The Battle

of
Kursk,
1943
Number 253

Lang Vei, Vietnam 1968

The Prochorovka Myth

Battle of Manzikert, Bzyantium 1071

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 contents

Editor: Joseph Miranda

Assistant Editor: Ty Bomba
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins
Copy Editors: Ty Bomba, Jason Burnett, Jon Cecil
FEATURES
and Dav Vandenbroucke.
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping 6 KURSK: Tactical Victory,
Publisher: Christopher Cummins
Advertising: Rates and specifications available Operational Defeat
on request. Write P.O. Box 21598, Bakersfield CA A new look at the turning point of Hitler’s War in the East.
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20 The Prochorovka Myth
field CA 93390. Was the Battle of Kursk the death ride of the German
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The Seljuks defeat a Byzantine army and begin the chain of
events which would lead to the Crusades.
by Kelly Bell
4 #253

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 contents

Number 253
Nov/Dec 2008

FEATURES

departments
43 Tanks in the Wire:
Lang Vei, February 1968
NorthVietnamese armor overrun a special forces camp 25 on design
and open the way for the siege of Khe Sanh. Kursk
by Kelly Bell by Joseph Miranda

27 for your information

Jane Fonda in North Vietnam:
What did she actually say?
by Blaine Taylor

Pike’s Pikes
by Robert Malcomson

The 298 Spartans

by James Yates

54 DATA FILE: Air-Independent Propulsion Systems

for Submarines
The Armies of Cobra
by Carl Otis Schuster
Background data for the divisions which fought in the
D-Day campaign.
by Paul Koenig American Counterinsurgency efforts
in Thailand
by John Walsh
Rules

R1 Drive on KURSK, July 1943 33 The long tradition

by Ty Bomba 34 Work in Progress

strategy & tactics 5

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 KURSK: Tactical Victory,
Operational Defeat
By Joseph Miranda
The German 1943 summer offensive in the USSR
represents an intriguing situation. The battle was
fought at a time and in a locale of the Germans’ choos-
ing. They were operating well within their lines of
supply, and they had effective air cover from the Luft-
waffe. Further, it was the only time during the war in
the east the Germans deployed an operational reserve
consisting of tanks of a quality superior to that of their
opponent. Yet the ensuing campaign fought around
Kursk in July would become a turning point in World
War II. After that campaign the Soviet armed forces
would never again surrender the strategic initiative.
For the rest of the war the Germans would be on the
defensive in the east. into the German rear areas both north and south, there-
The weeks following the German debacle at Stalin-
grad in early 1943 saw the Soviets try to continue their
offensive. They pushed back the central and southern
sectors of the German line from south of Orel to north
of Stalino. However, Manstein’s “Backhand Blow”
counteroffensive then recouped the situation, leaving
a west-jutting Soviet bulge centered around the town
of Kursk. That salient would become the focal point
for the German 1943 offensive in the USSR.
The Germans went through extensive planning for
the Kursk offensive, which they codenamed Operation
6 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 6
Zitadelle (Citadel). Their most important decision was
in simply committing to the overall concept. Unlike
1941 and 1942, the Germans’ objective in 1943 was
not to knock the Soviet Union out of the war. Instead,
they only sought to achieve an operational victory via
the destruction of the salient itself. By keeping the of-
fensive limited geographically, the Germans felt sure
they wouldn’t overextend themselves as they had in
the previous two years.
By destroying the Kursk salient, the Germans
expected to attain several goals. First, they would
straighten their lines. The salient gave the Soviets a
position from which they could launch thrusts deep
by possibly splitting in two the entire front. Further, a
front without the Kursk bulge would also require few-
er German troops to hold. Also, the Germans wanted
to draw in and destroy the Soviet armored reserves,
making it impossible for the Red Army to launch any
large offensive later that year.
The Germans believed their new heavy tanks and
assault guns would give them a tactical edge. They
would also concentrate the Luftwaffe to ensure air su-
periority over the attack sector. The geometry of the
salient itself also appeared to give them an advantage;
9/16/08 3:02:07 PM
 strategy & tactics 7

ST 253 Issue.indd 7 9/16/08 3:02:12 PM

 its exposed position made it vulnerable to a classic
double-envelopment launched against its northern and
southern shoulders. from many historians. That is, while the Germans
Finally, Hitler also hoped to gain a victory in battle
he could then exploit for political and psychological
purposes. That was a critical factor, given that Hitler’s
shaky allies needed encouragement, especially with
fascist Italy already wavering. A victory at Kursk
would restore the aura of German invincibility after
the blows suffered at Stalingrad and in Tunisia. assault guns such as the Ferdinand, would be decisive,
In fact, the experience of 1941-42 in Russia indi-
cated Citadel would be a German success. In each of
those earlier efforts the Germans had won victories in
the early part of the campaign. It was only as those
operations dragged on that reversals occurred, in front
of Moscow in 1941 and at Stalingrad in 1942. The
Soviets seemed to require a considerable amount of
time to react to any new situation, build up reserves,
and then launch their counteroffensive. The Germans
planned to not give them that needed time in 1943.
Kursk was limited enough in scope so the Germans
could win their victory during the summer and then go
over to the defensive, afterward allowing the Soviets
to, in turn, smash themselves to pieces against their
defensive positions. Model’s Ninth Army. The southern pincer was under
The objectives were also well within range of the
German supply system. There would be no rainy au-
tumn or freezing winter weather to slow things. Spear-
heads wouldn’t be plunging deep beyond the existing
front to overextended positions where they could be
cut off. More, the offensive wasn’t directed toward any
economic objectives, which meant forces wouldn’t be
sidetracked into chasing after far off industrial and
resource areas as they had during the 1942 Caucasus
operation. Fourth Panzer Army was seemingly poised to break
The Germans waited until July to begin the opera-
tion in order to more fully rebuild their panzer units,
reequipping them with an assortment of new and more
powerful armored fighting vehicles. Some of their
generals had, however, wanted to attack earlier in or-
Air force on the decline: Luftwaffe He-111 bomber
preparing for take-off.
8 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 8
der to take advantage of the weaker Soviet position.
That decision to delay has since come under criticism
reequipped, the Soviets spent the spring moving ad-
ditional reserves to the salient and building defensive
lines, ending up with eight fortified belts 100 miles
deep in some areas. An early attack would therefore
have meant less resistance. On the other hand, Hitler
believed the new Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as
but only if deployed in sufficient numbers. An interest-
ing fact, though, is that despite the lengthy prepara-
tions, German heavy armored fighting vehicle (AFV)
strength at Kursk finally included only some 120 Pan-
ther and 90 Tiger tanks on the south side of the salient,
and 90 Ferdinand assault guns on the north. Those
aren’t really impressive numbers when compared to
the total German AFV strength of 2,700. The vast ma-
jority of German AFV were therefore still Panzer IIIs
and IVs, along with some Marder and StuG III tank
destroyers and assault guns.
Into the Fire
The Germans launched the Kursk offensive on
4 July 1943. The northern pincer was under Gen.
Gen. Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army, backed up by Army
Detachment Kempf. Both wings made slow progress.
The Soviets used a semi-elastic defense, holding a line
long enough to cause maximum losses to the attackers,
then falling back to the next line of prepared defenses.
On the other hand, the German Tiger tanks did show
their worth, proving able to knock out Soviet anti-tank
positions at long range without much danger from re-
turn fire.
through in the south, but was then fought to exhaustion
in massive battles near the town of Prochorovka, with
the II SS Panzer Corps making the deepest penetration
before being stopped. On 13 July, Hitler ordered the
offensive halted and the units to withdraw.
Why Hitler chose to call a halt is still a matter of
debate. Manstein and other German commanders op-
posed the decision, claiming if they were allowed time
to push a little farther they could complete the destruc-
tion of the Soviet armor reserve. Manstein was, no
doubt, being over-optimistic, since the Germans had
taken losses in the course of Zitadelle. Moreover, he
wasn’t aware of the still uncommitted Soviet reserves
farther east, but that were in position to be thrown into
the fighting. Even had the offensive continued, the
Germans most likely would not have been able to cut
off the salient.
Soviet historians claim the real reason for the with-
drawal was their army’s defense and counterattack had
in fact stopped Zitadelle cold. As will be seen, there’s
merit to that position, though it was true more on the
operational than tactical level. Some writers also claim
9/16/08 3:02:12 PM
 Hitler needed to shift strength to the Italian theater to
meet the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily — though
that explanation does not really wash, given that the
forces sent to Italy came from reserves in the west,
notably the German airborne divisions.
Possibly, Hitler simply realized the offensive
wasn’t achieving its objectives. The planned for gains
weren’t being made, and a point of diminishing returns
had been reached in terms of friendly to enemy losses,
especially in the vital armored units. For once, then,
Hitler decided to call a halt before an operation got out
of control. Compare the stop order at Kursk with Hit-
ler’s decision in late 1941 to make the final plunge for
Moscow, which racked up huge German losses while
still failing to take the Soviet capital, as well as his
decision to continue the meat grinder struggle at Stal-
ingrad. Far from being a “death ride” for the panzers,
then, the Kursk battle can be considered to have been a
measured operation, ended when the offensive proved
no longer cost effective. By stopping the offensive,
the panzers could be maintained as a mobile reserve to
counterattack against the coming Soviet offensive.
Inescapably, though, the Germans had lost men
and equipment without gaining Citadel’s objectives.
Within a little more than a week casualties ran as high
as 50,000 to 70,000 men, about 200 aircraft, and 300
or so tanks. There were also losses in assault guns and
other AFV. Then again, many of the vehicles counted
as “lost” were only damaged, and were quickly put
back into action by recovery and repair teams.
The Red Army lost many more men and much more
materiel at Kursk than did the Germans, possibly up to
250,000 men, 1,000 aircraft, and roughly 1,500 AFV.
The Soviets, though, could more quickly replace their
losses owing to their larger industrial capacity, as well
as US Lend-Lease support. Also, like the Germans,
many of the Soviet losses were in obsolescent models
and lighter tanks such as the T-70.
In any event, what finally made the difference Kursk also signaled the Soviets were capable of fighting
wasn’t the tally sheet of losses on each side. Rather, it the Germans head-to-head. Much of that was due to the ex-
was the fact the Germans had proved unable to destroy perience they’d gained in the previous two years of war.
the Kursk salient. Having failed to do so, they then had The Germans had also surrendered strategic surprise by
to face the inevitable Soviet counteroffensive. attacking at the place the Soviets expected. Among other
things, Western Allied intelligence, forewarned by UL-
The Soviets TRA, tipped off the Soviet high command. That lack of
Citadel failed because the Germans underestimat- surprise gave the Soviets the maximum amount of time to
ed their enemy. They believed the Soviets wouldn’t be prepare their defenses and position reserves.
ready to launch a major offensive until the winter. In
The simply obviousness of the Kursk operation is in
actuality, the Soviets were ready to attack at about the
fact what doomed it. Germany’s previous campaigns had
same time as the Germans, but they decided to wait as
been breathtaking in scope. No one had expected them to
a matter of strategy.
attempt what they did in 1939-42. For example, driving
More broadly, Kursk represented a change in the several panzer corps through the Ardennes in 1940 had
way Germany was conducting the war. It was a battle been beyond the Allies’ concept of how wars could be
of attrition, and attritional warfare was the antithesis conducted. Again, in their 1942 offensive in southern Rus-
of blitzkrieg operations. The losses in armored fight- sia, they initially had good going because Stalin expected
ing vehicles at Kursk worked to decrease German mo- them to attack on the Moscow front. In 1943, however, it
bility during the follow-on Soviet counteroffensive.
continued on page 12
strategy & tactics 9

ST 253 Issue.indd 9 9/16/08 3:02:13 PM

 1943: Year of Decision
Viewed from the perspective of the spring of 1943,
the Germans appeared to still have had a good position in
Europe. They controlled most of the continent, including
western Russia. They had survived the second major Soviet
winter counteroffensive. They had rebuilt their strength to
the point they were in a position to conduct another major
offensive in the east. More importantly, they had finally rec-
ognized the war was going to be a long one and had begun
gearing their industry accordingly. On the battlefield, new
and improved tanks, such as the Panther (Panzer V) and Ti-
ger (Panzer VI) were making their way to the front. In the
west, the Anglo-Americans, while having captured North
Africa, still lacked the will and means to challenge the Axis
on the continent itself.
By the end of 1943, though, the Germans were in full re-
treat on the Russian front; Italy had been knocked out of the
war, the strategic bombing campaign was getting into full
swing, and the Allies were preparing to launch their invasion
of France. What had happened? Essentially, the Germans lost
the war in 1943, due primarily to strategic decisions made by
their own high command. Those decisions weren’t based on
insanity on the part of Hitler, but rather were made due to a
failure to understand the evolving strategic situation. There was also the Germans’ loss of air superiority. The
Kursk proved to be a turning point insofar as the Ger-
mans were now faced with inescapably fighting a prolonged
multi-front war. In early 1943, that didn’t seem to be the
10 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 10
inevitable outcome. The Germans had, in fact, built up two
powerful reserve formations. One was in the panzer divisions
that would be committed at Kursk. The other was in the new
wave of airborne divisions. Those latter units weren’t nec-
essarily for parachute assaults. Rather, they were intended
as mobile reserves, capable of being air-transported to any
threatened sector of the Reich’s frontiers. In fact, they were
used in precisely that way in 1943, with one division sent
to Sicily in response to the Allied invasion there, and others
moved into the Italian mainland to secure that peninsula in
the wake of fascist collapse.
The German problem was that by the end of 1943 their
reserves had largely been exhausted. The panzers had been
shot up in the east. The airborne divisions had become
bogged down in holding the line in places such as Monte
Cassino. The other source of German reserves had been in
the divisions holding France and the west. In 1940-43 they
could be pulled out during emergencies and used to shore
up other threatened fronts, then returned once the crisis had
passed. With the Allied invasion of northwest Europe im-
pending, however, those formations henceforth had to stay
where they were.
problem wasn’t simply that they couldn’t produce sufficient
numbers of aircraft; it was that the Luftwaffe was also over-
committed. It had to fight one war on the eastern front, an-
9/16/08 3:02:16 PM
 Waiting for the attack: German machinegun nest.
other in the Mediterranean and, increasingly, a third war in
the sky above Germany. The attrition in aircraft was suffi-
cient for the Luftwaffe to lose its entire operational strength
each six months. At that rate, even if aircraft could be re-
placed, trained aircrew could not. And there were never suf-
ficient numbers of either to create a reserve. One of the often
overlooked effects of the Allied strategic bombing of the
Reich was that it forced the Germans to pull fighters from
the front lines to defend the homeland. By late 1943, Ger-
man air strength in the east was cut back to the point that,
the Soviet air force would gain and maintain air superiority
against the Luftwaffe. tion was ultimately why those advocating a continued Medi-
What made Kursk significant was that, by failing to win
there, the Germans would lose any chance of reforming their
operational and strategic reserves for over a year. And be-
cause they failed to do that, they had to deal with crises by
shifting forces from one front to another. Even if a local vic-
tory could be gained, it was at the expense of loss elsewhere.
It would not be until late 1944, with the formation of Sixth
Panzer Army, that they would create new force capable of
intervening on any front. By that time it was way too late.
The Germans needed a victory at Kursk to maintain them-
selves in the east. They didn’t get it.
ST 253 Issue.indd 11
On the other side of Europe, Kursk’s effect on the strategy
of the Western Allies was important in that it brought about
their high command’s full and final determination to open a
major new front in northwestern Europe at the first oppor-
tunity in 1944. That is, in the months between Manstein’s
successful “backhand blow” counteroffensive in February
and the German reversal at Kursk in mid-July, the strategic
consensus in the west was the Russian front had settled into
a pattern of strategically indecisive stalemate. The course of
events seemed similar to the one that had occurred on World
War I’s western front from 1915 through 1917. That percep-
terranean strategy for 1943 won the argument. It still didn’t
seem if there need be any undue rush to get into western (and
then central) Europe ahead of the Soviets. Kursk changed
that perception. It proved the Soviets could meet and defeat
the Germans in the summer, as well as in the winter, and
demonstrated the front would not remain locked up inside
the Soviet Union.
strategy & tactics 11
9/16/08 3:02:18 PM
 The heavies prowl: German Tiger I tanks on the move.
was obvious to the Soviet high command—even before
getting confirmation from the Western Allies—Kursk
was going to be the German target and, accordingly,
the Kremlin concentrated on that sector. By committing
their reserves at Kursk, the Soviets created a local force
superiority there for their side starting with the first day
of the German attack. paign. That was unprecedented and disastrous: the Ger-
The Soviets had actually figured out an overall coun-
ter to the blitzkrieg. At that Kursk they built successive
lines of fortifications, each containing anti-tank artillery
and mines, backed up by armored reserves. Further, they
had an organizational advantage from their independent
anti-tank brigades, in that those units allowed them to
concentrate strength at threatened sectors.
The greatest advantage held by the Soviets, then,
wasn’t so much from their superiority in numbers, but
in their having a superiority in the types of units needed
to fight particular battles. Their many artillery divisions
allowed them to concentrate their offensive firepower
when the time came to go over to the attack. Most criti-
cally, they formed powerful tank armies, each roughly
equal in size and strength to reinforced Western armored
corps, which they used as operational shock forces and
reserves. Those tank armies were initially kept out of the
line to avoid attrition, and were then unleashed where
they could generate decisive attacks and counterattacks.
Compare that to what had become the Germans’ general
practice of keeping their panzer divisions on the front at
12 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 12
all times, often even subordinating them to the infantry
armies.
Kursk therefore started and ended as nothing more
than a battle of attrition, the kind of battle the Soviets
could win. Unlike previous German offensives, losses
were taken in the panzer units from the start of the cam-
mans needed the panzers not just for the breakthrough
but also for exploitation. By suffering the losses they
did, the Germans could not make any exploitation.
While the Germans inflicted more losses on the Sovi-
ets at Kursk than they suffered themselves, the battle
proved to be another important psychological and mili-
tary turning point in that it marked the end of their op-
erational ascendancy.
The Kursk operation also played into Soviet com-
mand and control capabilities. Once the Germans had
committed themselves to attacking the flanks of the sa-
lient, it was obvious where the panzers would head. Ac-
cordingly, the Soviets could respond to German moves
in a timely way. As the Germans advanced, reinforce-
ments could be fed into threatened sectors. Compare
that with the 1941 campaign, when the Germans had
options all along the front. Even the 1942 campaign was
comparatively more open, with the Germans having a
choice of everything from rolling up the southern end of
the Moscow line, to seizing Stalingrad, to advancing to
the Caucasus oil fields.
9/16/08 3:02:19 PM
 strategy & tactics 13

