Thales Presentation 2013 Rev - (Compatibility Mode)

www.thalesgroup.
com
CRJ700/900/1000
Specialized Training Session
2013
Spoiler/Stab Control System
2 / Table of Contents
 Thales Shipset
 High Level System Overview
 Built-In Test Equipment System (BITE)
 Initiated Built-In Test (IBIT)
 Troubleshooting and Resolving Common System Faults
 Troubleshooting Matrix
 HSTA 2000 Hour Oil Check/Purge Tasks
 HSTA 4500 Hour Torque Limiter Check
 HSTA Shipping
 Abbreviations
 Appendix A – CAS Messages
 Appendix B – CPOST/SPOST Details
 Appendix C – Maintenance Diagnostics Computer (MDC) Overview
Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

3 / Thales Shipset on CRJ700/900/1000
CRJ 700 /900 /1000

SYSTEM P/N CRJ SHORT P/N DESIGNATION QTY/A/C
C13045BAO5 CRJ700/900
SSCU SPOILER & STAB CONTROL UNIT 2
C13045CA02 CRJ1000
CONTROL SYSTEM
SPOILER & STAB
3C2200A ALL RCIM ROLL CONTROL INPUT MODULE 2

3F2202A ALL FSCL FLIGHT SPOILER CONTROL LEVER 1
51200-11 ALL MFSPCU MULTI-FUNCTION SPOILER PCU 4
51400-1 ALL GSA GROUND SPOILER ACTUATOR 4
51600-9 ALL GSSV GROUND SPOILER SELECTOR VALVU 2
84799066 ALL PSS PROXIMITY SENSOR SWITCH 4
7045-5 ALL MCU MOTOR CONTROL UNIT 1
8489-7 ALL HSTA HORIZONTAL STAB TRIM ACTUATOR 1
C12851CA01 CRJ700/900
SPC STALL PROTECTION COMPUTEER 1
PROTECTION
C12851DA01 ALL
SYSTEM
C16258AA CRJ700/900
STALL
AOA ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSOR 2

C16258AB ALL
501-1770-03 ALL PUSH ACT. STICK PUSHER ACTUATOR 1
501-1771-04 ALL PUSH CAP. STICK PUSHER CAPSTAN 1
3194-1 ALL SHAKER STICK SHAKER 2
C16221AA02 (V1) CRJ700/900
STANDBY
SYSTEM
C16221HA01 (V1) CRJ1000

ISI INTEGRATED STANDBY INSTRUMENT 1
C16221ZA01 (V1) CRJ700/900
C16786CA01 (V2) ALL

4 /
High Level System

Overview

5 / SSCS Main Functions
 The Spoiler Control System performs the following functions:

 Roll Assist
 Proportional Lift Dumping (PLD)
 Ground Lift Dumping (GLD)
 The Horizontal Stabilizer Control System performs the following
functions
 Manual Trim
 Autopilot Trim
 Flap Compensation Trim
 Mach Trim
 The Pitch Feel Control System varies the pitch artificial force
gradient depending on aircraft flight configuration.
 The Rudder Travel Limiter Control System limits the rudder travel
depending on CAS and flap position.

6 / Multifunction Spoilers System Architecture
2 Roll Control Input

Modules (RCIM)
1 Flight Spoiler
Control
Lever (FSCL)
Cockpit PBA ’s
and roll 2 Spoiler and Stabilizer
disconnect switch Control Units

7 / Multifunction Spoilers System Architecture
4 MFS PCU

8 / Ground Spoilers System Architecture
2 Throttle
Quadrant
Assemblies
1 GLD panel with a 3- Radio Altitude, WOW (PSEU),

position toggle switch. Wheels Speed (ASCU)

9 / Ground Spoilers System Architecture
4 Ground Spoiler
Proximity Switch
2 Ground Spoiler 4 Ground Spoilers

Selector Valve Actuators

10 / Horizontal Stabilizer Trim System Architecture
2 UP/DOWN Trim Switches

2 Stab Trim Engagement 2 Stab Trim Disconnect Switches
Switches
Airspeed (ADC)
1 Mach Trim Engagement Flap Position (SFECU)
Switch

11 / Horizontal Stabilizer Trim System Architecture
2 Dual Resolvers
2 HSTA Motors
1 Motor Control Unit

Dual similar channels

12 / Pitch Feel Control System Architecture
2 Pitch Feel Simulator
2 Pitch Feel Actuators
2 Spoiler & Stabilizer

Control Units (SSCU’s)

13 / Rudder Travel Limiter System Architecture
1 Rudder Travel Limiter
2 Rudder Travel Limiter

Actuators
2 Spoiler & Stabilizer

Control Units (SSCU’s)

14 /
Built-In Test
Equipment (BITE)

15 / BITE Overview
SSCS BIT Functions
OPERATIONAL BIT MAINTENANCE BIT
EICAS MDC
(display on (display on
EICAS Primary and left or right
Secondary displays) Multi-Function Display)

16 / BITE Overview

17 / BITE Overview
Operational BIT detects failures as they occur and reveals

dormant failures. Fault detection is implemented by the
following functions in the software:
 Computer Power On Self Test (CPOST) – Checks
computer integrity
 System Power On Self Test (SPOST) – Checks system
integrity. Divided into two parts:
 SPOST 1 – Checks only pitch feel actuator (no need for
hydraulics)
 SPOST 2 – Checks HSTA, ground spoilers, multi-function
spoilers, and rudder travel limiter.
 Continuous Built In Test (CBIT) – Checks continued

operation.

18 / BITE Overview
Maintenance BIT
 Communicates with the MDC which is the centralized
maintenance system for the aircraft.
 Maintenance personnel can access MDT data when the
aircraft is stopped on the ground. The MDT display and
interface is through the Multi-Function Displays (MFD’s) and
control panel.
The System BITE does the following:

 Collects the faults detected by the monitoring performed in
the operational BIT (CPOST, SPOST, and CBIT)
 Identifies the origin of the event at the LRU level.

19 / SPOST1 Automatic Activation
SPOST1 is automatically run under the following conditions :
 At power up
 Weight on wheels (PSEU)
 CAS 1 and CAS 2 valid and < 60 knots

20 / CPOST/SPOST1
SSCM A CPOST SPOST1

Operational Mode SPOST2 – See details Operational Mode
CPOST SPOST1
SSCM B
TESTS Second PF activation – 6 sec.

Flashprom ADC
RAM Fan FSCL – 2.6 sec.
SSCM A ARINC RAM
ARINC E2PROM
COM-MON Synchro
Watchdog RCIM – 2.45 sec.
Software segregation SSCM Validity
Pin Prog Switches interface TQA – 900 msec.
TESTS First PF activation – 14 sec.

Flashprom ADC
RAM Fan FSCL – 2.6 sec.
SSCM B Watchdog
Pin Prog
SSCM Validity
COMA2 RCIM – 2.45 sec.
Switches interface
COM-MON Synchro TQA – 900 msec.
Software segregation
Switches – 450 msec.
Power-Up 18 sec. 36 sec. 44 sec.( typically – can

0 sec. be as long as 75 sec.)
SSCU1 and SSCU2 can be powered separately and perform CPOST and
SPOST1 individually up to a certain degree (see NOTES on next page).

NOTES:
 Each SSCM performs its CPOST on ground, upon each power
up
 Each SSCM calculates the ground conditions based only on its
own acquisition of both valid ADCs and its valid PSEU channel
 Each SSCM automatically enters SPOST 1 after successful
CPOST
 There is no other way to enter SPOST 1 in any SSCM
 Both SSCU perform their SPOST 1 in parallel & independently
 Within 1 SSCU, the 2 SSCMs run their tests in turn, according to
a predefined priority logic
 Within a SSCM, the SPOST 1 is completed when all SPOST
tests are completed
 Not all SSCMs complete their SPOST 1 at the same time
 To avoid conflicts between SPOST 1 and application, all the
SSCMs leave SPOST 1 and enter operational mode
simultaneously

While on ground, if an SSCM is powered up late in respect to the

other SSCMs, it performs CPOST
 However, whether or not it performs SPOST 1 depends on the
moment the power up occurs
There are two situations:

 # 1: The concerned SSCM still has time to complete its
CPOST and SPOST 1 within 60 sec. from the moment the first
SSCM started its SPOST 1
 Inthis case, it performs SPOST 1, which ends simultaneously in all
SSCMs
 This allows a late power up delay between the first and last SSCM
of about 30 to 45 seconds (respectively for module A or B powered
last)

 # 2: The concerned SSCU does not have time to complete

its CPOST and SPOST 1 within 60 sec. from the moment
the first SSCM started its SPOST 1
 In this case, it does not performs SPOST 1, increments its
“SPOST not run counter” and enters operational mode
directly after CPOST
In any case, SPOST 1 is aborted if a SSCM is in SPOST 1

for 75 sec.
 It is therefore not possible to have a 30 to 45 seconds
delay between the power up of each of the four SSCM

24 / SPOST2
SPOST2 can only be entered by a single SSCM (1A, 1B, 2A, 2B) but can only be completed (to reset
the flight counter and “SPOST NOT RUN” counter) when all four SSCM’s complete SPOST2.
SSCM A CPOST SPOST1

Operational Mode SPOST2 – See details Operational Mode
SSCM B CPOST SPOST1
15 sec.
13 sec. HST
ACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE SSCM 1A
6.5 sec. GS Waiting
for HST INACTIVE ACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE SSCM 1B
5.2 sec. MFS to finish
INACTIVE INACTIVE ACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE SSCM 2A
INACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE ACTIVE INACTIVE SSCM 2B

