Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846

Britain Gets Its Way: Power
and Peace in Anglo-American

Relations, 1838–1846
Rebecca Berens Matzke
From the perspective of twenty-first-century America, it seems natural to

assume that no other nation has ever been able seriously to threaten the
continental states with its navy or military. The assumption that US
geography has always deterred such pressure, however, ignores the early
Victorian era. In the 1830s and 1840s, one nation could and did pose a
credible threat to the United States: Great Britain. As the world’s supreme
naval and financial power, Britain had the means to protect and advance
its interests in the face of American belligerence. Ultimately, Britain’s
strength deterred the United States from turning the tensions of 1838–
46 into war. True, by this time Britain could never invade and reconquer
its former American colonies. But it was never in its interest to go to war
with the US. Anglo-American commercial relations were quite profitable,
and peace kept them so. Furthermore, the British preferred a divided
America, fighting over slavery and states’ rights, to one united against an
external enemy.
Britain’s goal was peace, but the methods it used to avoid war with the
US in this period did not look particularly peaceful. Especially under Foreign
Minister Lord Palmerston, preserving the peace did not equate with yielding
in diplomatic battles. Rather, a ‘strong stance’ warned the US away from
confrontations of a more lethal kind. Interestingly, the prospect of a British
invasion through Canada played only a relatively small part in this deter-
rence. More important was the ability of the Royal Navy, with new gunnery
and steam vessels, to strike at the populous and prosperous cities of the
eastern and southern coasts of the US. Britain knew the possibilities for may-
hem, as did the US government and some, at least, of the American public.
Besides Britain’s technical advantages, its funding and political support for
the navy were second to none. While the US struggled in vain to finance
new ships and fortifications, the British cabinet could rest assured that if the
Royal Navy required more funding, it would get it.
The British government counted on the navy’s strength to intimidate the
Americans in controversies over the Caroline and McLeod affairs, the Maine
boundary and the Oregon territory. Palmerston’s personal style of ‘gunboat
diplomacy’ may have encouraged this course, but he and his colleagues did
worry that the political system of the United States might lead it to start a
war neither side really wanted: the fevered American press and people might
push the government to some act the British could not tolerate. Britain used
the Royal Navy to signal the dire consequences of such an act and forced
the American government to resist popular pressure. Geography in these
cases was not enough to shield the US; Britain’s strong stance preserved its
existing interests and maintained peace.
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20 Rebecca Berens Matzke
G reat Britain’s relations with the United States between 1838 and
1846 serve to demonstrate that ‘Pax Britannica’ was a genuine
power phenomenon. The power stemmed partly from Britain’s
remarkable commercial and financial advantages, factors that modern-
day observers are inclined to acknowledge. The power was also based,
however, upon an ability to project military force by and with the aid
of the Royal Navy, the capabilities and deterrent effects of which have
not been generally recognized. On the contrary, numerous scholars
have challenged the proposition that military and naval strength
played an important role in enabling Britain to secure its objectives
during the heyday of ‘Pax Britannica’ (c. 1815–80). They have emphas-
ized the limits of Britain’s means of exercising power and have per-
ceived Britain’s apparent ‘domination’ as a result of circumstances
rather than strength.1
Anglo-American relations in the late 1830s and early 1840s provide
insights into Britain’s use of power. Despite the formidable geographi-
cal barriers, Britain could and did pose a credible threat to the United
States. It used naval as well as financial means to protect and advance
its interests in North America in the face of US expansionism and
belligerence. Ultimately, Britain’s strength helped it get what it wanted
in North America and deterred the United States from turning the
tensions of 1838–46 into war.
What did Britain want most in North America during this period?
The British government approached North American issues with its
traditional dislike for acquiring formal colonies, as Lord Stanley, col-
onial secretary in Sir Robert Peel’s government, made clear in com-
ments about California: ‘I am not anxious for the formation of new
and distant colonies, all of which involve heavy direct, and still heavier
indirect expenditure, besides multiplying the liabilities of misunder-
standing & collision with Foreign Powers.’2 London concerned itself
with holding an existing position in North America rather than acquir-
ing anything new. Essentially, Britain wanted to maintain its colonies’
territorial integrity and defensibility – to ‘keep that which rightfully
1
Gerald S. Graham attributes Britain’s ability to uphold the ‘Pax’ with the Royal Navy
to the ‘general quiescence’ of European powers; he adds that the Empire’s seeming
dominance depended ultimately on alliances with continental states: Tides of Empire:
Discursions on the Expansion of Britain Overseas (Montreal, 1972), pp. 81–3. Paul M.
Kennedy agrees, emphasizing that Britain’s command of the sea ‘existed by default’
because rival nations did not choose to challenge it: The Rise and Fall of British Naval
Mastery (London, 1976), p. 157. Muriel Chamberlain, Barry M. Gough, and C.J.
Bartlett, while acknowledging Britain’s naval strength, also stress the Pax’s
limitations: maritime mastery was ineffective against continental European powers,
on land frontiers (e.g. in North America), and wherever Britain encountered serious
competition: Chamberlain, ‘Pax Britannica’? British Foreign Policy 1789–1914 (London,
1988), pp. 6–7, 9–10; Gough, ‘Pax Britannica: Peace, Force and World Power’, Round
Table CCCXIV (1990), pp. 171–2; Bartlett, Defence and Diplomacy: Britain and the Great
Powers 1815–1914 (Manchester, 1993), p. 2.
2
Stanley memorandum, 10 Nov. 1841, PRO CO 42/482, fo. 450.
War in History 2001 8 (1)
Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations 21
belongs to us’ and to protect it from ‘American aggression’;3 to uphold

its colonists’ rights and protect their property;4 and to continue to
carry on very profitable trade with, and investment in, both its own
colonies and the United States.5 Although these interests were on the
whole non-confrontational, they might at one time or another conflict
with the wants and ‘needs’ of the continent’s most aggressive occupant,
the United States.
In some areas of potential rivalry with the United States, Britain did
not even get involved, much less try to get the upper hand. Although
the Sandwich Islands could have provided a fine Pacific naval base
from which to operate on the American west coast, as well as in Asia,
the Admiralty and Colonial Office agreed in 1841 that establishing a
colony there would only borrow trouble.6 On the continent itself,
Texas, newly independent from Mexico in 1836, sparked some interest
in London but not enough to warrant action beyond diplomatic
encouragement.7 Suggestions from the Mexican government that
Britain establish a colony in upper California to block US expansion
met with a cool reception both in 1841 and in 1845.8
3
Lord Palmerston to Lord John Russell, 25 Oct. 1839, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/3D,
fos. 96–101; Peel to Lord Aberdeen, 16 May 1842, Peel Papers, British Library
[hereafter BL], Add. MS 40453, fos. 136–9. See also Palmerston to Fox, abstract of
dispatch No. 20, 15 Dec. 1838, BL, Add. MS 48495, fos. 44a–48a.
4
The Foreign Office [FO] noted the commercial interests of British subjects in
Canada, which required defence against American encroachments in Maine, and the
government wanted to protect British settlers in Oregon from American settlers
pouring into the territory. J. Backhouse (FO) to J. Stephen, Colonial Office [CO],
24 Oct. 1838, CO 6/13, fos. 161–8; Peel to Aberdeen, 23 Feb. 1845, Aberdeen
Papers, BL, Add. MS 43064, fos. 178–81.
5
Canadian governor-general Lord Sydenham understood the importance of friendly
relations with Britain to the US eastern seaboard’s commerce and the South’s
‘cotton interest’, and Palmerston agreed that ‘Commercial Interests on both sides’
were ‘strong’ enough to prevent a petty Anglo-American war. Sydenham to Lord
John Russell, private, 12 Apr. 1841, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4A, fos. 211–4;
Palmerston to Granville, private, 29 Mar. 1839, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/14/6,
no. 31, fos. 91–2.
6
Sir John Barrow, permanent secretary to the Admiralty (and a leading geographer),
wrote to the CO in Feb. 1841, ‘We certainly do not, as Lord John Russell observes,
want to establish colonies in the Sandwich Islands, nor indeed on any other of the
Pacific Islands.’ Britain already obtained everything it needed in the Pacific Islands –
access and supplies for its cruisers, trade for its merchants, and information for its
diplomats – without possessing territory there. Taking that territory would be
jumping into a ‘wasp’s nest’, and ‘endless disputes and squabbles would ensue, with
both foreigners and natives’. ‘By occasional visits,’ Barrow noted, ‘we get all we want
without much of these’: Barrow to James Stephen (CO), 11 Feb. 1841, CO/42/482,
fos. 30–1. Indeed, when a Royal Navy officer, over-anxious to protect Hawaii from
France, later declared British dominion over the islands, Peel’s government
repudiated the cession: [J.H. Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial
and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829–1861 (Westport, CT), pp. 71–2.
7
Lord Palmerston to T. Spring Rice, 9 Oct. 1837, Broadlands Papers [Broadlands],
GC/MO/129; Palmerston to John Russell, 30 Mar. 1845, Broadlands,
GC/RU/975/1–2; Peel to Aberdeen, 26 May 1844, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS
43 063, fos. 268–9; K. Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America 1815–
1908 (Berkeley CA, 1967), p. 124.
8
Canning (FO) to Stephen (CO), 15 Nov. 1841, CO 42/482, fo. 449; Stanley
memorandum, 10 Nov. 1841, CO 42/482, fo. 450; Peel to Aberdeen, 24 Sept. 1845,
On the other hand, the Anglo-American crises that erupted between

1838 and 1846 show that Britain did take action and risk serious quar-
rels with the US in order to uphold existing interests. The subject
should be considered in terms of time periods rather than locations,
since many issues and episodes combined to create the tensions. The
first crisis period, stretching roughly from 1838 and the end of the
Canadian rebellion to the signing of the Webster–Ashburton treaty in
1842, included clashes over the disputed Maine boundary, periodic
cross-border raids by American ‘Patriot’ societies, Canadian authorit-
ies’ burning of the American ship Caroline, and the capture and trial
in New York of Canadian Alexander McLeod. These various episodes
overlapped and intertwined to bring Britain and the US close to war.
After a brief easing of relations, the second period of crisis, 1844–6,
centred on the border of the Oregon Territory. In both of these per-
iods, statesmen in London and Washington worried about the possi-
bility of war. With that danger present, what was Britain’s approach to
dealing with the Americans?
Invading and reconquering the former American colonies was not
an option. Perhaps some hotheads thought it possible, but serious
statesmen knew that gaining complete control over such an immense
territory was too difficult.9 Even more compelling, Britain did not want
to invade or try to conquer the US. It had good reasons for this view.
First, the British government preferred a United States that was pol-
itically divided by sectionalism and economic issues and feared that
invasion would unite the disparate elements.10 Second, the economic
relationship between Britain and the independent American nation
was hugely beneficial for both sides. Why risk altering that relation-
ship – and why incur the costs of administering and protecting another
territory? So connected were Britain and the US that one historian has
written of a ‘single Atlantic economy’ from 1790 to 1850.11 Granted,
the United States was more dependent on Britain than Britain was on
the US for trade, but the British government recognized the value of
the American market.12 Even more than trade, British investment
flourished in the ever-expanding United States, with its laissez-faire
style of government; indeed, American expansion could not have
occurred (at least not at the rate it did) without British capital to fuel
Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43 064, fos. 357–60.

