it is still bound to follow the provisions thereof, 
because the Equidistance Principle is a customary international law 
● Germany is not a persistent objector of the Equidistance Principle 
RULING: Germany had not unilaterally assumed obligations under the Geneva Convention of 1958. 
● The Equidistance Principle is not a customary international law. Only a very definite and very 
consistent course of conduct on the part of a State would allow the Court to presume that such State 
had somehow become bound by a treaty, by means other than ratification or other formal manner. 
○ For a ​customary rule​ to emerge, the following are required: 
■ Widespread and representative participation in the Convention, including States 
whose interests were specially affected (i.e. generality) 
■ Virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage) 
■ Such practice is undertaken in a manner that demonstrates a general recognition of 
the rule of law or legal obligation (i.e. o
​ pinio juris​) 
○ The first criterion was not met, because the number of ratifications and accessions to the 
Convention (39 States) were not adequately representative or widespread. The third criterion 

 
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was also not meant, because several States have agreed to follow the Equidistance Principle, 
not because they felt legally obligated to do so, but they were merely compelled to do so by 
other factors. Therefore, the Equidistance Principle has not yet attained the status of 
customary international law. 
● Under the ​1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)​, which took effect in 1980, 
obligations arise for third States from a provision of a treaty, only if: 
○ The actual parties to the treaty intended the provisions to create obligations for third States 
○ The third State expressly accepts those obligations in writing 
● The fact that Germany had never specifically objected to the Equidistance Principle before is not a 
sufficient reason to make principle is now binding on it. 
 

 
 
Nicaragua v. US (1986) 
In its 1984 Decision, the ICJ held the US responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in 
Nicaragua. 
● In 1979, the government of President Somoza was replaced by a new government installed by the 
Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional​ (FSLN). Supporters of the Somoza government and opposed 
the new regime. The US was previously supportive of the new government, but it changed its attitude 
when it found out that the new government was providing logistical support and weapons to the 
guerillas in El Salvador. 
● Findings of the ICJ proved that the US has been mining in Nicaraguan ports and that the US has been 
aiding the military activities within Nicaragua. 
● Nicaragua complained that the US was behind the c ​ ontras​ who are attempting to overthrow the new 
government. The ICJ, however, found that there was insufficient proof that the US directly 
participated in such military activities. 
The USA challenged the jurisdiction of the ICJ, because: 
● Though a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the ICJ was deposited by the US in a 
Declaration made in 1946, such Declaration applies only to disputes with any Central American State 
● Nicaragua never deposited any declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
RULING: The ICJ has jurisdiction over both States. The basis of the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the US is the 1946 
Declaration it submitted. Although Nicaragua never submitted a declaration, the ICJ may still assume 
jurisdiction because Nicaragua consented to the eventual transfer of its declaration to the ICJ. 
○ Consent to a treaty is not a mere reiteration of a commitment undertaken in the Charter. It 
may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule. 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter​ prohibits the use of force, and the only exception to this rule, 
provided for under Article 51 of the same Charter, is when self-defense is necessary. The ICJ explained that 
self-defense may only be invoked when there has been an actual armed attack. In this case, Nicaragua’s 
activities involving logistics and weapons-dealing may not be considered an “armed attack.” 
 
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Right of Passage over Indian Territory (1960) 
Portugal is claiming a right of passage between Daman, the enclaves, and the in-between of the enclaves 
across the intervening Indian territory, to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty over the 
enclaves, subject to India’s right of regulation and control of the passage claimed, and without any immunity 
in Portugal’s favor. Portugal had the following contentions: 
● India is under obligation to exercise its power of regulation and control so as not to prevent the 
passage necessary for the exercise of Portugal’s sovereignty over the enclaves. 
● The Treaty of Poona of 1779 and on the ​sanads​ (decrees) issued by the Maratha ruler in 1783 and 
1785 conferred sovereignty on Portugal over the enclaves, with the right of passage to them. 
● Based on ​local custom​, they have always been given a right of passage over Indian waters. 
India, on the other hand, interposes the following: 
● Regarding the two s ​ anads​, India maintains that, if read together, they did not operate to transfer 
sovereignty to Portugal, but only conferred upon it a revenue grant of 12,000 Rupees per annum, 
called a j​ agir​ or s
​ aranjam. 
● Portugal cannot base its argument on constant State practice, even if it has been done for more than 
a century, because practice between only two States is not enough to establish a local custom. 
RULING: ​Local customary law​ may exist, even if the practice is only between two States, as long as the 
following requisites, enunciated in the N ​ orth Sea Continental Shelf Cases​, are present: 
● Widespread and representative participation in the Convention, including States whose interests were 
specially affected (i.e. generality) 
● Virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage) 
● Such practice is undertaken in a manner that demonstrates a general recognition of the rule of law or 
legal obligation (i.e. o ​ pinio juris​) 
 