ST 253 Issue.indd 13 9/16/08 3:02:19 PM

 The Germans hadn’t intended Kursk to be decisive by
itself. Instead, their objective had been simply to gain the
operational advantage. By planning their conduct of the
war at the operational level, rather than at the strategic
level, they had given up their earlier and more important
advantage. Previously they had conceived and executed
campaigns that went beyond the ability of their foes to
react. At Kursk they employed a plan ready made to be
thwarted by a Soviet defense.
The Germans had initially viewed the Kursk offen-
sive as a reasonable choice. Unfortunately for them, they
couldn’t win the war with reasonable measures: at best
they might gain a stalemate. The Germans hoped to gain
what essentially would’ve been a tactical victory and then
convert it to their operational advantage. They thereby
reversed the order of their previous warfighting strategy.
While German armor might still inflict tactical kill ratios
of five-to-one against Soviet tanks, it really meant little,
since they still weren’t gaining any operational or strate-
gic advantage in doing so. viets, as indicated by their post-Kursk summer offen-
Kursk therefore represented a reversal of the German
strategy of the “indirect approach,” which had previously
been winning the war for them. In the war’s first phase,
their panzers won campaigns by striking deep into en-
Red spearhead: Soviet tank column on the move.
14 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 14
emy rear areas, avoiding centers of enemy strength.
At Kursk the Germans made a head on assault into
their enemy’s strength. The result was attrition of the
panzers, stalemate and a massive Soviet counteroffen-
sive.
Possibilities
There are still numerous questions posed by the
Germans’ Kursk offensive. Suppose the Germans had
won at Kursk. That might have been possible, if the
critics were right, by attacking earlier. Or what if Hit-
ler had continued the offensive regardless of the cost?
In the latter case, the Germans might have been able
to collapse the salient and bag a considerable number
of prisoners. Then what? A German victory at Kursk
would only have delayed the inevitable. Germany
would still have been in the same situation in which
it had found itself in 1915-17, facing powerful foes on
multiple fronts.
By mid-1943 the initiative had passed to the So-
sive. But was it Kursk that had proved decisive insofar
as the Germans failed to win it, or was the battle it-
self irrelevant to the broader outcome of the war? Had
there been no Kursk offensive, would the course of
the subsequent fighting been much different? By that
time in the war, the Red Army had gained ascendancy
at the operational level. While the Germans still had a
tactical edge, owing to superior training and their new
tanks, they could not use that edge to win large battles
or campaigns.
Suppose the Germans had cancelled Citadel and
instead gone over to the strategic defensive in the
east. Would that have made a difference? Would the
armor lost at Kursk have been able to stop the string
of Soviet offensives, which did not end until reaching
Berlin almost two years later? That’s unlikely since
most of the tanks the Germans used there were Panzer
IIIs (already obsolescent in 1943), and Panzer IVs (a
moderately useful tank until the end of the war). The
new and much superior Panzer V Panthers and Panzer
9/16/08 3:02:20 PM
 VI Tigers were just coming into service at the time, re-
placing the older tanks that made up most of the losses
at Kursk.
Another often overlooked factor was that the Ger-
mans’ worst attrition wasn’t so much in AFV, but in
infantry and motor transport. Shortfalls in both men
and transport were apparent since early 1942. The
Germans never made good their losses from the 1941
campaign. Even before Kursk, their infantry divisions
were generally under-strength. That reality was insti-
tutionalized by the 1944 reorganization (which actual-
ly began in 1943) of the infantry divisions from nine to
six infantry battalions. There simply weren’t enough
riflemen to hold the front, much less create a defense
in depth.
Similarly, the loss of motor vehicles reduced Ger-
man mobility, as well as making logistics that much
more difficult. And while German mobility was on the
decline, Red Army motorization was increasing thanks
to American Lend-Lease.
The shortfalls in infantry and motorization imply
the Germans had lost ascendancy in the east before
Kursk began. It wasn’t the losses incurred during
Kursk that made the difference, but those suffered
over the previous two years. Kursk gave the Germans
one minor advantage in that it kept the Soviets on the
defensive for several extra months as they fortified
their salient.
The larger German problem at Kursk came from
their overarching strategy. They had to win, and win
decisively, all the time. Anything less simply meant a
protracted war of attrition that, even if a peace could
be negotiated, wouldn’t bring Nazi Germany the terri-
tories and resources it needed to survive. Kursk was a
major turning point in that it signaled the complete and
final transition of the war in the east from a struggle
for German supremacy over Eurasia into a struggle for
German survival in Europe.
If the Kursk offensive was ultimately doomed, then,
what might have been a viable alternative? The most
obvious alternative was to simply do nothing. Rom-
mel and Guderian recommended building up anti-tank
forces, concentrating on producing and deploying as-
sault guns and tank destroyers, which were cheaper
than turreted tanks by a third, and could mount more
powerful guns. They believed large numbers of those
vehicles could shoot to pieces the next Soviet offen-
sive, which would have allowed the Germans to fully
stabilize the front.
There may also have been better places for the
Germans to target their offensive that year. Leningrad
was still within reach throughout the summer of 1943,
though the Soviets had been able to open a tenuous
overland supply route along the southern shore of
Lake Ladoga. The capture of Leningrad would have
allowed the Germans to link up with the Finns, and
continued on page 18 Waiting for the signal: Waffen SS infantry resting before an assault.
strategy & tactics 15

ST 253 Issue.indd 15 9/16/08 3:02:21 PM

 Panzer Warfare & Tank Armies
The Germans had won their great victories in 1939-42,
when the bulk of their armored force was made up of mainly
light Panzer IIs and IIIs. By the time of Kursk, the German
main battle tanks were up-gunned 75mm Panzer IVs. There
were also large numbers of Panzer V (75mm gun) and Pan-
zer VI (88mm) tanks, as well as assorted heavy tank destroy-
ers and assault guns. Yet they failed to produce victory. then continued into the autumn and winter, giving the So-
That might seem contradictory, but the reasons aren’t re-
ally hard to see. What had made the German offensives work
in 1939-42 was their mobility. The primary German opera-
tional goal had been to penetrate deep into the enemy rear
areas. Essentially, German mobile warfare involved gaining
victory on the operational or strategic level; tactical victory
was then sure to follow. In that first phase of the war, Ger-
man tanks weren’t really required to destroy enemy tanks;
that was the job of the tank destroyers and anti-tank guns,
especially the 88mm FLAK pieces adapted for that mission.
It was, in fact, the lightness of German tanks in the early war
that made them effective, as they could operate better cross-
country. specifically held back for employment at decisive times and
16 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 16
Of course, at Kursk, the Germans were not trying to con-
duct mobile operations. They were attempting to smash their
way through Soviet prepared defenses. Given that, the em-
ployment of the heavy armored fighting vehicles was neces-
sary.
The Soviet 1943 summer offensive followed Kursk. It
viets the initiative in the east. They would never again sur-
render it. The Soviets had learned much by that stage in the
war, demonstrating they could conduct large-scale mobile
operations. The Germans were now fighting an enemy who
was coming close to their own operational capabilities.
Kursk marked the beginning of the tactical and op-
erational ascendancy of the Soviet military system on the
eastern front. What had come to matter most was effective
deployment of combat strength. The Soviets had learned to
concentrate sufficient force at the critical sectors of the front.
Red Army organization facilitated that concentration. They
kept large numbers of tank armies as independent reserves
places.
9/16/08 3:02:22 PM
 Each tank army usually consisted of two tank corps and The Germans, then, needed the ability to counter enemy
one mechanized corps. Actually, the term “corps” is a mis- mobile offensives on the operational level, and that they
nomer, as those units were the size of Western divisions. So- never accomplished. German operations had been based on
viet practice was to designate critical units an echelon above the offensive. Tactically, they had good doctrine for flexible
the normal in order to emphasize their importance, and to defense, and that’s how small numbers of Germans could
prevent line commanders from misusing them. outfight larger numbers of Soviets in individual actions.
This was unlike the Germans, who ended up employing Once the action reached up to the operational scale, how-
their mobile units simply to try to hold the line. Regardless ever, there was a glaring lack in German doctrine. The Ger-
of overall numbers, that deployment edge gave the Soviets mans, in fact, reverted to what amounted to a World War I
local superiority. Local superiority could in turn be trans- mentality. Instead of lightning campaigns, the war was to be
lated into operational advantage because, if the Germans fought as series of battles of annihilation.
could be continually or sequentially attacked where they That adaptation was forced on the Germans by the change
were weakest, their line would eventually be unhinged. Any in the nature of their foes. By 1943, the Soviets could no lon-
operational breakthrough would force the Germans to pull ger realistically be knocked out in one campaign. The Ger-
back their units or be destroyed in envelopments. That’s mans readjusted their strategy accordingly, but that meant
what happened when the Soviets counterattacked against the fighting on the same level as their opponents. When that
Orel salient in the latter part of the Kursk battle. happened, the Germans had given up their advantage. In the
end, Kursk was nothing more than the type of frontal assault
that had bled Germany white in the First World War.

strategy & tactics 17

ST 253 Issue.indd 17 9/16/08 3:02:22 PM

 possibly to cut the Murmansk Lend-Lease supply line.
Leningrad, once taken, would also have served as a
linchpin to the German defenses across the northern
portion of the whole front. Further, the Germans could
have capitalized on whatever propaganda advantage
accrued from taking that city, the birthplace of Bolshe-
vism.
Even more daring was the idea the Germans should
have tried for an even larger offensive in 1943 to once
and for all knock out the Soviets. What if the Ger-
mans had not launched a major offensive east, but to
the north and south of the salient (that is, directly
east of Tula and Kharkhov) in the hope of cut-
ting off the center of the entire front at the stra-
tegic level? That would have avoided the Soviet
defenses around Kursk. At a minimum, it would
have forced the Soviets to redeploy their armor
reserves out of the salient itself, unhinging their
plans for a summer counteroffensive.
Soviet Riposte
Even as the Germans were desperately fight-
ing their way into the defenses around Kursk, the
Soviets launched their own summer offensive,
starting with an attack on the Orel salient, north
of Kursk, on 11 July. The Germans then pulled
their Ninth Army out of the Kursk offensive in
order to assist Second Panzer Army’s defense of that
newly active sector. To the south, Soviet pressure
caused Manstein, in command of Army Group South,
to request permission to fall back to the Dnepr River.
Hitler refused. He had just recently allowed a with-
drawal from the Orel salient, but the eastern Ukraine
was too valuable to the war economy and couldn’t
simply be abandoned.
The Soviets kept up pressure throughout August.
Finally, Hitler allowed Army Group South to withdraw
to the Dnepr position. The Red Army followed close
behind, and hard fighting continued as both sides at-
tempted to maintain bridgeheads on opposite banks of
the river. The Soviets wanted bridgeheads to gain ac-
cess farther west; the Germans wanted them as bases
for future counterattacks to the east. Army Group Cen-
ter also fell back, reestablishing a front at the Panther
Line, a hastily constructed fortified position west of
Smolensk.
By mid-October the Soviet southern offen-
sive was in full swing. The Crimea was isolated,
and Kiev fell in early November. Throughout
all of it the Germans made desperate counterat-
tacks, but the Soviets were not to be stopped.
As autumn turned into winter, the Soviets
kept attacking. Though German forces in the
Crimea were cut off from overland supply, Hit-
ler ordered the port city of Sevastopol turned
into a fortress and held to the end, but the So-
viets would take it the following May. As the
ground froze in December, the Soviets again
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ST 253 Issue.indd 18 9/16/08 3:02:22 PM

 increased the pressure. As 1944 opened, they finally
broke through on the Leningrad front, forcing back
Army Group North.
The Germans hoped the spring thaw would bring
relief, but the Soviets kept rolling. Their tanks and
trucks were better suited to the ground conditions than
were the German. The First Panzer Army was cut off
in the Ukraine, but managed to fight its way back to
friendly lines. By April 1944 the Soviets had cleared
the Ukraine and the front finally settled down. Hitler
then relieved Manstein, blaming him for the reverses
in southern Russia. Manstein in turn blamed Hitler for
the lack of reinforcements.
The Germans were now entirely on the defensive
in the east, and that defense was failing. They lacked
operational reserves to reinforce threatened sectors of
the front. The reinforcements available usually con-
sisted of a few units rushed in from other fronts, or
battlegroups reconstituted locally from recently de-
stroyed divisions.
Experience had demonstrated the best way to stop
a blitzkrieg was defense in depth. By defending in
depth, the momentum of enemy mobile breakthroughs
could be dissipated and then stopped. The attacker’s
defeat occurred not on the main line of resistance, but The war was effectively lost by the Germans in the
somewhere deep within the defender’s own rear area. summer of 1943, when they proved unable to change
Territory would be surrendered in exchange for time their own doctrine to deal with the new situation on
and enemy casualties. Then, when the moment was the front. Kursk must be seen, then, as having been
right, a counterattack would be launched against a vul- largely irrelevant to the larger outcome of the war,
nerable enemy flank, forcing the enemy to fall back or as the operational ascendancy had already passed to
be cut off. Manstein had used those tactics to stop the the Red Army prior to the first shot of the battle being
Soviets in the previous year’s Kharkhov battles. fired.
Given the nature of mobile warfare, the Germans
could no longer win by defeating the Soviets up front;
however, they also lacked the reserves to fight a battle
in depth. Once the Soviets broke through, the entire
German line became unhinged. The Germans were no
longer capable of defending against the type of mecha-
nized warfare they had pioneered a few years earlier.
strategy & tactics 19

ST 253 Issue.indd 19 9/16/08 3:02:23 PM

 The Prochorovka Myth
By Ulrich Blennemann

[Ed’s Note: in the article below, German units are in italics

while Soviet units are in plaintext.]

Military history buffs have heard it many times: Opera-

tion Citadel was history’s largest tank battle, taking place at
Prochorovka near Kursk on 12 July 1943. For example, 52
years after the end of the battle, the eminent historian David
Glantz wrote:

Over twelve hundred tanks on both sides were en-

gaged in this struggle…Fifth Guards Tank Army’s
18th and 29th Tank Corps conducted an almost sui-
cidal charge across open, rolling terrain in order to
close to a range where all tank guns were equally
effective. In the process, Rotmistrov [commander of
Fifth Guards Tank Army] lost over 400 of his 800
tanks, but the Germans lost 320 tanks and self-pro-
pelled guns as well.

With slightly varying loss numbers, that same story has

been repeated by generations of military historians—but is
it true? Let’s look more closely at the events of that dusty
summer day in the Soviet Union in 1943.
In early July, two German armies and one “army de-
tachment” were to attack three Soviet fronts (army groups),
which together contained 18 armies (corps equivalents)
under the directive Operation Citadel. After destroying the
Kursk salient, Hitler intended to redeploy strong formations
from the eastern front to Sicily, mainland Italy and France
to counter the expected invasions of his “Fortress Europe”
by the Western Allies. That redeployment would have been
extremely dangerous, however, in the face of the massive
Soviet concentration in the Orel-Kursk-Kharkhov sector of
the eastern front. Citadel was a therefore a kind of pre-emp-
tive strike, with the aim of weakening Soviet offensive capa-
bilities over the coming months in order to allow the German
transfers to the west desired by Hitler.
German Ninth Army, under Gen. Walter Model, faced the
Soviet Central Front under Marshal Konstantin Rokossovs-
kiy in the north. In the south, Fourth Panzer Army, under the
command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, and Army
Detachment Kempf, under Lt. Gen. Werner Kempf, faced the
Voronezh Front under Maj. Gen. N.F. Vatutin. Directly be-
hind Central and Voronezh Fronts was Steppe Front, under
the command of Marshal Ivan Konev. Its task was to prevent
any German breakthrough into the Soviet rear area, and then
once the battle had reached its culmination point, to launch a
counterattack.
Altogether, then, about 518,000 German troops attacked
about 1.4 million Soviets. The Wehrmacht was able to mus-
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ST 253 Issue.indd 20 9/16/08 3:02:26 PM

