TITLE VI.

USUFRUCT

1. Eleizegui v. Manila Lawn Tennis Club

(G.R. No. 967; May 19, 1903)
Facts:

In January 1980, Dario and Gaudencio Eleizegui entered into a contract of lease of
its land with the Manila Lawn Tennis Club where it was stipulated that the lessee is
expressly authorized to make improvements upon the land, by erecting buildings of both
permanent and temporary character, by making fills, laying pipes, and making such other
improvements as might be considered desirable for the comfort and amusement of the
members. It was also stipulated that the lease for all the time and that the members of the
said club may desire to use it and that, Mr. Williamson or whoever may succeed him as
secretary of said club may terminate the lease whenever desired without other formality than
that of giving a month's notice. It was also specified that the ElezeguIs as owners of the land
would undertake to maintain the club as long as the tenant. The rent of the said land is fixed
at P25 per month.

In August 1980, the Elezeguis terminated the contract of lease by the notice given to
the Manila Lawn Tennis Club but the latter refused to accede and vacate the leased land.
The Elezeguis filed an action for unlawful detainer onn the ground that the lease was already
terminated. With respect to the term of the lease the present question has arisen. In its
discussion 3 theories have been presented: 1) the duration depends upon the will of the
lessor, who, upon one month's notice given to the lessee, may terminate the lease so
stipulated; 2) the duration makes it dependent upon the will of the lessee, as stipulated in the
contract; and 3) the right is reserved to the courts to fix the duration of the term.The first
theory is that which has prevailed in the judgment below.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract of lease was perpetual since in the contract, the duration
thereof as left to the will of the lessee alone.

Ruling:

No. The lease in question does not fall within any of the cases in which the rights and
obligations arising from a contract cannot be transmitted to heirs, either by its nature, by
agreement, or by provision of law. Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises
from a lease. It is a real right and includes all the jus utendi and jus fruendi. Nevertheless,
the utmost period for which a usufruct can endure, if constituted in favor a natural person, is
the lifetime of the usufructuary and if in favor of juridical person, it cannot be created for
more than thirty years. It was repeatedly stated in the document that it was a lease, and
nothing but a lease, which was agreed upon: "Being in the full enjoyment of the necessary
legal capacity to enter into this contract of lease they have agreed upon the lease of said
estate .They lease to Mr. Williamson, who receives it as such. The rental is fixed at 25 pesos
a month .The owners bind themselves to maintain the club as tenant. Upon the foregoing
conditions they make the present contract of lease." If it is a lease, then it must be for a
determinate period. It cannot be concluded that the termination of the contract is to be left
completely at the will of the lessee, because it has been stipulated that its duration is to be
left to his will.

2. Moralidad v. Pernas

(GR No. 152809; August 3, 2006)

Facts:

A parcel of land located in Davao City is registered in the name of petitioner

Mercedes Moralidad under TCT No. T-123125. Petitioner now actually residing at 8021
Lindbergh Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A, acquired the lot property initially for
the purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted
the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City.
Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986: 1. that
Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they
like; that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should
maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one
another; that anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use
thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof; and that
anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the
freedom to look for his own; and that any proceeds or income derived from the
aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in greater
percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of in standing.

Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with
the respondents’ on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their
relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her
suggestions and attempts to change certain practices concerning matters of health and
sanitation within their compound.

Issue:

Whether or not the agreement for the use of the land constituted the defendants as
usufructs.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted between
the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner
of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the respondents being two
(2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as petitioner’s kin. The
Court, however, cannot go along with the CA’s holding that the action for unlawful detainer
must be dismissed on ground of prematurity. Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply
allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property
of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, with the owner
retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.
 The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the
property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits
thereof. Therefore, with the CA’s ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and
respondents.

3. Bachrach v. Seifert

(GR No. L-2659; October 12, 1950)

Facts:

The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary
McDonald Bachrach, in his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed
the remainder of his estate. The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of
stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares
representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. In1948, Mary McDonald
Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to authorize
the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to
transfer to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the
corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form
of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the
ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and
therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. While appellants admit
that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely
represents an addition to the invested capital.

Issue:

Whether or not the 54,000 shares of stock dividends belong to the the usufructuary
Mary Mcdonald Bachrach.

Ruling:

Yes. So called Pennsylvania rule, which prevails in various other jurisdictions in the
United States, supports appellee's contention. This rule declares that all earnings of the
corporation made prior to the death of the testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the
estate, and that all earnings, when declared as dividends in whatever form, made during the
lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant. Under section 16 of our Corporation Law, no
corporation may make or declare any dividend except from the surplus profits arising from its
business. Any dividend, therefore, whether cash or stock, represents surplus profits. Article
471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct.
 Here, The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000
shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and
the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of
said profits. Said shares may be sold independently of the original shares, just as the
offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of its mother.

4. Orozco and Alcantara v. Araneta

(G.R. No. L-3691; November 21, 1951)

Facts:

Eugenio del Saz Orozco died leaving a will with a pertinent clause providing that
certain properties should be given in life usufruct to his son Jacinto del Saz Orozco y
Mortera, with the obligation on his part to preserve said properties in favor of the other heirs
who were declared the naked owners thereof. Among these properties were 5,714 shares of
stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, according to the project of partition
executed pursuant to said will and duly approved by the court.

On September 11, 1934, the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company declared and
distributed stock dividends out of its surplus profits, the plaintiff receiving his proportionate
portion of 11,428 shares. On November 17, 1939, said Mining Company again declared
stock dividends out of its surplus profits, of which the plaintiff received 17,142 shares,
making a total of 28,570 shares.

Issue:

Whether or not the stock dividends should be preserved in favor of the owners or an
income or fruits of the capital which should be given to and enjoyed by the life usufructuary
as his own exclusive property.

Ruling:

Yes. The stock dividends were income or fruits of the capital which should be given
to and enjoyed by the life usufructuary, Orozco as his own exclusive property.

Citing the case of Bachrach vs. Seifert, a dividend, whether in the form of cash or
stock, is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration
that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of the
corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law.

