Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represeted by Rosella A. genuine when he knew the Certificate of Title No.
itle No. M-16751 is fake and
santiago vs. Antonio O. Tobias III
G.R. No. 177780
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by
ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
- versus -
ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)that
dismissed the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to nullify
and set aside the resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice on July 20,
2004 and November 18, 2005 directing the City Prosecutor of Malabon
City to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 27020
entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.
We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with
the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the
public prosecutor in the latter’s determination of the existence of probable
cause, absent any showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby commits
grave abuse of his discretion.
Antecedents
In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was
introduced to respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose
Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK. Subsequently, Tobias
opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam
Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied
for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and
credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings.
METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as
collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related
documents. The property consisted of four parcels of land located in
Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-16751. Based on the
financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a
credit line for ₱40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo
Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to
the Registry of Deeds of Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of
real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The annotation was Entry No.
26897.
Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of ₱20,000,000, but took out
the balance within six months. He paid the interest on the loan for about a
year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his
request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was
foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone
bidder. On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of
METROBANK.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry
of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751
was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register
of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned that
Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been issued for TCT No. M-
15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT No. 16751 (now TCT No.
390146) appeared to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and
Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas.
Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate. In its report dated
May 29, 2000, PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax
declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended
the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in
relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias
with estafa through falsification of public documents through the
following information, viz:
xxx
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of
Malabon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense, fraudulent
acts and misrepresentation executed prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud, represented to METROBANK, as represented by MS.
ROSELLA S. SANTIAGO, that he is the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented to be true and
spurious and executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Metrobank and
offered the same as collateral for a loan and Rosella S. Santiago relying on
said misrepresentation gave to accused, the amount of ₱20,000,000.00
and once in possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by spurious
title and misappropriate, misapply and converted the said amount of
₱20,000,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated
demands accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to return the
amount to complainant METROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered
in the spurious title in the aforementioned amount of ₱20,000,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation, which was granted.
In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation, Tobias
averred that he had bought the property from one Leonardo Fajardo
through real estate brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that
Natalio Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin International,
had convinced him to purchase the property due to its being an ideal site
for his meat processing plant and cold storage business; that the actual
inspection of the property as well as the verification made in the Registry
of Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the veracity of TCT No. 106083
under the name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he had applied for the loan
from METROBANK to pay the purchase price by offering the property as
collateral; that in order for the final application to be processed and the
loan proceeds to be released, METROBANK had advised him to have the
title first transferred to his name; that he had executed a deed of absolute
sale with Fajardo covering the property, and that said instrument had
been properly registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the
title, being under the account of the seller, had been processed by seller
Fajardo and his brokers Munsuyac and Pilapil; that his title and the
property had been inspected and verified by METROBANK’s personnel;
and that he did not have any intention to defraud METROBANK.
Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still
found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged
with estafa through falsification of public document.
Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information
filed against Tobias, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Malabon City is directed to cause the
withdrawal of the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against
respondent Antonino O. Tobias III, and report the action taken thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently
established his good faith in purchasing the property; that he had even
used part of the proceeds of the loan to pay the seller; that it was
METROBANK that had caused the annotation of the mortgage on the
TCT, thereby creating an impression that the title had been existing in the
Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that the
possessor of a falsified document was the author of the falsification did not
apply because it was always subject to the qualification or reference as to
the approximate time of the commission of the falsification.
METROBANK moved to reconsider, arguing that Tobias had employed
deceit or false pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a
fake title; and that the presumption that the possessor of the document
was the author of the falsification applied because no other person could
have falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom except Tobias
himself.
On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied
METROBANK’s motion for reconsideration.
Ruling of the CA
METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari.
On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision, dismissing
METROBANK’s petition for certiorari by holding that the presumption of
authorship might be disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz:
We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it
is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and
makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is that such person is
the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]),
citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the
Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is
presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120,
141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render
ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.
It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the Department of
Justice finding no probable cause against private respondent Tobias for
estafa thru falsification of public document. The record speaks well of
Tobias’ good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability. Consider:
(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good faith is always
presumed. Therefore, he who claims bad faith must prove it (Prinsipio vs.
The Honorable Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December 19, 2005). No
such evidence of bad faith of Tobias appears on record;
(b) Tobias’ actuation in securing the loan belies any criminal intent on his
part to deceive petitioner Bank. He was not in a hurry to obtain the loan.
He had to undergo the usual process of the investigative arm or machine
of the Bank not only on the location and the physical appearance of the
property but likewise the veracity of its title. Out of the approved
₱40,000,000.00 loan he only availed of ₱20,000,000.00, for his frozen
meat business which upon investigation of the Bank failed to give negative
results;
(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one (1) year on the loan and two
(2) installments on the restructured loan; and
(d) More importantly, the loan was not released to him until after the
mortgage was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City
and even paid the amount of ₱90,000.00 for the registration fees therefor.
These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least
intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining the loan. It may not be
surprising to find that Tobias could even be a victim himself by another
person in purchasing the properties he offered as security for the loan.
The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive
function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of
the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such
determination; that the private complainant in a criminal action was only
concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the
criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based
on Article 35 of the Civil Code, to wit:
In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal
complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect of the
case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In
Vda. De Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the Supreme Court has
this for an answer:
"The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice would
not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an accused because it is
his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an information for
the complaint with which the respondents are charged of, is to file a civil
action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil Code, which provides:
‘Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense,
charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is
granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds
no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the
prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged
offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may require the plaintiff
to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complainant should
be found to be malicious.
‘If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended
until the termination of the criminal proceedings.’"
METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for
that purpose, emphasizing that the presumption that METROBANK firmly
relied upon was overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith
and lack of criminal intent. The CA relevantly held:
Petitioner should be minded that the subject presumption that the
possessor and user of a forged or falsified document is presumed to be the
falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a conclusive
one. Under the law on evidence, presumptions are divided into two (2)
classes: conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute presumptions
are rules determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of
any particular averment which is not permitted to be overcome by any
proof that the fact is otherwise, if the basis facts are established (1
Greenleaf, Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on Evidence 6 ed,
page 132). Upon the other hand, a disputable presumption has been
defined as species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on when
there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence (31A C.J.S., p. 197; People
v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9, 1994; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol.
VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41). In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that
the disputable presumptions therein enumerated are satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
Thus, as declared in Our decision in this case, private respondent had
shown evidence of good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability
that can overthrow the controversial disputable presumption.
Issue
In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of—
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT AND THUS, COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006,
DISMISSING METROBANK’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18
NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUDTICE AND IN
DENYING METROBANK’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient
to establish probable cause to hold Tobias for trial; that the presumption
applies when a person is found in possession of the forged instrument,
makes use of it, and benefits from it; that contrary to the ruling of the CA,
there is no requirement that the legal presumption shall only apply in the
absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed,
used and benefited from the forged document; that the CA erred in
declaring that Tobias was in good faith, because good faith was merely
evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that Tobias was
heavily involved in a modus operandi of using fake titles because he was
also being tried for a similar crime in the RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to
determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done during
the preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.
On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the Department
of Justice is to prosecute the guilty in criminal cases, not to persecute; that
although the prosecutors are given latitude to determine the existence of
probable cause, the review power of the Secretary of Justice prevents
overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocent; that in reversing
the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor Ojer Pacis, the
Secretary of Justice only acted within his authority; that, indeed, the
Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that there was lack of evidence
to prove that the purported fake title was the very cause that had induced
the petitioner to grant the loan; and that the Secretary likewise
appropriately found that Tobias dealt with the petitioner in good faith
because of lack of proof that he had employed fraud and deceit in securing
the loan.
Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be applied
in his case because it was METROBANK, through a representative, who
had annotated the real estate mortgage with the Registry of Deeds; and
that he had no access to and contact with the Registry of Deeds, and
whatever went wrong after the annotation was beyond his control.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute
their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this
case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will
not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
 For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth
Division, Cebu City, the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded
his jurisdiction when he required "hard facts and solid evidence" in order
to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such
requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial.
At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Probable cause refers to
facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof. There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is
determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the existence of
probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor
conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts
presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the
clear dictates of reason.
Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public
document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs
other similar deceits; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced
to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage. It is required that the false statement or
fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
that induced the complainant to part with the thing.
METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship
against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the
spurious title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no requirement
that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid
explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited
from the forged document.
We cannot sustain METROBANK’s urging.
Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged
in the State. The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to
the contrary. As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual
trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party
against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the
presumption and demolish the prima facie case. This is not so in a
preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only
determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the
prosecution of a criminal case in court.
We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it
is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and
makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is
the forger (Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]),
citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the
Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is
presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120,
141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render
ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank
dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain
the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and
integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the
responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives
to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of
investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK
did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the
circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such,
it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise
greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their
business is impressed with public interest. Their failure to do so
constitutes negligence on its part.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari,
and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
December 29, 2006. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be

accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for
which it stands. It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating
prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during
preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by
the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the
duty to weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the
investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have
ample discretion to determine the existence of probable cause, a discretion
that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and
inferences can properly warrant.

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is

its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.

Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in

dismissing the information in the face of the controverting explanation by
Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less
can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all
grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to
wit:
It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the
moment a person has in his possession a falsified document and has made
use of it, probable cause or prima facie is already established and that no
amount of satisfactory explanation will prevent the filing of the case in
court by the investigating officer, for any such good explanation or defense
can only be threshed out in the trial on the merit. We are not to be
persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the
very purpose for which preliminary investigation is required in this
jurisdiction.

A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved

against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary
investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71
[2006]). It is a means of discovering the person or persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]). Prescindingly, under
Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the respondent
must be informed of the accusation against him and shall have the right to
examine the evidence against him and submit his counter-affidavit to
disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a criminal preliminary
investigation is legally entitled to explain his side of the accusation.

Jaime O. Sevilla vs. Carmelita N. Cardenas
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,  at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision 1of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004
which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the
RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the
latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they
were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed
Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused
him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of
the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for
his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that
she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969, 4 and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking
the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on
May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a
certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract
(Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who,
plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied
them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness
to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792
allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he
never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M.
Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr.,
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and
defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before
Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage
license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and
expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding,
he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in
Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their
marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for
him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They
started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was
during this time when defendant's second son was born whose
paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured
a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself
manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his
marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of
San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and
with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters
dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March
9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to
and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply
thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"),
that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church
issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff
and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated
April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely
religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969
issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of
San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March
11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr.,
the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff
had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were
introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was
compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty
pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to
run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she
turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in
Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff
proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were
hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and
promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still
fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites,
without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-
28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she
was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969,
they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone
prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from
hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two
months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors
that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12
(TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded
by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual
behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex
with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural
sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to
plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had
tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine
and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then
would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant
tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it
has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they
often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half
years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send
some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an
English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff
physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in
their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one
Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that
his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife
ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and
guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for
medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed
in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also
stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
 inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order
for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each
other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in
the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage
contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the
marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage
void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications
(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more
recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the
marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage
contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31,
1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys
probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section
28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage
between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized
by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19,
1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under
religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer
Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under
Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil
Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil
and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the
Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office
of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994),
the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by  affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the
local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
is registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." With said testimony We
cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified
in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the
failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to
produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to
the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather,
because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were
available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would
have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage
on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a
marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration
of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and
relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts,
particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely
from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which
show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly
issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the
presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted
"fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the
certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no
Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of
the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the
time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53, 10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential
requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and
Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving
a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San
Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained
the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the
Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not
being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the
earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as
stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
 SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. - a written statement signed by
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied
by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No.
2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by
this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number
2880792,16we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
            Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were
ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said
number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
            Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no
Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do
not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear
to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the
interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
            Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due
to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader,
who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the
person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the
testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim
that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein,
had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring
to this Court among other things the register of application of/or
(sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19,
1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of
marriage applications that your office maintains as required by
the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the
witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether
marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by
their office while with respect to license no. 2770792
the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is
very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him
how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by
their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could
not find the record? But for the moment you cannot
locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued
or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the
disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of
evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or
one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty
has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. 22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable
and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence
or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not
to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived
together for several years producing two offsprings, 26 now adults
themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for
declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the
nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow
him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as
a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that
marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State
is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good,
solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and
moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima

faciepresumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his
emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. People of the Philippines vs. Winston De Guzman
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual Republic of the Philippines
problem. SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the SECOND DIVISION
Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner. G.R. No. 122740 March 30, 1998

SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
WINSTON DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused appellant Winston de Guzman was charged before the Regional

Trial Court of Mati, Branch 5, Davao Oriental1 with the crime of rape in an
information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2584, and which alleged:

That on or about June 9, 1994, in the Municipality of Governor

Generoso, Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one JOVELYN A. GERAM,
a (sic) against her will.2

Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on the aforequoted

indictment on September 5, 1994,3 and the case then went to trial.

