THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE DECCAN-Economic Factors and Consequences

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THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE DECCAN—Economic Factors and Consequences

Author(s): Shireen Moosvi
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Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 43 (1982), pp. 365-382
Published by: Indian History Congress
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THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE DECCAN-
Economic Factors and Consequences

Shìreen Moosvi
The Deccan has generally been treated by Modern historians as a

geographical entity so far separated from Northern India that attempts
by the Delhi Sultans or the Mughals to extend their frontiers beyond
the Vindhyas have been looked upon as over-ambitious and potentially
m
disastrous.1 There is no denying that the barrier of the Satpura range»
co
called the 'Bindha' (Vindhyas) in Mughal documents 2 was not easy to
pierce, and the terrain beyond it was quite different from the alluvial
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plains of the North, being cut into regions and sub-regions by hills and
s
plateaus. But the resistance offered by these physical features was

vi
certainly not insurmountable.

re
The fact that the fall of the Mughal Empire came close at heels
upon the complete annexation of the Deccan by Aurangreb lent further
al
strength to the criticism of the Mughal Deccan policy. It is generally

in
held that by extending into the Deccan, the Mughal Empire became
.f
unmanageable administratively as well as politically, "Aurangzeb* like

a boa constrictor, had swallowed more than he could digest."8 But
w
little attention has been paid to the specific factor which induced the
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Mughal Emperors from Akbar to Aurangzeb follow a policy of expan-

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sion into the Deccan ("a. sleepless aim of the Mughal Emperors" j4 in
spite of the obvious problems of distance and geography. It is sometimes
said that this derived from Akbar's desire to be a 'Chakravartin' or
from his self imposed obligation to provide 'good government.'5 In a
recent article Satish Chandra has made refreshing departure when he
argues that there were complex factors responsible for the Deccan policy
of the Mughals6
Moreover, in the debate on the fall of the Mughal Empire and the
role of the 'Deccan factor' the economic significance of the Mughal
expansion into the Deccan has largely escaped notice. As a result, as
we will see, the weaknesses of the Mughals in the Deccan have over*
shadowed some of their strengths and achievements.

366
In considering Mughal expansion, we may begin by asking whether

for the Mughals, except for some geographical complications, the Deccan
was any different, say, from Bengal or Gujarat. The Mughal ruling
class was naturally seeking larger revenues; and the Emperors had to
have expanding resources to reward their particular confidants and
favourites as against the established nobility.
It was thus a pressing need, in the short as well as the long run,
for enlarging imperial resources that dictated the policy of the Mugal
Euperors towards the Deccàn. Starting from Akbar down to Aurangzeb
all attepmts for conquests in the Deccan could be seen to have been not
a simple matter of choice of the invididual emperor but practically a
m
matter of compulsion, given the structure of the Mughal ruling c'ass.
co
By the 1590's Akbar's empire encompassed almost the whole of
Northern India barring some parts of Bengal; for the Mughal arms to
e.
turn now in the direction of the Deccan was only natural. Akbar anne-
xed Berar by 1596 and Khandesh by 160 1.7 Ahmadnagar too was
s
vi
formally annexed, but its actual absorption had only progressed partially
when Akbar died.8 Jahangir found it difficult to retain the annexed
re
areas within Ahmadnagar (Ahmadnagar and Bir), which were indeed

al
lost during 1610-16.® Shahjahan's reign saw two major spurts of

expansion. Between 1632-46 almost the entire Ahmadnagar kingdom
in
was annexed, though its sourthern parts were ceded to Bijapur. In

.f
1656-7 came the second spurt with the district of Ramgir taken from
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Golkunda, and large portions (including Bidar ard Parenda) seized or

w
claimed from Bijapur. Under Aurangzeb the pressure on the Deccan

sultanates continued unevenly during the first part of the reign; but in
w
1686 and 1687 both the rem ining Deccan Sultanates, Bijapur and
Golkunda, were seized
These waves of territorial expansion in the Deccan are duly reflected

in the fluctuations in the estimated revenue-income, the jama, ot the
Empire. The table below sets out the jama, of the Empire (column A)
along with the jama, of the Mughal Deccan (column B) drawn from
various authorities. Column 'C' gives tne jama, of the Deccan as per
cent of the total jama ; The total area of the Empire is set out in
column 'D' and that of the Mughal Deccan in column 'E'. The last
column 'F shows the area of the territory held in the Deccan as per
cent of the total area of the Empire.