No control over
HST, MFS, and GS SPOST for RTL. The four SSCM’s exchange control of RTL actuators during this period.
76 sec.
RTL actuators activation in SPOST2:
1A+2A --- 1A+2A --- 1A-(1B) --- 1A-((1B)) --- 2A-(2B) --- 1A-((1B)) --- 2A-((2B))
Legend
+ = Simultaneous activation on SSCM’s
( ) = Test reduced if successful on SSCM A
(( )) = Test not performed if successful on SSCM A

25 / SPOST2 Activation
Each SSCM enters SPOST 2 from operational mode, when

the following conditions are met:
 The aircraft is on ground
 SPOST1 has been performed
 SPOST1 conditions met
 Weight on wheels (PSEU)
 CAS 1 and CAS 2 < 60 knots (ADC1 and ADC2 both valid)
 SPOST1 does not have to be successful
 Both HST channels (STAB1 & 2) are engaged

 All three aircraft Hydraulic systems are at high pressure
(>2400PSI)
 SPOST 2 has been armed (manually or automatically)
 Automatic SPOST2 at power up only after the AC completes 50
flight cycles
AC Flight Counter Logic

 A flight counter is used to determine when SPOST2 will run
 The counter decreases based on take-off and landing detection
 It counts down the number of flights (from 50 to 0) before SPOST2
initiates automatically
 The logic for the counter is:
 At least one throttle in TOGA for a min of 15 seconds AND
 Aircraft is in flight (CAS > 100 kts and weight off wheels) AND
 Aircraft has landed (CAS < 60 kts and weight on wheels)

27 / SPOST2 Counter
The SPOST2 counter can be accessed through the MDC on the SSCU
primary IBIT page. The counter displayed is only for the SSCU under
IBIT.
SPOST 2 Counter
The counter is reset to 50 FC following a successful SPOST2

(automatic or manually armed).

28 / SPOST2 Manual Activation
To initiate SPOST2 manually:

 STAB TRIM DISC switch AND MACH TRIM pushbutton pressed
for 5 seconds
 SPLR/STAB IN TEST Advisory message will flash several times (for
approx 4 sec) indicating SPOST2 has been armed
 A/C must be under the same conditions required by the

automatic activation

29 / Running SPOST2
SPOST2 should not be run any more frequently than the established
Routine/Service Check (30-40 FH) or automatically on power-up
following 50 AC cycles.
In general, SPOST2 should only be run under the following

conditions:
 If a fault is detected during SPOST2 testing (RTL, HSTA, or spoilers),
it is necessary to carry out a successful SPOST2 in order to clear the
fault.
 Following an SSCU or associated system LRU replacement. This is
normal practice for a Return to Service action per the AMM.
 At or before each 50th AC cycle. Recommended to be accomplished
during a Routine or Service Check (30-40 FH).
 SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT EICAS messages and SPOST2
NOT RUN MDC message. (SPOST2 has been interrupted one time.)
Aerospace
30 / SPOST2 Notes
 The 4 SSCMs in the 2 SSCUs will perform SPOST2 - GS, MFS,

and HST, according to a predefined priority logic
 A separate logic is used to drive the SSCMs in/out of the RTL test
 Within a SSCM, SPOST 2 is completed when all SPOST 2 tests
are completed
 Not all SSCMs complete their SPOST 2 at the same time
 However, to avoid conflicts between SPOST 2 and application, all
the SSCMs leave SPOST 2 and re-enter operational mode
simultaneously
While on ground, if an SSCM is re-powered while the other
SSCMs are in SPOST 2, it performs CPOST
However, whether or not it performs SPOST 1 depends on the
moment the power up occurs

31 / SPOST2 Notes
SPOST 2 will never be performed on the re-powered SSCM
There are two situations:

 No.1: The concerned SSCM still has time to complete its CPOST and
SPOST 1 within 120 sec. from the moment the other SSCMs started
their SPOST 2
 In this case, it performs SPOST 1, and then enters the
operational mode and forces the other SSCMs to abort SPOST 2
 The other SSCMs increment their “SPOST not run” counter
 No. 2: The concerned SSCU does not have time to complete its
CPOST and/or SPOST 1 within 120 sec. from the moment the first
SSCM started its SPOST 2
 In this case, it does not performs SPOST 1, increments its
“SPOST not run counter” and enters operational mode directly
after CPOST

32 / SPOST2 Notes
 If SSCU1 and SSCU2 have different SPOST counter values the SSCU
with the lowest counter value will cause both SSCU’s to run SPOST2 at the
next power-up after that SSCU reaches “0” flights
 A successful SPOST1 and SPOST2 will reset both SSCU SPOST2

counters to “50” flights remaining before the next SPOST2
 An interruption in SPOST2 will not result in a reset of the counter
 SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT EICAS messages and a

CPOST/SPOST 1 NOT RUN MDC message are posted when SPOST1 has
been interrupted five times in a row

33 / SPOST2 Notes
 SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT EICAS messages and a SPOST2

NOT RUN MDC message are posted when SPOST2 has been interrupted
one time
 NOTE: If SPOST2 is not run during a routine maintenance interval and
the FC counter reaches “0”, SPOST2 will run automatically when all
the conditions are met
 If the crew interrupts SPOST2 for any reason (interrupting Hydraulics,
Stab Disengage), these messages will post
If SPOST2 (during automatic execution) is interrupted for any reason,

SPOST2 will re-start at the next power-up
 SPOST2 is not performed at the next power-up if it is interrupted after

being armed manually

34 / SPOST2 Notes
 IMPORTANT – If a fault occurs during SPOST1 or normal operation,

there is no need to perform SPOST2 in an attempt to clear the fault
 If the fault remains following SPOST1, the proper fault isolation

should be carried out
 Should a fault occur during SPOST2, SPOST2 is required to clear that

specific fault
 SSCU’s are shipped from repair with “0” flights
 SPOST2 is run automatically at the first power-up after an SSCU is

replaced
CONFIDENTIAL – This document contains trade secrets, financial, commercial, scientific,

technical or other confidential information, the further disclosure of which will result in
material financial harm to and/or prejudice to Bombardier Inc.BOMBARDIER AEROSPACE
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
35 / SPOST2 Notes
 Actions to avoid that may interrupt or fail SPOST2
 Shutting off or interrupting one of the hydraulic systems
 Disengaging STAB TRIM
 Pushing against the rudder pedals may result in a RUD LIMIT FAULT
Status or RUD LIMIT Caution (fail)
 Operators are reminded that SPOST2 should not be run any more
frequently than the established Routine/Service Check (30-40 FH) or
automatically on power-up following 50 AC cycles

36 / General SPOST Notes
NOTES
1. If SSCU1 and SSCU2 have different SPOST counter values, the SSCU with the
lowest counter value will cause both SSCU’s to run SPOST2 at the next power-
up upon reaching “0” flights.
Note:A successful SPOST1 and SPOST2 will reset both SSCU SPOST2 counters to
“50” flights remaining before the next SPOST2.
2. An interruption in SPOST2 will not result in a reset of the counter
3. SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT EICAS messages and a CPOST/SPOST
NOT RUN MDC message are posted when SPOST1 has been interrupted five.
4. SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT EICAS messages and a SPOST2 NOT
RUN MDC message are posted when SPOST2 has been interrupted one time.
NOTE: If SPOST2 is not run during a routine maintenance interval and the FC
counter reaches “0”, SPOST2 will run automatically when all the conditions are
met. If the crew interrupts SPOST2 for any reason (moving control wheel, etc.),
these messages will post.

37 / General SPOST Notes
NOTES
5. If SPOST2 (during automatic execution) is interrupted for any reason, SPOST2
will re-start following the next power-up. SPOST2 is not performed at the next
power-up if it is interrupted after being armed manually.
6. IMPORTANT – If a fault occurs during SPOST1 or normal operation, there is no
need to perform SPOST2 in an attempt to clear the fault. If the fault remains
after performing SPOST1 again, the proper fault isolation should be carried out.
Should a fault occur during SPOST2, a successful SPOST2 is require to clear
the fault.
7. SPOST2 is run automatically at the first power-up after an SSCU is replaced
(SSCU’s are shipped from repair with “0” flights). In this case, SPOST2 cannot
be manually activated until the SSCU power is cycled. SPOST2 will only run
once per power cycle.
8. While troubleshooting, if you swap the SSCU’s, you will need to reset power and
run SPOST2. This ensures that the faults clear on the original suspect unit.
Aerospace
38 /
Initiated Built-In Test

(IBIT)

39 / Initiated Built-In Test (IBIT)
 IBIT provides a means to perform the following:
 Assistance in performing fault isolation by displaying the

position, state or value of system equipment interfaces:
● All system switches (active/not active)
● Position of the system sensors/transducers
● Status of SSCU inputs from other systems
 Assistance for HSTA Torque Limiter and Brake Check
 Assistance for rigging of the RTL and PF actuators
Note: The SSCU being used for IBIT will be in a maintenance state
while the other remains active.
 See next slides for examples of IBIT displays.