 ter 2,365 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled anti-tank
guns (Jagdpanzer or “tank destroyers”) for the operation.
The Red Army had 4,938 armored fighting vehicles (AFV).
Some 7,417 German artillery pieces had to battle against
31,415 Soviet guns. In the air the Luftwaffe had 1,372 planes
versus 3,648 Red Air Force machines.
Hitler had postponed the attack date for various reasons
several times. That meant the Soviets were able to convert
the Kursk salient into a giant fortress. Within it they built
eight defense lines with a total depth of 186 miles (including
the defensive works set up within the Steppe Front area).
About half a million anti-tank and anti-personnel mines
were laid in.
When the offensive kicked off on 4 July, Model used his
infantry as spearheads in order to try to minimize losses in
the panzer divisions and preserve them intact for the break-
through. He also needed the panzers as a reserve against a
potential Soviet attack from the Bryansk Front to the north.
In the event, his units advanced five miles into the Soviet
defense lines while suffering heavy losses. On the next day
Rokossovskiy began counterattacking. That was too early,
though, as the Germans weren’t yet sufficiently worn down;
so the forces committed by Central Front suffered badly, es-
pecially among their tanks. German Ninth Army continued to
advance slowly but steadily during the next few days until,
on 12 July, Bryansk Front and the left flank of the West Front
attacked into its rear area. It was impossible for the neigh-
boring Second Panzer Army alone to move to stop the Soviet
offensive; Model was therefore ordered to send several pan-
zer and infantry divisions to that neighboring army. With the
dispersion of his armor, all hopes to continue the offensive
on the north of the bulge ended.
The southern thrusts by Fourth Panzer Army and Army
Detachment Kempf were stronger than Model’s effort. More-
over, Manstein used his panzer and panzergrenadier divi-
sions up front right from the start. The II SS Panzer Corps
fought its way through fierce resistance, broke through two
Soviet defense lines, and advanced 15.5 miles on the first
day of its attack. Vatutin therefore threw almost all his op-
erational reserve (1st Tank Army, 2nd and 5th Guards Tank
Corps, plus several other independent tank and assault gun
formations) into the battle on the second day. Parts of the
Soviet strategic reserve (2nd and 20th Tank Corps and Fifth
Guards Tank Army) were also moved to the front. Despite
those measures, though, the German advance continued.
Eleven July became the most successful day of the offen-
sive for the Germans: they made several breakthroughs and
it seemed the resistance of the Soviet defenders on the south
ST 253 Issue.indd 21
of the salient was about to break. The 6th Panzer Division
created a bridgehead across the Donets River. Soviet Sixty-
Ninth Army was almost pocketed between III Panzer Corps
and II SS Panzer Corps. Spearheads of Army Detachment
Kempf were only 10.5 miles from Prochorovka and were
driving into the flank of Fifth Guards Tank Army, which was
itself trying to maneuver to attack the flank of Fourth Panzer
Army. The Germans took Hill 252.2, only 1.5 miles south-
east of Prochorovka.
According to the Soviet high command (STAVKA), 12
July was supposed to be the decisive day of the campaign.
As noted above, north of the Kursk bulge, Bryansk Front and
parts of Western Front started an offensive against the Sec-
ond Panzer Army. STAVKA, however, also planned to strike
an annihilating blow against the German forces in the south
of the bulge. The strongest force there was Fifth Guards
Tank Army, which was ordered to attack II SS Panzer Corps.
Fifth Guards fielded 909 tanks and 42 assault guns. Even
considering that at 5:00 p.m. on 11 July, 101 of those ve-
hicles were still in transit, and 24 were undergoing repair, the
operational numbers of Soviet AFVs remain impressive.
According to what has become the traditional histori-
cal account, then, on 12 July German and Soviet tanks col-
lided at Prochorovka within 2.8-mile-wide gap between the
Psel River and the rail-line to Belgorod. In that battle, the
story goes, II SS Panzer Corps was in effect destroyed, los-
ing about 400 tanks, including many of the new Panthers
and Ferdinands. Marshal Konev called the battle the “swan
song of the German tank arm.” In fact, though, that sequence
of events is a myth. The origin of it was Rotmistrov, com-
mander of Fifth Guards Tank Army. On the 12th his newly
assembled army suffered tank losses greater than that of
any other single day during the entire war. Those losses had
to be explained to Stalin, therefore Rotmistrov, in self-de-
fense, began the legend of “armored armadas” colliding at
Prochorovka. Western historians later simply accepted his
numbers as accurate. In addition, hyperbole, such as the oft-
used phrase “the largest tank battle in history,” began to be
commonly appended to Rotmistrov´s story.
In reality, II SS Panzer Corps didn’t lose 400 tanks on 12
July. German records show that during all of Operation Cit-
adel that corps lost a total of only 33 tanks and assault guns.
Further, the corps had neither Panthers nor Ferdinands and
therefore could not lose any of them.
Rotmistrov also claimed 70 destroyed Tiger tanks. The II
SS Panzer Corps, however, had only 15 Tigers available for
combat on 12 July, and only five of them fought at Procho-
rovka.
strategy & tactics 21
9/16/08 3:02:27 PM
 On that day, II SS Panzer Corps was able to bring to
battle only 211 tanks, 58 assault guns and 43 tank destroy-
ers. The corps’s 3rd SS “Deaths Head” Panzer Grenadier
Division didn’t even take part in the Prochorovka fight; it
attacked across the Psel River to the north. Therefore only
1st SS “Life Guards” Panzer Grenadier Division and 2nd
SS “The Empire” Panzer Grenadier Division faced Fifth
Guards Tank Army. Those two divisions that day deployed a
total of only 117 tanks, 37 assault guns and 32 tank destroy-
ers.
Rotmistrov had 838 tanks available for combat that
morning; 96 others were in transit. Of his five mobile corps
(division-sized units), he initially held back 5th Guards
Mechanized in reserve. Another 100 tanks secured his left
flank against III Panzer Corps, which was advancing from
the south. So about 672 Soviet tanks fought 186 tanks and
assault guns of two German divisions.
Rotmistrov planned two directions of attack for his coun-
terattack. The main thrust came from the northeast and went
in frontally against 1st SS. It was to push through the gap
between the railway embankment and the Psel River. Parts
of that area were boggy and there were also several small
villages within it. Altogether, only 1.86 miles of maneuver
room were available. There, then, more than 400 Soviet
tanks of 18th and 29th Tank Corps would hit the 56 tanks, 10
assault guns and 20 tank destroyers of 1st SS.
22 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 22
Another thrust came from the east toward the German
flank and 2nd SS. There, about 200 Soviet tanks of 2nd Guards
Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps faced 61 German tanks, 27
assault guns and 12 tank destroyers.
One additional factor also has to be taken into account:
whereas the Germans had been in combat since 5 July, Fifth
Guards Tank Army was newly committed. So the Soviets
were in better shape at the start of the fight.
In one regard, Rotmistrov was completely successful:
he managed to move his whole army speedily and almost
entirely undetected to the front. The Germans had expected
some manner of Soviet counterattack on the south of the
Kursk salient. They didn’t imagine an attack of such magni-
tude was even possible.
For the 1st SS Division, 11 July had been successful
enough. It had crossed a deep Soviet anti-tank ditch and tak-
en an important local terrain feature, Hill 252.2. That same
advance had meant, however, there was only loose contact to
the neighboring division to the right, 2nd SS. To the left there
was almost no contact at all because 3rd SS was attacking
off to the north. The recon battalion of 1st SS tried to “over
watch” the gap between the two divisions. For the next day,
II SS Panzer Corps planned to support the attack to the north
of 3rd SS toward Hill 226.6 with all available artillery. Only
after that hill had been taken were 1st SS and 2nd SS Divisions
supposed to resume their own advances.
9/16/08 3:02:30 PM
 Southwest of the railway embankment, SS Panzer
Grenadier Regiment 1 was deployed on the right. SS Pan-
zer Grenadier Regiment 2 was on the left, farther ahead at
Hill 252.2. That unit was actually resting in a depression
behind the hill, and it only consisted of one battalion with
three companies along with an additional heavy tank com-
pany with four Tigers. The other battalion was in Germany,
switching to Panzer V Panthers. To recapitulate, then: in the
Prochorovka gap there was no German tank armada with
800 tanks, only a single tank battalion.
When Rotmistrov started his attack at 7:30 a.m. (8:30
Moscow time), most men in 1st SS were still sleeping (be-
ing exhausted after seven days of fighting). The 3rd Battalion
of SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 2, under the command of
the infamous Jochen Peiper, had advanced the farthest and
taken Hill 252.2. Suddenly Soviet tanks and infantry were
in their position. When 1st Lt. Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son
Counterattack or ambush? Soviet tanks cross a field.
of Hitler’s foreign minister, saw violet-colored flares above
the hill (meaning “enemy tanks!”), he drove toward it with
his seven Panzer IVs. The other two German tank companies
remained behind the anti-tank ditch in the rear. Suddenly he day later, after their supposed destruction, they fielded 190
saw 29th Tank Corps 100 to 200 yards away: 212 vehicles tanks. At the same time, Fifth Guards Tank Army suffered at
charging at full speed. Three of Ribbentrop’s panzers were least 235 total losses that day. (Newer, post-Soviet Russian
able to escape, four were destroyed. sources have raised that total to 334 losses.)
When the Soviet tanks had reached the far side of the From all this three new truths becomes clear concern-
hill, the other two German tank companies opened fire. The ing the Battle of Prochorovka. First, in the tactical sense the
Soviets simply continued to press their advance at full speed. engagement was not only a Soviet loss, but a fiasco. Second,
It seemed that within minutes they would surely rip open the operationally the Red Army stopped the German advance for
German front and break through. The Soviets, however, had several hours. Their goal, however, had been to destroy the
forgotten about their own anti-tank ditch. It was some 15 II SS Panzer Corps in a new “Cannae.” Strategically, Rot-
feet deep and ran parallel to the front line. At first a few, then mistrov’s attack day was also a mistake, since his army was
more and more Soviet tanks crashed into that obstacle. As supposed to play the decisive role in the forthcoming Soviet
the Soviet tank commanders became aware of the ditch, they summer offensive. As for the bigger picture, Kursk did mark
tried to maneuver to the left to cross it via a bridge. That was the last time the Wehrmacht would be on the offensive in the
another mistake. The fire of two German tank companies, east.
later aided by four approaching Tigers, knocked out their
AFV. The Germans termed that action: “Scheibenschießen
auf bewegliche Ziele” (target practice against moving tar-
gets).
While it was still morning, SS Panzer Grenadier Regi-
ment 2 resecured Hill 252.2 and the surrounding area. They
counted 190 Soviet tanks destroyed. That number was so
unbelievably high the commander of II SS Panzer Corps,
Gen. Paul Hausser, drove to the front to personally inspect
the scene.
On the left flank of 1st SS Division, 18th Tank Corps also
attacked at that same time. In a whirling tank action the So-
viets were again defeated, losing 55 tanks. All other Soviet
attacks that day were beaten off as well, and all three SS
divisions were advancing again that afternoon.
Rotmistrov therefore entirely invented a monumental
battle with 400 destroyed German tanks. Since then many
writers and historians have unquestioningly accepted his ac-
Sources
count. At the same time, though, the official German docu-
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 8: Die Ost-
ments from that day don’t contain any catastrophic reports.
front 1943/44, ed. By Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt,
On the contrary, the Germans at the time believed they’d Munchen: DVA 2007.
won a big victory that day. Further, if you look into those
Glantz, David M. & Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed : How
documents you will see II SS Panzer Corps suffered only the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence: University of Kansas
three unrecovered armored vehicle losses on 12 July. The Press 1995.
Germans stayed in possession of the battlefield and therefore Healy, Mark. Kursk 1943. The Tide Turns in the East (Osprey Cam-
were able to repair their damaged tanks. In addition, their paign Series 16), London: Osprey 1993.
tank repair shops also did a great job. On 12 July, the 1st SS
and 2nd SS Divisions had 186 tanks available for combat. One
strategy & tactics 23

ST 253 Issue.indd 23 9/16/08 3:02:30 PM

 Race your tanks across Russia!

Drive on Kursk: July 1943

This is the third edition of the Kursk game original- “Manstein’s Gambit” is a scenario for the alterna-
ly published by old-SPI back in the early 1970s, which tive scheme put forward for this German offensive by
was later redesigned into a second edition, retitled as: Field Marshal Manstein. He believed “Operation Cita-
Eric Goldberg’s Kursk: History’s Greatest Tank delle,” as put forward by Hitler, had no chance of suc-
Battle, July 1943. This new edition is by Ty Bomba, cess. He therefore argued the attack should be made
and shares an evolution of the system used in our other with all available forces. The additional units added
Road to Ruin series titles: Drive on Stalingrad and to the German order of battle represent the scouring of
Drive on Moscow. all the other fronts and rear areas of the Reich, to bring
There’s been a lot of new information published in all the divisions capable of conducting major offen-
on Kursk since the last edition. In particular, we made sive operations. That option is available to the German
good use of The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet player, but with the trade-off of then having to fulfill
General Staff Study. The insights it provided were far more ambitious victory conditions.
many, but the one that will cause the most eyebrow
raising will be the lack of separate Soviet artillery
units. We took that approach because the Red Army
command did, too. Concerned they’d be unable to shift
their cannon as and where needed, they initially spread
them throughout their defensive belts. Only later, once
they’d switched to the strategic offensive in August,
were the guns again brought together to reform artil-
lery divisions and corps. 

To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in

this issue send your name and address along with:
$26 US Customers
$31 Canadian Customers All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
$33 Overseas Customers CA residents add $1.45 sales tax. Send to:
Decision Games
ATTN: S&T Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
24 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 24 9/16/08 3:02:33 PM


The Battle of Kursk has gone from
relative obscurity (being overshadowed by Stalin-
grad), to being called “history’s greatest tank battle,”
then, more recently to being seen as a kind of grand-
but-abortive German armored raid against the Soviet
salient in the front line in the summer of 1943. One
of the advantages of wargaming is you can explore
all those different possibilities. And Kursk does have
much going for it as a battle: lots of armor on both
sides, and the mystique of this battle being the turn-
ing point in Hitler’s war with the Soviet Union.
The battle – actually, given the geographic extent
of its operations, Kursk was really a mini-campaign
– was fought in summer within range of the lines of
communication of both sides. That minimizes the
need for weather and supply rules that often bog
down designs. And, as a result, players can more
easily explore the big decisions that determined the
course of the campaign.
You win Drive on Kursk by accumulating victory
points for destroying enemy units and taking strate-
gic objectives. There’s not only the issue of defeat-
ing the enemy, there’s the ability to compare your
performance with that of the historic commanders.
Score more points and you get personal satisfaction.
That also gives you more of the historic dilemmas.
One is there’s a tradeoff between geographic objec-
tives and unit losses. Do you really want to hold that
victory point city if it means potentially losing more
points in eliminated units? Conversely, sometimes
it makes sense to fight for an objective that has little
geographic utility because of its victory point value.
Suddenly, many otherwise strange decisions made by
the original high commands fall into place.
Unit combat factors represent the quantitative fac-
tors of firepower and armament, as well as some non-
quantitative factors such as training and leadership.
The game also accounts for qualitative differences
between the armies. The ability of German mecha-
nized units to infiltrate enemy zones of control is one
example. That represents the panzers’ still-superior
capabilities in mobile warfare at that time in the war.
A lot of other things went into Kursk. Designer
Ty Bomba chose not to include separate Red Army
artillery units. Instead, their strength is subsumed into
Soviet maneuver-unit combat strengths. That may be
surprising to some, but it reflects the actual practice
in the field at that time. At the start of this campaign,
Soviet artillery divisions were directly attached to
tank and infantry commands, not kept as separate
formations, which would’ve been impractical given
ST 253 Issue.indd 25
On Design
the nature of the fighting. That’s also a common thing
in wargames: non-divisional unit capabilities being
factored into unit combat strengths or other game ac-
tions. For example, the ability of units to cross rivers
often reflects non-divisional engineer units that aren’t
otherwise shown in a game’s order of battle. Trying
to put every last unit that fought into a campaign into
a game often causes the design to sink of its own
weight.
One unique game mechanic in Kursk is players
choose their sequence of play at the start of each turn,
which can be one of several different combinations
of moving and fighting. That brings something into
its play that’s rarely seen in wargaming: the element
of staff planning and limited operational intelligence.
You don’t quite know what the other fellow is going
to do in his turn. Effectively, you have to anticipate
enemy intentions. At the same time, it requires you to
think ahead in terms of what you plan to do for your
turn. You may be planning for a set-piece battle while
the enemy is about to launch a war of movement.
Then there’s the bigger picture. The articles in this
issue indicate the Germans actually came out ahead
in the tank battle at Prochorovka, the action that’s
usually considered to have signaled the start of a
great German armored debacle. What we can now see
more clearly is that the German shortfall was really in
their infantry. The bulk of their infantry divisions had
never really been rebuilt after the losses of the previ-
ous two years of fighting. So when the Red Army
launched its historic 1943 summer counteroffensive,
the Germans couldn’t hold the line. You can explore
all those elements in Drive on Kursk.
strategy & tactics 25
9/16/08 3:02:33 PM
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26 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 26 9/16/08 3:02:34 PM