Respondents Salvador Araneta et al attempted to differentiate the present case from

the Bachrach case, contending that, while the doctrine in that case effected a just and
equitable distribution, the application of it in the present case would cause an injustice, for,
quoting Justice Holmes, "abstract propositions do not decide concrete cases." 
 One of the differences pointed out is that by the declaration of stock dividends the
voting power of the original shares of stock is considerably diminished, and, if the stock
dividends are not given to the remaindermen, the voting power of the latter would be greatly
impaired. Bearing in mind that the number of shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company is so large, the diminution of the voting power of the original shares of
stock in this case cannot possibly affect or influence the control of the policies of the
corporation which is vested in the owners of the great block of shares. This would not be a
sufficient reason for modifying the doctrine of the Bachrach case. These remarks were made
in answer to the argument of the appellees in this particular case, but they do not imply that
if the diminution of the voting power were considerable the doctrine should be modified.

5. Alunan v. Veloso

(G.R. No. L-29158; December 29, 1928)

Facts:

This case deals with an account filed in these intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosendo Hernaez by his judicial administrator,
Rafael Alunan. Jose Hernaez, one of the heirs interested in this proceedings, assigned the
whole of his portion to Eleuteria Ch. Velos- who objects to some of the items of the account
filed, assigning errors to the resolution of the lower court. One of the errors questioned
herein is that the lower court having admitted the partition proposed by the administrator in
his account. According to this account, the total amount to be partitioned among the heirs is
P88,979.08, which the administrator distributed equally among all the heirs, including the
widow's each one receiving P11,122.38. This partition is object to with respect to the
widow’s right of a usufructuary.

Issue:

Whether or not money be an object of usufruct.

Ruling:

Yes. In this case, it was alleged that the distributed amount is in money, and since
the widow's right is only a usufruct, and as there can be no usufruct of money, since it is a
fungible thing, the adjudication made to the widow was erroneous.

However, the Supreme Court stated that it is incorrect to say that there can be no
usufruct of money, because it is a fungible thing (Art. 482, Civil Code). Thus, Money can be
considered an object of usufruct.
 6. Bislig Bay v. Government of Surigao

(G.R. No. L-9023. November 13, 1956)

Facts:

Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. is a timber concessionaire of a portion of public forest
located in the provinces of Agusan and Surigao. To develop and exploit its concession, the
company constructed at its expense a road from the barrio Mangagoy into the area of the
concession. Tax was paid under protest but later, the company filed an action for its refund
in the Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that the road is not subject to tax. Province of
Surigao filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds (1) that the venue is improperly laid, and
(2) that the complaint states no -cause of action; but this motion was denied.

The theory of Bislig Bay is that the road is exempt from real tax because (1) the road
belongs to the national government by right of accession, (2) the road cannot be removed or
separated from the land on which it is constructed and so it is part and parcel of the public
land, and (3), according to the evidence, the road was built not only for the use and benefit
of appellee but also of the public in general.

Issue:

Whether or not a usufructuary be compelled to pay taxes of the road they

constructed which the government

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court upheld the theory of Bislig Bay that the ownership of the
road that was constructed by them belongs to the government by right accession not only
because it is inherently incorporated or attached to the timber land leased to appellee but
also because upon the expiration of the concession, said road would ultimately pass to the
national government. In the second place, while the road was constructed by Bislig Bay
primarily for its use and benefit, the privilege is not exclusive, for, under the lease contract
entered into by them and the government and by public in by the general. , the road in
question cannot be considered as an improvement which belongs to appellee, although in
part is for its benefit, it is clear that the same cannot be the subject of assessment within the
meaning of section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 470.
 It is well settled that a real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the
owner of the land and not by a usufructuary (Mercado vs. Rizal, 67 Phil., 608; Article 597,
new Civil Code). Appellee is but a partial usufructuary of the road in question.

7. Board of Assessments v. Samar Mining

(GR NO. L-28034 Feb 27, 1971)

Facts:

Samar Mining (Samico) owned a mine and mill built the 42-km gravel pit Samico
Road to connect to the pier. Granted Miscellaneous Lease for the right of way by the
Bureau of Land and Bureau of Forestry for the public land where the road traversed but
Contract of Lease never executed.

Samico received an assessment from the Provincial Assessor amounting to

P1,117,900.00 as real estate tax on the taxable portion of Samico Road. Samico appealed
the assessment to petitioner Board of Assessment (BAA) on the ground that the road was
not a taxable improvement because it was constructed entirely on public land. The BAA
upheld the assessment but held it unenforceable until the lease contracts were executed.
Samico moved for reconsideration, but the BAA, in a decision dated Aug. 3, 1965, not only
denied the appeal but made the assessment immediately enforceable, with the amount due
accruing from the date of completion of the road in 1959. Upon second denial by the BAA,
Samico elevated its case to the Court of Tax Appeals.

The Provincial Assessor and the BAA assailed the CTA’s jurisdiction over the case
on the ground that Samico should have paid the tax under protest first before appealing. On
June 28, 1967, the CTA ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case and then decided in favor
of Samico. Hence this appeal to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the road constructed on alienable public land leased to Samico is
taxable.

Ruling:

No. The road constructed on alienable public land leased to Samico is not taxable.

The road is indeed an improvement, but it is not taxable under Sec. 2 of the
Assessment Law pursuant to the ruling in Bislig Bay Lumber Co. v. Prov’l. Gov’t. of Surigao
(100 Phil 303), which held that a private party who introduces improvements on public land
subject to a lease is only a partial usufructuary of the road and therefore cannot be made to
pay real estate tax; because in such cases ownership ultimately remains with the
Government and the improvements remain open to public use.

In this case, the road constructed by Samar Mining made on the public land is for
public purpose. Hence, should be exempted from paying the real property taxes.

8. Mercado v. Real

(GR NO. 45534; Apr 27, 1939)

Facts:

The properties by the deceased Paciano Rizal y Mercado belonged in usufruct to

nine (9) heirs and in naked ownership to seven (7) others.

The naked owners wanted the usufructuaries to pay the land tax of the said properties.
However, the usufructuaries refused contending that the obligation to pay the land tax rests
on the naked owners. Notwithstanding the refusal of the usufructuaries, the naked owners
deducted the amount of the land tax to the share in the products of the former. Eventually,
eight (8) naked owners returned a portion of the amount that had been deducted from the
share in the products of the usufructuaries. The usufructuaries then brought an action to
compel the only naked owner who refused the return of the said share.