367
Note on Table - 1
The jama figures of the Empire are taken from Irfan Habib, Agrarian System
of Mughal India , Bombay, 1963, pp. 399-^rOO & 406-7, except for 1601 & 1702-7.
The figure for the jama of the Empire in 1601 is based on the sum of the totals
stated for the sarkars <cf. Atlas of Mughal Empire , p. 8). The jama of 1702-7 is
directly taken from the Dastur-ul Amai- 1 Shahjahani, (Br. Mus. Add. 6588, if. 15a-
47b). For the Deccan some of my totals are in disagreement with those set out
in I. Habib Agrarian System . I have generally accepted the dates to which Irfan
Habib ass'gns these figures; only in the case of the Bayaz-i KhushbuV it seems that
the date can be further narrowed. Irfan Habib assign* these figures to 1628-1636,
but the period can be limited further to 1628-33 on the basis of figures for Khandesh
which being identical with those of the Iqbalnama , show that the suba had not till
then been enlarged, by the transfer in 1634 of certain portions from Malwa.
m
The map-area is based on the jama -map-area statistics set out in the Altas of
co
the Mughal Empire , pp. VII & VIII. For transfers to Khandesh, the area has been
directly measured from sheets 9A, 14A and 15A of the Atlas . The Iqbalnama dees
e.
not mention the sarkars of Ramgir and Manikdrug under Berar. Manikdrug was
perhaps included in sarkar Kalam; but Ramgir though included in the A* in was not
s
yet annexed, its area is accordingly excluded from the area of the Mughal Deccan
vi
shown for 16^5.

re
The change in frontiers of the Deccan with the enlargement of the limits of s uba
Khandesh in the early 1630'?, and the annexation of Baglana in 1638 necessitates
al
separate column «b', with different corresponding figures in the A* in for jama and
map-area.
in
.f
w
w
w

368
TABLE- 1
A B
Year Reference Jama of the Empire Jama of the Daccan

S No. (a) (b)
~~l 1601 A' in-i

ed. Blochmann.
Calcutta, pp.
386 ff.
2 1605 Iqbalnama-i- 5,83,46,90,344.5 1,10,08,17,069
Jahangiri, Br.M.
m
or. 1334 ff 231b-
2b
Pre.
3 1627 Majalis-Salatin 6,30.00,00,000 1,15,67,00,000

co
e.
or.828ff.l 14-a
115b.
s
4 1628- Bayaz-i-Khus - 8,80,00,00,000 1 82,00,00,000

vi
33 é«i, 1.0.828, ff.

re
180-1 a.
5 1646- Lahori, II pp 8,80,00,00,000 1,82,00,00,000
47 709 12
al
6 G-
in
1658 Dastur-ul' Am- 9,12,24,45,84 i 1,85,64,48,000

al-i Alamgiri.
.f
Add.6598,la-
w
128b
7 1667 Mirat i Atam, 9,24 17,16,082 2,96,70,00,000
w
Add. 7657, ff.

445b-6a.
w
8 1687- Zawabit-i-Ala - 13,80,23,56,000 6,50,1452,140

91 mgiri, Add. 6598
ff. l30b-29
9 1687- Fraser 86, ff 12,07,18,76,841 4,75.20,09,370
95 ff. 57b-61b
10 1687 Intikhab i-Da- »3,21,98,53,981 5,45,30,65,511
stur-ul Amai-
i Padshahi,
Edinburgh, 224,
ff. lb-llb
11 1702- Dastur-ul- Amai-i 13,26,00,56,26? 6,09,61,92,104
7 Shdhjahani
12 1709 Jagjiwandas, 13.33,99,91,841 6,03,73,74,000
Add. 253,
51a-54a

369
'C' >D' 'E' 'F'
Das % 'A' Area of the Area of the Deccan Das%of 'C'

(a) (b) Empire (a) (b)
S.No. sq. miles
~~ Ī 18.8 20.0 9,79,644 60,336 71011 6.2 ŤT"
2 18.7 9,85,592 64,627 6.6
m
3 18.4 9,85,592 64,627 6.6 co
s e.
4 19.0 9,86,577 67,268 6.6
vi
re
5 20.7 10,10,266 95,998 9.5

al
6 20.4 10,10,266 95,998 9 5

in
.f
w
7 32.1 10,10,266 1,17,681 11.4

w
w
8 47.1 10,28,535 1,17,681 11.4
9 39.4 12,52,367 3,46,459 27.7
10 41.2 12,52,367 3,46,459 27.7
11 46.0 12,52,367 3,46.459 21.1
12 45,3 12,52,367 3,46,459 27.7

