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BPI VS.

GENUINO, 22 JULY 2015

DOCTRINE: A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC1 does not remove the plaintiff's duty


under Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court to promptly move ex-parte
to set his or her case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served
and filed.

FACTS:

The trial court dismissed the Bank of the Philippine Islands' Complaint
against Spouses Roberto and Teresita Genuino for failure to prosecute
under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands concedes that dismissal is justified under the Rules of Court, but
submits that dismissal for non-filing of a Motion to Set Case for Pre-trial
Conference is no longer proper beginning August 16, 2004 when A.M. No.
03-1-09-SC was issued.

ISSUE: Whether A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC no longer require the plaintiff to ex


parte set his case for pre-tial?

RULING:

No, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, providing that "[wjithin five (5) days from date of
filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that the case be
set for pre-trial conference [and] [i]f the plaintiff fails to file said motion
within the given period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-
trial,"3 must be read together with Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
on dismissals due to plaintiff's fault. Plaintiff should thus sufficiently show
justifiable cause for its failure to set the case for pre-trial; otherwise, the
court can dismiss the complaint outright.
PACANA-CONTRERAS VS. ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, 02 DECEMBER
2013

FACTS:

In a complaint filed by the petitioners against respondent, the latter first


filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction over
intra-corporate controversy.

Upon denial, respondent filed an answer but during pre-trial respondents


manifested that they would seek the dismissal of the complaint because the
petitioners are not the real parties in interest to prosecute the case.

The respondents also argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to
dismiss were timely raised, pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i, Rule
18 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the nature and purposes of the pre-
trial include, among others, the dismissal of the action, should a valid
ground therefor be found to exist; and such other matters as may aid in the
prompt disposition of the action.

ISSUE: Whether the motion to dismiss may be raised at pre-trial?

RULING:

The respondents are not correct. The rules are clear and require no
interpretation. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion
to dismiss based on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be
waived if not raised in a motion to dismiss or alleged in their answer. On
the other hand, "the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all
issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised. The
purpose is to obviate the element of surprise, hence, the parties are
expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact
which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged
or impeaching matter."
PIMENTEL V. ADIAO, OCTOBER 17, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents. However, it


was only during pre-trial that the petitioner filed her pre-trial brief which was
objected to by the respondents.

Petitioner alleged that her counsel received on February 12, 2014 a copy of
the Notice of PC and the Notice of PT and it was improbable for Joanna's
counsel to submit the PT brief at least three days prior to February 14,
2014.36 While Joanna was unable to file her PT brief on the said date, she
and her counsel were present and actively participated therein with her
counsel provisionally marking the photographs to be presented as evidence
subject to her counsel's request to mark the originals thereof on March 17,
2014.

ISSUE:

Whether the case was validly dismissed?

RULING: No,

Although Section 5 Rule 18 mandates that failure of the plaintiff to appear


during pre-trial shall cause the dismissal of the action, and Section 6 of the
same rule provides that the failure to submit the pre-trial brief has the same
effect of failure to appear on pre-trial.

However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules mandates that "[t]hese Rules shall
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

The Court was convinced with the explanations of Petitioner for her plea to
relax the application of the Rules in her case.
CHUA V. CHENG, NOVEMBER 22, 2017

FACTS:

In a case filed by the petitioners against the respondents, the former during
hearing Petitioners orally manifested in open court that they would be
presenting six (6) additional witnesses, and sought leave for this purpose.

The manifestation was objected by the respondents as they are not


included in the pre-trial order.

Petitioners assert Paragraph (A)(2)(d) of A.M. No. 03-


1-09-SC, which provides “The documents or exhibits to be presented,
stating the purpose thereof. (No evidence shall be allowed to be
presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-
in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-
marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good
cause shown.”

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s reliance over A.M. No. 03-


1-09-SC is proper?

RULING:

No, the rules governing pre-trial should be, at all times, applied in absolute
terms. While faithful compliance with these rules is undoubtedly desirable,
they may be relaxed in cases where their application would frustrate, rather
than facilitate, the ends of justice. 48 The relaxation of these rules, however,
is contingent upon a showing of compelling and persuasive reasons to
justify the same.49

It is the Court's considered view that Petitioners have failed to sufficiently


show that such compelling and persuasive reasons exist in this case.
Consequently, the Petition must be denied.
IN THE MATTER OF BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, 11 APRIL 2013

FACTS:

In the election for the IBP positions  IBP-Southern Luzon filed its Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In Intervention and
the subject Petition In Intervention, seeking a declaration that the post of
EVP for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it be
qualified to nominate a candidate for the position of EVP for the 2011-2013
term.