Did You Know?
• The US Department of Defense
has announced the creation
of the Armed Forces Institute
of Regenerative Medicine
(AFIRM). It will seek to find
ways to use stem cell technol-
ogy to grow new skin, muscles,
tendons, ears, noses and fingers,
and eventually (it’s hoped)
whole limbs. The Pentagon has
budgeted $250 million for the
project’s first year.
• The famous “parquet floor” on
the basketball court of the Bos-
ton Garden came about because
in 1946, when it was originally
constructed, there was still a
war-induced lumber shortage
across the US. The long flooring
pieces traditionally used in such
projects were available only at
premium prices, so the contrac-
tor came up with the idea of the
parquets, using shorter pieces of
wood laid out in squares.
• On 24 January 1961, a fuel leak
on a B-52 flying near Golds-
boro, North Carolina, caused an
explosion that, in turn, sent two
atomic bombs hurtling out of
the plane and into the ground.
Neither detonated, but later
investigation revealed the fuel
leak explosion had caused five of
the six safeties on both devices
to turn off. Thus, both were one
electric switch away from deto-
nating when they plowed into
the earth. Each of the two bombs
was 250 times more powerful
than the one used against Hiro-
shima in 1945.
• “Action figure,” a term com-
mon in today’s toy market, was
coined by staffers at the Hasbro
Corporation in 1964. They were
trying to come up with a descrip-
tor to use in place of “doll,” in
order to smooth the way for
their soon-to-be released “G.I.
Joe” product line. They believed
no red-blooded American boy
would want to play with a doll.
• On 14 July 1969, the “Soccer
War” broke out between El
ST 253 Issue.indd 27
F o r Yo u r I n fo r m a t i o n
Salvador and Honduras. Though
named after a series of disputed
sports matches between the na-
tional teams of the two countries
which preceded the outbreak
of the fighting by a few weeks,
the deeper cause was a border
dispute that went back a century.
The fighting lasted only four
days, but it was fierce. The total
casualties suffered by both sides
came to more than 5,000 dead
and another 10,000 wounded.
The war was largely crowded out
of the news at the time because it
erupted during the week Apollo
11, the first lunar-landing mis-
sion, was on its way into outer
space.
• During 1969, Mike Novosel, Jr.,
and Mike Novosel, Sr., father
and son, flew together as heli-
copter pilots in the same medical
evacuation unit in Vietnam, the
82nd Medical Detachment. That
was, and remains, the only time
in US military aviation history
a father and son flew together in
combat in the same unit. During
their shared tour of duty, each
rescued the other from a combat
crash under fire.
• The proximate cause of the 1982
Falklands War, fought between
Great Britain and Argentina
over possession of those islands,
occurred when some civilian
scrap metal dealers from the lat-
ter nation spontaneously raised
their flag on an out-island as
they worked. Though they had
the required permits from the
British embassy to be there, the
report of their flag raising, when
it reached London, led to the
dispatch of a warship to watch
over all such further projects.
The Argentine government then
sent a ship to watch that British
vessel, which led London to
reinforce the island garrison
with some Royal Marines. The
Argentines then invaded.
• Early on 16 January 1991, the
world press got the first tip
Operation Desert Storm was
about to begin from a pizza man.
Frank Meeks, who owned 60
Dominoes pizza franchises in the
D.C. area, had noticed the night
before that pizza orders from
the Pentagon were skyrocketing.
He’d seen similar surges during
the nights just prior to the inva-
sions of Grenada and Panama.
So he called the media and put
out the first word.
• The US government recently
initiated a nine-year, $30 billion
“cyber initiative.” The main
contractor is computer security
firm Symantec, and the aim of
the project is to better protect
all government and military
computer networks from hacking
and cyberwar attack.
• One of the most notable ‘cultur-
al’ developments within the up-
per echelons of the US military
in the past half-decade has been
video-teleconferencing, that on
about half the bandwidth used by
the Army is for that purpose.
Attention S&T readers: We’re al-
ways looking for authors for FYI for
Strategy & Tactics and the new World
at War magazine. If you’d like to try
your hand at writing short (under 2,000
words), pithy articles for this column,
on virtually any aspect of military his-
tory, contact Ty Bomba, FYI editor, at:
WhiteRook@att.net.
strategy & tactics 27
9/16/08 3:02:34 PM
 F o r Yo u r I n fo r m a t i o n
Jane Fonda in North
Vietnam: What Did She
Actually Say?
Most—indeed, if not all—Viet-
nam veterans still oppose actress
Jane Fonda’s going to North Vietnam
in 1972, where she posed for a still
infamous photograph wearing an
NVA helmet next to an anti-aircraft
gun used to shoot at attacking US Air
Force planes. But few know what she
actually did say there. Here, then, is a
transcript of her radio broadcast from
Hanoi of 22 August 1972.
This is Jane Fonda. During my
two week visit in the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam, I’ve had the oppor-
tunity to visit a great many places and
speak to a large number of people
from all walks of life—workers, peas-
ants, students, artists and dancers,
historians, journalists, film actresses,
soldiers, militia girls, members of the
women’s union, writers.
I visited the Dam Xuac agricul-
tural coop, where the silk worms are
also raised and thread is made. I vis-
ited a textile factory, a kindergarten
in Hanoi. The beautiful Temple of Lit-
“The Ancients had a great
advantage over us in that their
armies were not trailed by a
second army of pen-pushers.”
—Napoleon Bonaparte
28 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 28
erature was where I saw traditional
dances and heard songs of resistance.
I also saw an unforgettable ballet and
guerillas training bees in the south to
attack enemy soldiers. The bees were
danced by women, and they did their
jobs well.
In the shadow of the Temple of
Literature, I saw Vietnamese actors
and actresses perform the second act
of Arthur Miller’s play All My Sons,
and this was very moving to me—the
fact that artists here are translat-
ing and performing American plays,
while US imperialists are bombing
their country. I cherish the memory of
the blushing militia girls on the roofs
of their factory, encouraging one of
their sisters as she sang a song prais-
ing the blue sky of Vietnam—these
women, who are so gentle and poetic;
whose voices are so beautiful, but
who, when American planes are
bombing their city become such good
fighters.
I cherish the way a farmer, evacu-
ated from Hanoi, without hesitation,
offered me—an American—their best
individual bomb shelter, while US
bombs fell nearby. The daughter and
I, in fact, shared the shelter wrapped
in each other’s arms, cheek against
cheek. It was on the road back from
Nam Dinh, where I had witnessed the
systematic destruction of civilian tar-
gets—schools, hospitals, pagodas, the
factories, houses, and the dike system.
As I left the United States two
weeks ago, Nixon was again telling
the American people that he was
winding down the war, but in the
rubble strewn streets of Nam Dinh,
his words echoed with sinister
[several words indistinct] of a true
killer, and like the young Vietnamese
woman I held in my arms clinging to
me tightly—and I pressed my cheek
against hers—I thought, this is a war
against Vietnam perhaps, but the
tragedy is America’s.
One thing that I have learned
beyond a shadow of a doubt since
I’ve been in this country is that Nixon
will never be able to break the spirit
of these people; he’ll never be able to
turn Vietnam, North and South, into
a neo-colony of the United States by
bombing, by invading, by attacking in
any way. One has only to go into the
countryside and listen to the peasants
describe the lives they led before the
revolution to understand why every
bomb that is dropped only strengthens
their determination to resist.
I’ve spoken to many peasants
who talked about the days when
their parents had to sell themselves
to landlords as virtual slaves, when
there were very few schools and much
illiteracy, inadequate medical care,
when they were not masters of their
own lives.
But now, despite the bombs, de-
spite the crimes being created—being
committed against them by Richard
Nixon, these people own their own
land, build their own schools—the
children learning, literacy—illiteracy
is being wiped out, there is no more
prostitution as there was during the
time when this was a French colony.
In other words, the people have taken
power into their own hands, and they
are controlling their own lives.
And after 4,000 years of strug-
gling against nature and foreign
invaders—and the last 25 years, prior
to the revolution, of struggle against
French colonialism—I don’t think
that the people of Vietnam are about
to compromise in any way, shape, or
form about the freedom and indepen-
dence of their country, and I think
Richard Nixon would do well to read
Vietnamese history, particularly their
poetry, written by Ho Chi Minh.
~Blaine Taylor
9/16/08 3:02:35 PM

Pike’s Pikes
The US Army emerged from the
War of 1812 in much better condition
than it had been when those hostilities
began. On the northern battlefields,
and at New Orleans, a new crop of
officers learned their lessons and went
on to help create a new army as well
as provide national leadership. One
of the up and coming generals who
would have been at the forefront of
change was Zebulon Montgomery
Pike, if the ideas he developed as
a regimental commander were any
indication.
Pike turned 34 in January 1813
and was promoted to brigadier two
months later. He’d begun his service
in his father’s regiment in the 1790s
and, because of his well-known
explorations on the Mississippi River
and the southwest, he eventually
gained patronage and promotion,
rising to colonel of the newly created
13th US Regiment of Infantry in July
1812. After raising the unit in his
home state of New Jersey, Pike led
it north to Greenbush, New York,
and then on to Plattsburgh where it
wintered. Pike was zealous and out-
spoken. “You will hear of my fame or
of my death,” he wrote to Maj. Gen.
James Wilkinson in July 1812, “for I
am determined to seek the ‘Bubble’
even in the cannon’s mouth.”
“The generals we have are all gen-
erals of the cabinet,” he complained
on another occasion, adding propheti-
cally, “and it is only after several of
us who have some knowledge of
military business are sacrificed, that
men will be placed to lead who are
now in the ranks, or in obscurity. You
shall then see our cabinet generals
retire and fighting generals brought
forward.”
Pike wasn’t afraid to try new
things, and went to the expense to
outfit most of his 800-man regi-
ment with snowshoes and then put
them through their manual of arms
exercises so they would be prepared
for service in snowy Canada. He also
acquired a supply of rifles and, though
little more was said about them in his
correspondence, one of his companies
might have been trained as a rifle
corps, which was uncommon among
the infantry regiments.
ST 253 Issue.indd 29
F o r Yo u r I n fo r m a t i o n
Even more unusual than snow-
shoes was Pike’s decision to outfit a
portion of his regiment with pikes.
The best description of the weapons
issued to the 15th Infantry, and their
intended use, is found in a letter writ-
ten by Capt. John Scott, one of Pike’s
New Jersey men.
Oh, I forgot to tell you, one third
of our Regt. is armed with pikes 11
or 12 feet long. We form in ranks
of three deep and the pikemen
form the rear rank. The shape of
the pike is, as near as I can de-
scribe it, like this [here he inserted
a sketch of the pike’s head] drove
in the end of a handle 10 or 11 feet
long, made of ash timber. The men
who carry the pikes have had their
muskets cut off about 18 inches,
which they sling on their back and
are very handy. Those pikes, when
we charge bayonet, will reach
1 foot in front of the [front two
ranks’] bayonets.
The pikemen also carried swords
for use if their pikes were lost during
hand-to-hand fighting.
Historically recognized as the
key weapon of the classical Greek
and Macedonian phalanx, the pike
had long since been abandoned in
infantry warfare. With the exception
of a volunteer unit of rifles in Maine,
some locally raised marine forces
at Boston, and temporary use by a
few units in Russia and Portugal, no
other infantry commander in the 19th
century appears to have thought of
reintroducing pikes into his tactical
options. Many armies equipped their
color-parties with pikes and halberds
of various kinds, but that was more
for esprit de corps than utility.
Pike was all about utility, how-
ever, and he must have envisioned
his pikemen spearing the ranks of
redcoats as they charged down on
his steadfast infantry. Perhaps he got
his idea from the Navy’s use of pikes
during boarding operations. Pike’s
naval colleague, Commodore Isaac
Chauncey, for instance, ordered “300
muskets, 200 pistols, 300 cutlasses,
400 pikes (without handles), [and]
200 boarding caps” for his squadron.
Even on land some sailors rushed
into battle with pikes, as mentioned
in Secretary of War John Armstrong’s
description of an aborted attempt to gain
a beachhead on the upper Niagara River
in November 1812. “The 70 seamen [in
the raid],” he wrote, “... unaccustomed to
the order of military movements, and re-
quiring only to be told where the enemy
was, rushed forward with their habitual
gallantry and appropriate weapons, pikes
and cutlasses, and after a short but san-
guinary contest, carried the position.”
There were different types of heads
for the pikes; some were straight pen-
etrating blades while others had a cross-
piece at the base to prevent over-penetra-
tion. Whatever kind he issued, Pike had
his men use them to train for battle, and
Capt. Scott was confident about their
chances. “I should like to meet, with our
regiment... the 49th British Regiment on
some plain. I think we should have a
pretty hard fight [and] I think the Jersey
troops... would prove themselves wor-
thy.”
Pike’s regiment tested its weapons
on 27 April 1813, when they launched
an amphibious assault on the town of
York (modern Toronto), capital of Upper
Canada. There were about 450 of the
15th Infantry in the assault force and,
therefore, 150 long and cumbersome
pikes had to be carried on the crowded
vessels and then transfered into the boats
for going ashore. The records of that
day contain only one reference to those
weapons, prompted by the account of
what happened when otherwise ineffec-
tive British cannon shots arched over
Pike’s column. “Excepting for some
pikes broken and some bayonets bent,
those guns gave us no annoyance,” wrote
one of Pike’s aides.
It was about an hour later Pike was
mortally wounded by debris from the
explosion of the British grand magazine
and, along with his dreams of a glorious
military career, went his aspirations for
the pike as a reborn tactical innovation.
One of his peers, Col. Cromwell Pearce,
16th Infantry, remarked tersely: “These
experiments [with pikes] were tried,
and found not to answer the purposes
anticipated.” Thereafter, Pike’s pikes dis-
appeared completely from the historical
record.
~Robert Malcomson
strategy & tactics 29
9/16/08 3:02:36 PM
 F o r Yo u r I n fo r m a t i o n
The 298 Spartans
While it’s common belief all 300
of King Leonidas’s bodyguard died
with him at Thermopylae in 480 BC,
it isn’t true. Two of those Spartans
actually survived the battle, namely
Aristodamus and Pantites. Their
continued existence cost them dearly,
and both would also be dead within a
year.
Pantites had been dispatched by
Leonidas with a message to a city in
Thessaly, and therefore missed the
final day at Thermopylae through
no fault of his own. He afterward
returned to Sparta, where no dishonor
was attached to him. Still, the shame
of being a live man instead of a dead
hero weighed on him. Whether it was
the whispers of his fellow Spartans or
his own misplaced guilt isn’t known,
but Pantites could soon no longer
bear the stigma of having lived – and
hanged himself.
Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) Systems for Submarines
The need for air to support pro-
pulsion has been one of the limita-
tions on submarines for most of the
last century. The introduction of
nuclear power solved the problem for
those countries with the money and
technological industry to build and
support such vessels. Few countries,
however, can afford the construction
and infrastructure costs involved in
building and maintaining a nuclear
submarine force. As a result, most of
the world’s navies still use conven-
tionally powered submarines that
employ diesel-electric and battery-
powered propulsion systems. Those
conventional submarines are much
quieter than their nuclear counterparts
underwater but, unlike the nuclear
subs, they must either snorkel or
surface to re-charge their batteries
by running their diesel engines. That
requirement increases the probability
30 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 30
The other survivor was of stronger
character, a man who fought and died
on his own terms, Aristodamus. Aris-
todamus and Eurytus were two of the
300, but they’d been sent back from
Thermopylae to the village of Alpeni
because both were suffering from eye
infections that made them temporarily
blind. When word came the Persian
Immortals had defeated the Pho-
cian troops guarding the secret path
protecting the pass, and were about to
encircle the defenders, Eurytus put on
his armor and had his slave lead him
back to die alongside his king. Aristo-
damus refused to throw his life away
in such a useless gesture and instead
returned to Sparta.
When the Spartans learned of
Eurytus’s sacrifice, they branded
Aristodamus a coward. No Spartan
would speak to him, and all refused
to even grant him a light for his fire.
Some even spread the story Aristoda-
mus hadn’t been ill but had also been
of detection, the avoidance of which
is their primary advantage in naval
operations, and limits the duration
and range of their submerged opera-
tions.
As a result, most Western naval
officers consider conventional subma-
rines to be of only limited utility in
long-range or broad-ocean opera-
tions. They see them essentially as
“mobile minefields” suited primarily
for “choke point operations” where
constricted waters force surface units
to transit through their operating
areas. The advent of air-independent-
propulsion (AIP) systems promises
to change that assessment, however,
expanding conventional submarine
operating areas and flexibility by
enabling them to remain submerged
for up to three weeks.
Germany was the first country to
attack the problem, developing two
sent to deliver a message to Thessaly,
where he then deliberately delayed
his return to Thermopylae until after
the battle. Aristodamus endured the
taunts and disdain of his fellow Spar-
tans until the Battle of Plataea in 479.
As the Spartans advanced toward
the Persian battleline at Plataea, he
broke ranks to charge ahead. All
present admitted he fought like a
lion and slew many a Persian before
he finally succumbed to the wounds
they inflicted on him. Even so, the
stiff-necked and unforgiving Spartans
refused to honor him by naming him
the bravest man who fought that day.
That honor was awarded to another.
The reason given was that Aristoda-
mus had shown a lack of discipline
by breaking ranks and rushing to his
death. Aristodamus, his critics said,
had gone to Plataea only for the self-
ish purpose of regaining his honor by
dying in battle.
~James A. Yates
AIP systems during World War II: the
Walter system and the closed-cycle
diesel electric system. They achieved
more success with the former, and
abandoned the latter, during the war’s
closing days. The Walter system re-
lied on pumping highly concentrated
but chemically unstable hydrogen
peroxide over a catalyst that triggered
combustion in a burning chamber.
The resulting exhaust and steam then
passed over a turbine, driving the
submarine at speeds of 20 knots or
more. Hydrogen peroxide’s instability
necessitated its storage in excep-
tionally clean fuel tanks, since any
contact with dirt, dust or metal could
trigger a disastrous chemical reaction.
The Walter system propelled the
Type XXVI coastal submarines, but
they didn’t enter service in time to
see combat. Those taken over by the
Allies proved all but impossible to
9/16/08 3:02:36 PM

