Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud

The foundations of the state: emerging

urban–rural clevages in transitions countries
Lars Johannsen 
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Warsaw, Poland

Abstract

Using secondary data from 21 post-communist countries, a map of urban–rural cleavages

is produced. The findings are that while persistent cleavages exist with respect to attitudes
toward the state, the market and traditional institutions, these cleavages have yet to be insti-
tutionalized within the political system. Deviations from the generalized pattern can typi-
cally be explained by the intrusion of the state-building process into the urban–rural
cleavage structure. Furthermore, it is argued that the lack of institutionalization has led to a
situation in which state and political elites have gained increased autonomy.
# 2003 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.

Keywords: Political cleavages; State autonomy; Urban rural relations; Values; Institutionalization; Post-
communism

Foundations of the state

Political cleavages were conspicuously absent in the official rhetoric of the now for-
mer communist countries. The evolution of Soviet man and the much-heralded tri-
umph of the working class should, at least in theory, create a homogenous and
harmonious society. The concept of political cleavages, which divide society into pol-
itically significant groups on the assumption that underlying social structures are rel-
evant for political activity, has traditionally provided a strong tool for the analysis of
the stability of the party system and the number of political parties (Sartori, 1976;
Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). However, not only has social group attachment to
political parties waned in recent years (see, for example, Inglehart, 1997; Evans, 2000;
Dalton, 1996), but the very concept of cleavage also faces a direct challenge with the


Tel.: +45 89 442 1111.
E-mail address: johannsen@ps.au.dk (L. Johannsen).

0967-067X/$ - see front matter # 2003 The Regents of the University of California. Published by
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0967-067X(03)00040-0
292 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

analysis of the restructuring of former communist societies. In these societies a mix-

ture of a legacy consisting of atomized civil societies and a lack of market differen-
tiation was combined with the instant arrival of mass politics and economic reform.
The risk, therefore, is that too much is in motion to keep track of emerging cleavages
and that the political organizations are insufficiently differentiated and organization-
ally strong and stable to reflect these cleavages.
However, in embarking on the project of transition to democracy and the mar-
ket, and in some instances independence, the post-communist countries set out to
fundamentally alter the polity and the economy. Such changes are expected to lead
to a differentiation of socio-economic opportunities and allegiances, and hence the
transition may provide a new ‘critical juncture’ where cleavages of earlier critical
junctures are restored, in particular in the process of post-Napoleonic nation build-
ing and the industrial revolution.1 It is also likely that the transition itself may be-
come a new ideological cleavage, reflecting the underlying changed role of the state
and the regime. Furthermore, if political cleavages are indeed (re)emerging, they
can serve as background for further analyses of the capacity of the state to make
and implement policies, and thus contribute to our understanding of state-society
relations and the (likely) direction of state policies.
While it is generally recognized that the economic reforms instituted in the tran-
sition countries have had distributive consequences, it is perhaps less well known
that they have also had an urban bias as the rural economy (and population) in
general has lost more than the industrial and service sectors. Thus, the decline in
overall GDP during the first years of economic reform partly stems from a rural
sector in even deeper recession. Furthermore, whereas support to agriculture dur-
ing communism amounted to about twice the OECD average, farmers in the tran-
sition countries on average received less than their western colleagues by the end of
the 1990s (Johannsen, 2001).
Proposals for reductions in agricultural subsidies in the West nearly always un-
leash demonstrations by farmers, including roadblocks and the almost ritual burn-
ing of tyres. This corresponds to Haggard and Kaufman’s (1995, pp. 156–159)
observation of the inadequate organization of potential winners of economic re-
form as a potential barrier to economic reform. However, in the transition coun-
tries it does not seem that the losers, that is, the rural population have been either
better or more poorly organized than the winners, that is, the urbanites. This lack
of organized protest and support has in turn contributed to an increase in the rela-
tive autonomy of the state and state elites.
Ruechemeyer and Evans (1985, p. 64) argue that a combination of socio-econ-
omic crisis and constellation of cleavages, where threats from below may induce
the dominant classes to endow the state with more freedom of action, is likely to
result in increased state autonomy. Thus, rather than viewing the transition in the
former communist countries as only a matter of state withdrawal, it has also

1
Flora (1999, p. 304–306) spells out four critical junctures based on Stein Rokkan’s work, 1) the re-
formation. 2) the national revolution, 3) the industrial revolution, and 4) the international revolution.
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 293

