The Architect in The Modern Society Geni PDF

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Presented at the JMA automne 2013 Séminaire théorique Fribourg (SFR) « Public choices », 4 – 8 novembre 2013.
The Architect in the Modern Society: Genius and Social Acknowledge

Dr. Dr. Guido Seddone
University of Sassari (IT) and University of Leipzig (DE)
In this lecture I intend to point out the role and the tasks of the architecture in the modern western societies.
As we live in societies subjected to rising social control and approbation due to both the huge process of
acculturation and the role of the media, the architect is no more one artist on the service of a single sovereign
or prince like, for example, in the Renaissance. He is rather embedded in collective practices that are
normally unified and coordinated by unitary and institutionalized organisms like states, cities or
international organizations. Therefore he works within a social enterprise that is collectively acknowledged
and evaluated.
In order to understand his role we have hence to deal firstly with a social dimension, which is properly a
normative dimension, i.e. a space in which both moral and esthetic canons are collectively examined and
approved. However, as in modern societies this collective dimension is superseded by institutionalized
organizations such as cities and states, the modern architect faces social interests that are endorsed by already
institutionalized organisms. His work is therefore subjected to an approbation that is determined by the
historical identity of such organisms and he has to confront his genius with this fact. The esthetic work is
determined by the “ideology” that underlies the institutional design and transformations of a state or a city.
With this lecture I aim to explain the role of the architect in this kind of relational environment without
disregarding his leading nature of artist.
Premise
If one walks on the streets of the most important cities in the world and looks at the monuments
representing a specific human civilization one can reflect about many aspects of the history. One
can say that monuments and architecture are testimony and living history of a civilization.
Moreover, what one expects is that architecture is representative of the greatness and magnificence
of a city or a state. Therefore the works of the architects much more than the works of other artists
have the characteristic to be asked to become symbols in which persons can identify themselves and
social practices can be coherently assembled. When one observes monuments like the Sydney
Opera House in Sydney, the Pantheon in Rome, Pariser Platz in Berlin or the Legion of Honor in
San Francisco, one does not merely think that these buildings are beautiful or functional but rather
that each one is the symbol, one can also say the “business card”, of a civilization or social
organization. The etymology of the word symbol, from the ancient Greek holding together, explains
well that we call symbol what unifies and synthesizes the meaning and the relevance of the
symbolized. Symbols are developed for holding together the complexity that is inherent to a social
organization, they are hence both social and cultural fact. The social character of architectural
works is reinforced from the fact that they can be inhabited and lived from every member of that
social organization and from every foreigner having access. As they are places of the ordinary life
they are subjected to social acknowledge or blame. This explains why architecture differs from
other arts that are mostly expression of the style of an author and are enjoyed by a narrower number
of persons. Architecture is social matter, even an ideological fact, which is enjoyed by a whole
community of individuals. It produces works that hold an idea of greatness of a civilization by
representing the social enterprise of a community. With the expression social or cooperative
enterprise I mean a historic group attitude to preserve, evolve and transmit specific practices that
belong to that group. The fact that social organizations have a history is the outcome of an
individual effort for preserving, evolving and transmitting to coming generations those practices
and culture representing the identity and distinctiveness of their own organization. A social
organization like a state is also a social enterprise because it is an adaptive and historic organism
that is preserved, improved and transmitted by means of the duties and the personal engagement of
its member. Architecture must be meant as embedded in this social enterprise and the primary aim
of this lecture is to explain how.
The main social duty of the architects is expressed by understanding the social relevance and
commitment of their works and projecting in accordance with the ideology, i.e. the dominant
thought, of a social organization like a state, a city or an international organism. When I speak about
ideology or dominant thought I do not mean a political idea that justifies a political organism or a
totalitarianism. In other word, I do not mean an idea that excludes and prevents the other ones for
affirming itself or a political group. When I speak about dominant thought I mean the main and
leading idea that a social group has about itself, a sort of collective self-awareness with which
individual participants identify themselves. This is the reason why architecture and its creations
belong to the system of personal identification with a social enterprise. They yield symbols
containing a strong motivational and ideological significance and increasing the sense of
belongingness and personal engagement. The fact that the work of the architects has many political
and social implications is demonstrated by the role that architecture has for totalitarian states. The
possibility given by erecting buildings daily used for spreading pride and sense of belongingness
among the people is widely exploited by tyrannies and totalitarian regimes. In this lecture I do not
intend to tackle the question about architecture and totalitarianism, nonetheless it is important to
underline that the social character of the architecture can also be used for diffusing political
messages, which work as glue by conforming the public opinion.
In this lecture I aim to explain the role of the architect in the modern western society, which have
reached a dominant model of democratic participation. In this kind of society the leading idea or
ideology is the outcome of a free identification with the values and the aims of the social
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organization to which one belongs and that we call normally state. The characteristic of this
