TC- 22A

-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS- 1

JUSTICE Y.K. SABHARWAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition No.______/1969

BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA PETITIONER 1

ZAL IRANI PETITIONER
2
VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA RESPONDENT

As submitted to the Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court of India

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- 2

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CasesNumber of Words in the Arguments Section: 4000

Hans Muller v Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367(Para 2.1.5.) 10

IC Golak Nath v State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643(Para 1.1.6) 3

Liyanage v. R., (1967) A.C. 259(Para 1.2.8.) 5

R. v. Burah, [1878] UKPC 26(Para 1.2.7.) 5

Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 933(Para 1.1.3.) 2

Sankari Prasad Deo v. Union of India, (1952) S.C.R. 89(Para1.1.2.) 2

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226(Para 2.3.5.) 14

State of Rajasthan v Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544(Para 2.1.6.) 10

The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75(Para 2.2.2.) 11

Other Authorities
1. Craies, Statute Law (7th ed.)
2. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 8th ed.
-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS- 3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION (22ND AMENDMENT) ACT IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?

It is humbly submitted that an amendment to the Constitution of India is a ‘law’ under

Article 13(2) and hence an amendment to the Constitution cannot curtail any of the

fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens. It is further pleaded that there are

implied limitation on the powers of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and in so

far as an amendment seeks to exclude the power of the courts of judicial review it shall

stand invalidated. It is further submitted that the doctrine of prospective overruling as

propounded in previous cases cannot be applicable to the matter and the Court was

previously wrong in laying down such a provision.

2. WHETHER THE BOARD OF CRICKET CONTROL IN INDIA (SOCIAL

JUSTICE) ACT, 1969 CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?

It is respectfully submitted that the power to legislate in the matter of sports has been

given to the States by the State List of the Seventh Schedule. In the matter that the

parliament has legislated on a core issue and has exceeded the limits placed on its

legislative competency. Therefore, the Act is void ab initio for the want of legislative

competency. Further, there has been a lack of reasonable classification and rational

nexus in creating such an Act and the Act hence fails to appreciate the basic

requirements laid down by Article 14. Hence, the Act is constitutionally invalid. It is

further pleaded that on account of violation of Article 14 the purpose to be achieved by

invoking Article 15(4) becomes irrational and bad. Hence, the Act deserves to be

declared unconstitutional.
-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES- 4
-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED -1

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION (22ND AMENDMENT) ACT, 1969 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY

VALID?
It is humbly submitted that the Petitioners herein seeks challenge on the constitutional

validity of “the Constitution (22 nd Amendment) Act, 1969” (hereinafter referred to as the

“Amendment Act, 1969”), which was passed by Parliament on 14 th July, 1969. The

amendment placed the ‘Board of Control for Cricket in India (Social Justice) Act, 1969’ in

the Entry 65, 9th Schedule of the Constitution of India 1, thereby shielding it from any

challenge on its validity based on the ground of infringement of Fundamental Rights.

The Petitioner humbly submits as follows:

(1) That, any amendment to the constitution is a ‘law’ under Article 13(2) of the

Constitution of India, and hence, it is invalid if it violates Fundamental Rights,

provided under Part III of the Constitution.

(2) That, even if the constitutional amendment is not a ‘law’ under Article 13(2) of the

Constitution, even then, there is implied limitations of Parliament’s power to amend

the Constitution. Hence, Constitutional Amendment, which ousts the challenge

through judicial review of legislation, is barred by implied limitations on the power of

amending the constitution.

1.1. THAT CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS A ‘LAW’ UNDER ARTICLE 13(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF INDIA.
1 Moot Proposition – II, p. 7.
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1.1.1. It is humbly submitted that a Constitution Amendment Act is a ‘law’ made

under Art. 248, it must be subject to Art. 13(2) and would, therefore, be void if it

seeks to amend a fundamental right. It must, therefore, be held that a

fundamental right cannot be amended by passing a law under Art. 368.