proved to be a transition in which the state has gained autonomy vis-à-vis society
to make and implement reforms.
The increased state autonomy was used at the expense of the rural economy in
the transition countries. In an illustrative example, Wegren (2000) demonstrates
that rural interests in Russia consistently have been unable to get the state to inter-
vene to moderate the impact of price liberalization. However Kjær et al. (2002) ar-
gue that autonomy is a two-edged sword in developing capacity. On the one hand,
the state will be vulnerable to particularistic interests if it has too little autonomy,
while on the other hand the compliance of social groups may not be secured if the
state is too autonomous. Corresponding to the famous ‘window of opportunity’
(Balcerowicz, 1995)2 it is, however, questionable if the far-reaching reforms could
be carried out without at least a temporary increase in state autonomy. Kjær et al.
(2002) argument may hence be more relevant in a development perspective in the
sense that once the reforms are set in motion, the state may become entrenched
within society again, that is involving societal actors in the policy process (Evans,
1995) when the structural placement of social groups has changed and voter align-
ment shifted accordingly (Lipset, 1959, p. 294–297).
Whereas previous research has emphasized attitudinal divisions of an ideological
nature linked to the agenda of the transition and specific trait division such as
nationality (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Evans and Whitefield, 1998), the ambition here is
to survey the urban–rural divide utilizing data for 21 transition countries on 20
questions, a total of 696 observations. Furthermore, it is questioned if the traced
differences in attitudes, participation and institutionalization are consistent over
time.3 The impetus to examine the urban–rural divide in the post-communist coun-
tries is not only impelled by the recognition that urban–rural conflicts have been
institutionalized and represented in European thought, politics and history since
the Estates, but also by the expectation that the transition will open new divides
both in socio-economic and socio-cultural terms.
Despite the shared legacy of communism and the shared agenda in transforming
the polity and the economy, uniformity in the cleavage structure across all tran-
sition countries is not expected. It is certainly possible that cleavages will differ
from country to country. First, historical sentiments and differences in the mode
and policies of transition, and differences in the socio-economic structure are likely
to influence the importance of a cleavage as it interacts with other cleavages that
either reinforce or crosscut the cleavage.4 Second, the high volatility in political
processes where yesterday’s majority party may win little or no representation at
today’s parliamentary election and new political parties mushroom suggests that

2
Balcerowicz (1995, p. 95) calls the window the ‘period of extraordinary politics’.
3
We concur with Whitefield (2002) that the term cleavage is only meaningful if it is persistent over
time. We do, however, distinguish between salient and latent cleavages depending on whether or not
attitudes have become institutionalized.
4
This point has implications for future research. If the countries differ with respect to the direction of
the urban–rural cleavage, case-by-case research should be carried to examine the overall cleavage struc-
ture. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper that merely points to the cases to compare.
294 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

the institutionalization of the cleavage structure in specific political parties is far

from complete and ‘frozen’ (Dalton, 1996). We therefore adopt a distinction
between salient and latent cleavages, the latter expressing a cleavage that has yet to
be expressed in the party system (Flora, 1999, pp. 7, 34; Bartolini and Mair, 1990,
p. 215). This will permit an analysis of the emerging and latent cleavage structure
independently from the issue of the development of the party system.
The turmoil generated by the transition, i.e. the market liberalization, the chan-
ging role of the state and the newly established parties, suggests that the alignment
both in terms of attitudes and institutionalization will be imperfect. Further,
according to the original argument (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 34) the develop-
ment of parties and party systems is a slow process. However, if an alignment can
be demonstrated in a period of turmoil there is all the more reason to be confident
that salient political cleavages will develop over time (Evans and Whitefield, 1998).
If the urban–rural cleavage structure can be substantiated, a piece in the jigsaw
puzzle of political development in the transition countries has hence been found.

Previous research

Two research positions have emerged in the debate over the formation of clea-
vages in the transition countries. The first position bases its arguments on the dra-
matic changes within the various countries. However, if there is agreement on the
existence of attitudinal divides, then the literature is more inconclusive as to whe-
ther the divides are institutionalized in the party system. In his survey of Russia,
Ahl (1999, p. 192) argues that electoral politics ‘cannot properly be understood as
the expression of conflicting interests held by major social groups’. The lack of
social conflict not only inhibits mediation through democratic institutions but also
gives ‘more freedom for elites to contemplate non-democratic actions’, as long as
they are seen to act in the interest of the majority (Ahl, 1999, p. 179). In short, the
atomization of civil society, that is, destruction of the independent social groups,
under communism and the deep recession engendered by the transition renders
models formulated for use in the West inadequate for the foreseeable future.
In their analysis of how Russia votes, White et al. (1997, p. 64) reach a con-
clusion. They stress that the Lipset/Rokkan analysis remains limited when applied
to Russia, in particular with respect to the cultural division. However, the econ-
omic cleavages are also only embryonic at best, as Stalinism managed to destroy
the capacity of social groups to act independently. Furthermore, Stalin’s economic
policies, for example the process of collectivization, sought to obliterate class cate-
gories. Attitudinal differences reflect the transition from authoritarianism and com-
mand economy to democracy and market economy. Elster et al. (1998, p. 25, 235–
136, 248–249) reach a similar conclusion but nevertheless note that the urban–rural
cleavage with its associated agrarian parties is an exception from this general rule.
Early on, Kitschelt (1992) suggested that political competition is likely to take
place between the pro-market and pro-liberals versus the pro-state and authori-
tarian positions. Kitschelt et al. (1999) have later developed the position to suggest
four attitudinal divisions in the electorate. Using this expanded base, they find that
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 295

