The Primarily Political Functions of the Left-Right Continuum

Author(s): Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jan., 1983), pp. 139-158
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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 The Primarily Political Functions of the
Left-Right Continuum
Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

Labels and Cues

The concepts of left and right-or liberal and conservativein their American
versions-are common termsin politics, in politicaldiscourse, and in political
analysis. Their meaning, however, is multifacetedat best, elusive at worst,
and-over time and across polities-quite divergent.
The left-rightcontinuumin politics has been used for 200 years as a means
to ordera cognitive map of political and ideological relationships.Right and
left make sense only if you happento be the king of Francechairingthe first
joint meeting of the States Generalon May 5, 1789, or the second meeting on
June 23. Therethe nobility took the place of honorto the king's right, and the
representativesof the Third Estate were to the king's left. In August 1789
when the Aristocratsand the Patriotsmet at the Tuilleries to form the Con-
stituentAssembly in orderto write a constitution,it was the Patriotswho sat
to the left and the Aristocratsto the right of the speaker's tribune. It was on
August 26 that this group voted the Declarationof the Rights of Man, a land-
markof political thought and practice.
Most often in political discourse the left-right continuum has been given
economic meaning, referringto equalityas opposedto inequality,government
interventionas opposed to free enterprise,toleranceof change as opposed to
adherenceto the status quo. Political activists, commentators,and scientists
have widened the scope of the terms to include the major issues of the day.
Thus hawks and doves were labeled conservative and liberal in the United
States, and similarly in Israelthe hawks are right, the doves left. Issues such
as divorce laws, abortion, foreign aid, and integrationhave also been sub-
sumed underthese headings.
The concept of left-rightor liberal-conservativehas come to be regardedas
an overall ideological dimension, as a kind of "superissue," as ideology. For
political savantsthe continuumdenotes ideological content;political scientists
and elites use these terms more or less consistentlyto reflect the political and
ideological realities of the time.
0010-4159/83/0115-0002$06.00/1 139
? 1983 The City University of New York
Comparative Politics January 1983

Accepted wisdom not only equates the left-rightcontinuumwith ideology,

but from the dominantperspective it is also regardedas exogenous, as de-
terminingthe vote. Downs took this approachto the extreme.1He conceived
of it as the determinantof the vote. Althoughlaterwork qualifiedthis conclu-
sion and left-rightis now regardedas one in a list of determinants,the litera-
ture still seems to reflect a conception of the continuumas a very important
factor in the calculus of the voter.2
We shall presentan argument-and data-challenging those two perspec-
tives. The left-rightconcept for most people is not ideology, nor does it influ-
ence their vote. In other words, using Downs's terminology, there exists a
left-right space, but it is a political space, mainly a party space, and not an
ideological space. It is thereforenot independentof the vote, and hence the
continuum cannot determine the vote. In this sense, Stokes's criticism of
Downs is irrelevant.3Althoughit may be truethatDowns's model is deficient
in the sense that it does not reflect the fact that politics is multidimensional,
that issues and conflicts cannotbe arrangedalong one dimension, that leaders
and the public do not necessarily see the continuumin the same fashion, that
the continuumis not constantbut changes over time, and that many "valence
issues" cannotbe arrayedalong a continuumat all inasmuchas there is no di-
vergenceof opinionon them, the critiqueloses its cogency if the continuumis
not a determinantof the vote.
Left and right and liberal and conservative are political labels. They are
cues given by the political system, in particularby political parties, with re-
spect to politicalobjects. The majorpolitical objects are of course the political
partiestowardwhich the citizen must orient himself: either approve, support,
and vote for or oppose, reject, and vote against. The function is one of label-
ing for self- and partyidentificationon the one handas well as of vetoing and
rejectingothers' cues on the otherhand. The left or rightlabel is above all part
of one's political vocabulary, of one's political education, of one's political
and social adjustment.And it is learned. Such learning is reinforcedas one
proceeds with one's voting history, identifies with one's party, and absorbes
the cues generatedby those activities. In this view it is the vote that largely
determinesthe left or rightdefinitionand not the reverse. One situatesoneself
on the continuumas a reflectionof behaviorotherthanvoting; one' s vote does
not stem from the highly cerebraltask of self-placementon the continuum.
Althoughwe realize thatthe natureof this relationis much more complex and
endogenousthanwe have portrayedhere, our argumentis thatfor most people
left and right labels are not cognitive in nature;they do not denote ideology
and surely do not reflect ideologicalconceptualizationandthinking. For some
the political cues may include policy and ideological content; but on the
whole, the labels and cues of left and right are partybased and partyrelated.
Two importantfunctions that political attitudesfulfill are object appraisal
140
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

and social adjustment.4Both arerelevantto our discussion. Objectappraisalis

cognitive in natureand, in the context discussed here, ideological and policy
oriented. Following this line, self-identificationis based on issue preferences;
thus the common view holds that a political label primarilyreflects an orien-
tation toward issues. Anotherfunctionalversion that requireslower levels of
conceptualizationand political informationbut is also cognitive in origin
postulates that political labels provide individuals with shortcuts and
simplifyingdevices for orientationand guidancein the political system. Such
a need of course becomes strongeras the politics of a countrybecomes more
complex, and here the labels may be more relevant.5Social adjustmentis the
second function of the left-rightlabel, and we suggest that it is the more im-
portantone for a large portionof the public. It fulfills one's needs for self-
identificationand social acceptanceby significantothersand referencegroups
from which one learns one's political and social identification.
Indeed, much of the Europeanand American research into the left-right
continuummay be rereadin this light to supportour thesis. A left-rightor a
liberal-conservativecontinuumexists and is meaningfulto a large portion of
the electorate who can place themselves and political parties along it. Major
issues correlate with this left-right continuum.6 The terminology is well
known, and the public has learnedthe labels and relatesthem to partiesand to
a lesser degree to issues. In all cases the relationshipbetween partyand self-
location on the left-right scale is strongerthan the relationshipbetween left-
right labels and ideological content.7
Furtheranalysis indicatesthat the picturevaries among groups at different
levels of political cognition and education. The relationshipbetween the left-
right position and indices of policy or ideological orientationis strongerfor
those with high political cognition: for them the object appraisalfunction is
most evident. But correlations with party identification change little in
strength across different levels of political cognition because the social ad-
justment function operates for all.8 In more complex and polarized systems,
the highersalience of the left-rightdimensionis most noticeable, yet it should
not be inferredfrom this finding thatpeople have a clear-or, for that matter,
any-understanding of the ideological content imputedto those terms.
That left-rightlabels do not denote ideologies, that people often use those
terms "with little comprehensionof their ideological meaning, even though
70 percentor more of the citizens in these mass electoratesmay use them to
describe political parties,"9 is by now well documented. Nevertheless, it
seems that focusing on the individual and on the common identificationof
left-rightlabels with ideology has preventedus from drawingthe rightconclu-
sions from these findings. Most Americanstudies that followed Cambell and
associates' and Converse's focused on the concepts of liberal and conserva-
tive, getting entangledin the study of ideology and preoccupiedwith its exis-