The evidence for the prosecution reveals that 14-year old complainant,
Jovelyn A. Geram,4 was alone in their residence at Barangay Monserrat,
Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental when the crime was committed in the
afternoon of June 9, 1994 by appellant who had managed to gain entry
into the house.

Complainant was sleeping at around two o'clock that afternoon when she
was awakened by the weight of something on top of her. Upon opening her
eyes, she saw herein appellant naked and sitting on her thighs.
Complainant instinctively tried to shout for help but appellant covered her
mouth and nose with his hand and warned her not to resist or she would
be killed. A struggle between the two ensued thereafter. The strength of
appellant and the strain of complainant's efforts at resistance took its toll
on the latter, causing her to feel weak and faint.

On recovering her senses, complainant discovered that she was already

undressed and she saw blood on her vagina. She also noticed some white
fluid on her abdomen and thighs. Complainant felt pain on her genitals
and other parts of her body. Appellant was no longer around, and the
hapless complainant was left crying over the tragedy which had befallen
her.

In the evening of the same day, a neighbor, Florami Bayno, arrived in the
house of the Gerams to watch television. Complainant went with Florami
when the latter went home. They proceeded to the house of Mauricia and
Hugo Bayno, close friends of the Gerams and Florami's parent's-in-law. In
front of the couple, complainant recounted her ordeal at the hands of
appellant.

In the morning of June 10, 1994, complainant went to the house of

another neighbor, Genesis Delgado, and confided her misfortune to the
latter. Later, she went to the house of the Baynos and waited for her
parents who were in Barangay Tambo attending to their fishing
enterprises. Complainant's mother, Evelyn Geram,5arrived shortly
thereafter. Mother and daughter could only cry as the latter related the
incident to the former.

