Statutory Construction

RATIO/RELEVANT LEGAL
TITLE AND DATE PETITIONER/S RESPONDENT/S FACTS ISSUE/S HELD
DOCTRINE/S
PART 1: I. CONSTITUTION
Manila Prince Hotel Manila Prince Respondent Government Whether Par. The Supreme Court ruled in the A constitutional provision is self-
vs. GSIS 267 Hotel Service Insurance System 2 of Section affirmative. It admits that a executing if the nature and extent
SCRA 408 (1997) (GSIS) decided to auction 10, Article XII provision which lays down the of the right conferred and the
30% to 51% of shares in the of the 1987 basic principle, such as those liability imposed are fixed by the
Government Manila Hotel Corporation Constitution is found in Art. II of the Constitution, constitution itself, so that they can
Service (MHC). Only two bidders not self- is usually not self-executing. be determined by an examination
Insurance participated in the sale, held executing However, the Court also held that and construction of its terms, and
System, Manila on September 18, 1995: a) a provision which is complete and there is no language indicating
Hotel petitioner Manila Prince Hotel becomes operative without aid of that the subject is referred to the
Corporation, Corporation, a Filipino an enabling legislation, or that legislature for action.— A provision
Committee on corporation which offered which supplies sufficient rule by which lays down a general
Privatization and P41.58 per share for 51%; and means of which the right it grants principle, such as those found in
Office of the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian may be enjoyed or protected, is Art. II of the1987 Constitution, is
Government firm that offered to purchase self-executing. Thus, a usually not self-executing. But a
Corporate the same amount for P44.00 constitutional provision is self- provision which is complete in
Counsel per share. executing if the nature or extent of itself and becomes operative
right conferred, and the liability without the aid of supplementary
Pending Renong Berhad’s imposed are fixed by the or enabling legislation, or that
declaration as the winning constitution itself. Par. 2, Sec. 10, which supplies sufficient rule by
bidder, petitioner matched the Art. XII of the Constitution is means of which the right it grants
former’s bid in a letter to the mandatory, positive command, may be enjoyed or protected, is
GSIS dated October 28, 1995. which is complete and requires not self-executing. Thus a
In a subsequent letter, further implementing laws for its constitutional provision is self-
petitioner sent a P33-Mcheck enforcement. Thus, it may be executing if the nature and extent
as bid security, which the invoked by MHC in the present of the right conferred and the
GSIS refused. On October 17, case. liability imposed are fixed by the
1995, petitioner filed for constitution itself, so that they can
prohibition and mandamus. On In its plain and ordinary meaning, be determined by an examination
October 18, the Court issued a the term patrimony pertains to and construction of its terms, and
TRO on the sale. heritage. When the Constitution there is no language indicating
speaks of national patrimony, it that the subject is referred to the
 Statutory Construction