1.1.2. It is humbly submitted that when the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 was held

to be void as violating Art. 14, the Constituent Assembly, functioning as the

provisional Parliament under Art. 379, passed the Constitution (1st Amendment)

Act, 1951. Its validity was challenged in Sankari Prasad2’s Case, on several

grounds but the challenge failed. The argument that an amendment of the

Constitution was ‘a law’ within the meaning under Art. 13(2) was rejected.

Hence, amendment of the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power

under Art. 368 cannot be held invalid on the grounds of infringement of

Fundamental Rights.

1.1.3. It is humbly submitted that thereafter the Constitution (4th Amendment) Act,

1955 was passed amending some Articles in Part III (Fundamental Rights), but

its validity was never challenged. However, in Sajjan Singh’s case3, the

Constitution (17th Amendment) Act was challenged which had inserted some of

the Acts in schedule 9 by which the petitioners were aggrieved. Following

Sankari Prasad’s Case, all the judges concurred in dismissing the petition. But

Hidayatullah J. and Mudholkar J. expressed their doubts about the correctness of

Sankari Prasad’s case.

2 Sankari Prasad Deo v. Union of India, (1952) S.C.R. 89.

3 Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 933.

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1.1.4. Ultimately, in I.C. Golaknath4, the validity of the 17th Amendment was again

challenged. In view of the doubts expressed by J. Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, a

bench of 11 judges was constituted to reconsider the whole question. By a

majority of 6:5 it was held that Parliament had no power to amend fundamental

rights. Subba Rao, C.J. held that Art. 369 contained only the procedure for

amendment, the power to amend being located in the residuary power of

legislation.

1.1.5. As Legislative power was ‘subject to the provisions of this Constitution’, Art.

13(2) constituted a bar to an amendment abridging or taking away fundamental

rights. The majority judgments overruled Sankari Prasad’s case and held that

there was no distinction between legislative and constituent power.

1.1.6. It is submitted that in I.C. Golaknath’s case, a majority of 6 judges of a

special Bench of eleven has overruled the previous decisions and taken the view

that though there is no express exception from the ambit of Art. 368, the

Fundamental Rights included in Part III of the Constitution cannot, by very

nature, be subject to the process of amendment provided for in Art. 368 and that

if any of such Rights is to be amended, a new Constituent Assembly must be

convened for making a new Constitution or radically changing it.

1.1.7. It is humbly submitted that, though in this case there is no direct amendment

of the Fundamental Rights done through the 22nd Constitutional Amendment

Act, 1969, but its indirect implication is to denude the provisions of Chapter III

of the Constitution, and hence making them nugatory. The Amendment Act,

posts the law as entry 35 of the 9th schedule, thereby shielding it from the

constitutional challenge based on the violation of fundamental rights and ousting

4 IC Golak Nath v State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643

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the jurisdiction of the court provided by art. 32 of the Constitution, which in

itself is a fundamental right. Hence, it indirectly amends the Fundamental

Rights.

1.2. THAT THERE ARE IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON POWER OF PARLIAMENT TO AMEND THE

CONSTITUTION.

1.2.1. The Presumption in favour of amendability of the Constitution on the ground

that an unamendable Constitution would perish in violence, cannot be applied to

a Constitution with a wide but not unlimited amending power. And the history of

the Statute of Westminster showed that states enjoying sovereign status in

international law did not find their sovereignty diminished when they declined to

have an absolute amending power; and the example of Canada further showed

that even when the power to amend the Constitution was sought by the federal

Parliament, the basic features of the Constitution were excluded from the

amending power.

1.2.2. Therefore, in considering the interpretation of Art. 368 which confers a wide

amending power, there is no scope for the presumption that if two interpretations

are possible that which would favour amendability should be preferred.

1.2.3. It is respectfully submitted that in the instant case, the main issue is the

interpretation of Art. 368 of the Constitution.