PERSISTENT OBJECTOR DOCTRINE 
 
Asylum Case (1950) 
The Peruvian government issued an arrest warrant against Victor Raul Haya dela Torre for the crime of 
military rebellion. Three months after such rebellion, Haya dela Torre fled to the Colombian Embassy in Lima, 
Peru. The Colombian Ambassador granted him diplomatic asylum, in accordance with ​Article 2(2) of the 
Havana Convention of 1928​. 
● Asylum​ is the protection granted by a nation to someone who has left his native country as a political 
refugee. Asylum can be granted to people who are unable or unwilling to return to their home country 
because of persecution, or a well-founded fear of persecution, on account of race, religion, 
nationality, or membership in a particular social group. 
The Colombian Ambassador requested for Haya dela Torre’s safe passage to leave Peru, and also unilaterally 
qualified Haya dela Torre as a political refugee, in accordance with​ Article 2 of the Montevideo Convention of 
1933​. Peru refused to grant the request for safe passage and refused to accept the Ambassador’s unilateral 
qualification of Haya dela Torre’s offense. 
RULING: The Colombian Ambassador may not unilaterally qualify Haya dela Torre’s offense. 
● In the normal course of granting diplomatic asylum, under the Havana Convention, a diplomatic 
representative has the competence to make a provisional qualification of the offense, and the 
territorial State has the right to give consent to this qualification. 
● The Colombian Ambassador relies on the Montevideo Convention, which allows for the unilateral 
qualification of the offense by the State granting the asylum. However, it must be noted that Peru did 
not ratify this Convention, therefore, its provisions are not binding on Peru. 
 
Domingues v. US (2002) 
On October 22, 1993, 16-year-old Michael Domingues murdered a woman and her son in their home. The jury 
found Domingues guilty of one count of burglary, one count of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, one 

 
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count of first degree murder, and one count of first degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. 
Domingues was then 17 years old when he was sentenced to death. Domingues filed a Motion for Correction 
of Illegal Sentence, arguing that the execution of a juvenile offender violates the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ratified by the US and violates customary international law. 
The US invokes the ​Persistent Objector Doctrine​, because: 
● The US ratified the ICCPR with the following reservation: “The US reserves the right, subject to its 
Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person duly convicted under existing 
or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such punishment for crimes 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.” 
● In the R ​ oach and Pinkerton Case​, the two 17-year-old offenders were sentenced to death. 
○ However, although this was an act contrary to customary international law prohibiting the 
imposition of capital punishment on minors, during the time that the case was decided, there 
was still uncertainty as to the applicable age of majority under international law. 
RULING: The US may no longer invoke the Persistent Objector Doctrine because several of its states have 
started complying with the norm. Therefore, its objection is no longer “persistent.” 
● In the 1988 ​Thompson v. Oklahoma​ Decision of the US Supreme Court, it was held that the execution 
of offenders under the age of 16 is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. During this time, out of the 
36 states that authorized capital punishment, 18 required that the defendant is at least 16 years old 
at the time of the commission of the offense, while the other 19 states provided no minimum age for 
the imposition of capital punishment. 
● Currently, 16 out of 38 states where capital punishment is allowed have expressly chosen the age of 
18 as the minimum age for eligibility to the death sentence. In 1986, there were only 10. These 
statistics show the movement of the US toward the establishment of 18 as the minimum age for the 
imposition of capital punishment. 
 