refers not only to the natural

Petitioner contends that, under
resources of the Philippines, as
Par. 2 of Sec. 10, Article XII of
the Constitution could have very
the 1987 Constitution, the
well used the term natural
ManilaHotel is
resources, but also to the cultural
part of the national patrimony.
heritage of the Filipinos. Manila
Respondents’ arguments can
Hotel has become a landmark—a
be summarized thus: a) said
living testimonial of Philippine
provision is not self-executing;
heritage. While it was restrictively
b) the Manila Hotel does not legislature for action.
an American hotel when it first
fall under the national
opened in 1912, it immediately
patrimony; c)
evolved to be truly Filipino. The
the mandate of the
Supreme Court directed a ceased
Constitution is addressed to
and desist ordered to respondent
the State, not the GSIS; and d)
from selling the 51% shares of
petitioners’
Manila Hotel Corp. to Renong
prayers for prohibition and
Berhad and accept the matching
mandamus should fail.
bid of the petitioner.
Francisco Jr. vs. Ernesto B. The House Of An impeachment complaint Whether or On Judicial review: YES.  Verba legis, that is, wherever
House of Francisco, Jr., Representatives, against Chief Justice Hilario not the possible, the words used in
Representative Nagmamalasakit Represented By Davide and seven Asociate certiorari Finally, there exists no the Constitution must be given
G.R. No. 160261 Na Mga Speaker Jose G. Justices was filed on 2 June jurisdiction of constitutional basis for the their ordinary meaning except
November 10, 2003 Manananggol Ng De Venecia, The 2003 but was dismissed by the court may contention that the exercise of where technical terms are
Mga Senate, The House Committee on be invoked to judicial review over impeachment employed.
Manggagawang Represented By Justice on 22 October 2003 for determine the proceedings would upset the  Where there is ambiguity, ratio
Pilipino, Inc., Its Senate President being insufficient in substance. validity of the system of checks and balances. legis est anima. The words of
Officers And Franklin M. On 23 October 2003, second Verily, the Constitution is to be the Constitution should be
Members, Drilon, Representative Gilbert impeachment interpreted as a whole and "one interpreted in accordance with
Petitioner-In- Representative Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella complaint section is not to be allowed to the intent of its framers.
Intervention, Gilberto C. filed a new impeachment pursuant to defeat another."  Ut magis valeat quam pereat.
World War Ii Teodoro, Jr. And complaint against the Chief Article XI of The Constitution is to be
Veterans Representative Justice. Thus arose the instant the Both are integral components of interpreted as a whole.
Legionaries Of Felix William B. petitions against the House of Constitution. the calibrated system of
The Philippines, Fuentebella, Representatives et al, most of independence and
Inc., Petitioner- Respondents. which contend that the filing of interdependence that insures that
In-Intervention Jaime N. Soriano, the second impeachment no branch of government act
Statutory Construction
Respondent-In- complaint is unconstitutional
Intervention, as it violates the provision of
Senator Aquilino Section 5, Article XI of the
Q. Pimentel, Constitution, “no impeachment
Respondent-In- proceedings shall be initiated
Intervention. against the same official more
than once within the period of
one year.” Senator Aquilino
Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to
Intervene, stating that the
consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court and
that the sole power, authority
and jurisdiction of the Senate
as the impeachment court be
recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provision of
Article XI of the Constitution.
beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and
17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives
on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of
the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for
the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does
not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation
 Statutory Construction

assigned to it by the Constitution

to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel,

this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches
of government and "to direct the
course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent
in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the
court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
Civil Liberties Civil Liberties The Executive The petitioner are assailing the Whether The court held it is not an In the light of the construction
Union v. Executive Union Secretary Executive Order No. 284 Section 7 of exemption since the legislative given to Section 13 of Article VII,
Secretary 194 issued by the President Article IX-B intent of both Constitutional Executive Order No. 284 is
SCRA 317 (1991) allowing cabinet members, provides an provisions is to prevent unconstitutional. By restricting the
undersecretary or asst. exemption to government officials from holding number of positions that Cabinet
secretaries and other Article VII, multiple positions in the members, undersecretaries or
appointive officials of the section 13 of government for self-enrichment assistant secretaries may hold in
executive department to hold 2 the which a betrayal of public trust. addition their primary position to
positions in the government constitution. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to not more than two positions in the
and government corporations lay down the general rule government and government
and to receive additional applicable to all elective and corporations, EO 284 allows them
Statutory Construction

compensation. They find it
unconstitutional against the
provision provided by Section
13, Article VII prohibiting the
President, Cabinet members
and their deputies to hold any
other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B
further states that “Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or
employment in the
Government or any
subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned
or controlled corporation or
their subsidiaries." In the
opinion of the DOJ as affirmed
by the Solicitor General, the
said Executive Order is valid
and constitutional as Section 7
of Article IX-B stated “unless
otherwise allowed by law”
which is construed to be an
exemption from that stipulated
on Article VII, section 13, such
as in the case of the Vice
President who is
constitutionally allowed to
become a cabinet member
and the Secretary of Justice
as ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President,
Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies, and assistants. Thus, the
phrase “unless otherwise provided
by the Constitution” in Section 13,
Article VII cannot be construed as
a broad exception from Section 7
of Article IX-B that is contrary to
the legislative intent of both
constitutional provisions. Such
phrase is only limited to and strictly
applies only to instances of
allowing the VP to become a
cabinet member and the Secretary
of Justice as ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council. The
court thereby declared E.O 284 as
null and void.
to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct
contravention of the express
mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this constitution” must
be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those instances cited
in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art
VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
Statutory Construction

________________________

In July 1987, the President

Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284
which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices
or positions in addition to their
primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The
Civil Liberties Union (CLU)
assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of EO 284
is being challenged by CLU on
the principal submission that it
adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution
which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-

