Manila Prince Hotel vs.
GSIS  
267 SCRA 402
February 1997 En Banc
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in
September 1995 the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner
which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php 41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid prize
also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but
the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.
One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996,
the Supreme Court En Banc accepted the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51%
shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of
the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to
fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock.
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will
fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as
pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from
granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also
argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the
former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
Petitioner: Manila Prince Hotel
Respondent: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Manila Hotel Corporation, Committee on
Privatization and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
Facts:
 The shares (31% to 50%) of Manila Hotel Corporation were sold by GSIS through public
bidding.
 There were two bidders – Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (Filipino firm) and Renong Berhad
(Malaysian firm)
 Renong Berhad bade higher than Manila Prince Hotel Corporation.
 Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the highest bidder, MPHC sent a manager’s
check amounting to the same bid by RB.
 GSIS refused to accept offer.
 Petitioner prayed for writ of mandamus and prohibition. Lower court issued a restraining
order preventing GSIS and Renong Berhad from consummating the sale.
 Invoked by petitioners: Section 10 of Article XII. The Congress shall, upon recommendation
of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. (Thus,
any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the
term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.)
 The answer of the respondents are the following:
1. Section 10 of Article 12 is not self-executing. For the said provision to operate, there
must be existing laws “to lay down conditions under which business may be done.”
2. Granting the provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel Corporation is not part of
national patrimony. The mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
3. The Constitutional provision cannot be invoked because what is sold is only 51% of the
total shares of the corporation, not the building or the land where it is built.
4. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still
very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of
the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
5. Submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still
very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of
the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.
 
Issue: 
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution
 
Held: 
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation.  It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates.  It
has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers
and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded.  The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect.  Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
 
Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.  If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
 
The prevailing view is that: In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.  These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
 
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement.  From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation.  It is per se judicially enforceable.  When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.  And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings.  Where there is a right there is a remedy.  Ubi jus ibi remedium
 
We agree.  In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
 
Manila Hotel has become a landmark – a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
 
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and  failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.  Verily, Manila
Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.  For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made
between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.”
 
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos.
 
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
 
Therefore, the respondents are ordered to cease and desist from selling 51% of MHC shares to the
Malaysian firm. The Php44/shar bid of Manila Prince Hotel shall be accepted by GSIS.
 
