DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO, Judge of First

Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.

G.R. No. L-2068 , October 20, 1948

Rule denying accused of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him in a preliminary investigation held to be only an adjective law and
therefore constitutional (preliminary investigation — not essential part of due
process).

FACTS:

A warrant of arrest was issued for petitioner Bustos on the strength of the testimony of
the complainant and certain witnesses. In the preliminary investigation, his counsel
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could
be examined and cross examined. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected,
invoking Sec 11 of Rule 108, and the objection was sustained. Said Sec 11 denies the
defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation. Bustos
now contends that said Sec 11 infringes [the now Art VIII, Sec 5(5) of the Constitution].
It is argued that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights, to wit, his statutory and fundamental right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Does the rule in question impair substantive rights thereby violating the constitutional
limitation on the rule-making power of the Court?

RULING:

No. The rule in question is an adjective law and not a substantive law which creates
substantive rights.

Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in
a criminal prosecution. Therefore, it is not an essential part of due process of law. It may
be suppressed entirely, and thus, mere restriction of the privilege formerly enjoyed
thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition. In the latter stage
of the proceedings, the only stage where the guarantee of due process comes into play,
he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. As a rule of evidence, said Sec 11 is also procedural. The entire
rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down
Sec 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules. The distinction between “remedy” and “substantive
right” is incapable of exact definition. This being so, it is inevitable that the SC in making
rules should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to
tolerate, if not to expect, such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and
arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.

¹ Substantive law and adjective law, distinguished. – Substantive law

creates, defines and regulates rights, or that which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action. Adjective or remedial law prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. As applied to
criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the
procedural law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits
a crime is to be punished .

² Evidence—the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and

circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings. It is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in private
law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law
transgressor is punished. (Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and
practice.)