Complainant and her mother subsequently went to the barangay captain

of Monserrat who advised them to report then latter to the police
authorities of Sigaboy, Governor Generoso. After complainant had
narrated the incident to the police, she and her mother proceeded to the
municipal hospital for the physical examination of the former.
Dr. Divina Lopez,6 a resident physician of the Municipal District Hospital
of Governor Generoso, issued a medical certificate detailing the result of
her examination of complainant, as follows:
FINDINGS:
1) Positive (+) BLOOD CLOTS BOTH ON LABIA MINORA
2) POSITIVE (+) RUPTURED HYMEN
3) REDNESS AROUND THE VULVAR AREA7
Prosecution witness Genesis Delgado8 declared that he saw appellant
going inside the house of complainant on June 9, 1994 at around two
o'clock in the afternoon. Apparently, appellant entered through the
kitchen door at the rear portion of the house. Two hours later, appellant
went out of the house through the same kitchen door. Delgado noticed all
of these while he was watching television inside their house located just
beside the Gerams' residence.
Later, at the rebuttal stage, Enecita9 dela Cruz Torion,10 a teacher in
Monserrat Elementary School, also testified that she saw appellant,
together with two companions, sitting at the front porch of the house of
the Gerams at about one o'clock in the afternoon of June 9, 1994. Enecita
was then on her way from the school which was located in front of the
house of the Gerams.
The defense of appellant is denial and alibi. Aside from the intrinsic
weakness of this shopworn excuse, we are not persuaded to grant any
credence thereto since the facts relied on to make out appellant's story
obviously appear too pat as to have clearly been contrived. The only
persons presented to corroborate appellant's story are his own parents,
despite the availability of other persons whose lack of relationship to him
would not have engendered suspicion of connivance.
Appellant,11 who is also a resident of Monserrat, asserted before the trial
court that he was in Davao City at the time of the commission of the
felony. He allegedly went there on June 6, 1994 with his mother to attend
to his sister-in-law who was confined in the Davao Medical Center due to
an incomplete abortion.12 After his sister-in-law was discharged from the
hospital in the afternoon of June 8, they went to the house of Christy, his
sister who was residing at Sasa, Davao City. He stayed in the house and
cleaned it the whole day of June 9. At 4:30 in the morning of June 10, he
and his mother left Davao City for Monserrat, arriving at their house
between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M.
Aside from merely repeating the position of appellant, his father, Raul De
Guzman,13 tried to convince the trial court that he saw complainant in the
afternoon of June 9, 1994. According to this witness, Jovelyn went to their
store on that date to borrow a VHS cassette tape featuring "Robo
Vampire." Appellant's mother, Violeta De Guzman,14 also sought to
support his story by claiming that it was her decision to bring appellant
along to Davao City so that he could help minister to her daughter-in-law.
After considering the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense,
the lower court gave credence to the testimony of Jovelyn and disregarded
the defense of denial cum alibi presented by appellant.
The trial court considered the immediate revelation made by Jovelyn of
the crime committed against her, and her steadfast efforts to bring her
violator to justice, as indicative of the veracity of her charge. It rejected the
defense put up by appellant in light of the positive identification made by
Jovelyn and the categorical declarations of the other prosecution
witnesses placing him within the vicinity of the locus criminis at the time
of the commission of the crime.
Accordingly, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify Jovelyn in the amount of P40,000.00, and to pay
the costs. 15
Appellant now pleads for the reversal of the judgment of the trial court,
contending that said court erred in giving credence to the testimony of
Jovelyn and in finding him guilty on the basis thereof.16
Appellant adverts to the fact that complainant stated in her
complaint17and in her testimony18 given during the preliminary
investigation that he committed the crime of rape through the application
of odorous chemicals over her nose and mouth which caused her to sleep.
This fact was not repeated by complainant in the trial court but she merely
claimed the crime was consummated by appellant through force and
intimidation. Such inconsistency, according to appellant, destroys
Jovelyn's credibility, thus warranting a reversal of the lower court's
judgment of conviction.
The records disclose that at the trial, counsel for appellant tried to utilize
the testimony of complainant given in the preliminary investigation before
Judge Rodolfo A. Castro to impeach her through statements therein
supposedly different from what she gave in court.19 Alluding to her
answer to Judge Castro's questions numbered 28 and 29,20appellant's
counsel asked complainant if she first reported the rape to one Dioneson
Bayno. Complainant duly corrected that statement and clarified that it was
Mauricia and Hugo Bayno whom she first told about the incident.21
However, complainant was never confronted during the proceedings in
the trial court with her answers allegedly given in the same testimony at
the preliminary investigation regarding appellant's resort to sleep-
including chemicals. In fact, no sub-markings for such particular answers
as exhibits were made in the records of her testimony in the preliminary
investigation, much less offered by the counsel of appellant for that
purpose during the trial of the case.
It is universally accepted that a witness cannot he impeached by evidence
of contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper
foundation or predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said
witness was called.22 The American rule on laying the predicate is
embodied in Rule 132 of our own Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence
that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with
the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements
be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.
Although the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the
preliminary examination was offered in evidence by the defense and
admitted by the trial court,23 complainant cannot now be discredited
through any of her extrajudicial statements which were not brought to her
attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that
granting arguendo the alleged contradictions, previous statements cannot
serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his
attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an
opportunity to explain them.24
In People vs.  Resabal,25 this Court explicitly ruled that the mere
presentation of the prior declarations of a witness without the same
having been read to the witness while he was testifying in court is
insufficient for the desired impeachment of his testimony. As explained
therein, the apparent contradiction between the declarations of the
witness before the former justice of the peace court and those before the
then court of first instance was insufficient to discredit him since he was
not given ample opportunity, by reading to him his declarations before the
lower court, to explain the supposed discrepancy.
The rule which requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before
introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded
upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness.
His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enables him to
explain the statements referred to, and to show that they were made under
a mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his
testimony.26
It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible
witness as a result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by appellant. It
is evidentiarily proscribed to discredit a witness on the bases of
purportedly prior inconsistent statements which were not called to the
attention of that witness during the trial, although the same are
supposedly contained in a document which was merely offered and
admitted in its entirety without the requisite specifications.
Through such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently
offer in evidence at the trial the whole document containing allegedly
variant statements and then point out much later on appeal the supposed
contradictory statements which were not specified, intentionally or
otherwise, in the same trial. That sub silentio gambit would necessarily
deprive a witness of the chance to explain the seeming divergencies, which
is the paramount consideration of the rule mandating the laying of the
proper predicate.
Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the
rule to explain the supposed differences in her statements. Without such
explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis
to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when
no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his
conflicting declarations that he should be deemed impeached.27 As things
stand before us and the court a quo, therefore, complainant's credibility
remains unimpeached.
On the foregoing considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine
articulated by the Court of Appeals in Villaruel vs. Bascon28 that, unless
the proper predicate is laid during the trial by calling the attention of a
witness to his alleged inconsistent statements given outside of his
testimony in court and asking him to explain the contradiction, the
supposed inconsistencies cannot be pointed out on appeal for the purpose
of destroying the credibility of the witness. This pronouncement was
actually based upon and in line with the holdings of this Court
in Escosura29 and People vs.  Lim Quingsy.30
We now take up the other document relied upon by appellant, that is, the
complaint executed by complainant. A reading of the transcript of
stenographic notes shows that said complaint was never introduced in
evidence for the consideration of the trial court nor shown to complainant
during the trial so that she could explain the alleged discrepancies in
accordance with the foregoing rule. The complaint is not even included in
the folder of exhibits as part of the documents admitted in evidence by the
trial court. It is only attached to the original record of this case together
with the other records of the preliminary investigation forwarded to the
trial court. Under the revision in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
those records of the preliminary investigation do not form part of the
record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.31