Add a bullet noting the state of the SSCU during the test (maintenance mode) while the other SSCU remains active.
* Add a note dedicated to RTL … Refer to RIL # 1112A (Francisco to provide a slide)
40 / IBIT MDC Displays
SSCU Primary Page SSCU Parameters Page

Spoiler Sensor Status Page Stab Sensor Status Page

Avionics Input Status Pages 1 and 2

Avionics Input Status Page 3 Spoiler Switch Status Page

Stab Switch Status Page Horizontal Stab Test Page

Rudder Limiter Actuator Pitch Feel Actuator

Rigging Page Rigging Page

46 /
Troubleshooting and
Resolving Common
System Faults

47 / Frequent Drivers
EICAS Major Drivers FIX

Message
SSCU 1 Fault or  SSCU FAN Failure New Fan
SSCU 2 Fault Refer to Thales VSB C13045B-27-010 or
Computer Validity loss at Power-up Internal
fault
Refer to Bombardier SL-27-078
SSCU 1 Fault  SPOST Interruption Reset
and SSCU 2
Fault
RUD LIMIT Fault  Noisy Potentiometer in RTL Actuator RTLA H/W
 Marginal rigging of RTL RVDT

PITCH FEEL  Potentiometer issue PFA H/W
Fault/Caution
 Actuator contamination (glycol –
primarily in winter)
IB/OB FLT SPLR  Wear issue with MFS PCU H/W Rework
or SPOILERON Refer to Goodrich VSB 51200-27-35
Caution

48 / ATA 27-60 SSCU
 EICAS Message: SSCU 1 (2) FAULT

 MDC Message: SSCU x FAN x FAILED
 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 – 27-61-05-810-828
 SSCU2 – 27-61-06-810-829
 NOTE: This message is fully dispatchable under current MMEL
In the case of two fan failures, all possible messages for that SSCU will
be posted

49 / ATA 27-60 SSCU
 EICAS Message: SSCU 1 FAULT or SSCU 2 FAULT

 MDC Message: INTERNAL FAULT CH A (or B)
 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 CH A – 27-61-05-810-806
 SSCU1 CH B – 27-61-05-810-807
 SSCU2 CH A – 27-61-06-810-806
 SSCU2 CH A – 27-61-06-810-807
NOTE: This message is fully dispatchable under current MMEL.

See Bombardier SL 27-078

50 / SSCS Fault EICAS MESSAGE
 SSCU FAULT EICAS Message – SL 27-078

 The SSCU 1(2) FAULT EICAS status message generally indicates that one of
the two SSCU channels detected an internal fault. Although this fault is fully
dispatchable under current MMEL 27-65-02, the fault is in most cases
associated with one of the following temporary fault conditions in the system
and it is typically resettable on ground:
 SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT posted simultaneously, associated with

the SPOST2 NOT RUN or CPOST/SPOST1 NOT RUN fault message in the
MDC. Both SSCU 1 FAULT and SSCU 2 FAULT EICAS status messages posted
simultaneously usually indicates that one of the System Power-On Self Tests
– CPOST/SPOST 1 or SPOST 2 – was not properly completed.
 SSCU 1 FAULT or SSCU 2 FAULT status message associated with the

INTERNAL FAULT CH A (or B) fault message in the MDC, SSCU modules are
susceptible to temporary upsets during the power-up sequence, resulting in a
SSCU 1 FAULT or SSCU 2 FAULT message on the EICAS associated with an
INTERNAL FAULT CH A (or B) fault message logged on the MDC. These
temporary upsets statistically happen less than 1% of all SSCU power-ups
and they are typically resettable on ground.
Aerospace
51 / SSCU – Installation in AC
Improper insertion has been identified as a possible contributor for SSCU

internal fault messages.
 Proper SSCU insertion process
 Reference AMM TASK 27−61−05−400−801 currently under revision process
 SSCU tray torque screws alone will not ensure proper LRU insertions.
 Breaking torque value is not sufficient to push the LRU into the ARINC 600
connector for proper electrical connection
 Proposed method of insertion

 Put the SSCU(1) in position
 Push the SSCU fully into the mounting
tray(3) to engage the electrical connectors
into receptacles(5)
 Tighten the locking screws(2)
 Firmly push the SSCU into receptacles
 Tighten locking screws again

52 / SSCU – Installation in AC
Improper mounting or lubrication has been identified as a possible contributor for

SSCU internal fault messages.
 Inspection and Lubrication of the Electrical Connector Seals
 Reference AMM TASK 27−61−05−400−801.
 Each of the four connectors in the ARINC 600 mounting rack for the SSCU
has a rubber seal.
The installation instructions in the AMM

state:
●Carefully,apply a layer of valve lubricant on all

the seals of the electrical connectors of the
mounting tray.
●Make sure that there is no valve lubricant or

other contamination on the electrical connector.

53 / ATA 27-25 Rudder Travel Limiter

 EICAS Message: RUD LIMIT FAULT

 MDC Message: POSITION OR RIGGING ERROR
 FIM Reference
 RTLA 1 – 27-25-03-810-805
 RTLA 2 – 27-25-03-810-809
 Probable Cause
 Marginal rigging of the RTLA RVDT’s or RTL eccentric washer adjustment
 Degraded RTL actuator
Degraded No. 1 RTLA harness
 Resolution
 If the fault can’t be cleared by replacing the RTLA:
 Verify the rigging of the RTLA RVDT’s and RTL eccentric washer adjustment
as per the AMM.
Inspect the wiring harness for the No. 1 RTLA for breaks in the area where
the shields are joined (about 8 inches from the actuator connector)
 See Bombardier RTLA Modsum IS67027250118
 NOTE: This MDC message is not the result of an internal SSCU fault.
 NOTE: In some cases this fault may be resettable with SPOST 2.

 MDC Message: POSITION OR RIGGING ERROR
 Definition: The RTLA internal Potentiometer is inconsistent with the RTL
mechanism RVDT position
Example of bent RVDT shaft resulting in Position/Rigging Error
Bent shaft induced by

Maintenance on the
RTL Mechanism

56 / Removal & Installation of the Rudder Travel Limiter Actuators
 Use the MDC to place the RTL actuator in neutral position to insert the rigging pin
 While in SET RUD LIMITER CH1(2) POS page, open and tag the Circuit Breaker
of RTL actuator 1(2)
 Rigging pin to be installed in the location shown on illustration.


 MDC Message: MOTOR – NO RESPONSE TO COMMAND
 FIM Reference
 RTLA 1 – 27-25-03-810-802
 RTLA 2 – 27-25-03-810-806
 Probable Cause
 Rudder pedals inadvertently pushed during SPOST2
 Degraded RTL actuator
 Resolution
Replace RTLA
 NOTE: This MDC message is not the result of an internal SSCU fault.
 RTL Faults are a high driver for SSCU removals and high NFF rate


 MDC Messages: SSCU FAILED – CHX/ RTLA MOTOR
CONTROL
 Definition: A fault was detected by only ONE module of a given SSCU
(Speed, Direction, Enable)
 Probable Cause
 The fault is likely due to a very fast minor glitch in the actuator
performance (typically potentiometer related)
 The SSCU will report this non-specific MDC message. It cannot determine
if it is at fault or the other module is at fault (because the other module did
not latch the fault)
 For fault isolation purposes:
 Remove the power from the SSCU module that is not reporting
the fault
 If the fault repeats, the message will change to a specific fault
(Pot out of range, Position error, etc..)
 The fault will be associated with the RTLA of the reporting SSCU


 MDC Message: ISI/ADC DISAGREE
Definition: The ISI airspeed does not agree with both ADC’s
Above 60kts airspeed and >20kts delta
The SSCU uses the ISI as back up for Mach information for the RTL control
 Probable Cause
 Water accumulation in the Standby P3 System drain.
 If the visible drain is full, water may accumulate in the line, blocking the ISI
connection.
 Resolution
 Inspect the P3 system for water accumulation and drain as required.
 Operators are encouraged to establish an appropriate P3 drain inspection
interval, depending on their operating environment.
 NOTE: This is applicable to visual drain assemblies PN 50034-001
(earlier version) and 50036-002 (new).
Aerospace

 MDC Message: VARIOUS
 Probable Cause
 In many cases the RUD LIMIT FAULT message is posted with other EICAS
messages related to the ADC, IOC bus fault, SFECU, or ISI system.
 Resolution
 Use the MDC current faults page to determine if this fault is “system
internal” or if it is related to one of the system inputs.
 If the fault is not related to the rudder limiter system or the SSCU, the
appropriate FIM procedure should be used for fault isolation.
Aerospace
61 / ATA 27-42 Horizontal Stabilizer Control System
 EICAS Message: AP PITCH TRIM (C)

Definition: The SSCU has detected a delta between one motor
speed resolver and the other motor speed resolver
The SSCU compares the velocity feedback from the active motor
with that of the stand-by motor
 The Standby motor is back driven by the torque summing gearing between
the two motors
Each SSCU/MCU channel controls & monitors 1 motor

 The velocity feedback from the stand-by motor is therefore
provided by the opposite MCU channel through the cross-talk
databus of the opposite SSCU

 EICAS Message: AP PITCH TRIM (C) (cont’d)
 The Torque Limiter monitor is not designed to FAIL the trim

system, rather to inhibit the stabilizer response to Autopilot trim
commands
When discrepancy is detected in the active SSCM, the Autopilot

will declare a trim failure (AP PITCH TRIM)
 The Flight Crew will then revert to manual trim
 Flap deployment compensation remains fully available
In manual trim or flap compensation (high speed trim), the torque
limiter monitor will become active


 MDC Message: HSTAB ACT POSITION SPEED DISAGREE
 Probable Cause
 At least one of the SSCM’s has detected a disagreement between commanded
input and resulting HSTA movement.
 This message may be caused by a backlash effect in the gear train where the
difference in time between the motor rotation and the position change is longer
than the allowable delay.
 HSTA actuator jam and/or a torque limiter fault is monitored by the autopilot at
low speed trim command. When the AP PITCH TRIM caution message is posted,
the pilot is instructed to disconnect the autopilot, manually trim the STAB, and
then re-engage the autopilot - as referenced in the FCOM.
 For the ground crew, this can help to confirm the jam or torque limiter fault at
low speed or high speed command. If the system operates normally at high
speed command (manual input) and the fault could not be duplicated at low
speed, this message is to be considered a nuisance.


