,--- -- - david a .

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Case Western Reserve Unlverslty

EXPERIENTIAL
LEARNING
Experience as The Source of Learning
and Oevelopment

/l'/84
Prentice-Han, lnc., Eng!ewood Cliffs. New Jersev 076.~
~--------- rwo ---------

The Pro~ess
of Experiential
Learning

We shali not ceose from exp!oration

And the cnd o/ oU our exploring
Wi:i be to arrive u.Au!rc we starfed
And know 1he p!ocefor thcfirst rime.
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartds

Experiential learning theory ofíers a fundamentally differenr view o( the learnin

process from that oí the behavioral theories ol learning based on an empiria
episremology or the more implicit theories o( learning lhat underlie traditioni
educational methods, methods that for the most part are based on a rationa
idealist epistemology. From this difiere n! perspective emerge sorne ver
difieren! pres criptions for rhe conduc t of education, the proper relationship
among learnins, wol'I<, and other life activities, and the creation oí knowledg
itself.
T his pcrspective on learning is called "expe riential" fa r two reasons. Th
first is to tie it clearly to its intellectual o rigins in the work of Dewey, Le ....; n, a no
Piaget. The second reason is to emphasize the central ro'e that experienc·
plays in the learning process. This differentiates experiential learning theor:
from rationa!ist and other cognitive theories of learning that tend to give primar:
emphasis to acquisition, manipulation, and recall o( abstract symbols, and !ron
behaviora l leaming theories that deny any role for consciousness and subjectiv·
experience in the learning process. ll s hould be emphasized, however, that th•
aim oí this work is not to pose e xperiential leaming theory as a thirdalterna tiv·
to behavioral a11d COíll'lilive learninc¡ theories. bul rath~r to s uoo.,st thro11ol
 21

e xperien1ial learning lheory a holislic integrative perspective on learning that

combines experience, perceplion, co9nition, and behavior. This chapter <vill
describe 1he learning models of Lewin, Dewey, and Plaget and identify 1he
common characteris1ics they share-characteristics that serve to define the
nature of experiential learning.

THREE MODELS OF THE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING

PROCESS

The Lewinian Mode/ o/ Action Research ond Loboratory

Training
In the teclmiques oí action research. and thc laboratory method, learning,
change, and grov..t h are seen to be facilitated best by an integrated process that
begins wilh here·and-now e xperience followed by coUection of data and
observations about 1hat experience. The data a re lhen a nalyzed and the
conclusions oí this analysis are fed back lo the actors in the e xperience for their
use in the modification of their behavior and choice oí new experiences.
Learning is thus conceived as a íour·slage cycle, as shown in Figure Z. l.
lmmediate concrete experience is !he basis for observation and reílection.
These observations are assimilated in to a "theory" from which new implications
for action ca n L-e deduced. These implications or hypotheses then serve as
guides in acting to create new experiences.
Two aspects of this learning modelare particularly noteworthy. First is its
emphasis on here·ond·now concrete expcrience to validate and test abstrae!
concepts. lmmediate personal experience is the focal point for learning, giving
lile, lexture, and subjective personal meaning to abstract concepts and at the
sanie time providing a concrete, publicly shared reíerence point for testing the
imp!ications and validity of ideas created during the learning process. When
human beings share an experience, they coo share it fully, concretely, ond
abs tractly.
Second, action research and laboratory training are based on feedback
.orocesscs. Lewin borrowed the concept of feedback from electrical engineering
to describe a social learning and problem·solving process that generales valíd

~Concrete cxperlt n<e \

Tes1:n9 irnplic~tions.
of ee~opt1 I'\ ne·.~
"tuauons J Observations and
1efSec:1·0 ,."

~ fc>'mouonof abltr«t
concopt1 aocf geoen1 liza ~ 1 o n s
Figure 2.1 Thc Lowlnian Experientlal l eatnlng MOdeJ
information to assess deviations from cesired goals. This information feedback
provides the basis for a continuous process of goal·directed action and
cvaluation of the consequences o( that action. Lewin and his followers believed
that much individual and organizational ineffectiveness could be traced
uhimately 10 alack of adequare feedback processes. This ineffectiveness results
from an imbalance be tween observa tion and ~ction-eitherfrom a tendency far
individuals and organizations to emphasi2e decision and action at the expense
of inforT!".ation gathering, or from a tendency to become bogged down by data
collection and ana!ysis. The aim of t he laboratory method and action research is
to integrate these rwo perspectives into an effective, goal·directed learning
process.

Dewey's Model of Learning

John Dewey's model of the learning process is remarkably similar to thc
Lewinian model, ahhough he makes more exp!icit the developmental nature of
learning implied in Lewin's conception of il as a feedback process by describing
how learning transforms the impulses, fee!ings, 1111d desires of concrete
experience into higher·order purposeíul action.

The forrn at1on o/ purposes is, 1hcn, a rorherconiplex inle.'!ectvol operation.

/1 involves: (JJ obserualion of surrounding condilions; (2) knowledge oj what has
happened in sim~or situations in rhe post, o kr10wledge obtoined partly by
reccllection and partly from the informolion, advice, ond warning of those who
haue had o widcr experience; and (3) judgmen/, which puts 1ogether whot is
observed ond wltot is recolled 10 see what they sigr.ify. A purpose differsfrom an
original impu(se and desíre through its trQnslot1'011 into a p!an and method o/
action bosed upon /oresi9l11of the consequences of octlon vndcr giuen observed
conditions in o cerioin woy. ... The crucial educationa! problem is thot oj
procunng Ihe p0stponen'tant oj immecf:ate action upan desire unt~ observatíon
and jud9ment houe in/crvened. . .. Mere forosigh1, evcn iJ il takes the form of
accurote pred1ctíon, is not, of course, enough. The inte11eciual cncicipa:ton. the
ídeo o/ cor.sequences, musl b!end with desire ond impulse to ocquire moving
force. Ir the11 gives direcrion to who1 otherwise is blind, whi!e desire gives ideas
impetus and momentum. [Dewey, 1938, p. 69}

Dewey's model of experiential lcarning is graphically portrayed in Figure

2.2. We note in his description oí learning a similarity with Le...in, in ihe emphasis
on !eaming as a dialectic process integrating experience and concepts, obser·
vations, and action. The impulse of experience gives ideas the1r mov111g force,
and ideas give direction to impulse. Postponement of immediate action is
ess~>ltial íor observation and judgment to intervene, and action is essential íor
achievemem of purpose. 1t is through the integration of these opposing but
symbiotically related processes that sophisticated, mature purpose develops
from hlinA imn.n lco
 J11;.19ment ,