141
ComparativePolitics January 1983

tence or lack thereof within the masses. In general the results were negative,
althoughthere is still controversyaboutthe comparisonof the 1950s with later
periods.'0There is no ideological thinkingor conceptualization,and nothing
that can be called a superissue,or ideology, for a large portionof the public:
no constraint,no relationshipamong differentissue positions held by the pub-
lic, and no stabilityover time in the public's positions on issues. Conversein-
troduced the term nonattitudes-survey responses showing that no attitude
actuallyexisted. It followed, then, thatthe lack of ideology or meaningfor the
conservative-liberallabel stemmed from nonattitudeswithin the public.1"
One of the methodologicalcritiquesof this literatureis relevanthere. Smith
argues that the level of conceptualizationmeasures used, which showed in-
creases in the 1960s over the 1950s, actually measuredthe salience of the
liberal-conservativelabels-the respondents'knowledge and recognition of
these cues-not ideological conceptualizingand thought.'2 These measures
went up in the 1960s, reflecting changes in political climate and cues-the
more ideological, clear, differentiated,and intense cues of the Vietnam and
racial issues and, in particular,the polarizingGoldwatercandidacyin 1964.
When the political system made the labels more prevalentand salient, the re-
spondentsperceivedthe liberaland conservativelabels as more prevalentand
salient. Change was driven by a political motor, not an ideological one.
The learning of "ideological" cues does not occur in a vacuum. Their
source is political, and it is this complementary, system-level, functional
analysis that we shall pursue. Our argumentis political and is focused on the
political system in general and the party system in particular.The labels do
not necessarilycorrespondto "natural"political entities:they were invented,
not discovered, by political analysts for the political establishment.They are
used to label and to identify the good or the bad, the right and the wrong, the
desirableand the despicable. The stigma or the distinctionthat often accrues
to each label should be understoodas an artifactwith political intentand con-
tent. Words, too, produce political impact. Political parties and leaders use
these cues for their own ends.
The political context is a majorfactor that shapes the labels and their use
both for the partiesand the public at large. In a certaincontext the labels and
cues are more pervasive, more emphasized, and more useful than in others,
and we will demonstratethe operationof this factor in our analysis, as did
Finlay and associates, who found thatthe labels were much less meaningfulin
non-Westerncountries.'3Each party may choose to stress its own label, un-
derscoring its positive connotation, or to castigate those of its rivals. Also,
the degree of issue or ideological content loading in the left-rightlabels de-
pends on which political actorsare giving the cues and on the particularpoliti-
cal scene: the cue givers can present and emphasize more or less of thatcon-
tent. The structureof conflicts and policy issues in a polity is also important:
142
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

are they "constrained" in the sense that they go together, fitting partycleav-
ages? But even if there is a good fit of issues to the continuum,the majorim-
pact of the label would reside in its partisan, political natureand not in its
ideological aspect.

A Crucial Test

A least likely crucialcase14for the confirmationof this thesis is a polity thatis

highly ideological, where ideology is widely thought to play an important
role, and where ideological discourse is strong. Israel is such a political sys-
tem. Israeli politics, its parties, and its public have often been described as
highly ideological by political and social observers.15Even thoughthis view is
exaggeratedand ideology has become less importantthan in the past, there is
no questionthatIsraelisare very much awareof political happeningsand have
a high interestand involvement in politics. Newspaperconsumptionis wide-
spread, and the nightly television news is watchedby a sizable portionof the
adult population.The majorissues of the day are highly salient to most, and
no one would argue that such issues as the occupied territoriesare nonat-
titudes. Yet we shall show thateven in such a system the left-rightconcept is
not ideological but is primarilya label relatedto and probablystemmingfrom
one's party identification.Thus we shall argue that it is not the lack of issue
orientation or nonattitudesthat deprive the left-right notion of ideological
content. Left and right definitions are profoundly political; irrespective of
issue content and attitudeexistence, they are mainly party loaded and party
linked.
Israelis an appropriatesetting in which to test some of these ideas. A coun-
try with a reputationof ideological politics, influenced greatly by European
political ideas (nationalism,socialism, liberaldemocracy)yet open to Ameri-
can influences, Israel's many political parties have often been arrangedon a
continuumfrom left to rightin a mannersimilarto thatused to arrangethe po-
litical parties of other Westerncountries.
Fromthe 1920s, the periodin which the Britishmandatebegan in Palestine,
throughindependencein 1948, until the beginningof the 1970s, Israel had a
dominantpartysystem. One party(AhdutHaavoda, later Mapai, now Labor)
was dominantin the sense that it won a pluralityof the votes in elections, was
essential to the forming of coalitions, createdand maintainedthe centralized
economic and political hierarchiesthat facilitatedthe perpetuationof its rule,
and was dominantin a spiritualsense in thatthe goals and ideals of the period
were associated with it and vice versa.
The dominantpartyenjoyed pluralitysupportfrom most significantgroups
in the country, and so the party, including its label-left-was widely ac-

