Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Situations as a Function of Simulated Ideology,

Resources, and Electoral Systems

Author(s): Nigel Nicholson, Steven G. Cole, Thomas Rocklin
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 103-116
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1986

Coalition Formation in Parliamentary

Situations as a Function of Simulated
Ideology, Resources, and Electoral
Systems
Nigel Nicholson,' Steven G. Cole,' and Thomas Rocklin1

Groups of five students played the roles of party leaders in a coalition for-
mation game simulating a parliament divided into five ideologically distinct
factions. The study found support for the hypothesis that ideological
similarities best predict coalition behavior in such situations. In addition,
the study supported the hypothesis that the proportional representation elec-
toral system would produce more centralistparliaments than would the single-
member-plurality-district electoral system when the popular vote does not
provide substantial support for either Left or Right.

KEYWORDS:coalitionformation;parliamentarysimulations;electoralsystems;simulated
ideology.

INTRODUCTION

A great deal of research on coalition behavior has taken place since

Georg Simmel first raised the topic around 1890 (Croser, 1956). Most re-
searchers have used either resources alone or resources interacting with other
variables to predict the likely coalition outcome. Although many variables
have been found to interact with resources to influence coalition behavior
[e.g., probability of success (Cole, 1972), prior experience, (Komorita and

'PsychologyDepartment,Texas ChristianUniversity,Fort Worth,Texas 76129.

103
0162-895X/86/0300-0103$05.00/1 ? 1986 International Society of Political Psychology
104 Nicholson, Cole, and Rocklin

Kravitz,1980),numberof alternativecoalitions(Kravitz,1980),liking(Miller,
1980)],only one study (Miller, 1978)has examinedthe effects of simulated
ideologicaldifferencesamong the participantsin a laboratorysetting. The
presentstudyexaminedcoalitionformationin a simulatedlegislativebody,
whereresourcesandideologywerebothinstrumentalin obtainingthe payoff.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IDEOLOGY

The FrenchpoliticalscientistMauriceDuverger(1951)proposedthat
the two-partysystemcorrespondedto the "natureof things,"thus political
choice usuallyoffered two alternatives.Whilea dualityof partiesdoes not
always exist, there is almost alwaysa dualityof tendencies.Duvergeralso
suggested that there is no "centertendency."Instead the term "center"
appliesto the geometricspot wherethe moderatesof opposingtendencies
meet,thusgroupingthe left-wingof the Rightwiththe right-wingof the Left.
In additionto these"sociologicaldistinctions,"Duvergersuggestedthat
"temperamental distinctions"also createdideologicaldivision. Membersof
the Left and Right possesseithera moderateor an extremisttemperament.
As a result,thereareextremistsand moderateson both Left and Right,with
the Centerequidistantbetweenthe two moderategroups.
By usingDuverger's modelof ideology,thethree-party structuiecommon
to manyparliamentary systemsmay be seen to be composedof five distinct
factions, with the distinctionsbetweenthe extremeand moderatefactions
of eachtendencyblurredby theirmembershipin a commonparty.Although
other studieshave reportedevidencefor a bidimensionalmodel of ideology
(e.g., Rokeach, 1973;Gouldner,1976),the presentstudy deviseda Parlia-
ment boardgamewhichused Duverger'sunidimensionalmodel of ideology
to identifythe divisionswithina simulatedparliamentas an initial step in
studyingthe relationshipbetweenideology and coalition formation.

RESOURCES AND PARLIAMENTARY COALITION BEHAVIOR

Withinthe parliamentarysituation,resourcescan easilybe conceptua-

lizedas the numberof votes controlledby eachparty.Moreover,parliaments
can be dichotomized,ratherbroadly,by the electoralsystemthat transposes
popularvote into the numberof parliamentary votescontrolledby eachparty.
In contemporaryparliaments,eithera single-member-plurality-district elec-
toral system,more easilyreferredto as First-Past-thePost (FPP), or a Pro-
portionalRepresentationsystem (PR) is employed.
Coalition Formation 105