Take note:
Filipino First Policy
Supremacy of Constitution
Carino v Insular Government G.R. No. 2869 (1907)
Facts:
Mateo Cariño, on February 23 , 1904, filed his petition in the Court of Land Registration for a title to a
parcel of land consisting of 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares in the town of Baguio, Province of
Benguet. This was heard with a petition for a title for a portion of the land.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, because they alleged that the whole
parcel of land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any
manner or through any title of egresion from the State.
According to Carino, in 1884, he erected and utilized as a domicile a house on the property situated
to the north of that property now in question. They said that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said
house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim. Carino abandoned the
house and lived on the land in question.
The court of land registration ruled against their favor. They also ruled that the land was "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public land.
Issue: Is Carino the rightful possessor of the land?
Held: No, petition denied.
Ratio:
Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land being of common origin, presumptively
belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of
such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State.
There was no proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish Government.
The possessory information was not the one authorized in substitution for the one in adjustment of
the royal decree of February 13, 1894. This was due to:
1. the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last
past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve
years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the
three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed
openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the
land had not been cultivated
Or such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or
more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated
2. Under Spanish law, there was a period of one year allowable to verify the possessory
information. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in
possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full
possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said
possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or
general title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years
immediately following the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can
only acquire by time the ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance
with common law.
In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in
case the Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years
immediately following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out
by Felipe Zafra or any other person, from the record of the case
The right of possession in accordance with civil law remained at all times subordinate to the
Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when pertaining to royal
transferable or alienable lands even until after February 13, 1894.
3. The advent of American sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands
and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or
common lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the
alienation of which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with the Organic Act of
1902 and other laws like Act No. 648, herein mentioned by the petitioner.
Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership.
"The petitioners claim the title under the period of prescription of ten years established by
that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use from time immemorial. But said act
admits such prescription for the purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands not
exceeding more that 16 hectares in extent." Under Sec. 6 of said act. The land claimed by
Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his petition, or an extension of
28 hectares, therefore it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now
appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked.
And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same,
according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is
not determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined
in the trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment
and title be declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight
of the fact that, considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16
hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount in various
acquirements of lands, all of which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of
Land Registration.
Lee Hong Kok vs. David
G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
Distinction between IMPERIUM and DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant.
FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of Lands issued an
order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then
issued an original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant
HELD:
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void
patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim
that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners
thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their
private property.
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by
the government and set aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government.
IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:
The government authority possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of
sovereignty comes under the heading of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire property under
dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
FACTS:
Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with
which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by
the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.
On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to
which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character for having been formed by
reclamation (as opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES:
W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO
W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD:
Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot
arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials).
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void
patent. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private
parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void
since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the
cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of
an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens
Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase
within a period of 5 years.
Imperium v. Dominium
Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty.
Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference
to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution.
USA vs. Ruiz
G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985
Facts: The US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales which was one of those provided in the Military
Bases Agreement between the Phils. and the US. The US made an invitation for the submission of bids
for the repair of wharves in said base. Private respondent Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to
the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the private respondent received from the US
2 telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
private respondent complied with the requests. Thereafter, private respondent received a letter
which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating. The private respondent sued the US and the members of
the Engineering Command of the US Navy.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint may prosper
Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has
been necessary to distinguish them—between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the present case, the projects
are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Phils.,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. They are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands
G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946
GR: All lands are acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant.
EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since time immemorial.
Application for decree of registration is a condition precedent to acquisition of title. Non-compliance
gives rise to mere possessory right.