The trial court interposed a demurrer on the ground that the action is premature
under Article 505 of the Old Civil Code which states: Any taxes which may be imposed
directly upon the capital, during the usufruct, shall be chargeable to the owner. Then, if paid
the latter, the usufructuary shall pay him the proper interest on any sums he may have
disbursed by reason thereof; if the usufructuary should advance the amounts of such taxes
he shall recover them upon the expiration of the usufruct.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court is correct in interposing the demurrer based on the
ground that the action of the usufructuaries is premature.

Ruling:

No. The trial court erred in interposing the demurrer based on the ground that the
action of the usufructuaries is premature.
 Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 505 of the Old Civil Code, if the
usufructuary should pay the tax, he would be entitled to reimbursement for the amount
thereof only upon the expiration of the usufruct, and the usufruct being still afoot, it is
premature for usufructuaries who advanced the payment of the tax, to bring the action for
the recovery of what they paid. However, in this case, the usufructuaries did not make the
payment; the naked owners were the ones who made it without their consent and with
money belonging to them as their share of the fruits coming to them in their capacity as
usufructuaries. Reversing the resolutions of the trial court, the demurrer interposed to the
complaint is overruled.

9. Hemedes v. CA
GR NO.107132 Oct 8, 1999

Facts:
Jose Hemedes is the father of Maxima and Enrique. Jose executed “Donation Inter
Vivos with Resolutory Conditions” whereby he conveyed the subject land in favor of his third
wife, JUSTA KAUSAPIN, subject to the following resolutory conditions: (a) Upon the death or
remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children,
or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public document
conveying the property to the latter; or (b)In absence of such an express designation made
by the DONEE before her death or remarriage contained in a public instrument as above
provided, the title to the property shall automatically revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR
in common.
Pursuant to the first condition, Justa Kausapin executed “Deed of Conveyance by
Reversion”, conveying the property to Maxima Hemedes. A title was issued in the name of
Maxima. Maxima then constituted a real estate mortgage over the property and the property
was extra judicially foreclosed by R&B insurance for Maxima’s failure to pay the loan she
obtained. Meanwhile, despite the earlier conveyance by JUSTA to Maxima, Justa executed
a “Kasunduan” conveying the same property to her stepson Enrique. Enrique then sold the
property to Dominium.

Issue:

Whether or not R & B Insurance should be considered an innocent purchaser of the

land in question

Ruling:

Yes, R & B Insurance should be considered an innocent purchaser. The annotation

of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa upon Maxima’s OCT dose not impose upon R & B
Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor’s title.

Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance. The owner of the property maintains the jus disponendi
or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even destroy the same. This right is
embodied in the Civil Code, which provides that the owner of property the usufruct of which
is held by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter the property’s form or
substance, or do anything which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary. There is no doubt
that the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and the law
provides that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the
mortgagor, and should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the
debt, the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason
thereof. Based on the foregoing, the annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa is not
sufficient cause to require R & B Insurance to investigate Maxima’s title for the reason that
Maxima’s ownership over the property remained unimpaired despite such encumbrance. R &
B Insurance had a right to rely on the certificate of title and was not in bad faith in accepting
the property as a security for the loan it extended to Maxima Hemedes.

10. Chingen v. Arguelles

(GR No. L-3314; January 3, 1907)

Facts:
Anselmo Chingen, by his attorney, Claro Reyes, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, praying for judgment against the four defendants herein for
onehalf of the jewels therein mentioned and the rent of the property referred to therein, to
wit, 4,170 pesos, or a half of 8,340 pesos received by the defendants since the date they
took possession of the legacies left by the deceased Raymunda Reyes in her will that is to
say, since the 29th of May, 1900 which said legacies consisted of a house numbered 8, 10,
12 and 14 Calle Claveria, district of Binondo, two combs set with diamonds and pearls,
respectively, a gold ring set with three diamonds, a pair of gold earrings set with three
diamonds each, and a gold ring set with one large and several small diamonds, the
defendants having refused to pay half of the earnings derived from the property left by the
testatrix and the legacies referred to belonging to him as the surviving husband of the
deceased, who died without legitimate heirs, ascendants or descendants, all efforts to collect
the sum thus claimed having failed. Article 837 of the Civil Code provides: "If the testator
should leave neither legitimate ascendants or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be
entitled to one-half of the estate also in usufruct."

Issue:
Whether or not Chingen should received his share as an heir under the will from one
half of the estate and be further entitled to the usufruct of the other half

Ruling:
No. Article 513: The usufruct shall be extinguished: (a) By the death of usufructuary;
(b) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or performance of the condition
subsequent set forth in the deed creating the usufruct; (c) By the coincidence of the usufruct
and ownership in the same person. (d) By the renunciation of the usufructuary; (e) By total
loss of the thing constituting the subject matter of the usufruct. (f) By termination of the right
of the person who constituted the usufruct. And (g) By prescription.
 The property of the estate of his deceased wife having been divided in two equal
parts,the property to which the plaintiff was entitled as an heir under the will should have
been taken out of the one half,subject to the usufruct of the surviving spouse. The
usufructuary right in one-half of the estate of a deceased person who leaves neither
legitimate ascendants nor descendants is extinguished ipso facto by the merger of such
usufructuary right and ownership in one person whom concur the status of widower and heir.
 11. Vda de Aranas v. Aranas

(GR No. L-56249, 29 May 1987)

Facts:

The testator left a will which was admitted to probate in 1956. The will provides that:
(1) the remainder of the estate will be under the the special administration of Vicente Aranas,
his faithful and serviceable nephew, until his death or until he resigns; (2) that the sons of
testator’s brother [Carmelo] can hold said office of special administrator, and none other than
they, if Vicente dies or resigns; (3) the special administration is perpetual; and (4) that
Vicente will receive 1/2 of the produce of said properties, and the other 1/2 of the produce to
be given to the Catholic Church.