detect and destroy with the anti-sub-
marine warfare (ASW) weapons and
platforms of that era, but safety prob-
lems and the introduction of nuclear
power led to most countries abandon-
ing further development.
The Soviets pursued the closed-
cycle diesel-electric propulsion sys-
tem in the 1950s, installing it in their
Zulu-class boats. Closed-cycle diesel
propulsion is theoretically simple.
Compressed air or oxygen is fed from
storage tanks directly into the diesel
engines, and those engines’ exhaust
is vented into the sea. It has three
disadvantages; 1) it’s noisy; 2) it can’t
be used at depths below 100 feet, be-
cause the pressure inhibits the exhaust
venting, all but blocking it below that
depth; and 3) exhaust bubbles are
visible on the surface when the sub-
marine is using the system at depths
above 70 feet.
The Germans abandoned the
system because they could never
store enough compressed air to give it
significant endurance, a problem the
Soviets solved by storing compressed
oxygen in tanks aft of the submarine’s
torpedo tubes, away from the diesel
engines’ heat. Unfortunately for the
Soviets, their maintenance and safety
procedures were poor, resulting in
constant oxygen leaks that, combined
with the crews’ smoking habits and
the presence of flammable materi-
als, caused a long series of fires and
underwater explosions. In fact, fires
struck so often, and to such deadly ef-
fect, the crews called them “cigarette
lighters.” Today only the Netherlands
considers close-cycle diesel propul-
sion a viable AIP system.
Its disappearance from the Soviet
inventory marked the demise of AIP
systems from naval operations, but it
didn’t end the further pursuit of the
technology itself. Germany, France,
Russia and Sweden have continued
to pursue such development. Their
efforts accelerated in the 1990s in
response to a growing demand for
submarines by the world’s lesser
naval powers. Those countries wanted
a means of protecting their maritime
economic and environmental interests
within and just beyond their eco-
nomic exclusion zones. The subma-
ST 253 Issue.indd 31
F o r Yo u r I n fo r m a t i o n
rine exporting countries saw AIP as
a means of achieving operational
advantage over nuclear submarines
in those waters, both as a marketing
advantage and for their own navies
in the Barents, Bering and Mediter-
ranean seas.
Sweden’s submarine designers
were the first to achieve operational
success, introducing the Sterling
engine prototype in 1983, installing
it on the submarine Näcken in 1989.
The Sterling system consists of a heat
chamber in which a small quantity
of diesel fuel and oxygen is burned
to heat helium, which then expands
to drive a two-cycle, four-cylinder
piston engine that powers a genera-
tor. The exhaust gas is vented into an
absorption chamber where it’s dis-
solved in seawater and cooled before
being discharged into the ocean. The
entire system fits into a 3x5 meter
“plug,” which can be added to any
existing conventional submarine or
integrated into new construction. It
equips Sweden’s three Gotland-class
units, and is offered for export in their
A17-class submarines. Japan has also
installed it in one of their submarines
and has funded plans for more. It pro-
vides 70 kilowatts of power, enabling
a Sterling-equipped boat to remain
submerged, while traveling at a speed
of four to five knots for up to 15 days,
without snorkeling, or longer depend-
ing on battery capacity.
French, German and Russian
research has taken a different path.
The Vastergotland-class features an air-independent propulsion system.
The French system relies on burning
an oxygen/fuel mixture in a chamber
that drives two turbo-generators. The
first draws its power from hot exhaust
gases passing through its blades,
while the second is driven by the
steam generated by those gases. The
resulting system has 80 to 95 percent
efficiency and, at a power output of
150 to 600 kilowatts, is the most pow-
erful AIP system on the market. It is
also the noisiest, though at its lowest
power setting it’s still quieter than a
nuclear power plant. Its higher power
density can be used for high under-
water bursts of speed, or to add up to
20 days to a submarine’s underwater
endurance at speeds of four to five
knots. Entering service in 2002, the
French offer their MESMA system
(Module d’Énergie Sous-Marin
Autonome or Autonomic Energy
Module for Submarines) on their new
Scorpion-class export submarines and
as a retrofit installation for Agosta-
class units already in service.
German and Russian designers
have pursued fuel cell technology, the
same energy system used to power
the space shuttle and the Apollo moon
missions.
In its simplest form, a fuel cell
simply brings oxygen and hydrogen
together in a chemical reaction that
produces electricity, water and heat.
Submarine designers, however, prefer
to use polymer electrolyte membrane
(PEM) fuel cells, because they’re
more efficient and produce less heat.
strategy & tactics 31
9/16/08 3:02:36 PM
 F o r Yo u r I n fo r m a t i o n
PEM fuel cells pass hydrogen over
one side of a membrane and oxygen
over the other. A platinum catalyst
separates the hydrogen into posi-
tive ions and four electrons, which
then pass through an external circuit
as electricity to ultimately join the
oxygen atoms on the other side. The
hydrogen ions migrate to combine
with the oxygen to form water. In
fact, fuel cells constitute the only
truly closed-cycle AIP system. Their
only byproduct is water.
The absence of combustion and
moving parts also makes fuel cells
the quietest AIP system. Unfortu-
nately, they also suffer from having
the lowest power density, requiring a
much larger power plant to produce
a useable level of power. Addition-
ally, there are safety and maintenance
concerns due to having to store the
highly flammable liquid or gaseous
hydrogen. The safest method is to
join the hydrogen chemically with a
metal alloy to form a metal hydride.
The hydrogen can then be released
by chemical manipulation, but the
submarine thereby exchanges 10 days
of endurance for greater safety. The
German and Italian navies already
have units in service, and in the Greek
and South Korean navies are being
retrofitted to Type-209s and installed
on new Type-214s.
The Russians didn’t complete
their program before the USSR
collapsed, but their research has
continued. Russia reportedly installed
the Kristal-27E fuel cell based AIP
on their new conventional boat, the
St. Petersburg, about six months after
it was commissioned. They’re also
offering it as one of the options with
the export version of that vessel, the
Amur-class. A Kristal-27E equipped
unit may be able to operate sub-
merged for up to 30 days.
Most observers think China is
working on a fuel cell based AIP for
its new Yuan-class conventional sub-
marines. Since the Yuan-class propul-
sion system is derived from German
propulsion equipment, most believe
it’s based on German technology, but
it’s just as likely to turn out to be a
Chinese development of the Kristal-
27E.
32 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 32
AIP systems add a new dimension
to conventional submarine operations
by extending their reach and opera-
tional flexibility. Smaller and quieter
than nuclear submarines under most
circumstances, conventional boats
are becoming a more difficult threat
to counter then heretofore, when
they were largely a concern only in
constricted waters. All but freed from
their previously much shorter battery
recharging cycles, they can now
also range across larger patrol areas,
pursue targets at longer ranges more
quickly, and employ their superior
stealth characteristics as required.
The US Navy recently leased a
Swedish AIP Gotland-class unit for
a year, so it could study the acoustic
and handling characteristics with a
view toward perfecting tactics and
technologies to counter them. At pres-
ent, 10 navies have at least one AIP
submarine in service and two others
will acquire at least one before the
decade ends.
The next 20 years will no doubt
see a proliferation of AIP units be-
cause smaller navies view them as the
solution to projecting their power and
surveillance farther from their coasts.
That will probably generate political
pressure for the US Navy to consider
building a conventional submarine
force, but nuclear submarines, with
their greater sensor, communication,
weapons load and superior strategic
mobility, will remain the undersea
platform of choice for a nation with
global maritime interests.
~Carl Otis Schuster
American Counter-
insurgency Efforts in
Thailand
American efforts to strengthen the
capacity of South Vietnam to resist
insurgency by Vietnamese Com-
munists failed in the 1960s, since a
broader war eventually resulted. Yet
a similar campaign in Thailand was
much more successful and offers a
useful model for current and future
counterinsurgency programs.
From approximately 1950
through 1983, the Communist Party
of Thailand (CPT) was successful
in attracting members of the middle
class in the capital city Bangkok to
sympathize with its goals. Members
weren’t just limited to ethnic Chinese,
though many did have such a back-
ground. A series of military coups
ensured CPT members were regularly
forced to flee from the cities and hide
out in the jungles. In particular, CPT
members went to the northeastern re-
gion known as Isan, which has always
been home to the poorest people of
the country.
Isan natives are ethnic Lao, with
many strong ties with the Lao across
the River Mekong, which divides
Thailand from that country. Large
numbers of the Isan were alienated
from the Thai government, which
customarily placed their interests far
below those of the Bangkok masses
who facilitated military rule. CPT
members from the professional class-
es were able to spread their technical
knowledge to the poorly educated
villagers and received shelter in
return. At the same time, hundreds
of Vietnamese had been crossing
and recrossing the Mekong River
since the time of the war against the
French. The river is long, and there
are many safe places to cross. On the
other hand, Vietnamese in Thailand
who now remember that time recall
occasions when the “Mekong ran red
with blood.”
American advisors faced the
problem of dealing with insurgents
who received shelter and support
from villagers in a remote countryside
with little infrastructure. The CPT
had embraced Maoist concepts of the
9/16/08 3:02:37 PM
 “People’s War,” and its members used Chinese-inspired
methods and uniforms. Shadow governments were es-
tablished in villages whenever the CPT could make its
The Long Tradition:
presence accepted. CIA sources estimated around 4,000
active CPT agents were present throughout the country,
though many more were sympathizers.
Mobile, and supported by supplies from other
Southeast Asian countries, the CPT represented a seri-
ous threat to the integrity of the Thai state. The Thai
military, in response, attempted to crush the insurgency
through force of arms. The Communist Suppression
Operations Command (CSOC) was established in 1965
with a view to creating a military solution. Attempts
to kill or capture CPT members met with only limited
success, however, and did nothing to persuade villagers
that state was in any way their friend. Artillery bom-
bardment and air strikes destroyed villages and created
streams of desperate refugees. Even so, that policy
persisted, despite its lack of success, until the 1970s.
Eventually, a combination of better intelligence
and the prompting of US advisors led to a change in
emphasis. Development projects throughout the region
were stepped up, as well as determined attempts (which
continue to the present day) to convince villagers they
were fortunate to be part of a unified and compassion-
ately governed kingdom. Roads built with American
assistance not only assisted in the movement of military
materiel, but also enabled villagers to obtain jobs in cit-
ies offering much better salaries than before. Incoming
investment, especially from Japan, provided new facto-
ries ready to reward diligent, non-Communist workers
with steady and attractive income. The US government
committed in excess of $49 million to its “Accelerated
Rural Development” program, and that was more than
matched by Thai funds. Village and provincial notables
were provided with incentives not to upset the sources
of those funds.
Above all, the Thai “Boy Scout” movement was
promoted to flood the region with anti-Communist
activists who were supported by state funds and en-
thused with zeal to convince the villagers to recognize
their good fortune. The Scouts, actually a paramilitary
organization, were heavily armed and perfectly willing
to use gunfire to support their arguments. The Scouts
also proved an invaluable supplement to the armed
forces, many of who were at times involved in limited
actions against the North Vietnamese. The number of
US personnel stationed in Thailand peaked at 48,000,
and they were supported by more than 500 aircraft. A
Thai division of 11,000 men was for a time stationed
in South Vietnam, and a further 20,000 were engaged
in Laos on covert operations. That represented half of
Thailand’s total armed forces.
~John Walsh
ST 253 Issue.indd 33
50 issues ago, S&T 203:
Xenophon. March along with 10,000 Greek
mercenaries as they take on the Persian Em-
pire. Joseph Miranda designed the wargame
on one of history’s great epics, while James
Yates looked at the big picture of warfare in
the ancient Middle East. Gary Valenza delved
into the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, one of the
bigger exercises in futility of the last several
decades. And at the Little Bighorn, wargame
veteran Alan Zimm provided a new analysis
of the events of that fateful day of 25 June
1876, Custer’s Last Stand.
100 Issues Ago, S&T 153:
Operation Felix & Zama. This issue had
two wargames, Operation Felix, Dr. Chris-
topher Cummins’ design of a hypothetical
German assault on Gibraltar in World War
II; and Larry Baggett’s Battle of Zama, the
apocalyptical showdown between Hannibal
and Scipio Africanus, with an accompanying
article by Anthony Howarth. The redoubtable
Donald Mack marched along with several
centuries of British infantry while Richard
Filippi looked at intelligence operations
during the Napoleonic Wars. And Stefan
Patejak profiled Hector Bywater, prophet of
the Great Pacific War.
150 Issues Ago, S&T 103:
Road to Vicksburg. The Battle of Cham-
pion Hill, part of the Vicksburg campaign
by Robert Land. Plenty of features includ-
ing Civil War articles by Albert Castel and
Edwin Bears, Breakout and Pursuit with
James Meldrum, and War in the Falklands
by Brenda Ralph Lewis. Plus S&T regulars:
Al Nofi, Richard Berg, Ian Chadwick and
Kevin Zucker.
200 Issues Ago, S&T 53:
Punic War. Lead game and article by Ira
Hardy, Steve Patrick and Red Simonsen
covering the mayhem between Rome and
Carthage, a topic to which we will be return-
ing in the next issue of S&T. Steve Patrick
updated the history of wargaming, while
Steve List did an after action on SPI’s Tank!
Plus Outgoing Mail, FYI and Briefings.
Among other things, the editors announced
S&T’s first real profit!
strategy & tactics 33
9/16/08 3:02:39 PM
 Work In Progress
First Battle of Britain (1BoB), designed by Jo-
seph Miranda, is a wargame covering the Ger-
man bomber offensive against England in 1917-
18. The objective is to score more morale points
than your opponent. Historically the bombing
campaign inflicted little real damage on British
cities or industry. The attacks’ psychological
impact, however, was enormous: they demon-
strated Britain was vulnerable to outside invad-
ers for the first time in a millennium. Victory is
therefore based on the German player’s ability
to panic the British populace. Both sides can
spend their morale points to reinforce their air
forces and increase their air defenses.
Each air unit represents a flight or squadron.
Each hexagon represents five miles from side to
opposite side. Each “Operational Turn” repre-
sents one month. Each “Flying Turn” represents
20 minutes of flying time. The 34x22” map has
large hexes, and there are 176 large-size, fully
iconic units.
There are three scenarios. Scenario 1 covers
the situation in 1917, with both sides building
up their airpower. Scenario 2 covers 1918, with
both sides at full strength. Scenario 3 covers
the entire campaign from 1917 through 1918.
There are about 10,000 words in the rules,
which works out to mean two experienced play-
Next Issue
Articles in 254: Hannibal takes on the Roman
ers can finish either of the two shorter scenarios
Republic; the panzers attack in the Ukraine,
in about four hours. Solitaire play is doable, but
1941; the Argentineans repulse a British inva-
requires a little more ‘fudging’ than the typical
sion, Napoleonic style; and cybernetic warriors
land-wargame when played that way. The over-
battle over the Internet.
all game system is of intermediate complexity.

S&T Upcoming Features

#254 Hannibal’s War. Multi-player game of the Second Punic War, using a derivative of the 1066 system.
#255 First Battle of Britain. German air forces in English skies, 1917-18.
#256 Ramillies & Malplaquet: Two of Malborough’s great battles.
#257 Cold War Battles II: The US Army meets the Warsaw Pact in Wurzburg Pentomic, while the Soviet Army
drops in on Afghanistan in Kabul 1979.
#258 Santiago Campaign: Join the Rough Riders for the Spanish-American War’s campaign in Cuba.
#259 Battle for China: Imperial Japan launches one of the greatest land campaigns in history as the Chinese resist
invasion.

Visit www.StrategyAndTacticsPress.com for previews of these issues.

34 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 34 9/16/08 3:02:41 PM

 Empire’s End:
The Battle of Manzikert
by Kelly Bell
One of the most decisive battles in history was fought near an obscure fortress in
Armenia in AD 1071. It would bring down one empire and lay the groundwork
for the Western counterattack into the Middle East, the Crusades. The name of the
battle—Manzikert.
Eleventh century Armenia lay in a geographically
unenviable situation in an equally unfortunate time pe-
riod. Sandwiched between the Byzantine Empire and
the Seljuk Sultanate, this principality was eyed greedily
by both powers because of its wealth and strategic po-
sition. The central Asian trade route known as the Silk
Road wound through Armenia, making it a rich mercan-
tile center. Its own resources of fruit, cattle, iron, cop-
per, borax, salt, jewels, arsenic, silver, and gold ensured
the wealth of the country. Its artisans were renowned for
their skill in producing fine weapons, carpets, leather,
and fur garments. And its mountainous terrain made it
a natural fortress athwart the caravan highways. Who-
ever controlled Armenia controlled transcontinental
commerce. Determined to maintain their independence
and culture, the Armenians had resolutely resisted all
foreign influences. Their success, wealth, and pugna-
cious temperament aroused jealous hatred among their
lowland neighbors.
ST 253 Issue.indd 35
Late in the 11th century the Byzantines and Seljuks
were preoccupied with numerous political and military
matters, such as their uneasy relations with each other.
That was fortunate for the Armenians because they had
little unity themselves. Living mainly in clans, they
feuded incessantly among themselves, raiding each
other both for revenge and booty.
A New Emperor
In 1068 a new Byzantine emperor, Romanos IV Dio-
genes, assumed the purple in Constantinople and found
himself instantly beset by enemies on every side. The
Normans in Italy, Magyars in Hungary, Uze and Patzi-
nak Turks in the Balkans, and the delicate situation in
Armenia presented Diogenes with a host of political and
military challenges that would tax his abilities to the ut-
most. As a general he had distinguished himself on bat-
tlefields versus the Patzinaks, and his military outlook
was a signal for a new direction in foreign policy in the
Byzantine world.
strategy & tactics 35
9/16/08 3:02:44 PM
 Alp Arslan and his Seljuks overran Armenia in
1064 and began raiding deep into Anatolia. Realizing
diplomacy was no longer going to work, Diogenes set
out to rebuild the Byzantine armed forces. Ending the
Muslim raids on Armenia was a high priority, since it
was a buffer state protecting the empire from the east.
Byzantium’s military shortfalls compelled Diogenes
to recruit a large number of foreign mercenaries. It
was an eclectic conglomeration of soldiery—among
others, there were Normans and Saxons who’d fought
against each other at the recent Battle of Hastings.
There were also Patzinak and Uze Turks who might be
inclined to defect to the Seljuks. The west European
soldiery were knights, warriors or mercenaries who,
while individually proficient, weren’t integrated into
the methods of eastern warfare. They were in general
contemptuous of the fighting ability of light cavalry,
whom they saw as little more than mounted snipers.
Of course, the eastern horsemen had millennia of ex-
perience using their mobility to lure heavier forces into
ambushes, cutting off their line of retreat, and then fin-
ishing them at range with their powerful bows.
Despite the polyglot nature of his army, Diogenes’s
first two campaigns, in 1068 and 1069, were success-
ful. He forced Alp Arslan out of Anatolia and raided
into Syria and Media. He then undercut his military
achievements, however, via his poor treatment of
36 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 36
the very Christians he’d sought to rescue from Turk-
ish rule. Suspicious of the Armenians’ allegiance, he
treated them as conquered enemies rather than valued
subjects, alienating potential allies among them.
Year of Decision
In 1071 Diogenes launched an offensive directly
through Armenia, capturing the fortress-city of Man-
zikert after a month-long siege. He then weakened his
forces by dividing them, sending part to capture the
nearby city of Akhlat. The obvious next move was to
eliminate the menacing Seljuk garrison in the adjacent
city of Arkhash.
Alp Arslan, who was besieging the Fatimid city
of Aleppo, had made no significant preparations for
a major war with Byzantium, and Diogenes’s attack
took him by surprise. The incursion led him to believe
the Byzantines had allied themselves with the Fati-
mids. He realized that if he indulged his ambition of
invading Syria, his realm would be vulnerable to pin-
cer attack. The Fatimids might invade from the south,
and the Byzantines from the north out of Armenia.
The possibility of Byzantine forces penetrating as far
as Manzikert created the dire prospect of the Fatimids
pinning his army in Syria while the Byzantines ram-
paged unchecked through his home territory of Iran
and Mesopotamia. He couldn’t afford to wait for that
to happen.
9/16/08 3:02:48 PM
 Alp Arslan left his main army to carry on the siege
of Aleppo without him while he rushed to assemble
a cavalry force outside the city of Khoi. Detailing a
smaller force to pin down the Byzantines at Akhlat, he
and his troopers advanced on Manzikert.
When Byzantine foraging parties spotted the ad-
vancing Seljuk forces, they reported the intruders to
Diogenes. He assumed it was just a raiding party and
sent only a small force of his mercenaries to deal with
them. When the mercenaries saw the host of horsemen
bearing down on them, they pounded back to tell their
emperor something major was developing.
Alp Arslan had no desire for a war with Byzantium
at that moment. He preferred peace with his western
neighbor so he could pursue unhindered his campaign
against the Fatimids. So at first he tried negotiations
with Diogenes’s emissaries. Still, he couldn’t allow
the Byzantines to occupy Armenia because that would
threaten his own inner empire and lay open his line of
communication to Syria.
Diogenes, however, had strong motives to fight
rather than talk. For one thing, his predecessors had
failed to secure their borders through negotiations.
There was also the possibility Alp Arslan would use
any parlay to buy time to bring up reinforcements.
Further, the Byzantine citizenry and aristocracy were
weary of waiting for endless peace talks to provide
them with safety and stability. He had to win a military
victory in order to ensure his credibility as emperor.
The alternative might be another coup or even civil
war. Lastly there was the financial burden of maintain-
ing his army in the field during lengthy negotiations,
as well as the concern disgruntled mercenaries might
start new troubles. With all that in mind, Diogenes pr-
peared to fight.
He’s sometimes regarded by historians as foolhar-
dy to have attacked an enemy about which he knew
so little, but he had little alternative. The diplomacy
favored by his predecessors as unsuitable because Alp
Arslan had little control over (and hence could not
make agreements on behalf of) the lawless bands of
freebooters who operated along the Turkish/Armenian
frontier. The old foreign policy required Byzantium to
use vast sums of money for bribes at a time when the
increasing economic power of the ascendant Italian
city-states was steadily drawing trade away from Con-
stantinople, undercutting Byzantine financial clout.
Assembling his army on the plains north of Man-
zikert, Diogenes advanced south against the Seljuks,
who were conveniently bivouacked at the foothills
of mountainous country. Diogenes resolutely contin-
ued forward as Alp Arslan fell back. While the Turks
were mobile, the Byzantines had the advantage of a
combined-arms army with heavy and light cavalry and
infantry, as well as an engineer contingent and logis-
tics train. Centuries of experience had showed light
cavalry could be pinned against natural obstacles by
skirmishers and then de-
feated at close-quarters
via disciplined charges.
The mountains reduced
the Turks’ ability to ma-
neuver, and traditional
Byzantine tactics were
likely to have worked if
Diogenes’s army had been
better disciplined or more
cohesive.
That discipline short-
fall soon made itself felt.
A Byzantine forward unit,
commanded by an impa-
tient Norman mercenary
by the name of Russel of
Baileul, advanced without
bothering to reconnoiter.
Predictably, he was am-
bushed and his men wiped
out. Meanwhile another
Byzantine advanced contin-
gent, under command of the general Basilacius, which
was supposed to be covering the main army, withdrew,
leaving the emperor bereft of reconnaissance. Treach-
ery on the part of Basilacius was suspected ever since,
because court intrigues so often trumped military ne-
cessity in Byzantine affairs.
Diogenes realized he was overextended, so he
made a limited withdrawal as Alp Arslan’s army shad-
owed him. Seeing the retreat as a sign of weakness, the
Byzantines’ mercenary Kipchak and Pecheneg cavalry
deserted. Diogenes then decided the time had come to
stand and fight before the situation got further out of
control. He would do it between Akhlat and Manzik-
ert.
Day of Battle
Though the precise location of the battle has been
lost, there’s no doubt it was on the high plateau of Ar-
menia, probably on 19 August 1071. The Byzantines
had about 35,000 troops on the field, the Seljuks prob-
ably a few thousand less. Diogenes formed his army
into two lines according to standard Byzantine prac-
tice. He commanded the front line while the second
was under Andronicus Ducas.
The battle opened with opposing horse-archers
skirmishing. Charges by heavy Byzantine cavalry
pushed back the Turks but couldn’t pin them. The
emperor carefully pursued the Turks, who retreated in
good order as daylight faded. Centuries of experience
had demonstrated the need for caution in that kind of
situation, as horse-archer armies often tried to draw
in enemy forces and then ambush them. Diogenes be-
lieved himself to be in a good position, though, be-
cause of his second line. But those men began to lag
strategy & tactics 37

