G.R. No.
185734 July 3, 2013 substituted service of summons on the defendant
ALFREDO C. LIM, JR., PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES TITO S. LAZARO AND CARMEN T.
LAZARO, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for a
sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against the respondent Sps
Lazaro. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary
attachment application and upon the posting of the
required bond issued the corresponding writ on
October 14, 2005. 3 parcels of land owned by the
respondent spouses were levied upon.
The parties later entered into a Compromise
Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim,
Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment
basis, following a schedule of payments covering the
period from September 2006 until October 2013. The
RTC rendered a decision on the basis of the
compromise.
Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking
to lift the writ of preliminary attachment annotated on
the subject TCTs.
In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a writ of
preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or
ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect
and preserve certain rights and interests pending final
judgment. Considering that the case had already been
considered closed and terminated by the rendition of
the decision based on the compromise agreement, the
writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and
quashed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary
attachment was properly lifted.
HELD: NO. By its nature, preliminary attachment,
under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an
ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but
to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or
principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental
to the main action. As such, it is available during its
pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests
during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a
final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is
also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over
the action by actual or constructive seizure of the
property in those instances where personal or
cannot be effected.
In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are
silent on the length of time within which an
attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the
rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates
that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or
the sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner
provided by law.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the
discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have entered
into a compromise agreement which had already been
approved by the RTC in its January 5, 2007 Amended
Decision, the obligations thereunder have yet to be
fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the
total compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence,
given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the
attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should have
continued to subsist.
In the earlier case of Chemphil Export & Import
Corporation v. CA, the Court ruled that a writ of
attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a
compromise agreement between the parties. In that
case the Court held thus:
x x x x
The case at bench admits of peculiar character in the
sense that it involves a compromise agreement.
Nonetheless, x x x. The parties to the compromise
agreement should not be deprived of the protection
provided by an attachment lien especially in an
instance where one reneges on his obligations under
the agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio
Garcia failed to hold up his own end of the deal, so to
speak.
xxxx
If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect
create a back door by which a debtor can easily
escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be
faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor, in
order to buy time to dispose of his properties, would
enter into a compromise agreement he has no
intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose
of the provisional remedy of attachment would thus
be lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and
toothless tiger. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
In fine, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary
attachment subject of this case should be restored and
its annotation revived in the subject TCTs, re-vesting
unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the properties
covered by the same as it were before the
cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be
misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by an
attachment even before judgment, is in the nature of a
vested interest which affords specific security for the
satisfaction of the debt put in suit.30 Verily, the
lifting of the attachment lien would be tantamount to
an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s
properties which the Court, absent any justifiable
ground therefor, cannot allow.
G.R. No. 190028               February 26, 2014
LETICIA P. LIGON, Petitioner,
vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 56
AT MAKATI CITY AND ITS PRESIDING
JUDGE, JUDGE REYNALDO M. LAIGO,
SHERIFF IV LUCITO V. ALEJO, ATTY.
SILVERIO GARING, MR. LEONARDO J.
TING, AND MR. BENITO G. TECHICO,
Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Ligon filed before the QC RTC a
complaint for the collection of a sum of money with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia
Marasigan (Marasigan), Polished Arrow Holdings,
Inc. (Polished Arrow), and its incorporators. The
complaint alleges among others that the spouses
Baladjay enticed her to extend a short-term loan
secured by a PDC which bounced upon presentment,
and that the subject property was transferred to
respondent Polished Arrow allegedly defendants’
dummy corporation to defraud creditors. The
application for the writ was granted so the subject
property was levied upon by annotating the writ on
the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.
While the case was pending, a similar complaint for
the sum of money damages, and cancellation of title
with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment was lodged before the RTC Makati by the
Sps Vicente against the same respondents. During the
proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary attachment
also against the subject property was issued and
annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273.
While the case is still pending in QC, the Makati
RTC rendered a decision rescinding the transfer of
the subject property to Polished Arrow upon a finding
that the same was made in fraud of creditors.
Consequently, the Makati City RTC directed the
Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel
TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished Arrow; and
(b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous condition” 
in the name of Rosario Baladjay. In the subsequent
execution proceedings, the property was sold at a
public auction to respondent Ting.
The RTC Makati then ordered the RD under pain of
contempt to issue a new certificate in favor of
Ting free from any liens and encumbrances.
Meanwhile the QC RTC ruled in favor of Ligon who
sought its execution and discovered the earlier
attachment annotation in her favor has been deleted.
ISSUE: W/N the Makati RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the deletion of Ligon’s
attachment lien
HELD: YES. Case law instructs that an attachment is
a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the
particular property, enforceable against the whole
world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a
specific lien on the attached property which nothing
can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution
of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in
effect, means that the property attached is an indebted
thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the
owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is
paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in some manner
provided by law. Thus, a prior registration40 of an
attachment lien creates a preference, such that when
an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a
purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes
the property subject to the said attachment.42 As
provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as
a form of constructive notice to all.
Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT
No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9,
2004 Decision rescinding the transfer of the subject
property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon
a finding that the same was made in fraud of
creditors, Ligon’s attachment lien over the subject
property continued to subsist since the attachment she
had earlier secured binds the property itself, and,
hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps.
Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged in the Quezon City
Case is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or
vacated in some manner provided by law. The grave
abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with
its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the
name of Ting (i.e., TCT No. 19756),47 free from any
liens and encumbrances. This course of action clearly
negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment lien and,
also, defies the legal characterization of attachment
proceedings. It bears noting that Ligon’s claim,
secured by the aforesaid attachment, is against Sps.
Baladjay whose ownership over the subject property
had been effectively restored in view of the RTC’s
rescission of the property’s previous sale to Polished
Arrow.48Thus, Sps. Ligon’s attachment lien against
Sps. Baladjay as well as their successors-in-interest
should have been preserved, and the annotation
thereof carried over to any subsequent certificate of
title,49 the most recent of which as it appears on
record is TCT No. 31001 in the name of Techico,
without prejudice to the latter’s right to protect his
own ownership interest over the subject property.
Mangila vs CA
G.R. No. 125027            August 12, 2002
ANITA MANGILA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA,
respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money against herein petitioner.
On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriff’s
Return showing that summons was not served on
petitioner. A woman found at petitioner’s house
informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred her
residence to Sto. Niño, Guagua, Pampanga. The
sheriff found out further that petitioner had left the
Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioner’s
departure from the Philippines as done with intent to
defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a
Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On September
26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of
Preliminary Attachment6 against petitioner. The
following day, the trial court issued a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.
The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for
assistance from their counterparts in RTC, Pampanga.
Thus, on October 28, 1988, Sheriff Alfredo San
Miguel of RTC Pampanga served on petitioner’s
household help in San Fernando, Pampanga, the
Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond.
Petitioner filed a motion to discharge attachment
claiming that the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over her person.
The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge
Attachment on January 13, 1989 upon filing of
petitioner’s counter-bond. The trial court, however,
did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the
validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Thereafter private respondent applied for an alias
summons which was granted by the court.
ISSUE: W/N the writ was validly implemented
HELD: The grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court
issues the order granting the application; second, the
writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to
act in any manner against the defendant. Any order
issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.23
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and
implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the
alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989
or almost three months after the implementation of
the writ of attachment.
The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of
Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its
issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the
action.” However, on the day the writ was
implemented, the trial court should have, previously
or simultaneously with the implementation of the
writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as
was shown in the records of the case, the summons
was actually served on petitioner several months after
the writ had been implemented.
Private respondent never showed that she effected
substituted service on petitioner after her personal
service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private
respondent could not ascertain the whereabouts of
petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some
other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons
belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to
have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the
writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive
process on petitioner without first obtaining
jurisdiction over her person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be served
after or simultaneous with the service of summons on
the defendant whether by personal service,
substituted service or by publication as warranted by
the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service
of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition
of jurisdiction over her person because the law does
not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
Vicente CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN and
the Republic
G.R. No. 1339941 | JANUARY 19, 2001
(modes of quashal of the writ of attachment)
FACTS:
In September 1980, Chuidian allegedly a dummy of
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, was able to obtain,
allegedly under false pretenses, a loan guarantee from
Philguarantee Corp., the BOI and the Central Bank,
in favor of the Asian Reliability Co. Inc. (ARCI).
ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly owned by
Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of US $25M
for the establishment of 5 inter-related projects in the
country.