In 1977, respondent Judge in SP:303 [Motion for Declaration of Heirs and Partition
and for Removal of the Administrator] ruled in petitioners’ favor that the ‘perpetual
inalienability and administration by Vicente is null and void after 20 years from 1954. Vicente
moved to reconsider alleging that said order was violative of due process because only the
issue for the removal of administrator was heard. Thus, the court set aside its earlier order.
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the testamentary dispositions [right of usufructuary and right to hold
as special administrator] is null and void for being perpetual, that is, more than 20 years.

Ruling:

No. The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties
(Group "C") is subject to the following (1). Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net
proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente
Aranas, during his lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the estate, and, who, upon
his death or refusal to continue such usufruct, may be succeeded by any of the brothers of
the administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one selected by
his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the Will. (Article 562, 563, 564 and 603 of the
New Civil Code). (2) Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, particularly the
Archbishop diocese of Cagayan de Oro City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop
Patrick H. Cronin over one-half of the proceeds of the properties under Group "C." (Article
603, New Civil Code) and to last for a period of Fifty years from the effective date of the
legacy, Article 605, New Civil Code)." on the doctrine laid down in Art. 870 of the New Civil
Code to "Article 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
 12. City of Manila v. Monte de Piedad
(G.R. No. 1975. November 10, 1905)
Facts:

It was admitted during the trial of this case that the city of Manila was, on and prior to
the 6th day of July, 1887, the owner of the land in the Plaza de Goiti, on which the building of
defendant now stands. On the 6th day of July, 1887, the city of Manila adopted the following
resolution.

On the 14th of May, 1901, the defendant presented to the Court of First Instance of
Manila, a petition asking that its possession as owner of the land and building in question be
inscribed in accordance with the provisions of article 390 of the Mortgage Law. The
proceedings usual in such cases were taken, the prayer of the petition was granted by the
Court of First Instance, and on the 13th of June, 1901, the inscription was made in the
registry of property for the city of Manila. On the 13th of October, 1903, the plaintiff brought
this action against the defendant, asking that the above-mentioned inscription be canceled,
and that the judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the property
and the sum of $14,000, money of the United States, as damages. Judgment was entered in
the court below in favor of the plaintiff so far as to order that the inscription be so modified as
to show that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and that the defendant had a right to
occupy it gratuitously, so long as devoted the land to the purpose above mentioned. The
judgment denied the plaintiff any other relief. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, but
the defendant has not.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant has a right to occupy the land in question so long as
the building is not abandoned, and so long as it is devoted to the purposes of a Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros and consider the defendant as usufructuary

Ruling:

Yes.The defendant has a right to occupy the land in question so long as the building
is not abandoned, and so long as it is devoted to the purposes of a Monte de Piedad y Caja
de Ahorros.

The appellant also bases its appeal upon the ground that the defendant, by claiming
in the proceedings relating to the possessory information to be the absolute owner of the
land and building, forfeited all the rights which it acquired by virtue of the cession of 1887;
that by this claim it repudiated the relation which had theretofore existed between it and the
appellant, and virtually said that it no longer occupied the land under the terms of the grant,
but was the absolute owner thereof. At the trial below evidence was introduced by the
defendant to show that this claim of ownership was made by the officers then in charge of
the defendant institution under a mistake of fact; that the only documents which the then
officers had before them at the time the proceeding was commenced, indicated that the city
had conveyed in 1887 to the defendant an absolute title to the land. The evidence tended to
show that the then managers of the Monte de Piedad were not informed of and did not see
copies of the petition to which we have referred, nor of the resolution of the city of Manila
making the cession, and the claim of the defendant is that there was no intention on its part
in presenting the petition for the inscription.
 13. Locsin v. Valenzuela

(G.R. No. 51333, G.R. No. 52289 May 18, 1989)

Facts:

Petitioners Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita R. Guanzon, Celina R. Sibug, Ma. Lusia R.

Perez, Editha R. Ylanan and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of
agricultural land known as "Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in Barrio Panubigan, Canlaon
City, Negros Occidental covered by a Transfer of Certificate of Title. A portion of this land,
known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was subject to
the lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated
by lessee.

On 22 October 1972, after the onset of the martial law administration of former
President Marcos, Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated, decreeing the
"Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of land owned in common by the petitioners, including
the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell within the scope of
"Operation Land Transfer." Petitioners through counsel sought the opinion of the DAR as to
who (petitioners or respondent Helen Schon) should be entitled to receive the rental
payments which continued to be made by the respondent tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR
District Officer rendered an opinion on 30 May 1977 that the rental payments as of 22
October 1972 were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such
should pertain to the land- owners and not to the usufructuary.

Issue:

What is the legal character of the payments made by the tenants beginning 21
October 1972 payments on the price of the land itself or civil fruits of the land.

Ruling:

Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform area and subjected to
Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21 October 1972 by the private
respondent tenants-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that
they were required to pay under Presidential Decree No. 27. These payments, therefore,
legally pertain to petitioners, the former landowners as part of the compensation for the
dominion over land of which they were deprived by operation of Presidential Decree No. 27.
Those payments can not be characterized as rentals like those which had been paid to
Helen Schon as usufructuary prior to the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 and
prior to the effectivity of Operation Land Transfer.nIt follows that respondent Helen Schon,
so long as her rights as usufructuary persist under the instrument which gave birth to such
rights, would be entitled to a replacement reasonably equivalent to the land previously
burdened with her usufructuary right, or to legal interest on the amount of the indemnity or
cost of the land paid by private respondent tenants-farmers and the Land Bank. Thus, from
the monies that she actually received from private respondent tenants-farmers on and after
21 October 1972, respondent Helen Schon is entitled to retain an amount equivalent to the
legal interest on said amounts for every year that the usufruct would by its own terms have
continued to exist had it not been extinguished by operation of Presidential Decree No. 27;
the balance of such amounts received by her shall be turned over to petitioners.
 14. Moralidad v. Pernes
(G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006)

Facts:

Petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While teaching in Manila,
she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
While schooling, she was offered to teach at the Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which
she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she worked at the Mental Health Department of said
University for the next seventeen (17) years. During those years, she would come home to
the Philippines to spend her two-month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City.
Being single, she would usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece,
respondent Arlene Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario.

Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug at
the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and children were
victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents. Shocked and saddened
about this development, she immediately sent money to Araceli, Arlene’s older sister, with
instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where Arlene and her family could transfer and
settle down. Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene
move from Mandug to Davao City proper in Palm Village, Bajada, Davao City but later she
wanted the property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao
City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986.
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the
respondents’ on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their
relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her
suggestions and attempts to change certain practices concerning matters of health and
sanitation within their compound. Petitioner filed with an unlawful detainer suit against the
respondent spouses.

Issue:

Whether or not the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished or
terminated

Ruling:

Yes. The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the
title creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph 3 thereof states that
anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof.
Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof. What may be
inimical to the purpose constituting the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding
paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes
to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live
in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another. That the maintenance of a peaceful
and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for
the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding Paragraph 4 where
petitioner stated that anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the
undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of
the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of
harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by
express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
 TITLE VIII. NUISANCE

1. Bengzon v. Province of Pangasinan

(G.R. No. L-41941; January 9, 1936)

Facts:

The plaintiff owns a house constructed of wood and covered with nipa on Avenida
Rizal, municipality of Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan; that he had and his family have
resided there for twenty-seven years, his family being composed of eight members. Their
house is two stories constructed upon a lot which contains 720 square meter. Upon the
adjacent lot the defendant, during the years 1924 and 1925, constructed a reinforced
concrete stand pipe 28 meters high and nine meters in diameter. Within the base of this
cylindrical tank there are three machines: One electrical, one gasoline and one crude oil. On
the side of the tank nearest the plaintiff's residence and at a distance of 3.4 meters is a
chimney which rises to about the height of the gable of the house. The tank itself is 3.8
meters from the house of the plaintiff.

In March, 1927, the plaintiff protested to the governor of the province for the manner
in which the plant was being operated and asked that he be indemnified for the value of his
house and lot so that he might move his family and his effects to another residence.

Issue:

Whether or not an action for damages will prosper for maintaining a nuisance
continuously injurious to the plaintiff and his family.

Ruling:

Yes. In locating its pumping station within 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff,
the defendant should reasonably have foreseen that the noise, vibrations, smoke, odor and
sparks coming from the plant during its operation, not only during the day but during the
night as well, would cause a constant annoyance, discomfort and danger both to the
property of the plaintiff and the health and comport of himself and his family. The chimney
which is just opposite the plaintiff's house at a distance of only 3.4 meters emits smoke,
gases of crude oil and gasoline and occasionally sparks well. The plaintiff testified that at
times the smoke blinds him and his family affecting their lungs and their eyes and that the
noise and vibrations affect their sleep. As against the testimony of the plaintiff, who is
exposed day in and day out to these conditions, and of his neighbors who corroborate him,
the brief ocular inspection made by the court on one day, although conducted with eminent
fairness, seems to us to be entitled to less weight. The witnesses for the defendant, its
employees, naturally minimize the harmful effects to the plaintiff of the operation of the
machines in the pumping plant. But the evidence as a whole leaves us with clear conviction
that the construction and operation of this pumping plant in such close proximity to the
plaintiff's residence has rendered the same practically uninhabitable without exposing to risk
the comfort, health and, in case of fire, even the live of the plaintiff and his family.
 2. Ayala v. Baretto

(G.R. No. L-9966; February 14, 1916)

Facts:

The complaint alleged that the erection and operation of a combined brewery and
ice plant on Calle General Solano in the city of Manila, constitutes nuisance.

The twenty-two plaintiffs are either residents of property owners on Calle General
Solano. Twelve of them are actual resident of the street and of these twelve, six are lessees
of property owned by other plaintiffs. This street connects Echague and Aviles Streets. All
three parallel the Pasig River. Echague is almost wholly given over to industrial enterprises,
and Aviles also has some factories, etc., upon it, including the San Miguel Brewery. This
latter brewery is a long established business, is adjacent to many residences, and is, in fact,
closer to some of the plaintiffs than is the proposed brewery. 

Issue:

Whether or not the plant will create a nuisance

Ruling:

No. After a careful consideration of all the evidence of record, we have come to the
conclusion that the locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently the
impress of a residential district as to justify us in holding that the plant will be incongruous
with its surroundings. This conclusion is made easier in view of the fact that another brewery
is in fact closer to several of the plaintiffs than that of the defendants will be. The fact that
this latter brewery is not on the same street is immaterial. Distance is what counts in a
matter of this kind. Noise, smells, and smoke are no respecters of streets.

Is there evidence of record that the proposed plant will be operated so carelessly as
to materially increase the noise, smells, and smoke emanating therefrom? We think not. On
the contrary, the evidence is that a brewery, properly run, is not an unbearable neighbor and
that the defendants are installing modern machinery in every respect. For the defense, there
is evidence of engineers and others that there will be no noise, vibrations, or smells, and but
little, if any, smoke which will materially affect nearby residents. We think that the
preponderating weight of the evidence is to the effect that the new brewery will be operated
with a minimum of offense to nearby residents, and that in view of the semi-industrial
character of the locality, what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable.
 3. Ramcar v. Millar

(G.R. No. L-17760; October 31, 1962)

Facts:

Ramcar has been engaged in the auto repair and body building business since 1938
up to the present, except when it was interrupted during the Japanese occupation. It
transferred its place of business to its present site from 1049 R. Hidalgo Street, Manila, on
December 20, 1951 because the old location was within the 100-meter radius from the Jose
Rizal College, in violation of City ordinances. the nature of the corporation's activities,
actually engaged in, consists in repairing and building bodies of motor vehicles, and involves
the use of tools and machinery that give rise to much noise and annoyance during all hours
of the day up to nighttime; and its employees oftentimes work on Sundays and holidays. At
the time of the transfer, respondent Eusebio S. Millar and his family were already residing on
his own land adjacent to that of Ramcar, Inc. He and his co-respondents repeatedly
petitioned the city authorities for the closure of the shop to no avail, because city authorities
were "at loggerheads as to whether the immediate vicinity where the business of Ramcar,
Inc. is located is a residential or a commercial zone

Issue:

Whether or not business is a nuisance in its present location.