particular kind of social organization, i.e. the state, consists in self-determination, that is in the
capacity to determine its own institutional design and cultural identity as well. When this design is
democratic, then there is a particular kind of mutual interdependence among members that is the
result of social recognition. Through recognition the social organization can be constituted as
unified and coherent cooperative unit, i.e. a unit of reciprocally recognizing intentional beings.
However, recognition as unifying system of integration is also possible in social dynamics in which
dominates an authoritarian and hierarchic model of cooperation. In fact, recognition can also be
non-mutual but contemporary endorse its function of integrating individual in social practices. In
the Middle Age, for example, there was a system of recognition by which the people recognized
knights and nobles and their social role. However, this kind of recognition was non-mutual because
a great part of the population was alienated from determining the decisional power, i.e. the power
that decides the destiny of a social organization. In modern democratic societies and states the
mutual recognition makes possible that the whole population is admitted in determining the shape
of their own cooperative enterprise.
As I aim to show the cooperative character of the activity of the architects it is very important to
understand how their works are integrated in the cooperative dimension. When at the time of the
Renaissance some architects enriched with their creations several cities in Italy and in a second
phase in Austria, Saxony and French, they had to confront themselves with the desires and
evaluation of one person, the sovereign. This person had a wider function than centralizing the
power. He had also a representative power for the spirit and the identity of his nation and exerted
his role by determining the institutional and legal design and the esthetic canons as well. For
understanding the role of the architect today we have to refer to his role in the modernity, an age in
which many aspects of the contemporary societies and behaviors have been elaborated and
anticipated. The concept itself of sovereignty that indicates the power and the autonomy of an
institution like a state or a city arises directly from the world sovereign, i.e. the person who
centralized those powers and functions that endorse autonomy and self-determination of an
autonomous institution. In other words, at that time the preservation over time of the social
organization by means of laws, institutions and various powers was prevalently borne by the person
of the sovereign because of his centrality in the life of the community.
In a condition of centralized power, i.e. in a condition in which aims, laws, rules and values of a
social enterprise are managed and determined by a single person or by a narrow number of
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individuals, it is normal that also such things like esthetic canons and city planning are subjected to
the taste and sense of beauty of the sovereign. This is the reason why frequently sovereigns and
architects have worked together, and often successfully like the examples of the ancient Rome,
Florence during the Renaissance and Berlin at the age of the Enlightenment well show. This
happened because those architects could opportunely perform their art and genius exclusively
through a tight networking with the person who embodied the spirit and the identity of the state for
which they were employed. In my opinion the activity of an architect is strongly connected with the
aims, values and identity of the group for which his/her works are destined. In this way, it differs
from the activity of another artist whose works must not be necessarily expression of a Zeitgeist.
This probably because an architectural work must contain the elements of the present forms of life
and thought, i.e. elements that can be enjoyed and used in a specific laps of time in the history of a
socio-historic organism. This does not mean that architectural works cannot be transmitted to
coming generations. On the contrary, the urban history of both many italian cities and cities in ex
East Germany like Berlin or Leipzig demonstrates that many architectural styles can be acquired
and conserved although the leading ideas that builded them has been superseded. The urban history
of many cities shows that there is a process of actualization in using inherited architectural works,
which are properly adopted by transforming the original meaning. In this way, the Pantheon in
Rome became a church, a huge industry in Leipzig puts up now laboratories for young painters and
sculptors, a slaughterhouse in Cagliari became a museum for visual arts, etc. This points out that the
Zeitgeist works also in transforming the meaning and the use of a building or public space.
Let´s turn now to the role of the sovereign and the networking with the architect. Differently from
other arts, i.e. activities having a relation with some kinds of esthetic canon and sense of beauty,
architecture must face the needs of the people, the values of a society or of an autonomous
institution like a state, the identity and the historic moment in which a work has to be produced. The
fact that an architectural work has a role, frequently a central role, in the ordinary life of an entire
population and that it is integrated in the city planning makes it bearer of values, ideals, aims,
significance and ambitions of an entire cooperative enterprise. Moreover, it must also endorse the
forms of life and the practices that represent the culture and the identity of a cooperative unit. When
a single man—the sovereign— was in charge of this cooperative enterprise and of its conservation,
he has also determined, evaluated and approved the activity of his architects. It was by virtue of the
networking sovereign-architect that the architectural works could transmit values, suggestions,
4
emotions, ideals, aims, which, differently from those transmitted by other arts, involved a sense of
identification with a common mission and shared practices.
What happens when the sovereignty of a nation is governed by all members, i.e. when the
institutional design and the political destiny are determined by a process of democratic law-making?
It happens that also the work of the architect is subjected to a social approval, because his/her work
must keep values, aims and ideals that are not alien but belong to the community.
Architecture as cooperative matter