The FPP system frequentlyproducestwo-partyparliaments(Lipset,

1963) in which case, both parties usually moderate their policies in an
attemptto gainthe supportof ideologicallyuncommittedvoters.On the other
hand, PR typicallyfavors the establishmentof multipartyparliaments,in
which each party representsa narrowsegmentof public opinion (Lipset,
1963).
For example,the United Kingdom'spresentFPP systemprovidesthe
leadingpartywithan exaggeratedmajorityin the Houseof Commonswhich
can be estimated,from the popularvote, by the Cube Law (Smith, 1909).
Whenonly two partiescompete,the CubeLaw predictsthat, giventhe ratio
of popularvotes as A:B, the ratio of seats each will receivein the House
of Commonswill be A3:B3.The major partiesthus gain approximately18
of the 650 seatsfor every1%swingin theirdirection.WithPR only 6.5 seats
would be gained with each 1% swing.
Thereis debatein the United Kingdomover the virtuesand likely ef-
fects of usingthe PR electoralsystemto replacethe FPP systemundercur-
rent use. Those preferringthe maintenanceof FPP have stated that
introductionof PR would resultin the continuanceof the Left-Rightduali-
ty, but with the leadingparty frequentlydenieda workingmajority;while
those advocatingthe adoptionof PR do so in anticipationof a subsequent
groundswellin popularsupportfor the Center.
These debatersalso differ on the purposeof democracy(Curticeand
Steed, 1982). Those in favor of PR think that it is intendedto ensurethat
Parliamentrepresentthe complexityof the electorate,and assumethe elected
assemblywill producea workinggovernmentsubsequentto the election.FPP
supporters,on the other hand, think it is the role of the people to produce
a government,not the roleof the assembly(Schumpter,1975).FPP thusgives
the electoratea simpleyet effective choice betweenalternategovernments.
It is usefulto considerthe debatepresentedabovefromthe perspective
of underlyingsocial psychologicalprinciples.One can predictthat a change
in the Britishelectoralsystemto PR would intensifythe pressuresboth on
the electorateand on the individualpartymembersto breakold coalitions
and form new ones. To be more specific, since each major party is com-
posed of individualswho form interestgroups, or factions, based on their
ideology and common interests,membersof those wings sharemore views
with each other than with their party-at-large.The presentFPP electoral
systemencouragestheirshelteringin a large, compromisedcoalitionrather
than going withoutmajorpartysupportand, perhaps,sufferingthe fate of
the SDP Labordefectorswho werereducedfrom26 parliamentary members
to 4 in the 1983BritishGeneralElection. On the other hand, the introduc-
tion of PR to the UnitedKingdomwouldlikelyproducea situationin which
all factions would attemptto find their own place on the electoralmarket.
106 Nicholson, Cole, and Rocklin

OPERATIONALIZATION OF IDEOLOGY

A single-peaked distribution payoff curve has previously been used by

Miller (1978) to simulate ideological positions. He found that players will at-
tend to ideological position and not to resources when ideology is linked to
payoff. However, Miller did not consider Duverger's (1951) temperamental
distinctions and placed the Center closer to the Left than to the Right on
the ideological scale. As a result, the payoffs to the Left-Center coalition
were greater than those of the Right-Center coalition.
In a later study, Miller (1980) found that, when payoff and resources
were both manipulated, payoff overshadowed resources. Had the 1978 study
placed the Center party equidistant between Left and Right, the usual pat-
tern of naive inexperienced players attending at first to the minimum win-
ning coalition as determined by resources, then moving toward realization of
their functional equivalency at asymptote may well have been observed.
The present paper approached the operationalization of ideology by
utilizing Duverger's (1951) concept of the political spectrum including his
temperamental distinctions. The extreme Left was given an ideological value
of 10 to indicate absolute commitment to one extreme. The extreme Right
was given an ideological value of 0 to indicate an absolute commitment to
the other extreme. The ideological value of the Center was given a 5 to in-
dicate the Center's determination not to favor either extreme. The moderate
Left and Right were assigned as 7 and 3, respectively, placing both moderates
closer to the Center than to either extreme. The five political factions were
treated as separate parties. Each had the right to negotiate on its own behalf
with all other parties in Parliament. The purpose of this study was to test
the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1

Differences in quantifiable ideological values lying along a unidimen-

sional scale will determine the formation of party coalitions in a simulated
legislative body.

Hypothesis 2

The ability of the Center to influence events will be strengthened under

PR for electoral swings not indicating substantial voter preference for either
Left or Right.
Coalition Formation 107

METHOD

Participants

Seventy-five male and female students of Texas Christian University

participated in exchange for partial credit in undergraduate psychology
courses and the chance to win $20.00.

