SOFIA J.

NEPOMUCENO  RTC denied petition for probate due to

vs. intrinsic invalidity
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA  CA modified, granting the probate but
GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG CARMELITA JUGO disallowing the portion for petitioner
 SC affirmed CA’s decision 

FACTS: 
 Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament;
 In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as
his sole and only executor of his estate. However, the testator was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children but since 1952, he had been
estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and
wife;
 Testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children
Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner;
 The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo contending that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was
legally married to the testator;
 The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging that
petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in
integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued to her;
 The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in
his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner thus the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is
evident;
 CA declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code;
 Petitioner appealed averring that the only purpose of the probate of a will is to establish
conclusively as against everyone that a will was executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The issue on intrinsic
validity should be determined in a separate action.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the CA acted within its jurisdiction in disallowing the portion of the will which is
intrinsically invalid.
HELD:
 NO. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will;
 In Sumilang v. Ramagosa, it held that the testator’s testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented
for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature;
 The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do;
 In Nuguid v. Nuguid, it held that if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result. Waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. We
might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question;
 The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue;
 We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the
proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the
court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.