~
Figure 2.2 Oewey·s Model of Exporltntial Leartilng

Piagefs Madcl of Learning and Cog nilíve Deve/opment

For Piaget, the dimensions of experience a nd concept, reflection, and action
form the basic continua for lhe development of adult 1hought. Deve!opmenl
from iníancy to adulthood rnoves from a concrete phenomenal v¡ew of the world
to M abstract constructionist vtew, from an active egocentric view to a
reílective internalized mode o f knowing. Piaget also maintained that lhese have
been lhe major directions of development in scientific knowledge (Plaget, 1970).
The learrñng process whereby this development takes place is a q'C!e of
interaction between the individual and the environment that is similar to the
learning models of Dewey and Lewin. In Piaget's terms, the key to learning líes in
the mutual interaction of the process of accommodaiion of c;oncepts or
schemas to experience in lhe world and lhe process of ossimilation oí evenls
and experiences from the world in1o existing concepts and schemas. Learning
or, in Piage t's term, inlelligent adapta tion res ults írom a ba lanced lension
between lhese lwo processes. When accommodalion processes domínate
assímilation, we have imitation-the mo!ding of oneself to environmental
contours or constraints. When a ssímilation predominates over accomrno·
dation, we have p!ay-the impos ition oí one's concept and images without
regard to environmental realities.. The process of cognitive growth from
concrete to abstract and from active to reílective is based on this continua!
transaction between assimilation and accommodation, occurring in successive
stages, each of which incorporales whal has gone befare in to a new, higher level
of cognitive íunc tioning.
Piage t's work has identified four majar stages of cognitive growth thal
emerge from birth to about the age of 14-16. In the lirsl stage (0-2 years), the
chi!d is predominantly concrete and active in his learning style. This srage is
called the sensory-motor stage. Learning is predominantly e nac live through
feeling, touching, and handling. Representation is based on ac tion-for
e xample, "a hole is to dig." Perhaps the greatest accomp!ishment ol this period
is the development of goal·oriented behavior: "The sensory-rnotor period
shows a remarkab!e evolution fro m non·intentional habi ts to experimental and
exploratory activity which is obvious ly intcntional or goal oriented" (Flavcll,
1963, p. 107). Yet the chi!d has few schemes or theories inlo which he can
assimilate events, and as a result, nis primary stance toward the "'-orld is
24 The Process of Ex.periential Learnlng

accommodative. Environment plays a major role in shaping his ideas and

intentions. Learning occurs primarily through the association between stimulus
and response.
In the second stage (2-6 years), the child retains bis concrete orientation
but begins to develop a reflective orientation as he begins to internalize actions,
converting them to ima.ges. This is called the representational s tage. Learning is
now predominantly ikonic in nature, through the manipulation oí observations
and images. The child is now freed somewhat from his immersion in immediate
experience and, as a result, is free to play with and manipula te his images o[ the
<vorld. At this stage, thechild's primary s tance toward theworld isdivergent. He
is captivated with his ability to collect images and to view the world from
different perspectives. Consider Bruner's description of the child at this stage:

Wha t appears next in deuelopment is o great achievement. lmages develop

on outono1nous status, they become great summarizers of action. By qge three
lhe child has become a paragon of sensory distractibility. He is vicíim of the laws
of vivídness, and his action pattern is o series of encounters with this bright thing
which is then replaced by thal chromatically splendid one, which in turn gives way
to the next noisy one. ·And so it goes. Visual memo¡y at this stage seems to be
high/y concrete and specific. What is intriguing abou1 this period is that the child is
a creature of the moment; the ima9eof the moment is sufficient and it is controlled
by a single feature o/ the siiuation. [Bruner, 1966b, p. 13)

In the third stage (7-11 years), the intensive development of abstract

symbolic powers begins. The first symbolic developmental stage Piaget calls the
s tage of concrete operations. Learning in this stage is governed by the logic of
classes and relations. T he child in this s tage further increases his independence
from his immediate experiential world through the development of inductive
powers:

The structures o/ concrete operations are, to use a home{y anology, rathcr

(ike parking lots whose individua{ parking spaces are now occupied and now
ernpty; ihe spaces themse1ves endure, however, and leaue thelr owner to look
beyond 1he cars actual/y present toward potential,ft.tureoccupants of the vacant
and IO·be·vacant spaces. [Flavell, 1963, p. 203]

Thus, in contras! to the child in the sensory·motor stage whose learning style
was dominated by accommodative processes, the child at the stageofconcrete
operations is more assimilative in his learning style. He relies on concepts and
theories to select and give shape to his experiences.
Piaget's final stage of cognitive development comes with the onset of
adolescence (12-15 years). In this stage, the adolescent moves from symbolic
processes based on concre te operations to the symbolic processes of
representational logic, the stage or formal operations. Henowreturns toa more
active orientation, but it is an ac tive o rienta tion that is now modified by the
development of the reflective and absfrac t power that preceded it. The
TM t'toces.s 01 Experiential Leerning 25

C-oncnite
Phtnomenati.sm

EractJ•·e 11co·.ic
Learnirr.g lelfrin9

1 s.-...,. 2. Represeota
motor Sta?& 1lcnal Stoge

A«m ___ ____...¡._ _ _ __ ___._ ln:em1lil.td

Egocentricism Reffec.Con

4. St~of 3 St¡,ggot
Fon-al Concttte
Optn1t:ons Opefa¡ions

Hyoothe1ico loducti·~>e
dtdi..Cl1~
le•n ng
ltlU11flV

AbsHF.Ct
Corsuuctioni.sm
Figure 2..3 Piagot'a Mod'el of Lea rning and Cognitive Oevelopment

symbolic powers he now possesses enable him to engage in hypolhetico·

deductive reasoning. He develops !he possible implications of his theories and
proceeds to experimentally test which of these are true. Thus his basic leaming
slyle is convergent, in contras! to the divergen! orientalion of the child in the
representational s tage:

We see, titen, thot formal thought is for Pioget not so much this or thot
speci[ic behavior as it is o generafized orientation, sometimes expUcit and
sorne times irnp!icit, towards prob.'em solving;· on orientatiori towards organi2ing
dato (combinotcriaf anafysis), towordsiso!ation and controlo/ voriobles, towards ·
the h~'POthetteal, ond towords logicolJUsti[icationondproof. /Flovell, 1963, p. 211}

This brief outline of Piaget's cognitivedevelopment theoryidentifies those basic

developmental processes that shape the basic learning process o( aduhs (see
Figure 2.3).

CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING

There is a great deal of similarity 301ong the models of tne learning process
discussed above. 1 Taken 1ogether, tney form a unique perspective on learning
'There ate a!so poir.!$ of dsasreernent. "ilich"iJ be exp!ored more fultyin lhe next chapter.
26 The Process of Expesientiel learning

and development, a perspective that can be charac1er12ed by lhe fo!!owing

propos11tons, which are shared by the three major t raditions of experiential
learning.

Learning Is Best Conceiued as a Process, Not in Terms

o/ Outcomes
The emphasis on the process oí learning as opposed to the behavioral
outcomes distinguishes experienlial learnin9 from lhe idealist approaches of
tradilional education and from the behavioral lheories of learning created by
Watson, Hull, Skinner, and others. The lheory oí experienlial learning rests on
a different philosoph!cal and epistemological base from behaviorist lheories of
learning and idealist educational approaches. Modem versions of these latter
approaches are based on the empiricist philosophies of Locl<e and others. This
epistemology is based on the idea that there are elements of consciousness-
mental aloms, or, in Locke's term "simple ideas"-that always remain thesarne.
The various combinations and associations of these consistent elements lorrn
our varying pattems of thought. lt is the notion of constant, fixed elements ol
thought that has had such a profound elfect on prevaiting approaches to
learning and education, resulting in a tendency to define learning in terms of its
outcomes, whether these be knowledge in an accu mulaced storehouse of íacts
or habits representing behavioral responses to specific stirnulus conditions. JI
ideas are seen to be fixed and immutable, then it seems possible to meas ure how
111uch someone has learned by the amount ol these lixed ideas the person has
accu111ulated.
Experiential learning theory, however, proceeds from a different set ol
assumptions. Ideas are not fixed and immutable elements of thought but are
lormed and re-lormed through experience. In ali three o( the Jearning models
just reviewed, learning is described as a process whereby concepts are derived
from and continuous!y modified by experience. No two thoughts are ever the
same, since experience always intervenes. Plagel (1970), lor example,
considers the creation of new knowledge to be the central problem of genetic
epistemology, since each act of understanding is the result of a process of
continuous construction and invention through the interaction processes of
assimilation and ac.commodation (compare Chapter 5, p. 99). Learning is an
emergent process whose outcomes represen! only hisiorical record, not
kno•oledge ol the future.
When viewed from the perspective of experien1ial learning, the tendency to
define learning in terms of outcomes can becorne a definition of nonlearning, in
the process sense that the failure to modily ideas and habits as a result ol
experience is maladaptive. The clearest examp!e of lhis irony lies in the
behaviol'ist axiom that the strength of a habit can bemeasured byicsresistance
to extinction. That is, the more 1 have "learned" a given habit, the longer 1will
persist in behaving that way when it is no longer rewarded. Similarly, there are
those who lee! that the orientations that conceive of !earning in terms of
outcomes as opPosed to a process of adaptation have hada negative effect on
lhe educational system. Jerome Bruner, in his influential book, Toword o
Theory o/ lnstruction, makes the point that the purpose of education is to
slimulate inquiry and skill in the process o{ knowledge getling, not to memorize
a bocly of knowledge: "Knowing is a process, not a product" (1966, p . 72). Paulo
Freire calls the oricntation that conceives of educa tion as the transmission of
fixed content the "banking" concept of education:

Educorion thus b«omes on oc1 of deposiring, in whích the swden1s ore 1he
depasitories ond rhe teocher is the deposiror. lnsieod o/ communicoting, the
teocher issl.l<'s communiques ond mokes deposits which the students potiently
receive, 1nemo,.ize, ond repeot. This is the "hankins"' concept of educotion, in
which the scope of ocrion ollowed ro the studenlsextends only os for os receiving,
/iling, ond storm,g the deposits. Tlicy do, it is rwe, hove lhe opportunily to bccomo
collectors or catologucrs of the th1'ngs they s tore. But in the last anólysis, it is 1nen
themselues who ore /iled au:oy llirough thelock of creotivity, tronsformation, and
knowledge in this (al best) mísgtiided system. For oporlfrom inquiry, aport from
the praxis, men cannot be truly human. Knowled9e emerges only through
inuention or1d reinvention, through the restless, impotient, contínuing, hope/ul
inquiry men pursue in the world, with rhe world, ond with eoch other. {Friere,
1974, p. 58]

Learning Is o Continuous Process Grounded in Experience

Knowledge is continuously derived from and tested out in the experiences of
:he learner. William James (1890), in his sludies on the nature of human
:onsciousness, 111arvelecl at the fact lhat consciousness Is conlinuous. How is it,
1e asked, that 1awake in the morning with the same consciousness, the same
·houghts, feelings, memories, and sense o ( who 1am that 1went to sleep with the
,;ght oefore? Similarly for Dewey, continuity of experience wasa powerful lruth
>f human existence, central to rhe theory ol learning:

... the principie of continuity of experience meons thot every experience

both takes upsomothir,gfrom thosewhichhavegonebeforeondmodi[:esinsome ,
way the qualily of those which come ofter. . .. Asan individual posses from one
situatio:1io or:othcr, hís uJorld, his environrnent, expands orcontracts. He does
1101 find himsclf living In anotlier world but in a di/ferent part or aspect o/ one ond
t/ie sorne world. What he hos !earned in lhe way of knowledge and ski!/ in one
sífuolion beco:ncs an inslrument of understanding ond dealing effeclive.'ywith the
situations whfch fo!!ow. The ptoce.ss goes on as longos U/e ar1d learnir1g contin1.Je.
{O.,wey, l938, pp. 35, 44)

Although we are ali aware of lhe sense of continuily in consciousness and

•xperience to which James and Dewey refer, and rake com!orl from the
>redictability and security ir provides, there is on occasion in the penumbra oí
hat awareness an elemenc of doubt and uncertainly. How do l recondte my
•wn sense o( continuily and predictability with whar at limes appears to be a
and development, a perspective that can be characlerized by the following
propositions, which are shared by the three major traditions of experiential
learning.