The motion was opposed by Fortunato, who insisted that IBP-Western


Visayas was the only region that could vie for the position of EVP for the
2011-2013 term.

ISSUE: Whether intervention may be allowed?

RULING:

Yes, It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar


matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact,
in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment. Where
there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not come into
play. On several occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases
and modified its decisions that had long attained finality in the interest of
justice. A recent example is Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo, where the Court
lifted the ban against the disqualification of the respondent from re-
employment in government. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Clemency, the Court granted clemency so the respondent could transfer to
a higher position. In Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita v.
Masamayor, the respondent was given judicial clemency for her past
administrative offenses so she could apply for a lateral transfer.
BOARD OF REGENTS OF MSU VS. OSOP, 22 FEBRUARY 2012

FACTS:

The case arose from the complaint filed the respondent against MSU and
several of its officer. The RTC decided in favor of the respondent. MSU
president filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary and Instant Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order in its
personal capacity.

MSU subsequently filed a motion to intervene which was opposed by the


respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the motion for intervention was properly filed?

RULING:

No, Jurisprudence describes intervention as “a remedy by which a third


party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings.” [65]  “The right to intervene is
not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the
movant establishes facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing it.”[66]

While undoubtedly, MSU has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it
may not avail itself of the remedy of intervention in CA-G.R. SP No. 82052
simply because MSU is not a third party in the proceedings herein.

IN THE MATTER OF BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS


OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, 11 APRIL 2013

FACTS:
Earlier, on July 27, 2012, IBP-Southern Luzon filed its Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In Intervention 25 and the
subject Petition In Intervention,26 seeking a declaration that the post of EVP
for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and that it be qualified to
nominate a candidate for the position of EVP for the 2011-2013 term.

The Petition in Intervention was, in turn, opposed by Fortunato, 27 who


insisted that IBP-Western Visayas was the only region that could vie for the
position of EVP for the 2011-2013 term.

ISSUE:

Whether the intervention may be allowed?

RULING:

Yes,

It should be noted that this is merely an administrative matter, a bar


matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact,
in administrative cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment. Where
there is no entry of judgment, finality and immutability do not come into
play. On several occasions, the Court has re-opened administrative cases
and modified its decisions that had long attained finality in the interest of
justice. A recent example is Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,43 where the
Court lifted the ban against the disqualification of the respondent from re-
employment in government. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Clemency,44 the Court granted clemency so the respondent could transfer
to a higher position. In Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita v.
Masamayor,45 the respondent was given judicial clemency for her past
administrative offenses so she could apply for a lateral transfer.

HEIRS OF ARCE V. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, JULY 25,


2018

FACTS:
In the instant case petitioner’s land is being covered in the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Meanwhile SAMANACA filed an Ex-
parte Motion for Leave (for Intervention and for Admission of
Comment),40 arguing that its members have already been identified as
qualified beneficiaries of the subject lands and hence, has the right to
participate and air its side of the controversy.

ISSUE:

Whether intervention may be allowed?

RULING: Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted


by the court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements
of the statute authorizing intervention.

The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than
mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect
and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or
collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest,
permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the
exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding."

Clearly, SAMANACA's assertions do not amount to a direct and immediate


legal interest, so much so that they will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation of the court's judgment. At most, their interest, if any, is
characterized as inchoate, contingent and expectant – which could not
have justified intervention.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. VITRIOLO, JUNE 3, 2019

FACTS:
In an admin case filed against the respondent before the petitioner
Ombudsman, the latter found the former liable for misconduct and
suspended him for one month without pay.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration and without impleading the


Ombudsman, respondent filed a petition for review 21 under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court before the CA.

After the case has been decided by the CA it filed the Omnibus Motion
seeking to intervene in the case and consequently, the reversal of the CA
ruling.

ISSUE: Whether the Motion for Intervention may be allowed?

RULING:No,

Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court moves for intervention must be


made before rendition of judgment

The rule requiring intervention before rendition of judgment, however, is not


inflexible. Jurisprudence is replete with instances where intervention was
allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rules of Court when
demanded by the higher interest of justice; to afford indispensable parties,
who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard; to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues
raised by the parties; or, because of the grave legal issues raised.

After a meticulous review of the available records, however, the Court finds
that none of the excepting circumstances as above-enumerated obtain in
this case; hence, the general rule provided under Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court applies.

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