In this lecture I have often highlighted that architecture is a cooperative matter because it is in
charge of spreading suggestions, ideals and aims having a social relevance. It has a very special
esthetic function and social power because its creations are integrated in the ordinary life of the
members of a community. However, architecture is not requested to be exclusively functional like
engineering is, fundamentally because it is strategic in city planning. If I have to construct a cheap
residential district or an aqueduct I would employ an engineer. But if I want to build a place with a
particular significance or message, a place keeping together beauty, relevance, functionality and
ideals, I need to ask the competences of an architect. Moreover, the architect is asked to partially
give up his/her artistic temperament; firstly because of the principle of functionality that requires to
conciliate one´s own styles. Secondly because architecture has to evolve styles and ways of building
that are socially relevant. This social relevance can have many aspects. For example, today the
research of architectural solutions that are environment friendly has changed the work of the
architect insofar as this kind of demand is socially determined. In other words, it is the level of
social attention for climate change that determines the work and the dispositions of the architects
and not vice versa. It is not task of the architects to persuade the society to evolve environment
friendly solutions, it is rather the architect to be persuaded by a specific community disposition.
This does not mean that the architect is a mere executor. On the contrary, he can make explicit
needs and demands that remain implicit in the social sphere. He can also use argumentations for
justifying some proposals, but, I believe, his activity is prevalently an answer to more or less
implicit demands within the social context in which he operates. His genus is hence subjected to
more or less implicit social expectations and evaluation, which orientate his projecting. How does
this social influence on projecting work?
In nowadays debate around social ontology there are many approaches and theories that I cannot
illustrate now. Nevertheless, I can shortly say that in the debate between atomism and holism, I
5
assume a holistic position. I am hence persuaded that social behaviors are not determined by
individual attitudes but rather by an interdependence existing between a group or social
organization and its members. I explain this interdependence by means of the following
fundamental principle of belongingness: The existence, preservation and evolution of a social
organization depend on the personal engagement and duties of its members. On the other side, the
nature of this engagement is determined by the integration and formation of individual participants
within social activities and practices, which represent the cultural and linguistic premise for having
cooperation. Differently from atomists, I believe that a social attitude is not casual but is rather
shaped by this principle of belongingness and interdependence between the existence of a group
and the nature of the membership. This is said to highlight that the activity of an architect is
cooperative insofar as it is understood in terms of personal engagement for the preservation of one
´s own social organization. This approach enables us to go beyond the classic contractual theory
that explains only legal and formal aspects of the social commitments and to pinpoint the question
of an activity which is integrated with the social organism itself, i.e. with its own identity, aims and
nature. I like to say that my notion of belongingness contains conspiratorial aspects to the
reconstructive style of explanation of others´ intentions and ideas. And this is meant in the
etymological sense of the word conspiracy, from the Latin “breathing together”. Belonging to a
social organization means understanding the more or less implicit intentional stances like self-
awareness, ideals, emotions and aims endorsed by every intentional participant. For an architect it
means to be able to follow and explain the common mind (Pettit 1996) underling the shared
practices and to give the appropriate contribution in terms of creations that synthesize and bring
together the dominant intellectual elements implicit in the practical and cooperative dimension to
which he belongs. This is also valid for foreign architects employed abroad. They are requested to
understand the cooperative factors of the society and their primary cognitive and moral aspects for
evolving projects and creation with a symbolic value. With the expression common mind I mean
that thought that is evolved by individuals belonging to the same social organization and sharing
common cognitive and behavioral attitudes and beliefs. Personal intentional stances are not
independent by a normative way concerning what is wrong and what is right, they are rather the
outcome of an integration in a common way to understand and govern the world. Architects should
be not indifferent before this collective manifestation of thinking, evaluating and judging.
At this point the question is: Insofar is the activity of an architect a form of personal engagement for
the preservation of his own social organization? Firstly because of the public character of his
6
creations that asks him to go beyond the contractual relation with his employers and to understand
his works as fundamental contribution for a cooperative and historic enterprise such as a civilization
or a state. Moreover, as representative of a civilization, architectural creations increase the sense of
belongingness by transmitting ideals, suggestions, symbols and aims which are necessary for the
cooperative firmness of a group. Since architecture is fundamentally enjoyed by all citizens, it must
entail those values determining the citizenship itself by distinguishing it from other ones.
The interdependence architect/society is determined by means of the public character of the ideas,
aims, esthetic canons and functionality contained in creations that are both socially enjoyed and
characteristic of a self-aware society. The cooperative character of architecture consists hence in
producing works that must be both functional and representative, i.e. both useful for the daily
interaction and symbolic for the social organization for which they are projected.
Architecture and social acknowledge

