DOMINADOR B.

BUSTOS, petitioner
VS. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent

No. L-2068. October 20, 1948

Ponente: Tuason, J.
Nature of the Case: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and mandamus.
Topic/Doctrine: Curtailment of the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-
examine witnesses.

FACTS:

In this case, Dominador Bustos (petitioner) appeared at the preliminary investigation

before the Justice of Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal
charges against him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, he entered the plea of not
guilty. Then, his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law.

The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. Consequently, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the
court of first instance.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony.

The motion was denied, and for that reason the present, the special civil action of
mandamus was instituted. Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11
or Rule 108, on the ground that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision of
section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108 is an adjective law and not a
substantive law or substantive right.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. We cannot tear down
section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an
accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given
evidence for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition.
As we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due
process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the
privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains unaffected,
and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him both at such investigation
and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the
guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.

The degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged

by the fact that this formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court in
making rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary
manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to
his disadvantage.