An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public domain by prescription.
FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they
openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said
land and also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is
an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they
applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent,
which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right,
not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien,
the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is
disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.
Isagani Cruz and Europa v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, et al
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights asserts that IPRA is an expression of
the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. It prays that the petition be
dismissed.
HELD: After due deliberation, 7 voted to dismiss the petition, while 7 other members of the Court
voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.[1] In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through
the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which,
in turn, defines ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;
“(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation.”[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains”
and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.[4]
These provisions are:
“(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials
over said area terminates;
“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
“(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
“(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples.”[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1998, which provides that “the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination.” They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
“(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
“(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
“(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
“(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371; and
“(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources.”[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should
be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have
been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Land Titles and Deeds – IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine 
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral
domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.
They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s
petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public
domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.
Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City
G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995
Regalian Doctrine
Burden of Proof of private ownership rests on plaintiff
Doctrine of indefeasibility of Torrens title, exception
FACTS:
Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT.
Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free patent
acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public documents was filed by
Petitioner was acquitted of the crime.
Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against Petitioner, praying for the declaration of
nullity of the Free Patent and the OCT.
Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the unclassified
public forest land because by the approval of his application for Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands,
the land was already alienable and disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the land
was a small portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been declared disposable public land by the
cadastral court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable public land
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-owned are
presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are public lands, are
not subject to private ownership unless they under the Constitution become private properties. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition.
The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands,
and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Classification of public lands is,
thus, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President.
Courts have no authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming
the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant.
In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute evidence to overcome
said presumption and to support his claim.
Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment, notwithstanding the
indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a certificate of title
cannot be invoked by one who procured the same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and
extrinsic -- an intentional omission of fact required by law.
Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be registered still formed
part of the unclassified forest lands.
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990
FACTS:
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands
over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action
for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable.
CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not land is alienable
HELD:
The SC affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the
dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act
from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until
the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title
if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 73085 June 4, 1990
FACTS: Claiming that they acquired the property by virtue of a document which they alleged to be a
Spanish title originally issued in the name of Bernardo Merchan, the private respondents filed a
complaint dated August 7, 1974 against petitioner Republic of the Philippines for quieting of title over
said property located in Sitio de Malapianbato alias Arras, Bo. de Ayuti, Lucban, Quezon, containing
an area of one million six hundred and sixty thousand (1,660,000) square meters, more or less, or 166
hectares. The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the land is part of a forest reserve established
by Proclamation No. 42 dated October 14,1921, and by Proclamation No. 716 dated May 26,1941
which declared the area as part of the "Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park."
The Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the private respondents. The Immediate Appellate
Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcel of land which was declared a part of the forest reserve in
1921 and later a national park in 1941 may be subject of private appropriation and registration.
RULING: NO. The land in question was proclaimed part of a forest reserve by virtue of Proclamation
No. 42 dated October 14, 1921. This proclamation was superseded by Proclamation No. 716 dated
May 26, 1941 establishing the Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park. It is already a settled rule
that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry.
In this case, there is no proof of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is
disposable or alienable. Furthermore, with the passage of Presidential Decree No. 892, effective
February 16, 1976, Spanish Titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership. Under the
same decree, lands not under the Torrens System shall be considered as unregistered.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR.
[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]
Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory
and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
(3) Whether or not the TLA’s can be out rightly cancelled.
(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition
to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident
to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be
too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and
by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to
protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches
of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right
vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized
that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to
it as a matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
FRANCISCO M. ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 130876 January 31, 2002
FACTS: The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, declaring that the title to the contested Lot No.
727, Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, was validly re-constituted in the name of the Cebu Country