President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any
business, or be financially
interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special
 Statutory Construction

privilege granted by the

Government or any
subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned
or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the

phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“,
the only exceptions against
holding any other office or
employment in Government
are those provided in the
Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary
of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8
(1), Article 8.
Endencia vs. David PASTOR M. SATURNINO Respondent Saturnino David, Whether or On the issue of imposition of
93 SCRA 696 ENDENCIA and DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue not the income tax upon the salaries of the
FERNANDO Collector of collected income taxes from imposition of judges, in a rather exhaustive and
JUGO Internal Revenue Petitioners Justices Endencia an income tax well considered decision found
and Jugo, as Presiding Justice upon the and held under the doctrine laid
of the Court of Appeals and salaries of down by the court in the case of
Associate Justice of the Justice Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 552,
Supreme Court, respectively. Endencia and Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held
The lower court held that Justice Jugo that the collection of income taxes
under the doctrine applied in and other from the salaries of Justice Jugo
Statutory Construction
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
the collection of income taxes
from the salaries of Justice
Jugo and Justice Endencia
was a diminution of their
compensation and therefore
was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines,
and so ordered the refund of
said taxes. Respondent,
through the Solicitor General
contended that the collection
was done pursuant to Section
13 of Republic Act 590 which
Congress enacted to authorize
and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salaries of
judicial officers, if not to
counteract the ruling on the
Perfecto Case.
members of and Justice Endencia was in
the Supreme violation of the Constitution of the
Court and all Philippines, and so ordered the
judges of refund of said taxes.
inferior courts
amount to a
diminution.
Whether or
not Section On the issue of whether Section
13 of 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is
Republic Act constitutional, the court believes
No. 590 that this is a clear example of
constitutional. interpretation or ascertainment of
the meaning of the phrase “which
shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office,” found in
section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the
salaries of judicial officers. By
legislative fiatas enunciated in
section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation.
This act of interpreting the
Constitution or any part thereof by
the Legislature is an invasion of
the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. “The rule is recognized
elsewhere that the legislature
cannot pass any declaratory act,
or act declaratory of what the law
was before its passage, so as to
give it any binding weight with the
Statutory Construction

courts. A legislative definition of a

word as used in a statute is not
conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the
legislature would be usurping a
judicial function in defining a term.
The court reiterates the doctrine
laid down in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that
the collection of income tax on the
salary of a judicial officer is a
diminution thereof and so violates
the Constitution.

Further, the court holds that the

interpretation and application of
the Constitution and of statutes is
within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a
law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of
later interpreting said statute,
especially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said
statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the
land. Thus the court holds that
judgment is affirmed, that Section
13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it
provides that taxing of the salary of
Statutory Construction

a judicial officer shall be

considered “not to be a diminution
of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law”, constitutes
and invasion of the province and
jurisdiction of the judiciary.

In this sense, the court is of the

opinion that said section is null and
void, it being a transgression of the
fundamental principles underlying
the separation of powers.

In the light of the issue on

imposing income tax on judges
salaries, dissenting opinion of
court cited that judges are also
citizens and thus their salaries are
subjected to the Income Tax Law
prevailing.

The debates, interpellations and

opinions expressed regarding the
constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the
true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, in adopting it,
was to make the salaries of
members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic
law and of the people adopting it
 Statutory Construction

should be given effect.

