II. CONSTITUTION AND ITS INTERPRETATION Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS (DIGEST)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of
the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price  in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s
check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October
1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid,
MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
RULING: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.
267 SCRA 402
3 February 1997 En Banc
Alternative title: manila prince hotel petitioner vs.
government service insurance system, manila hotel
corporation, committee on privatization and office of the
government corporate counsel
FACTS
The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued. In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning
bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid
prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check
worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept
both the bid match and the manager’s check.
The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits that the Manila Hotel
has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become
a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part
of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the
shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy.
 ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article
11 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing or non self
executing
If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is
violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy (Section
10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is
therefore null and void.
HELD
As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled
that the qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting
it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The
Supreme Court, therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to
cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the
Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid
of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution
should be considered self executing rather than non self
executing.  Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article
11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that “in grant of rights and
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”. 
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10,
second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory
provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En
Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over
foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term
patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution speaks of national
patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and
therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark
a living testimonial of Philippine heritage
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the
nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this
is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of
the Philippines being a democratic and republican state. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question
should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-
alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of
qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from
assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew
the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
“to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed
an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint
was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First
District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint never made it
to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that the
one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners
on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint.
Since there was already a first complaint that never got through the Committee, no
impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.
ISSUE/S
1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment
complaint valid?
HELD
1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide  all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean,
as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried
the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers
of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing
of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House.
This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an
impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
______________________________________
Case Digest: Chavez vs. JBC
 
FACTS:  In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a
representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the
House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,”
such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as Issue:
expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the
Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?
performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Held/Reason:
Congress. 
The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the
ISSUE:  Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of
respondent does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the
judicial review have been met. 
purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance,
DECISION:  Yes 
thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and
State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d)
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is
put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost
his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice.
While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi,
this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to
the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily
publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the
country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is
an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who
have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.  

PREAMBLE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and
selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious
purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
I. ORIGIN, DEFINITION AND NATURE
Marbury v. Madison - 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
RULE:
The Constitution of the United States establishes certain limits not to be transcended
by the different departments of the government. The powers of the legislature are
defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is
that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with limited and
unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom
they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is
a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative
act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary
act.
FACTS:
William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper,
by their counsel, Charles Lee, severally moved the court for a rule to James
Madison, secretary of state of the United States, to show cause why a
mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them
respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the district of
Columbia. This motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts; that
notice of this motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late
president of the United States, nominated the applicants to the senate for their
advice and consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the district of
Columbia; that the senate advised and consented to the appointments; that
commissions in the due form were signed by the said president appointing
them justices, and that the seal of the United States was in due form affixed to
the said commissions by the secretary of state; that the applicants have
requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commissions, who has not
complied with that request; and that their said commissions are withheld from
them. 
Applicant asked the Supreme Court to compel President Jefferson’s Secretary of
State, by Writ of Mandamus, to deliver the commission.
ISSUE: Does the applicant have a vested right in the commission he demands?
ANSWER: No.
CONCLUSION:
The Court granted a rule to show cause, requiring the Secretary to show cause why a
mandamus should not issue to direct him to deliver to the commissions. No cause was
shown and the applicant filed a motion for a mandamus. The Court determined that
the applicant had a vested legal right in his appointment because his commission had
been signed by the President, sealed by the Secretary of State, and the appointment
was not revocable.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme
court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and
establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the
United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the
present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States. In the
distribution of this power it is declared that "the supreme court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have
appellate jurisdiction."
The Court held that § 13 of the Act of 1789, giving the Court authority to issue writs of
mandamus to an officer, was contrary to the Constitution as an act of original
jurisdiction, and therefore void.
Angara vs Electoral Commission (G.R. No. L-45081)
Separation of Powers
FACTS: In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in
the first district of Tayabas. The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district
for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office. A Motion of
Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner. The petitioner countered this
with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission.
ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy; and
Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.
HELD: The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its
consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain
officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine
the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.” In view of the deliberations of the framers of the
Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is
hereby denied.
II. JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTION
Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520,
February 28, 1957
10JAN
En Banc
[CONCEPCION, J.]
FACTS:  Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be
immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco,
Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to
usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices
respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from
paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. Petitioners
likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from
the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the
preliminary injunction permanent.
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the
petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the
election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of
respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said
respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of
special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power,
authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in
choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal
ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco
and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the
nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.
[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to
“those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the
present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on
Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination .. of
the party having the second largest number of votes” in the Senate,
and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The
Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the choice
of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the
proceedings in connection therewith.
“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with
law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department
has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in
conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but,
also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised
by the parties herein.
GUTIERREZ V. JUSTICE COMMITTEE (G.R. NO. 193459;
FEBRUARY 15, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: MA. MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ v. COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al.
FACTS: Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private
respondents known as the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint
against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement
by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group’s complaint to Speaker
Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the
Order of Business.

 ________________________________________________
_______
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for
injunctive reliefs.  The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of
a status quo ante order and to require respondents to comment on the
petition in 10 days. 
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition.  They argue that public respondent was not exercising any
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the
two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is
discretionary in nature, and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a
preliminary investigation.
Petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the
special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. 
ISSUES: [1] Is petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
[2] Do the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule?
HELD: The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent
two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power.  Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely
when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer
within a period of one year.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: “No
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.” However, the term “initiate” means
to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set
the complaint moving.  It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.  The initial
action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint
to the Committee on Justice. DISMISSED.
 Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set
up by Napoles.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in
BELGICA vs. HONORABLE the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that
JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, prohibition be issued permanently
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For
JR, et al, Respondents Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in
the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
NATURE: the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel against respondents
System.

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared

FACTS: unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim
 ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that
they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c)
checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating
to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment
measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund
release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must
be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of
post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was
declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY
CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION
PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of
the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT
GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE
THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE
MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE,
LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
____________________________________________________
OCAMPO V. ENRIQUEZ (G.R. NO. 225973; NOVEMBER 8, 2016)
CASE DIGEST: OCAMPO, et al. v. ENRIQUEZ, etc. (THE
MARCOS BURIAL CASE)
CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 225984, 226097, 226116,
226117, 226120, & 226294

FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's

remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein
respondent's superior to prepare the burial.

ISSUES: [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their

discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB?
[2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987
Constitution, jurisprudence and the law?

HELD: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents.

It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the

LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a law allowing
anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority
of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President,
it is within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of
anyone in the LNMB.

The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national
shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone buried
therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as
one who is worth emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.

III. Role of the Judiciary