 MDC Message: HSTAB ACT POSITION SPEED DISAGREE
 Resolution
 In some cases, both modules of an SSCU may eventually detect the fault
(during same flight with manual input).
 In the event a third module (from the other SSCU) detects this type of fault
(during the same power on cycle), the STAB CHANNEL for the SSCU that had
both modules detect the fault will not be able to be re-engaged, even after
performing SPOST1 and 2.
 In order to re-engage the faulted STAB CHANNEL, push the STAB TRIM
DISCONNECT and the STAB CH 1 (or 2) engage switches simultaneously for 5
seconds, then push the STAB CH 1 (or 2) engage switch. This will re-engage
STAB CH 1 (or 2).
 If all four modules detect the fault, the HSTA should be inspected as per AMM
task 05-51-43-220-801-A01 or AMM task 05-51-43-220-802-A01 prior to carrying
out the procedure to clear the latched fault and allow re-engagement.

EICAS Message: AP PITCH TRIM (C) (cont’d)

MDC Message – HSTAB ACT POSITION SPEED DISAGREE
Detected by 1 SSCM – HSTA still controlled
 EICAS – STAB FAULT
 MDC – HSTAB ACT POSITION SPEED DISAGREE
 Detected by 2 SSCM’s – HSTA still controlled
 EICAS – STAB CHx INOP
 Detected by 3 SSCM’s – HSTA still controlled
 EICAS – STAB CHx INOP, STAB FAULT
 SSCU X will prevent re-engagement of STAB CH X until the specific
reset sequence is performed
 Actuator Jam Message
 Detected by 4 SSCM’s (loss of HSTA control)
 EICAS – STAB TRIM (C)
 SSCU1 and SSCU2 will prevent re-engagement of STAB CH 1 and CH 2
until the specific reset sequence is performed

 MDC Message – HSTAB ACT POSITION SPEED DISAGREE
 Resolution (cont.)
 When experiencing recurrent AP PITCH TRIM (C) message, the MCU is to
be suspected first, and then the HSTA Motor, and then the HSTA Position
Sensor.
 MCU Troubleshooting
 Turn the MCU upside down and swap connectors from CH A to CH B
 Confirm that the MCU is adequately grounded (see next slide).
 The MCU performs health monitoring of the HSTA
 Speed, torque limiter faults, jam conditions, motor speed resolver faults,
and over temp conditions.
 The MCU uses a BIT status (discrete output to the SSCU) to identify these
faults:
 Some malfunctions are possible due to MCU faults.
 Wiring for the 4 BIT status signals should also be suspected in cases
where the MCU or motor change does not correct the fault.
 Hydraulic fluid contamination in connectors is a potential root cause.

MCU Troubleshooting
TROUBLE SHOOTING
RECOMMENDATIONS
- Swap channels at MCU level

to isolate failure (for this
purpose turn the MCU upside
down).
- Be sure MCU has a proper Cables

ground. to swap
- If fault remains on same side

after swapping channels, fault is
likely in HSTA Motor.
- If fault changes to opposite

channel, the fault is likely in the
MCU.

68 / ATA 27-61 Ground Spoiler System
 EICAS Message: IB GND SPLR FAULT

 MDC Messages: SSCU x NO ASCUx BUS INPUT
and SSCU x NO PSEUx BUS INPUT
 FIM Reference
 IB – 27-61-01-810-810; OB – 27-61-01-810-812
NOTE: Depending on the MDC message, the IB GND SPLR
FAULT might be resettable by performing the SSCU reset + proper
system at fault reset

 EICAS Message: GLD UNSAFE (C)

 MDC Messages: RAD ALT RANGE FAULT
 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 – 27-61-05-810-831-A01
 SSCU2 – 27-61-06-810-831-A01
 Probable Cause
 The Radio Altimeter is one of three inputs monitored by the SSCU that is
used to determine the aircraft is On-Ground.
 In the event the Radio Altimeter (or one of the two if 2nd Rad Alt is installed)
height is greater than 10 ft, the SSCU will post GLD UNSAFE caution
message.
 This message indicates that while on ground, one of the monitored On-
Ground conditions is not in agreement with the PSEU (WoW), Anti-Skid
Control Unit output (either Wheel Speed Greater than 16 kts), and Computed
Air Speed (less than 60 kts).

 EICAS Message: GLD UNSAFE (C)

 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 – 27-61-05-810-831-A01
 SSCU2 – 27-61-06-810-831-A01
 Probable Cause (cont.)
 GLD UNSAFE may be posted temporarily as a result of the following
conditions:
 One or both of the Rad Alt antennas covered with moisture (typical after
De-icing)
 Taxi over contaminated taxi ways (ice, snow or heavy water)
 Aircraft tail section not over a solid surface (high % Left Rad Alt )
 Equipment in the area of the Rad Alt antennas (i.e. servicing cart)
 Loose Radio Altimeter coax connectors
 Radio Altimeter antenna dirty
 Degraded “coax connector” to “cable” installation.

 EICAS Message: GLD UNSAFE (C) cont.

 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 – 27-61-05-810-831-A01
 SSCU2 – 27-61-06-810-831-A01
 Resolution
 Operators should consider the above conditions prior to declaring the
Radio Altimeter faulty.
 It is useful for the Technician or Flight Crew to observe the Radio Altimeter
height fluctuation as indicated on the PFD during GLD UNSAFE events.
 This condition should not be considered a SSCU or spoiler system fault, but
rather a SSCU external input system fault, especially on ground.
 A Radio Altimeter reset may clear the fault.
See Bombardier SL CRJ700/900/1000-SL-34-013A
 To advise Operators of possible Radio Altimeter (Rad Alt) erroneous
fluctuations while the aircraft is on the ground

72 / ATA 27-61 Spoiler Stabilizer Control System
 EICAS Message: PITCH FEEL FAULT

 MDC Messages: PITCH FEEL FAULT CH A (B)
 FIM Reference
 SSCU 1 – 27-61-05-810-824 and 27-61-05-810-825
 SSCU 2 – 27-61-06-810-824 and 27-61-06-810-825
 Probable Cause
 This fault is considered a generic fault message. The MDC messages
indicate that a fault was detected by one SSCM but not the other. In this
case, the data used to determine the fault will be indicated by diagnostic label
353A (B), bit 11 set to “1”.
 A generic fault is posted in the MDC because the two modules in SSCU 1
(or SSCU 2) cannot determine which module is correct. This includes a
possible internal fault in SSCM A or SSCM A has detected a fault condition for
the control of the PFA, but the other SSCM B did not detect the fault. In this
example, in order to isolate the generic fault to a specific fault, open the CB of
the non-faulty SSCM (not reporting) to revert to a single channel operation
within the reporting SSCU.


 MDC Messages: PITCH FEEL FAULT CH A (B)
 Resolution (cont.)
 This forces the SSCM that reported the fault to provide more specific LRU fault
determination.
 If the fault is not an actual SSCM fault, the MDC will report the actual fault as
indicated by another bit between 12 through 14 on Label 353A.
NOTE: If the MDC message and BIT remain the same (bit 11), the fault should be
assigned to the SSCU. If the MDC message and BIT change, the fault is not with
the SSCU and is related to an external component or wiring.
THIS PROCEDURE MUST BE DONE AFTER FAULT ANNUNCIATION AND PRIOR
TO SHUTTING DOWN SSCU POWER,
 Otherwise the SSCU will not identify the specific fault.
 NOTE: This procedure also applies to the generic system faults RTL system,
HSTAB system, and spoiler system.
 This fault may be attributed to a temporary nuisance condition and is
typically resettable.
 The fault should not be initially considered as an SSCU internal fault.


 MDC Messages: SSCUx FAILED CH Xx/INF FAULT PF CTRL
Definition: A fault was detected by only ONE module of a given
SSCU (Speed, Direction, Enable)
FIM Reference
 SSCU 1 – 27-61-05-810-824 and 27-61-05-810-825
 SSCU 2 – 27-61-06-810-824 and 27-61-06-810-825
The fault is likely due to a very fast minor glitch in the actuator
performance (typically potentiometer related)
The “generic” MDC message indicates the SSCU could be at fault or

the actuator could be at fault
Note: Typically the SSCU is changed and the fault is reset but SSCU
will likely be NFF

 EICAS Message – SSCU 1 (2) FAULT

 MDC Message – INTERNAL FAULT CH A (B)
 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 CH A – 27-61-05-810-806
 SSCU1 CH B – 27-61-05-810-807
 SSCU2 CH A – 27-61-06-810-806
 SSCU2 CH B – 27-61-06-810-807
 Probable Cause
 Complete loss of validity of one SSCM.
 This fault may be temporary (glitch) or permanent.
 Resolution
 The operator may perform a re-initialization of the SSCU’s in an attempt to
clear the fault.
 If the fault persists, MMEL should be applied.
 NOTE: This message is fully dispatchable under current MMEL.

 EICAS Message – SSCU 1 (2) FAULT

 MDC Message – SSCU x FAN x FAILED
 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 – 27-61-05-810-828
 SSCU2 – 27-61-06-810-829
 Probable Cause
 One of the cooling fans has failed in the SSCU.
 Resolution
 SSCU fans are automatically replaced under THALES VSB C13045B-27-
010 during an SSCU repair.
 NOTE: This message is fully dispatchable under current MMEL.

 EICAS Message – SPLR/STAB FAULT

 MDC Message – SSCU INTERNAL FAULT ARINC BUS FAULT
CH A (B)
 FIM Reference
 SSCU1 – 27-61-05-810-842-A01 and 27-61-05-810-829
 SSCU2 – 27-61-06-810-842-A01 and 27-61-06-810-829
 Probable Cause
 This message is typically posted if one of the external peripheral LRU inputs
has been degraded (indicating loss of redundancy).
 In many cases, other EICAS messages are displayed related to flaps/slats,
hydraulic, or RAD ALT system.
 Resolution
 Use the MDC current faults page to determine if this fault is “system
internal” or if it is related to one of the system inputs.
 NOTE: This message is normally dispatchable under the Dispatch
Deviation Guide.