9
The British government dismissed the idea of a full-scale invasion, and even a minor
strike with land forces from the Canadas was only a slim possibility and usually tied
in with other plans. Sir Howard Douglas (former governor of New Brunswick) to
Lord Normanby (CO), forwarded to Foreign Office (FO), 25 Apr. 1839, CO 6/13,
fos. 733–68.
10
H.S. Fox to Palmerston, dispatch no. 21, copy, 7 Mar. 1841, CO 42/483, fos. 159–62;
‘Memorandum about the Defence of Canada’, 8 Sept. 1845, Murray papers, PRO,
WO 80/11, cited in Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 147–8.
11
F. Thistlethwaite, America and the Atlantic Community: Anglo-American Aspects, 1790–
1850 (New York, 1959), p. 5.
12
Gladstone to Peel, 13 Oct. 1842, Peel Papers, BL Add. MS 40469, fos. 276, 278–81.
it.13 Again, as they did in regard to nearly every part of the world at
this time, successive British governments preferred profits to con-
quests.
I
Great Britain wanted peace in North America, but the methods it used
during these crises to maintain peace and uphold its interests looked
decidedly unpeaceful. Britain often took a strong stance to deter the
US from war. It could reasonably take such a stance because, first, it
was fully aware of its strategic advantages (which the US government
also appreciated); second, it enjoyed a strong financial base to act
upon and improve its advantages; and third, it had the political will to
employ those advantages.
What kind of strategic threat could Britain wield that would deter
the Americans from going to war? In Canada, British policy was almost
entirely defensive, focused on fending off an American strike. Part of
this defence involved preparing border fortifications and naval forces
on the Great Lakes – the latter in defiance of the 1817 Rush–Bagot
Agreement limiting naval armament on the Lakes – in order to prevent
an easy American victory or, better yet, to deter an American attack
there.14
But while Britain used defensive measures in Canada to make an
American invasion more difficult and costly, its main deterrent
power was offensive: the ability of the Royal Navy to assault Amer-
ican cities on the east and Gulf coasts. Such action would be a seri-
ous blow to the US even if Britain never used the cities as bases
from which to launch an invasion (although some Americans feared
that possibility). 15 These port cities were the centres of the nation’s
commerce and wealth, vital not only for overseas trade but for the
indispensable domestic coastal trade as well. As one Admiralty investi-
gator noted in 1841, the port of New York controlled the resources of
13
R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979), p. 57;
Thistlethwaite, America and the Atlantic Community, pp. 19–22.
14
By 1838, British armament on the Lakes had already gone beyond the agreement’s
limitations, but without drawing US protests. Palmerston justified the treaty violation
as self-defence, pointing out that the US government had proved unable to prevent
its own citizens from attacking the Canadas. He instructed the British minister in
Washington to answer any American complaints about British increases with the
explanation that ‘H.M.’s Govt. must consider themselves released from all restrictions
as to the nature and extent of the means wch it may be necessary for them to
employ, in order to repel invasion and to defend from Attack the Possessions of the
British Crown’: Palmerston to Fox, 15 Dec. 1838, BL, Add. MS 48 495, fos. 44a–48a.
15
Congress, House, Defenceless Condition of the Southern Coast of the United States and Gulf
of Mexico: Statement Submitted by the Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs to the
House of Representatives in relation to the defenceless condition of the Southern coast of the
United States and Gulf of Mexico, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 May 1842, published in B.F.
Cooling, ed., The New American State Papers [NASP], Military Affairs II: Policy and
Strategy of National Defense (Wilmington, DE, 1979), pp. 180–5.
the north-eastern interior, served by the Erie Canal and Hudson

River.16 Worried about the ‘Defenceless Condition of the Southern
Coast of the United States and Gulf of Mexico’, the US House of Rep-
resentatives committee on Naval Affairs submitted a statement in May
1842 emphasizing that the Gulf coastal cities served as entrepôts
through which goods and provisions from the south and north-western
states were shipped not just overseas but to the northern states as well.
The report estimated the current value of commerce through the Gulf
ports at $100 000 000 and warned, ‘If you desire to measure the hazard
to which a maritime war with a formidable naval Power would expose
this commerce, you have but to consult the testimony of experience’:
the great commercial losses in the war of 1812.17
The defence of the Canadian frontier therefore rested chiefly on
Britain’s naval threat to the US coast and American commerce. Even
if an American army should take Montreal, at least one British investi-
gator thought, Britain could still bring the US to heel, since ‘all their
commercial cities on the Atlantic would become exposed to the attacks
of%our naval and military forces’.18
Both sides understood the credibility of the British naval threat.
First, Britain had imperial naval bases at Halifax, Bermuda and Jamaica
that would enable the Royal Navy to carry out attacks on the US coast.
Reports at different times in the US House of Representatives and by
the navy department noted these bases when they expressed concern
about the inability of the US Navy to defend the coast.19 Second, the
Royal Navy possessed advantages from new naval technology, especially
light-draft steam vessels (for which the British had developed tactics
for inshore operations) and new hollow-shot artillery. Britain had pion-
eered the development of steam gunboats, and although in the early
1840s its steam fleet was largely composed of experiments, the mere
potential of steamers had tremendous moral weight. The American
government feared that the combination of steam tenders, which
could tow ships of the line into position, as well as out of danger
inshore, and steamers armed with a handful of heavy guns, might ren-
der fixed defensive batteries obsolete.20 Moreover, Britain’s imperial
bases meant that it could provide the coaling and maintenance essen-
tial to steamers operating off the US coast.
16
Lt Fanshawe to Stanley, 30 Nov. 1841, PRO: ADM 7/626, fos. 2–9.
17
Defenceless Condition of the Southern Coast, pp. 180–5.
18
Capt. Boxer, RN, ‘3rd Report upon the Country in the immediate Vicinity of
Montreal: being the third of a series of joint reports relative to the Frontier Water
and other communications in connexion with the Military Occupation and Defence
of Canada’, 31 May 1845, quoted in Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 139.
19
US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Report, 13 Feb. 1841,
published in Foreign Office Confidential Print, ‘Papers Relating to the Arrest of Mr.
McLeod %’, CO 42/483, fos. 383b-391a; Reports published in Niles National Register,
14 Mar. and 11 Apr. 1846, cited in Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, pp. 87–8.
20
Lewis Cass to Daniel Webster, 5 Mar. 1841, quoted in K.R. Stevens, Border Diplomacy:
The Caroline and McLeod Affairs in Anglo-American–Canadian Relations, 1837–1842
(Tuscaloosa, 1989), p. 99.
The power of steam technology was not merely latent – it was on

public display elsewhere in the world. A British force equipped with
steam vessels destroyed the river forts protecting Canton and took a
squadron nearly 200 miles inland to Nanking to defeat China in the
first Opium War (1839–42). Other steamers towed a Royal Navy fleet
and supplied land forces in the autumn 1840 Syrian campaign against
Egyptian Mehemet Ali. One of the fleet’s four steamers, firing at long
range, landed the lucky shot that destroyed a magazine at Acre,
expediting the fall of that fortress and the Egyptians’ defeat.21 Even in
these supporting roles, steamers grabbed the attention of authorities
on both sides of the Atlantic, and their accomplishments seemed to
prove that steam vessels would be invaluable for inshore and river oper-
ations. British policy makers were alive to the possibilities steam
offered, and one adviser even wanted to explore repeating the feat at
Acre in New York and Boston.22 Numerous worried American officials
also appreciated the advantages steamers gave to the Royal Navy,
especially because the US Navy had nothing similar to counter them.23
Senator Thomas Hart Benton noted in a debate during the McLeod
affair that Britain might back up its threats against the US with ‘such
blows as the towns of Syria lately received from the war steamers of
[Admiral Sir Robert] Stopford and [Captain Charles] Napier’.24 US
secretary of the navy J.K. Paulding recommended to President Van
Buren in January, 1840, that the country’s entire defence system be
reexamined because of the ‘great changes in the elements of attack
and defence’ afforded by steamers and shells.25 A year later, the House
of Representatives committee on naval affairs supported the creation
of a home squadron of the US Navy in response to new ‘steam power’,
which would allow an enemy to seize American merchant ships on the
coast and to endanger the whole coastline.26
The facility of steamers for easy blockades, surprise attacks and pen-
etration up rivers seemed all the more significant because of another
British advantage: the US Navy was weak and scattered, whereas the
British could quickly assemble a substantial fleet off the US coast. In
1838, even before it increased forces during the crisis period, the Royal
Navy’s North American/West Indian squadron still numbered more
than 27 ships. The squadron was enlarged, decreased and then
21
A. Lambert, ‘The Introduction of Steam’, in Robert Gardiner and Andrew Lambert,
eds, Steam, Steel and Shellfire: The Steam Warship 1815–1905 (London, 1992), p. 23.
22
C.E. Trevelyan (Treasury) to R.I. Routh, commissary general, Canada, 12 Jan. 1842,
C.E. Trevelyan Papers, New Bodleian Library, MS Film 1186.
23
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, p. 58.
24
[US] National Intelligencer, repr. as no. 46 in Foreign Office Confidential Print, 10
June 1841, CO 42/483.
25
Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting, in compliance with a resolution
of the Senate, a report from the Secretary of the Navy, in relation to the military and naval
defences of the country, 27 Jan. 1840, published in NASP, Military, ii, pp. 61–3.
26
‘Home Squadron’, House of Representatives Report No. 3, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 1841; 1,
2, 5–6; House Journal, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 1841; 270–311; Senate Journal, 27th Cong.,
1st sess., 1841; 129–30; all quoted in Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, p. 58.
enlarged again in this period but always remained formidable.27 In