However, Chuidian used the same in investing in
corporations operating in the US. ARCI then
defaulted in the payments of the loan, compelling
Philguarantee to undertake payments for the
same. Philguarantee sued Chuidian before a
Californian court, charging him of violating the terms
of the loan, defaulting in payments and misusing the
proceeds for his personal benefit. Chuidian claimed
that he himself was a victim of the systematic plunder
perpetrated by the Marcoses.
On November 1985, Philguarantee entered into a
compromise agreement with Chuidian whereby
Chuidian shall assign and surrender title to all his
companies in favor of the Phil. Gov’t.  In return,
Philguarantee shall absolve Chuidian from all civil
and criminal liability concerning the payments
Philguarantee had made on Chuidian’s defaulted
loans. It was further stipulated that the Phil.
government shall pay Chuidian the amount of US
$5.3M. Chuidian received the 1st two installments of
the payment. The remaining balance of US $4.6M
was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit
(L/C) from which Chuidian would draw US $100k
monthly.
With the advent of the Aquino administration, the
newly-established PCGG exerted earnest efforts to
search and recover properties and assets suspected as
having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their
relatives and cronies. Chuidian was among those
whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG.  The
PNB was directed to place the letters of credit under
its custody, in behalf of the PCGG.
In the meantime, Philguarantee filed a motion before
the Superior Court of California, seeking to vacate
the stipulated judgment containing the settlement
between Philguarantee and Chuidian on the grounds
that: (a) Philguarantee was compelled by the Marcos
administration to agree to the terms of the settlement;
(b) Chuidian blackmailed Marcos into pursuing the
settlement agreement by threatening to expose the
fact that the Marcoses made investments in
Chuidian’s American enterprises; and (c) the Aquino
administration had ordered Philguarantee not to make
further payments on the L/C to Chuidian.  However,
the Californian court concluded that Philguarantee
was not able to sufficiently show that the settlement
should be set aside. On appeal, the CA of the State of
California affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court denying Philguarantee’s motion.
Chuidian filed before the California Central District
Court, an action against PNB seeking to compel the
latter to pay the proceeds of the L/C. Philguarantee
intervened in said action, raising the same issues and
arguments it had earlier raised in the action before the
Santa Clara Superior Court, alleging that PNB was
excused from making payments on the L/C since the
settlement was void due to illegality, duress and
fraud.
The Federal Court rendered judgment ruling:  (1) in
favor of PNB excusing the said bank from making
payment on the L/C; and (2) in Chuidian’s favor by
denying intervenor Philguarantee’s action to set aside
the settlement agreement.
Meanwhile a Deed of Transfer was executed between
then Sec. of Finance and then PNB President
Edgardo Espiritu, to facilitate the rehabilitation of
PNB. Thus, the gov’t assumed all liabilities of PNB
including the L/C listed in favor of Chuidian in the
amount of US $4.4M
On July 1987, the gov’t filed before the
Sandiganbayan a civil case against the Marcos
spouses, several gov’t officials, and a number of
individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses,
including Chuidian, seeking the reconveyance,
accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth
allegedly procured illegally by the defendants.  (4) Chuidian has not removed or disposed of his
While the case was pending, the Republic filed a
motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the
L/C in the name of Chuidian, citing as grounds
therefor the following:
(1) Chuidian embezzled or fraudulently misapplied
the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity,
justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b),
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the
same rule as Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the
action was brought, or that he concealed or disposed
of the property that is the subject of the action;
(3) Chuidian has removed or disposed of his property
with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff as justified
under Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and
(4) Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on
whom summons may be served by publication, which
justifies the writ of attachment prayed for under
Section 1(e) of the same rule.
The Republic also averred that should the action
brought by Chuidian before the U.S. District Court of
California to compel payment of the L/C prosper,
inspite of the sequestration of the said L/C, Chuidian
can ask the said foreign court to compel the PNB Los
Angeles branch to pay the proceeds of the
L/C.  Eventually, Philguarantee will be made to
shoulder the expense resulting in further damage to
the government.  Thus, there was an urgent need for
the writ of attachment to place the L/C under the
custody of the Sandiganbayan so the same may be
preserved as security for the satisfaction of judgment
in the case before said court.
Chuidian opposed the motion for issuance of the writ
of attachment, contending that:
(1) The plaintiff’s affidavit appended to the motion
was in form and substance fatally defective;
(2) Section 1(b) of Rule 57 does not apply since there
was no fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff
and Chuidian;
(3) While Chuidian does not admit fraud on his part,
if ever there was breach of contract, such fraud must
be present at the time the contract is entered into;
property in the absence of any intent to defraud
plaintiff;
(5) Chuidian’s absence from the country does not
necessarily make him a non-resident; and
(6) Service of summons by publication cannot be
used to justify the issuance of the writ since Chuidian
had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court
by way of a motion to lift the freeze order filed
through his counsel.
On July 1993, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
issuance of a writ of attachment against the L/C as
security for the satisfaction of judgment. The
Sandiganbayan ruled:
1) Although there was no separate was attached to the
motion, the motion itself contained all the requisites
of an affidavit, and the verification thereof is deemed
a substantial compliance of Rule 57, Section 3.
2) Fiduciary relationship exists between Chuidian and
ARCI but not with the Republic. Hence, the Republic
cannot invoke Sec. 1(b) of Rule 57.
3) There was a prima facie case of fraud committed
by Chuidian, justifying the issuance of the writ of
attachment.  
4) The Sandiganbayan also adopted the Republic’s
position that since it was compelled to pay, through
Philguarantee, the bank loans taken out by Chuidian,
the proceeds of which were fraudulently diverted, it
is entitled to the issuance of the writ of attachment to
protect its rights as creditor.
5) Chuidian’s absence from the country was
considered by the Sandiganbayan to be the most
compelling ground for the issuance of the writ.
Almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order
of attachment, Chuidian filed a motion to lift the
attachment based on the following grounds:   also the latter’s subsequent MR.
1) He had returned to the Philippines, and
considering that his absence was the most compelling
ground for the issuance of the writ, the latter should
be lifted.
2) There was no evidence at all of initial fraud or
subsequent concealment except for the affidavit
submitted by the PCGG Chairman whose statement is
hearsay since he was not a witness to the litigated
incidents, was never presented as a witness by the
Republic and thus was not subject to cross-
examination.
3) He denies that he ever disposed of his assets to
defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in the
records that support the Sandiganbayan’s erroneous
conclusion on the matter.  falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s
4) He was never a defendant in any other pending
criminal action.
5) He was not guilty of fraud in contracting the debt
or incurring the obligation. L/C was not a product of
fraudulent transactions but the result of court-
approved settlement.
6) Should the attachment be allowed to continue, he
will be deprived of his property without due
process.  The L/C was payment to Chuidian in
exchange for the assets he turned over to the
Republic.  Said assets had already been sold by the
Republic and cannot be returned to Chuidian should
the government succeed in depriving him of the
proceeds of the L/C.
7) Finally, throughout the 4 years that the preliminary
attachment had been in effect, the gov’t had not set
the case for hearing.  The case itself should be
dismissed for laches owing to the Republic’s failure
to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of
time.  Accordingly, the preliminary attachment, being
only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted
and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the
proceeds of the L/C to Chuidian.
The Republic opposed e motion and contended that
allowing the foreign judgment as a basis for the
lifting of the attachment would essentially amount to
an abdication of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to hear and decide the ill gotten
wealth cases lodged before it in deference to the
judgment of foreign courts.
The Sandganbayan denied petitioner’s motion and
ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary attachment should be
lifted as a result of petitioner’s return to the country
and his averments that there was no fraud in incurring
the obligation
HELD: No
*Preliminary attachment issued upon a ground which
is at the same time the applicant’s cause of
action. When the preliminary attachment is issued
upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant’s cause of action, the defendant is not
allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment
under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the
application and affidavits on which the writ was
based – and consequently that the writ based thereon
had been improperly or irregularly issued – the
reason being that the hearing on such a motion for
dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial
of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits
of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of
a motion, instead of at the regular trial.
The merits of the action in which a writ of
preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable
on a motion for dissolution of the attachment;
otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could
force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere
motion.
There are only two ways of quashing a writ of
attachment: (a) by filing a counterbound
immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the
ground of improper and irregular issuance. These
grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed
in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the
Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by
the grounds specified therein. Petitioner’s motion to
lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or
defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment;
neither did he file a counterbond.
WEE vs. TANKIANSEE G.R. No. 171124,
February 13, 2008 NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Wee has money placements totaling to
more than P210M with the Wincorp, to which,
respondent Tansiankee is a vice president and
director.
Wincorp extended a loan equal to petitioner’s total
money placement to a corporation, Power Merge,
with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M.