Club, Inc. and ordering petitioners to pay attorney’s fees of P400,000.00, and litigation expenses of
P51,000.00, and costs.
Petitioner Francisco M. Alonso, who died pendente lite and substituted by his legal heirs, a lawyer by
profession, the only son and sole heir of the late Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle, who died on
June 16, 1962 and August 18, 1963, respectively. Cebu Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws the purpose of which is to cater to the
recreation and leisure of its members.
Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents and records — Friar Lands Sale Certificate
Register/Installment Record Certificate No. 734, Sales Certificate No. 734 and Assignment of Sales
Certificate — showing that his father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the
Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in accordance with the Friar Lands Act
(Act No. 1120). The documents show that one Leoncio Alburo, the original vendee of Lot No. 727,
assigned his sales certificate to petitioner’s father on December 18, 1911, who completed the
required installment payments thereon under Act No. 1120 and was consequently issued Patent No.
14353 on March 24, 1926. On March 27, 1926, the Director of Lands, acting for and in behalf of the
government, executed a final deed of sale in favor of petitioner’s father Tomas N. Alonso. It appears,
however, that the deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of technical
requirements, among them the approval of the deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, as required by law.
Upon investigation of the status of the land, petitioner found out from the office of the Registrar of
Deeds of Cebu City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been
"administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate" on July 26, 1948 under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 (T-11351) in the name of United Service Country Club, Inc.,
predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. On March 8, 1960, upon order of the Court of First Instance,
the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11531) was changed to Cebu Country Club,
Inc. Moreover, the TCT provides that the reconstituted title was a transfer from TCT No. 1021.
In the firm belief that petitioner’s father is still the rightful owner of Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate since there are no records showing that he ever sold or conveyed the disputed property
to anyone, on July 7, 1992, petitioner made a formal demand upon Cebu Country Club, Inc. to restore
to him the ownership and possession of said lot within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Cebu
Country Club, Inc., however, denied petitioner’s claim and refused to deliver possession to him.
Left with no other recourse, on September 25, 1992, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City, a complaint for declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, cancellation of
certificates of title and recovery of property against defendant Cebu Country Club, Inc. He alleged
that the Cebu Country Club, Inc. fraudulently and illegally managed to secure in its name the
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. RT-13 10 (T-11351) despite the absence of any transaction of
specific land dealing that would show how Lot No. 727 had come to pass to Cebu Country Club, Inc.;
that TCT No. 11351 which is the source title of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) does not pertain to Lot No.
727; that the reconstituted title which was issued on July 26, 1948, did not contain the technical
description of the registered land which was inserted only on March 8, 1960, twenty-eight (28) years
after the issuance of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351), hence, Cebu Country Club, Inc.’s title is null and void.
Petitioner thus prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351) and the issuance of another
title in his name as the sole heir of Tomas Alonso, for Cebu Country Club, Inc. to deliver possession of
the property to petitioner, and render an accounting of the fruits and income of the land. Petitioner
likewise prayed for the sum of P100, 000.00 by way of attorney’s fees plus P500.00 per hearing as
appearance fee, and P10, 000.00 as reasonable litigation expenses.
On November 5, 1992, Cebu Country Club, Inc. filed with the trial court its answer with counterclaim.
It alleged that petitioner had no cause of action against Cebu Country Club, Inc. since the same had
prescribed and was barred by laches, Cebu Country Club, Inc. having been in possession of the land
since 1935 until the present in the concept of an owner, openly, publicly, peacefully, exclusively,
adversely, continuously, paying regularly the real estate taxes thereon; that Cebu Country Club, Inc.
acquired the lot in good faith and for value; that it caused the administrative reconstitution of Lot No.
727 in 1948 from the owner’s duplicate, the original of TCT No. 11351 having been lost or destroyed
during the war, pursuant to Republic Act No. 26, its implementing Circular, GLRO Circular No. 178 and
Circular No. 6 of the General Land Registration Office; that unlike Cebu Country Club, Inc., petitioner’s
father never had any registered title under the Land Registration Act No. 496 nor did he pay the
necessary taxes on Lot No. 727 during his lifetime; that petitioner’s father knew that the United
Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc. was occupying Lot No. 727 as
owner; that petitioner’s father never reconstituted his alleged title to Lot No. 727 but did so over Lot
No. 810 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, a lot adjacent to the disputed property, in 1946; that
petitioner himself lived in Cebu City, a few kilometers away from the land in litigation; that
petitioner’s father or petitioner himself, both of whom are lawyers and the former a congressman as
well, for more than sixty (60) years, never made any demand on Cebu Country Club, Inc. for the
recovery of the property knowing fully well that said land was owned and utilized by Cebu Country
Club, Inc. as its main golf course. By way of counterclaim, Cebu Country Club, Inc. prayed for the
award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P900,000.00 and litigation expenses of P100,000.00, moral
damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of P2,000,000.00.
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff: declaring the
contested property or Lot 727 as legally belonging to the defendant; directing the plaintiff to pay
attorney'’ fee of P400, 000.00; and litigation expenses of P51, 000.00; and finally, with costs against
the plaintiff.
After proceedings on appeal, on March 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision.
On April 30, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on October 2, 1997, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether Francisco Alonso is owner of the land.
HELD:
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Cebu Country Club, Inc.
is owner of Lot No. 727.
Admittedly, neither petitioners nor their predecessor had any title to the land in question. The
most that petitioners could claim was that the Director of Lands issued a sales patent in the name of
Tomas N. Alonso. The sales patent, however, and even the corresponding deed of sale were not
registered with the Register of Deeds and no title was ever issued in the name of the latter. This is
because there were basic requirements not complied with, the most important of which was that the
deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void. [28] “Approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.” [29] Moreover, Cebu Country Club, Inc. was in
possession of the land since 1931, and had been paying the real estate taxes thereon based on tax
declarations in its name with the title number indicated thereon. Tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are strong evidence of ownership. [30] This Court has ruled that
although tax declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
will be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. [31]
Notwithstanding this fatal defect, the Court of Appeals ruled that “there was substantial
compliance with the requirement of Act No. 1120 to validly convey title to said lot to Tomas N.
Alonso.”[32]
On this point, the Court of Appeals erred.
Under Act No. 1120, which governs the administration and disposition of friar lands, the
purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or occupant of any portion of friar land shall be “agreed
upon between the purchaser and the Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis).”[33]
In his Memorandum filed on May 25, 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court