contrast, most of the larger ships of the US Navy, whose role was to
protect and promote American trade (rather than ensure command
of the sea), were far from home waters, serving on the Mediterranean,
Atlantic, Pacific, and East Indian stations, or with the US exploring
expedition.28 At the height of the McLeod crisis, a memorandum from
the US navy department estimated that it would take two or three
months to pull together nine battleships, 14 frigates, and 15 sloops;
only one large steamer was ready, and it was not sea-going.29 Also, Bri-
tish reports estimated that the US Navy was undermanned and its ships
overgunned.30 The US Navy and Congress were so distressed in 1842
by the navy’s deficiencies that they authorized appropriations to build
and repair warships during a session of bitter wrangling in which little
else got done.31 To make matters worse, US coastal defences were
unfinished, lacking in men and armament, or missing entirely – and
all this prevailed even in times of crisis.32 The British did numerous
surveys of American coastal defences and usually determined that they
were mediocre at best.33 In the United States, politicians, naval plan-
ners, and even the public howled at the defencelessness of their coasts,
27
Official list in ADM 8, cited in Bourne, Balance of Power, p. 47. By 1 June the force
had been increased to 36, and by November to 41 ships. Many of the new ships were
steamers, but larger vessels arrived also. Bourne thinks that some of this force had to
do with the French blockade of Mexico in 1838, but it was useful for dealing with
the US as well. Numbers were again decreased in 1840, as the Admiralty shifted
forces to the Mediterranean for the confrontation with Egypt (and its supporter,
France), although these were mostly freed up by the end of that year. ADM 8/118,
cited in Bourne, Balance of Power, p. 79.
28
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, pp. 58, 67; D.F. Long, ‘The Navy under the
Board of Navy Commissioners, 1815–1842’, in K.J. Hagan, ed., In Peace and War:
Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775–1984, 2nd edn (Westport, CT, 1984), p.
75.
29
‘Memorandum handed to the Secretary’, Letters to the Secretary of the Navy, vol.
vii, 19, Records of the Board of Navy Commissioners, 1815–42, Naval Records
Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, USNA RG 45, quoted in
Bourne, Balance of Power, p. 101.
30
Lt Fanshawe to Lord Stanley, 14 Dec. 1841, ADM 7/626, fos. 10–23; Lord John Hay
to Lord Minto, Oct. 1842, Minto Papers, National Maritime Museum [NMM],
ELL/236.
31
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, pp. 64–5.
32
In 1845 (during the Oregon crisis), for example, US ordnance officer George
Talcott estimated that existing and building forts would require 4800 guns, and
those proposed but not yet built would need another 3500. However, only 2900
suitable guns were available at the time. Report from Talcott to Secretary of War
W.L. March, 27 Dec. 1845, quoted in R.S. Browning III, Two If By Sea: The
Development of American Coastal Defense Policy (Westport, CT, 1983), p. 45.
33
Col. W. Napier to Lord FitzRoy Somerset, 19 Mar. 1841, enclosure in letter from
FitzRoy Somerset to Duke of Wellington, 19 Sept. 1841, Wellington Papers,
2/78/133–41; Lt Fanshawe to Stanley, 30 Nov. 1841, ADM 7/626, fos. 2–9; also
Admiralty Digests and Indexes, 1841, Foreign Countries, Transactions With, America
[n.d.], ADM 12/385.
especially while tensions increased with Britain.34 Local worthies from

Baltimore and Philadelphia sent memorials to the US Senate begging
for improved fortifications.35 At this time, the federal government was
inclined to concentrate most of its defensive efforts on coastal fortifi-
cations, and not only because of domestic political pressure. Policy
makers considered the expense of building a navy capable of
defending the entire seaboard prohibitive.36 Yet fort construction
always lagged behind: not until 1851 was the coastal defence system
the Board of Engineers had recommended back in 1821 completed.37
Finally, the British government played with the idea of landing West
Indian troops in the south to incite a slave rebellion, something that
US southerners greatly feared.38 While this scheme might seem far-
fetched, Britain had an example close to hand of a similar measure
that had succeeded: in 1840 British forces, especially Captain Charles
Napier of the Royal Navy, had helped to foment and then supported
a successful Syrian rebellion against Mehemet Ali as part of Britain’s
campaign against Egyptian forces.39 Southern leaders were alarmed at
the prospect of black invaders, aware that steam ships could now
penetrate their coasts.40
34
Clipping of unnamed New York newspaper, forwarded to Admiralty by British consul
in New York, 15 May 1841, ADM 7/712, fo. 224; secretary of war’s Report on the
Protection of the Frontiers, 9 Jan. 1838, and ‘The Major General of the Army to the
Secretary of War, November 1837’, enclosure no. 7 to the secretary of war’s report
accompanying the president’s Annual Message, 4 Dec. 1837; both quoted in Bourne,
Balance of Power, pp. 50–1. Also, New Orleans city leaders heard a speech from Gen.
Edmund Gaines on the dangers of steam to coastal fortresses, quoted in Browning,
Two If By Sea, p. 86. In general, coastal cities (Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, and New Orleans) were centres of commerce, wealthy areas with
influential people living in them; a threatened attack there would receive much
attention and work well as a deterrent.
35
Congress, Senate, Report on Defenses of Baltimore, 26th Cong., 2nd sess., 2 Mar. 1841,
published in NASP, Military ii, pp. 155–62; Congress, Senate, Memorial on Measures for
Defense of the Delaware, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 11 June 1841, published in NASP, Military
ii, pp. 163–4.
36
Secretary of War Joel Poinsett to Hon. R.M.J. Hunter, Speaker, US House of
Representatives, 12 May 1840, printed in NASP, Military ii, pp. 142–7.
37
Congress, House, Statements Explaining Appropriations for Fortifications, House
Document no. 30, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 7 July 1841, serial no. 392, printed in B.F.
Cooling, ed., The New American State Papers, Military Affairs iii: Policy and Strategy of
National Defense (Wilmington, DE, 1979), pp. 236–42; Browning, Two If By Sea, p. 44.
38
Sir Howard Douglas (former governor of New Brunswick) to Lord Normanby (CO),
25 Apr. 1839, CO 6/13, fos. 733–68.
39
One official speculated on landing a force in the southern US to ‘distribute muskets
to the Negroes in Syrian style’. Trevelyan to Routh, confidential, 12 Jan. 1842, C.E.
Trevelyan Papers, New Bodleian Library, MS film 1186, 126–8.
40
e.g. ‘Home Squadron’, House of Representatives Report No. 3, 27th Cong., 1st sess.,
1841, 1, 2, 5–6, in Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire pp. 58–9; and speech by Mr
Benton, debate on US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Report, 13 Feb. 1841, published in Foreign Office Confidential Print, ‘Papers
Relating to the Arrest of Mr McLeod %’, CO 42/483, fos. 467a–468b.
II
So Britain was quite clear about – and the US quite aware of – the
general threat the Royal Navy posed. In addition to the strategic and
technological advantages which made the threat credible, Britain’s
financial prowess made it real and immediate. Britain’s national wealth
and strong public finances, combined with a traditional public and
parliamentary acceptance of the need for a strong navy, underlay the
Royal Navy’s strategic and technical advantages over the Americans.
First, steady naval funding meant that new technology could be
developed and disseminated throughout the Royal Navy, and overseas
bases and support systems could be kept up. Second, it made possible
the timely mobilization and assembly of a sufficient fleet where and
when it was needed; this depended partly, of course, on the new tech-
nology and overseas bases, but it also resulted from the Admiralty’s
capacity simply to act without waiting for parliamentary approval. And
finally, naval funding gave the government confidence that, should
Britain be dragged into war in spite of itself, it could – compared to
the US – take that war in stride. The US could not take comfort in
the hope that Britain might be unable to mount and sustain a force
sufficient to attack America, or that it might be slow in doing so.
Admittedly, most British governments wished to avoid going to Par-
liament for an extraordinary increase in naval estimates. They naturally
preferred to evade political controversies and difficult issues, and often
they wanted to avoid a public airing of their policy, which might inter-
fere with diplomacy or warn an adversary. But in times of crisis, govern-
ments could generally make a persuasive case in Parliament for raising
naval estimates, often invoking the British public and its expectation
of a strong navy.41 And the government had ways of obfuscating, at
least temporarily. Sometimes the Admiralty just built more ordnance
or employed more seamen than were voted; the government would
publicly justify the expense once the task at hand was underway or
finished.42 Underlying financial strength and a political commitment
by parliament and public meant that, although the Royal Navy was not
constantly on a war footing, it could get there quickly if necessary. For
example, though naval budgets were reduced in the peaceful early
years of Peel’s administration, Britain added to its fleet fairly swiftly
when the situation changed in 1844 and relations with both France
and the United States deteriorated.43
41
Palmerston to Minto, 29 Dec. 1839, Minto Papers, NMM, ELL/218; Minto to
Admiral George Elliot, 3 Feb. 1841, Minto Papers, NMM, ELL/234; Sidney Herbert
to Lord Haddington, ‘Memorandum % for the Navy Estimates for 1845–6’, 1 Jan.
1845, Ellenborough Papers, PRO: 30/12 5/1 pt iv, fo. 892.
42
Peel to Wellington, 9 Aug. 1845, Peel papers, BL, Add. MS 40 461, fos. 168–81; ‘A
Return on the Amount of British Naval Force on the Brazil Station %’, 19 June
1846, Ellenborough Papers, 30/12 5/1, pt vi, fos. 1520–3.
43
Becoming alarmed in 1844 that naval preparation had been neglected too long, Peel
brought through large increases fairly swiftly. Peel to Wellington, 9 Aug. 1845, Peel
Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 461, fos. 168–81.
In contrast, the United States had great difficulty financing naval