Hence, court affirms judgment as

in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue
of imposing income tax on judges’
salaries.
Nifatan vs. Com. Of David G. Nitafan, Commissioner of This is a petition to prohibit Whether or No. The salaries of members of The primary task in constitutional
Internal Revenue Wenceslao M. Internal Revenue Commissioner of Internal not the the judiciary should be subject to construction is to ascertain and
152 SRA 284 Polo, And and the Financial Revenue and Supreme Court members the income tax applied to all thereafter assure the realization of
Maximo A. Officer, Supreme financial officer from of the taxpayers. the purpose of the framers and of
Savellano, Jr Court of the making deductions of judiciary the people in the adoption of the
Philippines withholding taxes from the are The relevant rule of Statutory Constitution.” To be able to
petitioners’ salaries. exempt Construction in this case is: “The ascertain the proper
from primary task in constitutional understanding of the judge’s salary
On June 4, 1987, the Court en payment construction is to ascertain and as the law intended, the court had
banc had already reaffirmed of tax? thereafter assure the realization of to examine the framers’ intent. The
the directive of the Chief the purpose of the framers and of deliberations in the 1986
Justice which. directs the the people in the adoption of the Constitutional Commission reveal
continued withholding of taxes Constitution.” To be able to that the clear intent of the framers
of the justices and the judges ascertain the proper understanding was to delete the proposed
of the judiciary. of the judge’s salary as the law express grant of exemption from
intended, the court had to examine payment of income tax to
Petitioners Nitafan, Polo, and the framers’ intent. The members of the Judiciary, so as to
Savellano seek to prohibit deliberations in the 1986 “give substance to equality among
and/or perpetually enjoin Constitutional Commission reveal the three branches of the govt”.
respondents, the that the clear intent of the framers
Commissioner of Internal was to delete the proposed SALARIES OF JUDGES –
Revenue and the express grant of exemption from Payment of income tax by judges
Financial Officer of the payment of income tax to does not fall within the
Supreme Court, from members of the Judiciary, so as to constitutional protection against
making any deduction of “give substance to equality among decrease of their salaries.
withholding taxes from the three branches of the govt”.
their salaries
Members of the judiciary, just like
They submit that "any tax members of the other branches of
withheld from their the government, are subject to
 Statutory Construction
emoluments or compensation
as judicial officers constitutes
a decrease or diminution of
their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating
that "during their continuance
in office, their salary shall not
be decreased," even as it is
anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said
Constitution."
Aglipay vs. Ruiz 64 Gregorio Aglipay Juan Ruiz Petitioner seeks the issuance
SCRA 201 of a writ of prohibition against
respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling
postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd
International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends
that such act is a violation of
the Constitutional provision
income taxation. What is provided
for by the constitution is that
salaries of judges may not be
decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a
fix salary which may not be subject
to the whims and caprices of
congress. But the salaries of the
judges shall be subject to the
general income tax as well as
other members of the judiciary.
Stated otherwise, the court accord
due respect to the intent of the
people, through the discussions
and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all
citizens should bear their aliquot
part of the cost of maintaining the
government and should share the
burden of general income taxation
equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
Whether the It is obvious that while the In the present case, however, the
action of the issuance and sale of the stamps in issuance of the postage stamps in
respondent is question may be said to be question by the Director of Posts
violative of inseparably linked with an event of and the Secretary of Public Works
the provisions a religious character, the resulting and Communications was not
of section 13, propaganda, if any, received by inspired by any sectarian feeling to
Article VI, of the Roman Catholic Church, was favor a particular church or
the not the aim and purpose of the religious denominations. The
Constitution Government. stamps were not issued and sold
of the for the benefit of the Roman
 Statutory Construction
stating that no public funds
shall be appropriated or used
in the benefit of any church,
system of religion, etc. This
provision is a result of the
principle of the separation of
church and state, for the
purpose of avoiding the
occasion wherein the state will
use the church, or vice versa,
Philippines?
as a weapon to further their
ends and aims. Respondent
contends that such issuance is
in accordance to Act No. 4052,
providing for the appropriation
funds to respondent for the
production and issuance of
postage stamps as would be
advantageous to the
government.
II. LAW
People vs. Palma People Of The Hon. Judge Private Respondent Romulo, Whether or
G.R. No. 44113 Philippines Mericia B. Palma 17 years of age, was charged not the
March 31, 1977 76 And Romulo Intia with vagrancy. Respondent issuance of
SCRA 243 Y Morada Judge dismissed the case on PD 603
the ground that her court “has transferred
no jurisdiction to take further the case of
cognizance of this case” the accused
without prejudice to the re- from the
filing thereof in the Juvenile regular courts
Court, because he believed to the
that jurisdiction over 16 years Juvenile
olds up to under 21 was Court.
transferred to the Juvenile
Court by the issuance of PD
603 or the Child and Youth
We have come to the conclusion
that there has been no
constitutional infraction in the case
at bar. Act. No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, discretion to
issue postage stamps with new
designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the
Government.
The Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court expressly confers
upon it a special and limited
jurisdiction over “criminal cases
wherein the accused is under 16
years of age at the time of the
filing of the case”. The subsequent
issuance of PD 603 known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code and
defines a youth offender as “one
who is over 9 years of age but
under 21 at the time of the
commission of the offense” did not
by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases
Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church.
On the contrary, it appears from
the letter of the Director of Posts of
June 5, 1936, incorporated on
page 2 of the petitioner's
complaint, that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this
country."
P.D 603 is a general law while R.A
6591 is a special law.A general law
cannot repeal a special law by
mere implication.The repeal
must be express and specific.
Furthermore, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of
Camarines Sur is a court of special
and limited jurisdiction and the
enlargement or conferment of
additional jurisdiction on said
court to include accused persons
who are 16 years and under 21
years of age must positively
appear in express terms.
 Statutory Construction
Welfare Code, which defines
youthful offenders as those
over 9 years of age but under
21 at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Valera vs. Tuason Rosario Valera, Mariano Tuason, This is an appeal from a
80 Phil 823 Assisted by her Jr., Justice of The decision of the Court of First
Husband, Juan Peace of Instance of Abra dismissing a
Valera Lagayan, Abra, petition for certiorari. It results
Manuel Tullas Et that a complaint for forcible
Al entry was filed in the justice of
the peace court of Lagayan
over which Judge Federico
Paredes presided. Finding
himself disqualified, by reason
of relationship to one of the
parties, to try the case, Judge
Paredes transferred it to the
justice of the peace of La Paz,
the nearest municipality to
Lagayan. In the meantime, a
new justice of the peace had
been appointed for Lagayan
— Mariano B. Tuason, one of
the respondents in the petition
for certiorari. After the case
was received in the court of
the justice of the peace of
Lagayan, the defendants
moved for a new trial
impeaching the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace of La
Paz. The Lagayan justice's
ground for unvalidating the
decision of the justice of the
peace of La Paz is that "the
involving accused who are 16 and
under 21 years of age from the
regular courts to the
Juvenile Court.
Whether or One of the well-established rules
not a of statutory construction enjoins
subsequent that endeavor should be made to
general law harmonize the provisions of a law
on a subject or of two laws so that each shall
has repealed be effective. In order that one law
or amended a may operate to repeal another law,
prior special the two laws must actually be
act on the inconsistent. The former must be
same subject so repugnant as to be
by implication. irreconciliable with the latter act.
(U. S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208.)
Merely because a later enactment
may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute
is not of itself sufficient to cause an
implied repeal of the latter, since
the new law may be cumulative or
a continuation of the old one.
(Statutory Construction, Crawford,
p. 634.)
The above-quoted provisions can
stand together. By a fair and
reasonable construction, section
73 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended, may be said to apply
to disqualifications under section 8
of that Act, and section 211 of the
Revised Administrative Code to
disqualifications or disabilities not
Valera v. Tuason
●A subsequent general law on a
subject has repealed or amended
a prior special act on the same
subject by implication is a question
of legislative intent.
●Intent to repeal may be shown in
the act itself the explanatory note
to the bill before its passage into
law, the discussions on the floor of
the legislature,
●Intent to repeal the earlier
special law where the later general
act provides that all laws or parts
thereof which are inconsistent
therewith are repealed or modified
accordingly
●If the intention to repeal the
special law is clear, then the rule
that the special law will be
considered as an exception to the
general law does not apply; what
applies is the rule that the special
law is deemed impliedly repealed.
●A general law cannot be
construed to have repealed a
 Statutory Construction
designation of another justice
of the peace to decide a given
case, when the
justice having jurisdiction to
decide on the same
disqualifies himself, is not in
law given to the disqualiying
justice but 'to the judge of the
district' who 'shall designate
the nearest justice of the
peace.' (Section 211, Rev.
Adm. Code)." He believes that
the circular of the Secretary of
Justice of January 17, 1940, in
pursuance of which the case
was transferred, is legally
wrong. The annulment by the
newly-appointed justice of the
peace of Lagayan of the
proceedings before the justice
of the peace of La Paz and the
latter's decision was sustained
on appeal by Honorable
Patricio Ceniza, Judge of the
Court of First Instance, but on
a different ground. Judge
Ceniza does not agree that
section 211 of the Revised
Administrative Code has
repealed section 73 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act
No. 190.) He is of the opinion
that it is the new Rules of
Court which have abrogated
the last-named section.
Espiritu vs. Primitivo Espiritu Ricardo Cipriano This is a petition for certiorari Whether
embraced in the Code of Civil special law by mere implication
Procedure. At any rate, in the admits of exception
event harmony between provisions
of this type in the same law or in
two laws is impossible, the specific
provision controls unless the
statute, considered in its entirety,
indicates a contrary intention upon
the part of the legislature. Granting
then that the two laws can not be
reconciled, in so far as they are
inconsistent with each other,
section 73 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, being a specific law,
should prevail over, or be
considered as an exception to,
section 211 of the Administrative
Code, which is a provision of
general character. A general law is
one which embraces a class of
subjects or places and does not
omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class, while a
special act is one which relates to
particular persons or things of a
class. (Statutory Construction,
Crawford, p. 265.) A special law is
not regarded as having been
amended or repealed by a general
law unless the intent to repeal or
alter is manifest. Generalia
specialibus non derogant.
or According to Article 4 of the Civil 1. The subject provision affects
 Statutory Construction