143
ComparativePolitics January 1983

Table 1 Alignment and Likud Knesset Seats, 1965-1981

1965 1969 1973 1977 1981

Alignment 63 56 51 32 47

Likud 26 32 39 45 48

Alignment included Rafi and Mapam in 1965; Likud included

State List and Free Center in 1969 and Sharon in 1977.

cepted in the society as the only legitimateruler. The right organizedlate and
less systematically;the centersof power were not within its reach. The Irgun
Zvai Leumi, the militia headedby MenachemBegin, laterformedthe core of
the Herutmovement, which in turnbecame the biggest partyin the Likud. In
the prestateperiod and in the years following the founding of the state, the
Irgun and the Herut were stigmatized as undergroundorganizationsoutside
the structureof the national institutions headed by Mapai. This view was
ironic because the activities of the Hagana and Palmachwere equally illegal
from the British point of view, but the power to define legitimateand illegiti-
mate was held by the leaders of Mapai. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion
placed the Irgun and the Herutin the company of the other ostracized group
when he declaredthatall partieswere candidatesfor his coalition government
except the Communistparty and Herut.
Two factors closely related to the rise of the right are the political and
demographicchanges that have occurredin Israel since independence.Until
1967, Herut and Begin were ostracized by the Mapai establishmenton the
groundsthatthey were outside the system of consensus priorto the formation
of the state. In 1967, in the periodbefore the Six Day War, Gahal (a combi-
nationof the Herutmovementandthe Liberalparty)joined the NationalUnity
Government,and Begin became a ministerof the governmentof Israel. This
legitimacy was enhancedby the fact thatGahalleft the Unity governmentwell
before the 1973 Yom KippurWar, a defection that highlightedthe decline of
the dominantstatusof the Alignment. Not only were the political fortunesof
the Likud and Begin picking up because the political fortunes of the Align-
ment were turning down, but time was working in the Likud's favor.
Twenty-five years after independence,a sizable portionof the electorate did
not know of the stigma that Begin had carried. The intergroupfights of the
past generationbusied older people and scholarsbut not the man on the street.
His conceptualworld of politics was different, and with generationalchange

144
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

the role of the right and the Likud changed. As Table 1 clearly shows, the
Likud continuallygained votes and political power.
The passing of dominance from the Alignment led to a very competitive
state of affairsby 1981. The two largestlists were almosteven at the polls. Of
the two million votes cast, the Likud and the Alignmentwon between them
almost a million and a half votes, giving the Likudforty-eight seats and the
Alignment forty-seven.

The Growth of the Right

Observingthe Israeli political system in the crucial period of transitionfrom

dominanceto competitivenessallows us to considerthe role of left-rightlabels
in a political system undergoingchange. It has often been observedthat Israel
has been moving to the right, and that is certainly so (see Table 2). In the
twenty years from 1962 to 1981 the rightincreasedmorethanfourfold, from 8
percent in 1962 to 16 percent in 1969 to 35 percent in 1981. Not only has
identificationwith the right become more legitimate in the system-so, too,
has the word. When the Israel Instituteof Applied Social Researchrana pre-
test before the 1962 study, the rightpoliticaltrendwas found to be so discred-
ited that the institute decided to substitutethe political party of the right-
Herut-in the questionnaire.The final version of the question had as its ex-
tremes "Marxistleft" and "Herut"; "moderateleft" and "center" were the
other two categories. By 1969 the problemhad dissipated, and the termsleft
and right were used for the extreme responses. By 1981 some studies began
splitting the "right" response into right and moderateright because the dis-
tributionhad shifted over time.16
This movementto the right coincided with the strengtheningof the Likud
and the weakeningof the Labor-MapamAlignment,as shown in Table 1. The
ideological perspectiveimputedto the left-rightcontinuumwould lead us to
expect that as a society's orientationshifts so do its positions on political is-
sues.17The fascinating finding about Israel is that althoughthe country has
moved to the right politically, the distributionof attitudeson importantmat-
ters has remainedbasically constant(see Table 2). Hardlinestandson return-
ing the territoriesare about as prevalenttoday as they were in 1969.18
The samplesare different, and the distributionof responsesis not identical.
Still, what is strikingis the relative stability of the attitudein the society. In
1969, 90 percentfavoredreturningnone of the territoriesor only a small part,
and in 1981, aftermost of Sinai hadbeen returned,the figure was 92 percent.
Explaining attitudinalstability in light of the movement of the political
continuumto the right appearsto be more difficult because the populationhas

145
ComparativePolitics January 1983

Table 2 Left-RightTendency, 1962-1981a

1962 1969C 1973 1977 1981

LEFT-RIGHT LABELb

Left 6% 3% 4% 4%
31%
Moderate left 19% 19% 14% 13%

Center 23% 26% 33% 29% 39%

Right 8% 16% 23% 28% 32%

Religious 5% 6% 7% 6% 6%

No interest in
politics;
No answer 33% 27% 15% 19% 6%

ECONOMY

Capitalist 7% 10% 11% 10%

More Capitalist 19% 24% 18% 25%

not
More Socialist 39% 38% 31% 40%
asked
Socialist 15% 19% 25% 20%

No Answer 20% 9% 15% 5o

RETURN THE TERRITORIES

None 38% 31% 41% 50%

not
A small part 52% 52% 43% 42%
asked
Most 5% 10% 7% 4%

All 1% 2% 7% 3%

No Answer 4% 5% 2% 1%

Sample Size; 1170 1314 1939 1372 1249

a. From 1962 through 1977 the surveys were conducted by the Israel
Institute of Applied Social Research, the 1981 survey by the Dahaf
Research Institute.
b. The question was "With which political tendency do you identify?"
The first four responses were read, the last two were not.
c. The 1969 return the territories question was posed in August to a
sample of 380 respondents.