Learning Is Best Conceiued as a Process, Not in Terms

of Out co mes
The emphasis on the process of leaming as opposed to the behavioral
oulcomes distinguishes experiential leaming from the iooalist approaches of
uadiuonal education and lrom the behavioral theories ol learning created by
Watson, Hui!, Skinner, and others. The theory of experiential learning rests on
a different philosophical and epistemological base from behaviorist theories of
!earning and idealist educational approaches. Modern versions of these latter
approaches are based on the empiricisf philosophies of Locke and others. This
episte mo!ogy is based o n the idea that lhere are clements oí consciousness-
mental atoms, or, in Locke's term "simple ideas"- 1hat always remain the same.
The various combinalions and associations ot these consis tent elements lorm
our varying patlerns o( thought. lt is the notion ol constan!, fixed elements ol
thought that has had such a profound eflecl on prevailing approaches to
learning and education, resulting in a tendency to define learning in terms ol its
oulcomes, whether these be knowledge in an accumulated storehouse oí lacts
or habits representing behavioral responses to specific stimulus conditions. lf
ideas are seen to be fixed and immutable, lhen it seems possible to measure how
much someone has lcarned by the amount oí these fixed ideas the person has
accumulated.
Experie ntial learning theory, however, proceeds from a dif(erent set o l
assumptions. Ideas are nol fixed and immutable elemcnts ol thought but are
lormed and re·formed through experience. In all three of the learning models
jusi reviewed, learning is described as a process whereby concepts are derived
lrom and continuously modified by experience. No two thoughts are ever the
same, since experience always intervenes. Plaget (1970), for example,
considers the creation ol new knowledge lo be the central problem of genetic
epislemo!ogy, s ince each acl ol understanding is the result ol a process oí
cont inuous construc tion a nd invenlio11 through the interaction processes oí
assimilalion <>nd accommodation (compare Chapter 5, p. 99). Learning is an
emergen! process whose outcomes represen! only historical record, not
knowledge of the luture.
When viewed from the perspective of experiential learning, the tendency to
c!e'ine learning in terms ol outcomes can become a definition of non!earning, in
the process sense that the lailure to modily ideas and habits as a resull o(
experience is maladaptive. The clearest example ol this irony lies in the
behaviorist a xiom that lhe strength of a habit can bemeasured byits resistance
10 extinction. That is, the more 1have "!earned" a given habit, the Jonger 1will
persist in behaving tha t way •vhen it is no longer rewarded. Similarly, there are
those who feel that the orientations that conceive ol learning in terms o l
chaotic and unpredictab!e world around me? l move lhrough my daily round ot
1asks and meeiings with a lair sense of ••hat the issues are, o( what olhers are
saying and thinkíng, and with ideas about what acrions to take. Yet 1 am
occasionally upended by unforeseen circumstances, miscommunications, a nd
dreadful miscalculations. lt is in this in terplay between expectation and
expertence tha t learning occurs. In Hegel's phrase , "Any experience that does
not viola te e xpectation is not wort hy o f the name e xpericnce." And yet
somehow, the rents that lilese violations cause in the fabric of my experience
are magically repaired, and l íace the next day a bit changed but s till the same
person.
That this is a learning process is pcrhaps better iUustrated by the
nonlearning postures that can result fro m the ínterplay between expectation
and e xperience. To focus so sharply on conlinuity and certainty that one is
blinded to the shadowy penumbra of doubt and uncertainty is to risk dogmatism
and rigidity, the inability to learn from new experiences. Or conversely, to have
continuity c ontinuously shaken by the vicissiludes of new experience is to be
!e/t pa ralyzed by insecurity, incapable o! effective action. From the perspective
o f epistemo!ogical philosophy, Pepper (1942) shows that both these postures-
dogmalism and absolute skepticism- are inadequare foundations for the
creation ol valid knowledge systems. He proposes instead that an atlitude o!
provisionalism, or what he calls partial skepticism, be the guide for inquiry and
learning (compare Chapter 5, p. 107).
The lb<!t that learning is a continuous process grounded in experience has
importan! educational implications. Put simply, it impfies that all learning is
relearning. How easy a.n d le mpting it is in designing a course to think o! the
learner's mind as being as blank as the pa per on which we scra tch our outline.
Yet this is not the case. Everyone enters every learning situation with more or
less a rticula te ideas aboul lhe topic at hand. We are ali psycho!ogists,
historians, and alomic physicists. 11 is just that s orne of our theories are more
crude and incorrect than others. But to focus so!ely on the refinement and
validity o! these theories misses the point. The important point is that the people
we leach have held these belieís whateve r their quality a nd that unül now they
have used them whenever the situation ca lled for them to be atornic physicists,
historians, or what~ver.
Thus, one's job asan educa tor is not only to implan! new ideas bur also to
dispose o! or mod1ly o!d ones. In many cases, resistance to new ideas stems
from their conflict "'i th old beliefs that are inconsistent with them. lf the
education process begins by bringirlg out the !earner's belicfs and theories,
exarnining and testing them, and 1hen in tegrating the new, more refir.ed ideas
into the person's belief syslcms, the learning process w1ll be facilitated. Píaget
(see Elkind, 1970, Chapter 3) has identilied twomechanlsms by wh:ch new ideas
are adopted by an indi•;dual- integration and subsritution. Ideas that evolve
lhrough integration lend to become highly stable pa rts of the person's
co11cep1ion of the world. O n the o ther hand, when the conrent of a concept
changes by means of substitution, there is always the p0ssibility of a reversion to
the earlier level oí conceptualization and understanding, or to a dual theory oí
the world where espoused theories learned through substitution are incon·
gruent with theories·in·use that are more integrated with the person's total
conceptual and attitudinal view oí the world. lt is this latter outcome that
stimulated Argyris and Schon's inquiry into the effectiveness of professional
education:

We ihought the lrouble people hove in learning new theories may stem not
so much from 1he inherent dif[ic11/1y o/ the new theories as fram the existing
theories people haue tl1at alreody determine praclices. We coii 1heir operational
thcories of action theories·in·usc to distingui.sh them from the espoused thcorics
t/101 are used ro describe andjus1ify behavior. We wondered whether lhe difficulty
í11 !eorning new theories of action is related 10 o disposition to protect th(J old
lheory·in·use. (Argyris and Schon, !974, p. viiil

