EN BANC
Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to
G.R. No. 206248               February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision  and March 5, 2013 Resolution  of
1 2
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.  Out 3
of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February
8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).  The children were not
4
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of
the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition
for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a
notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. 5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein
respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming
that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the
sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio]."  Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
6 illegitimate children.  In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants
[Antonio’s] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially
approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following
Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a.
cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the
aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth
and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the
surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental
Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor children,
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over
the parties’ minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard
Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the
Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grande’s]
custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick
Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the
aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the written
consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor
children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the
amount of ₱30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande].  (Emphasis supplied.)
7
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her
motion was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22,
2010  for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
8
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error
on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and
jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her
9
in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan
in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in
the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and
may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of
₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the
father’s recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of
reasons.  Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
10
committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of
the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the
minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-
of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO." 11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give
support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of
the minor children.  Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive
12
respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the
constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children.
13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a
partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the
CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio."
When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the
present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as
amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive
language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255  which 14
now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court  is enough to establish the
15
paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his
children’s surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the
mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also
goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate
children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of
the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use
the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate
the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its
literal meaning free from any interpretation.  Respondent’s position that
16
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal
basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
"may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion  upon the
17
illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter
of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea
that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor
child. In Alfon v. Republic,  for instance, this Court allowed even a
18
legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than
that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no
legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,  this Court,
19
upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use
of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother.
Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second only to
the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation
considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,  We gave due deference to the
20
choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it
would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a
person’s name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his
successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any
way, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against
such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s
petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by
his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by
his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will
not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis
supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use
of the father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children,
citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,  which21
states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the
child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child
shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of the
accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child
shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public
document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the
documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if
he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in
a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the
child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be
recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private
handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in
the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to
(new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth
and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration,
the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live
Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is
hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation,  We held:
22
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a
law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to
amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be
broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative
agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.  What is
23
more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike
down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi- judicial bodies  when found contrary to statutes and/or the
24
Constitution.  Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
25
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights  at least twice a week, and
28

admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of
₱30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]; and

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8
the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the
illegitimate children of their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre
of his paternity. Lewis.

To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art.
176 rendering the use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary
controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames
by which they will be known.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.

At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring Associate Justice
their opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."  However,
26

since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial
court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to
rule for or against petitioner.  A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the
27

evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is

necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July

24, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is
MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the

appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan
in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard

Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980 Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de
MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents
ALFON, petitioner, are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva
vs. Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been
residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street,
ABAD SANTOS, J.: Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years.
When petitioner started schooling, she used the name
ñé

Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth

This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an
year high school at Stella Maris College using the name
Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated
Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After
December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's prayer for a
graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano
change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no
University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing
controversy over the facts which are well-stated in the questioned Order
(Exhibit E-4). Her scholastic records from elementary to
as follows:
college show that she was registered by the name of
Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her committed any felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1,
counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be G-2, G-3 and G-4).
changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to
Estrella S. Alfon.
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing
the petition:
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December
14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her
the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and
childhood;
11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the
petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3). 2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in
college using the same name;
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty.
Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal 3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon
Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the since her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances
Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the know her by this name;
petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat,
the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to 4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same
receive the evidence and to submit the same for name.
resolution of the Court.
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it
appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in
Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital the order that such order has been published as directed
(Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
 shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such
name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name
from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella
Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the
surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a
different surname and has become known with such
surname does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize and change her surname to
Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of
petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted
this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change
her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to
allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of
the Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname
of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since
childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not
a petition for change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is
granted but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner
is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to
change her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and
Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father
invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in
the codal provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no
legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court
in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA
677, 679, said:  têñ.£îhqwâ£
The following may be considered, among others, as
proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant
of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a
consequence of a change of' status, such as when a
natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3)
when the change is necessary to avoid confusion
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1,
p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood,
borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the
grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call
her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was
graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the
right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample
justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the
contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid
confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the
petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her
surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18127             April 5, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGES OF NAME OF GERTRUDES
JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER NATURAL GUARDIAN
CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor and appellant.
Angeles, Maskariño & Angeles for petitioner and appellee.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Davao granting the petition of petitioner-appellee,
Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, for a change of name.
On July 23, 1959, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her
mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition
in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes
Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is
alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on
March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del
Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which the
petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has
become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the
petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and
would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other
people; that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to
Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to
have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the
surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother.
The publication of the order for the hearing of the petition was duly made.
On July 11, 1960, the Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the
Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the petition upon the ground that
the change of surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that
said petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has
the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the
law she should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado; and
that the change of the surname of the petitioner would be prejudicial to
the rights and interest which she has by virtue of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 2272 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, annulling the
marriage of her mother, Corazon Adolfo, to Manuel del Prado, and would
also be prejudicial to her rights as conferred upon her by law. Counsel for
the petitioner filed in reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal filed a
supplemental opposition, and counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the
supplemental opposition. 1äwphï1.ñët
After hearing the court a quo issued an order, under date of July 28,
1960, granting the petition and ordering the change of the name of the
petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina
Calderon." The dispositive portion of the order of the court further states:
"This order, however, shall not operate to deprive the petitioner of her
status, rights and obligations as recognized by law."
From the above-mentioned order the provincial fiscal, representing the
Solicitor General, appealed to this Court.
In this appeal the Solicitor General contends (1) that the lower court erred
in finding as proper and reasonable ground for the change of the
surname of the petitioner the reason that petitioner's present surname
carries the stigma of illegitimacy, and (2) that the lower court erred in
declaring "that although the law is specific that petitioner shall principally
use the surname of the father yet it does not follow that petitioner is
prohibited from using other surnames when justified."1
The issue to be resolved in the present case is whether the lower court's
order granting the petition is, based upon "proper and reasonable cause"
as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the new Rules of Court.
The lower court found that petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was
born on March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of Manuel del Prado and
Corazon Adolfo as a result of their bigamous marriage which was
annulled on July 18, 1957, after a judgment of conviction of said Manuel
del Prado on the complaint for bigamy on December 5, 1956; that
subsequently, on December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo, mother of the
petitioner, got married to Romeo C. Calderon; that the petitioner is living
with her mother and her foster father; and that Romeo C. Calderon
declared in open court his consent to the petitioner's adopting his
surname, especially so because he is the one supporting her. The lower
court says, "In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the
petitioner are valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor
who after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate
child."
We agree with the court a quo. A petition to change the name of an
infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for
the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the
instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best
interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is
the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using
his surname. The mother had considered the generous attitude of her
husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and
enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a
stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her
surname is that of her illegitimate father.
The Solicitor General, in his brief, avers that the evident purpose of
petitioner in seeking a change of her surname is to conceal her status as
an illegitimate child and that any attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be
motivated by good faith and an honest purpose. The Solicitor General
further alleges that to authorize the change of the name of the petitioner
would be to sanction a misrepresentation because the petitioner wants to
appear as if she is the daughter of Romeo C. Calderon. We cannot agree
with the view of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General seems to
support the idea that since the petitioner has the misfortune of being born
illegitimate she must bear that stigma of illegitimacy as long as she lives.
That idea should not be countenanced. Justice dictates that every person
be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as
long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests
of the State or of other people.
The Solicitor General also contends that the status of the petitioner is that
of a natural child by legal fiction and under Article 367 of the Civil Code
she shall principally enjoy the surname of the father. We agree with the
lower court when it said that "While it is true that the Code provides that a
natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy
the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is
prohibited by law, from taking another surname with the latters consent
and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a legitimate child may secure
a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a
"proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a natural
child cannot do the same. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of
name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to
promote his interests. We are satisfied that the facts and circumstances
as borne out by the record amply justify the change of the surname of the
petitioner, as ordered by the lower court . We have held that the matter
whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the
sound discretion of the court,2 and in the present case We believe that
the court a quo has exercised its discretion in a judicious way when it
granted the petition.
The Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the
petitioner here is of tender age, who cannot as yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of her name, may be prejudiced in her
rights under the law. This apprehension is dispelled by the
pronouncement of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalintal, as
follow:
... But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not
by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing family
relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it
create new family rights and duties where none before was
existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or
citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the
convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). (In Re Petition
for Change of Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S. Barrera vs. Republic
of the Philippines, L-20874, May 25, 1966)
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to the costs. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Sanchez, and Castro, JJ,, concur.