and military preparations or utilizing its navy as a foreign policy tool.
Economic troubles and political wrangling hampered it in developing
new technology, fully manning the navy, constructing and garrisoning
coastal fortifications and building new ships. In this period the US
Navy never got much money for new construction, and thus the nation
could not rely on its navy for a floating defence. The war department
never got enough funding even to build all the fortifications it thought
necessary for defence, much less to arm, man and maintain them.44
An economy that remained stagnant after the crisis of 1837, a drop in
federal receipts and a federal debt that grew to $13 584 000 in 1841
combined to discourage Congress from increasing defence funding.45
Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston thought the US in ‘a Condition of
general Bankruptcy’ during the Maine dispute, a situation which would
not ‘give a fancy for maritime war to a nation who live by commerce
and who have made no naval Preparations whatever for a Fight by
sea’.46 Politics, too, hindered effective preparations against a British
naval threat. Arguments among local interests delayed action on naval
yard improvements, and sectional concerns entangled naval building
in issues of states’ rights and the expansion of slavery.47 While these
serious weaknesses in American defence capabilities did not stop the
public and some politicians from making defiant gestures toward
Britain, well-informed American policy makers and experts were aware
that Britain could certainly better support an attack on the US than
the US could support a defence against that attack.48
III
Knowing its advantages and the Americans’ disadvantages in a naval
war, and possessing the financial base to capitalize on those advan-
tages – and accept the risks – gave the British government the political
will to deploy, or threaten to deploy, forces to intimidate the United
44
‘[m]ost seacoast forts remained unarmed up to the eve of the Civil War’: Browning,
Two If By Sea, p. 46.
45
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, pp. 62–3.
46
Palmerston to Lansdowne, 25 April 1840, quoted in Bourne, Balance of Power, p. 85.
47
Despite the publication of US Navy Department reports on naval weakness in the
spring of 1846 – and the public outcry they caused – both House and Senate bills
failed to come to a vote, and new steam warships proposed in the Senate were sunk
in a debate over Oregon. Senate Documents Nos. 187 and 263, 29th Cong., 1st sess.,
1845–6, in Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire, pp. 87–8.
48
Regarding the US Navy’s capacity for defence, Secretary of War Joel Poinsett lamented
in May 1840, ‘To defend a line of Coast of three thousand miles in extent and
effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities & important naval
depots, the Navy of the United States must be very superior to the means of attack of
the most powerful Naval power in the world, which will occasion an annual expense this
Country is not now able to bear’: Poinsett to Hon. R.M.J. Hunter, Speaker of the House
of Representatives, 12 May 1840, printed in NASP, Military II, p. 143.
States. Britain used its advantages in 1838–42 and 1844–6 to deter the
US from war and to protect its interests in North America.
Anglo-American tensions had swelled after December 1837, when
Canadian authorities burned the steamship Caroline. The vessel was
being used by American ‘Patriot’ societies, set on driving Britain out
of Canada, to ferry guns and supplies on the Niagara River to fellow
rebels at Fort Schlosser. The British minister in Washington, H.S. Fox,
was so concerned that US citizens like these, engaged in raiding over
the Canadian border, might trigger a war, that he instructed the
commander-in-chief of Britain’s North American/West Indies squad-
ron to ready his fleet to strike an ‘astounding blow upon [American]
navigation and commerce’ if ordered to do so.49 To counter the Patriot
societies, as well as belligerent American settlers in the disputed area
of Maine, Britain took various other steps as well. The Admiralty
ordered an increase of the British squadron on the Great Lakes,
especially significant because, before a late 1841 increase was voted,
the US had no naval force on the Lakes other than a small revenue
cutter.50 Captain Richard Sandom of the Royal Navy supervised the
addition of four steamers, as well as several schooners, along with 400
more men to man them by the end of 1839.51 New troops were brought
to Halifax52 and transported to New Brunswick to protect against any
invasion by the citizens of Maine.53 Throughout 1839, the Admiralty
kept close watch on the disposition of its own North American squad-
ron and of US ships, particularly in the Mediterranean, ‘in conse-
quence of the Boundary Question’.54
After November 1840, attention shifted away from the Maine bound-
ary for a time. The cause was the arrest by New York authorities of
Alexander McLeod, a Canadian deputy sheriff from Niagara, for his
part in the burning of the Caroline. McLeod, with other Canadian
officials, destroyed the steamer while it was probably in American
waters, but the British government thought the action justified. Upon
learning of McLeod’s arrest, London expressed outrage that an indi-
vidual state would dare to try a foreign citizen for an act avowed by
his government, and it pressured Washington to intervene. The Col-
49
H.S. Fox to Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Paget, 15 Mar. 1838, H.S. Fox papers, PRO:
PRO 97/17, fos. 138–146.
50
Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 99, 102. American merchant ships on the Lakes were
numerous, and officials hoped that these might be hired and converted to carry
guns in the event of war. British officials usually hoped to do the same with
Canadian merchant steamers: op. cit., pp. 102, 145.
51
Admiralty Digests and Indexes, 1839, North American Provinces General & Political
Arrangements, 16 Jan. 1839, ADM 12/356; Sandom to Lord Colchester, 15 Sept.
1839, 15 Jan. 1841, 13 Feb. 1846, cited in Stevens, Border Diplomacy, p. 52.
52
Admiralty Digests and Indexes, 1839, Colonies, settlements, possessions, North
American Provinces General & Political Arrangements, 14 Feb. 1839, ADM 12/356.
53
Op. cit., 27 Feb. 1839, ADM 12/356; Admiralty Digests and Indexes, 1839, Foreign
Stations, Jamaica, 15 Apr. 1839, ADM 12/358.
54
Admiralty Digests and Indexes, 1839, Foreign Stations, 20 Mar. 1839; and Foreign
Nations – America, 1 June 1839, ADM 12/358.
onial Office asked the Admiralty to give instructions to its commander-

in-chief in North America ‘as shall correspond with the views of H.M.’s
govt. on the subject’, and the Admiralty directed Vice-Admiral Sir
Thomas Harvey at Bermuda to keep in touch with Fox in Washington
and Governor-General Lord Sydenham in the Canadas to await devel-
opments in McLeod’s case.55 Further direct communications between
Fox and Harvey (and Harvey’s replacement, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Adam) instructed the squadron to prepare for action if the state of
New York executed McLeod and Fox quit Washington in response.56
The cabinet ordered Bermuda’s defences and garrison prepared in
case of a rupture with the US, and decided to send Sydenham’s
replacement to Canada in a ship of the line, in order to have a power-
ful vessel on hand if needed.57 British ships in the Mediterranean
would be moved to Gibraltar and frigates and steamers gathered at
Plymouth, ready for quick deployment.58 Reports to the Admiralty gave
the promising information that the entire US Navy counted only four
or five large ships in commission.59
The British made preparations of this sort, some quite obvious,
throughout the developing crisis over the raiders, the Maine boundary
dispute and McLeod’s trial. Palmerston’s conversations on these mat-
ters with Andrew Stevenson, the US minister in London, frightened
Stevenson enough that he warned President Van Buren in a confiden-
tial report in February 1841 that McLeod’s execution would mean
‘immediate war.’60 Soon after, Stevenson advised the commander of the
US Navy’s Mediterranean squadron to move his forces past Gibraltar
and to be ready, at the start of war, to harass British vessels as long as
possible before running for home; Commodore Isaac Hull complied
with these directions.61 Stevenson also informed Secretary of State
Daniel Webster of a Lloyd’s of London notice seeking bids on troop
transports to Canada, a worrying signal of British intentions.62 In
addition to these indications of anxiety among US diplomats and naval
officers, congressional committees and military experts worried pub-
55
Colonial Office to Barrow (most confidential), 3 Mar. 1841, CO 42/483, fos. 57–58;
R. More O’Ferrall to Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Harvey, dispatch no. 52 (secret), 3
Mar. 1841, ADM 1/1696, fo. 46.
56
Fox to Harvey, 13 Mar. 1841, CO 42/483, fo. 406a; Fox to Adam, Oct. 1841, Fox
Papers, PRO 97/17, fos. 562–5.
57
Peel to Stanley, 20 Sept. 1841, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 467, fos. 60–1;
Haddington to Peel, 13 Sept. 1841, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 456, fos. 3–4. In the
event, the warship departed as ordered but was held up in Ireland by bad weather
and never made it to North America during the crisis.
58
Peel to Wellington, 18 Oct. 1841, Wellington Papers, 2/80/26–7.
59
Haddington to Peel, 19 Oct. 1841, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 456.
60
Stevenson to Van Buren, 9 Feb. 1841, quoted in Stevens, Border Diplomacy, pp. 86–7.
61
Stevenson to Commodore Isaac Hull, 8 Mar. 1841, and Hull to Capt. William C.
Bolton, 25 Mar. 1841, published in K.J. Bauer, ed., The New American State Papers:
Naval Affairs ii: Diplomatic Activities (Wilmington, DE, 1981), p. 334.
62
Stevenson to Webster, 9 and 18 Mar. and 7 Apr. 1841, Dispatches, Great Britain,
National Archives, quoted in H. Jones, To the Webster–Ashburton Treaty: A Study in
Anglo-American Relations, 1783–1843 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1977), p. 55.
licly about what Britain could accomplish with steam warships. The war
and navy departments – and the citizens of coastal US cities – pushed
urgently for improvements in coastal defences and for naval expan-
sion, pointing to the tensions with Britain as their reason for urgency.
The message about Britain’s naval capability was plainly getting
through.
McLeod’s acquittal by a New York jury in October 1841 offered an
opportunity for a cooling of tempers and for negotiation. Of course,
it is impossible to credit the jury’s decision to Britain’s show of force.
But Britain’s strong stance seems to have had an intimidating effect
in Washington. A worried federal government scrambled to overcome
constitutional limitations put upon it by states’ rights, invoked by New
York State to justify its trial of a foreign agent for a public act. Although
New York resisted, the federal government tried frantically to pressure
the state into turning over the McLeod issue to be handled diplo-
matically.
The acquittal reduced immediate tensions, and the Webster–Ashbur-
ton treaty in 1842 soon resolved the Maine boundary issue and settled
Anglo-American relations for the time being. Palmerston, now out of
office, derided this treaty as foolish and thought Britain should have
held out for a better boundary line, since the US had neither the
money nor the navy to go to war over the issue.63 The treaty, however,
largely satisfied the British Parliament and public. Yet even the new
prime minister, Sir Robert Peel, felt strongly enough about signaling
British willingness to apply power that he refused to award more than
a viscountcy to Lord Ashburton; a higher elevation might send an
erroneous message of Britain’s ‘fear of collision with the United
States’.64
Two years later Britain again flexed its muscles in a dispute with the
United States over Oregon. A treaty had given Britain and the US joint
rights of occupation, and previous agreements had not set a border.
When US Democrats tied the annexation of Texas to that of Oregon
in the 1844 presidential campaign, they brought the issue to the fore-
front of Anglo-American relations. This political manoeuvre whipped
up expansionist enthusiasm in the United States and thereby limited
the possibilities for compromise.
Peel and his foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, are usually con-
sidered more conciliatory in foreign policy than Palmerston, but they
had no patience for the blustering of US presidential candidate James
K. Polk and his vociferous supporters. Peel favoured arbitration, not
concessions to the US, and thought the best answer to American bel-
ligerence was to send the Pacific squadron flag ship Collingwood (2nd
63
Palmerston to Lord Monteagle, 28 Oct. 1842, Broadlands, GC/MO/131/1–3.
64
Peel to Wellington, 16 Oct. 1842, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 459, fos. 319–20.
Rate, 80 guns) to make a ‘friendly visit’ to the Columbia River.65 The