Cipriano G.R. No. and Leonora A. and The Court of filed by spouses Primitivo not R.A. 6126 Code, no law shall be given substantive rights hence a
3243, February 15, De Espiritu First Instance, and Leonora A. De Espiritu will have retroactive effect unless the strict and prospective construction
1974 55 SRCA Rizal, Branch XV seeking the nullification of two retroactive contrary is provided. R.A. 6126 is therof is in order.
533 (1974) orders of the Court of First effect at the not applicable at the case at bar. It
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Br. case at bar. is a well-established rule of 2. As the language of the law
XV/Trial Court including (1) statutory construction that if the is clear and unambiguous, it
Order dated August 4, language of the law is plain, clear, must be held to mean what is
1970 sustaining respondent and free from ambiguity, it must be plainly says.
Ricardo Cipriano’s motion to given its literal interpretation. The 3. Expressium facit cessare
dismiss on the authority of principle of verba legis or the plain tacitum – no reasonable
Republic Act 6126/Rental Law meaning rule was applied. implication that the legislature
and (2) Order dated October ever inteded to give the law
16, 1970 denying the motion in question a retroactive effect
for reconsideration of the 1st may be accorded to the same
Order.Respondent/Defendant (intent of the lawmakers can
Cipriano’s house was built be verified on the deliberations
on the property of of the congress on house bill 953
plaintiff/petitioner spouses which became RA 6126.
Espiritus by virtue of an oral
contract of lease. Cipriano was
their lessee since 1954.
Before 1969 the lease
was on year-to-year
arrangement, rentals being
then payable at or before the
end of the year. Starting
January 1969 the lease was
converted to a month-to-month
basis and rental was
increased to P30 a month by
the lessors. Their dispute
emanated on the failure of
Cipriano to pay rental since
January 1969 at the monthly
rate mentioned. This lead to
the filing of a complainant of
 Statutory Construction