Ruling:

Article 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person
injured to recover damages for its past existence and, in the general provisions on
Damages, the same Code states:

ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages
formulated elsewhere in this Code .

However, the business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per se. It is only on account
of its location that it is a public nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed
decision decrees, to remove all building an structures built in the place where it is presently
located as these, or parts thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that are not forbidden by law or
ordinance.

The decision appealed from is modified by permanently enjoining the petitioner only
from operating its body building operations or activities in its present location, without
requiring the demolition of the existing building.
 4. Iloilo Cold Storage v. Municipal Council

(G.R. No. L-7012; March 26, 1913)

Facts:

Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made
complaints regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their
health and comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution
which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory
operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to
label and abate the supposed nuisance in this case

Ruling:

No. There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The
former are recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such
only because of the special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former
may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a
determination of the facts which is a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the
established courts of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards
organized by force of municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City
Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance
which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial
determination.
 5. Espiritu v. Municipal Council

(G.R. No. L-11014; January 21, 1958)

Facts:

Market building of the town of Pozorrubio was destroyed during the last world war,
and after Liberation, the market vendors began constructing temporary and make-shifts
stalls, even small residences, on a portion of the town plaza. The Municipal Treasurer
collected from these stall owners fees per month. In time, the whole municipal market was
rehabilitated, but the owners of the structures on the plaza failed and refused to transfer to
said market place.

The Municipal Council of Pozorrubio received petitions from civic organizations for
the removal of the market stalls on the plaza, which were being used not only as stalls, but
also for residence purposes, said organization desiring to convert said portion of the plaza
into a children's park. As a result, the Municipal Council of Pozorrubio No. 20, Series of
1951, stating that the public market had already been rehabilitated, and ordering the
occupants and owners of the structures on the plaza to remove their buildings within sixty
days from receipt of the resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not town plaza can be used for the construction of market stalls and
leased

Ruling:

No. There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the
construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a
nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general.
They are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
municipality of Pozorrubio to private parties. While in case of war or during an emergency,
town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was
tolerated by the municipality of Pozorrubio, when the emergency has ceased said temporary
occupation or use must also cease, and the town officials should see to it that the town
plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal
constructions.
 6. Canlas v. Aquino

(G.R. No. L-16815; July 24, 1961)

Facts:

Spouses Arsenio L. Canlas and Adena Gonzales-Canlas was granted a permit to

build a house/hospital in San Jose, Municipality of Concepcion Tarlac. On December 1,
1958 the Spouses Canlas applied for a permit to operate a hospital from the Director of
Hospitals and on January 14, 1949 the Provincial Board of Tarlac granted its approval. On
the other hand, Jaime Tayal acquired a permit to construct a rice mill in front of the Canlas
Clinic.

Issue:

Whether or not the construction of the rice mill is a nuisance

Ruling:

Yes, the construction and operation will hinder the operations of the Canlas Clinic.
The rice mill will emit smoke. Vapour, palay husk dusk and dirt at the same time the noise
the mill will bring about which is detrimental to the fast recovery of the patients.
 7. San Rafael Homeowners v. City of Manila

(G.R. Nos. L-26833 and L-26834 July 28, 1972)

Facts:

The City of Manila scheduled a bidding for the construction of a Garbage and Refuse
Disposal Plant which must be pollution-free and never be a nuisance pursuant to City
Ordinance No. 5274, authorizing the establishment, equipping and construction of a garbage
and refuse disposal plant. he City of Manila advertised for and received bids for the
construction of the plant in accordance with specifications previously prepared by the
respondents. Six bids were received: four firms offered to construct a compost plant, one
firm offered to put up an incinerator with a thermal power station to generate electricity, and
another offered a combined compost and incinerating plant. however, the Committee on
Awards decided to reject all the bids on the ground that none of them complied with the
requirement in the ordinance that the garbage and refuse disposal plant should be capable
of being operated on a self-liquidating basis. New specifications were drawn which defined
the term "Garbage and Refuse Disposal Plant" to mean "pollution-free incinerator plant
complete with accessories and all other auxiliaries that may render it a self-liquidating
project," 

However, herein petitioner contends that the advertised bidding for an incinerator
was in excess of the respondents' authority because an incinerator is a nuisance per se and
because its establishment would violate Ordinance No. 5274, the City Charter of Manila, the
Revised Administrative Code, and the Local Autonomy Act. Thus, the operation of an
incinerator may give rise to a nuisance which should be prevented.

Issue:

Whether or not the argument of the petitioners that composting is better than
incineration as a method of garbage and refuse disposal and that incineration will prove to
be a nuisance is meritorious.

Ruling:

It is entirely pointless to go into an academic discussion of the relative merits of the

composting and the incineration methods of garbage and refuse disposal for purposes of
deciding whether or not at this stage prohibition should issue to stop the bidding called for by
the respondents. The instant petitions for that purpose are premature. Certainly the court
cannot and should not substitute its judgment this early for that of the respondents, and on a
purely theoretical basis rule that the bids submitted should not be opened, or if opened
should not be accepted, because not one of the plants therein offered to be established
would serve the purpose envisaged and because, if so established, it would so pollute the
environment as to constitute a nuisance. If and when such a result becomes a reality, or at
least an imminent threat, that will be the time the petitioners may come to court .That they
are not successful now will not preclude them from doing so, because a continuing nuisance
calls for a continuing remedy.
 8. Tamin v. CA

G.R. No. 97477, May 8, 1992

Facts:

The plaintiff (petitioner municipality herein) is the owner of a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur with an area of 5,894 square meters
more or less; that the parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under Presidential
Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968; that during the incumbency of the late Mayor
Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958, the municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square meters to the
defendants (respondents herein) subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in
case it is needed for public purposes; that the defendants religiously paid the rentals until
1967; that thereafter, the defendants refused to pay the rentals; that the incumbent mayor
discovered that the defendants filed a "Cadastral Answer" over said lot; that the defendants
refused to vacate the place despite efforts of the municipality; that the national government
had alloted an appropriation for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public
plaza but the said construction which was already started could not continue because of the
presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants; that the appropriation for the
construction of the gymnasium might be reverted back to the national government which
would result to "irreparable damage, injury and prejudice" to the municipality and its people
who are expected to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project.