EX AEQUO ET BONO AND EQUITY 
 
Diversion of the Water from the Meuse River (1937) 
Under the Treaty of 1863 between the Netherlands and Belgium, a single feeder was to be provided and 
situated in the Netherlands territory. The Netherlands opposed Belgium’s construction of certain canals, 
because these constructions could alter the water level of the Meuse River, in violation of the earlier 
agreement between the States. 
The Netherlands insists that the treaty granted it the right to supervise and control all the intakes situated, not 
only in its territory, but also in the Belgian territory. Belgium, on the other hand, interposes that the 
Netherlands cannot complain about the construction of locks, when the Netherlands itself was the one who 
first started constructing locks. 
RULING: The Principle of Equity must be applied. 
● The Netherlands' submission that both areas must be under its supervision and control cannot be 
sustained. In order to allow the existence of such inequality between the parties to a treaty, the text 
of the treaty must say so in precise terms. 
● Nothing prevents either Belgium or the Netherlands from making such use as they may see fit of the 
canals covered by the treaty, when the canals do not leave their own territory. Each of the two States 
is at liberty in its own territory to modify such canals, to enlarge them, to transform them, to fill them 
in, and even to increase the volume of water in them, provided that the diversion of water at the 
feeder and the water to be discharged therefrom is not affected. 
 
SOFT LAW AND HARD LAW 
 
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Duque, III 
E.O. No. 51 (Milk Code)​ was issued by President Corazon Aquino in 1986, by virtue of the legislative powers 
granted to her under the Freedom Constitution. One of the clauses of the Milk Code seeks to give effect to 

 
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Article 11 of the ​International Code of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS)​, a code adopted by the 
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the 
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted, and protected, hence, it should be ensured that 
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. 
The Department of Health (DOH) issued the Milk Code RIRR (A.O. No. 2006-0012) in 2006, the validity of 
which is being assailed by the Petitioner, as it unduly expands the coverage of the Milk Code. 
RULING: While the Milk Code is valid and constitutional, several provisions of the Milk Code RIRR must be 
struck down. 
● While the ICMBS is not a treaty, it was still transformed into domestic law through local legislation, 
the Milk Code. It is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction, and not the 
ICMBS itself. However, the succeeding WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local 
legislation, therefore, they cannot be deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land. 
 
Ang Ladlad Partylist v. COMELEC 
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals, or transgenders (LGBT). Ang Ladlad first applied for accreditation as a partylist in 2006 but was 
denied by the COMELEC, on the ground that it had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad filed 
another petition for accreditation, but this time, their petition was denied based on moral grounds. 
Ang Ladlad argued the following: 
● The LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly 
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation or gender identity 
● LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence 
● The denial of their petition is a violation of their right to equal protection, freedom of expression and 
freedom of association 
● Even international law has secured their right against discrimination 
○ Articles 25-26 of the ​International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)​ on the 
Principle of Non-Discrimination 
○ Article 21 of the ​Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)​ on the freedom of the 
people to choose the representatives of their country 
○ Yogyakarta Principles​ on the application of international human rights law in relation to 
sexual orientation and gender identity 
● Ang Ladlad complied with the ​Eight-point Guidelines​ enunciated in​ Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC​: 
○ First, the political party, sector, organization, or coalition must represent the marginalized and 
under-represented groups identified in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, and the majority of its 
membership should belong to the marginalized and under-represented group. 
○ Second, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens 
belong to marginalized and under-represented sectors to be elected to the House of 
Representatives. 
○ Third, the partylist must not represent the religious sector. 
○ Fourth, the partylist must not be disqualified under Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. The grounds 
for disqualification are as follows: 
■ It is a religious sect or denomination, organization, or association organized for 
religious purposes 
■ It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal 
■ It is a foreign party or organization 
■ It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, 
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members 
indirectly through third-parties, for partisan election purposes 
■ It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections 
■ It declares untruthful statements in its petition 
■ It has ceased to exist for at least 1 year 