Again, it is undeniable that the proper basis was not laid for the
impeachment of complainant through the statements contained in her
complaint. Coupled with the basic principle that courts shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered or whose purpose has not
been specified,32 the complaint cannot also be taken into account for
impeaching complainant. If appellant was really prepared to attack Matilde Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban
complainant's credibility based on the statements in her complaint, he
should necessarily have asked complainant about them during the trial, Republic of the Philippines
offered the complaint as his evidence, and specified the purpose for its SUPREME COURT
submission. Appellant utterly failed in all of these mandatory evidential Manila
requirements.
EN BANC
Hence, no impeaching evidence having been properly brought before it for
its consideration during trial, the lower court was perfectly justified in G.R. No. L-49084 October 10, 1985
disregarding the supposed inconsistent statements of complainant in her
complaint and her testimony during the preliminary investigation. Her MATILDE ALAVADO in her own right and as natural guardian
testimony at the trial, therefore, stands unassailed and entitled to full of IDA VILMA, IMELDA AND ROLANDO, all surnamed
credit, together with the corroboration afforded thereto by the testimonies ALAVADO petitioner, 
of the other prosecution witnesses, in stark contrast to the effete and vs.
puerile defense offered by appellant. CITY GOVERNMENT OF TACLOBAN (ENGINEER'S OFFICE
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, now the
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED, LABOR APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF), respondents.
with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity to be paid by accused-
appellant Winston de Guzman is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance Bonifacio L. Ramo for petitioner.
with the present case law thereon. Francisco C. Pedrosa for respondent City Government.
Ernesto H. Cruz and Emilia Andres for respondent labor.
SO ORDERED.
CUEVAS, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition is the decision  1 dated November 29, 1975
of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission which dismissed
petitioner's death benefits claim for the death of her husband, Ricardo
Alavado, a former employee of the City Engineer's Office in Tacloban City.

The evidence on record discloses that the late Ricardo A. Alavado was
employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City Engineer's Office, Tacloban
City with a daily wage of P13.12. His last day of service was on April 19,
1974 since he was on leave from April 23, 1974 to May 23, 1974. On August
6, 1974 when he reported for work, he was no longer under the supervision
of respondent city. He suffered severe headache when he was supervising
laborers on a construction project in Tolosa, Leyte. He died the following
day of CVA-Cerebral Hemorrhage.

Petitioner, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children. Respondent city filed a notice
of controversion of the claimant's right to compensation on December 10,
1974. On March 31, 1975, the hearing officer of Regional Office No. 9 in
'Tacloban City issued an award granting petitioner the sum of P5,200.00
as death benefits and P200.00 as reimbursement of burial expenses.

Respondent city appealed. On November 29, 1975, a decision was

rendered by the Commission dismissing petitioner's death benefits claim,
holding that—