This credit facility originated from another loan of
about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another
corporation [Hottick Holdings]. When the latter
defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case
against it and its surety. Settlement was, however,
reached in which Hottick’s president, Virata,
assumed the obligation of the surety.
Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and
Hottick’s president, petitioner’s money placements
were transferred without his knowledge and consent
to the loan account of Power Merge through an
agreement that virtually freed the latter of any
liability. Allegedly, through the false representations
of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner
was enticed to roll over his placements so that
Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.
Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as
a conduit and connived with Wincorp’s officers and
directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without
any intention of paying the said placements,
petitioner instituted suit for damages with the RTC
Manila. Respondent was impleaded in the complaint
as one of the defendants.
On the basis of the allegations in the complaint and
the Affidavit of petitioner, RTC ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties not exempt from execution of all the
defendants subject to petitioner’s filing of a P50M-
bond. The writ was consequently issued.
Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that
the bond furnished was grossly insufficient,
respondent moved for the discharge of the
attachment.
The other defendants likewise filed similar motions.
RTC denied all the motions. The defendants,
including respondent filed their respective motions
for reconsideration but the trial court likewise denied
the same.
Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question
anymore the said orders, his co-defendants, Virata
and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-
MARA), assailed the same via certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA. CA, however, denied it and the
motion for reconsideration thereon.
In a petition for review on certiorari before SC, the
latter denied the petition and affirmed the CA rulings
for Virata’s and UEM-MARA’s failure to sufficiently
show that the appellate court committed any
reversible error.
Respondent filed before the trial court another
Motion to Discharge Attachment, re-pleading the
grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the
following additional grounds: (1) that he was not
present in Wincorp’s board meetings approving the
questionable transactions; and (2) that he could not
have connived with Wincorp and the other
defendants because he and Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,
in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against
the company as they were also victimized by its
fraudulent schemes.
Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed
upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA
and SC, and that the additional grounds were
respondent’s affirmative defenses that properly
pertained to the merits of the case, RTC denied the
motion.
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
respondent filed a certiorari petition before the CA
where the appellate court rendered the assailed
Decision reversing and setting aside the
aforementioned orders of the RTC and lifting the
Writ of Preliminary Attachment to the extent that it
concerned respondent’s properties. Petitioner moved
for the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA
denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed a petiton for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA was correct in lifting the writ of
preliminary attachment against respondent based on
additional ground that allegedly pertains already to
the merits of the main action, i.e., lack of factual
circumstances of fraud.
HELD:
YES. Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
which pertinently reads:
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment
may issue.-At the commencement of the action or at
any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any
proper party may have the property of the adverse
party attached as security for the aatisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered in the following
cases:
x x x x
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of
a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the
performance thereof.
For a writ to issue under this rule, the applicant must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
inferred from the debtor’s mere non-payment of the
debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The
applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the
debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
In the instant case, petitioner’s Affidavit is bereft of
any factual statement that respondent committed a
fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged
fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata
and/or Power Merge, by which SC affirmed the writ
of attachment issued against the latter.
As to the participation of respondent in the said
transaction, the affidavit merely states that
respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp,
connived with the other defendants to defraud
petitioner of his money placements. No other factual
averment or circumstance detailing how respondent
committed a fraud or how he connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued
upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any
specific act or deed to support the allegation that
respondent is guilty of fraud.
The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must
contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed
to respondent was committed for the court to decide
whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any statement
of other factual circumstances to show that
respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation,
had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or
without any showing of how respondent committed
the alleged fraud, the general averment in the
affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of
Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to
support the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
In the application for the writ under the said ground,
compelling is the need to give a hint about what
constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated
because established is the rule that fraud is never
presumed.
Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and
director of the company does not necessarily give rise
to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he
connived with the other defendants to commit a
fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may
treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons,
to whom liability will directly attach, this is only
done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and
convincingly established.
Considering that petitioner has not fully satisfied the
legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive
of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the
trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of respondent.
The merits of the main action are not triable in a
motion to discharge an attachment otherwise an
applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the
merits of the case on his motion.
However, the principle finds no application here
because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the
requirements set by the Rules of Court for the
issuance of the writ against the properties of
respondent. The evil sought to be prevented by the
said ruling will not arise, because the propriety or
impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case
can be determined by simply reading the complaint
and the affidavit in support of the application.
G.R. No. 166759               November 25, 2009
SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS
OF MARIO TORRES and SOLAR
RESOURCES, INC.,Petitioners,
vs.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA
SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL SATSATIN and
NIKKI NORLIN SATSATIN, Respondents.
FACTS: On October 25, 2002, the petitioners filed a
complaint for a sum of money and damages against
herein respondents.
On October 30 2002, they filed an Ex-Parte Motition
for the Issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
alleging that the respondents are about to depart from
the Philippines that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced; and that
they are willing to post a bond fixed by the court to
answer for all costs which may be adjudged to the
respondents and all damages which respondents may
sustain by reason of the attachment prayed for.
On October 30, 2002, the trial court issued an Order9
directing the petitioners to post a bond in the amount
ofP7,000,000.00 before the court issues the writ of
attachment.
On November 15, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for
Deputation of Sheriff, informing the court that they
have already filed an attachment bond. They also
prayed that a sheriff be deputized to serve the writ of
attachment that would be issued by the court.
In the Order dated November 15, 2002, the RTC
granted the above motion and deputized the sheriff,
together with police security assistance, to serve the
writ of attachment.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment
dated November 15, 2002, directing the sheriff to
attach the estate, real or personal, of the respondents.
On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ of
attachment was served upon the respondents. On the
same date, the sheriff levied the real and personal
properties of the respondent, including household
appliances, cars, and a parcel of land located at Las
Piñas, Manila.
On November 21, 2002 or two days after the writ was
implemented, summons, together with a copy of the
complaint, was served upon the respondents.
Respondents argued that the subject writ was
improper and irregular having been issued and
enforced without the lower court acquiring
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. They
maintained that the writ of attachment was
implemented without serving upon them the
summons together with the complaint. They also
argued that the bond issued in favor of the petitioners
was defective, because the bonding company failed to
obtain the proper clearance that it can transact
business with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. They
added that the various clearances which were issued
in favor of the bonding company were applicable
only in the courts of the cities of Pasay, Pasig,
Manila, and Makati, but not in the RTC, Imus,
Cavite.
ISSUE1: W/N the bond was properly issued
HELD1: NO. The CA correctly found that there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in
approving the bond posted by petitioners despite the
fact that not all the requisites for its approval were
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is
necessary that all the requisites for its approval are
met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance
from the Supreme Court showing that the company
concerned is qualified to transact business which is
valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its
issuance.38 However, it is apparent that the
Certification39 issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued
would clearly show that the bonds offered by
Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only
in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig.
Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding
company should not have been accepted by the RTC
of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification
secured by the bonding company from the OCA at
the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it
may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities.
ISSUE2: W/N writ was properly implemented
HELD2: NO. In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court
issues the order granting the application; second, the
writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented.
For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the
writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to
act in any manner against the defendant. Any order
issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant
At the time the trial court issued the writ of
attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to
do so since the motion for its issuance can be filed “at
the commencement of the action or at any time
before entry of judgment.” However, at the time the
writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since
no summons was yet served upon them. The proper
officer should have previously or simultaneously with
the implementation of the writ of attachment, served
a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order
for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon
them and for the writ to have binding effect.
Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was
validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly
enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v. ERLINDA
KRISHNAN, GR No. 203530, 2015-04-13
Facts:
Petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas
Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez (hereafter petitioners)
are the respondents in the complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money and Damages filed by respondent
Erlinda Khrishnan (hereafter respondent Erlinda) on
February 7, 2001.
Respondent Erlinda claimed that she is a client of
respondent bank wherein she maintained several
accounts including time deposits. On several
occasions, when respondent Erlinda presented her
Time Deposits Certificates amounting to
P28,597,472.70 for payment because they have...
become due, petitioners refused to honor them for the
reason that they were fraudulent. Respondent Erlinda
likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of
Attachment which the RTC granted on February 27,
2001.
By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in
BPI Family Bank, Calamba, Laguna in the amount of
P28,597,472.70 and its account amounting to
P49,000,000.00 in the Central Bank were garnished.
On March 9, 2001, petitioners filed an urgent ex-
parte Motion to Recall Quash and/or Lift Attachment
or Garnishment (in excess of amounts in the writ).
On August 15, 2001, petitioners filed an Omnibus
Motion seeking the substitution of their garnished
account with government securities and the
immediate resolution of their motion to discharge
attachment and setting the motion for hearing
On September 8, 2003, the RTC issued an order
lifting the attachment
The said Order was questioned by respondent Erlinda
by way of Petition for Certiorari before the 7th
Division which rendered a decision on November 15,
2006
, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:...
the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is GRANTED.