1.2.4. The golden rule of interpretation is to give the words of a statute or a

Constitution their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning subject to the rider

that in construing words in a Constitution the most liberal construction should be

put upon the words so that they might have effect in their widest amplitude,

subject to very limited exceptions. Secondly, where words are clear and

unambiguous, effect must be given to them regardless of consequences.

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1.2.5. The object of interpretation of documents and statutes is to ascertain ‘the

intention of them that made it’. The literal interpretation has only a prima facie

preference.

1.2.6. However, where the words of a statutory or constitutional provision are

ambiguous, resort may be had to well recognized extrinsic aids to construction

and regard may be had to the consequences of adopting one construction rather

than another.5

1.2.7. The Principles for the interpretation of Constitutions enacted by the British

Parliament were laid down by the Privy Council in a classical passage in R. v.

Burah6: “If what has been done is legislation within the general words give the

power and if it violates no express condition or restriction by which that power

is limited, it is not for a Court of Justice to inquire further or to enlarge

constructively those conditions and limitations.”

1.2.8. First, the word ‘express’ does not exclude what is necessarily implied.

Secondly, though it is not for a court to enlarge constructively the conditions and

restrictions contained in the Constitution, the nature of the Constitution may be

important on a question of construction.7

1.2.9. The words ‘any provision’ in art. 368 are ambiguous. It is humbly submitted

that, ‘any’ in this context cannot mean ‘all’ because an amendment by way of

repeal of all the provisions of the Constitution is not possible, since Art. 368(2)

provides that on the amending, Bill receiving the President’s assent “the

Constitution shall stand amended”, and a Constitution which is repealed, does

5 Craies, Statute Law (7th ed.), p. 96 et. Seq., “Rules in Heydon’s Case”.

6 R. v. Burah, [1878] UKPC 26.

7 Liyanage v. R., (1967) A.C. 259.

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not stand at all, much less it stands amended. It is a necessary implication of the

Constitution standing amended, that all its provisions cannot be repealed, and the

word ‘any’ does not mean ‘all’.

1.2.10. It is humbly submitted that, as it is shown that Art. 368 cannot repeal the

whole constitution, it is clear that only part of it can be amended. This clears out

the position that there is some implied limitation on powers of amending the

constitution, i.e. the parts of the constitution which cannot be amended by it.

1.2.11. As the art. 368 does not tells that which part of the Constitution may be

amended. It has to be inferred from the other provisions of the Constitution. It is

humbly submitted that, according to art. 368, what must be left after the

amendment must be ‘the constitution’. Article 393 provides that ‘this

Constitution may be called the Constitution of India’. Therefore, the Constitution

which must be left standing must be ‘the Constitution of India’, not a

Constitution in the abstract.

1.2.12. It is humbly submitted that, following this argument, it is indisputable that

article 32 (Judicial Review of a Legislation) of the Constitution of India, is

called as ‘heart and soul of the constitution’. If a legislation is put inside 9 th

schedule thereby shielding it from the infringement of Fundamental Rights, it

indirectly impinges upon Article 32 of the Constitution, and bars aggrieved to

claim remedy from the court when the legislation violates Fundamental Rights.

For this reason, the 22nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1969 is not valid, as

what is left after this amendment is not ‘the Constitution of India’; it indirectly

repeals ‘the heart and soul of the constitution’, thereby crossing the implied

limitation.
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1.2.13. It is humbly submitted that Fundamental Rights are not merely personal rights,

but have a larger social content; the conferment of fundamental rights on

individuals promotes the social and political objectives of the Constitution,

including unity of India. Hence, amending Fundamental Rights is in no way less

than Amending ‘The Constitution’.

1.2.14. The provisions of Chapter III carry out objectives of the Constitution not only

as embodied in the Preamble. These provisions are inseparable from the

Constitution and if amended, the remaining part and left out part will not be ‘a

Constitution’.