370
An important feature that emerges from the statistics is the large

size of the jama' of the Deccan territories, The figures suggest that
right from the beginning the revenue resources of the Deccan were quite
significant. At the beginning of the 17th century when only Berar and
Khandesh were annexed, the jama of the Deccan was over 1 8% of the
jama of the Empire, though the area of the annexed territories was only
6% of the total area of the Empire. After the annexations of 1636, the
Mughal Deccan contributed over a fifth of the total jama of the Empire
(1646-7), while its area was even less than one-tenth of the total area.
But proportionately the increase was smaller than could be justified by
the area gained. W here as the area of the Mughal Deccan increased
m
in comparison with 1601, from 7.45 to 9.50% of the total area of the
co
Empire, ie. a net increase of only 2.05% of the area of the Empire, the
jama of the Deccan increased by 0.65% ot the jama of the Empire, For
e.
this lag in the jama, the great famine of 1630-321® might perhaps have
been partly responsible. The jama of the Deccan remained at about
s
vi
the same levels in 1650 as well. But after the subsequent annexations,
the increase jama' greatly out paced the territorial additions. The jamo
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of the Mughal Deccan ròse from less than 21 % in 1646 and 1656 to
al
over 32% of the Empire in 1667, though the area of Mughal Deccan
increased only from 9.5% to nearly 115% so that while the increase in
in
the area was 2% of the whole Empire the increase in the jama amounted
.f
to 11% of that of the Empire.10 The same trend continued uptill the
w
end of our period. In 1709 the revenues of the Deccan accounted for
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over 45% of the jama; though it comprised only over 27% of the entire
area. Compared to 1667, the Deccan was enlarged by an area equal to
w
16.2% of the Empire, and the jama increased by an amount equal to over
13% of that of the Empire.
The estimation of the jama' of the Deccan thus was from the
beginning quite disproportionately large relative to its area. This
process of inflating the jama had begun under Akbar himself. Abu-1
Fazl says that the tanka of Khandesh was first reckoned at 16 dams but
soon afterwards before the A in was closed, Akbar decreed it equal to
24 dams, 11 implying that the revenue of Khandesh was enhanced by
50^4 at a stroke of the pen. The inflated nature of the jama of the two
Deccan subas (Berar and Khandesh) in the A in Akbari becomes very
obvious if we compare the jama per square mile of map-area of these

371
subas with those of the various provinces of the Empire. The table
below exhibits the jama in thousand dams per square mile.
TABLE - II
Provinces jama per sq. mile-(in

thousand dams)
Lahore 10.3
Multan 2.3
Delhi 9.0
m
Agra 11.8
Awadh 7.6
Allahabad 6.1 co
e.
Bihar 4.0
Bengal & Orissa 4.7
s
Ajmer 2.4
vi
Thatta 2.5
re
Malwa 2.1
Malwa (excluding Garh) 4.6
al
Gujarat 5.6
in
Berar 12.9
.f
Khandesh (at 16 dam

w
Khandesh (at 24 damsļtanka) 38.6

w
Even at the lower rate of conversion (16 dams to the tanka) the jama
w
of Khandesh per square mile was not only the highest but was much
more than double of that of even Agra, where the incidence of jama
was the highest in the whole of Northern India. The ratio for Berar
too exceeded that of every northern province including Agra and was
more than double the jama incidence in Malwa and Gujarat, the two
provinces which adjoined it to the north and west. This artificial 'infla-
tion' seems to have continued throughout the 17th century. As we
have seen, the increase in relative size of the jama of the Mughal Decćan
in one phase radically out-paced the size of the territory gained within
the Peninsula. The out come was that in 1709 the jama in thousand
dams per square mile was 7.6 in the Northern Indian provinces and
over twice that, viz., 16.3 in the Deccan.

372
Such overestimation in the jamď of the Deccan was a fact well

recognised by the Mughal administration. During his second viceroyalty,
Aurangzeb made repeited complaints about the enormons difference
between the estimated and actual income. He says that the realization
{hasil) of the Mughal provinces of the Deccan was Rs. 88 lakhs which
did not amount to even sih-maha ('3-monthly) or even one-fourth of the
jama , which was put at 1,44,90,00,000 dams (equal at 40 dams a rupee
to a nominal sum of Rs. 362.26 lakhs).13 Jagirs in the Deccan were at
best '4-monthly' (chahar maha) and often of much lower yield,14 most
jagirdars held '3-monthly' or jagirs of still lower income.15 This situation
persisted despite a reduction (takhfif) in the jamď that had been granted
m
in the Deccan during the early years of Shahjahan's reign, owing to the
famine of 1630-32.16
co
The reasons for the overestimation of the jama in the Deccan can
e.
be explained by reference to the military problems faced by the Mughals
s
The Mughal possessions south of the Satpura Range were in the nature
vi
of frontier territory, facing a group of hostile or potentially hostile

powers. Thus the position was quite different from the North India
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provinces where maintenance of internal peace was practically all that was
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required of troops stationed in them.17 As a result, the Mughals had to

post a much larger number of mansabdars (in terms of contingent they had
in
to maintain) in the Deccan in relation to the area under their control