On May 09, 2008, respondent judge issued an Order
directing respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment
bond in the amount of P35,000,000.00 and petitioners
to file a counterbond within ten days from notice of
the filing and approval of the bond of respondent
Erlinda.
Respondent Erlinda filed her attachment bond on
June 25, 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00
through Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation
which was approved by respondent on July 7, 2009.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2009, petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion praying that a hearing be held to
determine the sufficiency of the attachment bond and
they be allowed to deposit Certificates of Title of real
property, and the issuance of the writ of attachment
be held in... abeyance.
On January 28, 2010, petitioners filed a motion to
admit bank property in lieu of counterbond
On September 24, 2010, respondent judge denied
petitioners' motion in the assailed Order.
On June 27, 2011, respondent judge issued an Order
reinstating the Writ of Attachment dated March 1,
2001 for failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond.
petitioners filed this petition for certiorari
In a Decision dated March 27, 2012, the CA
dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition and affirmed
the Orders of the RTC reinstating the Writ of
Attachment for failure of petitioners to file the
required counter-bond. The CA ruled that the RTC
judge committed no grave... abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' motion to admit bank property in
lieu of counter-bond
Issues:
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's decision
which denied petitioners' motion praying that bank
property be deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-
bond.
Ruling:
We rule in the negative.
once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only
remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is
through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-
bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner's argument
that it has the option... to deposit real property instead
of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to
discharge the attachment or stay the implementation
thereof is unmeritorious.
In fact, in Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v.
Tria-Infante,[6] we held that one of the ways to
secure the discharge of an attachment is for the party
whose property has been attached or a person
appearing on his behalf, to post a counterbond... or
make the requisite cash deposit in an amount equal to
that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.[7]
Apropos, the trial court aptly ruled that while it is
true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or
construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation
thereof is not justified in the present case for the
reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment
under
Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount
equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of
attachment or to the value of the property to be
attached. The proximate relation of the word
"deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5
of Rule 57. Plainly, in... construing said words, it can
be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the
deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly
refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of
money.
[ GR No. 203240, Mar 18, 2015 ]
NORTHERN ISLANDS v. SPS. DENNIS AND
CHERYLIN* GARCIA  the time to appeal of the other parties.
Facts
On September 23, 2005, petitioner Northern Islands
Co., Inc. (petitioner) filed a Complaint [4] with
application for a writ of preliminary attachment,
before the RTC against respondents t alleged that: (a)
from March to July 2004, petitioner caused the
delivery to respondents of various appliances in the
aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17;[7] (b) the goods
were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio
Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and
condition by respondents' representatives; x x x
however, the value of the goods were not paid by
respondents despite repeated demands;[10] and (e)
respondents fraudulently asserted that petitioner had
no proof that they  had indeed received the quantity
of the subject goods.[11]
In connection with the application for a writ of
preliminary attachment, petitioner posted a bond,
through Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation,
in the amount of ?8,040,825.17.  On November 7,
2005, the RTC issued the writ sought for.
Meanwhile, the CA, in a Decision dated January 19,
2012, partly granted the certiorari petition of
respondents, ordering the RTC to appoint a
commissioner as provided under Rule 32 of the Rules
of Court as well as the subsequent discharge of any
excess attachment if so found therein, and, on the
other hand, denying respondents' Motion for
Discovery.
Issues: The issues presented for the Court's
resolution are: (a) whether the RTC had lost
jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary
attachment after petitioner appealed the decision in
the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal
of the records to the CA; and (b) whether the CA
erred in ordering the appointment of a commissioner
and the subsequent discharge of any excess
attachment found by said commissioner.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides
that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of
In this case,  petitioner had duly perfected its appeal
of the RTC's September 21, 2011 Decision resolving
the Main Case through the timely filing of its Notice
of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together with the
payment of the appropriate docket fees.
With the RTC's loss of jurisdiction over the Main
Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all
matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the propriety
of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to
determine the excessiveness of the subject
preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter
to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
[40]
Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral,  the Court,
in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment,
definitively ruled that the he consequence is that
where the main action is appealed, the attachment
which may have been issued as an incident of that
action, is also considered appealed and so also
removed from the jurisdiction of the court a
quo.  The attachment itself cannot be the subject
of a separate action independent of the principal
action because the attachment was only an
incident of such action.[41] (Emphases supplied)
WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORP. v. ALFRED
RAYMOND WOLFEG.R. No. 181721September
09, 2015PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: (Watercraft) is engaged in the business of
building,repairing, storing and maintaining
yachts, boats and other pleasure crafts at the
Subic Bay FreeportZone, Subic, Zambales. It hired
respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British
national and residentof Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager. During his
employment, Wolfe stored thesailboat, Knotty Gull,
within Watercraft1’s boat storage facilities, but
never paid for the storage fees.Later on, Watercraft
terminated Wolfe’s employment.Sometime in June
2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from
Watercraft's storage facilities aftersigning a Boat
Pull-Out Clearance where he allegedly
acknowledged the outstanding obligation
ofUS$16,324.82 representing unpaid boat storage
fees.
Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay thesaid
amount. Thus, Watercraft filed a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money with Damages with
anApplication for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.Wolfe on the other hand,
claimed that he was hired as Service and Repair
Manager, instead ofShipyard Manager and denied
owing Watercraft the amount of US$16,324.82.
He explained that thesailboat was purchased in
February 1998 as part of an agreement between him
and Watercraft1’s thenGeneral Manager and
President for repair and be used as training or fill-in
project for the staff, and to besold later on.RTC
granted Watercraft’s application for Writ of
Preliminary attachment. CA on the other
hand,granted Wolfe’s petition, annulling and setting
aside the Writ of attachment, and declaring null and
voidthe Notice of attachment and levy.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE EX-PARTE ISSUANCE OF THE
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT BY THE TRIAL
COURT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER IS
VALID.
II.
WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT CONCERNING FRAUD
ARE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT THE ISSUANCE
OF A PRELIMINARY WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER.7
HELD: A writ of preliminary attachment is
defined as a provisional remedy issued upon
order of thecourt where an action is pending to be
levied upon the property or properties of the
defendant therein,the same to be held thereafter by
the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment thatmight be secured in the said
action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
After a careful perusal of the foregoing; allegations,
the Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed
to state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud, as required by Section 5,24 Rule 8
of the Rules of Court, and that Wolfe's mere failure to
pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily
amount to fraud, absent any showing that such
failure was due to insidious machinations and intent
on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due
it.
In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,25
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a
condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses,
usually kept secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and
therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances.27 Thus, the
applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must
sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be
inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the
debt or failure to comply with his obligation. 28 The
particulars of such circumstances necessarily include
the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud
committed.29 An affidavit which does not contain
concrete and specific grounds is inadequate to
sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere
general averments render the writ defective and the
court that ordered its issuance acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.30
In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary
Attachment does not contain specific allegations of
other factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at
the time of contracting the obligation, had a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither
can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars
of why he was guilty of fraud in the performance of
such obligation. To be specific, Watercraft's
following allegation is unsupported by any particular
averment of circumstances that will show why or how
such inference or conclusion was arrived at, to wit:
"16. For failing to pay for the use [of] facilities and
services - in the form of boat storage facilities - duly
enjoyed by him and for failing and refusing to fulfill
his promise to pay for the said boat storage fees, the
Defendant is clearly guilty of fraud x x x." 31 It is not
an allegation of essential facts constituting
Watercraft's causes of action, but a mere conclusion
of law.
With respect to Section 1 (a), 32 Rule 57, the other
ground invoked by Watercraft for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment, the Court finds no
compelling reason to depart from the CA's exhaustive
ruling to the effect that such writ is unnecessary
because Wolfe is not a flight risk, thus:
As to the allegation that Wolfe is a (light risk, thereby
warranting the issuance of the writ, the same lacks
merit. The mere fact that Wolfe is a British national
does not automatically mean that he would leave the
country at will. 
Phil-Air Conditioning Center vs RCJ Lines and
Rolando Abadilla, Jr.
 G.R. No. 193821, November 23, 2015
Phil-Air Conditioning Center (Phil-Air) filed this
petition for review on certiorari
On various dates between March 5, 1990, and August
29, 1990, petitioner Phil-Air sold to respondent RCJ
Lines four Carrier Paris 240 air conditioning units for
buses (units). The units included compressors,
condensers, evaporators, switches, wiring, circuit
boards, brackets, and fittings.