1.2.15. If it is accepted that, constituent power is independent and above the

Constitution itself because it operates on the Constitution and can displace it

with, so to say, one stroke of its exercise, it would make it unnecessary to have a

constitution beyond one consisting of a single sentence laying down that every

kind of power is vested in the constituent bodies, which may, by means of a

single consolidated order or declaration of law.

1.2.16. It is humbly submitted that, the amending power could not be unlimited, for if

it were unlimited, the amending power itself could be deleted and the

Constitution made unamendable which would defeat the very object of claiming

an unlimited amending power.

1.2.17. Hence, it can be submitted that in a detailed Constitution like ours, the

assumption that there is no scope for reading implied limitations on powers

conferred by the Constitution to amend it, is not supported by examination of its

provisions.

1.2.18. Similarly, there is not any existent theory which supports that the amending

power is needed to alter the fundamentals of the Constitution. The actual

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working of the US, the Canadian and the Australian Constitution and

amendments brought into them clearly show that there has not been any attempt

to bring any ‘fundamental’ change in their constitutions.

1.2.19. In USA, the first 10 amendments, as is well known, are treated as part of the

Constitution. The separation between the judiciary, the legislature and the

executive is maintained; and the presidential form of government has remained

intact. In Australia and Canada, the actual exercise of the amending power by

free democratic governments of these sovereign states has not taken the form of

altering the fundamentals of their Constitutions. None of the Amendments have

altered the basic structure, or basic feature of the Canadian or the Australian

Constitution. If Constitutions enacted in 1787, 1867 and 1900 respectively have

survived up to date without needing the amending power for altering the

fundamentals of those Constitutions, it would be arguing against long experience

to say that the amending power is needed to alter the fundamentals of Indian

Constitution.

1.2.20. Also, it is humbly submitted that, as in I.C. Golaknath, Supreme Court though

opined that Fundamental Rights cannot be infringed through Constitutional

Amendments, but it did not provided relief by strucking down the impugned

amendments therein, applying the doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’. It is

humbly submitted that this had been done, as J. Hidayatullah mentions that,

“The fundamental rights are outside the amendatory process if the amendment

seeks to abridge or take away any of the rights. The first, the Fourth and the

Seventh Amendment Acts being part of the Constitution by ‘acquiescence’ for a

long time cannot be challenged.”

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1.2.21. In the instant case, there is no delay in filing petition seeking challenge of the

22nd Constitutional Amendment, 1969, through which it can be inferred that they

have become part of the Constitution by ‘acquiescence’ for a long time. Hence,

Doctrine of Prospective Overruling cannot be applicable in this case, and if the

court opines that Fundamental Rights cannot be amended through Constitutional

Amendment then 22nd Constitutional Amendment Act has to be struck down.

2. WHETHER THE BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA (SOCIAL JUSTICE) ACT, 1969
IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
2.1. THAT THE ACT PASSED BY THE PARLIAMENT IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF LEGISLATIVE

COMPETENCY OF THE PARLIAMENT.

2.1.1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the crux, the pivotal

point, of a federal constitution is the division of power and functions between the

Centre and the regions. The distribution of legislative powers between the Centre

and the regions is the most important characteristics of a federal constitution.

The whole structure of the federal system continues to revolve around this

central point.8

2.1.2. Article 246(3) confers an exclusive power on the States to make laws with

respect to the matters enumerated in the State List (List 2 in the Seventh

Schedule). These are matters, which admit of local variations and, from an

administrative point of view, are best handled at the State level and, therefore,

the Centre is debarred from legislating with respect to these matters. Article

246(3) opens with the words: “Subject to clauses (1) and (2).”

2.1.3. Thus, if a particular matter falls within the exclusive competence of the States,

i.e. List II, that represents the prohibited field for the Centre.

8
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 8th ed.
- ARGUMENTS ADVANCED- 10

2.1.4. Entry 33 of the List II of the Seventh Schedule gives the power to the States to

legislate on the matters of: Theatres, and dramatic performances: cinemas

subject to the provisions of entry 60 of the List I; sports, entertainment and

amusements.