Unlawful Detainer against

Cipriano in the Municipal Court
of Pasig, Rizal, with a
favourable decision for lessors
Espiritu. Respondent
Cipriano filed a motion to
dismiss said complaint
invoking the prohibitory
provision of R.A. 6126, which
was upheld by the Trial Court
in the 2 Orders assailed by
spouses Espiritu.

III. Statute
Homeowners Assn. HOMEOWNERS' THE MUNICIPAL The Mayor and the Municipal Whether or The Court of First Instance of The authority of municipal
of the Philippines ASSOCIATION BOARD OF THE Board of the City of Manila not Municipal Manila rendered judgment corporations to regulate is
vs. Municipal Board OF THE CITY OF passed Municipal Ordinance Ordinance declaring said ordinance “ultra essentially police power. Inasmuch
of Manila G.R. No. PHILIPPINES, MANILA, ET AL., No. 4841 on December 31, No. 4841 is vires, unconstitutional, illegal and as thesame generally entails a
23979 August INC. and ANTONIO J. 1963, to take effect on January constitutional void ab initio upon the ground that curtailment of the liberty, the rights
1968, 24 SCRA VICENTE A. VILLEGAS, 1, 1964, declaring a state of ? the power to “declare a state of and/or the property of
856 RUFINO Mayor of the City emergency in view of the emergency … exclusively pertains persons,which are protected and
of Manila prevailing scarcity of lands and to Congress”; that “there is no even guaranteed by the
buildings for residential longer any state of emergency” Constitution, the exercise of police
purposes in the City of Manila which may justify the regulation of power isnecessarily subject to a
which shall provide housing house rentals; that said ordinance qualification, limitation or
accommodations especially for disconstitutes an unreasonable restriction demanded by the
the poor at reasonable rates. and unjustified limitation on the regard, therespect and the
An action was brought by the use of private properties and obedience due to the prescriptions
Homeowners’ Association of arbitrarily encroaches on the of the fundamental law, particularly
the Philippines, Inc. and its constitutional rights of property thoseforming part of the
President, Vicente A. Rufino owners”; that the power of the City Constitution of Liberty, otherwise
against the Mayor and the of Manila to “regulate the business known as the Bill of Rights — the
Municipal Board of the City of of … letting or subletting of lands policepower measure must be
Manila to nullify the and buildings” does not include the "reasonable".In other words,
aforementioned Municipal authority to prohibit what is individual rights may be adversely
Ordinance. forbidden in said ordinance; and affected by the exercise of police
 Statutory Construction