Phil-Air allegedly performed regular maintenance
checks on the units pursuant to the one-year warranty
on parts and labor. RCJ Lines issued three post-dated
checks in favor of Phil-Air to partly cover the unpaid
balance.
All the post-dated checks were dishonored when
Phil-Air subsequently presented them for payment.
Check No. 479759 was returned because it was
drawn against insufficient funds, while Check Nos.
479760 and 479761 were returned because payments
were stopped.
Before presenting the third check for payment, Phil-
Air sent a demand letter to Rolando Abadilla, Sr.
asking him to fund the post-dated checks. In view of
the failure of RCJ Lines to pay the balance despite
demand, Phil-Air filed on April 1, 1998 the
complaint  for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim, RCJ
Lines admitted that it purchased the units in the total
amount of P1,240,000.00 and that it had only paid
P400,000.00. It refused to pay the balance because
Phil-Air allegedly breached its warranty.
RCJ Lines averred that the units did not sufficiently
cool the buses despite repeated repairs. Phil-Air
purportedly represented that the units were in accord
with RCJ Lines’ cooling requirements as shown in
Phil-Air’s price quotation. The price quotation
provided that full payment should be made upon the
units’ complete installation. Complete installation,
according to RCJ Lines, is equivalent to being in
operational condition.
RCJ Lines claimed that it was also entitled to be
reimbursed for costs and damages occasioned by the
enforcement of the writ of attachment.
Issues: (2) Whether Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ
Lines for the counterbond premium and its alleged
unrealized profits;
(3) Whether RCJ Lines proved its alleged unrealized
profits arising from the enforcement of the
preliminary writ of attachment.
Held:
2. Phil-Air is not directly liable for the counter-bond
premium and RCJ Lines’ alleged unrealized profits.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional
remedy issued by the court where an action is
pending to be levied upon the property or properties
of the defendant. The property is held by the sheriff
as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment
that might be secured by the attaching party against
the defendant.
The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the
finding of the court that there exists a valid ground
for its issuance. The Rules also require the applicant
to post a bond.
Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules) provides that “the party applying for the order
must…give a bond executed to the adverse party in
the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the
issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will
pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the
adverse party and all damages that he may sustain
by reason of the attachment, if the court shall
finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled
thereto.”
The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the
party whose property is attached is afforded relief to
have the attachment lifted. There are various modes
of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.:
(1) by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond
under Section 12;
(2) by proving that the attachment bond was
improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that
the bond is insufficient under Section 13;
 (3) by showing that the attachment is excessive
under Section 13; and (4) by claiming that the
property is exempt from execution under Section 2.
RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a
counter-bond.
Under the first mode, the court will order the
discharge of the attachment after (1) the movant
makes a cash deposit or posts a counterbond and (2)
the court hears the motion to discharge the
attachment with due notice to the adverse party.
The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must
be equal to that fixed by the court in the order of
attachment, exclusive of costs. The cash deposit or
counter-bond shall secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching party may recover in the
action.
The discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon
posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and
after hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash
deposit or counter-bond. On the other hand, the
discharge under Section 13 takes effect only upon
showing that the plaintiff’s attachment bond was
improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is
insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under
Section 13 must be made only after hearing.
As discussed above, it is patent that under the Rules,
the attachment bond answers for all damages incurred
by the party against whom the attachment was issued.
Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the
costs adjudged to and the damages sustained by RCJ
Lines because of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57
positively lays down the rule that the attachment
bond will pay “all the costs which may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was
not entitled thereto.”
The RTC, instead of declaring Phil-Air liable for the
alleged unrealized profits and counter-bond premium,
should have ordered the execution of the judgment
award on the attachment bond. To impose direct
liability to Phil-Air would defeat the purpose of the
attachment bond, which was not dissolved despite the
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment.
The order to refund the counter-bond premium is
likewise erroneous. The premium payment may be
deemed a cost incurred by RCJ Lines to lift the
attachment. Such cost may be charged against the
attachment bond.
3. RCJ Lines failed to prove its alleged unrealized
profits.
In Spouses Yu v. Ngo Yet Te, we held that if the claim
for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the
amount of unrealized profits must be established and
supported by independent evidence of the mean
income of the business undertaking interrupted by the
illegal seizure.
We explained in Spouses Yu that to merit an award of
actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment,
the attachment defendant must prove, with the best
evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered
and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be
of the kind which is not only capable of proof but
must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. As to its amount, the same must be
measurable based on specific facts, and not on
guesswork or speculation.
Similarly, the evidence adduced by RCJ Lines to
show actual damages fell short of the required proof.
Its average daily income cannot be derived from the
summary of daily cash collections from only two
separate occasions, i.e., August 22-23 and September
2-3, 2000. The data submitted is too meager and
insignificant to conclude that the buses were indeed
earning an average daily income of P12,000.00.
More significant, the person who prepared the
unsigned summary of daily cash collections was not
presented before the RTC to verify and explain how
she arrived at the computation. The dispatchers who
prepared the collection reports were likewise not
presented; some of the reports were also unsigned.
While the summary was approved by Rolando
Abadilla, Jr., in his testimony on the alleged
unrealized profits was uncorroborated and self-
serving.
Nonetheless, we recognize that RCJ Lines suffered
some form of pecuniary loss when two of its buses
were wrongfully seized, although the amount cannot
be determined with certainty.
We note that in its prayer for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary attachment, Phil-Air alleged that RCJ
Lines was guilty of fraud in entering into the sale
transaction. A perusal of the record, however, would
show that Phil-Air failed to prove this bare assertion.
This justifies an award of temperate or moderate
damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Idolor vs. CA
Petitioner executed in favor of private respondent
Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage with right of extrajudicial foreclosure upon
failure to redeem the mortgage. private respondent
Iluminada de Guzman, wife of Gumersindo de
Guzman, filed a complaint against petitioner Idolor
before the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which
resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos". Petitioner
failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private
respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution
before the Office of the Barangay captain who
subsequently issued a certification to file action.
Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the
parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage
dated March 21, 1994. The mortgaged property was
sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo, as
the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriff's
Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. On June 25,
1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint for annulment
of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
a writ of preliminary injunction against private
respondents. The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. Spouses de Guzman filed
with the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari seeking annulment of the trial court's order
dated July 28, 1998 which granted the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The respondent court granted
the petition and annulled the assailed writ of
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether the annulment of the preliminary
injunction by the CA is proper?
HELD: Yes.
ISSUE: Whether Idolor has proprietary right over the
foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a
writ of injunction.
HELD: No. Injunction is a preservative remedy
aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests.
Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that
the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a
right in esse or the existence of a right to be
protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to
be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the
existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the
granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed
to protect contingent or future rights.
Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and
positive right which should be judicially protected
through the writ of injunction or that the defendant
has committed or has attempted to commit any act
which has endangered or tends to endanger the
existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for
denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the
existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that
the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties
before their claims can be thoroughly investigated
and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard of compensation. In the instant case, we
agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no
more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed
property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of
injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property
was sold in a public auction to private respondent
Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's
certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. Petitioner
had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale
to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her
right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de
Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the foreclosed property. When
petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of
sheriff's sale against private respondents with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest
or title in the property sought to be protected as her
right of redemption had already expired on June 23,
1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the
complaint. It is always a ground for denying
injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient
title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the
ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows
no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage
without proof of actual existing right is not aground
for an injunction.
Gustilo vs. Real (353 SCRA)
Rimeo Gustilo was a candidate for punong barangay
of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros
Occidental in the 12 May 1997 elections. His lone
opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on, then the incumbent
punong barangay and the representative of the
Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) to the
Sangguniang Bayan of Manapla and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental. Both Gustilo and
Libo-on garnered 819 votes during the elections,
resulting in a tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board
of Canvassers was in Gustilo's favor and he was
proclaimed duly elected punong barangay. On 20
May 1997, Libo-on filed an election protest case
before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, Negros
Occidental and sought the recounting of ballots in
two precincts, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and
damages. The judge issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO), after receiving the Lobo-on's evidence
ex parte, and annulled the proclamation of
complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of
Punta Mesa, Manapla. Gustilo took his oath of office
as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC lifted the TRO issued by the Judge and
declared as null and void the order nullifying
Gustilo's proclamation as duly elected punong
barangay. Believing that the Judge could not decide
the case impartially, Gustilo moved for his inhibition.