The Process o/ Learning Requires the Resolution

o/ Conflicts Between Dialectically Opposed Modes
o/ Adaptation to the World
Each of the three models oí experiential learning describes conflicts between
opposing ways of dealing with the world, suggesting that learnlng results from
resolution o! these conílicts. The Lewinian model emphasizes two such
dialectics- the conflict between concrete experience and abstrae! concepts
and the conílict between observation and action.2 For Dewey, the major
dialectic is between the impulse that gives ideas their "moving force" and reason
tha t 9ives desire its direction. In Piaget's framework, the twin processes of
accommodation o! ideas to the externa! world and assimila tion of experie nce
into existing conceptual structures are the movin9 forces of cognitlve
development. In Paulo Freire's work, the dialectic nature of learnin9 and
adaptation is encompassed in his concep! o( praxis, which he defines as
"reflection and action upon the world in order to translorm it" (1974, p. 36).
Central to the concept o( praxis is the process of "naming the world," which is
both active-e.., the sense that naming somethin9 translorms it-and
reílecrive-in that our choice of words gives meaning to the world around ~.
This process ol naming the world is accomplished through dialogue among
equals, a jo:nt process of inquiry and learning that Freire sets against the
banking concept ol education described earlier:

1 Tht> concept o! d:ia!ectk. relationsh!p iJ uscd odviscd!y in lh~ work. Thc long history and

chang1n9 usagcs of lhis lerm, ~nd pnr11cull)t)y tho en\Ottonnl and idcalog:cal connotations atlendh'(!
lls usase in s.orr.e con!exts, nlay <::auM? .sonie confuslo1l far lhe re1:1der. Ho<.A.•ever, no other term
cxpresses as v.·e!I the relatlonsh:p between learn!ng orientalions de&cribed here-1~1 of mutunl:Y
opposed and conílicti:lS processes !he resu!!s o! e.lch or which cannot be expl2i:ned by the other, but
whose n'e(se( th:oush ccnftont::it:On cf the co1,0iccbel\~:een them resv.hs in a hish.erorder proce.u
th.et tra"'lscends and encompasses them both This c!eíinilion comes closest to Hegel's use o! the
term bi.Jt does not imp~~· tot~f acceptance ol the Htgebn eplstemology (compare Cha;>ter 5, p. 117).
 The Prccess of €xpertential l..earning

As lUe atternpf to ona1yze dialogue as a human phenon1enon, we disco1..-er

somethiog which is the essence o/ dia!ogae iiself: the word. But fhe word is n1ore
thon just an insfn.anent luhich 1nakes dia!og.ue poss:bre; occordingfy, we must
seek iis constitlitiue e}e1l1ents. Within the UJOrd wefind twodi1nensior1s, rej!ecrion
ond acflon, in such radical ifuerac1ion thot if o tle is sacrificed-even in J)Or'l-the
other irrur:ediate1y suffers. There is no true word thot is not al the sorne Ji.rne a
praxis. Th us, io speok o ir~e u:ord is 10 tronsform the world.
An unauthenlic word, one tvhich is unobfe to transform reaJity, resuits
u..·.~en dichotorr.y is irnposed upen its constltutiue eleme11ts. When a word is
deprived of its din¡ension of action, reflectíon outomaticoUy suffers as weU; and
the 1.vord is changed into idie chaflf:?r. inio verba!ism, into an o(ienated and
a!ienating "bfah." lt becomes an empty word, one 1.uhich con11ot denounce the
1.uor(d~ Jor denunciation is impossib!e w ithout a co1nn1itn1ent to transform, and
there is no transformafion U.lithoul actión.
On Jhe other hand, if acfio11 is emphasized exclusiueJy, to ihe detriment of
reflecfion, the u..:ord is converted into activism. The Jatter-action for action's
sake- negates 1he true praxis and Jnakes dialogue impossib!e. Either dichotomy,
by creating unouthentic Jorms of cxisfencc, creares also u11authe11tic forms of
tl1ought, which reinforce the original dí.chofomy.
Hurnan existence cannot be silent. norcan it be nourished by false words,
out only by true u:ords, u:ith which men ~ronsform the world. To exist, humanly, is
to na me /he world, to change jf , Once narped, !he worid in its Jurn rea¡>peors to
/he norr1ers as o proble1n and requfres of thern a r1ew nain:ng. Menare not built in
si!cncc, bu/ in u..•ord, in work, in action~refleciion .
But w}1ife to soy the true word-u/hich is u;ork., which is praxis- is to
lronsform /he world, saying that word is no/ the priuilege of somefew men, but the
right of euery man. Consequently, no one can saya irue word a(one-norcan he
soy it for another, in ó prescriptive act which robs others of their words. {Freire,
1974, pp. 75, 76]

Ali the models above suggest the idea that learning is by its very naturea
tension· and conílic t·filled process. N "w knowledge , skills, or altitudes are
achieved through confrontation a mong four modes ol experiential learning.
Learners, if they are to be effective, need lour difiere n! kinds ol abilities-
concrele experience abilities (CE), reflectiue obseruation a bilities (RO).
abstrae/ conceptuolíza tion abilities (AC), and active experimenlatian (AE)
abilities. That is , they must be able to involve themselves íully, openly, and
without bias in new experiences (CE). They must be able to reílect on and
observe their experiences from many perspectives (RO). They must be able to
create concepts tha t integrate their observations into logically sound theories
(AC), and they must be able to use these theories ro make decisions a nd solve
problems (AE). Yet rhis ideal is diíficult to achieve. How can one act and reílect
at the same time? How can one be concrete and immedia te and still be
theoreticaJ? Learning requires abilities t hatare polaropposites,and the learner,
as a result, must continually choose which set of learning abilities he ar she will
bring to bear in a ny specific leaming s ituation . More specifically, there are two
primary dimensions to the learning process. The first dimension represents the
The Procass ot Expor'8ntlal Learning 31

concrete experiencing of cvents at one end and a bs trae! conceptualiza lion a l

rhe o ther. The other dimension has active experime nlalion at one extreme and
reílective observation a l the other. Thus, in the process of learning, o ne moves
in varying degrees from actor to observer, and from specific involvemenl lo
general analytic de1achment.
In addition, 1he way in which theconOicts among the dialectically opposed
modes of adaptalion get reso!ved determines the level of learning that resulls. 11
conP.icts are resotved by suppression of one mode and/or dominance by
another, learning tends to be specialized around thedominant mode and llmited
in areas control!ed by the domina ted mode. For examp!e, in Piaget's model,
imicalion is 1he resull whe n accommodation processes dominate, and play
results when assimilation dominates. Or fo r Fre ire, dominance of the active
mode results in "activism," and dominance o f lhc reflective mode results in
uverbalism. JJ
However, when we consider the higher forms of adaptation-the process
of creativity and personal developme nt-conílict among adaptive modes needs
to be confronted and integrated in to a crealive synthesis. Nearly every accounl
of the creative process, from Wallas's (1926) lour·stage modelofincorporalion,
incubation, insight, and verificatio n, has recognized the dialectic conflicts
involved in crea1ivity. Bruner (1966a), in his essay on the condilions of
creativity, emphasizes the dialectie tension between abstrae! detachment a nd
concre te involvement. For him, the -crea tive acl is a product oí detachmenl a nd
commitme nt, of passion and decorum, and of a freedom to be dominated by the
object of one's inquiry. Al the highesc s tages oí development. the adaptive
commitme nl to learni ng and creativity produces a s trong need for integralion
of the tour adaptive modes. Development in one mocle precipitates development
in the others. lncreases in symbolic complexily, for e xamp'e, refme and sharpen
both perceptual and behavioral possibililies. Thus, comp!exity and lhe
integration of dialectic conflicts among the adaptive modes are the hallmarks of
true crealivily and growth. ·