The trial court granted the petitioner municipality's motion for a writ of possession
"with the ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of
this case, to the end that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized."

Issue:

Whether or not the buildings constructed by the respondents are nuisance.

Ruling:

The buildings constructed by the respondents shall be considered a nuisance should

the pending administrative case declare that the subject land is part of public dominion. The
Civil Code provides under Art. 694 that “A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property or anything else which hinders or impairs the use of
property." Thus, if the administrative case is decided against the respondent, his continued
use of the buildings hinders or impairs the use of the property by the municipality making
such building a nuisance.
 9. Lucena Grand v. JAC Liner

(G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005)

Facts:

The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses,
mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city
and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping
of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby
declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all
jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city.

Issue:

Whether or not terminals are public nuisance

Ruling:

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a
legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property,
health, or comfort of the community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to
their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens,
not per se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an
ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.

10. Hidalgo v. Balandan

 (91 Phil 448; G.R. No. L-3422; June 13, 1952)

Facts:

Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the
death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises
2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was
easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the
said gate. Also the tanks didn’t have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was
playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming
inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in
the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of
attractive nuisance.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case

Ruling:

No. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in
play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the
attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as
natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere
water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine
thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.

11. City of Cebu v. Judge Gako

 (AM 08-2111; May 7, 2008)

Facts:

The Court initially referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA later found the respondent
judge administratively liable for undue delay in deciding the case and for gross ignorance of
the law, which is tantamount to grave abuse of judicial authority, when he violated the
doctrine of non-interference. The OCA, therefore, recommended that the case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; the respondent judge be fined P11,000.00 and
be suspended without pay for 6 months; and the motion to direct the respondent to
compulsorily inhibit himself from all cases pending in his court in which complainant is a
party-litigant be denied for being judicial in character. Subsequently, the Court designated
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas to further investigate and evaluate
the charges leveled against the respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Gako is liable.

Ruling:

Yes. After weighing the arguments and the evidence of the parties, the Investigating
Justice found the respondent judge liable only for undue delay in deciding case. The Court
upholds the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Justice, but modifies the
recommended penalty.

On the charge that the respondent judge unduly arrogated unto himself the duty of a
counsel, in Civil Case No. CEB-26607, by calling a witness to the stand and conducting the
latter's direct testimony even if the respective counsels were not interested or did not intend
to present said person as their witness, the Court finds nothing irregular in the same.
Revealed in the hearings of the said case is that the respondent judge intended to obtain
enlightenment from the said witness, the project director of one of the signatories to the
contract being litigated. In not a few cases, this Court has declared that the trial judge, if he
is not satisfied after hearing all the evidence adduced by the parties, may, in the exercise of
sound discretion, on his own motion and in furtherance of justice, call additional witnesses or
recall some or the same witnesses for the purpose of questioning them himself to enlighten
him on particular facts or issues involved in the case.

As to the four charges of willful violation of laws and rules, the Court finds them
without merit. The complainant failed to clearly prove error or ill will on the part of the
respondent judge in denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-26066. Granting that
respondent erred in denying the motion, the complainant should have appealed or petitioned

12. RP v. Mijares
 (GR No. 170615; July 9, 2009)

Facts:

This case against respondents started from a controversy involving a parcel of land owned
by the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) located in Barangay
Pinugay, Baras, Rizal. Claiming that the subject land is covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), members of the Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (SPFMPCI) occupied about 100 hectares thereof. They
introduced improvements such as houses, fruit-bearing trees, vegetables, palay and other
crops.

PHILCOMSAT filed a protest before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

claiming that the land was exempt from CARP coverage since it was an integral part of the
Philippine Space Communications Operation. The DAR denied the protest. PHILCOMSAT
then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the petition,
respondent Mayor Roberto G. Ferrera issued an order directing respondent Engr. Romeo
Querubin to demolish the said houses and improvements. Meanwhile, in a pending case
between PHILCOMSAT and SPFMPCI before the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems, respondent Commissioner Rufino V. Mijares issued an order interposing no
objection to the order of demolition. Ferrera then directed Querubin to implement the order.
He also sought police assistance. On March 24, 2000, the houses and improvements on the
subject land were demolished and destroyed. As a result, SPFMPCI filed an administrative
case for grave misconduct and harassment against respondents before the Office of the
Ombudsman. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, respondents argued that the SPFMPCI
members were not in the list of occupants/potential farmer-beneficiaries Thus, they were
illegal entrants whose houses and improvements constituted a nuisance that may be abated.

Issue:

Whether or not the summary demolition of the houses owned by farmer-members of

the SPFMPCI violated RA 7279 and PD 1096 and thus, constituted nuisance

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court instead finds the reliance of both parties on the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1096 misplaced and that the demolition implemented by
respondents in order. If under Rep. Act No. 7279, demolition and eviction are allowed when
individuals have been identified as professional squatters and squatting syndicates or when
they occupy danger areas and other public places, and under P.D. No. 1096, they construct
dangerous and ruinous buildings or structures, thus, more reason the SPFMPCI members
should be summarily evicted and their structures and dwellings demolished. The parcel of
land involved in this case is a security zone whose operations must be protected from any
form of disruption. It must be protected from all types of squatters, including the SPFMPCI
members, who might create danger to a very important national telecommunications facility.
Hence, Clearly, respondents acted within the limits of the law when they implemented the
demolition.

13. Telmo v. Bustamante

 (GR No. 182567; July 13, 2009)

Facts:

The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square
meters in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde
Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and
952-C, respectively, located at the back of respondents lot. When his lot was transgressed
by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for sale the
remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said they would have no use for
it, the remaining portion being covered by the roads 10-meter easement. The complaint
further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A in the
presence of the Telmos

On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00
p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The
following day, respondents relatives went to Brgy Chairman Consumo to report the
destruction of the concrete poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same,
because he was present when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the incident
in the barangay blotter. Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive
any just compensation from the government when it took a portion of their property for the
construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of
the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and
Consumo.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s contention that the concrete posts erected by respondent
were a public nuisance under Article 694

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held in negative and finds no merit on the contention of the
petitioner that respondent’s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se, which
may be the subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings

It should be noted that a nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to
the safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and
summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by
blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.