78 / ATA 27-6X Spoiler Stabilizer Control System
 EICAS Message: SPLR/STAB FAULT

 MDC Message: NO BUS INPUT (various LRUs)
Definition: The SSCU has detected a loss of redundant inputs

from the SFECU or RAD ALT
 Loss of ADC, ASCU, PSEU and AHRS will produce other EICAS
messages
NOTE: This message is fully dispatchable by flight crew under

MMEL

79 / ATA 27-64 Multi-Function Spoiler System
 EICAS Messages: IB (OB) FLT SPLR (C) and

IB (OB) SPOILERONS (C)
 MDC Message: L (R) IB (OB) MFS PCU / PCU JAM
 FIM Reference
 L IB – 27-64-01-810-802 L OB – 27-64-01-810-807
 R IB – 27-64-01-810-812 R OB – 27-64-01-810-817
Definition: MDC message PCU JAM is only an indication that the
PCU did not respond appropriately to a command within 270ms

Recommend to reset and if persistent, change the PCU at Operators
convenience
NOTE: This message is resettable on the ground with a power re-set

 EICAS Message: IB (OB) FLT SPLR (C) and IB (OB)

SPOILERONS (C)
 MDC Message: L (R) IB (OB) MFSPCU / PCU JAM
 FIM Reference: L IB – 27-64-01-810-802; L OB – 27-64-01-810-807
R IB – 27-64-01-810-812; R OB – 27-64-01-810-817
Probable Cause
 May experience message during the use of flight spoilers
 Proportional lift dump or Ground lift dump (symmetric).
 Typically associated with a PCU JAM message on the MDC.

 PCU did not respond appropriately to a command within 270ms
 The affected pair of flight spoilers are fully retracted and fully inhibited.
 An investigation into these events identified a wear issue with the MFS PCU
internal piston seal.
 The minor wear of the seal can, at high aerodynamic loads, cause
some temporary internal leakage resulting in a lag or hesitation of the
MFS PCU to reach a commanded position within a given time.

 EICAS Message: IB (OB) FLT SPLR (C) and IB (OB)

SPOILERONS (C)
 MDC Message: L (R) IB (OB) MFSPCU / PCU JAM
 Resolution
OEM identified the seal wear to be a result of the seal mating surface finish.
 Corrective action VSB 51200-27-35 on all MFS PCU’s during repair
since Aug 2005.
Following the first event, subsequent events may be infrequent and random.
 Therefore operators are recommended to reset and monitor the
specific MFS PCU.
 Operators should perform SPOST 1 (only) to clear the fault.
 NOTE: This message is normally resettable on the ground with

CPOST/SPOST1.

Debris accumulation because of micro groove wear on

piston head seal due to inadequate bore surface finish.
Seal wear before

corrective action
(grooves worn)
Seal wear after

corrective action
(groove not worn)

83 /
SSCU Troubleshooting
Matrix

84 / SSCU Troubleshooting Matrix
Expected Shop
EICAS Message MDC Message OPERATOR ACTION
Finding (Probability)
Send SSCU for repair and request
SSCU X FAN 1 (2) FAILED application of THALES VSB C13045B-27- FAIL (100%)
010 (AMDT. E)
SSCU 1 (2) FAULT
RESETTING the 4 SSCU circuit breaker did not
INTERNAL FAULT CH A (B) clear the fault NFF (70%-90%)
 Replace SSCU#1(2) and send it in for repair
SSCU 1 FAULT NOT AN SSCU ISSUE

and SSCU X CPOST/SPOST NOT RUN Documentation reference: FCOM TR NFF (>90%)
SSCU 2 FAULT RJ700/126
STAB CH 1 (2) INOP VARIOUS NOT AN SSCU ISSUE NFF (>90%)
NOT AN SSCU ISSUE

SPOST 2 execution did not clear the fault
RUD LIMIT ACT 1 (2)
 Replace RTL Act #1(2), send for repair NFF (>90%)
MOTOR– NO RESPONSE TO CMD
Troubleshoot for a faulty RTL No 1 wire
RUD LIMIT FAULT
harness (approx 4”-6” from No 1 RTLA)
Standby P3 system purge did not clear the

ISI/ADC DISAGREE OR RNG fault  Not an SSCU or ISI failure
NFF (>90%)
NOT AN SSCU ISSUE

IB () FLT SPLR RESET of all 4 SSCU circuit breakers did not
L (R) IB () MFS PCU clear
and the fault
- PCU JAM NFF (>90%)
IB () SPOILERONS Send flagged MFSPCU for repair and request
application of Goodrich VSB 51200-27-002
SSCU X NO ASCU-X BUS INPUT NFF (>90%)

IB () GND SPLR FAULT NOT AN SSCU ISSUE
SSCU X NO PSEU-X BUS INPUT NFF (>90%)

85 /
HSTA 2,000 Hour

Check/Purge Tasks

86 / 2,000 Oil Check/Purge Tasks
Purpose - To ensure adequate oil level in the HSTA for the no-
back ratchet assembly (i.e. to detect excessive oil migration
to other parts of the HSTA), there are two tasks required
every 2,000 FH:
 Check oil level in the “no back” ratchet assembly
AMM 12−13−27−610−805
 It is important to remove the Oil Fill plug and dipstick to let the
HSTA stabilize its internal pressure (wait 3 min) before checking the dip
stick.
 It’s important to look at the dip stick in good light
 The oil has no color. It’s clear. (really)
 Purge oil from the gear box assembly
AMM 12−20−27−680−803

87 / 2,000 Oil Check/Purge Tasks
 Make sure to open the oil fill plug before reading the oil level on the
dipstick in order to equalize pressure within the cavity
 Per AMM wait 3 mins before taking reading and after filling reservoir
V-Groove
Oil fill plug
Dip stick
Oil drain plug
(never to be
opened)

88 / Dipstick Indications

89 /
HSTA No-Back
No-back assembly

90 / HSTA No-Back
No-back upper seal
No-back lower seal

91 / Piece Parts - 2,000FH Hour Task
 Following is a list of piece parts that are removed and re-installed or

installed new during the Oil Level Check and Gear Box Purge.
PN Qty. Description
8489-053 /-1 1 Plug, Oil Level
8489-059 1 Plug, Gear Box Emptying
DDMM000093AN9MA 1 Ring, BS
Turbonycoil 160 (no substitute allowed)

92 /
HSTA 4500 FH Torque

Limiter Check

93 /
4500 FH Torque Limiter Check
Every 4500 hours of service, there is a functional

check of the torque limiter that has to be performed
 Brake Friction Check – The brake is applied to each

HSTA motor and a GSE Tool is used to try and turn the
motor. The motor brake should hold at least 15 in. lb. of
force
 Torque Limiter Check – The HSTA position is locked in
place with a special tool, and with the brake released, a
GSE Tool is used to turn the motor. The motor should turn
with 8.50 – 11.85 in. lb of force
This Task verifies the Torque Limiter is not Jammed, while
the SSCU monitors for Torque Limiter slippage

94 / Torque Limiter
The Torque Limiter

is in place
between the
rotating plates and
Jammed Plate
will ‘slip’ when the
Torque Limiter
specified torque
(slip mechanism)
limit is reached
Jammed system with torque limiter
Torque
System break point The Torque limiter
Torque limiter slippage
will prevent
damage of the
aircraft structure
by the motor
T

95 / HSTA Torque Limiter GSE
PROGRAM SELECTION RESULTS DISPLAY

96 / HSTA Torque Limiter GSE
Torque Limiter Check

97 / Piece Parts – 4500 Hour Task
 Following is a list of piece parts that are removed and re-installed or

installed new during the 4,500 FH Torque Limiter Check.
PN Qty. Description
8489-056 2 Cap, Motor Input
DDM000093AN9MA 2 Ring, BS
8489-061 2 Cap, Limiter Input Port
8489-063 2 Seal, Limiter Input Port
8489-062 2 Bushing, Locking Limiter Input Port

98 /
HSTA Shipping
Checklist

99 / HSTA Shipping Checklist
BA AOM 700-0608
This AOM emphasizes HSTA packing and shipping best

practices to prevent additional repair costs and longer
turnaround time (TAT). Below is a list of general
recommendations for the HSTA packing and shipping.
 Provide all Hours and Cycles for HSTA and subassemblies (HSTA,
both HSTA Motors & Position Sensor)
Ensure HSTA has all subassemblies attached: 2 Motors & 1 Position

Sensor
 Remove HSTA as per AMM Task 27-42-01-000-801.
 Purge gearbox as per AMM Task 12-20-27-680-803.
 IMPORTANT: Do not drain the oil from HSTA before sending it to the
repair shop. The HSTA can be shipped with oil since it is not considered
to be hazardous material.

BA AOM 700-0608
 Ensure all oil servicing plugs are secure to prevent oil from leaking
and contaminating subassemblies.
Ensure all connector protective caps are properly installed as per AMM
Task 27-42-01-000-801 to protect connectors from damage and debris.
Ensure HSTA Motor Input Sealing Caps (2) and Torque Limiter Input
Port Sealing Caps (2) are reinstalled if HSTA was removed for failing
Torque Limiter and Motor Brake Test.