The Judge denied Gustilo's motion for inhibition and
after hearing Libo-on's motion for permanent
injunction, issued a second TRO "to maintain the
status quo between the contending parties." In a
verified complaint dated 15 June 1997, Gustilo
charged Judge Real with gross misconduct, gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
Whether a TRO (the first) can be issued without
notice and hearing. No. Under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 20-95], whenever an
application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on
the application only after all parties have been
notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other
words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed
with.
Whether a TRO (the second) can be issued in favor of
the losing candidate on the ground that "extreme
urgency" and "grave injustice and irreparable injury
will arise." No. Before an injunctive writ can be
issued, it is essential that the following requisites be
present: (1) there must be aright in esse or the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act
against which injunction to be directed is a violation
of such right. The onus probandi is on movant to
show that there exists a right to be protected, which is
directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of
the right is material and substantial and that there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent a serious damage.
In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed
as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He
had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was
annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said
office. We do not see how the complainant's
exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable
injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so
as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining
order "to maintain the status quo."
Lagrosas vs. Bristol-Myers (565 SCRA)
Lagrosas was an employee of Bristol-Myers. He was
terminated after accidentally hitting his former
girlfriend, who was his coemployee, when he saw her
with Menguito following a district meeting in
Alabang Town Center. Petitioner filed a case for
illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter declared that the
dismissal was illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the decision but it later reinstated the decision of the
Labor Arbiter after a motion for reconsideration. The
arbiter issued a writ of execution. Bristol-Myers
moved to quash the writ of execution contending that
it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court gave due course to
Bristol-Myers petition and issued a TRO enjoining
the enforcement of the writ of execution and notices
of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the
appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction. Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO
cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the
Decision dated January 28, 2005. On August 12,
2005, the appellate court denied the motion as
premature since the decision is not yet final and
executory due to Lagrosas appeal to this Court. The
appellate court held that upon the expiration of the
TRO, the cash bond intended for it also expired.
Thus, the discharge and release of the cash bond for
the expired TRO is proper. But the appellate court
disallowed the discharge of the injunction cash bond
since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued
pendente lite. Since there is a pending appeal with the
Supreme Court, the Decision dated January 28, 2005
is not yet final and executory. On 28 October 2005,
the appellate court resolved to reconsider and set
aside its August 2005 resolution.
ISSUE: Whether the conditions of writ of
preliminary injunction were satisfied? Yes.
Whether the cash bond for the injunction should be
released? Yes.
HELD: It is settled that the purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its
sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits
of the case can be heard fully. A preliminary
injunction may be granted only when, among other
things, the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files
with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person
enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay such party or person
all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for
damages in case it is finally decided that the
injunction ought not to have been granted. Its
principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction,
and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. By
its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate
court disposed of the case by granting Bristol-Myers
petition and reinstating the Decision dated September
24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint
for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the
TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both
conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were
satisfied. Notably, the appellate court ruled that
Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted
by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the
implementation of the writ of execution and notices
of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect
amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain
any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate,
the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction
only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security
for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
Jenosa vs. Delariarte (630 SCRA)
Some students of the University of San Agustin,
among them petitioners Niño Carlo Jenosa, Patrick
Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and
Nonell Gregory Duro were caught engaging in hazing
outside the school premises. A meeting between
school authorities and the students’ parents was
conducted. The parties agreed that, instead of the
possibility of being charged and found guilty of
hazing, the students who participated in the hazing
incident as initiators, including petitioner students,
would just transfer to another school, while those
who participated as neophytes would be suspended
for one month. The parents of the apprehended
students, including petitioners, affixed their
signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify
their conformity. In view of the agreement, the
University did not anymore convene the Committee
on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the
hazing incident. The parents of petitioner students
(petitioner parents) sent a letter to the University
President urging him not to implement the 28
November 2002 agreement. According to petitioner
parents, the Principal, without convening the COSD,
decided to order the immediate transfer of petitioner
students
Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and
damages assailing the Principal’s decision to order
the immediate transfer of petitioner students as a
violation of their right to due process because the
COSD was not convened. The trial court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to
admit petitioner students during the pendency of the
case. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss.
Respondents alleged that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and
that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping.
Petitioners wrote the DepEd and asked that it direct
the University to release the report cards and other
credentials of petitioner students. The University
replied that it could not release petitioner students’
report cards due to their pending disciplinary case
with the COSD. Petitioners filed another complaint
for mandatory injunction praying for the release of
petitioner students’ report cards and other credentials.
The CA ruled in favor of the university.
ISSUE: Whether the mandatory injunction should be
granted. No.
HELD: No. In this case, we rule that the Principal
had the authority to order the immediate transfer of
petitioner students because of the 28 November 2002
agreement. Petitioner parents affixed their signatures
to the minutes of the 28 November 2002 meeting and
signified their conformity to transfer their children to
another school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia
Duro even wrote a letter to inform the University that
they would transfer their children to another school
and requested for the pertinent papers needed for the
transfer. In turn, the University did not anymore
convene the COSD. The University agreed that it
would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings
and instead issue the transfer credentials of petitioner
students. Then petitioners reneged on their agreement
without any justifiable reason. Since petitioners’
present complaint is one for injunction, and
injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners
must come to court with clean hands. In University of
the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr., a case involving
student misconduct, this Court ruled: Since injunction
is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it
must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so
because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who
seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is
a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in
the principle that he who has done inequity shall not
have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied
relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Discipline in education is specifically mandated by
the 1987 Constitution which provides that all
educational institutions shall "teach the rights and
duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual
values, develop moral character and personal
discipline." Schools and school administrators have
the authority to maintain school discipline and the
right to impose appropriate and reasonable
disciplinary measures. On the other hand, students
have the duty and the responsibility to promote and
maintain the peace and tranquility of the school by
observing the rules of discipline.
Solid Builders, Inc. vs. China Banking
Corporation
During the period from 1992 to 1996, China Banking
Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid
Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted to
P139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other
charges. To secure the loans, Medina Foods
Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor
several surety agreements and contracts of real estate
mortgage over parcels of land. In a letter addressed to
CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a
reduction of interests and penalties and the
implementation of a dacion en pago of the New
Cubao Central property. CBC sent SBI a letter dated
stating that the loans had been completely
restructured effective March 1, 1999 in the amount of
P218,540,646.00. On the aspect of interests and
charges, CBC suggested the updating of the
obligation to avoid paying interests and charges.
Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000,
CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account
within ten days from receipt thereof. Claiming that
the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC
were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin
CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI
and MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel Execution of
Contract and for Performance and Damages, With
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-
Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the RTC of
Pasig City. The trial court granted the application of
SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction for they were able to
sufficiently comply with the requisites for the
issuance of an injunctive writ. CBC sought
reconsideration but the trial court denied it.
Subsequently, CBC filed a "Motion to Dissolve
Injunction Order" but this was denied. Aggrieved,
CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of
CBC, set aside the Orders of RTC and dissolved the
injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the SBI and MFII failed to satisfy the
requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Yes
HELD: A writ of preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary event which must be granted only in
the face of actual and existing substantial rights. A
writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve
the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of
two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the
right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the
acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
It must be proven that the violation sought to be
prevented would cause an irreparable injury. There is
no clear right that warrants the extraordinary
protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by
SBI and MFII to exist in their favor. Here, SBI and
MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged
properties shielded from foreclosure by CBC on the
ground that the interest rate and penalty charges
imposed by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are
iniquitous and unconscionable. As debtor-
mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a
right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from
foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on
the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and
confiscatory rate of interest. Neither has there been a
showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered
irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent
recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be
had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of
mathematical computation. The provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard of compensation.
Knights of Rizal Vs. DMCI Homes, Inc., DMCI
Project Developers, Inc., City of Manila, National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, National
Museum, and National Historical Commission of
the Philippines
FACTS: DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a
lot in the City of Manila.  The said lot was earmarked
for the construction of Torre de Manila
Condominium project.  After having acquired all the
necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI
was ready to commence the intended project. 
However, the City of Manila Council issued a
resolution to temporarily suspend the Building Permit
until such time that issues had been cleared. 
Consultations after consultations had he been
initiated both by the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI. 
Finally, On Jan. 2014, the City Council of Manila,
issued another resolution ratifying and confirming all
previously issued permits, licenses and approvals
issued by the City for Torre de Manila.
Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition
for injunction seeking TRO, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of the project. 
The KOR argued that the building, if completed,
would be a sore to the view of the monument, an
endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a
construction borne out of bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should issue a writ of
mandamus against the City Officials to stop the
construction of Torre de Manila.