ST 253 Issue.indd 37 9/16/08 3:02:50 PM

 behind, thereby further exposing the first line to show-
ers of arrows from the smaller Seljuk army.
After a full day of trudging futilely after a foe who
refused to stand and fight, the Byzantines were becom-
ing demoralized. Moreover, Diogenes had taken all his
men into the field rather than leave a reserve to guard
the bivouac, and he didn’t want to leave his own camp
undefended and liable to plunder by the enemy.
Seeing the danger of continuing the pursuit in dark-
ness, Diogenes gave the signal to turn back. The sig-
nal was made by reversing the imperial standards, and
that’s when things began to unravel.
The units following in the wake of the first line
misconstrued the reversing of the standards to mean
the army’s vanguard had been defeated and was in
retreat. Making things worse, the outer wings of the
Byzantine army had become detached from the center
during the pursuit. As the Byzantines milled in con-
fusion in the gathering darkness, the Seljuks, poised
on the heights in front of Diogenes’s troops, stopped
retreating, turned and charged.
Slicing into the disorganized Byzantines, the Turks
annihilated the right wing of their first line, and then
surrounded the rest of the formation, forcing it to sur-
render. Diogenes himself was captured. Andronicus,
who commanded the still intact second line, turned
around and led his men off the battlefield.
38 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 38
Andronicus’s actions are generally attributed to
treachery rather than cowardice or incompetence. He
was probably bribed into not fighting either by the
Seljuks or Diogenes’s enemies in Constantinople. That
may also be why he provided less than satisfactory
support to the emperor in the first phase of the battle.
The nature of the army itself also contributed to the act
of mass desertion. The European mercenaries were re-
sentful of the emperor’s unabashed favoritism toward
his native troops. The Armenians within the army nur-
tured a hatred of the Byzantines, who’d invaded their
country and treated them as conquered subjects. Many
of the Byzantine nobles fighting alongside Andronicus
also had issues with Diogenes because of his milita-
ristic inclinations, and they may well have hoped the
Seljuks would rid them of him.
Regardless, as the sun rose the next morning over
the battlefield, Alp Arslan and his Turks were trium-
phant. The once mighty Byzantine army was no more.
Diogenes was brought before Alp Arslan and the fol-
lowing conversation is alleged to have occurred.
Alp Arslan: “What would you do if I was brought be-
fore you as a prisoner?”
Romanos: “Perhaps I’d kill you, or exhibit you in the
streets of Constantinople.”
Alp Arslan: “My punishment is far heavier. I forgive
you, and set you free.”
9/16/08 3:02:51 PM
 strategy & tactics 39

ST 253 Issue.indd 39 9/16/08 3:03:03 PM

 Byz antin es & S eljuks
The Seljuks were among the many Turkish tribes who
had traditionally roamed the steppes. Unlike
their predecessors and contemporaries,
however, the Seljuks (Sunni Muslims)
didn’t loot, burn and kill and then
move on in search of new locales to
pillage. Instead they settled on the
lands they subdued, creating a more
permanent polity. By 1040 they
controlled all of Persia and simply
walked into Baghdad and set up
their rule there. The Abbasid caliph
there was wise enough not to resist
the powerful invaders and accepted
being reduced to a figurehead under
Seljuk control.
Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan
(1029-72, the name means “Valiant
Lion”) turned his covetous gaze on
Syria and Egypt, which were then
ruled by the Shia Fatimids. Unlike
Baghdad, the Fatimid Caliphate of
Egypt wouldn’t be a walkover, and
its leaders quickly showed their defi-
ance by supporting anti-Seljuk insur-
gents.
Apart from the political rivalry between the Fa-
timids and Seljuks, there were the traditional economic ten-
sions between these regions. Since antiquity, trade between
central Asia and the Mediterranean littoral had been a source
of wealth. Merchants ranging across the region favored two
routes. One followed the Euphrates River north, then crossed
Syria to the markets of Lebanon. The other went up the Red
Sea, caravanned across Sinai or sailed down the Nile. A va-
riety of 11th century Syrian rulers strove to dominate opulent
Lebanon. Egyptian and Mesopotamian states periodically
clashed over control of the entire Near East.
Because of its enmity with Fatimid Egypt, the Seljuk
Sultanate needed to keep the peace with its other power-
ful neighbor, the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantines, heirs
to the classical Roman Empire in the east, controlled lands
Ruin of an Empire
Following Manzikert, the Byzantine Empire sank
into a decade-long self-destructive civil war. Realizing
he was no longer a threat, Alp Arslan released Dio-
genes, who returned home and tried futilely to regain
his throne. In the end, he was blinded by Andronicus
Ducas. Ironically enough, Diogenes died as he was
trying to raise the money to pay the ransom Alp Arslan
had demanded.
Fatally weakened by fighting against itself, Byzan-
tium was helpless to resist the Turkish warrior bands
that swept into Anatolia. While Alp Arslan himself
probably had no desire to destroy the Byzantine Em-
pire, numerous tribal raiders poured into the military
vacuum. The countryside was ravaged and the popula-
40 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 40
from southern Italy to the Armenian foothills, as well as
in the Balkans. The Byzantine heartland was in Anatolia,
where sturdy warrior-peasants formed the solid core of their
armies. At the center was the great capital city of Constanti-
nople, where the emperor sat. Actually, the emperor was by
this time called basileus, which means “sovereign lord”—a
far cry from Roman and Greek republican ways.
The Byzantines had a long record of military efficiency.
In the early 11th century, the empire was on the march, push-
ing back the Muslims and expanding its frontiers. Byzan-
tine armies campaigned in Syria and threatened to retake
Jerusalem, lost to the Arabs in the seventh century. In 1018
the Byzantines conquered Bulgaria. They also defeated the
Normans in Italy at the second Battle of Cannae (where Han-
nibal had defeated the Romans 13 centuries prior).
After the death of the soldier-emperor Basil II in 1025,
Byzantine leaders pursued a policy of retrenchment. A series
of emperors deliberately neglected arsenals, weakened fron-
tier garrisons, cut military salaries, and mustered out reserv-
ists. Part of the reason was financial, to reduce the drain on
the economy of supporting a large military. But it was also
a matter of survival. Increasingly, the empire was wracked
by civil wars and coup attempts, as power-hungry generals
marched on Constantinople to claim themselves emperor.
The empire’s own armies were becoming a greater threat
than its foes.
Constantinople increasingly preferred to pay its enemies
not to attack. The Byzantines were masters of treachery and
subversion, which is where one of the modern meanings of
“byzantine” originated. The Byzantines would bribe other
powers to attack the empire’s enemies, thereby diverting
hostile forces to faraway theaters of operation. A fragile se-
curity was maintained for a time, but damage was also done.
By encouraging their people to think they could avoid mili-
tary confrontation, a generation of Byzantine rulers weak-
ened their will to bear arms. The empire became vulnerable
to invasion by resolute enemies who refused to be bribed.
One such enemy appeared in the form of Alp Arslan, who
had his own dreams of imperial glory. Thus began the chain
of events that led to the Battle of Manzikert.
tion was either killed, starved or fled. Constantinople,
while remaining a powerful city and still ruling terri-
tories in the west, had lost the heartland that had been
the core of its military might.
Begin the Millennium
With the Byzantine bulwark against Islam gone,
the balance of power across the Near East changed
forever. The Muslims had the upper hand. In 1081
Alexius Commenus assumed the throne and began to
attempt another restoration of Byzantine power. The
empire, however, was literally a hollow shell of its for-
mer self: it controlled only the coastlines of Anatolia,
though its hold was still secure at Constantinople and
9/16/08 3:03:05 PM
 Ways of War
The Seljuks were lightly armed horse archers who used
harassing fire and feigned retreats to lure their foes into ex-
hausting chases. They would then use their superior mobility
to turn and ambush their foes. When executed by a suffi-
ciently large number of cavalrymen, that stratagem could re-
sult in entire armies being surrounded and destroyed. There
was nothing new about those tactics; Western writers had
recorded them as being used by the ancient Scythians and
Parthians.
Seljuk armies were recruited from two sources. The sul-
tans and amirs maintained askaris, professional soldiers,
often including heavier-armed Mamluk horsemen. The ma-
jority of horse troopers were tribal auxiliaries, armed and
equipped as light horse-archers. Some locales also supplied
light infantry of various types. While large numbers of such
auxiliaries could be raised, the problem was keeping them in
the field for extensive periods of campaigning. Indiscipline,
treachery and looting often signaled that tribal hosts would
soon thereafter vanish. That made good leadership and open-
ing new regions to pillage essential for the Seljuks.
The Byzantine army, while tracing its origins back to
the late Roman military, was based essentially on a system
implemented in the 7th century. The empire was divided into
military themes. Each theme had a contingent of farmers who
were responsible for providing military service. The farmer-
soldiers were paid during peacetime and could be called to
serve fulltime during war. Each theme was commanded by a
strategos (general) who had a retinue of fulltime soldiers.
There was also a regular army consisting of units called
tagmata, about 4,000 men each. At the center of the mili-
tary establishment were assorted imperial guard units. One
famous unit was the axe-armed Varangian Guard, originally
consisting of Russian mercenaries, but later recruited from
all over Europe—including Harald Hardrada who would lat-
er go on to become King of Norway and then perish fighting
the Anglo-Saxons at the Battle of Stamford Bridge in 1066.
Byzantine infantry units consisted of a mix of heavy
spearmen and light archers, providing for an integrated
“combined arms” approach on the battlefield. Byzantine
infantry was generally more heavily armed and armored
Godfrey of Bouillon.
ST 253 Issue.indd 41
Clash of arms: Byzantines versus Turks.
than their eastern counterparts. Cavalry consisted of a mix
of armored horsemen and lighter archers. The Byzantines
also made extensive use of mercenaries and auxiliaries
who could be bribed into serving on their side. The overall
system, while effective in raising large numbers of troops
quickly (and preventing them from being recruited by the
other side), got out of hand as the army came to rely too
much on foreign troops.
The Byzantines also had regular engineer, medical and
supply services. That gave their armies more resiliency in
the field, and reduced the logistical burden placed on the
countryside through which it marched.
Byzantine generals had devised tactics to counter mount-
ed archers, and those methods were generally successful. The
most common ploy was to maneuver hostile horse bowmen
onto terrain unsuitable for cavalry, while the Byzantines then
moved to a position where the enemy was backed against a
natural obstacle such as a river, cliff or canyon.
Byzantine armies deployed in two lines, with a reserve
behind that. The front line included heavy cavalry and horse-
archers who would attempt to pin down a foe with fire and
well-controlled charges. The second line consisted of a com-
bination of heavy and bow-armed infantry who would pro-
vide covering fire and a solid base of maneuver. The second
line would also ensure the front wasn’t enveloped by a more
mobile foe.
Light cavalry protected the flanks; scouts reconned for
ambushes, and a reserve force remained in the bivouac,
ready to turn it into a defensive position in case the battle
lines were forced to retreat. With a well trained and disci-
plined army, those tactics generally proved successful. Such
was not the case at Manzikert.
strategy & tactics 41
9/16/08 3:03:07 PM
 in the Balkans. Alexius appealed to the Christian West
for reinforcements to fight the Turks. He was prob-
ably looking for some mercenaries, but in 1095 Pope
Urban II called for united Western action against the
Muslims. The response was the launching of the First
Crusade in 1096, the purpose of which was to liber-
ate Jerusalem and the Holy Land. That was certainly
not what Alexius had wanted or expected, but it set
into motion a chain of events that would see European
armies fighting in the Middle East over the following
two centuries. The irony is the Crusades didn’t save
Byzantium. In 1204 the armies of the Fourth Crusade,
embroiled in the politics of that day, seized Constanti-
nople and destroyed the city’s power. While the Byz-
antines would eventually regain the city, the empire
would never recover from that blow. In 1453 the once
mighty capital would fall to the Ottoman Turks, who
would become the regional superpower for centuries
following.
Looking back, one can only ask what would have
happened had the Byzantines won at Manzikert. Had
Alp Arslan been defeated, might Islam have been
pushed farther back to the east and south, while the
divided Christian church reconciled with itself and
reunified? The power of the medieval Vatican was im-
mense. If it had been combined with the host of adher-
ents of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Near East
42 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 42
might have been completely dominated by the forces
of a united Christianity. The Crusades would not have
been necessary, and the damage caused by them to
Byzantium might never have occurred. The Byzantines
themselves might have retaken Jerusalem from their
bases in northern Syria. Successive waves of Islamic
invaders would have been repulsed on Anatolia’s east-
ern frontiers instead of at the gates of Vienna. Islam, a
crucial force in today’s Middle East, might have been
relegated to subsidiary status. Perhaps, but all that was
decided on that fateful day at Manzikert.
Sources
Canard, M. Byzantium and the Moslem World to the Middle East
of the 11th Century/Cambridge Medieval History, volume IV,
edited by J. Hussey, Cambridge Press, 1966.
Charanis, P. Byzantium, the West and the Origin of the First Cru-
sade, Byzantion Press, 1949.
Friendly, Alfred. The Dreadful Day: The Battle of Manzikert,
1071, Hutchinson & Co., 1981.
Nersessian. S. Armenia and the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge
Press, 1947
9/16/08 3:03:09 PM
 Tanks in the Wire:
Lang Vei, February 1968
by Kelly Bell
US Special Forces troops and Montagnards.
On the morning of 24 January 1968, Lt. Paul Long-
grear noticed what seemed to be a column of refugees
trekking along South Vietnam’s Highway 9 from the
direction of Laos. Longgrear was with a US Special
Forces unit, Operational Detachment A-101, which
had built its combat base just a mile east of the Laotian
border near a village called Lang Vei. The Lang Vei
base was there to maintain surveillance of the South
Vietnamese frontier, since the North Vietnamese Army
used supposedly neutral Laos as a staging ground and
sanctuary. Longgrear’s assumption that the party was
made up of refugees was correct, and the American
would have a great deal more to learn from that pe-
culiar procession. They had information about a new
Communist offensive called “Tet”—and a new enemy
weapon.
ST 253 Issue.indd 43
At the Gates
Longgrear was greeted by an English-speaking
Lao officer wearing a US Army paratrooper uniform
and carrying an AK-47 assault rifle. He identified his
motley command as the 33rd Royal Laotian Elephant
Battalion. Aside from the soldiers, over 2,200 non-
combatants were also with the unit (which included
no elephants). Though the newcomers seemed non-
threatening, their sudden appearance made the Ameri-
cans wary. Longgrear ordered his base Mobile Strike
(MIKE) Force to disarm the Laotians. The MIKEs
were mercenaries from the warlike Hre and Bru
mountain tribes (often called “Montagnards”), who
were fierce fighters against both the North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC).
Lang Vei commander Capt. Frank Willoughby in-
terrogated the Lao officer, who claimed to be a colonel
who’d trained in the United States. The colonel told
strategy & tactics 43
9/16/08 3:03:10 PM
 Outpost: Special Forces troop looking out from a base camp.
Willoughby his outfit had been attacked by North Viet-
namese regulars two days earlier in the Laotian border
village of Ban Houei San. He claimed those Commu-
nists had been elements of the NVA 304th and 325th
Infantry Divisions. Most significantly, he said tanks
spearheaded the attack.
Since the Communists had never before used tanks
against US forces in Vietnam, the report was as un-
expected as it was unwelcome. Lang Vei was in a
forward position, and the Special Forces’ duties had
shifted from border surveillance and area pacification
into almost daily fire fights with Communist forces
probing from Laos. The enemy build-up had to mean
something, and the abrupt appearance of tanks could
mean that something was about to start.
Willoughby’s concerns were validated when, later
that day, US Air Force ground attack jets spotted and
attacked five NVA tanks just inside the Laotian border.
The jets knocked out one tank but lost the others in the
jungle.
Back at Lang Vei, the Laotian colonel’s report was
suddenly accorded new respect when, on 30 January, a
North Vietnamese deserter told the Americans a major
assault on Lang Vei was planned, but for reasons un-
known to him had been repeatedly postponed. He also
claimed to have heard the unmistakable clanking of
tank tracks in the jungle adjacent to his bivouac.
44 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 44
That same day, a Special Forces patrol discovered a
clandestine hard-surface road built into the bed of the
shallow Sepone River marking the Vietnam-Laos bor-
der. That would make it possible for armor to approach
Lang Vei while leaving only minimal tracks.
On 3 January the Marines at Khe Sanh engaged
and killed a group of NVA soldiers outside that base.
Marine intelligence ascertained the dead were NVA
regimental staff officers who’d been on a personal re-
connaissance of Khe Sanh. There was then little doubt
in the US military command that a major enemy at-
tack was in the offing in the I Corps Zone that covered
northern South Vietnam.
American intelligence shifted into overdrive,
quickly identifying two regiments of the NVA 325C
Division camped 15 miles northeast of Khe Sanh, two
regiments of the 320th Division about 15 miles to the
northwest, and the 304th Division stationed just across
the border in Laos. Those units had to be there for a
reason, and Khe Sanh and Lang Vei were the obvious
targets.
Responding to the information about enemy armor,
Willoughby had more than 100 M-72 light anti-tank
weapons (LAW) rush-delivered to Lang Vei. The M-72
LAW was a one-shot, disposable version of the World
War II bazooka. He immediately set his men to train-
ing with the weapon. He also reinforced the already
9/16/08 3:03:13 PM
 strategy & tactics 45