BA AOM 700-0608
 Ensure HSTA that the Translating Nut Positioning Tool P/N

FV292906000 is installed on the actuator at the 2.0 units position
during removal of HSTA (AMM Task 27-42-01-000-801).
NOTE: Repair shop will know if the tool was not installed properly during removal of HSTA and
operator could incur additional costs to repair HSTA and longer TAT.
Aerospace
BA AOM 700-0608
 Ensure bonding strap is attached to HSTA.

NOTE: It is sometimes disconnected from HSTA and left attached to the airframe, leading to
additional cost for replacement.
Translating Nut
Positioning Tool
Connectors (4)
Grounding Strap
Aerospace
BA AOM 700-0608
 Put the HSTA into the container box P/N 260910763 (see figure
below).
USE THIS ONE! NOT THIS ONE!
Aerospace
104 / HSTA Lockwire Removal
Follow the AMM:
 Remove and discard the lockwire from the left slotted nut (32) and
the right slotted nut (39).
 Cutting the wrong lockwire may result in a BSA replacement.

105 /
End of Presentation
Questions?

106 /
Abbreviations

107 /
List of Abbreviations
ADC Air Data Computer or Analog to Digital D/A Digital to Analog

Converter DAC Digital to Analog Converter
A/D Analog to Digital (converter) DC Direct Current
ADG Air Driven Generator DCU Data Concentrator Unit
ADHC Air Data Sensor Heating Controller DFDR Digital Flight Data Recorder
AHC Attitude and Heading Computer DIR Dispatch Interruption Rate
AHRS Attitude and Heading Reference Computer
AOA Angle Of Attack ECD Engineering Control Document
AP AutoPilot ECP EICAS Control Panel
ARINC Aeronautical Radio INCorporated EHSV Electro-Hydraulic Servo Valve
ASCU Anti Skid Control Unit EICAS Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting
ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit System
EM ElectroMechanical
BA Bombardier Aircraft ESS Essential (DC bus)
BIT Built-In Test
BITE Built-In Test Equipment FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control
CAS Crew Alerting System or Computed Air FC Flight Cycle
Speed FCC Flight Control Computer (Autopilot)
CAS Calibrated Air Speed FCP Flight Control Panel
C-BIT Continuous Built-in Test FDR Flight Data Recorder
COM Command (lane of an SSCM) FH Flight Hour
CPOST Computer Power-On Self Test FIM Fault Isolation Manual
CPU Central Processing Unit FSCL Flight Spoiler Control Lever
CRJ Canadian Regional Jet FSR Field Service Representative
FT Functional Test
FW Failure Warning

108 /
GLD Ground Lift Dumping MCU Motor Control Unit

GND Ground MDC Maintenance and Diagnostic Computer
GS Ground Spoiler MDS Maintenance and Diagnostic System
GSA Ground Spoiler Actuator MEL Minimum Equipment List
GSSV Ground Spoiler Selector Valve MFS Multi-Function Spoiler
MMEL Master Minimum Equipment List
HST Horizontal Stabilizer Trim MON Monitor (lane of an SSCM)
HSTA Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator
HYD Hydraulic N/A Not Applicable
HW Hardware NCD No Computed Data
Hz Hertz NVM Non Volatile Memory
Nz Normal Acceleration
IAPS Integrated Avionics Processor System
I-BIT Initiated Built-in Test OC Open Circuit
IM Internal Monitoring OOS Out Of Service
IRS Inertial Reference System OPP Opposite
IOC Input Output Concentrator
I/O Input/Output PBA Push-Button Annunciator
ISE In Service Evaluation PCU Power Control Unit
ISI Integrated Standby Instrument PF Pitch Feel
PFA Pitch Feel Actuator
JAA Joint Airworthiness Authority PFD Primary Flight Display
PLD Proportional Lift Dumping
LRU Line Replaceable Unit PTCT Protection
LVDT Linear Variable Differential Transducer PSEU Proximity Sensor Electronic Unit
PSS Proximity Sensor Switch
PWM Pulse Width Modulation

109 /
RA Radio Altitude or Radio Altimeter or Roll Assist TC Transport Canada

RAC Radio Altitude Computer TQA Throttle Quadrant Assembly
RCIM Roll Control Input Module
RMS Root Mean Square UTC Universal Time Coordinated
RTL Rudder Travel Limiter
RTLA Rudder Travel Limiter Actuator VAC Volts (of) Alternating Current
RTLM Rudder Travel Limiter Mechanism VDC Volts (of) Direct Current
RTO Rejected Take-Off VSB Vendor Service Bulletin
RVDT Rotary Variable Differential Transducer
WD Watch Dog
SCAS Spoiler Control and Actuation System WOW Weight On Wheels
SDI Source Destination Identifier
SFECU Slat Flap Electronic Control Unit
SL Service Letter
SPOST System Power-On Self Test
SPC Stall Protection Computer
SPS Stall Protection System
SSEC Static Source Error Correction
SSCM Spoiler and Stabilizer Control Module
SSCS Spoiler and Stabilizer Control System
SSCU Spoiler and Stabilizer Control Unit
SSM Sign Status Matrix
SW Switch
SW Software

110 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages

111 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Warning

CONFIG SPLRS – Also sounds a synthetic voice aural warning.
 Displayed on the ground if, during take-off configuration conditions, any spoiler is deployed for
any reason other than a roll assist command. The aural warning <<CONFIG SPOILERS>>
sound at the same time that the CONFIG SPLRS message is displayed.
 NOTE: Aircraft take-off configuration is: aircraft on ground, engines set to take-off power, thrust
reverser not deployed.
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Caution

IB (or OB) SPOILERONS – Posted by SSCU 1 (or 2) when it detects loss of roll assist capability
for the inboard (IB) or outboard (OB) multi-function spoilers. Loss is detected as a result of one of
the following:
 PCU failure – In case of a single PCU failure, ROLL ASSIST is maintained using the opposite
MFS panel. Message triggering due to a PCU failure is inhibited when hydraulic is low on
ground.
 SSCU double failure (both SSCM A & B failed)
 RCIM double failure (both RVDT’s in an RCIM fail) – PLD and GLD
functions are maintained.

112 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers – Caution (cont.)

IB (or OB) FLT SPOILERONS – Posted by SSCU 1 (or 2) when it detects loss of PLD capability
the following:
 PCU failure (inboard or outboard) – In case of a single PCU failure, PLD function is lost due to
symmetry requirements. Message triggering due to a PCU failure is inhibited when hydraulic is
low on ground.
 FSCL detected failure – ROLL ASSIST and GLD functions are maintained.
SPOILERONS ROLL – Posted 20 seconds after any inconsistency in the roll priority selection by
the flight crew is detected. Inconsistencies result when one of the following occurs:
 After a roll disconnect has been triggered, the flight crew has not resolved their roll priority
 Either (left or right) aileron bungee position is not compatible with proper operation
 If any roll priority switch is depressed while a roll disconnect has not been triggered

113 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Caution (cont.)

FLT SPLR DEPLOY – Posted when the MFS pairs are deployed (> 5 degrees), or when the
FSCL is not stowed at ZERO position, while the aircraft is below a preset altitude or when
throttles are set to a take-off or go-around positions (high thrust settings) This message is
inhibited under landing conditions to prevent a caution message being posted during GLD
operation. A similar message is also posted green (Advisory) under different altitude and thrust
conditions. Refer to Advisory messages description.
IB (or OB) GND SPLRS – Posted by SSCU 1 (or SSCU 2), to signal inboard (IB) or outboard
(OB) GS pair inoperative. A GS pair inoperative condition is detected as a result of one of the
following:
 Detected failure of a GSSV
 Detected failure of one or both GS Actuators via the PSS’s
 A mismatch of either left or right TQA RVDT’s
 Failure of two out of three ground condition sensors (RA, WOW, WS)
 Failure of both redundant SSCM’s.
NOTE: Message triggered due to GSSV or GSA detected failures is inhibited when hydraulic is
low on ground.
GLD NOT ARMED – Posted to signal that the GLD function is not armed in at least one SSCU
while the aircraft is in landing or take-off configuration conditions.

114 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Caution (cont.)

GLD UNSAFE – Posted (except if the GLD function is manually disarmed) to indicate potential
inadvertent deployment of all GS and MFS spoilers for GLD due to an active failure or loss of two
out of three of the GLD input sensors (RA, WOW, WS). An active failure of a sensor means an
indication of a ground condition while the aircraft is flying. Within an SSCU, this message is posted
by the SSCM under control of the GS operation.
Note: If either one of the RA/ WOW/ WS sensors is giving erroneous ground/flight indication, the
GLD can be either delayed or inoperative and/or may reduce the capability of the system to prevent
GS/MFS deployment in flight. The GLD function will remain operative using the two valid sensors but
the GLD function must be manually disarmed until touchdown to prevent inadvertent deployment on
landing.
GLD SPLR DEPLOY – This message is posted amber (caution) to indicate any GS deployment
occurring before touchdown. This message can be posted green (advisory) after touchdown.

115 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Status

IB (or OB) SPLRONS FAULT (White) – Posted by SSCU 1 (or SSCU 2), upon reduction of the
capability (loss of redundancy) of the ROLL ASSIST control of inboard (IB), or outboard (OB) MFS.
Loss of redundancy is detected as a result of one of the following:
 Failure of one redundant SSCM (SSCM loss or Roll Assist/MFS functional failure)
 Following loss of either pilot or co-pilot RCIM own-side RVDT. In case of failure of the own-side
RVDT directly connected to the SSCU, the redundant cross-side RVDT is received over the ARINC
429 cross-talk data bus and the ROLL ASSIST function is maintained.
IB (or OB) FLT SPLR FAULT (White) – Posted by SSCU 1 (or SSCU 2), upon reduction of the
capability (loss of redundancy) of the PLD control of inboard (IB), or outboard (OB) MFS. Loss of
redundancy is detected as a result of one of the following:
Failure of one redundant SSCM (SSCM loss or PLD/MFS functional failure)
Following loss of FSCL own-side RVDT. In case of failure of the own-side RVDT directly connected
to the SSCU, the redundant cross-side RVDT is received over the ARINC 429 cross-talk data bus
and the PLD function is maintained.
GLD MAN DISARM – (White) – Posted when the GLD Switch selected to MAN DISARM position as
sensed by the SSCM in control of the MFS and GS operation.