in four cases (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland), the most
developed cleavage is found between social protectionists and market–liberal parties,
even if other divides make for a unique national configuration of party compo-
sition (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 306). Furthermore, in contrast to Ahl (1999) who in
his examination of Russia was unable to establish an association between social
characteristics such as education and type of employment with attitudes toward
economic reform, Kitschelt et al. (1999) find that social structural traits account
for about 10% of the variation on popular preferences for economic liberalism.
However, the attitudinal divides ‘by and large wash out the independent effect of
socio-structural background variables’ (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 300).
Finally, when measuring support for market-liberal parties, left-right self-place-
ment appears to be the strongest predictor. This suggests consistency at the elec-
toral level. Evans and Whitefield’s (1998) study of political cleavages in the Czech
and Slovak Republics confirms the imprint of the transition. The differences
observed in the Slovak and Czech Republics by and large reflect that the nation-
building process is at the forefront in Slovakia, whereas the transition to the mar-
ket emerges as a central component in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is
ethnically homogeneous and consolidated as a nation-state and the post-Napo-
leonic juncture of nation building is hence less prominent there than in Slovakia.
However, this neither suggests that attitudinal divides are institutionalized, nor
that party systems have become stable as widespread distrust in the political parties
still prevails (Rose, 1995).
Sitter (2001, p. 87) finds that the development of more or less stable patterns of
party competition in Central Europe is ‘driven and shaped largely by the parties
themselves’. This finding gains support from a survey of developments in Lithuania,
Ukraine and Russia (Miller et al., 2000). Markowski (2000) goes even further in his
conclusion that only Hungary has developed a stable party system. These findings
indicate, at a minimum, that the causal direction between institutionalization and
the development of political identifications may be reversed relative to Lipset/Rok-
kan’s original model, or at least work in both directions during the transition, where
the roles played by political parties serve as proof of political entrepreneurship.5
A second position in the debate argues that while an effect of the transition
exists, pitting post-communists against anti-communists, stable and consistent
structures of political identification unrelated to the transition are also present.
Thus, rather than a change in political preferences, volatile electoral behavior
reflects the change in institutional configuration among the contestant, that is, the
mergers and splits and the public images of political parties.
Shabad and Slomczynski (1999) argue against the implicit assumption within the
first position that the structuring of group interests and political preferences only

5
In the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) model territorial-cultural or economic-functional variations lead to
differences in values, attitudes and identities between segments within the society, that with the arrival of
mass politics shape parties and party systems. The model thus carries with it a deterministic touch roo-
ted in Marx and Weber as the impetus for a change come from changes in the society’s socio-economic
structure.
296 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

began after the transition (the so-called Tabula Rasa theory)6 and instead find evi-
dence of stable political identities in Poland shaped by a ‘combination of social
demographic characteristics such as age and gender, size of community, education,
and religiosity, as well as former membership in the Communist Party or Soli-
darity’ (p. 716). Thus, in the early phase of the Polish transition, rural residence
was associated with the populist and post-communist political camps and with pat-
ernalistic views on the proper role of the state (pp. 707; 715). Zarycki and Nowak
(2000, p. 338) find that between 40 and 70% of the variance in electoral behavior in
the Polish presidential and parliamentary elections between 1990 and 1997 can be
ascribed to two factors. The first factor is interpreted as an urban–rural divide and
the second is related to the differences arising from the imprint of the Polish parti-
tions and the territories annexed following World War II.
Furthermore, building on Kitschelt’s classification of cleavages, Zarycki (2000)
finds that economic issues, that is, conflicts over resource redistribution and free
market support, could collectively be interpreted as an urban–rural cleavage while,
in turn, the values of liberalism vis-à-vis authoritarian attitudes expressed a centre-
periphery cleavage. Kubicek (2000) finds that socioeconomic differences cannot ac-
count for the variation in the patterns of beliefs and voting among the regions in
Ukraine. He therefore maintains the historical foundation of cleavages in his ac-
count of growing regional polarization.7 This corresponds to Bunce’s (1995) dis-
cussion of the differences between the transitions in Eastern Europe with the earlier
ones in Southern Europe and Latin America. She argues that one of the con-
sequences of eradicating classes in state socialism is that emerging cleavages first
and foremost will reflect primordial groups and historical sentiments in the process
of state building.
The role played by political parties in shaping political identities found within
the former position is not immediately recognizable in the latter. However, White-
field (2002) makes two observatiost, he argues that communism did not destroy the
public’s cognitive capacity to have complex and structured attitudes, or to make
judgments about how these attitudes relate to parties. Second, despite evidence of
structured partisan choices, this structure is likely to be temporary because the
political parties themselves are unstable and elite interests dominate. Yet, Clark
(1995) sees strong evidence of class vote in Lithuania, but Nørgaard and

6
An illustrative example is that Schmitter and Karl (1994) argue that the ‘tabula rasa’ concept is one
of the main differences distinguishing the post communist transitions from the transitions in Southern
Europe and Latin America.
7
Kubicek’s (2000) findings give rise to an important argument against the method adopted in this sur-
vey. Here the analytical distinction between urban and rural populations is made within a country, mak-
ing country the unit of analysis. Choosing country as the unit of analysis is a conservative decision in
the sense that other cleavages may wash out the urban–rural difference. However, in situations char-
acterized by stark regional differences, we may thus not know if detected differences result from a
reinforcement of the cleavage. Second, insignificant results may be due to divisions within the rural
population generated by the land reform process. Thus and Johannsen and Nielsen (2002) finds a
division between Lithuanian farmers, who have received land through the restitution process, and workers
in those agrarian enterprises that still function.
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 297