2.1.5. It is the humble submission that an important principle to interpret the entries

is that none of them should be read in a narrow, pedantic sense; that the ‘widest

possible’ and ‘most liberal’ construction be put on each entry, and that each

general word in an entry should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary

matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.9

2.1.6. It is humbly stated that the “entries are to be regarded as enumeratio simplex

of broad categories” and the “power to legislate on a topic of legislation carries

with it the power to legislate on an ancillary matter which can be said to be

reasonably included in the powers given.”10

2.1.7. It is respectfully stated that when a legislation enumerated in one list is also

touching upon a subject in the other list the court applies the rule of pith and

substance. This rule envisages that the legislation as a whole be examined to

ascertain its ‘true nature and character’ in order to determine to what entry in

which list it relates.

2.1.8. It is therefore submitted that the enumeration of the subject sports in the Entry

33 of the State List empowers States to legislate on the matters of the sports.

Furthermore, the States are empowered to legislate on the ancillary matters

related to the subject and which can be reasonably included under the subject.

9 Hans Muller v Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, AIR 1955 SC 367.

10 State of Rajasthan v Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544.

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2.1.9. The Centre thus is making rules for reservation of spots for the players of

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes categories in cricket team of India

exceeded the limits of power conferred on it by the entries of the Seventh

Schedule.

2.1.10. It is therefore submitted that the Board of Cricket Control in India (Social

Justice) Act, 1969 is void ab initio for the want of legislative competence of the

parliament.

2.2. THAT THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 14 HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED WHEN SPECIAL

PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN ENACTED.

2.2.1. It is humbly submitted that article 14 of the Constitution of India is a General

Non-Discriminatory Clause, ensuring Equal Protection of Law and Equality

before Law to all the persons.

2.2.2. While interpreting Article 14, Justice S.K. Das, of the Supreme Court has held

in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar11 “that, Article 14 does not

insist that every piece of legislation must have universal application and it does

not take away from the State the power to classify persons for the purposes of

legislation, but the classification must be rational, and in order to satisfy this test

(i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which

distinguished those that are grouped together from others, and (ii) that

differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by

the Act.”

11 AIR 1952 SC 75.

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2.2.3. It is humbly submitted before the Court that the situation of the Indian Cricket

team is very bad and as per the statement of the Prime Minister herself it “is in

shambles.”

2.2.4. The recent trips of the team to Australia had been humiliating and the team

lost badly in the matches their and the performance of the team was widely

criticized.

2.2.5. In such a situation, even if we consider the situation that the Centre was

concerned about the team and it wanted to see the team performing better in the

coming days, the appropriate measure would have been to reform through the

various changes the performance of the team.

2.2.6. It is respectfully submitted that in a situation that is so bad to have become a

humiliation for the nation, there was no compelling need to have spots reserved

for the SC and ST players.

2.2.7. In such a situation it is highly undesirable that there should be an inclusion of

SC and ST players in the team by compelling the Board, its head and the team

captain to compulsorily induct players of these categories into the team, whether

or not they are competent to play with the team.

2.2.8. It is stated that the report that the Prime Minister sought from the BCCI

showed that the team had a meager representation of the “depressed classes” of

citizen in the team. The Centre acting on the report sough to include players of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the team.

2.2.9. The term as wide as “depressed classes” cannot be construed in a very narrow

sense to include only the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Such an

approach is neither reasonable nor desirable for the purpose for which such

changes are to be introduced.

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2.2.10. Furthermore, it is submitted on the behalf of the petitioners that a term like

“depressed classes” cannot be determined in a very concrete term. For example,

a group of people may be depressed in some kind of social setup. But, at the

same time the same group, geographically situated at a different location in some

other social setting may not be depressed as such.

2.2.11. Hence, such a definition of “depressed classes” cannot be adopted and applied

over the entire nation, if for a moment we consider that the Parliament is

empowered to legislate on the subject, and such a classification is unreasonable.