116 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Status (cont.)

IB (or OB) GND SPLR FAULT (White) – Posted by SSCU 1 (or SSCU 2), upon reduction of the
capability (loss of redundancy) of the control of inboard (IB), or outboard (OB) GS. Loss of
redundancy is detected as a result of failure of one of the following:
 One redundant SSCM (SSCM loss or GLD/GS functional failure)
 Loss of one own-side on-ground sensor (RA, WOW, WS)
 Failure of either left or right TQA own RVDT’s. In case of failure of the own-side RVDT directly
connected to the SSCU, the redundant cross-side RVDT is received over the ARINC 429 cross-
talk data bus and the GLD function can be maintained operative.
NOTE: This message is not inhibited during a touch-and-go operation.
SPLR/STAB FAULT (White) – Posted upon detected failure at the avionics input of the SSCU
(ADC, ISI, AHC, IOC, RAC, PSEU, ASCU, SFECU) not reported by other messages.
It is also posted when the SPOST 1 has been interrupted 5 consecutive times or SPOST 2
interrupted 1 time. In this case, MDC message CPOST/SPOST NOT RUN is displayed.
This message can also be posted with a FAN Failure in the SSCU.

117 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Spoilers - Advisory

FLT SPLR DEPLOY – Posted when the MFS pairs are deployed (>5 degrees) or when the
FSCL is not stowed at ZERO position, while the aircraft is above a preset altitude or when
throttles are set to any position except go-around and take-off.
PLT (or CPLT) ROLL CMD - Posted to indicate that the pilot’s control wheel (or the co-pilot’s
control wheel), is handling roll control of the MFS pair following pilot selection. Simultaneously,
the PLT ROLL (or CPLT ROLL) is illuminated on the pilot / co-pilot roll priority PBA.
GND SPLR DEPLOY – Posted to indicate any GS deployment occurring after touchdown.
This message can be posted amber before touchdown.
GLD MAN ARM – Posted when the GLD Switch is selected to MAN ARM position as sensed
by at least one SSCM controlling the MFS and GS operation.
SPLR/STAB IN TEST – Posted when the SSCS is performing its on-ground SPOST2 as
triggered by the hydraulic system pressurized conditions. The spoiler control surfaces are
inoperative during these tests. This message is only posted on ground and cannot be inhibited
through the EICAS.
T/O CONFIG OK – Posted by EICAS logic using inputs from various aircraft systems to reflect
adequacy of the aircraft configuration for take-off regardless of any MMEL consideration.
SSCS contribution includes the following condition: «No spoiler is deployed for any reason
other than ROLL ASSIST function ».

118 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for HST – Aural and Warning

TRIM CLACKER - This aural clacker provides the flight crew with an alarm upon HST overspeed
operation. It sounds when the HSTA is moving at more than 0.21 degrees/sec for more than 3
seconds. It stops when the HSTA recovers normal operation.
CONFIG STAB – Also sounds a synthetic voice aural warning <<CONFIG TRIM>>.
 Displayed on the ground if, during take-off configuration conditions, the HSTA position is set out
of its take-off range (out of the “green band”), or if the two HSTA channels are inoperative. The
aural warning <<CONFIG TRIM>> sound at the same time that the CONFIG STAB message is
displayed.
 NOTE: Aircraft take-off configuration is: aircraft on ground, engines set to take-off power, thrust
reverser not deployed.

119 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for HST - Caution

IB (or OB) SPOILERONS – Posted by SSCU 1 (or 2) when it detects loss of roll assist capability
the following:
 PCU failure – In case of a single PCU failure, ROLL ASSIST is maintained using the opposite
MFS panel. Message triggering due to a PCU failure is inhibited when hydraulic is low on
ground.
 RCIM double failure (both RVDT’s in an RCIM fail) – PLD and GLD functions are
maintained.
STAB TRIM – Posted when the HST function is no longer available upon detected failures or
loss of valid Stab position, or when both channels have been disengaged following a stab trim
disconnect switch being depressed.
MACH TRIM – Posted when the Mach Trim function is no longer available upon detected
failures, or when the Mach Trim is disengaged by the flight crew using the MACH TRIM
ENGAGE / DISENGAGE PBA or when the HST function is not engaged. Together with this
message, the INOP legend illuminates on the Mach Trim PBA.
STAB TRIM LIMIT – Posted when the HSTA is at its full nose up or nose down limit.

120 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for HST - Status

STAB CH1 INOP (White) – Posted when the HST channel #1 becomes inoperative upon
detected failures, or if the STAB TRIM CH 1 engage PBA has not been depressed, while HST
channel #2 is still engaged. This message is not posted if the two channels are inoperative: the
STAB TRIM message would be posted instead.
STAB CH2 INOP (White) – Same as described above for HST channel #1, but applies to the
situation where HST channel #2 is disengaged while the HST channel #1 is engaged.
STAB FAULT (White) – Indicates reduction in system redundancy (e.g.: failure of one SSCM,
loss or failure in the Stab Trim function, failure of one pilot or copilot trim switch, loss of one
redundant resolver within the HSTA, loss of ADC Mach data validity, or loss of flap data).

121 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for HST - Advisory

SPLR/STAB IN TEST – Posted when the SSCS is performing its on-ground system power up
self tests as triggered by the hydraulic system pressurized conditions (SPOST 2). The HST
system is inoperative during these tests (about 40 sec). This message is only posted on ground
and cannot be inhibited through the EICAS.
T/O CONFIG OK – Posted by EICAS logic using inputs from various aircraft systems to reflect
adequacy of the aircraft configuration for take-off regardless of any MMEL consideration. A valid
take-off configuration for the HST includes the following condition: <<HST position within the
green band and the two HST channels operative (CONFIG TRIM not posted)>>.

122 /
Appendix A
CAS Messages for Pitch Feel

PITCH FEEL – New message for CRJ700. Loss of either pitch feel channel.
PITCH FEEL FAULT (White) - Loss of redundancy in either channel (loss of one module).
CAS Messages for Rudder Travel Limiter

RUD LIMITER – New message for CRJ700. Total loss of both RTL channels.
RUD LIMIT FAULT (White) - Loss of control of one RTL channel.
CAS General Messages

SSCU 1 (2) FAULT (White) - This message is posted upon loss of one SSCM in one SSCU
(invalid or not powered). It is not posted upon loss of the complete SSCU.

123 / Appendix B
Appendix B
CPOST/SPOST1/SPOST2
Details

124 / CPOST/SPOST1
 The conditions for CPOST and SPOST1 to run are:

 Weight on wheels (PSEU)
 CAS1 and CAS2 < 60 kts (ADC1 and ADC2 both valid)
 The following tests are performed during CPOST and SPOST1:
 ROM, RAM, NVM, WD, IO, Pin Prog, COM-MON Sync, Fan, PITCH FEEL
motion (extension and retraction)
 Cockpit sensors (RCIM, FSCL, TQA, RVDT’s) integrity test
 The following CAUTION (amber) messages are displayed during
SPOST 1 (because the SSCU is not transmitting ARINC data):
IB SPOILERONS OB FLT SPLRS STAB TRIM
OB SPOILERONS IB GND SPLRS PITCH FEEL
IB FLT SPLRS OB GND SPLRS RUD LIMITER
 Upon successful completion of CPOST and SPOST1, all messages
linked to the SSCU are removed and the following CAUTION (amber)
messages are displayed:
STAB TRIM
MACH TRIM

125 /
CPOST/SPOST1 Notes
NOTES
1. Each SSCM performs its CPOST on ground, upon each power up. Each SSCM calculates the ground
conditions based only on its own acquisition of both valid ADCs and its valid PSEU channel.
2. Each SSCM automatically enters SPOST1 after successful completion of its CPOST. There is no other
way to enter SPOST1 in any SSCM.
3. Both SSCU’s perform their SPOST1 in parallel and independently from one another. Within one SSCU,
the two SSCM’s run their tests in turn, according to a predefined priority logic.
4. Within a SSCM, the SPOST1 is completed when all SPOST tests are completed. Not all SSCM’s
complete their SPOST 1 at the same time. However, to avoid conflicts between SPOST1 and application,
all the SSCM’s leave SPOST1 and enter operational mode simultaneously.
5. While on ground, if an SSCM is powered late in respect to the other SSCM’s, it performs CPOST.
However, whether or not it performs SPOST1 depends on the moment the power up occurs. There are two
situations:
a. The concerned SSCM still has time to complete its CPOST and SPOST1 within 60 sec. from the
moment the first SSCM started its SPOST1. In this case, it performs SPOST1, which ends
simultaneously in all SSCM’s. This allows a late power up delay between the first and last SSCM of
about 30 to 45 seconds (respectively for module A or B powered last).
b. The concerned SSCU does not have time to complete its CPOST and SPOST1 within 60 sec.
from the moment the first SSCM started its SPOST1. In this case, it does not perform SPOST1,
increments its “SPOST not run counter” and enters operational mode directly after CPOST.