146
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

Table 3 Measuresof Left-RightLabel Among Alignment-LikudVoters, 1969-1981

Date of Total Sample Pearson's r vote X Alignment/ Z Alignment Z Likud

Studya Sample Sizeb by left-right X Likud giving "left" giving "right"
Size label response response

Sept 1969 1314 565 .21 84/16 45 42

Oct-Nov '69 1825 786 .45 74/26 55 55

May 1973 1939 986 .25 70/30 36 49

Sept 1973 548 258 .27 63/37 37 45

March 1977 1372 516 .44 54/46 37 69

Harch 1981 1249 733 .40 59/41 31 57

April 1981 1088 514 .42 53/47 49 68

June 1981 1237 607 .55 48/52 46 72

a. Studies conducted by Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, except for

March 1981 and June 1981 which were conducted by Dahaf Research Institute.

b. Respondents answering vote intention question "Alignment" or "Likud" are used in

the computations in this table.

not become more capitalist in economic matters, as might have been expected
from the right label. As shown in Table 2, almost 60 percent of the population
has consistently favored socialism. Government intervention has often been
decried, and the economy has been liberalized; yet the movement to the right
has not been reflected in this important economic attitude. The stability of
these attitudes over time forces us to consider the sense in which the system
has changed.
What we have witnessed in Israel over the last few decades is a process of
political change, not ideological change. The growth of the Likud and the
growth of the right must be understood as a reaction to the years of dominance
of the Alignment and the left. The terms are important as labels but not neces-
sarily as indicators of the ideological content of party programs. Likud means
not only right but also non-Alignment and hence nonleft. Our argument is that
the designations of left and right are more important in their labeling function
than in their ability to denote ideological orientation. Beyond the aggregate
stability of attitudes and the simultaneous movement to the right of party
identifications and fortunes, another good example of how this labeling func-
tion acts is the very stable religious response (see Table 2), a category not of-
fered to the respondents. A steady 5 to 7 percent of the respondents sampled
over a period of two decades volunteered the religious answer when asked to
identify the political label with which they identified. Those respondents are
the voters of the religious parties.

147
ComparativePolitics January 1983

The interrelationsamong vote, left-rightlabels, and attitudesprovide fur-

ther tests for our contention that political change-not ideological change-
accounts for the shifting fortunesof political life in Israel and that left-right
labels are partisanratherthan ideological. The transitionfrom a dominant
system to a competitiveone is shown in Table 3. It is clear from the eight sur-
veys conductedover a twelve-yearperiod that the Alignment has lost support
and that the Likud has gained. More important,the correlationbetween the
vote and the political label has tended to rise over time, indicatingthat the
distributionof left-rightlabels became more importantin a political context of
competitionthan was the case when a pluralityof most groups supportedthe
same party.

Left-Right, the Parties, and the Voters

We have seen thatthe rightand the Likudhave increasedin strengthover time

and that the left and the Alignmenthave declined. We get a more refinedpic-
ture of the process when we look at the responses of those who reportedthat
they intendedto vote for one of the two parties.Those responsesindicatethat
both the rightand the Likudhave grown and that the Alignment has declined.
The portion of the Alignment voters who identified themselves as left has
been constant. The shrinkageof the left is a resultof the decline of the Align-
ment; the growth of the right stems from the greaterlegitimacy and the in-
creasing political power of the Likud.
Thata political label serves a veto functionby pointingout which partyone
wants to avoid is not surprisingto observerswho know the natureof political
communicationsin Israel. This function was filled by the left in the prestate
and early state era-the period of one-partydominance-when the left was
widely considered the legitimate authorityin the system. Now, because the
direction of that basic understandinghas changed, the label right serves the
function of identifying the bad guys (the left) as well as of reinforcingone's
sense of identificationwith the group that one wishes to support(the right).
The prime mover behind the label is identificationwith one of the political
parties;from that flows identificationwith one of the political labels.
In the analyses thatfollow we deal only with thatpartof the samples (about
half-see Table 3) that reportedsupportingone of the two large parties. A
large portionof Israeli samples (30 to 40 percent)has refrainedfrom answer-
ing when asked aboutvoting intentionor behavior;a smallerfractionhas cho-
sen other, smallerparties.To test the set of relationsthatinterestsus, we have
focused attentionon the first group.
The long-termexplanationfor the patternof increasingcorrelationbetween
vote and label shown in Table 3 is the shift from dominanceto competitive-
ness. In a dominantparty system, the clarity of the signal of the dominant

148
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

partyis less crucial because most groups supportit anyway. No political cues
are needed; no ideological labels are necessary to identify the object of the
vote. The message can remainfuzzy as long as political dominance is not at
stake. The more competitivethe system, the more importantit is to direct at-
tention towardthe ideological labels and thus facilitate the cuing function of
the campaign.This interpretationseems to fly in the face of the inheritedwis-
dom that maintainsthat competitive systems, especially those in which two
large parties are competing againsteach other, work to blur ideological mes-
sages in orderto appealto the center. In reality, no contradictionexists at all.
A partycompeting in a two-partysystem does not strive for ideological clar-
ity; instead, it endeavorsto cue its supportersby using labels such as left and
right to reinforcetheir decisions to vote for the party. The cue is importantas
an additionalsupportfor the voting decision, not as a correlateof ideological
content. This labeling function explains why in Israel, in the long term, the
correlationbetween the vote andthe label increasedas the system passed from
dominanceto competitiveness.
The higherlevels of responseover time to the left-rightquestion, as shown
in Table 2, reflect this political change. The labels have become more impor-
tant for the competitivepartiesthatneed to send more of these cues, as well as
for the public thatreceives them. Thus a much largernumberof the electorate
in a competitive system respondto the labels and define themselves accord-
ingly.
There is also an evident short-termcorollary. Cuing becomes more effec-
tive as election day comes closer. One of the prime functions of the election
campaign is to provide the opportunityfor and to legitimize the effort of po-
litical cuing. For example, the 1981 election was held at the end of June. The
correlationbetween the vote and the left tendencyrose from .40 in Marchto
.42 in April to .55 in June. Similarly, the September1969 survey yielded a
correlationof .21; and the October-Novembersurvey, conductedjust before
and afterthe election, yielded a correlationof .45. We can be precise because
we know when each interview took place. The correlationbetween the vote
and the left-righttendency for those interviewedduringthe two-week period
before the election in 1969-at the height of the election campaign-and
duringthe two to three days after the election producedan r of .46. The cor-
relationdeclined to .42 and .43 one and two weeks after the election and to
.31 two to threeweeks afterelection day. The campaignthat providedgreater
visibility for party names and cues facilitatedthe higher correspondencebe-
tween the vote and the left-rightlabel. We rejectthe alternativeargumentthat
because the campaign period made party positions clearer, it became easier
for individualvotersto identifythe partyclosest to theirpolitical labels. In the
period under considerationin Israeli politics, ideological differences among
the partiesdiminishedand campaignsbecame less ideological.
There is a basic sense in which all politics in Israel are ideological. Mes-