Admiralty raised the number of men on its Pacific station, headquart-
ered at Valparaiso, to 2437 by January of 1845 (up from 706 in 1841),
and by March the Admiralty and Foreign Office were working out the
details for having a ship of war appear frequently on the Oregon
coast.66 The danger of a brush-fire that could lead to a larger confla-
gration prompted Peel to recommend sending a frigate with marines
and artillery to the territory to act as a local deterrent and support
British citizens against possible American insults.67 The frigate America
(50 guns) arrived on the coast of Oregon in August, 1845, and the
sloop Modeste (18 guns) in October.68 But Britain’s main deterrent was
still its ability to attack the US east coast, and the government main-
tained naval superiority in those waters. Although numbers on the
North American and West Indian station had been reduced since 1842,
Britain retained a substantial force of 13–15 vessels. And to defend
Canada, while the main action was carried out against the American
seaboard, the British had a respectable garrison of more than 10 000
regulars.69
When the British minister in Washington mistakenly rejected an
American proposal in 1845, an infuriated Polk renewed calls for a US
border above the 54th parallel. The British government responded:
Peel commented to a friend in January 1846, ‘We shall not reciprocate
blustering with Polk but shall quietly make an increase in Naval and
Military and Ordnance Estimates.’70 He asked for and got these
increases, and though they were also a response to worsening relations
with France and that country’s naval expansion, Aberdeen stressed to
the American minister in London, Louis McLane, that they would be
‘useful and important’ in a conflict over Oregon as well.71 When the
US rejected a new offer of arbitration, Aberdeen called McLane back
for another conversation and warned him that unless the American
government cooperated, he would yield to those in the British govern-
ment who wanted preparations ‘founded upon the contingency of war
with the United States’, including ‘offensive operations’. McLane,
alarmed, wrote to his secretary of state that these preparations would
include ‘the immediate equipment of thirty sail of the line, besides
65
Peel to Aberdeen, 28 Sept. 1844, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43 064, fos. 34–37;
H.U. Addington to Corry, 5 Mar. 1845, secret, quoted in B.M. Gough, The Royal Navy
and the Northwest Coast of North America 1870–1914: A Study of British Maritime
Ascendancy (Vancouver, 1971), pp. 69–70.
66
Sidney Herbert to Haddington, ‘Memorandum%for the Navy Estimates for 1845–6’,
1 Jan. 1845, Ellenborough Papers, 30/12 5/1 pt iv, fo. 892; Admiralty to Addington,
6 Mar. 1845, ADM 1/1696, fos. 104–6.
67
Peel to Aberdeen, 23 Feb. 1845, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43 064, fos. 178–81.
68
Gough, The Royal Navy, pp. 72, 76.
69
Stanley to Peel, 12 and 18 Aug 1845, cited in Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 142–3.
70
Peel to Lord Egerton, 6 Jan. 1846, quoted in Gough, Royal Navy, p. 78.
71
steamers and other vessels of war of a smaller class’.72 Orders for prep-
arations were going forth. The Admiralty commissioned secret surveys
of Canadian and US forces on the common frontier and the Great
Lakes.73 Lord Ellenborough, who replaced Lord Haddington as First
Lord in January 1846, elaborated plans for an American war, and his
Admiralty board requested Foreign Office permission to use the anti-
slave-trade squadron off the African coast to attack American merchant
ships if war broke out.74 Ellenborough received intelligence about US
defences, American and British naval building, and British forces off
the American coast. He also ordered guns for steamers on the Great
Lakes and made plans to increase British forces there.75 In 1843 the
Americans had launched the steamer Michigan on Lake Erie,76 and
Britain decided to add to its available Lakes force of five steamers and
a schooner. In January 1845, government and Admiralty had contrac-
ted with a Niagara company to build three steamers convertible for
war as a ‘demonstration’ to ‘prevent further armament on the part of
the United States’; two were ready in late 1845.77 On the Pacific station,
Commander-in-Chief Rear Admiral Sir George Seymour sent to Ore-
gon the frigate Fisgard (42 guns) and the steamer Cormorant (6 guns),
which could enter the Columbia River. The Grampus (50 guns) and
Talbot (26 guns) would be at Hawaii; the Juno (26 guns), the Frolic (16
guns), the brig Spy (6 guns) and the Collingwood all waited in Californ-
ian waters.78 These measures caught the attention of the US govern-
ment, and Polk alerted the US Senate that Britain was making ‘unusual
and extraordinary armaments and warlike preparations, naval and mili-
tary%with a view to the contingent possibility of a war with the
United States.’79
These preparations and McLane’s communication to Washington
were all the more important because the Americans were unprepared
for war with Britain. Although progress had been made on coastal
defences, many installations were not complete, especially in the criti-
72
McLane to Buchanan, 3 Feb. 1846, quoted in op. cit., p. 158; and Wilbur Devereux
Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy, 1841–1861 (London, 1974), pp. 50–1.
73
W.A.B. Hamilton to Capt. Warden, RN, Orders (secret and confidential), 16 Sept.
1845, ADM 1/1696, fos. 118–24; Capt. Edward Boxer to Haddington, 1 Oct. 1845
and 9 Dec. 1845, ADM 7/626, fos. 67–71, 100–31.
74
Ellenborough to Peel, 18 Jan. 1846, Ellenborough Papers, 30/12 4/29, fos. 3–12;
Ellenborough memorandum, ‘Questions as to preparations for American War’, 19
Jan. 1846, Ellenborough Papers, 30/12/ 5/1, pt iv, fos. 1030–3; Corry to Addington,
19 Jan. 1846, ADM 1/1696.
75
e.g. Gen. John F. Burgoyne to Ellenborough, 4 Feb. 1846, Ellenborough Papers,
30/12 5/1, pt v; Ellenborough to Peel, 7 Feb. 1846, 30/12 4/29; J.F. Newell to
Ellenborough, 1 Mar. 1846, 30/12 5/1, pt v; ‘Return of Ships and Vessels on
Commission’, 1 Apr. 1846, 30/12 5/1, pt v.
76
D.L. Canney, The Old Steam Navy. i: Frigates, Sloops, and Gunboats, 1815–1885
(Annapolis, MD, 1990), pp. 18–19.
77
Stanley, quoted in Bourne, Balance of Power, p. 129.
78
Seymour to Corry, 7 Apr. 1846, quoted in Gough, Royal Navy, p. 80.
79
Congress, Senate, Message from the President of the United States, In compliance with a
resolution of the Senate, relative to the expediency of increasing the military and naval defences
of the country, 29th Cong., 1st sess., 24 Mar. 1846, printed in NASP, Military, II, p. 198.
cal New Orleans area. The US Navy was plainly no match for a British
fleet, having ready in December 1845 only one ship of the line, six
frigates, fifteen sloops, six brigs or schooners, four armed store ships
and one sea-going steamer. The shortage of steamers particularly
alarmed the board of naval commissioners, who reported to the Senate
that while Britain had a total of 141 steamers mounting 698 guns, the
US had only seven, mounting a mere 39 guns.80 The great discrepancy
between British capability to attack and American capability to defend
gave Polk the political excuse he needed to escape the belligerent
stance of his party, and the US agreed to Aberdeen’s Oregon boundary
offer in June 1846.
IV
While Britain’s ability to threaten the US enabled it to take a strong
stance in the crisis periods between 1838 and 1846, the British govern-
ment could have chosen not to do so. It could have been conciliatory
and appeasing, keeping its considerable power under wraps to avoid
antagonizing the US. So why did it choose to meet outbreaks of Amer-
ican belligerence with firm defiance?
Palmerston’s vigorous personal style of foreign policy certainly
played a role. To friends and colleagues, he consistently expressed his
belief that, in dealing with the US, ‘a little Firmness and spirit shewn
in Time, save many quarrels’:81
With such Cunning Fellows as these Yankees, it never answers to
give way, because they always keep pushing on their Encroachments
as far as they are permitted to do so; and what we dignify by the
names of moderation and conciliation, they naturally enough call,
Fear. . . .82
Palmerston left office in early September 1841. His successor, Lord
Aberdeen, was milder, but upon taking office, he and the prime minis-
ter, Sir Robert Peel, saw Palmerston’s policies through in existing situ-
ations from the McLeod controversy in North America to the war with
China. Aberdeen is known for his conciliatory tendencies, but Peel
became rather Palmerstonian after 1844. He remarked privately, ‘I am
firmly persuaded that a really efficient naval force is consistent with
true economy, and is a security for the continuance of Peace’,83 and
80
Secretary of war to the chairman of the Senate committee on foreign affairs, 29 Dec.
1845, Report on the Military Defence of the Country, 25 Mar. 1846; Report on Naval Power
of Maritime Nations, 2 Mar. 1846; and board of naval commissioners to secretary of
navy, 30 Dec. 1845, in Report on Naval Force and Supplies, 8 Jan. 1846; all cited in
81
Palmerston to John Russell, 30 Mar. 1845, Broadlands, GC/RU/975.
82
Palmerston to John Russell, 19 Jan. 1841, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4A, fos. 63–6.
83
Peel to Sidney Herbert (copy to Wellington), 20 Dec. 1844, Wellington Papers,
2/126/41–2.
he readily signalled Britain’s naval capabilities to keep the Americans