Johannsen (1999) add to that explanation by arguing that early polarization and
party institutionalization also brought about an institutional framework that ben-
efited large organized parties. This made the parties invest in organizational and
political development to prevail in electoral competitions.
At present, research concerning cleavage structures and political development in
transition countries is somewhat inconclusive and it is safe to argue that the
research has so far failed to systematize the complex causal pattern in which ideo-
logies, political parties and structural aspects shape developments. However, three
central lessons can be learned from previous research. First, both positions recog-
nize that changes in the economic and political regimes affect attitudes or at least
that the public forms opinions about the dramatic changes and the role they would
prefer the state to play in economic and social affairs. Second, it will be fair to
argue that the role of political parties is still not sufficiently researched. Firm proof
of an early institutionalization of cleavage structures into party systems has not
been presented.
Moreover, it is a question whether the political parties themselves can be seen as
the driving force in developing constituencies along emerging cleavages, or whether
parties reflect embryonic and historical cleavages. The lack of strong links between
the electorate and the political parties continues to transfer autonomy into the
hands of the state and political elites that still play a predominant role in the shap-
ing of the polity and policies. Third, the two positions diverge on the question whe-
ther the emerging cleavage structure is historically and structurally rooted.
Whereas the first position, with some variation, adopts a ‘‘tabula rasa’’ perspective,
the second school of research has been able to link cleavages with processes of the
state building. These three lessons will be applied in this research paper to compare
attitudes, party preferences and participation in rural and urban populations.

Some reflections on the research model

When comparing urban–rural8 cleavages in 21 countries on the parameters such

as attitudes, participation and institutionalization, we look for a general pattern in

8
The urban–rural cleavage is measured as a dichotomy with the rural category defined as 0–20,000
inhabitants. This satisfies three criteria of robustness. 1) Univariate sensitivity studies show that an alter-
native category of 0–5000 inhabitants will only produce minor or no change in the results across coun-
tries over time. 2) Use of 0–20,000 inhabitants corresponds well with both the theoretically expected and
empirically observable bimodal distribution. 3) Using 20,000 as the divide honors robustness and is a
conservative choice. CEEB (Central and Eastern EuroBarometer): For 1990 and 1991 rural population
includes community sizes below 20,000 inhabitants. For 1992 and 1993 only labels are assigned. We
have assumed the same categories as CEEB 1991. For 1995, 1996 and 1997 rural population includes
‘smaller city’ and ‘village areas—rural areas’; urban population includes ‘Capital’ and ‘other big city’.
NBB (New Democracies Barometer): For 1993, 1995 and 1996 rural population includes communities
below 20,000 inhabitants. NDB (New Baltic Barometer): For 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1995 rural popu-
lation includes communities of less than 20,000 inhabitants. NBB and NDB are used with the per-
mission of and as part of the CITNET program headed by Richard Rose and Christian Haerpher.
298 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

Table 1
A hypothetical coding example
Country Rural Urban Coding
A 30 50 U
B 60 70 U
C 50 20 R
Support for an issue in percent.

order to identify groups of cases where the direction of cleavage structures differs.
This perspective also implies that we are less concerned about absolute levels of
support for attitudes and political parties than whether differences do in fact exist
between urban and rural populations within a country.
The hypothetical example in Table 1 may help to clarify the coding. In countries
A and B, urban support is forthcoming, whereas there is less support for the issue
in question among the urban population of country C. The coding will reflect this
by assigning U, U and R to countries A, B and C respectively. However, this cod-
ing ignores that rural support in countries B and C is much higher than in A, and
that the rural population in C came forth to the same extent as the urban popu-
lation in A. Information is thus lost. However, as we have chosen to find out whe-
ther or not urban–rural cleavages in fact exist rather than to explain the absolute
level of support for an issue or differences in support between countries, the coding
matches the research question, to establish a broad category of cleavage structures.
This choice also implies that it cannot be argued that the importance of a cleavage
is greater in one country than in another. We can merely ascertain whether or not
cleavages exist and, if so, their direction.
Given the ambiguity of previous research and that no pervious attempt to
survey a cleavage structure over time and for 21 countries has been made, we
have adopted several indicators to evaluate the strength of each item in our
data set guided by the principle of robustness. First, the number of significant
observations was counted. As reported in Table 2, significant results were
found on all items in the battery. However, it is not surprising that fewer valid
results were found on variables covering political institutionalization and par-
ticipation. Second, given that several observations on a specific item were avail-
able, the number of inconsistencies was counted. An inconsistency is a situation
with at least two significant observations where, for example, the urbanites
carry more support in one observation and less in another. This makes sense
in theoretical terms as a cleavage is supposed to be stable and not fluctuate
over a relatively short period of time. Only four inconsistencies were found in
230 cases with more than one observation. This indicates that the structure is
stable. Third, because some of the variables tapped the same underlying dimen-
sion it was decided to require that inconsistencies among sub-questions in the
dimensions would not be used when the results were compared (see note to
Table 3).
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 299