149
ComparativePolitics January 1983

Table 4 Pearson CorrelationsAmong Alignment-LikudVote, Left-RightLabel, and

Attitudeson Foreign Policy and the Economya

Time Period Vote x Left-Right x Left-Right x Vote x Vote x

Left-Right foreign policyb Economy Foreign Policy Economny

Sept. 1969 .21 .12 (.03)C .09 (.00)

Hay 1973 .25 .22 .10 .23 .17

March 1977 .44 .24 .21 .26 .23

March 1981 .40 .26 .20 .26 .16

a. For sample sizes, see Table 3.

b. The question used in 1969 was different from the other three time periods. In 1969 it
was "To what extent would you support a militant policy by Israel toward the Arab
states?" 691 were in the two affirmative categories, 29X in the two negative ones, 2X
not answering.The territories question used in 1973, 1977 and 1981 was asked in 1969 but
to a small sample (see Table 2). It was decided therefore to utilize the larger sample
of 1969 at the cost of using a different -- but related -- question.

c. Correlations in parentheses are not significant at the .05 level.

sages are packaged in ideological containers;code words are frequentlyat-

tached. Isms and such phrasesas fascism, socialism, and revisionism, as well
as the basic values of the labor movement, aboundedin the 1981 campaign;
yet for many of the voters they were empty sounds. The style of Israelipoliti-
cal communicationovershadowsthe substance.
Anothertest of our contentionis confirmedby the data presentedin Table
4. In each case the correlationof the vote and the left-rightlabel was higher
than the correlationsbetween the vote and attitudesand between the left-right
label and attitudes.Attitudestendedto be weakly relatedto vote and political
label and never reachedthe level of the correlationbetween the vote and the
political label. The short-termfactor of the election campaignevident in the
correlationbetweenthe vote and the left-rightlabel also affected attitudes:the
furtheralong in the campaign, the higher the correlationsbetween attitudes
and the vote and between attitudesand the label as well. But in no year did
these correlationsexceed the correlationbetween the vote andthe label, which
remainsthe highest correlationof all.19
Political partiessend cues about issues and attitudes.These cues are pack-
aged and labeled to aid the voter in making the correct voting decision. It is
fashionableto dignify these cues and labels by designatingthem superissues
or ideology, whereasin fact theirbasic functionfor the bulk of the population
is to identify the party to be voted for. Consider, for example, the way this
functionhas workedin Israel. As we have seen, the majorityof the population
150
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

has supporteda firm stand on the territoriesand has approvedof a socialist

economy over the years. Weak relationshipsexisted between the left-right
label and the attitudeon territories(.26) and between the label and the eco-
nomic attitude (.20)-the two importantissue dimensions of the left-right
continuum. But furtherinsight into the cuing process was gained when party
preference was controlled for. Alignment voters were much more differ-
entiatedwith respectto the economic issue than the territoriesissue, concern-
ing which left and right lose meaning. Likud voters were more differentiated
with respect to the territoriesissue. This finding correspondsto the cues pro-
vided by the partiesand to the consensualpositions. Thereis at work a process
of filteringthatdeterminesthatleft-rightwill be importantwhen the following
conditions are met: first, when the opinion is partof the consensus that marks
the political system and, second, when it is applied to the supportersof the
partythat generatesapprovingcues about the issue. The left-rightlabel con-
tributesonly marginallyto the sharpfocus of the picturecomparedto the gen-
eral climate of attitudesand the positions of the parties.
In a more directattemptto ascertainthe meaningof left-right,the following
question was asked: "People talk a lot aboutleft and right in politics. In your
opinion, what are the main things that distinguish between left and right?"
First, it is importantto note that70 percentof the sample indicatednothing at
all. Second, moving to the right yielded higher response rates (see Table 5).
We interpretthis finding to mean that the former dominantleft is in retreat
ideologically as well as politically and that its adherentsare less equippedto
confrontthe issue thanthe more assertivevoters of the right. The pendulumin
Israel is swinging in their favor, and the respondentsof the right are prone to
talk about it.
Our conclusion regardingthe filteringfunction of the left-rightcontinuum
was reconfirmedwhen this open-endedquestionwas analyzed. The ideologi-
cal content of the territoriesincreasedsteadily from left to right, and the con-
tent of the economy issue decreasedin the same direction.20Each groupplays
to its strong suit: the right to the territories,the left to the economy. Each
group plays to that issue that enjoys wide social support. Left-rightdoes not
reflect ideology; it reflects an accurateperceptionof the composition of so-
cial-political reality. Table 5 shows that those identifyingthemselves as reli-
gious are most similar to those who identify themselves as right.
Left-righthas no content for most people; only 30 percent imputed to it
issue meaning. When asked whetherthey thoughtleft-rightwas meaningfulin
Israeli politics today, 15 percentsaid definitely, an additional20 percentan-
swered affirmatively, and 23 percent took a noncommittalcenter position.
This distributionnot only reinforces our general doubt about the potency of
left-right, it also strengthensthe finding regardingthe right:the fartheron the
right respondentsplaced themselves, the higher the percentagewho thought