Learning Is an Holistic Process of Adaptation to the World

Experiential learning is not a molecular educalional concept but ra ther is a
molar concept describing the centra l process oí human adaptation to the social
a nd physical environment. lt is a holistic concept much akin to the Jungian
theory of psycholog:cal types (Jung, 1923), in 1hat it seeks to describe the
emergence of basic life orientations as a function of dialec1ic cer.sions between
basic modes of relating lo the wor!d. To leam is not the special province of a
sing~e specíalized realm of human functioning such as cognirtonor perception. lt
involves the integrated functioning: of the lotal organism-thinking, feeling,
Perceiving, and behaving.
This concepl or ho!istic adapta tio n is somewha l out of step wilh c urrent
resea rc h trends in the behavioral sciences. Since lhe early years of this century
a nd lhe decline of what Gordon Allport callcd lhe "simple and sovereiqn"
theories of human behavior, the trend in the behavioral sc;ences has been away
from theories such as those of Freud and his followers that proposed to explain
the totality of human functioning by focusing on the interrelatedness among
human processes such as thought, emotion, perception, and so on. Research
has instead tended to specialize in more detailed explorat;on and description of
partic ular processes and subprocess es of human adaptation-percept;on,
person perceptton, attributton, achievement motivation, cognttion, memory-
the list could go on and on. The fruit of this labor has been bountiful. Because of
this intensive specialized research, we now know a vast amount about human
behavior, so much that any attempt to integrate and do justice lo all this diverse
knowledge seems impossible. Any holistic theory proposed today could not be
simple and would oertainly no! be sovereign. Yel if we are to understand human
behavior, parlicularly ;n any pract;caJ way, we must in some way pul together ali
the pieces that have been so carefully analyzed. In addition to knowing how we
think and how we teel, we must also know when behavior is governed by
thought and when by feeling. In addition to addressing the nature of specialized
human functions, experiential learning theory is also concerned \!.ith how these
functions are integrated by lhe person into a holistic adaptive posture toward
the world.
Leaming is the major process of human aclaptation. This concept of
leaming is considerably broader than that commonly associated with the school
classroom. lt occurs in all human settings, from schools to the workplace, from
the research laboratory to the management board room, in personal
relationships and the aisles of the local grocery. lt encompasses all life stages,
from childhood to adolescence, to middle and o!d age. Therefore it en·
compasses o ther, more limited adaptive concepts such as creativity, problem
solving, decision making, and attitude change that focus heavily on one or
another of the basic aspects of adaptation. Thus, creativity research has tended
to focus on the divergen! (concrete and reftective) factors in adaptation such as
tolerance for ambiguity, metaphorical thinking, and ílexibility, whereas
research on decision making has emphasized more convergen! (abstrae! and
active) adaptive factors such as the rational evaluation of solution alternatives.
The cyclic description o( the exp€riential learning process is mirrored in
many of the spedalized models of the adaptive process. The common theme in
ali these models is tha t all forms of human adapta tion approximate scientific
inquiry, a point oí view articulated most thorough!y by the late George Kelly
(1955). Dewey, Lewin, and Piaget in one way or another seem to take the
scientific method as their model for the learning process; or to put it another
way, they see in the scientific method the highest philosophical and
technological refinement of the basic processes of human adaptation. The
scientific method, thus, provides a meaos for describing the holistic integration
of all human functions.
Figure 2.4 shows the experiential !earning cycle in the center circle anda
model of the scientific inquiry process in the outer circle (Kolb, 1978), with
models of the prob!em·solving process (Pounds, 1965), the decisio n·makinQ
 The Process of Experlontial Loarnlng 33

fllOiltW

i
l
o '/f(1!i1•19"
,
<
~
•
~

'""

Al>'~'l ll $E.f>1{IN1l

Figure 2.4 Símilarlties Among Conceptlons of BasiCAdaptive Pro,cesses: lnqulry/Research,

Creallvity, Decislon .Maklng, Problem Solving, Learnl ng

process (Simon, 1947), and the creative prócess (Wallas, 1926) in belween.
Although the models ali use different terms, there is a reinarkable similarity in
concept among them. This similarity suggesls that there may be great payoff in
the integration of findings from the se specialized areas into a single general
adaptive model such as that proposed by experiential learning theory. Bruner's
work on a theory of instruction (1'966b) shows one example ol this potential
payoff. His integralion ol research on cognitive processes, problemsolving, and
learning theory provided a rich new perspective for the conduct of education.
When learning is conceived as a holistic ada ptive process, it provides
conceptual bridges across life situations such as school and work, porlraying
learning as a continuous, lifelong process. Similarly, this perspective highlights
the similarities among adaplive/learning activilies that are commonly called by
 The Ptocess of Expetlenttal Leatning
-
;pecialized names - learning, creativity, problem solving, dccision making, and
scientific research . Finally, learning conceived holis tically includes adaptive
~ctivities that vary in their extension through time and space. Typically, an
mmediate reaction to a limitcd situation or prob!em is not 1hough1 ofas learning
~ut as performance. Similarly al the other extreme, we do no1common!y think
~f Jong-term adaptarions to one's total lile situation as learning but as
:leue/opmenr. Yet performance, learning, and development, when viewed from
the pcrrspectives of experiential learning theory, lorm a continuum of adaptive
postures to the environment, varying only in their degree of extension in time
and space. Performance is limited to short-term adaptations to immediate
c ircumstance, learning encompassessomewhat longer-term masteryof generic
classes of s itua tions, and development encompasses lifelo ng adaptations to
o ne's total lile s ituatio n (compare C hapter 6) .