RULING: No, The SC ruled that there was no law
prohibiting the construction of the project.  It was not
even considered as contrary to morals, customs and
public order.  The project was way well from the
Park where the monument was located.  The SC ruled
further that a mandamus did not lie against the City
of Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus
is issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed
upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled
to perform an act, and the party seeking mandamus
has a clear legal right to the performance of such
act.”  In the case at bar, such factors were wanting.
Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any
Law or rule that the construction of such building
outside the Rizal Park was prohibited if the building
was within the background sightline or vision of the
Rizal Monument.  Thus, the petition was lacking of
merit and, thus dismissed.
SATURNINO NOVECIO v. RODRIGO F. LIM,
GR No. 193809, 2015-03-23
Facts:
Respondents Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V.
Nieto, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Lope
Durotan (the respondents), filed complaints[4] for
forcible entry with damages against petitioners
Saturnino Novecio,... Gavino Novecio, Anastacio
Golez, et al. (the petitioners).[5]
The respondents alleged that on February 15, 2004,
the petitioners, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
and stealth, unlawfully squatted and took possession
of several portions of land
The petitioners allegedly planted crops, erected
makeshift shelters, and continue to plant and /or
improve the shelters as of the filing of the complaints
for forcible entry, all without the consent and/or
against the will of the respondents.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that
they have already been in possession of the land for
more than two years when the complaints were filed.
They maintained that they have planted the land with
corn, durian, coconut, mango, jackfruit, rambutan,
etc. for their... livelihood.
The petitioners further maintained that Manuel V.
Nieto, father of Maria Carmen J. Tuazon, had
previous landholding in the area but the same was
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) and so it was subdivided in favor of
the tenants.[7]
The MTC ruled in favor the petitioners.[8]
The MTC found that the respondents anchored their
alleged prior possession on the fact that they have
applied title for the land as shown by a certification
authorizing land survey.[9] Other than this, the
respondents had no evidence of their actual and...
physical possession of the land. The MTC also found
that they were not even residents of the place and
never personally appeared in court during trial.
The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed their prior
possession on the fact that their livelihood as fisher
folks and farmers require them to live by the
riverbank where the land is located. The petitioners
also asserted that they have been occupying the land
for more than... two (2) years when the complaints
were filed. The MTC held that the certification issued
by the barangay captain that the petitioners are
residents of the place is a very strong evidence of
their prior physical possession.[10]
The MTC concluded: "[a]s between a resident and a
non-resident the likelihood is that the resident has the
prior physical possession because of his accessibility
to the area."[11]
The RTC reversed the MTC decision.[13]
The RTC ruled that the MTC should have given
credence to the certification issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources - Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO) showing that the land in litigation is the
subject of an application... for title and claim by the
respondents. The RTC also took judicial notice of the
request for authority to conduct a survey over the
subject property, which provides that "the parcel of
land herein treated was an unsurveyed land and
Manuel V. Nieto was the identified occupant and...
tiller of the land."[14]
In view of these, the RTC ruled that the respondents
were the actual occupants of the property in litigation
long before the petitioners had taken possession of
the same property. The RTC ordered the petitioners'
ejectment.
The petitioners filed on April 30, 2009 a Petition for
Review[16] with the CA
As the respondents sought the execution of the RTC
judgment, the petitioners filed on May 14, 2010 an
Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order.[17]
On July 13, 2009, the CA issued a TRO effective for
sixty (60) days.
On January 28, 2010, the CA issued the first assailed
resolution denying the petitioners' application for
preliminary injunction.
Issues:
whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it denied the petitioners' prayer for
preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious.
the CA ignored relevant facts that would have
justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Contrary to established jurisprudence, the CA also
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction without
giving the factual and legal... bases for such denial.
In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is
not required to submit conclusive and complete
evidence. He is only required to show that he has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.[25]
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown
their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the
relief demanded consists in restraining the execution
of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the
disputed land. Second, their ejectment from the land
from... which they derive their source of livelihood
would work injustice to the petitioners. Finally, the
execution of the RTC decision is probably in
violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending to
render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible
entry cases ineffectual.
Moreover, the court in granting or dismissing an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction based
on the pleadings of the parties and their respective
evidence must state in its order the findings and
conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This
is to enable the... appellate court to determine
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for
injunctive relief.[26]
Thus, we do not understand why the CA denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction without citing any
legal or factual basis for the denial.
We therefore have no idea why and how the CA
came to the conclusion that the petitioners are not
entitled to the injunctive relief. Hence, we are forced
to go beyond the function of a certiorari under Rule
65 and examine the factual findings of the MTC and
the RTC.
The MTC found that the petitioners have been in
actual and physical possession of the land for more
than two (2) years prior to the institution of the
complaints for forcible entry.[27] The MTC also
found that the respondents were not even sure how
the... petitioners entered the land. In their complaints,
they alleged that petitioners entered the land by
means of "force, intimidation, threat, stealth and
strategy," a shotgun allegation which shows that
respondents' lack knowledge of how the petitioners
entered the disputed... property.
The RTC, on the other hand, relied on a mere request
for authority to conduct a land survey, allegedly
showing that respondent Manuel V. Nieto was the
occupant and tiller of the land.
However, this document does not prove prior
possession of the subject land. It only points to the
fact that there was an application for a land title in the
name of one of the respondents, which application
was not even shown to have been granted. This
document merely... authorized the survey of the land;
the declaration regarding possession was just
incidental to the application for land survey.
Between the clear findings of the MTC, which
conducted the trial of the forcible entry cases, and the
RTC acting as an appellate court, which relied on
documentary evidence but without sufficiently
explaining how such evidence would prove prior
possession, we are inclined to... give weight to the
MTC's ruling.
Under this factual backdrop, we conclude that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction without
explanation and justification.
CAYABYAB V DIMSON
“In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson
filed any application for renewal of his business
permit to operate the subject poultry farm in 2014,
apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary
barangay clearance which was not issued based on
complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said
farm. Records show that complaints from
neighboring barangays were received by the office of
Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming
from the said farm, 42 which was confirmed upon
ocular inspection conducted by the Health and
Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao,
Pampanga.43 Settled is the rule that acts of public
officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless
sufficiently shown to be otherwise.44 In this case,
Dimson was unable to refute the finding that foul
odor is being emitted by his farm, having failed to
present the inspection report of the sanitary officer
who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in
the fann.45 Not having passed the necessary
sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima
facie valid reason for the withholding of the required
barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the
renewal of Dimson’s business permit to operate.
 
Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary
business pennit to operate in 2014 on account of his
inability to obtain the required barangay clearance
due to non-compliance with a requirement
standard,46 Dimson may not legally operate in the
Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby,
warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the
CDO and the Closure Order. Accordingly, no error,
much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed
on the RTC in denying Dimson’s application for the
issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the
absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear
legal right to resume his operations pending final
determination by the RTC of the merits of the main
case for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A
clear legal right means one clearly founded in or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law,
which is not extant in the present case. It is settled
that the possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for
the issuance of an injunctive.”
REPUBLIC v. REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, GR
No. 197472, 2015-09-07
Facts:
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev.
Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in
humanitarian and charitable activities, established an
orphanage and school in Punta Verde
, Palaui Island
He claimed that since 1962, he has been in... peaceful
possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the
western portion of Palaui Island... which he, with the
help of Aetas and other people under his care, cleared
and developed for agricultural purposes in order to
support his... charitable, humanitarian and missionary
works.
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military
purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in
Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the
southern half portion of the Palaui Island were
withdrawn from sale or... settlement and reserved for
the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however, to
private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994,
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No.
447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding
waters... as marine reserve. Again subject to any
private rights, the entire Palaui
Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48
hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine
protected area.
On June 13,2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction[5] against Rogelio
C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as Commanding
Officer of the Philippine Naval Command
According to him, some members of the Philippine
Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful
and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion
of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they
commanded him and his men, through the use of
force... and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he
sought assistance from the Office of the Philippine
Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks
and threatened with drastic military action if they do
not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were
constrained to leave the area.
the RTC issued an Order[8] dated February 21, 2002
granting the... application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained
to five hectares (subject area) only, not to the whole
50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev.
Cortez, viz.:
It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez]
covers an area of 50 hectares more or less located at
the western portion of Palaui Island which is within
the Naval reservation. [Rev. Cortez] presented what
he called as a survey map (Exh. "H") indicating the...
location of the area claimed by the Church of the
Living God and/or Rev. Claudio Cortez with an
approximate area of 50 hectares identified as Exh.
"H-4". However, the Survey Map allegedly prepared
by [a] DENR personnel is only a sketch map[,] not a
survey map as claimed by [Rev.
Cortez]. Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area
[are] not specifically indicated.