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ComparativePolitics January 1983

Table 5 Ideological Contentby Left-RightLabel for Alignment-LikudVotersa

Left Moderate Center Moderate Right Religious Total

Left Right

Territories 7 12 14 27 28 29 19

Economy 13 12 12 4 4 5 11

None 80 76 74 70 68 67 70

Total 4 15 21 16 17 3 N-645

the continuummeaningful. The ascendantright perceived these cues as more

centralto theirgrowing power thandid the decliningleft, for whom these cues
were often unnecessaryduringthe period of dominance.
The process of filtering, or the use of selective perceptionin handlingpo-
litical cues, was also evident in the resultsachieved from using a differentap-
proach. Using semanticdifferentialquestions, we measuredover time the im-
ages of the ideal partyand those of the two majorpartieson the right-leftcon-
tinuum (see Table 6). In May 1973, before the October Yom KippurWar
dealt a fatal blow to the dominanceof the Alignment, the ideal partywas per-
ceived to be the right, the Likudwas thoughtof as stronglyright, and even the
Alignment was considered more right than left. By 1981, the passing of
dominanceand the adventof competitivenesshad clearly emerged. Although
Alignment voters perceived things much as they had in 1973 (but note how
they had become smaller as a group compared to the Likud voters), Likud
voters perceived the Alignment as much more left than in the past. The cue
had been received. The Alignment had to be rejected. The Likud cue to its
voters to strengthentheir vote transmittedthe signal that the Alignment had
become left and thereforehad to be rejectednot only on political groundsbut
on ideological ones as well. Whereas Likud voters perceived their party as
right over time, they perceivedthat the Alignmenthad moved to the left. In a
relative sense, then, they too had moved to the right.
Alignmentvotersalso pickedup partycues. The idealpartywas perceivedas
more left, or at least less right, between 1973 and 1981. They considered
their ideal party more centristthan ever before. They understoodthat some-
thing had occurred in the party space; in a competitive system their ideal
party, by moving towardthe left, became stuck in the center. Althoughtheir
party had moved to accommodate the shifting nature of the party system,
Alignmentvoters themselves stayed put. Over the two time periodstheir dis-
tributionby left-righttendencywas stationary.Likud voters, despite the static
natureof the perceptionof theirparty(see Table 6), moved dramaticallyto the
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 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

Table 6 Left/RightParty Images by Vote, 1973 and 1981a

Ideal Alignment Likud N

May 1973

Alignment voters 20/48 33/37 10/76 708

Likud Voters 7/69 32/43 7/79 313

Total 15154 32/37 9/76 1021

April 1981

Alignment voters 24/38 32/33 10/75 306

Likud voters 3/76 53/25 4/82 208

Total 14/57 42/29 7/79 586

a. Based on a seven-point semantic differential battery. The numbers

in the table are the sum of the percentage of the sample
identifying the parties with a given characteristic, with the three
categories left of the center point being summed and presented left
of the slash and the three categories right of the center point
summed and presented right of the slash. The size of the middle
category is the difference between 100 and the sum of the two
reported figures. For example, on the seven point scale, 14 per
cent reported in 1981 that their ideal party was either in the
first, second, or third category toward the right end of the
continuum, while another 57 per cent were in the three categories
on the left end and 29 per cent (100 - 71) were in the fourth or
middle category.

right; 45 percent of them identified themselves as right in 1973 compared with

58 percent in 1981.
If our conclusions regarding the political functions of the left-right con-
tinuum are correct, our findings should reflect these conclusions when we
control for important attitudinal and social factors. And indeed they do. The
higher the level of political interest, the greater the correlations between at-
titudes and the left-right label and between attitudes and the vote (see Table
7), as the ample literature on political interest and education leads us to be-
lieve. The ideological functions of the continuum are especially pronounced at
higher levels of interest and education.21 In addition and central to our theory,
the relation between the vote and the label remains high regardless of the level
of interest in politics. The cues sent by the parties bypass attitudes for the less
interested but work well nonetheless. The generalizations in the literature re-

153
ComparativePolitics January 1983

Table 7 Pearson Correlationsof Alignment-LikudVote, Left-Right Label, and At-

titudes by Political Interestand Continentof Birtha

Left-Right
Territories Economy Label

High Interest (N?201)

Vote .41 .33 .45
Label .42 .43

Some Interest (N1=268)

Vote .33 .14 .45
Label .22 .14

Little Interes-t (N=186)

Vote .13 (.03) .31
Label .15 (.01)

No Interest (N=136)
Vote (.07) (.11) .43
Label .15 .11

European-American (N=329)
Vote .26 .19 .49
Label .33 .26

Asian-African (N=368)
Vote .24 .17 .33
Label .18 .16

I Left-Right Left-Right
Territories Economy | Label Territories Economy Label

High Interest European-American (N=94) Asian-African (N=80)

Vote .38 .34 .52 .44 1 .39 .35

Label .45 .54 1 .37 1 .39

Low Interest European-Amnerican (N=45) Asian-African (N=75)

Vote (.05) (.06) .56 (.09) (.07) .36

Label ( . 22) ( . 20) ( . 20) ( . 04)

a. From March 1981 survey. For Israeli-born, father's continent of birth.