.f
than in any other region of the Empire. As Dernier put it, the Deccan
w
was the bread of the soldiers of Hidustan.18 To maintain this army,

w
jagirs had to be found in the Deccan, since assignment of jagirs outside

Deccan to the mansabdars posted there raise other problems. If jagirs
w
were assigned outside the Deccan, management of jagirs at a distance

being more expensive, the size of the contingent had to be reduced from
ťone-thirď to 'one-fourth' of the sawar rank.19 Thus there would then
have to be a reduction in the size of the Mughal army posted in the
Deccan. Moreover, there would be difficulty of providing supplies to
troops serving in the Deccan if the jagirs of their mansabdars were
situated at a distance from their camps. This would raise the expenses
of troopers as well as make them vulnerable to the vagaries of caravan
traffic. Finally, if to avoid this, the troops were garrisoned in jagirs out-
side the Deccan it would be difficult to mobilise them rapidly in case of
need. The last must bave been a very important factor in the eyes of
the Mughal court.

373
If Jagirs were then to be found for the very large number of mansab -
dars posted in the Deccan, the temptation to raise the jama so as to meet,
on paper at least, the total salary demand (talab) of as many mansabdars
as possible would have been irre istible. lhus as we have seen, even
Akbar was compelled to raise the jama of Khandesh by 50% by a single
stroke of the pen.
Conditions for the Mughal nobles and soldiery posted in the Deccan
became even worse owing to the fact that 'Deccani'20 nobles won over
for the Mughal cause in the Deccan had also to be accommodated with
jigirs. The Mughal administration tried to moderate the pres sure of
claims of the Deccani nobles by reducing their pay claims by a fourth
m
when meeting claims on assignment o{ jagirs. This practice was well
co
established by 63421 and continued under Aurangzeb who very clearly
reiterated it in his 11th regnal year.22
e.
Thus there was multiple pressure on the revenues of the Deccan.
s
This inevitably lea to thi iaiensification of tax-realization from the peas-

vi
ants. The assignees in their anxiety to collect whatever proportion of

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their sanctioned salary they could, necessarily neglected the long-term

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interests of agricnlture. It was perhaps owing to this excessive exploita-

tion that agriculture failed to recover even after a lapse of more than
in
fifteen years from the famine of 1630-32; ttie short fall in the revenues
.f
was not made good even by 164723. The fall in cultivation seems to have
w
continued and Aurangzeb found it in a precarious position on his arrival

in 1652-5324. The concern of the Mughal court over this declining agri-
w
culture is evident from the fact that Shahjahan while appointing Aurang-
w
zeb Viceroy of the Deccan for the second time in 1652, gave him special
instructions to strive for improving cultivation and resettling villages25.
For the agricultural decline in the Deccan Aurangzeb himself held
the mismanagement by previous governors to be chiefly responsible, as
well as the prevalence of different forms of assessment and collection
( Zawabit-i Gunagun ) 26. Accordingly Murshid Quii Khan was appointed
diwan with the task of improving conditions. He introduced a particular
form of crop-sharing with a differential scale, depending upon crops and
irrigation27. He carefully fixed a rai (crop/rate) and brought land under
measurement. The introduction of crop sharing, in the beginning, was
naturally expensive28 and was resorted to presumably as a temporary
expedient, designed to help in evolving a reliable rai*9. Taqavi advances