Learning lnvolves Tronsactions Between the Person

ond the Environment
So stated, this proposition must seem obvious. Yel slrangely enough, ils
implications seem to have been widely ignored in research on learning and
practice in educalion, re placed instead by a person-cenlered psychological view
of Jearning. The casual observer of the traditional educalional process would
undoubtediy conclude 1hal learning was primarily a personal, interna! process
requiring only the limited environment of books, teacher, and classroom.
lndeed, the wide r "real·world" environment al times seems to be aclively
rejected by educational syslems at all levels.
There is an analogous situalion in psychological research on learning and
development. In lheory, slimulus-response theories of learning describe
relationships be1ween environmental stimuli and responses of the organism.
But in practice, most of this research involves lreating the environmental stimuli
as independenl variables manipulated artificially by the experimenter to
determine their effecl on dependent response characleristics. Thls approach
has had two outcomes. The first is a tendency lo perceive the person-
e nvironment relalionship as one·way, placing greal emphasis on how
environment shapes behavio1· with little regard for how behavior shapes the
environment. Second, the models oí learning are essen lially decontextualized
and lacking in whal Egon Brunswick (1943) called ecological validity. In rhe
emphasis on scienl ific control of en~ironmental condilions, laboralory
siluations were created thal bore little resemblance to the environment of real
lile, resulting in empórically validated models of learning that accura1ely
described behaV:or in these artificial seitinss but could not easilybegeneralized
lo subjects in their natural environment. lt is to me not surprising that the
foremost proponen! of this theory of learning would be fascinared by the
crealion of Utopian societies su ch as Walden 11 (Skinner, I94S); for the only way
to apply the resulls of lhese s ludies is to make the world a labora tory, subject to
"experimenter" control (compare Elms, 198 1).
 Similar criticisms have been made of developmental psychotogy. Piaget's
work, for example, has been criticized for its failure to tal<e account of
environmental a nd cultural circumstances (Cole, 1971). Speaking of deve!op·
mental psychology in ge neral, Bronfenbrenner states, "Much of developmental
psyc hology as it now exists is lhe science of the slrange behauior of children in
strange situotions with strange adults far the bricfest p<.>ssible periods of time"
(1977, p. 19).
In experiential !earning theory, the transaclional relationship between the
person a nd the environment is symbolized in the dua l meanings of the term
experience-one subjective and personal, re ferring to the person's interna!
s tate, as in "the experience of joy and happiness," and tne other objective and
environmental, as in, " He has 20 years of experience on this job." These two
forms of experience interpenetrate and interrelate in very comp!ex ways, as, far
example, in the o!d saw, "He doesn't have 20 years oí e xperience, but one year
repeated 20 times." Dewey describes the matter this way:

Experie11ce does not go on simp fy inside a person. Ji does go on 1hete, for i't
in,fluences the formation of altitudes of desire and purpose. But this is not the whole
of the slOl'.\r'. Euery genuine experience has an actiue side which chongcs in son1e
degree the ob}ective conditions undet which experiences are had. The difference
between ciuilizotio:t ond sovcgery, to toke on cxampfeon a largescale, isfound in
the degree in 1..vhich previous experiences have chansed the objecfive condition$
under which subsequent experiences tóke place. The existence of roods, of
means o/ rapid n;ovemenJ and lransporlation, toors, imp!ements, furniture,
e.'ectric light and power, are illustrations. Destroy the exterr1al condiiions o/
present ciuilized experiencc, andfora tirneourexperiencewould relapse into thot
of barbarie peoples. . ..
The uxird "interaction" assigns equol rights to boihfactors in experience-
objective and interna! conditions. Any norn1al expe1ience is an interplay of these
two sets o/ conditions. Token together . . . they form what we cal/ a situation.
The sfate1nenl that individuats live in a world meons, in the concrete, that
1hey liue in a seties o/ situations. Ar1d when it is said thot they Iive in 1hese
situations, the n1eanin9 of the word ''in"is differentfrom i'ts meoning when it is said
that pennies are "in*' a pocket or painf is "in" a can. lt meons,. once n1ore, tltat
interoction is going on between an individual and objccts and other petsons. The
conceplions o/ situation ond o/ interaction are inseparable from each other. An
experience is a.'u.:ays u;hat il is beca use of a transaction taking p{cce beJu.ieen an
individual ond what, al thc tüne, constitutes h1's environrnent, w.~eiher the Iatter
consists of persons 1.vi!h whon1 he is lalking about sorne top:c or et.·ent, the subject
1D1ked obout being olso a port oí the situation; the book he is reading (in which his
·envitoning conéitions o r the time tnay be éng.1ond or .oncien1 Greece or an
in;oginóry region); or the n1oterials o/ on experirnenl he is pe1jorming. The
enuironn1en!, in ofher words, is whatevercondi!ions interccl u;ifh personal needs,
desires, purposes, cnd capacities to creote the expen'er:ce which is llad. Ei,:en
when o person bt:ilds a castle in ihe air he is 1'ntetcciing with lhe objects tohich he
consiructs in fancy. {Dewey, 1938, p. 39, 42·43}
 Although Dewey refers to the rela tionshi¡) between the objective and
subjective conditions of experience asan "interaction," he is struggling in the
last portien of the quote above to convey the special, complex nature of the
relationship. The word lronsaction is more appropriate than interoctio11 to
describe the relationship between the person and the environment in
experiential learning theory, because the connotation of interaction is somehow
100 mechanical, involving unchanging separate entities that become ínter·
twined but reta in their separate identities. This is why Dewey attempts to give
special meaning to the word in. The concept of transaction impliesa moreftuid,
interpenetrating relationship between objective conditions and subjective
experience, such that once they become related, both are essentially changed.
Lewin recognized this complexity, even though he chose to sidestep it in
his famous theoretical formulation, B = /(P,E). indicating that behavior is a
function of the person and the environment without any specification as to the
specific mathematical nature of that function. The position taken in this work is
similar to that of Bandura (1978)- namely, that personal characleristics,
environmental iníluences, and behavior ali opera te in reciproca! determination,
each factor iníluencing the others in an interlocking fashion. The concept of
reciprocally determined transactions bctween pcrson and leaming enviren·
ment is central to the laboratory·training method of experiential learning.
Learning in T·groups is seen to result not simply from responding to a fixed
environment but from the active creation by the learners of s ituations that meet
their learning objectives:

The cssence o/ this leorning experionce is a transactiono( process in which

the members nego/iaie os cach atlempts ta in/luc11Ce or control the s/feom o/
euents and to satis/y his per~al needs. lnórviduals leam to rhe extenr that they
expase 1hcir needs, vafues, ond behovior patterns so that perceptions and
reactions con be exchonged. Behovíor thus becomes the currency for
transactlOll. The arnaunt eoch invesls helps to determine the relum. (Bradford,
1964, p . 192}

Learning in this sense is an active, self·directed process that can be applied not
only in the group selling bul in everyday life.