For this reason, there is merit to the contention of
[Biñas] that [Rev. Cortez]' claim to the 50 hectares of
land identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is unclear and
ambiguous. It is a settled jurisprudence that
mandatory injunction is the strong arm of equity that
never ought to be... extended unless to cases of great
injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate
and commensurate remedy in damages. The right
must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so
as to be averted only by the protecting preventive
process of injunction.
Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev.
Cortez] tended only to show that [he] has a pending
application of patent with the DENR. Even so, [Rev.
Cortez] failed to present in evidence the application
for patent allegedly filed by [him] showing that he
applied for patent on... the entire 50 hectares of land
which he possessed or occupied for a long period of
time. Under the circumstances, therefore, the title of
petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island
remains unclear and doubtful, and [is] seriously
disputed by the government.
More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was
issued on May 22, 1967, [Rev. Cortez] has not
perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor
acquired any vested right thereto considering that he
only occupied the land as alleged by him in 1962 or
barely five (5)... years before the issuance of the
Presidential Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had
the effect of removing Palaui Island from the
alienable or disposable portion of the public domain
and therefore the island, as of the date of [the]
Issuance [of the proclamation], has ceased to... be
disposable public land.
However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev.
Cortez] has lawfully possessed and occupied at least
five (5) hectares of land situated at the western
portion of the Palaui Island identified as Exh "H-4".
During the hearing, Cmdr. Rogelio Biñas admitted
that when he was assigned... as Commanding Officer
in December 1999, he went to Palaui Island and [saw
only] two (2) baluga families tilling the land
consisting of five (5) hectares. Therefore, it cannot be
seriously disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and his baluga
tribesmen cleared five (5) hectares of land for...
planting and cultivation since 1962 on the western
portion identified as Exhibit "H-4". The Philippine
Navy also admitted that they have no objection to
settlers of the land prior to the Presidential
Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had been identified
as one of the early settlers... of the area before the
Presidential Proclamation. The DENR also
acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has filed an
application for patent on the western area and that he
must be allowed to pursue his claim.
Although the court is not persuaded by the argument
of [Rev. Cortez] that he has already acquired vested
rights over the area claimed by him, the court must
recognize that [Rev. Cortez] may have acquired some
propriety rights over the area considering the
directive of the DENR... to allow [Rev. Cortez] to
pursue his application for patent. However, the court
wants to make clear that the application for patent by
[Rev. Cortez] should be limited to an area not to
exceed five (5) hectares situated at the western
portion of x x x Palaui Island identified in... the
sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the
portion where [Rev. Cortez] has clearly established
his right or title by reason of his long possession and
occupation of the land.
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision[11]
making the injunction final and permanent. In so
ruling, the said court made reference to the
Indigenous Peoples' [Fight] Act (EPRA) as follows:
The Indigenous [Peoples' Right] Act should be given
effect in this case. The affected community belongs
to the group of indigenous people which are protected
by the State of their rights to continue in their
possession of the lands they have been tilling since
time immemorial.
No subsequent passage of law or presidential decrees
can alienate them from the land they are tilling.[12]
In its Decision[17] dated June 29, 2011, the CA
upheld the RTC's issuance of a final injunction
Issues:
whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of
mandatory injunction.
Ruling:
We grant the Petition.
while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right
of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that
the subject area over which he has a claim is not part
of the public domain and therefore can be the proper
object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.
Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under
private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of... the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons."[45] To prove that a land is
alienable, the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an... administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
declaring the land as alienable and disposable must
be established.[46]
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the
subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared
alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to
occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still
inalienable public domain.
The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and
Proclamation No. 447 were made subject to private
rights.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels
of land had been segregated from the military
reservation, the respondents had to prove that the
subject properties were alienable or disposable land
of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale
and... settlement and reservation for military purposes
under Presidential Proclamation No. 265.
Without first determining the nature and character of
the land, all other requirements such as length and
nature of possession and occupation over such land
do not come into play. The required length of
possession does not operate when the land is part of
the public... domain.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev.
Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed
right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as
would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.
Principles:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated
and thus may not be the proper object of possession.
Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect
one's alleged right of possession over the same.
[ G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017 ]
AMA LAND, INC., PETITIONER, VS. WACK
WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
A commercial and residential building project located
at Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue comer Fordham
Street in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City,
was proposed by x x x AMA Land, Inc. (AMALI x x
x) in [the] mid-1990s.
On March 18, 1996, AMALI notified [WWRAI] - a
registered homeowners' association of Wack Wack
Village - of its intention to use Fordham Street as an
access road and staging area of the project. As
AMALI received no response from [WWRAI], the
former temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a
field office along Fordham Street. [WWRAI]
claimed, however, that AMALI already converted
part of the said street as barrack site and staging area
even before March 18, 1996. All subsequent attempts
of [WWRAI] to remove the said field office proved
futile.
[On May 8, 1996,] AMALI then filed a petition
before the [RTC], [wherein it seeks the temporary use
of Fordham Street belonging to WWRAI as an access
road to AMALI's construction site of its AMA Tower
project pursuant to Article 656[5] of the Civil Code,
and to establish a permanent easement of right of way
in its favor over a portion of Fordham Street pursuant
to Article 649[6] of the Civil Code. Aside from its
prayer for the declaration of temporary and
permanent easement of right of way in its favor over
a portion of Fordham Street, AMALI is also] praying
for: (a) a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
immediately enjoin [WWRAI] from demolishing and
removing the temporary field office, constructing a
fence isolating Fordham Street, and preventing
AMALI from gaining access to the construction site;
(b) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
directing [WWRAI] to allow AMALI to use Fordham
Street as an access road and staging area; (c) an order
making the TRO and the aforesaid writ permanent;
and (d) an order declaring a permanent right of way
in favor of AMALI.
Issues
whether WWRAI is entitled to a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction;
HELD: The Court agrees with the RTC that:
[WWRAI]'s allegation that [its members'[16]] right to
live in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be
violated in the event that the condominium project of
[AMALI] will be erected is untenable. The alleged
noise and dust that may be caused by the construction
is the natural consequence thereof. However, this
annoyance that may be brought by the construction is
not permanent in nature but is merely temporary and
once the building is completed, [said members'] right
to live in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will
be restored without noise and dust.
As to the allegations that [said members'] privacy
may be invaded for the reason that they may be
photographed or videotaped without their knowledge,
these fears are merely speculative and cannot be
taken into consideration.
As admitted by [WWRAI's] witness, the construction
activity is suspended, hence, there is nothing to
restrain x x x. There is no urgent and paramount legal provisions on the establishment and grant of the
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[17] legal easement of right of way under the Civil Code.
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly Lastly, the status quo prevailing before the filing of
demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that must the WWRAI petition before the CA is not the status
be protected by the injunctive writ. The quo ante that must be preserved. The object of a writ
apprehensions of its members are, as correctly ruled of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
by the RTC, speculative and insufficient to quo, which is the last peaceable uncontested status
substantiate the element of serious and irreparable that preceded the pending controversy.[39] Thus, the
damage. proper understanding of the status quo ante should
refer to the situation prior to AMALI's unauthorized
The Court reiterated in Searth Commodities Corp. v.
use of a portion of Fordham Street as an access road
Court of Appeals[35] that:
and staging area of its AMA Tower project.
The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing
a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect
dispose of the main case without trial. x x x There
would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case
and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since
it would assume the proposition which the petitioners
are inceptively bound to prove.[36]
The RTC erred and/or gravely abused its discretion
when it granted AMALI's application for preliminary
mandatory injunction because, in so doing, it
prematurely decided disputed facts and disposed of
the merits of the case without the benefit of a full-
blown trial wherein testimonial and documentary
evidence could be fully and exhaustively presented,
heard and refuted by the parties. [37] As such, the RTC
Order dated July 24, 1997 insofar as it granted a
temporary easement of right of way over Fordham
Street in favor of AMALI is concerned is declared
void and of no force and effect. [38] The RTC lacked
jurisdiction to declare a temporary easement of right
of way arising from Article 656 of the Civil Code
without a full-blown trial.

Article 656 requires proof of indispensability and

receipt of payment of the proper indemnity for the
damage caused by the owner of the dominant estate
before the owner of the servient estate can be
compelled to grant a temporary easement of right of
way. It appears from the rollo that AMALI presented
no witnesses to establish these prerequisites. Being
preconditions, they are akin to suspensive conditions
that must be fulfilled before the obligation on the part
of WWRAI to allow the easements can arise. Until
the preconditions are met, AMALI has no legal basis
to use a portion of Fordham Street as an access road
and staging area of its AMA Tower project. To allow
AMALI to do so would be in contravention of the