in check.
It could also be argued that Britain wanted to look strong in quarrels
with the United States to discourage any other nation from joining in
a war. Conciliation could seem like weakness and tempt a second
enemy to take advantage of British difficulties in North America. Dur-
ing both crises with the Americans, British policy makers worried that
their traditional enemy, France, might join, or at least take advantage
of, a British–American war. One Admiralty agent blamed France for
prolonging the 1841 conflict by encouraging US obstinacy, and both
Minto and, later, Wellington warned that the French public might
push its government into both North American boundary disputes.84
If for no other reason, the prospect of war against two adversaries
meant Britain must actually be prepared to fight the United States,
rather than just threaten. Ellenborough estimated that the Royal Navy
must be capable of crushing the US Navy within six months of the start
of hostilities to prevent France from declaring war.85 On the other
hand, the United States might also play tag-along if Britain went to
war with France; this seemed possible in both 1840 and 1844–5.86 To
counter a possible double threat, the Admiralty made plans in 1846
for strengthening the Royal Navy in the Pacific in case French and
American forces there combined.87 Wellington also suggested a kind
of ‘two-power standard’ to thwart any such opportunism, urging that
Britain could keep the peace only if it achieved ‘certain and decided
naval superiority’ over the navies of both France and the United
States.88
The Melbourne and Peel governments may also have felt that they
needed to take a strong stance against the United States to appease
the British public.89 Even if their claims to be acting upon ‘public opi-
nion’ were not entirely sincere, policy makers in London may at least
have found the British public useful for threatening the United States.
Fox, in Washington, reported often the great intimidating effect of
news about British Parliamentary and newspaper excitement, and even
84
Lord John Hay to Minto, 2 Oct. 1842, NMM, ELL/236; Minto to Admiral Parker, 6
Mar. 1842, Parker Papers, NMM, PAR/154a; Wellington to Peel, 10 Sept. 1845, Peel
Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 461, fos. 205–16. See also John Russell to Melbourne, 20
Sept. 1840, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/3E, fos. 35–9.
85
Ellenborough to Peel, 8 Mar. 1846, Ellenborough Papers, 30/12 4/29, fos. 73–6.
86
Minto’s worries on this score were only alleviated by France’s démarche following
the British victory at Acre in the Egyptian crisis. Minto to Admiral Elliot, 3 Apr.
1841, NMM, ELL/234.
87
Corry to Smythe, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, 6 June 1846, quoted in
Gough, Royal Navy, p. 78. Within weeks, however, the signing of the Oregon treaty
convinced the Foreign Office to decline to increase the Pacific squadron. Gough,
Royal Navy, pp. 78–80.
88
Wellington to Peel, 17 Aug. 1844, Peel Papers, BL, Add. MS 40 460, fos. 256–7.
89
For example, London newspapers called for war if McLeod were executed: Morning
Herald 17 Mar. 1841; Times, 9, 18 Mar., 10 Apr. 1841; all quoted in Stevens, Border
Diplomacy, p. 86.
US senators remarked that the outrage expressed by the British public

and press had frightened many Americans.90
Pitting the British public against the American was dangerous, how-
ever, and points up a final significant factor in the British government’s
choice to use strength rather than conciliation in dealing with the US:
worries that the American system would allow the public and the poli-
ticians to obstruct rational diplomacy. For deterrence to work, the sig-
nal of British power had to be sent clearly, be received by the American
government and be acted upon rationally by that government.91 The
British government feared that democracy put American foreign policy
at the mercy of irresponsible, expansionist masses and that the United
States’ politics and people might hinder a rational response from the
federal government. Thus London tried diligently to make its deter-
rent moves impressive enough to reinforce that response. Moreover,
it aimed to be genuinely prepared for a war, in case the deterrent did
not work – in other words, to avoid mere bluffing.92
London worried that US citizens might commit acts (like the raids
across the Canadian border) – without their government’s permission
or even its knowledge – that might balloon into wider hostilities. The
Maine and Oregon boundary issues, as well as the McLeod affair, made
the dangers obvious. Beyond the constant possibility of a belligerent
popular initiative was the truly serious risk that an excited public or
Congress might force the administration into irrational action, leading
it to do something that might result in war. In the middle of the north-
east boundary crisis, the colonial secretary, Lord John Russell, warned
his prime minister that ‘whatever may be the inclination of [President]
Van Buren, a large portion of the American people are pressing on a
war with an eagerness which he has not the means, & is not the man,
to withstand’.93 Political parties might interfere as well. In both oppo-
sition and support, they might drive a president to an aggressive
foreign policy for domestic political gain.94 To complicate matters, a
clear picture of the Americans’ changing political moods was hard to
come by. The British government did its best to keep tabs on its antag-
onist through despatches and private letters from its diplomats and
90
Fox to Palmerston, copy of dispatch no. 21, 7 Mar. 1841; copy of dispatch no. 35, 7
Apr. 1841; copy of dispatch no. 38, 14 Apr. 1841; [US] National Intelligencer, repr. as
no. 46 in Foreign Office Confidential Print, 10 June 1841; all in CO 42/483.
91
See A. Lambert, The Last Sailing Battlefleet: Maintaining Naval Mastery 1815–1850
(London, 1991), p. 7.
92
Peel argued in Oct. 1841 for measures ‘suitable’ to war ‘because the decision upon
War or Peace may be beyond our Controul . . . .’: memorandum to cabinet, 17 Oct.
1841, Wellington Papers, 2/80/28.
93
John Russell to Lord Melbourne, 26 Apr. 1840, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/3D, fos.
283–4.
94
Fox worried that the Democrats in 1841 would pressure the new Whig
administration to defy Britain to the point of war, and Peel was concerned about a
Congressional ‘war party’ in 1846. Fox to Palmerston, 7 Mar. 1841, copy of dispatch
no 21, CO 42/483, fos. 159–62; Peel to Ellenborough, 8 Feb. 1846, Ellenborough
Papers, 30/12 4/29, fos. 23–6.
naval and military observers, US newspapers and congressional reports,

and personal contacts with American officials or visitors.95 The
occasional contradictions in these sources strengthened British resolve
to make the deterrent signal as strong as possible: Palmerston con-
cluded that the Americans would ‘give way when in the wrong, if they
are firmly and perseveringly pressed’.96 Intelligence-gathering and sus-
picions that popular pressure and political opportunism could override
the deterrent process in ‘a country pretending to be civilized’97 played
a key role in London’s decisions to adopt a strong stance against the
United States.
V
Britain’s strategy of deterrence worked. In the crises that erupted
between 1838 and 1846, Britain prevented war and upheld its vital
interests in North America. British statesmen were fully aware of the
advantages Britain enjoyed in any conflict with the US, and, although
it did not want war, London was never bluffing: it was always ready to
follow through to the next step. Britain’s main goal was peace, for the
sake of trade and investment, as well as humanity (as both the public
and statesmen believed), but it did not want peace at all costs. Palmer-
ston stated this doctrine bluntly:
if a nation once establishes & proclaims as its Rule of conduct, that
any sacrifice of Interest is preferable to war, it had better at once
abdicate its Independence & place itself under the Protection of
some less Quakerlike state; For to that condition of subjection it
must come at last, and it is better to get to it decently & at once,
than to arrive at it painfully, after successive humiliations, and all
the losses and sufferings resulting from repeated spoliations.98
British policy makers steered between the danger of a foolish war and
the need to uphold Britain’s primary interests, a policy which sup-
ported its reputation and ‘national honour’ – a ‘substantial property’,
as Aberdeen called it.99
An American historian, Robert Browning III, has proposed a critical
distinction between a Cold War definition of deterrence and a simpler
historical one. In the 1980s, deterrence implied
95
Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy, pp. ix–x. For example, the
inflammatory US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs report and
the subsequent lengthy House debate was distributed throughout the British
government as part of a Foreign Office Confidential Print: ‘Papers Relating to the
Arrest of Mr. McLeod %’, CO 42/483.
96
Palmerston to John Russell, 19 Jan. 1841, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4A, fos. 63–6.
97
Sydenham to John Russell, 24 Feb. 1841, Russell Papers, PRO 30/22/4A, fos. 114–17.
98
Palmerston to Monteagle, 28 Oct. 1842, Broadlands, GC/MO/131/1–3.
99
Aberdeen speech, House of Lords, 4 Apr. 1845, quoted in Bourne, Balance of Power,
pp. 135–6.
the ability to strike back in overwhelming force, directly at an