Israeli-born whose fathers were also Israeli-born were excluded from the analysis
(9X of the sample).

garding interest and ideology are correct, but they overlook the political as-
pect of the relationship.The relationshipsbetween the left-rightlabel and at-
titudes and between the vote and attitudesare indeed conditionedby the level
of political interest. But not so the relationshipbetween the vote and the left-
right label. That relationshipremainsstrong at all levels of political interest.
Although the relationshipis weaker, the levels of education generate the

154
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

same general patternas the degree of political interest.22The higherthe level

of education, the more effective the left-rightcontinuumis in cuing political
attitudes;but regardlessof the level of education, the political cuing function
works well.
In Israelthe difference between those Jews who arrivedin Israel from Eu-
ropean-Americancountriesand those who arrivedfrom Asian-Africancoun-
tries has always been great. The formerwas the foundinggroupwhose mem-
bers possessed modern skills and higher levels of education. Closely associ-
ated with the partyof dominance,the group set the tone and the normsof the
developing country.
Given the generalpoliticalrelevanceof the ethnic variable,we examinedits
effect on the relationshipsbetween vote, attitudes, and the left-right label.
Table 7 shows that the general patternof correlationsholds: the highest cor-
relationin both subtablesis the one between the party vote and the left-right
label. It is higherthanthe correlationsbetween attitudes,on the one hand, and
the political label, on the other. When comparing the Europeanborn with
those from Asian and Africancountries, we found a similarmagnitudeof re-
lationships between attitudesand the vote. But the correlationbetween the
vote and the left-right label is lower for the Asian-Africanborn, as are the
correlationsbetween the political label and the two issues. Looking further
into these relationshipsby controllingfor ethnic origin and political interest
simultaneously,we found that the differences between the two ethnic groups
remain with regard to the relevance of the left-right continuum but that the
similaritiesbetween the ethnic groupsare much more strikingthan the differ-
ences. At high levels of interestthe correlationsbetween attitudes,the politi-
cal label, and the vote are high for both ethnic groups, and at low levels of
interest relations between the vote and attitudes and between the left-right
label and attitudesdisappearfor both groups. Only the correlationbetweenthe
vote and the political label remains high-and at the level of the correlation
for the high-interestgroup.
Age variations between the two ethnic groups may be at least a partial
source for the difference between them. Jews of Europeanorigin are on the
average older. When we controlled for age, we found indications of two
age-relatedprocesses: with aging, the correlationbetween the vote and the
left-right label increased-the cues are learned and learned better the older
one is. But there also seems to be a generationaleffect: the older generation
still holds the cues from the periodof dominance,thus relatingthe cues less to
partythando youngerage groups(althoughnot as little as the youngest gener-
ation). The correlationsbetween the vote and the label are .27 for those aged
eighteento twenty-two,. 36 forthe groupagedtwenty-threeto twenty-eight,.51
for those between twenty-nineand thirty-eight,and .42 for those over thirty-
nine.

1l55
ComparativePolitics January 1983

CONCLUSION

Our argumentis that only by reinjectingthe political considerationinto the

analysis can the functioning of the left-right continuumbe properly under-
stood. The electorateis in need of cues, and the labeling providedby the par-
ties helps voters make sense of the partysystem. Althoughthis sense may be
relatedto attitudesand ideology at higher levels of educationalachievement
andpolitical interest,the basic relationshipbetweenpartychoice and left-right
tendency is much strongerand equally clear at all levels of ideological con-
ceptualization.
Reinterpretingin this light the vast amountof data that has been collected
places the political partyand its activity at the centerof politics-where it be-
longs, in our opinion-and not at the receivingend of a long causal chain. The
political partytransmittingcues is more importantthanthe ideological content
of the label that is being transmitted.Elections are primarilycontests between
political organizations and competing elites and only secondarily contests
between opposing ideas. Partiesoften try to presenttheir appealsin ideologi-
cal guise, and in some elections ideological alternativeshave even been pre-
sented and debated. In Westerndemocracies,the tendency to presentpolitical
parties as representing competing ideologies is great among scholars,
analysts,journalists, and politiciansthemselves. But in most cases the party,
trying to mobilize voters and legitimize itself by stressingthe correspondence
between the cues and the label it transmitsand the messages and symtols ac-
ceptable in a given polity, is at the center of attention.
The left-rightcontinuumshouldbe thoughtof as denotinga partyspace, not
an ideological space, for the electorate. This conceptualizationshould not be
construedto mean that the left-rightcontinuumis irrelevantto politics. For
much of the academic, political, and communicationselite, left-right repre-
sents ideological content as well as political cues. For the "masses," the
left-rightcontinuumdoes not structurethe vote; it defines the boundariesof
the partyspace within which the voting choice is made. As we have shown in
the case of Israel, it may be that left and right have become more important
not because of increasing ideological differences but because of increasing
competitivenessbetween parties. There is no need to forsake the use of left
and right labels in politics as long as we rememberthe fundamentallypartisan
and political purposethat they serve.

NOTES

We thank Mr. Ilan Talmud for his able assistance in communicatingwith the computer. The
researchon which this articlewas based was supportedin partby the Pinhas SapirCenterfor De-
velopment of Tel-Aviv University.