This is the reason why an architect has to face the question concerning the social acknowledge.
How it works in modern societies subjected to a huge system of social control and approbation it is
quite more complex than in previous ages when, as we have seen, architects had to confront
themselves with a single sovereign. Democratic societies have a structure of rationality based on a
particular coercive force that Bob Brandom calls the force of the better reason (Brandom 1994). In
place of the authority of single persons we have the authority of the communication and of the
language, which have the eminent form of the argumentation (Habermas 1981), i.e. the capacity to
defend and carry out one´s own ideas and proposals. The force of the better reason is a real coercive
force insofar as it is the outcome of an intersubjective dynamic in which the power of the rational/
social acceptance is more determining that the authority of a single person. What W. Sellars (1956)
calls the logical space of reason is a space in which each participant is requested by the others to
give reasons and justifications for his own statements. In this space the system of evaluation of
beliefs and assertions is based on so called commitive practices, practices in which everyone
commits oneself to justify one´s own ideas, rather than on an individual and private evaluation. The
inferential character of such commitive practices lies on a system of social control, approbation and
acknowledge rather than on a principle of universal and natural reason (Brandom 1994).
Communication fosters a wide participation of the individuals to the practical context because of
the performative nature of the language that enables speaking beings to promote their ideas within
the society without having dominant thought or ideas. This supplies us with the possibility to evolve
7
and spread new ideas, aims, values and suggestions by means of the social acknowledge. The
theories about communicative acting (Habermas) and commitive practices (Brandom) highlight a
particular character of the truth: the fact that it is not determined by natural capacities of the human
reason but rather by social practices based on commitive stances assumed before other members.
This implies that every member of this space is subjected to a normative force that has the power to
render sharable and necessary those statements that are coherently justified. Norms, like esthetic
canons, functionality, typology of materials, etc. are consequently evolved in intersubjective and
linguistic activities in which everyone is responsible for his performances, that is he must give
responses for his doing and asserting. This theory has a revolutionary character because it describes
the evolution and the transformations of the normative as evolution and transformation determined
intersubjectively and by means of the personal commitment. The activity of the architects can be
understood as embedded in this kind of collective practice in which the acceptance is not arbitrary
but established by a linguistic system of justification and argumentation. An idea is accepted insofar
as the bearer is able to commit himself for its validity and to justify itself in a public sphere.
For example an enunciation like:
[A] In Sydney should be built a music-hall that is coherent with that landscape, a sails-like roof is a
good solution.
is valid insofar as it does not contrast with the taste of the community.
In my opinion, the activity of the architect is subjected to the approbation or blame of the
community and he must consequently be able to justify his proposals and suggestions. Sydney
Opera House has, for example, a quite worst acoustic than the Berliner Philarmonie, nonetheless it
is a quite appreciated creation and Sydneyer would never change it with other ones. This happens
because its aim and suggestions are intersubjectively endorsed and are not the outcome of a solitary
reflection. Communicative acting has to be grasped as a system of collective control, which is based
essentially on the performative nature of the language. By making explicit the aims, ideas and
purposes animating a creation an architect submit himself to the social acknowledge and exploits
the discursive dynamics for increasing and improving his projecting. This implies that the harmony
of the different elements of a creation is not only determined by a subjective but rather by an
intersubjective taste, which is outcome of a confrontation establishing norms about beauty,
functionality, ideals and emotions contained in an architectural creation.
8
Architecture and institutions