Table 2
General strength indicators of Urban–Rural cleavages 1990–1997
Variable Total Significant differences (0.05) Number of Possible
inconsistencies observations
Urban Rural Total
DEVEL 87 18 9 27 1 19
STATE_PROP 22 1 13 14 0 9
T_PRIV 23 5 3 8 1 10
STATE_WEL 21 2 3 5 0 8
FREEMAR 87 31 3 34 0 19
PARLSUS 44 1 13 14 0 13
STRONGL 31 0 10 10 0 10
T_P.O 26 0 10 10 0 9
T_COURTS 30 0 5 5 0 13
T_ARMY 30 1 10 11 1 13
T_CURCH 30 0 14 14 0 13
T_POLICE 30 0 5 5 0 13
RIGHTIST 34 3 3 6 0 11
NON-COM-PAR 41 11 2 13 1 12
DISCUSS 30 11 1 12 0 10
CONVINCE 31 14 0 14 0 10
INT_POL 16 9 0 9 0 5
VOTE-INTENT 31 0 5 5 0 11
T-POL.PAR 30 1 2 3 0 13
T-FARM.ORG 22 2 5 6 0 9
Total 696 110 116 226 4 230
Source: Authors’ calculations based CEEB I-VII; NDB I-IV; NBB I-III.

Despite these precautions we readily admit that the results should be

treated with caution and that the map of cleavage structures presented here is
tentative.

Emerging patterns: attitudes to the market, the state and democracy

The transition has had ramifications for the economic and political regimes in
Eastern Europe, and we, therefore, track differences in attitudes toward the mar-
ket, the state and democracy by considering the emerging pattern of cleavages on
three dimensions:

. Attitude to and perception of the market and the role of the state
a) prefers state ownership of enterprises (STATE_PROP)
b) trust in private enterprises (T_PRIV)
c) prefers state responsibility for welfare (STATE_WEL)
d) a free market economy is considered to be right development for the country
(FREEMAR).
 300

Table 3
Dimensions of the Urban–Rural cleavage 1990–1997
DEVEL STATE_ T_PRIV STATE_ FREE- MARKET_ PARLSUS STRONGL DEM_ T_P.O T_ T_ T_ T_ TRUST_
PROP WEL MAR DIM DIM COURTS ARMY CHURCH POLICE DIM

Albania R N/A N/A N/A R R N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Armenia U N/A N/A N/A U U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Belarus R R U . U U R R U R . R R R R
Bulgaria U R U R U U R R U R . R R . R
Croatia . R . . U U . . . . . . . . .
Czech R. U . U . . U R R U . . . . . .
Estonia R (U) (R) . R R . . . (R) R R . R R
Georgia  N/A N/A N/A U U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Hungary . R U . U U R R U R R R R R R
Kazakhstan R N/A N/A N/A U U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Latvia R . . (U) U () R (R) U (R) . . . . (R)
Lithuania U (R) . . U U . . U (R) R . R R R
Macedonia U N/A N/A N/A . . N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Moldova . . . . (U) (U) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Poland U . . R U U R . U R . R R R R
Romania . R  . U  . R U . . R R . R
Rus(euro) U N/A N/A N/A U U N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Slovakia . R R R U  R R U R .  R . 
Slovenia U . . . U U R . U R . . R . R
Ukraine . R . U U  U . R (R) . R R . R
Yugoslavia (R) N/A N/A N/A . . N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Source: Author’s calculations based on CEEB I-VII, NBB I-III, NDB I-IV.
L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 301

. Lack of support for democracy

a) the approval of parliamentary suspension (PARLSUS)
b) whether a strong leader is preferred over parliamentary rule (STRONGL).9
. Trust in state and traditional institutions
a) trust in public officials (T_P.O)
b) trust in courts (T_COURTS)
c) trust in the police (T_POLICE)
d) trust in the army (T_ARMY)
e) trust in the church (T_CHURCH).
For all tree dimensions (coded as MARKET_DIM; DEM_DIM and TRUST_
DIM) consistency in the direction among the constituent questions are required.10
All tree dimensions (MARKET_DIM; DEM_DIM and TRUST_DIM) require
consistency in the direction among the constituent questions.
In the majority of cases the urban population expresses more support for the
market and a diminishing role for the state in welfare provision (MARKET_DIM,
see Table 3). This result was expected, given the losses of incurred by the rural
economies relative to the urban and industrialized economy throughout the tran-
sition. The pattern is reversed in Estonia and Albania, however. Although the rural
populations in both countries are more inclined to believe that developments are
moving in the right direction (DEVEL), the reasons need not be the same. In Alba-
nia, rapid distributive land reforms resulted in a relative early and strong resump-
tion of growth in the rural economy (Cungu and Swinnen, 1999; Lemel, 1998;
Lerman, 1999; Swinnen, 1999; Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998).
In contrast, land reform proceeded more slowly in Estonia and growth in the ru-
ral economy has not been resumed at the pace seen in other sectors of the economy
(Rabinowicz, 1997; Meyers and Kazlauskiene, 1998; Lerman, 1999). However, as
the urban–rural cleavage structure is reinforced by the (chiefly) ethnic division
among Estonians and Russian speaking immigrants, indigenous control could be
secured by adopting restitution as the principle vehicle of land reform. Corre-
sponding to the desire of restoring the Estonian republic after some 50 years of