126 / SPOST2
 During SPOST2, for testing the HST, MFS, and GS, only one
module is active at a time. The HST is the longest of these tests.
When MFS and GS tests are finished, the sequencing keeps the
same SSCM active until the HST test is finished. At this time the next
SSCM becomes active and starts testing the HST, MFS, and GS with
its own circuitry … and so on until all four modules are tested.
 The sequencing for SSCM activation is 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B.
 Due to RTL geometry in AC linkage, this test is organized with a

different sequencing. Instead of having the sequence 1A, 1B, 2A, and
2B, the test activates all 4 modules in an intermixed sequence. The
RTL test is the longest test and is the last one to be terminated.

127 / SPOST2
 The following messages are displayed during SPOST:

 CAUTION (amber)
IB SPOILERONS OB FLT SPLRS STAB TRIM

OB SPOILERONS IB GND SPLRS PITCH FEEL
IB FLT SPLRS OB GND SPLRS RUD LIMITER
Advisory (green)
SPLR/STAB IN TEST
NOTE: The only difference between SPOST1 and SPOST2 regarding

displayed messages on the EICAS during SPOST2 is SPLR/STAB IN TEST.

128 / SPOST2
 Duration
 For one SSCM (i.e. for duration of HST test): ~ 15 sec. >>Total duration 60 sec.
 Total RTL: ~ 76 sec. (additional 10-15 sec. in case of rudder pedal input during
SPOST.
 There is a TIME OUT 76 sec. after which SPOST2 is declared failed and SPLR
STAB FAULT message is posted on the EICAS in white.
 Functions Performed
 PCU auto-rigging: Determination of a delta between the MFS stowed position
and the position read by the LVDT. The delta is stored in NVM (if it is significant)
to be used in PCU control.
 HSTA Testing – Each SSCM verifies that it is able to control the HSTA by
sending a command in open loop. To ensure that HSTA configuration is not
changed by the SPOST, the initial position is memorized and used to command
the HSTA back to this position in closed loop.
 HST, MFS, and GS tests are performed simultaneously on one SSCM. RTL
tests have been designed to minimize duration. Due to the complex geometry of
the RTL, in order to avoid force conflicts, both RTL actuators must cooperate; it
would have been impossible to do so by using the same sequencing as for other
surfaces (HST, MFS, GS).
NOTE: During SPOST2, the rudder pedals should not be moved.

129 /
SPOST2 Notes
NOTES
1. The four SSCM’s in the two SSCU’s will perform SPOST2 GS, MFS and HST tests in turn,
according to a predefined priority logic. A separate logic is used to drive the SSCM’s in and
out of the RTL test.
2. Within a SSCM, SPOST2 is completed when all SPOST2 tests are completed. Not all
SSCM’s complete their SPOST2 at the same time. However, to avoid conflicts between
SPOST2 and application, all the SSCM’s leave SPOST 2 and re-enter operational mode
simultaneously.
3. While on ground, if an SSCM is re-powered while the other SSCM’s are in SPOST2, it
performs CPOST. However, whether or not it performs SPOST1 depends on the moment
the power up occurs. SPOST2 will never be performed on the re-powered SSCM. There
are two situations:
a. The concerned SSCM still has time to complete its CPOST and SPOST1 within 120
sec. from the moment the other SSCM’s started their SPOST2. In this case, it performs
SPOST1, and then enters the operational mode and forces the other SSCM’s to abort
SPOST2. The other SSCM’s increment their “SPOST NOT RUN” counter.
b. The concerned SSCU does not have time to complete its CPOST and/or SPOST1
within 120 sec. from the moment the first SSCM started its SPOST2. In this case, it
does not performs SPOST 1, increments its “SPOST NOT RUN” counter and enters
operational mode directly after CPOST.

130 /
Using SPOST
 SPOST1 and SPOST2 are useful for validating LRU functionality.

 To clear or confirm a failure after swapping SSCU’s (IMPORTANT – SPOST
must be completed.) After swapping SSCU’s run SPOST2 completely to
confirm faults.
 After replacing an LRU – use AMM Task.
 Recommendations after a failure in flight:
 Reset breakers on ground – CPOST/SPOST1 will start automatically.
 Run SPOST2 if associated fault is tested during SPOST2 – see next slides.
 In case of non-resettable fault, swap SSCU’s and restart test.
 Reset all circuit breakers simultaneously – maximum delay
between first and last CB should not exceed 20 seconds).

131 /
Using SPOST – Failures Detected in Operational Mode
 Failures detected in operational mode (in flight or on ground) are

latched in NVM. These failures can only be reset by a power-up on
ground (i.e. The failure is reset in NVM but can be set again in
operational mode if the fault condition is still present.)
 NOTE – SPOST2 is not necessary to reset these faults.
HST Spoilers
 Pilot command invalid  Handwheel mismatch
 Copilot command invalid  Left/Right MFS runaway
 HST no-movement  FSCL RVDT mismatch
 HST position resolvers mismatch  Left/Right throttle RVDT mismatch
 HST uncommanded movement  Left/Right aileron bungee switch failure
 HST Torque limiter
 HST velocity loop invalid (i.e.
opposite runaway or overspeed) Rudder Travel Limiter
 RTL loop invalid
 RTL RVDT’s mismatch
 RTL RVDT/potentiometer mismatch
Pitch Feel
 Pitch feel velocity loop invalid

132 /
Using SPOST – Failures Detected in SPOST
 SPOST global results (not individual faults) are latched in “SPOST NVM”.
 SSCU SPOST NVM is cleared when SPOST is completed without any
failures detected.
 A failure detected in SPOST (1 or 2) will cause the appropriate MDC and
EICAS messages to be posted and prevent the associated SPOST OK
variable (see below) from being set. This subsequently prevents
engagement of the affected system.
 After the SSCU is reset on ground, SPOST1 is executed. If SPOST2 is
not performed, no MDC message will be posted, but an EICAS message
will be posted.
 Remember that the fault may be logged in the MDC history but will not be
logged as a current fault.
Global SPOST OK Variables
 PF SPOST OK - in SPOST1, if there are no PF failures detected
 HST SPOST OK - in SPOST2, if there are no HST failures detected
 Right MFS SPOST OK - in SPOST2, if there are no right MFS failures detected
 Left MFS SPOST OK - in SPOST2, if there are no left MFS failures detected
 GS SPOST OK - in SPOST2 if there are no GS failures detected
 RTL SPOST OK - in SPOST2 if there are no RTL failures detected

133 /
Using SPOST – Failures Detected in SPOST
 These failures are only reset in NVM after successful completion of

SPOST2. Note that these affect the relevant SPOST OK variable.
 EHSV Bias Shift Failure – only detected in SPOST. Triggers only an MDC
message, no EICAS message.
 EHSV Failure – There is also an equivalent monitor in operational mode, but

this one allows better isolation of the failure.
 GSSV Failure – There is also an equivalent monitor in operational mode, but

this one allows better isolation of the failure.

134 /
Appendix C
Maintenance
Diagnostic Computer
(MDC)

135 / MDC Overview
MAINTENANCE MAIN MENU
CURRENT FAULTS
CURRENT SERVICE MESSAGES
AIRCRAFT HISTORY PRI STAT ECS HYD ELEC FUEL
LRU TEST
LRU RIGGING F/CTL A/ICE DOORS SEL
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
ATA INDEX CAS MENU UP DN STEP
LRU INDEX/OPERATIONS
MDC SETUP
CONFIGURATION DATA
FCC DIAGNOSTICS
REPORT DOWNLOAD
PILOT DATA DOWNLOAD TO DISK
ON ANY SUB-PAGE, PUSH MENU

BUTTON TO RETURN TO MAIN MENU
--------------------------------------
UP DOWN SELECT
UP DN SEL

136 / MDC Overview
PRI STAT ECS HYD ELEC FUEL
F/CTL A/ICE DOORS SEL
CAS MENU UP DN STEP

137 / MDC Overview
Push HYD to move cursor

below the line
PRI STAT ECS HYD ELEC FUEL
F/CTL A/ICE DOORS SEL
CAS MENU UP DN STEP
Use UP/DN to select

different word
Select word to be viewed

138 / MDC Overview
ARINC 429
DISCRETE WORD
BREAKDOWN

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CRJ 700 /900 /1000

3C2200A ALL RCIM ROLL CONTROL INPUT MODULE 2

AOA ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSOR 2

C16221HA01 (V1) CRJ1000

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High Level System

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 The Spoiler Control System performs the following functions:

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2 Roll Control Input

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1 GLD panel with a 3- Radio Altitude, WOW (PSEU),

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2 Ground Spoiler 4 Ground Spoilers

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2 UP/DOWN Trim Switches

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1 Motor Control Unit

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2 Pitch Feel Simulator

2 Pitch Feel Actuators

2 Spoiler & Stabilizer

Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

1 Rudder Travel Limiter

2 Rudder Travel Limiter

2 Spoiler & Stabilizer

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Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

SSCS BIT Functions

OPERATIONAL BIT MAINTENANCE BIT

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Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

Operational BIT detects failures as they occur and reveals

 Continuous Built In Test (CBIT) – Checks continued

Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

The System BITE does the following:

Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

SPOST1 is automatically run under the following conditions :

Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

SSCM A CPOST SPOST1

TESTS Second PF activation – 6 sec.

TESTS First PF activation – 14 sec.

Power-Up 18 sec. 36 sec. 44 sec.( typically – can

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Thales PROPRIETARY For Reference only

While on ground, if an SSCM is powered up late in respect to the

There are two situations:

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 # 2: The concerned SSCU does not have time to complete

In any case, SPOST 1 is aborted if a SSCM is in SPOST 1

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SSCM A CPOST SPOST1

INACTIVE INACTIVE INACTIVE ACTIVE INACTIVE SSCM 2B

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Each SSCM enters SPOST 2 from operational mode, when

 Both HST channels (STAB1 & 2) are engaged

AC Flight Counter Logic

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The counter is reset to 50 FC following a successful SPOST2

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