Procedure

Subjects were recruited in 15 groups of 7. When more than 5 attended,

the extra subjects performed an alternate activity. Five subjects were seated
in individual booths in view of a large version of the Parliament boardgame
(Fig. 1), which was hung on a wall. The booths were constructed so that the
subjects could not observe each other. Each booth contained (1) a consent
form, (2) a supply of proposal forms, (3) a scratch pad and pencil, (4) a
postexperiment questionnaire, (5) a small version of the Parliament board,
(6) a Parliament rulebook.
After the subjects were seated, the experimenter said, "You will shortly
play a game in which you will attempt to form a majority coalition to gain

Fig. 1. Parliament boardgame.

108 Nicholson,Cole, and Rocklin

control of a parliament.I shall explainhow this will be done in a moment.

First,let me assureyou that thereis no deceptioninvolvedin this studyand
that no secretobservationsof you will be made at any time duringthis ex-
periment.We areonly interestedin how you play this gamewith each other.
While all of you will receive1-hrcreditfor coming here and takingpart in
the study, the winningplayerwill also receivea monetaryprize. The prize
will vary from $20 to $0.50, dependingon the numberof times the group
fails to reachan arrangementby the fifth attempt.So while the game is in-
tendedto be fun it is also importantto do your best. Please read and com-
pletethe consentform."Theexperimenter thengatheredall completedconsent
forms.
Next, the experimenterplayeda tapedset of instructions(a spokenver-
sion of the Parliamentrulebook)on how to play the game. At the end of
the tape, he answeredquestionsraisedby the playersconcerningthe rules
of the game, and play commenced.

Game Description

To begineachgame,eachplayer,in randomorder,drewa PartyLeader

figurefroma hopper.Thesefigues,coloredBlue(B), Green(G), Yellow(Y),
Pink (P), or Red (R) indicatedwhichpartythe playerrepresented.The par-
ties had the followingpreferredideological(I) positions:I(B) = 0: I(G) =
3: I(Y) = 5: I(P) = 7: I(R) = 10. The playing board had strips numbered
0 to 10. The strip on which each playerbegan bore the appropriateparty
color, and was labeledwith the numbercorrespondingto the party'sprefer-
red ideologicalposition.
After the playershad been selectedto representthe five parties, the
experimenterposted resource weights which were describedas "election
returnsindicatingeach party'sstrengthin Parliament."Parliamentaryseats
(i.e., resourceweights)weredividedevenlybetweenthe Left and Rightpar-
ties in the 0% swing(i.e., hungParliament)scenario.In the FPP condition,
the Cube Law providedthe theoreticalbasis for giving 18 extra seats for
each 1%oswing in popularvote. In the PR condition, on the other hand,
only 6.5 extra seats were awardedfor each 1% swing. The 2/27o and 5%o
swings,wereselectedbecausetheserepresentthe typicaland extremeswings,
respectively,obtainedby modernBritishgeneralelections(Curticeand Steed,
1982). The weights for each game are presentedin Table I.
The practicegame was alwayspresentedfirst and the other six were
presentedin randomorder. Once the subjectshad the above information,
they completedproposalformsindicating(a) theirpartyand (b) the Govern-
Coalition Formation 109

ment value they would accept. When all forms were completed, the ex-
perimenterreadaloudeachproposal,and all playersplacedcoloredcounters
onto the appropriatestripson theirindividualgameboards.Whencounters
representing playerswitha simplemajorityof votes(326or more)wereplaced
on one ideologicalposition, it becamethe government'sideologicalposition
(referredto as the G value)for that Parliament.Playersreceivedpointsequal
to the differencebetweentheirparty'spreferredideologicalpositionandthe
G value. Thus, each playerreceiveddifferencescores for each game type
and the playerwho accumulatedthe least points by the end of the session
receiveda monetaryprize.
In each simulatedParliament(gametype) five roundswereallowedto
enableplayersto reachagreementon the G value. Whenthey failedto reach
agreementby the fifth round a hung Parliamentwas declared.All players
then receiveda differencescore of 0 but were advisedthat with each hung
Parliamentthe value of the prizewould shrink.(The prizewas reducedby
$5.00 for every two hung rounds.) The gameboarddisplayeda maximum
prizeof $20.00, with no or one hung Parliament;and a minimumof $0.50,
with eight or more hung Parliaments.The playerswere not informedthat
there would be only six Parliaments,and thus, the prizecould only shrink
to $5.00. At the conclusionof each session, the experimenterpresentedthe
appropriatemonetaryprizeto the winningplayerin full view of the group.
The subjectswerethen debriefedand asked to give their commentson the
game. Most gave favorableevaluationsof their experience.Some askedto
returnon anotheroccasionin orderto play again for the enjoymentof the
game.