9
We have chosen not to use the otherwise commonly used CEEB question concerning ‘Satisfaction
with the development of democracy’ as an indicator of democratic sentiment. We believe that the ques-
tion expresses an evaluation of current performance rather than support for democracy. Thus Johannsen
(2000) finds on the aggregate level that the degree of inflation has the strongest association with the ‘sat-
isfaction with the development of democracy’ variable.
10
Some notes to Tables 3 and 4. The present research covers the period between 1990 and 1997. For
some countries we have several observations covering almost all years and for other countries only a sin-
gle survey has been available. In evaluating these results we have distinguished between results based on
only one survey and results from several surveys. Thus, a result (R, U, ) in brackets indicates that only
one survey has been available. When not in brackets, this indicates, 1) there is more than one obser-
vation, 2) at least one of these observations is significant, and 3) no significant observations are mutually
contradictory. If two observations are mutually contradictory we have classified them as inconsistent,
assigning  as the result. Insignificant differences are denoted with a dot. Concerning the aggregated
dimensions, we not only require that each variable is consistent, but also consistency in the direction
among the constituent questions in the aggregated dimension.
302 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

Soviet annexation, the principle was also followed in other sectors and policies
(Kuddo, 1996). Furthermore, Unwin (1998) concludes that the drive toward a free-
market economy has revealed that the Estonian national identity is based on the
republic’s rural past and Nørgaard and Johannsen (1999, p. 96) see the drive
towards self-determination in the late 1980’s—that is, independence, market econ-
omy and democracy, as a rejection of Soviet rule. It is therefore possible that the
positive or less negative evaluations expressed by the rural populations in Estonia
and Albania are products of quite different circumstances.
Latvia and Ukraine are classified as inconsistent on the market dimension. How-
ever, both cases illuminate possible hypotheses about the state as welfare provider
in a market economy. In both cases, the urban populations are more in favor of a
market economy than the rural populations, but the urban dwellers are also more
inclined to believe that the state should be responsible for developing and main-
taining the welfare system. Rather than an inconsistency this position could reflect
a preference for an economic model corresponding to that found in the Scandina-
vian countries. However, further studies, in particular using comparative cases, are
necessary to confirm this proposition.
With respect to the second leg of the new regime, it is striking that except for
Ukraine, urban populations report significantly less support for the two authori-
tarian options than rural populations do. This implies that the urbanites to a
higher extent espouse democratic values than their rural compatriots. This feature
has long been recognized within modernization theory, which proposes that econ-
omic modernization and urbanization induces a value change toward more secular,
tolerant and democratic ends. On a much broader scale, the present research con-
firms Shabad and Slomczynski’s (1999) discussion of the association rural residence
with populism, paternalism and post-communist camps in the Polish political sys-
tem.
In view of this, it is hardly surprising that rural populations show more trust in
traditional institutions such as the church (T_CHURCH). Rural residents also
exhibit greater trust in state institutions. This pattern is perhaps surprising given
the economic difficulties encountered throughout the transition, but it is consistent
with the more authoritarian values discussed above, the paternalistic views found
by Shabad and Slomczynski (1999), and less political participation (see Table 4). It
is also surprising given the argument that good governance, participation and trust
go together (Johannsen and Nørgaard, 2001). Rather, these findings show that the
political residues of an authoritarian past and traditional socio-cultural life have
developed a subject-oriented culture in the rural areas. The ‘subjectness’ of rural
attitudes provide autonomy for the state elites and is a far cry from the engaged
and critical democratic participation necessary for interlocking or embedding the
state in a rural based civil society. Finally, as the broad pattern of less market sup-
port and authoritarian outlook crisscrosses cultures, mode of transition and land
reform (except Estonia and Albanian), this is evidence of a deeply rooted cleavage
structure unrelated to the current transition agenda.
Table 4
Level of civic engagement and institutionalization
RIGHTIST NON_ DISCUSS CONVINCE VOTE_ INT_POL T_ T_
COM_PARa INTENT POL. PAR FARM.ORG

Albania U . U . R N/A N/A N/A

Armenia . N/A U (U) . N/A N/A N/A
Belarus . N/A . . (R) N/A . U
Bulgaria U U U U . N/A R R
Croatia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A . .
Czech R. .  . . . U . .
Estonia R . . . R . . (R)
Georgia (R) N/A (R) . . N/A N/A N/A
Hungary U . U . . (U) . .
Kazakhstan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Latvia . R . . . U R .
Lithuania . . . U . U . .
Macedonia . . . (U) . N/A N/A N/A
Moldova (R) N/A . . .
Poland . . U U . U . R
Romania . . . . . N/A U R
Rus(euro) . U U U . N/A N/A N/A
Slovakia . U . (U) . U . .
Slovenia . N/A . (U) . U . .
Ukraine . U (U) (U) (R) N/A . .
Yugoslavia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CEEB I-VII, NBB I-III, NDB I-IV.
L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

a
Ishiyama’s (1999) classification of communist successor parties is used. Small N problems in cells for Ukraine 1993; Romania 1993; Estonia 1993 and
1995; Latvia 1993 and 1995.
303
304 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