power to theextent only — and

only to the extent — that may fairly
be required by the legitimate
demands ofpublic interest or public
welfare. If such demands are
brought about by a state of
emergency,the interference
upon individual rights, resulting
from the regulations adopted
to meet thesituation, must be,
by and large, co-extensive, co-
equal or co-terminous with the
that the same cannot be deemed
existencethereof. And, since an
sanctioned by the general welfare
emergency is by nature temporary
clause in the City Charter.
in character, so must the
regulationspromulgated therefor
be.As a consequence a law or
ordinance affecting the rights of
individuals, as ameans to tide
over a critical condition, to
be valid and legal, must be
for a"definite" period of time, the
length of which must be
"reasonable", in relation tothe
nature and duration of the crisis it
seeks to overcome or surmount
Tolentino vs. ARTURO M. THE The value-added tax (VAT) is
Secretary of TOLENTINO SECRETARY OF levied on the sale, barter or
Finance 235 SCRA FINANCE and exchange of goods and
630 (1994) THE properties as well as on the
COMMISSIONER sale or
OF INTERNAL exchange of services. It is
REVENUE equivalent to 10% of the gross
selling price or gross value in
money of goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged or
 Statutory Construction

of the gross receipts from

the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No.
7716
seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by
amending the National
Internal Revenue Code.
These are various suits for
certiorari and prohibition,
challenging the
constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7716
on various grounds
summarized in the resolution
of July 6,
1994 of this Court, as follows:
Phil. Const. Assn v.
Enriquez, 235
SCRA 506 (1994)
Integrated Bar of
the Phil vs. Zamora
338 SCRA 81
(2000)
IV. Bill
Tolentino vs.
Secretary of
Finance 235 SCRA
630 (1994)
Morales vs. Subido
27 SCRA 131
(1969)
V. Presidential Issuances
Pesigan vs.
Angeles G.R. No.
 Statutory Construction

April 30, 1984

Ople vs. Torres
G.R. No. 127686
July 23, 1998
VI. Administrative Rules and Regulations
Cemeco Holdings
Inc., vs. National
Life Insurance Co.,
GR. No 171815
August 7, 2007
Executive
Secretary vs.
Southwing Heavy
Industries Inc. G.R.
No. 164171
February 20, 2006
VII. Ordinances
Lagcao vs. Labra
G.R. No. 155746,
October 13, 2004

Phil. Internal
Trading Corp. vs.
COA 309 SCRA
177 (1999)

VIII. Manner of Computing Time

PNB vs. Court of
Appeals 222 SCRA
134 (1993)
Garvida vs. Sales,
Jr., 271 SCRA 767
(1997)
Part 2: I. Statutory Construction
 Statutory Construction

Caltex (Philippines)
Inc. vs. Palomar
G.R. No. 19650
September 29,
1966, 18 SCRA
247
U.S vs. Farenhalt
206 US 226 51 L.
ed. 1036 (1907)
Republic Flour
Mills, Inc., vs.
Commissioner of
Customs, G.R. No.
28463, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA
268
Roman Catholic
Apostolic
Administration of
Davao vs. Land
Registration
Commission 102
Phil 596 (1957)
People vs. Mapa
20 SCRA 1164
Daoang vs.
Municipal Judge of
San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, 159 SCRA
369
People vs. Nazario,
165 SCRA 186
Commissioner vs.
TMX 205 SCRA
184
Veroy vs. Loyague,
 Statutory Construction