 
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■ It fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections, or fails to obtain at least 2% of 
the votes cast under the partylist system in the 2 preceding elections for the 
constituency in which it has registered 
○ Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized, or an entity 
funded or assisted by, the government. 
○ Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, but its nominees must 
likewise do so. 
■ R.A. No. 7941, Section 9​: No person shall be nominated as partylist representative 
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of 
the Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of 
the election, able to read and write, a b ​ ona fide​ member of the party or organization 
which he seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election, 
and is at least 25 years of age on the day of the election. 
○ Seventh, not only the party or organization must represent marginalized or under-represented 
sectors, but also must its nominees. 
○ Eighth, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of 
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. 
RULING: Ang Ladlad’s petition must be allowed to apply for accreditation as a partylist, as they have duly 
complied with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941 and the Eight-point Guidelines enunciated in A ​ ng Bagong 
Bayani v. COMELEC​. The COMELEC erroneously applied the enumerations in the ​Ang Bagong Bayani Case​ to 
be an exclusive enumeration. The crucial element in that case is not whether a sector is specifically 
enumerated, but whether a particular organization has complied with the requirements provided by law. 
However, the Court stresses that the blanket invocation of international law is not the remedy of social ills. 
We are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory in the 
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in the said Principles which are not reflective of 
the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law. 
 
UNILATERAL ACTIONS 
 
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel 
Starting in 1996, a process of negotiation and creation of several prior agreements ensued between the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which all 
started in 1996. In 1997, the GRP and the MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of 
Hostilities, and in 1998, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent. In August 2009, the GRP 
and the MILF, through their respective Chairpersons, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement 
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001. 
The Province of North Cotabato and Vice Governor Emmanuel Pinol filed their cases before such scheduled 
signing, so the SC issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same, invoking their right to information 
on matters of public concern. Petitioners sought to compel the GRP Peace Panel to disclose and furnish 
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, including its attachments, and to prohibit the 
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a 
public consultation regarding the matter. Finally, the Petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared 
unconstitutional. 
RULING: 
● The GRP Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the consultation 
process required under E.O. No. 3, R.A. No. 7160, and R.A. No. 8371. 
● The MOA-AD involves matters of public concern, as these matters will directly affect the lives of the 
public at large. Therefore, the Petitioners have the right to request for disclosure of the pertinent 
documents. 
● The contents of the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only 
its specific provisions, but also the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative 

 
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relationship envisions between the GRP and the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity (BJE), are 
unconstitutional. The concept of ​associative relationship​ presupposes that the associated entity is a 
separate State and implies that the same is on its way to independence. 
 
Nuclear Test Cases (1974) 
In 1974, Australia and New Zealand challenged France for conducting atmospheric nuclear testing in the 
South Pacific. They further claimed that the tests caused radioactive fallout which had adverse effects on 
their respective territories. France, on the other hand, challenged the jurisdiction of the ICJ. During the 
deliberations regarding the jurisdictional issue, France declared its intention to stop all atmospheric nuclear 
testing under normal conditions, and to shift its operations underground. Consequently, Australia and New 
Zealand objected to the validity of such declaration, alleging that the termination of atmospheric testing is 
not an assurance that the nuclear testing itself will cease completely. 
RULING: Declarations made by way of unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations. When 
States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is to be 
applied. Declarations made by way of unilateral acts are in the nature of ​pacta sunt servanda​. 
 
Burkina Faso v. Mali (1986) 
Burkina Faso, previously the Republic of Upper Volta, and the Republic of Mali, each obtained independence 
in 1960 following their decolonization. Later, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed, consisting 
of African Heads of State. In 1964, the OAU passed a Resolution declaring that all of their member-States 
must solemnly pledge to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence. Such 
Resolution was codified into law, under the ​Uti Possidetis​ Principle. 
● The ​Uti Possidetis Principle​ literally means “as you possess under the law.” This is a principle of 
international law which provides that newly-formed sovereign States should retain the internal 
borders that their preceding dependent area had before their independence. 
In 1975, the Head of State of Mali made a statement indicating a lack of respect for the existing boundaries 
between Mali and Burkina Faso. The two States then submitted to the ICJ the question of the proper 
demarcation of boundary lines between the two States. The historical documents and other proofs relied 
upon by both States contained names of bodies of water and villages that were no longer in existence, so it 
was difficult to establish the previously agreed upon boundaries. The ICJ, instead, made use of the few 
boundary points that were established by facts, then made use of the ​Uti Possidetis Principle​ in determining 
the rest of the boundaries. 

 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW | Laohoo 2020

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