xxx xxx xxx

While it is true that the deceased has suffered from the ailment
which resulted in his death while he wall the performance of his
work as a Carpenter Foreman this case must be denied on tile
ground of lack of filiation between the herein claimant and the
deceased. It is a settled rule that the status of dependency of a
spouse arises from the fact that a marriage exists. A showing of
marital status is essential. In this case the herein claimant
Matilde Alvarado presented a marriage certificate issued by the
Sto. Nino Parish of Tacloban City as proof of her marriage to the
deceased. This certification is not an authentic proof of marital
status. To prove filiation as a spouse and, therefore claim as a
dependent 'within the meaning of the Act, the surviving spouse-
claimant must show either the original of the marriage contract
or the marriage certificate duly issued by the local Civil Registrar
of the place where the marriage was solemnized. In the absence
thereof, as when the records are destroyed or not available due
to fire or other causes, secondary evidence may be presented
consisting of an affidavit of the claimant and at least three
witnesses to the marriage cohabitation. As to the filiation of the
children the same is establish by the presentation of the birth
 certificate. In this case only the baptismal certificates of all the
children were presented in evidence by the claimant. A
baptismal certificate is not sufficient because it merely proves
the fact that originated its execution, and the date of the same,
namely the administration of the sacrament of baptism on the
date specified. It is not an authentic proof as to the statements
made therein respecting the kinsfolk of the person baptized and
the presentation of such baptismal certificate does not prove
filiation for the purpose of establishing the status of dependency.
favor of claimant's marriage to the deceased Alavado. But what wrote
finish to this issue-legality of the claimant's marriage to the deceased is the
marriage certificate submitted later by the claimant.  7 In the said
document. the contracting parties appeared to be Ricardo Alavado and
Matilde Valdesco The marriage was solemnized on August 19, 1939 by Fr.
Ignacio Mora, priest of Tacloban, Leyte. It is certified to be a true copy of
the original issued by the local Civil Registrar of the City of Tacloban. The
said document indubitably establishes claimant marriage to the deceased
Alavado,

Dissatisfied with respondent Commission's decision, claimant spouse filed
the instant petition raising the following issues:
I benefits.
May a marriage certificate attesting to the fact that claimant and
deceased were in fact married be considered satisfactory proof of
marital status in the absence of any evidence to the contrary?
And
II
Whether or not the respondent commission committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
matter.
In the answer filed by City Fiscal Pedroza for respondent City, he averred
that Alavado was on longer an employee of respondent city government at
the time of his death, hence the city is not liable to pay compensation
We find respondent city's contention untenable. Such a defense should
have been raised before the Commission within the period prescribed by
the Workmen's Compensation Act 8 within fourteen (14) days from death
or within ten (10) days from knowledge thereof. Having failed to
controvert the said claim within the prescribed reglementary period, its
compensability is now beyond challenge. Respondent city's failure to
controvert the claim within the aforesaid period is a waiver of its right to
do so. 9

The petition is impressed with merit. Its grant is therefore in order. While
admitting the compensability of the claim, respondent Commission
nevertheless dismissed the same due to the alleged failure of petitioner
claimant to prove that she was legally married to the deceased. In making
the said pronouncement, respondent Commission relied solely on the
absence of a copy, or a certified copy of petitioner's marriage contract with
the deceased Alavado. What was submitted by her is a mere copy issued by
the church authorities where the questioned marriage was
solemnized. 2 The said document shows that petitioner claimant and the
deceased were married on August 9, 1939. Since then, they lived together
as man and wife continuously for a period of 35 years in their conjugal
abode up to the time of Alavado's death.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, being a social legislation, aimed at
protecting the rights of the workingmen in consonance with the social
justice guarantee of the Constitution, its provision must be interpreted
liberally in favor of laborers or workers. This basic mandate should guide
all tribunals and agencies in the resolution of cases of this nature more
specially those involving poor claimants who have come to court as pauper
litigants.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 1979 of the defunct
Workmen's Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. The award
of the Hearing Officer of Regional Office No. 9 of Tacloban City is
REINSTATED.

Section 5(bb) of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:

SO ORDERED.
Sec. 5. Disputable Presumptions.—The following presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and

wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Courts look upon this presumption with great favor and it could not be
lightly repelled. It may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary or
by evidence of a higher than ordinary quality. The rationale behind this
presumption could be found in the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng
Gee, 3which runs this wise—

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that

of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties qwere not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper — praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife
and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted the presumption of
their being married must be admitted as a fact. 4

Likewise, the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show

the fact of marriage. Similarly a witness who was present at the time the
marriage was solemnized, is a competent witness to establish the existence
of said marriage. 5 Indeed, public and open cohabitation as husband and
wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born unto them after the
celebration of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such marriage
in subsequent document were held to be competent evidence as proof of
said marriage . 6