21 SCRA 97 (1992)
Rizal Commercial
Banking Corp., vs.
IAC, 320 SCRA
279 (1999)
Del Mar vs. Phil.
Amusement and
Gaming Corp, 346
SCRA 485 (2000)
II. Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aids
Radiola-Toshiba vs.
IAC, 199 SCRA
373
People vs. Munoz,
170 SCRA 107
III. Purpose and Object of Construction and Interpretation
Macondray & Co
vs. Eustaquio, 64
Phil 446 (1937
People vs.
Conception 44 Phil
126 (1922)
People vs.
Gatchalian 104 Phil
676 (1958)
City of Baguio
vs.Marcos, G.R.
No. 26100,
February 28, 1969,
27SCRA 342
Torres vs. Limjap,
56 Phil 141
Aisporma vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R.
No. 39419, April
1982, 113 SCRA
 Statutory Construction

446
Garcia vs. Social
Security
Commission, G.R.
No. 170735,
December 17, 2007
IV. Does Statutory Construction Involve Question of Fact or of Law?
Paat vs. Court of
Appeals 266 SCRA
169, Jan 10, 997
People vs. Mapa,
20 SCRA 1164
V. Basic Rule on Statutory Construction
Manila Jockey Club
Inc., vs. Games
and Amusements
Board, G.R. No 107
Phil 151
General vs.
Barrameda,
G.R.No 29906,
January 30, 1976,
69 SCRA 182
Aboitiz Shipping
Corp. vs. City of
Cebu 13 SCRA 449
B.E. San Diego vs.
Court of Appeals
218 SCRA 446
(1993)
Escribana vs. Avila,
G.R. No. 30375,
September 12,
1978, 85 SCRA
245
VI. Power to Construe
 Statutory Construction

U.S vs. Ang Tang

Ho, 43 Phil 1
People vs. Ferrer,
48 SCRA 382
National Power
Corporation vs.
Province of Lanao
Del Sur, 264 SCRA
271 (1996)
Silva vs. Cabrera,
88 Phil 381
Cebu Portland
Cement Company
vs. Municipality of
Naga. 24 SCRA
708 (1968)
National Federation
of Labor Eisma,
127 SCRA 419
People vs. Quijada,
259 SCRA 191
(1996)
Vda. De
Macabenta vs.
Davao Stevedore
Terminal Company,
32 SCRA 553
San Miguel Corp
vs. Avelino, G.R.
No 39699, March
14, 1979 89 SCRA
69
Joya vs. PCGG,
225 SCRA 568
(1993)
Malaluan vs.
 Statutory Construction

Comelec, 254
SCRA 397 (1996)
Philippines Today
Inc., vs. NLRC, 267
SCRA 202 (1997)
Chinese Flour
Importers’ Assn vs.
Price Stabilization
Board, 89 Phil 439
Quimpo vs.
Mendoza, G.R. No.
33052, August 31,
1981, 107 SCRA
73
People vs. Mapa,
20 SCRA 1164
Ramos vs. Court of
Appeals G.R. No.
43766, October 30,
1981, 108 SCRA
728
Quijano vs. DBP,
G.R. No 26419,
October 19, 1970,
35 SCRA 270
(1970)
Chartered Bank
Employees Assn
vs. Ople, 138
SCRA 273 (1985)
Republic vs. Lacap,
G.R. No. 158253,
March 2, 2007
National Food
Authority vs.
Masada Security
 Statutory Construction

Agency Inc., G.R.

No. 163448 March
8, 2005
Miranda vs.
Imperial 77 Phil
1066
People vs. Jubinal
55 SCRA 607
Pesca vs. Pesca
G.R. No. 136921,
April 17, 2001
Benzonan vs. Court
of Appeals 205
SCRA 515 (1992)
Roa vs. Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil
315
Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor
Party vs. Comelec
359 SCRA 698
(2001)
People vs. Ferrer,
48 SCRA 382
(1972)
VII. Limitation on the Power to Construe
Republic Flour Mills
Inc., vs.
Commissioner of
Customs, G.R. No.
28463, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA
268
Enrile vs. Salazar
186 SCRA 217
(1990)
 Statutory Construction

Floresca vs. Philex

Mining Corporation
136 SCRA 141
(1985)
Philippine British
Assurance Co. Inc.,
vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,
150 SCRA 520
Banco de Oro
Saving and
Mortgage Bank vs.
Equitable Banking
Corp., 157 SCRA
188
Salenillas vs.
Court of Appeals,
169 SCRA 829
People vs. Garcia,
85 Phil 657
Inchong vs.
Hernndez 101 Phil
1155
People vs. Nazario,
169 SCRA 186
(1988)
Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp.,
Inc., 234 SCRA 255
(1994)