Emerging patterns: participation and institutionalization

The pattern of participation reported in Table 4 was discussed above. Concern-

ing the four questions that tap political participation, it must be noted that urban
residents to a higher degree than their rural counterparts express an interest in
politics (INT_POL), and more often discuss politics (DISCUSS) and convince
friends (CONVINCE) to shape their views. However, it is the rural dwellers that
actually intend to use the ballot box (VOTE_INTENT). This can interpreted as a
legacy of the communist system and its regimented participation (Mihalisko, 1997).
Thus, when people who identify themselves as conservative and ‘preservationist’
exhibit far greater interest in voting compared to the liberal and reform oriented
segments, the latter are simply exercising one of their new democratic rights—the
freedom to not participate (Rose, 1997; Johannsen, 2000, p. 96).
Johannsen (2000) argues that the pattern of urban–rural participation and the
traditional values held in the rural areas were used strategically by the incumbent
communists in Belarus to design an electoral system to their own advantage by
keeping the Belarusian Popular Front from winning a fair share of the seats.11
However, similar outcomes may not have identical causes. Further analyses of the
Estonian data for 1991 thus confirm that the ethnic cleavage was reinforced by the
urban–rural cleavage structure. Ethnic Russians (and other Slavs) are less inclined
to declare their intention to vote than ethnic Estonians are. This corresponds to the
‘restoration of the Estonian state’ thesis and the effective exclusion of Russian
speaking Estonian immigrants in 1992.
With respect to the variables tapping voter alignment on the left/right scale
(RIGHTIST) and vote for non-successor parties (NON_COM_PAR), a compari-
son of Estonia and the other two Baltic states, and in particular with Albania, does
indicate that the similarities and dissimilarities in attitudes reported above are not
necessarily aligned to fixed points within the party systems. The rural Estonians
are, for example, aligned to rightwing parties, whereas it is the Albanian urban
population that votes further to the right. While the difference may at a first glance
appear inexplicable, it should be recalled that the reform process in Estonia was
based on land restitution and the restoration of the state, the Albanian process was
characterized by an early egalitarian and distributive reform process. Albanian
market reform is associated with equality and freeing the largely agrarian econ-
omy. The Estonian urban–rural cleavage is dominated by the critical juncture of
the national revolution which, in the long run as the state becomes consolidated,
can produce tensions between the free market and the rural identity (Unwin, 1998,
p. 302). In addition, the state building process also seems to have made an impact
in Latvia (but not in Lithuania). In Latvia, the chiefly indigenous ethnic and rural

11
By adopting turnout thresholds the communists not only succeeded in keeping the Belarusian Popu-
lar Front from gaining influence but also kept an indecisive parliament from reaching quorum, a fact
would-be strongman Lukashenka used in his campaign against the parliament.
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 305

population is associated with the non-successor parties,12 which means that the
overlap of the urban–rural cleavage with ethnic divisions has reinforced both. The
Lithuanian ethnic minorities are not only smaller than those found in Estonia and
Latvia, but the tradition of statehood (largely absent in Latvia and Estonia except
for the interwar period) also served to reduce the importance of the cleavage asso-
ciated with the juncture of national revolution (Nørgaard and Johannsen, 1999).
Only the Bulgarian and Latvian rural populations exhibit more trust in political
parties (T_POL.PAR). This could be a function of the reinforcement of ethnic
issue in Latvia. In Bulgaria, which on all accounts exhibits the strongest urban–
rural cleavage, further studies should consider whether the functioning of the ‘Bul-
garian Model’, in which the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)—
representing largely rural ethnic Turks—has managed to defend not only agrarian
interests but also become a pivotal party, participating in governments with either
The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) or The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
(Meurs and Begg, 1998; Swinnen, 1999; Whitefield, 2002).
In only 4 out of 13 cases have rural dwellers expressed a higher degree of trust in
their own organizations (T_FARM.ORG). Effective rural interest representation
appears to be deficient, and as the rural residents distrust their own organizations,
the emergence of a rural civil society may thus be far below the horizon.
The evidence on participation and institutionalization of the urban–rural cleav-
age is not inconclusive as a consistently broad pattern of little institutionalization
and less participation is discernable. The subject culture and the authoritarian out-
look may help explain the absence of institutionalization. The number of insignifi-
cant results concerning lack of institutionalization alone bears witness to this fact.
Where institutionalization of the cleavage does take place, it is due either to over-
lapping cleavage structure that reinforces the urban–rural cleavage (e.g. Estonia), a
particular rural economy and the execution of swift and egalitarian land reforms
(e.g. Albania), or to the success of a minority party that partly owes this success to
the polarization of the party system (Bulgaria). Rural dwellers are evidently diffi-
cult to mobilize in a permanent fashion through organizations but they turn out
regularly to vote. In the terms of Huntington’s (1968) famous concept of institutio-
nalization and political order, this makes the countryside a potentially destabilizing
factor for the continuation of political and economic reforms.