14. Gancayco v. Government

 (GR NO. 177807 October 11, 2011)

Facts:

The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of

Quezon City and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance
pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco
owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey
commercial building, which was situated along EDSA, in an area which was designated as
part of a Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon City Council. The Quezon City Council
also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of Arcades for Commercial
Buildings.

The ordinance was amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon City
- San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the
arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property,
already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April
28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to
be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply
with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls. Gancayco then filed a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon
City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and just
compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He
sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property be constituted as a public

nuisance

Ruling:

No. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers
the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A
nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the
undefined law of necessity. Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a
nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In
AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp., 506 SCRA 625 (2006), we held: We agree with
petitioner’s contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears
stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact,
that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its
nature, situation or use is not such.
15. Perez v. Spouses Madrona
 (GR NO. 184478 March 21, 2012)
Facts:

Respondent-spouses Madrona are registered owners of a residential property

located in  Marikina City and covered by TCT No. 169365. Respondents built their house
thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. Later, respondents were
notified that the structure that they built encroached on the sidewalk and that is in violation of
PD 1096 of the National Building Code and RA 917 on Illegally occupied/constructed
improvements within the road right-of-way. The respondent-spouses are given 7 days to
remove the said structure. Respondent Madrona contended that (1) contained an
accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due process;
(2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish their
structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish;
and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
Respondents filed a complaint for injunction.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents’ structure is a nuisance per se

Ruling:

No. If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the

sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed
his request to remove it.  Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed
violations in the construction of the concrete fence.  Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per
se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention.  

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., on the need for judicial
intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning. In said
case,

Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.  That applies to a nuisance per se, or
one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso).  The storage of
copra in the building is a legitimate business.  By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious
to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community.  If it be a nuisance per
accidents it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.  It is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se.  By its nature, it is not injurious to the
health or comfort of the community.  It was built primarily to secure the property of
respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by
respondents, the sidewalk still exists.  If petitioner believes that respondents’ fence indeed
encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose.  Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary
abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

16. Linda Rana v.Teresita Lee Wong

 [GR No. 192862, JUNE 20, 2014]
Facts:

Teresita Lee Wong (Wong) and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong (Sps. Ong) are
co-owners pro-indiviso of a residential land situated in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug,
Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1391605 (Wong-Ong property),
abutting a 10-meter wide subdivision road.
On the opposite side of the subject road, across the Wong-Ong property, are the
adjacent lots of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy (Sps. Uy) and Spouses Reynaldo and
Linda Rana (Sps. Rana), respectively covered by TCT Nos. 1240958 (Uy property) and T-
1155699 (Rana property). The said lots follow a rolling terrain with the Rana property
standing about two (2) meters higher than and overlooking the Uy property, while the Wong-
Ong property is at the same level with the subject road. Thereafter, Sps. Rana elevated and
cemented a portion of the subject road that runs between the Rana and Wong-Ong
properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion with their gate. Sps. Rana
likewise backfilled a portion (subject backfilling) of the perimeter fence separating the Rana
and Uyproperties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added
filling materials. The matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Lahug as
well as the Office of the Building Official of Cebu City (OBO), but to no avail.
On September 19, 1997, Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps. Uy (Wong, et al.) filed a Complaint
for Abatement of Nuisance with Damages against Sps. Rana before the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the elevated and cemented subject portion is a nuisance

Ruling:

No. With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the
same is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their
house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the
adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties.Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per
se(but actually a nuisance per accidensas will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily
abated. As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject portion, which was not
sanctioned under the RTC’s November 27, 1997 Order,remains unwarranted.
However, Sps. Rana themselves have caused damage to the Sps. Wong, as the
records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior consultation with Wong, et al. and to their sole
advantage, elevated and cemented almost half61 of the 10-meter wide subject road. As
homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al. maintain the rights to the
unobstructed use of and free passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject
portion, Sps. Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the
aforesaid rights.

17. Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc.

 [GR No. 188213, JANUARY 11, 2016]
Facts:

Here, the acts of petitioners prompted the filing of a Complaint before the Prosecutor's
Office and the Office of the Ombudsman by the group that claims to be the basketball court's
owners, herein respondents Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc. and its president Ilao. In the
complaint, they alleged that PHC is the group that had donated, administered and operated
the subject basketball court for the Pandacan community until its alleged destruction by
petitioners. In answer, Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the
barangay and was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. Cruz
maintained that the court's users never heeded the barangay officials' efforts to pacify them
and when the basketball ring was once padlocked, such was just removed at will while
members of the complainants' club continued playing. When Cruz asked for the PHC to
return the steel bar and padlock, the request was simply ignored, thus, prompting her to
order Dela Cruz to destroy the basketball ring. The destruction was allegedly also a
response to the ongoing clamor of residents to stop the basketball games.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint filed by Ilao, having found that
the act of destroying the basketball ring was only motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz
performing their sworn duty. The office found that though the cutting of the ring was "drastic,"
it was done by the barangay officials within their lawful duties, as the act was only the result
of the unauthorized removal of and failure to return the steel bar and padlock that were
earlier placed thereon. After the Ombudsman's dismissal, the complainants Ilao filed a
petition for review.
Issue:

Whether or not the act of destroying the basketball ring was one in abatement of a
public nuisance

Ruling:

No. The destructive acts of petitioners, however, find no legal sanction. This Court
has ruled time and again that no public official is above the law.The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that although petitioners claim to have merely performed an abatement of a
public nuisance, the same was done summarily while failing to follow the proper procedure
therefor and for which, petitioners must be held administratively liable. Prevailing
jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily
abated.
In the case at bar, none of the tribunals below made a factual finding that the
basketball ring was a nuisance per se that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And
based on what appears in the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per
accidens, for it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property,
the definition of a nuisance per se. A basketball ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or
danger to anyone but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its nature, injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as
a nuisance without the benefit of a judicial hearing.