The theories about discursive practices supply us with a conception that highlights the horizontal
character of the interaction between individuals. With the expression horizontal I mean a form of
networking without a center or with a center that is constituted by means of the interpersonal
interaction itself. The system of justification, evaluation and approbation of ideas and proposals
leads to assign some members entitlements, competences and authorities that differ from those of
other individuals. However, such theories disregard the fact that discursive practices are integral
part of historic social organisms that are based on a set of ethical values mostly inherited and
already given. In other words, discursive practices are not independent from a system of norms that
are historically evolved. The rational practice of inferring and committing cannot hence be
independent from the necessity of the already given ethical substance of a nation or of a social
organization. This represents the most important critic that the third generation of the Frankfurter
School represented by Axel Honneth (2011) moves against the second generation represented by
Habermas. Participants of a cooperative context are normally embedded in an already given
practical context, which is determined by a set of ethical norms and governed by already given
institutions and forms of life.
A group of individuals that calls itself nation due to the shared ethical values preserves itself by
means of a legal system of institutions, laws and rights (Hegel 1987). The indissoluble connection
between ethics and right was often pinpointed by Hegel. It consists in the idea that the ethical
values of a nation establishing what is wrong and what is right must be preserved by means of
institutionalized and legalized practices. This implies that social acknowledge is possible only
within the institutional organization of a social group like a nation, a state or a city. By means of the
right, in fact, a social group improves its own adaptive and historic character by evolving social
behaviors that are ideated for being always cooperative. An institution like the police, for example,
is not merely a group of good motivated persons, but rather a group of persons trained for
performing socially necessary duties and actions. Institutions are the result of an improvement on
the cooperative practices, which makes them more efficacious in preserving the activities and
identity of a group. Therefore if we speak about social acknowledge we have to consider that it is
not merely given in a horizontal cooperative context, but also in a vertical one, that is in a context
ruled through laws and rights disciplining the individual interaction.
9
As in modern societies the collective dimension is superseded by institutionalized organizations