ST 253 Issue.indd 45 9/16/08 3:03:14 PM

 thick belts of concertina and tanglefoot wire along the
perimeter, emplaced claymore and anti-tank mines,
and strengthened his bunkers with 8x8 timbers.
The captain also brought four 4.2-inch mortars, two
81mm mortars and 19 60mm mortars into the already
bristling camp. He positioned his two 106mm recoil-
less anti-tank rifles to face the likeliest approaches
for enemy armored vehicles. (Recoilless rifles were
tripod-mounted tubes that fired an artillery shell. The
barrel was designed to vent exhaust gases out the rear
and counterbalance the recoil normally imparted by
the shell propellant’s ignition, hence the term, “recoil-
less rifle.”)
One recoilless rifle had its field of fire down
Highway 9, and the other south on the road leading
to the nearby village of Lang Troi. He also had his
four 57mm recoilless rifles loaded with flechette anti-
personnel rounds. Last, he made certain his two .50-
caliber and two 7.62mm M-60 machineguns, and 39
Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR), were ready. While
the BAR was designed during World War I, it was still
an effective weapon for jungle warfare. By nightfall
on 5 February, Lang Vei was ready.
Tanks in the Wire
At 12:42 a.m., 6 February 1968, eleven Soviet-
built PT-76 amphibious tanks hit the installation from
several directions. The first approached from the south
via an abandoned road. Turning their hull-mounted
searchlights onto the wire barricades, the tank com-
manders stood in their turrets and sent two soldiers on
foot to cut through the outer fence. The garrison had
been alerted when one of the tanks had run over and
set off a trip flare. Lang Vei’s startled defenders were
able to see the NVA soldiers through the eerie green
flare-tinged fog, and immediately shot the pair at the
wire. The tank com-
manders ducked back
inside their machines,
buttoned up, and
charged their vehicles
straight through the
camp’s fence. Watch-
ing from the roof of the
command bunker, Sgt.
Nick Fragos screamed
into his radio micro-
phone: “We have tanks
in the wire!” The battle
of Lang Vei was under-
way.
Longgrear shoul-
dered his LAW and
pressed the trigger, but
it misfired. He picked
Meanwhile at Khe Sanh: USMC machinegunners
prepare to repel a North Vietnamese attack.
46 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 46
up another but it also misfired. In desperation he re-
armed the firing mechanism and again pressed the trig-
ger. That time it worked, and the rocket sped forward
and hit an incoming tank’s hull. Instead of penetrating
the armor and exploding, however, the rocket rico-
cheted straight up, doing no damage to the target.
Longgrear and his men fell back to the command
bunker and reported to Willoughby. Willoughby
shoved LAWs at his tank-killer teams and led them
outside while Spec. Frank Dooms radioed Da Nang
(the main US base in I Corps) and nearby Khe Sanh to
report the attack.
At Khe Sanh the Marines at first refused to believe
the report, attributing it either to the Army perpetrating
a practical joke or having lost its nerve in the night-
time jungle. Dooms reset his frequency and called
directly to Khe Sanh’s fire direction center. When he
shouted into his radio’s microphone that he could hear
tank engines backfiring, the bored-sounding reply was:
“Negative. That must be the sound of your generators
backfiring.”
At Lang Vei, Special Forces troopers and merce-
naries were engaged in fierce firefights with NVA sap-
pers who’d penetrated the wire. They radioed to an Air
Force forward air controller (FAC) circling overhead
to send in an air strike. It couldn’t come too soon. Six
more tanks were clanking down Highway 9 to assault
Lang Vei from the east.
Dooms finally prevailed and convinced the Marines
Lang Vei was under attack by enemy armor. NVA gun-
ners at Co Roc were dropping 152mm howitzer shells
on Khe Sanh; so it was apparent something big was
afoot. Marine artillery, in range of Lang Vei, began fir-
ing in support of the beleaguered outpost.
At 1:00 a.m. a FAC informed Willoughby a C-47
“Spooky” gunship had arrived. Willoughby told the
FAC to have the airplane fire flares and illuminate the
south perimeter so targets could be identified. He then
snatched Dooms’s microphone and ordered the Marine
gunners to bombard Highway 9. As Spooky showered
parachute flares, heavy shells began crashing along the
road, halting the incoming tank column.
SFC James Holt fired his 106mm recoilless rifle
against the tanks advancing from the south. His first
shot destroyed the lead tank as it rumbled up the Lang
Troi road. Moments later he knocked out the sec-
ond tank. As crewmen scrambled from the burning
machines, Holt reloaded his 106mm with a flechette
round and fired. The swarm of tiny steel darts hummed
like hornets as they cut down the fleeing tankers.
By that time Lang Vei’s defenders were engaged
in hand-to-hand combat with NVA infantry pouring
through the gaps the tanks had ripped in the wire. Holt
was last seen pumping round after round of flechettes
at an oncoming tank. He tried to move back just as his
position was overrun, never to be seen again. He’s still
listed as missing in action.
9/16/08 3:03:15 PM
 At that moment fire slackened as the NVA infantry
facing Lang Vei’s Companies 102 and 103 broke off.
The mercenaries cheered because they believed they’d
beaten back the Communists. But the reason the Com-
munists had backed off was to allow four more tanks
to pass through to the camp’s eastern defenses. Those
machines scattered Companies 102 and 103. Surviv-
ing Montagnards scrambled onto Highway 9 and fled
north, only to be slaughtered as they ran into North
Vietnamese ambush positions surrounding the base.
One of the circling FAC, USAF Capt. Gerald L.
Harrington, used his Starlight scope to pinpoint the
location of the tanks’ muzzle flashes. He marked their
positions with white phosphorus flares, then radioed
an approaching B-57 bomber to target the markers.
The three tanks the bomber attacked were station-
ary, firing their main guns into the command bunker.
The pilot dropped four general-purpose bombs. Har-
rington was delighted to see all three tanks go up in
oily flames.
At 2:30 a.m. Lang Vei’s forward observation post
was overwhelmed, and more PT-76s began attacking
the crumbling command bunker. A tank shell hit the
door, spraying the men inside with high-velocity de-
bris and collapsing the entrance.
Outside, Lt. Col. Daniel Schungel, who’d been
in camp only a few hours, ran through the confusion
to momentary safety in the base teamhouse. At 3:00
a.m. he spotted five NVA approaching with AK-47s
and satchel charges. He shouldered his M-16 and shot
them down, but also set off one of their charges, which
wounded him in the leg.
Passing the Buck
At this moment Willoughby decided it was time to
call for the Marines to mount a relief expedition to ex-
tract his dwindling command. Raising Khe Sanh; he
reported: “Americans are dying up here! For God’s
sake help us!”
Khe Sanh’s junior officers were eager to comply,
but when they asked their superiors in Da Nang for
permission to proceed the brass said “No.”
Higher command feared sending ground troops on
the five-mile trek from Khe Sanh to Lang Vei in the
rain forest at night would be both too risky and too
time-consuming. At the same time, the FAC reported
some of the tanks had withdrawn from the fighting,
and had taken up overwatch positions on the helicop-
ter landing zones outside the camp, precluding aerial
rescue.
So the senior Marines contacted Gen. William
Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, and
asked for guidance. At first light, Westmoreland
boarded a C-130 in Saigon and headed for Da Nang to
take a closer look. By then, of course, the Communist
Tet Offensive was a week old.
ST 253 Issue.indd 47
NVA Armor
The first battle-tank used by the North Vietnamese against
American forces in Vietnam was the Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious
tank. The USSR began shipping those snorkel-equipped machines
to North Vietnam in 1967, and they were first used to overrun the
US Army Special Forces at Lang Vei on 6-7 February 1968. Prior
to that engagement there had been no significant use of Communist
armor against Free World forces in Southeast Asia. Unprepared US
and Montagnard troops were unable to hold their positions despite
inflicting grievous casualties on their attackers.
Over the next several years the Soviet Union supplied the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) with the T-55 main battle tank. Though
NVA crews initially handled the machine ineptly, they quickly
learned from their mistakes and made effective use of the tanks in
their 1972 offensive. The main problem the NVA had was in coor-
dinating their infantry with the armor. The tanks often outran their
own supporting infantry, leading to the vehicles’ destruction by tank-
killer teams. Even so, armored warfare was a big step forward for the
NVA from its origins as a guerrilla army.
Main battle tanks used by Communist forces in Vietnam.
PT-76 amphibious tank
Weight—13.78 tons
Armament—one 76mm D-56T rifled cannon, one
7.62mm SGMT machine gun.
Range—155 miles on land, 62.5 miles on water.
Speed—27mph on land, 6.25mph on water.
Crew—3
Used later in the Vietnam War by the NVA.
T-55 main battle tank
Weight—39.7 tons
Armament—one 100mm D-10T rifled cannon, two
7.62mm PKT machine guns.
Range—310 miles
Speed—30mph
Crew—4
Main battle tank used by US and South Vietnamese forces
in Vietnam.
M48 Patton main battle tank
Weight—50 tons
Armament—One 105mm M68 rifled cannon, three
7.62mm NATO M73 machine guns, one .50-caliber M2
HB machine gun
Range—309 miles
Speed—30mph
Crew—4
Insurgent armor: PT-76 tanks ford a river.
strategy & tactics 47
9/16/08 3:03:15 PM
 48 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 48 9/16/08 3:03:17 PM

 The Green Berets in Vietnam
As far back as 1962, US Special Forces—more popularly known as the
“Green Berets” from their headgear—had worked tirelessly to recruit, equip
and train highland Vietnamese (known generically as “Montagnards,” a
term used by the French for all the tribes living in the mountains) to fight the
Communists. That effort was vital because lowland Vietnamese, north and
south, had traditionally regarded the hill tribes with contempt. The Montag-
nards therefore felt little affinity to outsiders, but they lived in strategic loca-
tions that could be used to control South Vietnam’s porous borders. Careful
not to appear ethnocentric, Special Forces soldiers learned the hill peoples’
dialects, wore the local dress, and practiced area customs to win their loyalty
and affection.
Some observers thought the Special Forces were “going native,” and
their new found love of the exotic native culture would distract them from
their primary mission in Southeast Asia—to prevent a Communist takeover.
But Special Forces’ techniques proved effective in forging the Montagnards
into an efficient fighting force.
After opening a military training school in Soa Cam, adjacent to Hue,
the Special Forces first began training a Montagnard cadre. Introducing them to modern weapons, and paying
them with such new temptations as money, cigarettes and Pepsi-Cola, the Green Berets accomplished two
aims: molding those men into an efficient fighting machine and ensuring their loyalty.
Montagnard and Special Forces cadres then moved out to the highlands and recruited units from the tribesmen there. They
built camps and used them as bases from which to conduct patrols, ambushes and black operations across the border. The chain
of Special Forces camps also screened South Vietnam’s major population centers against NVA infiltration. Special Forces per-
sonnel also conducted civic action missions among the Montagnard civilian populace, helping them build hospitals and schools,
and improving their agriculture. It was a hearts and minds operation that worked.
strategy & tactics 49

ST 253 Issue.indd 49 9/16/08 3:03:20 PM

 NVA Sappers
North Vietnamese army sappers were considered the elite of that army. They were specially trained for infiltration, assault
and sabotage. Sappers were sent in ahead of a main force to neutralized defenses and seize critical positions. Throughout the
course of the Vietnam War, the sapper branch expanded, fielding full regiments by 1972. A typical sapper training course
included the following.

Hours of training Topics

40 Explosives, black powder, TNT, safety, explosives in mines.
120 Wiring and electric power, electricity measurement and its sources, types of wiring,
protecting wire.
48 Reconnaissance: principles, organization of a scout team, scouting airfields, bases,
routes, ports, docks and bivouacs.
72 Camouflage: methods, individual movement, lighting.
120 Overcoming obstacles with explosives: barbed wire, trenches, mine fields,
bangalore torpedoes, assault planning.
144 Penetration of enemy positions, night training.
72 Coordination among sapper cells; formations, weapons and explosive preparation;
assault operations.
168 Overcoming natural and artificial obstacles: mud, deep water, ditches, dry leaves,
lime, sand, grass. Using ladders and planks to negotiate barbed wire obstacles.
216 Ambushing.
24 Raiding.
24 Close Assault.
72 General Review.
48 Final Test.
Source: http://www.gruntonline.com/NVAandVC/nva_sappers1.htm

Model terrain: Viet Cong planning an attack on

a Special Forces camp.

Order of Battle, Lang Vei

Free World
Twenty-six Special Forces (Green Berets) troops comprising Operational Detach-
ment A-101, C Company, 5th Special Forces Group.
Approximately 500 Montagnard troops comprising the 101st, 102nd, 103rd and 104th
Mobile Strike (MIKE) Companies, and three combat reconnaissance platoons.
Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces Team
North Vietnamese Army
Approximately 400 troops (one battalion) of the NVA 304th Infantry Division
50 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 50 9/16/08 3:03:25 PM

 Part of the problem lay in the difference between then Ashley and his
the Special Forces and Marine approaches to war. The Laotians launched
Marines felt Special Forces went too far in their efforts their second charge on
to establish close rapport with the locals, making them the eastern perimeter.
vulnerable to enemy agents and Communist sympa- Ashley’s group
thizers within the ranks of the tribesmen. Marine com- had been reinforced
munications units monitored Army radio transmis- by mercenaries who’d
sions for anything that might compromise security. escaped the camp dur-
For their part, the Special Forces believed Marine ing the night, but again
tactics were too heavy handed for a guerrilla war. The they were pinned by
Leathernecks patrolled in units so large they were eas- NVA fire. When the
ily detected by the enemy and were therefore easily enemy counterat-
ambushed. In any event, the unconventional warfare tacked, Ashley radioed
the Special Forces practiced made them seem like Willoughby: “It’s no
prima donnas to the Marines. But while inter-service good. I’m getting a lot
cooperation may have been strained at times, the men of fire and we’re taking
of both services in the combat zone were burning to a lot of casualties. I’m
help one another, if only the senior commanders could gonna try again.”
agree on a plan. When a lull came in the enemy fire, Ashley re-
Inner Perimeter newed his attack, only to be thrown back yet again.
Exhausted, his men staggered back to Highway 9.
By 3:00 a.m. jubilant Communists were clustered
around Lang Vei’s shattered command bunker. An NVA The NVA were having their own problems. US air
tank lurched onto its earthen roof and rocked back and support was keeping many of the Communist troops
forth in an unsuccessful attempt to collapse it atop pinned down. As evening began to fall, the trapped
the men inside. The machine did succeed in breaking Americans decided they’d waited long enough, and
off the radio antennas, leaving Willoughby with only prepared to try and fight their way out. Willoughby
short-range communications. He was just able to pick managed to raise a FAC on the radio and requested air
up an incoming transmission from nearby old Lang cover for the impending dash for safety.
Vei camp, which was being used as a field hospital. Inside the bunker, medic Spec. 4 James Moreland
A Special Forces medic, Sgt. First Class Gene Ashley, had lapsed into a coma and his comrades had to leave
told Willoughby he’d assembled a force of Laotian ir- him behind. After three strafing runs by F-4 Phan-
regulars to come to the new camp’s relief. toms, the seven walking wounded steeled themselves,
After calling down an air strike on Lang Vei’s en- climbed over the pile of slaughtered South Vietnamese,
emy controlled eastern boundary, Ashley led his men and staggered east across the smoldering compound.
in a charge, only to be bracketed by machinegun fire. When an NVA machinegunner opened up on
The Laotians melted away. Furious, Ashley caught up Willoughby’s procession, Longgrear replied with his
with them amid a cascade of mortar bombs, rallied his CAR-15 and silenced him. The column hobbled a few
ragtag command and charged again. more yards until a jeep driven by a South Vietnam-
By then it was 7:00 a.m., full daylight, and the NVA
intensified their efforts to wipe out the survivors in-
side the command bunker. They set off satchel charges
against its crumbling walls, then threw thermite gre-
nades and tear gas canisters down its airshafts. But the
bunker’s defenders held.
The attackers finally dug out the entrance and
shouted down the stairs that if those inside gave up
they would be well-treated. At this moment the tribal
contingent lost heart and surrendered. Their ranking
officer led his men up the stairs where the Communists
immediately gunned them down. Only eight shaken
Americans were left inside.
The besiegers then blew up the bunker door and
tossed a bundle of Chinese hand grenades down the
stairs. There was still no capitulation, so they set off
a series of high explosives that obliterated the south Relief force, air cavalry style: Helicopter landing zone
wall and knocked the Americans unconscious. Just somewhere in Vietnam.
strategy & tactics 51

ST 253 Issue.indd 51 9/16/08 3:03:27 PM

 ese lieutenant named Quy suddenly roared
up, seemingly out of nowhere, and gave the
Americans a much-needed lift. It was, Long-
grear said later, “the bravest thing I’ve ever
seen a man do in combat.”
Bouncing back down the road past aston-
ished Communists, Lt. Quy trundled his pas-
sengers into a small clearing. A CH-46 heli-
copter that had been sent by Westmoreland
picked up the survivors and flew them to the
dispensary at Khe Sanh.
At Lang Vei a strange quiet descended.
It was 7 February 1968, and the North Viet-
namese had successfully concluded their op-
eration. The other side of the wire: North Vietnamese gunners.