2.2.12. It was the purpose of the Prime Minister to provide “adequate representation”

to ameliorate “the lot” of the weaker sections.

2.2.13. It is stated that providing two or four people the benefits of such legislation

cannot be considered to be an adequate measure to provide “adequate

representation.”

2.2.14. Similar provisions regarding reservation of posts for the depressed classes

should have been and could have been made if the actual aim of the Government

was to work for the betterment of the community.

2.2.15. Again, why such a provision has been created for cricket only? Similar

provisions could have been enacted for the players in other sports too. That

would have been an appropriate measure for the purpose that Government

intended to achieve.

2.2.16. The petitioner humbly submits that such legislation runs contrary to the

fundamental assumptions that have been entrenched in Article 14 and deserves

to be struck down for being in contravention to the Article.

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2.3. THAT THE VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 15(1) ENSUES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE PREVIOUS

VIOLATIONS.

2.3.1. It is humbly submitted that Article 15(1) is a ‘special’ non-discriminatory

clause which operates within bars discrimination based exclusively on the

prohibitions mentioned in the provision. Such prohibitions include

discrimination based on grounds ‘only’ of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth

or any of them.

2.3.2. Here, in the instant case, the object of the enactment as set out in the letter by

Prime minister, mentions the objective as providing ‘special provisions’ for

giving representation to people belonging to ‘depressed classes’ in the Cricket

Team. But what the enactment does is, give the people only belonging to SC or

ST categories, reservation in the cricket team.

2.3.3. If the enactment had been based on some criteria which had defined depressed

classes, then it could have been said that the reservation provision is not

discriminating persons on the basis of caste. But, the provisions of the Act, only

gives such benefit to persons of SC and ST, thereby creating discrimination

based on caste, which is prohibited by art. 15(1) of the Constitution.

2.3.4. It is humbly submitted that though art. 15(4) permits the state to make special

provisions for benefit of persons belonging to SCs and STs, it must be

understood that in what context the amendment inserting article 15(4) was

brought about in the first place.

2.3.5. The object of the amendment was to override the Supreme Court judgment in

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan 12, where it was held that the

Constitution did not consider it necessary to protect the interests of the backward

12 State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226.

- ARGUMENTS ADVANCED- 15

classes or weaker sections of the community in the matter of admission into

educational institutions.

2.3.6. It is humbly submitted that, providing reservation to only 2 people from SC

and ST in National Cricket Team is not going to protect interests of the

backward classes, as it would have done substantial social justice in the case of

creating an enactment providing ‘many of them’ reservation in the ‘educational

institutes’. Hence, Article 15(4) cannot be taken aid of for saving the enactment,

as there is ‘no advancement’ of persons belonging to SCs and STs by providing

them with reservation in Cricket team, as it would have done in case of

providing them reservation in ‘educational institute’.

2.3.7. It is humbly submitted that, the impugned act only provides reservation in

cricket team, not in any other sports. As the Cricket is one of the most popular

sports in the Country, reservation in such a game, can help ‘politically’ but not in

providing ‘social justice’.

2.3.8. Hence, for the submissions made hereinbefore, article 15(4) cannot be taken

resort of, for saving the impugned Act, i.e. BCCI (Social Justice) Act, 1969.
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED, REASONS

GIVEN AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO:

I. HOLD THAT THE CONSTITUTION (22ND AMENDMENT) ACT, 1969 IS

INVALID.

II. HOLD THAT THERE ARE IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON THE POWERS OF

PARLIAMENT TO AMENT THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF

PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING CANNOT BE APPLICABLE.

III. HOLD THAT THE BOARD OF CRICKET CONTROL IN INDIA (SOCIAL

JUSTICE) ACT, 1969 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID.

AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO GRANT IN THE

INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE, ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED.

Sd/-

COUNSELS FOR THE PETITIONERS