Table I. Simulated Election Results: Number of Votes for Each

Player in Each Game Typea
Player
Game Type
(%o) Blue Green Yellow Pink Red Total
Practice 130 130 130 130 130 650
FPP (5) 266 133 32 73 146 650
FPP (2.5) 236 118 32 90 174 650
FPP (0) 206 103 32 88 221 650
PR (0) 105 120 200 70 155 650
PR (2.5) 135 147 178 64 128 650
PR (5) 267 133 100 50 100 650
aThese vote distributions were chosen to reflect the allocation of
seats in the United Kingdom House of Commons with three
selected swings of popular vote.
110 Nicholson, Cole, and Rocklin

RESULTS

Results Relevant to Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 predictedthat differences in quantifiable ideological values

lying along a unidimensional scale would determine the formation of coali-
tions in a simulated legislative body. To test for the accuracy of coalition
predictions based on resources, ideology, and their combination, the F, value
developed by Komorita (1978) was used. The F, value is based on the predicted
and observed rank order of coalitions formed and provides an index for
measuring how well a theory predicts coalition formation relative to random
prediction. t tests, for differences between the base rate FCvalues and the
F, values for coalitions predicted by resources, by ideology, and by a com-
bination of resources and ideology, were performed.
We found that ideology and ideology combined with resourcespredicted
which coalitions would form significantly better than chance (t(14) = 2.00,
p < 0.05 and t(14) = 1.92, andp < 0.05 respectively). Resources alone did
not predict coalition formation significantly better than chance. The F, values
for coalitions predicted by chance, ideological contiguity, resources, and the
combination of ideology and resources are presented in Table II. A fre-
quency count of the types of coalitions that were formed in each game type
is recorded in Table III.

Results Relevant to Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the ability of the Center to influence events

would be strengthenedunder PR for electoral swings not indicatingsubstantial
voter preference for either wing. Hence, obtained G values were predicted
to equal Yellow's ideological position of 5 in the 2.5% swing/PR game and

Table II. Fc Values for Coalitions Predicted by Ideological Contiguity, Resources, and Their
Combination"
Game Type
PP PR
5%o 2.5%o 0%o 0% 2.5%07 5% Mean
Chance 0.625 0.625 0.571 0.583 0.550 0.625 0.596
Ideology 0.833 0.893 0.721 0.736 0.835 0.750 0.795
Resource 0.479 0.679 0.586 0.535 0.410 0.542 0.540
Combination 0.854 0.857 0.686 0.764 0.840 0.750 0.792
aThe higher the FC value the better the predictability. Perfect predictability would receive an
F, value of 1.00.
Coalition Formation 111

Table III. Obtained Coalitions

Coalitions
Ideologically Hung
Game Type Contiguous Others Parliaments
(o) Type n Type n n
FPP 5 BG 10 BR 2 1
GPR 1
BP 1
FPP (2.5) BG 7 GPR 2 6
FPP (0) BG/YPR 7 BR 2 4
BGP 2
PR (0) GYP 4 GYR 1 1
BGY/YPR 6 YR 2
GPR 1
PR (2.5) GYP 4 1
BGY/YPR 8
PR (5) BG 7 BR 1 4
GYR 3

Green'sideologicalposition of 3 in the 2.5% swing/FPP game. With a 0%

swing both electoralsystemswere predictedto yield G values of 5. With a
5% swingboth systemswerepredictedto yieldG valuesof 3. TableIV reports
the mean differencebetweenthe G values and the partypositionsby game
type. Figure2 presentsa graphicalrepresentationof the mean G valuesfor
each gametype. Inspectionof those differencesfor eachgametype revealed
that:
1. With a swing of 0% (no swing)both electoralsystemsproduceda
G value favoring the Center (mean G values: FPP = 5.54; PR = .5.35).
2. Witha swingof 2.5% (slightswing)the FPP systemproduceda G
valuefavoringthe right(meanG value = 2.44) whilethe PR systemproduc-
ed a G value favoringthe Center(mean G value = 4.38).
3. With a swingof 5% (substantialswing)both electoralsystemspro-
duceda G valuefavoringthe Right(meanG values:FPP = 2.53;PR = 2.58).