A review of the records of this case failed to disclose any evidence

whatsoever which will overthrow the aforementioned presumption in

In re: William Gue. Angelina L. Gue vs. Republic of the Philippines
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14058             March 24, 1960
In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue,
presumptively dead. ANGELINA L. GUE, petitioner-appellant,  competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Virgilio V. David for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva
for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided by Judge Bonifacio Ysip, dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue.
Involving as it does only question of law, the appeal was taken directly to
us.
On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 34303, alleging that she was
married to William Gue; that they had a child named Anthony L. Gue; that
January 5, 1946, her husband left Manila where they were residing and
went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had not been heard of, neither
had he written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his
whereabouts; that despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate
him; and that they had not acquired any property during the marriage.
She asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of
William Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. After due publication and hearing, the trial court issued
the order of dismissal, which we reproduce below:
This is a petition filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare her
husband. William Gue, presumptively dead. During the hearing
of this petition, it was established by the testimony of the
petitioner that she and her husband were married on October 11,
1944 in the City of Manila before the parish priest of Tondo,
Manila, as shows in Exhibit B, the marriage contract. Her
husband, who is a Chinese citizen, left the Philippines for
Shanghai on January, 1946. The petitioner joined him in
Shanghai in August of the same year. In January, 1949, the
petitioner came back to the Philippines alone with her children,
on which occasion her husband promised to follow her.
However, up to the present time, said William Gue has not
returned to the Philippines. From January, 1949, the petitioner
had sent letters to her husband in Shanghai, but she never
received any reply thereto. She made inquiries from the Bureau
of Immigration in 1955 and 1958 as to whether her husband had
already returned to the Philippines and she received Exhibit D
and Exhibit E from said Office, which gave no information as to
the whereabouts of her husband. It was also established by
petitioner's testimony that no properties have been acquired by
said spouses during their union, and during which they begot
two children, named Eugeni and Anthony, surnamed Gue.
In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of the Article 390 of the
With this evidence on record and considering the allegations in
New Civil Code, which for purpose of reference, we reproduce below.
the petition, it is clear that no right had been established by the
petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be predicated, and
this action is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee,
as it is clear that he did not leave any.
In the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai
Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461, a case similar to the present, the
Supreme Court held:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai
Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no
property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule
invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the
court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such
person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and
made in a case, whether in an action or in a special proceeding,
which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
special proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced
nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a
particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880), for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven
years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead.
But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve
the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even
if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption
only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
controversy the right or status of a party or established finally a
particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise
or may arise; and once such controversy is decided by a final
judgment or such right or status is determined, then the
judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon
the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except
in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is, therefore,
clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof cannot
reach the state of finality or become final. Proof of actual death
of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from
in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been
heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such a presumption is still disputable
and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
"Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as
the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted, may make or lead
her to believe that the marital bonds which binds her to her
husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or may
feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of
the rules of court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of
evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial
declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A
petition for a declaration such as the one filed in this case may be
made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case,
then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted
under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could
easily be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a
person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.
This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one
presented in this case should not be countenanced and allowed.
What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of the
Divorce Law could indirectly be secured under the provisions of
Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made
to prevail over the former."
In view of the foregoing and the doctrine of the Supreme Court
laid down in the case above-cited, the Court hereby orders that
this case be, as it is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as
the costs.
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
 The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening this succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the of seventy-five years, an absence of five
years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.

She contends that under Article 191 of the Old Civil Code, which reads:

After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the

absentee, or since he was last heard from, or ninety years from
his birth, the judgment upon the petition of any party lawfully
interested, shall make an order declaring that such absentee is
presumed to be dead.

a person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal

provision was repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure and continued to be
repealed by the Rules of Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable
presumption of death was available to any party, and that the case of
Nicolai Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the law then
existing, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure, and later the new Rules of
Court. However, according to appellant, with the promulgation of the New
Civil Code in 1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are now
authorized to declare persons presumptively dead.

In answer to her contention, the Solicitor General, as appellee herein,

correctly cites our decision in the recent case of Lourdes G. Lukban vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 98 Phil., 574; 52 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1441,
decided long after the New Civil Code went into effect, wherein we
reiterated the doctrine laid own in Nicolai Szatraw, supra. We quote the
pertinent portions of our decision in that case:

This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a

declaration that petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco
Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal
impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that

the same is not authorized by law. After petitioner had presented
her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and dismissed
the petition. Hence this appeal.

Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with

Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic
Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco
left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not
been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also
inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one was
able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is
still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco,
Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had been
absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order
that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of

our decision in the case of Nicolai Szatraw, 46 Off. Gaz. 1st Sup.
243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial declaration
that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such
declaration cannot be made in a special proceedings similar to
the present, much less can the court determine the status of
petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend
upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare
upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely
presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szatraw, 48 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup.
243).

The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial

pronouncement cannot be made in a proceeding of this nature is
well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said that
"A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is
still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject
of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass .. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had
been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final."

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The

appealed order dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.