such as cities and states, the modern architect faces social interests that are endorsed by already
institutionalized organisms. His work is therefore subjected to an approbation that is determined by
the historical identity of such organisms and he has to confront his genius with this fact. The
esthetic work is determined by the “ideology” that underlies the institutional design and
transformations of a state or a city. With institutional design (List and Pettit 2011) I mean the set of
rules, laws, rights and internal institutions that improve the interaction and cooperation between
individuals and preserve the state, the eminent institution that unifies and centralizes the internal
cooperative activities. A social organism like a state needs an institutional design for preserving
itself and the activities of the citizens, we could also say that it preserves itself by preserving the
activities of its citizens through laws, rights and institutions.
The work of an architect is integrated with this institutional dynamism much more, I believe, than
with the social dynamism of the communicative acting. Although a democratic state normally
promote the free and independent discussion about central themes, it is, generally speaking,
responsible for the tutelage of every internal cooperative activity. I believe that it is not this the
place for discussing such a complex debate concerning the difference between what Hegel (1821)
calls the civil society and the state, nonetheless it is important to highlight that the state is much
more in charge of preserving and improving the social activities inside it than the civil society, due
to its institutional design and the centralization of the cooperative activities. Whereas the civil
society has a horizontal and circumstantial extension that promotes the production of the particular,
the state has an unitary one. For an architect, understanding his own creations as representative of a
state is quite different from understanding them as representative of the civil society, although the
former is outcome of the latter. If one considers the necessary centralization of the cooperative
activities of a social organization by means of an institution like the state, than one understands why
the state preserves the civil society by internal fragmentation.
The architectural creations receive the influence from this institutional organism in charge of the
centralization and the coherent unification of the cooperative activities inside it. Whereas the civil
society debates and approves ideas in the way illustrated by Habermas and Brandom, the state
requires to unify the various activities, proposals and ideas through a unique principle of
belongingness to a ethical-national identity. As Hegel rightly claims (1821), the individual freedom
can be guaranteed only by such centralized institution because it preserves the ethical spirit of a
10
nation from the fragmentation proper of the civil society.1 The unification of the several cooperative
activities and institutions within the state is necessary because members understand unitarily the
organism to which they belong. In order to preserve this unitary awareness from fragmentation of
interests and opinions, the plurality of the civil society must be brought together by an eminent
institution having the power of self-determination, i.e. to determine itself and not to be determined
by external powers. This is the reason why the function of the state cannot be disregarded in a
discourse about cooperation.
I believe that also the modern architect has to face the existence of this centralized institution. This
does not mean that he must be a state-person indifferent towards the movements and the
argumentations of the civil society. In a democratic state the civil society is not suppressed, it
continues to act freely and autonomously. The dimension of the social acknowledge is hence not
superseded from the state and each citizen has to receive a social approbation in order to have a
role. The social acceptance is also fundamental in developing a ruling class responsible before the
civil society. Nonetheless, in order to have a central role an architect should consider that the
discussions and acknowledge of the civil society are subjected to the fragmentation of which Hegel
warns. His activity, I believe, is asked to be in service of an unified cooperative, historic and
adaptive system such as state rather than of a particular moment of it.
Whereas the communicative acting represents a rational interaction and production of socially
shared beliefs, the dimension of the state, i.e. of a centralized and institutionalized social
organization, represents the realization of an ethical ideal, the genre of a nation. Every agent inside
a cooperative context must face the existence of such organisms, despite what Habermas says about
communication and language. Since architecture produces creations subjected to a social
approbation, it is unavoidable that this approbation is conditioned by the state-body.
Conclusion
At the begin of this lecture I have highlighted that the symbolic nature of architecture has to be
understood in connection with its role in a cooperative dimension. This dimension can be either
communicative or institutionalized. Nonetheless, the institutionalized form of cooperation appears
1 Hegel 1821, § 269: “The [political] disposition takes its particularly determined content from the various aspects of
the organism of the state. This organism is the development of the Idea in its differences and their objective actuality.
These different aspects are accordingly the various powers [within the state] with their corresponding tasks and
functions, through which the universal continually produces itself. It does so in a necessary way, because these various
powers are determined by the nature of the concept; and it preserves itself in so doing, because it is itself the
presupposition of its own production. This organism is the political constitution”.
11
to be more efficacious in preserving, evolving and bringing together the plurality of internal
cooperative activities of a social organization. In other words, without an unitary and centralized
institution like a state it is difficult to keep together the several and particular forms of activities
arising from a cooperative dimensions (forms like cultural, economic, politic, etc.). The double
nature of architecture, both symbolic and cooperative, requires that it faces prevalently the unitary
aspects of the cooperative enterprise for which a creation is destined, rather than the fragmentary
ones proper of particular activities. In other words, an architectural creation is evolved for all
citizens of state and not only for musicians or academics or butchers. A creation has to satisfy the
demand of an entire community that is represented by that organism the bring together its spirit,
identity and personality. Understanding this fact is the reason, I believe, why successful creations
are approved and acknowledged by the entire community and not only by a part of it.
References
Brandom, Bob (1994). Making it explicit. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
Habermas, Jürgen (1981). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
English translation by Thomas MacCarthy (1984): The Theory of Communicative Action. Boston:
Beacon Press Edition
Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich (1821). Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Frankfurt am
Main (1970): Suhrkamp. English Translation by Nisbet (2003): Elements of the Philosophy of
Right. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich (1987). Naturphilosophie und Philosophie des Geistes. Hamburg:
Meiner Verlag.
List, Christian / Pettit, Philip (2011). Group Agency. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.
Pettit, Philip (1996). The Common Mind. Oxford (MA): Oxford University Press.
Searle, John (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, John (1996). The Construction of the Social Reality. London: Penguin Books.
Searle, John (2010). Making the Social World. Oxford (MA): Oxford University Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge (MA): Harvard
University Press.
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The Architect in the Modern Society: Genius and Social Acknowledge

Architecture as cooperative matter

Architecture and social acknowledge

Architecture and institutions

As in modern societies the collective dimension is superseded by institutionalized organizations

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