Conclusion

The post-communist countries exhibit an emerging urban–rural cleavage struc-

ture where the urban population is more inclined to express support for the funda-
mental direction of the new regime. Describing the pattern as ‘emerging’ is a
deliberate choice as the analysis has also demonstrated that the cleavage structures
are only latent, except in a few cases. So based on the available data the urban–

12
Ishiyama’s (1999) classification of the communist successor is troublesome, however, and small N-
problems remain in the analysis.
306 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309

rural cleavage is not yet institutionalized in the party system. However, as the cleav-
age structures crisscross countries with different levels of economic development
and cultures and mode of the transition, the urban–rural cleavage structure is per-
haps not so much ‘emerging’ as permanent feature deeply rooted in the societies.
The picture is clear and consistent. State autonomy has increased during the
transition. This is evident in the otherwise seemingly contradictory pattern where
the urban population supports reforms and a rural population exhibits greater
trust in state institutions. The lack of institutionalization also indicates more or less
unrestrained state elites. The traditional and subject oriented political culture of
the rural population implies that the elites are not likely to find themselves under
increasing pressure for a foreseeable future, unless political entrepreneurs succeed
in mobilizing the rural population.
A number of cases deviate from the general pattern, however, proves that there
is neither a uniform structure emerging from post-communism, nor an easily de-
scribed legacy of Leninism to put on a comparative formula. In Estonia it is the
rural population that rallies in support of the new regime and is aligned with the
right of the political spectrum. This constellation may be explained by the overlap-
ping and reinforcement of an ethnic cleavage linked to the restoration of the Esto-
nian state. A similar argument of reinforcement by another cleavage can be made
with respect to Bulgaria, reinforced by a particular party system constellation. A
salient urban–rural cleavage has developed in Bulgaria because the ethnic Bulgar-
ian minority has succeeded not only in achieving representation and come to func-
tion as a pivotal party, but also because the party chiefly represents the rural
population. In Estonia, the reverse structure has helped pave the way for unprece-
dentedly fast and radical reform strategies. But the Estonian nation-building pro-
cess may generate increasing tensions between the rural identity on the one hand,
and the economics of agrarian production, the process of integrating large numbers
of non-citizens, and the integration of the Estonian economy into the world market
on the other.
The process of EU accession and its common agricultural policy, supra-national
decision centers and open markets can only serve to exacerbate this tension. Se-
cond, while the Estonian case shares some characteristics with the Albanian one,
the chiefly agrarian Albanian economy in combination with an egalitarian reform
can be interpreted as a situation where the urban population is aligned to the right
of the spectrum but requires market protection before world market forces are
unleashed.
The window of opportunity was thus formed by granting greater autonomy to
the state and the state elite. The fact that in some countries autonomy did not re-
sult in marketization and democratization (for example Belarus) is another story
where the absolute level of support and the constellation of political actors need to
be factored into the study of how autonomy relates to the development of state ca-
pacity and the reform agenda.
 L. Johannsen / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) 291–309 307

Acknowledgements

This article is part of an ongoing research project concerning agrarian reform in

former communist countries within the framework of the DEMSTAR program
(http://www.demstar.dk). A draft version of this paper was presented in Work-
shop 22, The State in developing and transitional countries at the 13th Nordic
Political Science Conference (NOPSA) held 15–17 August, 2002 in Aalborg, Den-
mark. I am indebted to Linda Drengsgaard, Henning Jensen and Tom Y. K. Niel-
sen for their assistance in compiling and analyzing the data.

Appendix
Table 5
List of variables
Variable U=Urban; R=Rural Sources
DEVEL Development in general (right) CEEB I-VII
STATE_PROP Prefer state ownership of enterprises NDB I,III; NBB I
T_PRIV Trust in Private Enterprises NDB III, IV; NBB III
STATE_WEL Prefer State responsibility for welfare NDB I,III; NBB I
FREEMAR Free Market (right) CEEB I-VII
PARLSUS Approves of parliamentary suspension NDB I-IV; NBB I-III
STRONGL Strong leader better than parliament NDB II-IV, NBB I-III
T_P.O Trust in Public officials NDB II-IV, NBB III
T_COURTS Trust in Courts NDB II-IV, NBB I, III
T_ARMY Trust in Army NDB II-IV, NBB I, III
T_CHURCH Trust in Church NDB II-IV, NBB I, III
T_POLICE Trust in Police NDB II-IV, NBB I, III
RIGHTIST Left/right scale (right) CEEB I-IV
NON_COM_PAR Not vote for communist successor party NDB I-IV; NBB I-II; CEEB V,VI
DISCUSS Discuss politics CEEB I, II, IV
CONVINCE Convince friends CEEB I, II, IV
INT-POL Interest in politics NDB I, II; NBB I-III
VOTE-INTENT Intends to vote CEEB I,II,III
T-POL.PAR Trust in Political Parties NDB II-IV, NBB III
T-FARM.ORG Trust in Farmers’ organizations NDB II-IV, NBB III

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