attacker’s homeland. But, at its most basic, deterrence simply means
the placing of barriers in an enemy’s way, barriers which by their
existence prevent an enemy from taking a certain line of action.100
So, even though neither British nor American policy makers ever
thought Britain could invade and reconquer the United States, Britain
could still deter the US. The tools the British used to check American
action were mostly signals of an ability and willingness to attack the
US coast, ruin American trade and demolish port cities. These signals
were all the more impressive because the government of the United
States knew its own areas of weakness: its navy, its coastal fortifications,
its manning and armament, and even the flaw in its own deterrent
strategy – its inability to invade Canada quickly.
Britain’s policy was not really ‘gunboat diplomacy’, or at least not
gunboat diplomacy alone. Britain did not park warships off the US
coast, as it might have done against an underdeveloped nation. Rather,
it made its capabilities known to the US, occasionally deploying a suit-
able warship, so the US knew its potential and knew (from Palmerston
and later from Peel and Aberdeen) what Britain was prepared to do.
Some would argue against the notion that this deterrence worked.
It appears that Kenneth Bourne, in Britain and the Balance of Power in
North America (still one of the most thorough and interesting analyses
of Anglo-American relations in the nineteenth century), would say that
it was not really successful. Bourne dealt with the 1838–46 period crisis
by crisis, arguing that the British show of strength had no concrete
effects in helping to resolve this or that dispute in Britain’s favour –
an approach that gives the impression of serial failures. Bourne also
emphasized opportunities Britain missed in Maine, Mexico and
Oregon. But did Britain in this period really sacrifice any vital interests
in its disputes with the US?
If one assumes, as Bourne does, that Britain’s vital interest was to
swing the ‘balance of power in North America’ in Britain’s favor and
against the US, then perhaps Britain missed opportunities in the late
1830s and early 1840s. It failed to improve its military position on the
north-east frontier, use Texas or California to block US expansion or
gain more territory in Oregon.101 But what if one does not assume that
Britain’s goal was altering the balance of power on the North American
continent in its favour? War Office planners may have wanted to
improve that balance, and it was their job to consider such matters,
but what if one accepts instead that the British government on the
whole wanted other things? The public and private utterances of Bri-
tish statesmen at this time, as well as the pattern of policy decisions,
indicate that London sought to prevent the US from encroaching
upon what territory Britain already possessed on the continent and to
100
Browning, Two If By Sea, p. 190.
101
Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 71, 112, 121–2 ,161–2.
protect British and Canadian subjects and their property from insults
and harm. They also indicate a desire to reap the profits of a lucrative
commercial and financial relationship with the United States, and to
avoid war generally. The case that Britain focused on these goals is
strong.102 If so, Britain achieved what it wanted.
The issue may be pressed further. Did Britain really miss opport-
unities in its particular dealings with the United States? In the Maine
dispute, London’s determination helped to prevent the US govern-
ment from giving any encouragement to the American provocateurs,
ranged all along the frontier, who saw Maine as only a first step toward
pushing the British out of Canada. In fact, General Winfield Scott was
sent to keep the Patriots and settlers in line, to prevent them from
starting a war with Britain. Subsequently, although Lord Ashburton
may not have made the best deal possible in his treaty with Secretary
of State Daniel Webster (Palmerston was probably right in judging that
he could have held out for a more favourable boundary), he did retain
the important highlands to the south of the St Lawrence River, over-
looking the river and the city of Quebec.103 The negotiated boundary
thus protected Quebec, and at least one military expert thought that
holding that city was all that was necessary, since British naval attacks
on the eastern seaboard would quickly serve to draw American forces
away from any other part of Canada they may have occupied.104 Britain
may not have improved its position with the Webster–Ashburton
Treaty, but it avoided diminishing its overall ability to defend the Can-
adas – which was all it really needed to do, since it relied on its naval
forces off the US coast for deterrence or, in the event of war, decis-
ive attack.
Kenneth Bourne implies that in Texas and California Britain missed
its chance to obstruct US expansion by guaranteeing Texan indepen-
dence or by setting up its own colony in California. Although Bourne
thinks Peel and Aberdeen hinted at a willingness to abandon anti-
colonialism in North America,105 evidence shows that neither Peel’s
administration nor his predecessor’s was prepared to create new
dependencies there. Their views were in line with a concept of interests
that generally was not territorial, especially in regard to North Amer-
ica. Any financial, commercial or strategic benefit from controlling
Texas and California would be offset by the likelihood that the US
would mount a challenge, to which Britain would have to respond with
102
See p. 20–22 above.
103
Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 105–6. Bourne emphasizes the American opinion of the
highlands – that they were not vital for US interests – and slights the desire of the
British military to retain them (pp. 106–9). Muriel Chamberlain, on the other hand,
thinks British possession of the highlands was a valuable part of the treaty: Lord
Aberdeen: A Political Biography (London, 1983), p. 326.
104
Capt. Boxer, RN, ‘3rd Report%’ 31 May 1845, quoted in Bourne, Balance of Power, p.
139.
105
Op. cit., p. 122.
costly defensive measures.106 Moreover, British capitalists would prob-

ably refuse to invest in such insecure areas.107 Intervening territorially
in Texas and California would have meant a significant deviation from
British imperial policy.
Bourne also doubts whether Britain’s strong stance in the Oregon
crisis had any effect. He maintains that the only material change that
resulted from the threat of naval force was the Americans’ later con-
cession of free navigation of the Columbia River. Bourne thinks of
this as an important balm to wounded British pride but sees other
circumstances, rather than British strength, at its root: the moderate
Aberdeen was about to be replaced by the blustering Palmerston, and
the US was gearing up for war with Mexico.108 This appraisal neglects
to mention that the British government achieved its main objectives
in the Oregon settlement: besides the navigation of the Columbia, it
secured the harbour of present-day Vancouver plus its naval base at
Esquimault – both of which, the Colonial Office recognized, would
serve to counter an American port at San Francisco.109 The treaty gave
Britain the means of safeguarding its commerce in the Pacific and
served to protect British settlers in the territory. As for whether Bri-
tain’s show of naval strength had anything to do with forcing the US
to settle on Oregon, Bourne seems to miss the point that forceful
deterrence works best against weakness. The United States was neither
prepared for war nor preparing for war, and President Polk was blus-
tering for political effect. His real intentions can be seen in that, while
giving a belligerent, anti-British address to Congress in December,
1845, he was requesting naval appropriations for 1846 that were one
third less than those proposed by the previous administration;
additionally, he rejected his secretary of war’s pleas to remedy the US
deficiency in steamers.110 Polk’s problem was that if he settled too eas-
ily with Britain, he would risk losing the support of his Democratic
party and other constituents, whose rabid expansionism he had pro-
voked.111 He therefore needed a political excuse at home to compro-
106
Bourne notes that what probably dampened British interest in San Francisco was an
1842 report that the harbour city could not be defended against a land attack (op.
cit., pp. 122–3).
107
Peel to Aberdeen, 24 Sept. 1845, Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43 064, fos. 357–60.
108
Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 161–2.
109
James Stephen, permanent under-secretary of state for the colonies, cited in Gough,
Royal Navy, p. 85.
110
C. Sellers, James K. Polk, Continentalist 1843–1846 (Princeton, NJ, 1966), p. 358. John
Quincy Adams deduced from signs like these that ‘Mr. Polk will finish by accepting’
a compromise with Britain: quoted in op. cit., p. 358.
111
For instance, in view of the public enthusiasm he had stirred up, Polk had been
relieved when, in a diplomatic faux pas, the British minister had rejected the US’s
49th Parallel proposal in 1845: ‘if that proposition had been accepted by the Brittish
[sic] Minister my course would have met with great opposition, and in my opinion
would have gone far to overthrow the administration; % had it been accepted, as we
came in on Texas the probability was we would have gone out on Oregon’: J.K. Polk,
The Diary of James K. Polk During His Presidency 1845 to 1849, ed. Milo Milton Quaife, i
(Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1910), pp. 4, 107; also quoted in Sellers, Polk, p. 251.
mise on Oregon so that he could shift his focus to his project for a
Mexican war. Even if, as Bourne points out, Polk was probably disposed
to give in before Aberdeen threatened naval increases, he could not
actually do so without the justification provided by a clear signal from
Britain of its capabilities and intentions – which Aberdeen emphasized.
A decade after the events, the British minister in Washington, John S.
Crampton, confirmed that some diplomats credited the strong stance
with forcing a resolution:
the Oregon question was settled by the launching and fitting out of
certain heavy frigates at Portsmouth without a word being said. The
American Government read it in the papers and Mr. McLane was
sent in a great hurry to ask Lord Aberdeen what it all meant.112
The British threat intimidated the cabinet, which quickly sent a pacify-
ing note to London after receiving McLane’s communication.113 It also
strengthened the peace movement in the Congress when Polk submit-
ted to both houses McLane’s despatches – edited to play up the danger
of the situation.114 Altogether, it made Polk’s acceptance of negoti-
ations seem reasonable. Bourne makes this sound like a minor
accomplishment, but in light of Britain’s worries about the vagaries of
US politics and public opinion, London had reason to be pleased with
the outcome.
In considering the balance of power in North America broadly,
Bourne acknowledges that Britain’s ability to threaten the US seaboard
threw the balance in its favour; he recognizes that the threat the Royal
Navy could pose to US coastal cities overrode the US military threat
to Canada.115 But he contends that Britain’s problem – and the reason
it needed to alter the balance of power even more in its favour – was
that it could not win a war against the US by applying naval power, just
as the Americans could not win a war with Britain simply by attacking
Canada.116 The prospect of stalemate meant that Britain had no real
advantage over the United States that would deter war and preserve
British interests. In response to this analysis, two points should be
emphasized.
First, the kind of naval war Britain could carry out would have shut
down US trade and been more damaging to America than to Britain,
partly because Britain was a more important trading partner for the
US than the US was for Britain, and partly because the Americans
needed access to third parties for trade. General Sir George F. Murray,
Master General of the Ordnance, had studied Canadian defences and
communicated extensively with Peel’s colonial secretary, Lord Stanley.
He believed (as he stated in a memorandum) that Britain could win
112
Quoted in Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy, pp. 51–2.
113
Polk, Diary i, pp. 244–6, 253; Bourne, Balance of Power, p. 163.
114
Sellers, Polk, pp. 386–7.
115
Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 47–51.
116
Op. cit., p. 52.
a war against the US if it defended Canada, destroyed US trade and