Table IV. Mean Differences Between G Values and Party Position by Game Typea

Electoral Party Critical

System (lo) Blue Green Yellow Pink Red F Value
FPP (5) 2.54a 1.54a 2.77a b 4.56b 7.46c 34.76 1.90
FPP (2.5) 2.45a'b 1.60a 3.00a.b 4.55b 7.55c 24.04* 2.51
FPP (0) 4.81 2.72a 2.54a 2.72a 5.18a 22.81** 3.67
PR (0) 5.36e 2.36c 0.50a 1.64b 4.64d 86.00* 0.24
PR (2.5) 4.38bc 1.38a"b 0.76a 2.61a.b c 5.61C 7.25* 3.20
PR (5) 2.58a 1.50a 2.08a 3.75a 6.75b 10.10* 2.65
aMeans with the same letter in the subscript are not significantly different.
*p < 0.01, df = 6,14.
**p < 0.05, df = 6,14.
112 Nicholson,Cole, and Rocklin

Qo 6-

E 5-

o 4- \
Q> I \".

0 \
5 3"

2_
FPP
. ............PR
1-

I I I
0 2.5 5

Percentage of swing

Fig. 2. Mean G value for each type and electoralsystem.

Because of the unequal variance of G values between games revealed

by a test of homogeneity of variance (Winer, 1962, pp. 33-37) (F(8, 12) =
5.52, p < 0.05) separate t tests of the mean G values for each level of swing
were computed. For the 5% swing and the 0%7swing the G values were not
significantly different across electoral systems (t(25) = 0.22, ns, t(25) = 0.20,
ns respectively). For the 2.5% swing the G values were significantly different
(t(22) = 2.81,p < 0.01).
The pattern of significance supported the hypothesis that PR would
allow both the extreme parties significantly less influence over Parliament
with a small swing (2.5%o)than would FPP. On the other hand, with a large
swing (5%) both Left and Right extremeswould have as much influence under
PR as they would under FPP.
To further test Hypothesis 2, a one-way analysis of variance was per-
formed separately on each of the game types. It was necessary to compute
Coalition Formation 113

six separateANOVAs,dueto dependencebetweengames.Thedataconsisted

of the differencescoresobtainedcomputingthe differencesbetweenG values
and ideologicalpositions for each party for each of the game types.
Table IV reportsthe mean differencescores for each party by game
type. Each of the six ANOVAs yielded a significanteffect (see Table IV).
On the basis of these ANOVAs a seriesof Tukey'sHSD tests examinedthe
relativegains of each partyin each gametype. Whilein the 0% swing/FPP
game no party'sscore was significantlybetterthan any other; in all other
gamesthe leadingparty,whenit was centerist(Yellow),scoredsignificantly
betterthanthe extremesof bothLeft(Red)andRight(Blue).Whenthe leading
party was moderateRight (Green),it scored significantlybetterthan both
moderateLeft (Pink) and extremeLeft (Red).
The outcomeof eachgamemaximizedpayoff to the partythatwasable
to balancewinningcoalitionson eitherside of its own ideologicalposition.
The partythat had been predictedto gain the most influencein each parlia-
ment, based on ideologicalcontiguity, had done so.

DISCUSSION

The present study provided experimentallaboratory support for

Leiserson's(1965) suggestionthat ideology determinesthe compositionof
coalitions. Based on the results, it appearsthat while resourcesdetermine
the criteriafor a controllingcoalition, politicians(and other)do not simply
evaluateresourcesin decidingwhereto placetheirallegiance.Instead,when
more than one possible alliance has the ability to control a parliament,
ideologicalconsiderationstake precedenceover resources.
On the basis of the presentstudy, one may say that playersattempt
to formcoalitionswithpartnerswho areclosestto theirown ideologicalposi-
tion if they are able to offer the resourcesneededto gain a winningcoali-
tion. Resourceswereattendedto by most playersin the presentstudy, only
in so far as theychosethe minimumnumberof ideologicallycontiguouspart-
ners neededto obtain the reward.
One should note that not all playerschose the rationalapproach.For
example, one playeralways selectedthe ideologicalposition of the player
with the largestnumberof votes, even in rounds when the party with the
most votes was obligedto move off the preferredideologicalposition. That
group experiencedthe largest numberof hung rounds of any group, and
receivedthe smallestpayoff as a consequence.Thusit was evidentthat even
though the rationalstrategydeliveredthe greatestpossible payoff, not all
playersadopted it.
114 Nicholson,Cole, and Rocklin