Learning Is the Process o/ Creoting Knowledge

To understand learning, we must undersiand the nature and forms of human
knowledge and the processes whereby this knowledge iscrea ted. lt hasalready
been emphasized that this process of creation occurs at ali levels of
sophisticalion, from the mosl advanced forms of scientific research 10 the
child's discovery that a rubber ball bounces. J<nowledge is 1he result of the
transaction between socia l knowledge and personal knowledge. The formo:«, as
Dewey noled, is lhe civilized ob;ective accumulation of previous human cuÍlural
experience, whereas !he latter is the accumulation oí the individual person's
The Process ot Experiential Learning 37

subjective lile experiences. Kno••ledge results from the transaction between

these objective and subjective experiences in a process called learning. Hence,
to understand knowledge, we must understand the psychology of the learning
process, and to understand learning, we must understand epistemology- the
origins, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge. Piaget makes the following
comments on these last points:

Psychoíogy Jhus occupiesa key position, and its imp fications become increasing1y
cleor. The very sin1p!e reason for this is thot if the s ciences of noture exptain the
human spccies, humans in turn exp!ain Jhe sciences oj nature, ond it is up to
psychology to show us how. PsycholOS)I, in fact, represents the junction of two
opposite directions of scientific thought that are dialectico!ly complementary. Jt
foltows that the sys/en1 of sciences cannot be arranged in a linearorder, as many
people begitming w ith Auguste Comle haue aliempled lo arrange them. Theform
thot characterizes the sysfem of scie11ces is thot of a circle, or more precise/y that
af aspira/ as it becomes euer lorger. lnfact, objeclsare knownonly through the
s libject, wfii!e the subject can know hi111selj or herse{j on}y by actins on objecls
materio!ly and mentally. Jndeed, if objects are innt1merable and science
indefinite!y d iuerse, al/ knowledge of the subjecr brings us back to psycholoS)I, the
science of the subjecl and the subieci's actio.os.
. . . it is impossible to dissociote psycho/ogy from epistemology . . . how is
knou..•ledge ocquired, how does it increose, and how does it beco me orgonizedor
reorganized? . .. The answers we find, and /rorn l1Jhicl1 u;e can only c/1oose by
more or less refining tl1e1n, are necessarify of the foUowing three types: Either
knowledge comes exclusi1..•efy from the object, or it is constructed by the subject
alone, or it results from mu/tiple inferactions between thesubject and theobject-
but whot interaclions and in what form ? lndeed, we see al once thal these are
epistemo!ogical sofutions stem1ning fron1 en1piricisrn, apriorism, or diverse
interaclionism. .. . [Piaget, 1978, p. 651)

lt is surprising that few learning an9 cognitive researc hers other than
Piaget have recognized the intimate relationship between learning and
knowledge and hence recognized the need for epistemological as well as
psychological inquiry into these rela ted processes. In my own research and
prac tice with experiential learning, [have been impressed with the very practical
ramifications of the epistemological perspective. In teaching, for example, 1
have found it essential to take into account the nature of the s ubjec t matter in
deciding how to help students learn the ma terial a t hand. T rying to develop skills
in empathic lisrening is a different educational task, requiring a different
teaching approach from that of teaching fundamentals of s tatistics. Similarly, in
consulting work with organizations, l have o ften seen barriers to communica·
tion and problem solving that a t root are epistemologically based- tha t is,
based on conflicting assumptions about the nature of knowledge and truth.
The theory of experiential learning provides a perspective from which to
approac h these prac tica! problems, suggesting a typology of different
knowledge sys tems that res ults from the way the dialectic conílicts between
adaptive modes of concre te experience and abstract conceptualizationand the
38 Tho Procesa of ExperientlBI Lcarning

modes of active experimentation and reílective observation are characteristi·

cally resolved in differe nt fields of inquiry (compare C hapter 5). This approach
draws on the work of Stephen Pepper (1942, 1966), who pro¡>05es a syslem íor
describing the different viable forms of social knowledgc. This system is based
011 whal Pepper calls world hypotheses. World hypolheses correspond to
metaphysical systems that define assumptions and rules for the development o(
reltncd knowledgc írom common sense. Pepper mainlains lhat all knowledgc
systems are refinemcnts of common sense based on different =um;itions
about the nalure of knowledge and t ruth. In this process ol refinement he sees a
basic di!emma. Although comn1on scnse is a lways applicable as a means of
explaining an experience, it tends to be imprecise. Relined knowledge, on the
other hand, is precise but limited in its application or generalizability because it
is based 011 assu mptions or world hypotheses. Thus, common sense requires
the criticism of refined know!edge, and relined knowledge requires lhe security
of common sense, suggesting that all social knowledge requires an all itude of
partía! skepticism in its interpretation.

SUMMARY: A DEFINrTION OF LEARNING

Even though definitions have a way of making things seem more certain than
they are, il may be useful to summarize this chapter on lhe characteristicsof the
exper:ential learning process by <iffering a working defininon ol lcarning.l
Leoming is the process wher·eby knowledge is created lhrougfr the
transformotion o{ experience. This definition emphasizes severa! critica!
aspects ol rhe learning process as viewcd lrom the experiential pers pective.
Firsl is the emphasis on lhe process ol adaptation and learning as opposed to
conlent or outcomes. Second is that knowledge is a translormation process,
being continuously c realed and rec realed, not a n indepenclent entity to be
acquired or transmitted. Third, learning transforms experience in both its
Jbjective and s ubjective lorms. Finally, to· unders1and leaming, we mus!
Jnders tand the nalure ol knowledge, and vice versa.

lfrom 1h:s po'nt on, J'WiO drop thc 1nodi!ier "cxperi~nllal" inrefcrring 10 lhe lea:ni1l9 ptOf;t$$
ie.sc:rit,ed i:i 1hl3 chapter. V.i'hen other throciesof litarrjng are d~. ~ ""~'I hP vt.nti''°"' ••
-··...