refrained from invading the states. Murray rejected invasion as too
likely to rouse the US public: ‘The only means by which the American
people, if they engage in a war with us, are likely to be alienated from
it is % By finding their general commerce on the ocean distressed,
their Navy crippled, and their efforts to conquer Canada ineffec-
tual’.117 In other words, Britain had a good chance of success, notwith-
standing the territorial spread of its opponent, because the United
States would quit first unless galvanized by British army incursions into
its territory. Again, Britain’s tremendous financial and political
capacity for sustaining a naval war would work in its favour. As First
Lord of the Admiralty Lord Minto remarked generally, ‘There is no
doubt that in a protracted war our naval resources would give us the
ascendancy. . . .’118
So Britain could succeed in a contest with the United States, but it
was the threat of this ability that was really important, since London
had no plans to start a war in the first place. Because Britain’s goals
in North America were based on maintenance rather than expansion,
its position was essentially defensive, however offensive it looked oper-
ationally. London merely wanted to make its capabilities and commit-
ment to defence so apparent to the US that they would prevent the
Americans from endangering Britain’s primary interests of existing ter-
ritories, citizens, and trade and investment. The object was to make
the prospect of war appear damaging enough to the US to prevent
hostilities while avoiding challenges of a sort that might encourage
permanent and dangerous territorial rivalry. Britain’s capacity to out-
last the US was both the ultimate deterrent and insurance against the
foolishness of American politics and public opinion, which might lead
the nation to start an irrational war.
Second, Bourne’s emphasis on British anxiety about a US invasion
of Canada reflects War Office worries. The duty of the military experts
was to concern themselves with a possible invasion and get the govern-
ment to prepare defences. Bourne faults the Admiralty for being qui-
eter about war planning against the Americans and assumes that this
indicated doubts about the navy’s ability seriously to injure the US.119
Could the Admiralty’s relative silence not be read instead as cool con-
fidence? Minto, for one, seemed assured that Britain could deal easily
with the United States:
It is very strange that the last American war should have left such a
false impression of the military & naval power of the United States,
because at a time when we had the whole of Europe in arms against
us they were enabled by the grossest mismanagement on our part
117
‘Memorandum about the Defence of Canada’, 8 Sept. 1845, Murray Papers, WO
80/11; also quoted in Bourne, Balance of Power, pp. 147–8.
118
Minto, notes for speech, n.d. (probably late 1838 or early 1839), NMM, ELL/275.
119
to obtain some successes against single ships. I do not believe that

any motive would be strong enough at present to induce the United
States to go to war with us. As they must be quite aware that less
than three months would suffice for the total destruction of their
navy, and of their trade in every part of the world.120
While the First Lord’s statement ignores the impressive successes of
American privateers in the war of 1812, it does accurately imply that
Britain could bring more power to bear against the US in the peaceful
early 1840s than it could in 1812–14, when it was preoccupied with a
European war. Even in the earlier contest, the Royal Navy blockade
had bankrupted a US government dependent on customs duties, and
the imminent arrival of overwhelming British reinforcements, released
from Europe upon Napoleon’s defeat, had compelled the Americans
to settle.121 More importantly, in the years since 1814 British naval
power had increased significantly. The Admiralty had renovated its
older battleships, built new ships – including steamers – installed heav-
ier guns, and begun an effective gunnery training system.122 In
addition, the British had developed a naval base at Bermuda, which
joined Halifax to command the American coast, and they had ensured
overall command of the sea with other new bases around the world.123
In the US, ‘antinavalists’ had by 1827 dedicated the navy to frigates
for a worldwide trade force;124 what battleships the USN possessed had
grown obsolete after 1826, and it had only two sea-going steamers by
1841.125 The American navy could not hope to challenge the Royal
Navy’s command of the sea in the early 1840s, and even a guerre de
course would have run up against stronger British forces in all seas.
Minto’s faith in his navy seems well-placed.126
Furthermore, correspondence of leading statesmen shows that the
cabinet and Foreign Office believed that naval capabilities provided
the best possible deterrent, since they were more flexible than the
additional Canadian ground forces and forts that the War Office was
pushing (although these did receive some attention and funding). The
naval forces could be easily moved, withdrawn quickly if necessary, or
expanded and displayed. As Murray’s memo shows, the government
believed the navy would be the most effective tool in bringing the US
to a compromise and peace. It could destroy America’s commerce and
navy, and do economic and fiscal injury, but was unlikely to provoke
120
Minto to Palmerston, 12 Oct. 1842, Broadlands, GC/MI/452.
121
L. Maloney, ‘The War of 1812: What Role for Sea Power?’ in Hagan, In Peace and
War, pp. 54, 60; D.C. Allard, foreword to William S. Dudley, ed., The Naval War of
1812: A Documentary History II: 1813 (Washington, DC, 1992), pp. v–vi.
122
Lambert, The Last Sailing Battlefleet, p. ix.
123
A.D. Lambert, ‘Preparing for the Long Peace: The Reconstruction of the Royal Navy
1815–1830’, Mariner’s Mirror LXXXII (1996) p. 42.
124
C.L. Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States,
1785–1827 (Newark, DE, 1980), pp. 234–5.
125
Worse, one of the two burned in 1843: Canney, The Old Steam Navy, p. 168.
126
Lambert, The Last Sailing Battlefleet, pp. 11–12.
the US to unite, as a potent ground force might. Since Britain was

always prepared in this period to carry out naval strikes against the
United States – much more prepared than the US was to carry out a
land attack on Canada – Britain’s threat was the more credible. It
promised swift action that could not be answered by the Americans.
The British government assumed that any war would be started by
the US, but it could have stumbled into a war by its own miscalculation.
London’s use of naval power, with the measured response it assured,
helped to guard against such a mis-step. But London was also unlikely
to blunder into war with the US because of its relatively well-informed
(if not always organized or systematized) decision-making. Even
accounting for sometimes contradictory sources, policy makers from
Palmerston and Minto to Peel and Aberdeen received fairly good intel-
ligence, keeping tabs on American forts and naval forces, but also
learning about US finances, politics and public opinion. The govern-
ment was unlikely to get carried away in North America because it
could utilize this information in a broad cost–benefit analysis of inter-
ests and actions on the continent. It could also use the data to make
decisions on what kinds of force to deploy, where to position those
forces and thus what attitude to project to the Americans. Palmerston
was, indeed, more likely than Aberdeen to determine upon a forceful
response based on this intelligence, but Peel after mid-1844 prodded
his cabinet toward that posture. Informed on America’s defences, mili-
tary and naval capabilities and political climate, Britain could take a
stance against the US that would be strong enough to discourage irres-
ponsible American actions, yet not so provocative as to incite a war.
Admittedly, relations with Europe remained the principal concern of
British policy makers throughout this period. That very priority may
actually have worked to decrease the chances that Britain might act
immoderately toward the US – the Americans were not important
enough for desperate measures, and Britain’s strength was superior
enough to allow it to avoid them. Overall, the measured response by
the Royal Navy and informed decision-making of the government
reduced Britain’s chances of slipping into hostilities.
To sum up, British strength worked effectively in dealing with the

United States. Britain’s projection of naval power, and the forceful
diplomatic posture based upon it, achieved the nation’s goals in North
America despite the geographical barriers involved. Britain protected
its citizens and the existing territory it considered vital; it gained a
naval base that would help its trade; and it prevented a war with the US
that would have interfered with profitable commerce and investment.
Britain preserved both its interests and the peace it desired.
Acknowledgements
I wish gratefully to acknowledge the permission of the Trustees of the
Broadlands Archives to quote from the papers of Lord Palmerston, the
Trustees of the National Maritime Museum to quote from the papers
of the 2nd Earl of Minto, and the Controller of Her Majesty’s Station-
ery Office to quote from the papers of the Duke of Wellington. Thanks
also to Professor Daniel Baugh of Cornell University for his assistance
with this project.
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846

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Britain Gets Its Way: Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846

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Britain Gets Its Way: Power

and Peace in Anglo-American

From the perspective of twenty-first-century America, it seems natural to

War in History 2001 8 (1) 19–46 0968-3445(00)WH219OA  2001 Arnold

War in History 2001 8 (1)

belongs to us’ and to protect it from ‘American aggression’;3 to uphold

War in History 2001 8 (1)

On the other hand, the Anglo-American crises that erupted between

Aberdeen Papers, BL, Add. MS 43 064, fos. 357–60.

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

the north-eastern interior, served by the Erie Canal and Hudson

War in History 2001 8 (1)

The power of steam technology was not merely latent – it was on

War in History 2001 8 (1)

enlarged again in this period but always remained formidable.27 In

War in History 2001 8 (1)

especially while tensions increased with Britain.34 Local worthies from

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

In contrast, the United States had great difficulty financing naval

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

onial Office asked the Admiralty to give instructions to its commander-

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

Rate, 80 guns) to make a ‘friendly visit’ to the Columbia River.65 The

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

he readily signalled Britain’s naval capabilities to keep the Americans

War in History 2001 8 (1)

US senators remarked that the outrage expressed by the British public

War in History 2001 8 (1)

naval and military observers, US newspapers and congressional reports,

War in History 2001 8 (1)

the ability to strike back in overwhelming force, directly at an

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

costly defensive measures.106 Moreover, British capitalists would prob-

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

a war against the US if it defended Canada, destroyed US trade and

War in History 2001 8 (1)

to obtain some successes against single ships. I do not believe that

War in History 2001 8 (1)

the US to unite, as a potent ground force might. Since Britain was

To sum up, British strength worked effectively in dealing with the

War in History 2001 8 (1)

War in History 2001 8 (1)

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