The numberof winningcoalitions a playercan join determinesthat

player'spivotalpower,or Shapleyvalue(Shapley,1953;Shapleyand Shubik,
1954). In all of the gamesthe playerwith the greatestShapleyvalue was at
the fulcrumof the ideologicalscale, and was alwaysin a position to form
a coalition with several different players. The opposing sides were com-
pelledto competeagainsteach otherto come to a positionacceptableto the
fulcrumplayer.
For example,underFPP with2.5%oand 507oswingsand underPR with
a 5?%o swing Greenrequiredeitheronly Blue or a combinationof the other
partiesto form a controllingcoalition. Greenmay have considereda small
concessionto Blue an acceptablepriceto pay to quicklyobtain a coalition
and avoid the need to come to agreementwith three other parties.That a
cost was incurredif majoritieswere not formed within five attemptsalso
encouragedGreento make concessionsto Blue.
A second objectiveof the presentstudy was to investigatewhethera
changein the FPP electoralsystemto a PR systemfor allocatingparliamen-
taryseatswouldresultin the formationof moreParliamentswitha centralist
ideology. The study found that with a 0%7o swing(i.e., the popularvote not
indicatingpreference for eitherthe Left or Right), a centralistG value was
obtainedunderboth systems(FPP mean G value = 2.58). However,with
only a small swing (e.g., 2.5%0to Right)the FPP systemprovidedan exag-
geratedmajorityfor the leadingparty, and a G value of 2.44; whereasPR
produceda more centralistG value of 4.38.
It is interestingto considerthe consequencesfor the United Kingdom
parliamentarysystembasedon a generalizationof the resultsof the present
study. One could speculatethat a contributingfactor to Britain'smodern
declineis revealedby the inconstancyof Parliamentswhichhave alternated
betweenConservativeand Laborgovernmentsovermuchof the presentcen-
tury. Laborhas frequentlycome into powerwith a mandateto administer
the Britishestablishment,not to radicallyalterthe structureof society.This
has led to unrestin the Labormovement.It constantlydebateswithinitself
whetherLaborshould simplyguide a mixed-economyor seek to producea
socialistsociety.Oneargumentfor the introductionof PR is thatLaborwould
not receivethe parliamentaryresourcesto governalone until a majorityof
the electorateactuallychose socialism(Curticeand Steed, 1982).ThusLabor
wouldnot comeinto governmentaloneuntilit hada clearmandateto achieve
its originalgoals.
Thereexistsan interimperiodbetweenthe consensualrejectionof one
ideology and the adoptionof another(Gouldner,1976).Britishsocietyhas
ceasedto respondeffectivelyto capitalistideologywithouthavingbegunto
respond effectively to socialist ideology. If the present results could be
generalizedto the UnitedKingdom,ParliamentunderPR wouldmost likely
CoalitionFormation 115

ceaseits historyof alternatingbetweenConservativeand Laboradministra-

tions, anda successionof centeristParliamentswouldprobablyresult.In light
of this, the adoptionof a PR electoralsystem(whichwouldmost likelypro-
duce mixed-economyadministrationsduring this interim period) would
benefit the United Kingdom.

CONCLUSION

Ideologywasthe most salientvariablein the presentstudy.The number

of partnersandthe powerof theirvoteswere,respectively,secondandthird.
Thus, it is proposedthat ideologyis a useful variableto measurewhen one
predictscoalitionbehaviorin parliamentarysituations.Regardingthe elec-
toral systemsquestion, PR was shown in the presentstudy to enhancethe
abilityof the centerto influenceParliamentwhenthe popularvote displays
only a slight preferencefor one party.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thisarticleis basedon a master'sthesiscompletedat TexasChristianUniver-

sity. The authorswouldlike to acknowledgetheirgratitudeto Don Jackson
of the political science departmentat TCU for his helpful suggestions.

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