Aftermath
Of the 11 PT-76 amphibious tanks the NVA de-
ployed that night, seven were confirmed destroyed,
with two more listed as probable kills. Approximately
250 of the 400 men the 304th NVA Infantry Division
sent against Lang Vei were estimated to have become
casualties. Twenty-three of the camp’s 24 US Special
Forces troops were dead, wounded or missing, includ-
ing those who’d made it back to Khe Sanh. The Mon-
tagnards suffered worst, with 269 dead, wounded or
missing.
A major problem was defective and inadequate
anti-tank weaponry. It had been the first encoun-
ter Free World forces had with Communist armor in
Vietnam. Recoilless rifles had been used previously
as “bunker busters” against enemy strongpoints or to
fire anti-personnel rounds. More meticulous anti-tank
training would be needed.
Of course, Lang Vei was just part of the country-
wide Tet offensive, during which the NVA and VC
attacked targets throughout South Vietnam. Bigger
battles were fought at Hue, Saigon and Khe Sanh.
Lang Vei soon slipped into obscurity as the broader Tet
offensive captured media attention worldwide. Never-
theless, Lang Vei was a novel and significant clash that
heralded a new chapter in the war because of the Com-
munists’ commitment of tanks to battle. The 1972 and
1975 NVA offensives would be led by tank regiments,
and that long drive to Saigon can be said to have begun
at Lang Vei.
Sources
Lightbody, Andy. and Poyer, Joe. The Illustrated History of Tanks,
Publications International, LTD., 1989.
Nalty, Bernard C. The Vietnam War, Crown Publishers, 1979.
Stockwell, David B. Tanks in the Wire, Daring Books, 1989.
Weir, William. Fatal Victories, Archon Books, 1993.
Welsh, Douglas. The Complete Military History of the Vietnam
War, Dorset Press, 1990.

After the wire: Allied troops inspect

a knocked-out PT-76 tank
52 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 52 9/16/08 3:03:29 PM

 A Fast & Easy Playing Series of Card Games
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This game depicts the German campaign against Poland in September, 1939. Historically,
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PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598 • (661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com

strategy & tactics 53

ST 253 Issue.indd 53 9/16/08 3:03:35 PM

 DATA FILE:
The Armies of Cobra
By Paul Koenig
Tank landing ships unloading supplies on Omaha Beach, building up for the breakout from Normandy.
Germans
1944 Panzer Division
This unit was a simplification and standardization of
the 1941 panzer division. The battalions of its armored,
armored infantry and motorized infantry regiments could
be combined in different ways to form battlegroups for
combat. The divisional armored recon battalion was
frequently used as a spearhead unit.
Shortages of equipment dictated many of the reforms
adopted. Only one infantry battalion in the division had
half-tracks, though those vehicles were often also found
in divisional recon and pioneer units. The division had
plenty of self-propelled guns and half-track mounted
heavy weapons. The tank regiment had two battalions,
one with Pz IV and one with Pz V (Panther) tanks. While
the total number of tanks was lower than in the early
war panzer divisions, the Pz IVs and Vs were heavier
54 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 54
and much more effective. And even heavier Pz VI Tiger
tank battalions could also be attached.
1944 Panzer-Grenadier Division
This was essentially a motorized infantry division,
reinforced with armor. It had two motorized infantry
regiments, plus an assault gun battalion, though the
latter, on paper, was supposed to be a light tank regi-
ment. Incidentally, the Germans treated assault guns
as part of the artillery, using them for direct fire sup-
port of the infantry. They were also useful for antitank
work. While the division might seem short of maneuver
units on paper, Germans found from experience that
six or seven motorized/armored battalions was about
the maximum that could be used efficiently in mobile
situations. Divisional units were similar to that of the
panzer division.
9/16/08 3:03:35 PM
 strategy & tactics 55

ST 253 Issue.indd 55 9/16/08 3:03:37 PM

 SS Panzer Division
This unit was a reinforced version of the 1944 panzer
division. The infantry regiments had
three battalions, one in each regiment
having half-tracks. Each tank battalion
had five tanks in each platoon instead
of four (assuming the unit was at full
strength, a rarity in combat). Addi-
tional battalions in the division were:
a 170mm gun battalion (12 guns), a
rocket launcher battalion (18 launch-
ers), and an assault gun battalion (22
assault guns). While that gave the
SS panzer division more organic firepower, it must be
realized that many of those extra units would normally
be assigned by corps and higher echelons to a regular
army division going into the attack. Still, with only 10
percent more manpower, the SS panzer divisions had
42 percent more firepower than the army’s 1944 panzer
division. They also got the pick of the recruit pool.

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ST 253 Issue.indd 56 9/16/08 3:03:38 PM

 1944 Infantry Divisions
During 1943 the manpower squeeze began to hit the
Wehrmacht. The Germans were unable to find enough
men qualified to serve as infantry, and the troops in the
field needed more firepower. The solution was found
in the reorganization of the infantry division. Total
divisional manpower was reduced 27 percent, with in-
fantry strength down by 31 percent. But weapons were
upgraded. Heavier antitank guns, 120mm mortars, and
organic assault guns were introduced to the infantry.
The 1944 division was officially introduced in late
1943, though many of the changes had already been
unofficially adopted on the Russian front. The major
changes were the deletion of one infantry battalion per
regiment, and the conversion of the divisional recon
battalion into a fusilier battalion (which was to act as
both a recon unit and a divisional mobile reserve).
The reduction in infantry strength made it difficult
for the division to hold extended fronts, but the lower
manpower levels made it easier to provide replacements
for depleted units. By late 1944, the infantry division
would be reorganized again, this time to the Volksgrena-
dier format, with further reductions in manpower and
equipment.
Static Infantry Divisions
These divisions lacked transportation and recon-
naissance units, since they were envisioned for use, as
the name implies, in static defensive positions such as
holding coastlines or fortifications. The divisional bat-
talions did not possess heavy weapons were, instead,
left under the control of regimental headquarters. The
“700” series static divisions were initially formed with
two regiments, each with three battalions. Many of
the static divisions in France underwent a conversion
prior to the invasion so they contained three regiments
of two battalions each. The three-regiment units were
capable of generating more firepower because each HQ
was only responsible for two battalions but had a full
complement of heavy weapons.
ST 253 Issue.indd 57
Luftwaffe Field Divisions
The first attempt to solve the manpower crisis actually
came in late 1942. Hermann Goering ordered the creation
of Air Force field divisions staffed and controlled by the
Luftwaffe. Goering got into the act because he did not
want to transfer Air Force personnel to Army control
as replacements for depleted divisions. Actually, there
was some precedent for this move, as the Luftwaffe
frequently fielded ground units to protect airfields on
the Russian front.
The new units were two-regiment divisions (three
battalions per regiment), with all other components
similarly scaled down. The only addition was a Luftwaffe
flak battalion per division. The technical units (signal,
artillery, engineers, etc.) were also from Luftwaffe per-
sonnel. But while the technical services were efficient,
without good infantry up front the divisions as a whole
could not withstand the shock of combat. Lacking suf-
ficient infantry training and leadership, the Luftwaffe
field divisions fell apart.
Some of these divisions included Ost battalions,
formed from former Soviet prisoners of war. These
units were of variable quality, with some disintegrating
under fire. Considering the Germans knew what they
were getting when they formed these divisions (they
were intended to man fixed fortifications), many of
them performed well.
strategy & tactics 57
9/16/08 3:03:39 PM
 Flak Divisions
The Luftwaffe controlled most of the anti-aircraft
outside of the army divisional and non-divisional flak
units. Throughout 1941-42 that meant about 60 percent
of the heavy flak guns (88mm or larger) under Luftwaffe
control. But from 1943 on, as the Allied bombing of
Germany went into high gear, some 90 percent of the
heavy flak was under Luftwaffe control. Some heavy guns
served with the Heer (army) under Luftwaffe control.
They were organized into flak divisions, brigades, and
regiments as well as flak corps.
The flak battalion was the largest unit with a stan-
dard organization. There were light battalions with
70-80 20mm and 37mm pieces and heavy battalions
with twenty-four 88mm guns and eight 20mm. Three
of those battalions (usually a mixture of two of one and
one of the other) made a flak regiment. The flak brigade
contained a variable number of battalions or separate
batteries. It was often as large or larger than a flak
division. The major difference was that a flak brigade
was usually a static (non-mobile) unit, while the flak
division was a field formation containing a number of
regiments or battalions. One flak corps was present in
Normandy during the campaign. The flak units were
often used on the front line either as artillery or, more
frequently, as anti-tank guns. That exposed them to high
losses, though they were effective in destroying Allied
tanks.
58 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 58
Fallschirmjager (FJ) Division
The FJ (parachute infantry) were by 1944 another
elite German formation, alongside the SS. They actually
had little in the way of parachute training, but the Ger-
man high command considered these units to be “fire
brigades,” to be used as mobile reserves on the Reich’s
crumbling frontiers. These divisions contained a high
proportion of heavy weapons and were supposed to
be motorized. At least until late 1944, personnel were
well trained and highly motivated. By the end of the
war, several of the FJ divisions had been formed from
Luftwaffe ground personnel and suffered accordingly.
United States
1943 Armored Division
This was an attempt to make the paper organization
for mobile units match the practice in the field—and it
worked. The division included three combat command
headquarter companies, which would be used by the
divisional commander to task organize his units. Typi-
cally, a combat command would include a tank battalion,
an armored infantry battalion, and an armored field
artillery battalion, plus recon, engineer and other units.
Each combat command, in turn, would task-organize
its battalions into combined arms groupings by cross-
attaching units. The concept proved successful enough
to be become the basis for the Cold War era US Army
ROAD divisions.
1943-45 Infantry Division
This was intended to be a flexible combined arms
formation. The infantry division was “lean,” with a
minimum of support units. Recon, armor, engineer and
additional artillery formations could be attached from
corps and army levels as needed. Doctrine called for the
division to form regimental-sized task forces organized
for specific missions. While not as efficient as the Ger-
man kampfgruppe system, the task forces worked in the
field. The American infantry division was motorized,
though transport was not necessarily organic but rather
coming from attached truck companies.
Airborne Division
9/16/08 3:03:39 PM
 strategy & tactics 59

ST 253 Issue.indd 59 9/16/08 3:03:41 PM

 This formation included a variable number of parachute
and glider infantry regiments, plus divisional assets. The
artillery was light, since it had to be brought in via parachute
or glider, consisting of 75mm pack howitzers. American
airborne personnel were both highly trained and highly mo-
tivated. Their ability to fight when cut off would later prove
critical when the 101st Airborne Division was surrounded at
Bastogne during the Bulge.
Great Britain
60 #253
ST 253 Issue.indd 60
1944 Armored Division
British armored divisions went through several
evolutions during the war until this organization was
settled on. The main change was a shift away from the
original “masses of tanks” concept to a more balanced
formation with infantry and artillery support. Divisional
units could be organized into several task groups, each
consisting of armor, infantry, reconnaissance and artil-
lery support.
1944 Infantry Division
This unit remained fairly standard throughout
the war, with minor reorganizations here and
there. Divisional level units were frequently
broken up and assigned down to the brigades.
The primary organizational dilemma was at
higher levels. By 1944 the manpower crunch
was hitting the British, and infantry replacements
were becoming increasingly more difficult to
obtain.
1944 Airborne Division
This was a light unit, but that made
sense given the necessity to deploy all
assets via parachute or glider. Once
landed, the division was expected to
hold on long enough for conventional
ground forces to reach and relieve it.
9/16/08 3:03:42 PM
 jump into history!

Highway to the Reich

Highway to the Reich is a tactical simulation of the largest airborne operation in history. Over 35,000 men
belonging to 1st Allied Airborne Army dropped from the skies of Holland. Their objective: capture and hold a high-
way. The result: a salient into German territory that lacked only the last objective, and was thus a tragic defeat.
The 2,000-plus counters detail Gen. Brereton’s airborne corps of three divisions, the units of 30th Corps, and
Model’s scattered and disheveled forces at company level for infantry; battery level for artillery, anti-tank and
anti-air, and troop-level for tanks and armored cars.
The four maps cover from the front along the Meuse-Escaut Canal to the area, nearly 200 hexes away, sur-
rounding Arnhem Highway Bridge. Each map is positioned to cover the operational area of one airborne division
in order to allow one-division scenarios.
All the activities of each formation are completed before those of another are begun. Attacks start with a
preliminary barrage, followed by fire attack by maneuver companies, and then close action with tanks and as-
sault troops. All activities involve comparisons of involved units’ capabilities. Optional rules focus on hidden
movement and multi-player variations, as well as giving the Allied player the opportunity to execute his own
operational plan. The revisions have made this classic game easier and faster to play than ever before.

Contents:
Four 22” x 34” maps
2,520 die-cut counters
Rule & scenario books
6 Organization Charts
Player Aid Cards
Campaign Analysis
Six-sided Dice

PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com Order form on page 63.
strategy & tactics 61

ST 253 Issue.indd 61 9/16/08 3:03:47 PM

 Decision Games…
Games
publisher of military history magazines & games

China: The Middle Kingdom

China: The Middle Kingdom covers the full scope of
Chinese history, from its beginnings as a collection of warring
feudal states, to the current cold war between China and
Taiwan. In this epic game based on the classic Avalon Hill
Britannia system, four players each control several factions
simultaneously, with each faction having their own objectives
and situations, such as conquering certain provinces. The
winner is the player who scores the most points by the end of
the game. This breathtaking game unfolds on an illustrated map
of China with 432 counters, covering 50 separate countries and
peoples, including all of the major dynasties of Chinese history,
the arrival of the European powers, both World Wars and the
Japanese invasion, right up to the end of the civil war between
the Communists and the Nationalists. The game occurs over
24 turns, starting from 403 BC, during the “Warring States”
period as China begins to rise from its feudal age. The game
has two shorter campaign scenarios covering the first half and
second half of the full campaign game.
Battles between armies can be dramatically affected by
the presence of mountains, emperors, heroes, new inventions,
and even the Great Wall. Rebellions, barbarian invasions, and
uprisings may spring up from anywhere, and signal the end of
one dynasty and the birth of a new dynasty. Diplomacy is as
important as military strength. Each player continually must
defend against multiple enemies on multiple fronts.

62 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 62 9/16/08 3:03:53 PM

 Available Now!
Flying Circus:
Aerial Combat in WWI
Flying Circus: Aerial Combat in WWI depicts the fun
and flavor of World War I aerial dogfighting. You fly the
colorful and agile aircraft of WWI as you make history
in the world’s first use of aircraft in a military role.
This is the basic game. You have everything you need
to play single aircraft duels to multi-aircraft dogfights.
Each aircraft has its own unique charateristics reflected
in its ratings and special abilities. The basic game rules
cover all the maneuvers that made WWI aerial combat:
barrel rolls, stall turns, Immelmanns, vertical rolls and
Chandelles. Outmaneuver your opponent to line up your
guns and watch his planes go down in flames!
Gamers who have played the Down in Flames game
series will find many similarities in game play, however,
previous experience is not necessary. The basic game
rules can be read in less than 20 minutes and you can
play your first game immediately.
110 full color
playing cards &
rules sheet
Flying Circus Deluxe:
Bombers & Campaigns
This is the deluxe game. You will need the basic game
card deck to play this expanded version. Then you will
have everything you need to play single aircraft duels
and team play with multiple flights in swirling dogfights.
This deluxe game adds rules for altitude, pilot abilities—
including a deck of 25 pilot cards for historical cam-
paigns—bombers, rear gunners, scouts and other optional
rules. This deluxe game also includes cards and rules
for playing multi-mission games of famous WWI cam-
paigns such as Cambrai and Meuse-Argonne, along with a
“Campaign Analysis” article detailing the development of
the aircraft, their tactics and strategy.
Contents:
110 Deluxe deck cards
(bombers, scouts, plus more
fighters & action cards)
Deluxe Game rules booklet
6 Campaign Cards
Pilot Log
36 Pilot & altitude cards
Dice marker

Shipping Charges
1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
$10 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
20 2 Canada
26 4 Europe, South America
28 6 Asia, Australia

QTY Title Price Total

China The Middle Kingdom $60
Highway to the Reich $160
Flying Circus-Basic $25
Flying Circus-Deluxe $40
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strategy & tactics 63

ST 253 Issue.indd 63 9/16/08 3:03:57 PM

 World at War magazine provides a sharp focus on WWII
with the same in-depth format as Strategy & Tactics. Use
the special subscription card inside to order now or order
online. Don’t miss a single issue!
US 1st Infantry Division during the Battle of the Bulge
Each issue is1 packed full of:
XX

• In-depth analysis
Attachments
III III I I II II

• Detailed maps
Counter II II II

Intelligence
• Orders of Battle II (ñ)

US 4th Armored Division during the Battle of the Bulge

XX
4
Attachments
X II II II I II II
CC
II II
Counter II II

Intelligence
I II

Diagram from next issue feature

article on the Bulge, #3.

Map from upcoming article on Wake

Island, issue #6.

P.O. Box 21598

Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031
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64 #253

ST 253 Issue.indd 64 9/16/08 3:04:04 PM