certified copies of Sale Certificate No. 734, in favor of Leoncio Alburo, and Assignment of Sale
Certificate No. 734, in favor of Tomas N. Alonso. Conspicuously, both instruments do not bear the
signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of the Interior. They also do not bear the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Only recently, in Jesus P. Liao v. Court of Appeals,[34] the Court has ruled categorically that
approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the sale of friar lands is indispensable for
its validity, hence, the absence of such approval made the sale null and void ab-initio.[35] Necessarily,
there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of such sale or assignment. [36]Consequently, petitioner
Francisco’s father did not have any registerable title to the land in question. Having none, he could
not transmit anything to his sole heir, petitioner Francisco Alonso or the latter’s heirs.
In a vain attempt at showing that he had succeeded to the estate of his father, on May 4, 1991,
petitioner Francisco Alonso executed an affidavit adjudicating the entire estate to himself (Exh.
“Q”), duly published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and city of Cebu (Exh. “Q-
1”). Such affidavit of self-adjudication is inoperative, if not void, not only because there was nothing
to adjudicate, but equally important because petitioner Francisco did not show proof of payment of
the estate tax and submit a certificate of clearance from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
[37]
 Obviously, petitioner Francisco has not paid the estate taxes.
Consequently, we rule that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or the
latter’s heirs are the lawful owners of Lot No. 727 in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu
Country Club, Inc. been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of
a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.
It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A
reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or
estate covered thereby.[38]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner, vs.HON. COURT
OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-43938; April 15, 1988
FACTS: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered
by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9
to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was
sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim
in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. For its part, Atok
alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in
the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its
objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it
was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is a forest land.
HELD: NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive
rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private
property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
Director of Forestry v. Villareal
G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]
Facts:
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the Director of Foresty on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation?
HELD: The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application
for registration of title of Villareal.
The Philippine Legislature categorically declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public
forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on
1October 1917, providing in Section 1820 of said code that ³for the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and
mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." The legislative definition
embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, remains unamended up to
now, and provides that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of
private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having
so determined, the Court has no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the
exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less
noteworthy is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. The Court repeats its statement in the Amunategui case that the
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made
and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, the Court has no duty as judges but to apply
it.
AYOG, petitioners, vs. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao,Branch I,
respondents.MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OFLANDS, intervenors.
G.R. No. L-46729. November 19, 1982.*
FACTS: On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co.,
Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No.281 located at Barrio
Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares.
Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August
30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their
improvements. No appeal was made from that decision. Because the alleged occupants refused to
vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana).
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a private
corporation from purchasing public lands) is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD: The said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of
Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at
the time the 1973 Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional
law.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent
for that land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of
Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by
private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and
the economic family- size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had owned social unrest.
continued to hold the property until then, and will be subject to escheat or reversion proceedings" by
the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Quasha may own the properties upon exipiration of the Parity Agreement.
HELD: A reading of Sections 1 and 4 of Article XIII, as originally drafted by its farmers, leaves no doubt
that the policy of the Constitution was to reserve to Filipinos the disposition, exploitation
development or utilization of agricultural lands, public (section 1) or private (section 5), as well as all
other natural resources of the Philippines.
The import of paragraph (17) of the Ordinance was confirmed and reenforced by Section 127 of
Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public Land Act of 1936) clearly evidencing once more that equal rights
of citizens and corporations of the United States to acquire agricultural lands of the Philippines
vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic. Which explains the need of introducing the
"Parity Amendment" of 1946.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE SOLICITOR GENERAL petitioners, vs. WILLIAM H.
QUASHA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-30299; August 17, 1972

FACTS: The respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen, had acquired by purchase on 26
November 1954 a parcel of land with the permanent improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave
Place, in Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, with an area of 2,616 sq. m. more or
less, described in and covered by T. C. T. 36862. On 19 March 1968, he filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, docketed as its Civil Case No. 10732, wherein he (Quasha) averred the
acquisition of the real estate aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through its officials,
claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of
the United States of America shall cease and be of no further force and effect; that such claims
necessarily affect the rights and interest of the plaintiff, and that continued uncertainty as to the
status of plaintiff's property after 3 July 1974 reduces the value thereof, and precludes further
improvements being introduced thereon, for which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of
his rights under the Parity Amendment, said plaintiff contending that the ownership of properties
during the effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues notwithstanding the termination and
effectivity of the Amendment.

The then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and later on his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar
and Felix Q. Antonio) contended that the land acquired by plaintiff constituted private agricultural
land and that the acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos, except by hereditary
succession; and assuming, without conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and all rights
by him so acquired "will expire ipso facto and ipso jure at the end of the day on 3 July 1974, if he