156
 Asher Arian and Michal Shamir

1. AnthonyDowns,An EconomicTheoryof Democracy (New York:Harperand Row, 1957).

2. See the rationalchoice, spatial analysis school and empirical work along the line of the
Michiganschool, such as ArthurMiller, WarrenE. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and ThadA. Brown,
"A MajorityPartyin Disarray:Policy Voting in the 1972 Election," AmericanPolitical Science
Review 70 (1976): 753-78; J.D. Holm and J.R. Robinson, "Ideological Identificationand the
American Voter," Public Opinion Quarterly42, no.2 (1978): 235-46; and Theresa, E. Levitin
andWarrenE. Miller, "Ideological Interpretations of PresidentialElections," AmericanPolitical
Science Review 73 (September 1979): 751-71.
3. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of PartyCompetition,"AmericanPolitical Science Re-
view 57 (1963): 368-77.
4. C. Alan Elms, Personalityin Politics (New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich, Inc., 1976).
5. See Giovanni Sartori,Party and Party Systems (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press,
1976); Ronald Inglehartand Hans D. Klingemann,"Party Identification,Ideological Preference
and the Left-RightDimension among WesternMass Publics," in Party Identifictionand Beyond,
ed. Ian Budge, Ivan Crewe, and Dennis Farlie (London:Wiley, 1976), pp. 243-73, who make an
argumentsimilarto ours;see also Downs, An EconomicTheory;Angus Campbell, PhilipE. Con-
verse, WarrenE. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The AmericanVoter (New York: Wiley, 1960);
and PhilipsW. Shively, "The Developmentof PartyIdentificationamong Adults:Explorationof
a FunctionalModel," AmericanPolitical Science Review 73 (1979): 1039-54-all of whom de-
velop the functionalmodel of party identification.
6. See Inglehartand Klingemann, "Party Identification";Samuel Barnes, "Left, Right and
the Italian Voter," Comparative Political Studies 4 (1971): 157-75; Hans D. Klingemann,
"Testing the Left-Right Continuumon a Sample of German Voters," Comparative Political
Studies (1972): 93-105; Jean A. Laponce, "Note on the Use of the Left-Right Dimension,"
ComparativePolitical Studies 3 (1970): 481-502; and Levitin and Miller, "ldeological Interpre-
tations."
7. Inglehartand Klingemann, "Party Identification," and Levitin and Miller, "Ideological
Interpretations."
8. Hans D. Klingemann, "The Backgroundof Ideological Conceptualization,"in Political
Action, ed. Samuel H. Barnes et al. (Beverly Hills, California:Sage Publications, 1979) pp.
255-78; and Inglehartand Klingemann, "Party Identification."
9. Levitin and Miller, "Ideological Interpretations,"p. 751; see also David ButlerandDonald
E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1969); PhilipE. Converse,
"Some Mass-EliteContrastsin the Perceptionof Political Spaces," in Social Science Informa-
tion 14, no. 3/4 (1975): 49-83; Inglehartand Klingemann, "Party Identification";Miller et al.,
"A MajorityParty in Disarray";Hans D. Klingemann,"Measuring Ideological Conceptualiza-
tions," in Political Action, ed. Samuel H. Barnes et al. (Beverly Hills, California:Sage Pub-
lications, 1979), pp. 215-54; and PamelaJohnstonConoverand Stanley Feldman, "The Origins
and Meaning of Liberal/ConservativeSelf-Identifications,"AmericanJournal of Political Sci-
ence 25, no. 4 (November 1981): 617-45.
10. See Norman H. Nie and Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political
Change and AttitudeStructure,"Journal of Politics 36 (1974): 540-91; NormanH. Nie et al.,
The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Massachusetts:HarvardUniversity Press, 1976);
John C. Pierce, "Party Identificationand the ChangingRole of Ideology in AmericanPolitics,"
MidwestJournalof Political Science 14 (1970): 25-42; GeraldM. Pomper, "From Confusionto
Clarity:Issues and AmericanVoters, 1956-1968," AmericanPolitical Science Review 66 (1972):
415-28; John 0. Field and RonaldAnderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conceptualizationof the
1964 Election," Public OpinionQuarterly 33 (1969): 380-98; ChristoferH. Achen, "Mass Po-
litical Attitudes and the Survey Response," American Political Science Review 69 (1975):
1218-31; John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, "Ideological Constraintin
the Mass Public:A MethodologicalCritiqueand Some New Findings,"AmericanJournalof Po-
litical Science 22 (May 1978): 233-49; George F. Bishop et al., "Effects of Question Wording
and Formaton Political AttitudeConsistency," Public OpinionQuarterly42 (1978): 81-91; and
GregoryG. Brunk,"The 1964 AttitudeConsistencyLeap Reconsidered,"Political Methodology
5 (1978): 347-59.
11. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and

157
ComparativePolitics January 1983

Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61; Philip E. Converse,
"Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," in The Handbookof Political Science, vol. 6, ed. F.I.
Greensteinand N.W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1974), pp. 75-170.
12. Eric R. A. N. Smith, "The Levels of Conceptualization:False Measuresof Ideological
Sophistication,"American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 68$5-96.
13. David J. Finlay et al., "The Concept of Left and Right in Cross-NationalResearch,"
ComparativePolitical Studies 7 (1974): 209-21.
14. HarryEckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in The Handbookof Po-
litical Science, vol. 7, ed. Fred I. Greensteinand Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley, 1975), pp. 79-137.
15. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt,Israel Society (London:Weidenfeldand Nicolson, 1967); Emanuel
Gutmann,"Political Partiesand Groups:Stability and Change," in The Israeli Political System,
ed. Moshe Lissak and EmanuelGutmann(Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1977), pp. 122-70 (in Hebrew).
16. For the wordingof the question, see note b, Table 2. All the surveys were based on repre-
sentativesamplesof the adulturbanJewish populationof Israel.With two exceptions, the surveys
reportedhere were conductedby the IsraelInstituteof Applied Social Research. The Marchand
June 1981 surveys were conductedby the Dahaf Research Institute.All the questionnaireswere
preparedby Arian.
17. Converse, "The Natureof Belief Systems in Mass Publics," and Butler and Stokes, Po-
litical Change in Britain.
18. The territoriesquestion was put to a small sample in August 1969 but was not repeatedin
subsequentsurveys conductedthat year. See note b, Table 4.
19. In 1969 the foreign policy question was different from the one used in the other surveys
(see note b, Table 4). This difference makes questionablethe comparisonof the correlationsover
time. Disregardingthis question, we observe some long-termstrengtheningof the weak correla-
tions between attitudesand the vote as well as between attitudesand the left-righttendency.
20. See Conover and Feldman, "The Originsand Meaningof Liberal/ConservativeSelf-Iden-
tifications." They discuss similarAmericanfindings and rejectthe traditionalbipolarconception
of ideological identifications.
21. Campbellet al., The AmericanVoter; Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems"; Con-
verse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior"; and Ingelhartand Klingemann,"Party Identifi-
cation."
22. See Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," for similar results.

158