374
( agricultural loans ) were made to peasants to enable them to buy seeds

and cattle30. The Mughal court was so anxious about the situation that
Shahjahan criticised Aurangzeb for not sanctioning 40 to 50 thousand
rupees on his own, as taqavi for construction of irrigation bunds in the
provinces of Khandesh and Berar.31 Nevertheless, the desired results
were not obtained at least in the short run. The revenues of the Deccan,
not even on paper, could suffice to meet all claims assigned to it.32
Aurangzeb sought the grant of extra-Deccan jagirs to those serving in the
Deccan province, as also cash payment from the treasuries of Malwa.33
Shahjahan would not acced to this. On the other hand, the size of
troops tnat the mansabdars were required to maintain in the Deccan was
m
increased by an order simply reducing the sanctioned rate for the troopers
from Rs. 20 to Rs. 15 and 17.34 By this device the mansabdars were
co
called upon to maintain 9,000 more horsemen.35 Aurangzeb protested
that the new rates were too low to maintain a suitable horse, and
e.
complained that the increase in number of the troops would only be
s
theoretical,36 the order had finally to be reversed.37

vi
The critical problem of difference between the paper jama and actual
re
collection thus persisted. Neither the reforms of Murshid Quii Khan, in

al
spite of Aurangzeb's claims of doubling of revenues in certain mahals,

in
nor Shahjahan's manipulation of salary rates fcr cavalry could be of

much help. It was in this situation that any possible scheme of territorial
.f
aggrandizement m the Deccan would look so attractive. Peace had been

w
established in 1636 by a settlement imposing tribute on Golkunda and

w
partioning Ahmadnagar with Bijapur. Yet the Mughals could not

honour it for more than twenty years. Since the Marathas were not yet
w
an independent power or a real menace for the Mughals, it is not possible

to see them as an excuse for the fresh wave of annexations which came
in 1656-7.
By Aurangzeb's campaigns against Golkunda and Bijapur, dealt

with succesively, the territory of Mughal Daccan was enlarged by about
21%, Yet the increase in the jama in 1667 over that of 1556 (before
the annexations) was about 58% (see Table I). This disparity between
the proportional increase in area and the jama' shows that the solution
was only partial, and the pressure on revenue resources continued. This
was all the more so because the annexations involved the Mughals in
expensive compaigns in the 1660s, largely to seize territories and forts

375
that were theirs by the treaty of 1657 made with Bijapur, but which the
latter was unwilling to deliver, or could not be delivered because they
had passed into the hands of the Marathas. Shaista Khan's campaigns
ended in a fiasco at Poona (1663), this was followed by sack of Surat by
Shivaji (1664). The Deccan had thus to be filled with more troops, with
the resultant expedient of inflating the jama , which our jama fiigures for
1667 so clearly brings out. Thus the Mughals were back to square one,
with Mirza Raja Jai Singh trying to recoup the losses by an alliance with
Shivaji against Bijapur.38 These plans, however, did not meet with the
hoped for success; and Aurangzeb lost interest in the Maratha alliance.
This was shown in the episode of Shivaji's arrival at and escape from
m
Agra in 1666. Henceforth the Marathas would act as an independent
co
power; and the Mughal problems in the Deccan would be intensified even
further.
e.
In other words, while the Marathas increased thei r pressure upon
s
the Mughal dominions in the Deccan, the same inducements to the

vi
Mughals to expand their frontiers, which had caused them to make a

re
breach of the 1636 settlement in Ì 656-7, continued to operate.

al
With Aurangzeb reaching the Deccan with large armies in 1682, the
in
compulsion towards aggrandisement increased with the still larger strain

on resources. This then was the essential factor behind the anexations
.f
of Bijapur (1686) and Golkunda (1687) and the subsequent campaigns

w
to take effective possession of their territories. It was not only because

w
these had become the refuge of the Marathas, or because the Sultans of
w
Golkunda and Bijapur were unable to ťtame Shambhuji/ as Sarkar

believed.39 The presence of the Marathas was undoubtedly a factor in
the further expansion into the Deccan; but our argument is that this was
secondary to the economic considerations.
The annexations of Bijapur and Golkunda on paper completed the

conquest of the Deccan. But the advantage gained did not provea
sufficient counterweight to the drain of resources caused by the burden
of continuous campaigns. The jama of the Deccan continued to be
highly inflated. Th t jama' and hasil-i akhir (the revenue of the previous
year) statistics set out in the Zawabit-i-(AlamgiriA0 suggests a hasil-jama
ratio of 67 : 100 for the entire Empire, as against 52 : 100 for the Deccan.
Thus tax realization in the Deccan was still half the jama , although

376
there seems to be some thing nominal and inflated about these

'realisation' figures as well.
There was also the absolute decline in the internal revenues that
have to be considered. Bhimsen's well-known passage brings out the
unending cycle of agrarian depredations, fall in revenues, increase in
revenue pressure, internal disturbances and further agrarian depredations
of which the Maratha sardars were the chief beneficiaries, with the
pe&sant-bargis as their instruments.41
There simultaneously occurred an influx of the Deccani nobles into

Mughal service. According to Athar Ali the number of Deccani holding
m
ranks of 1000 zat or above increased between 1658-78 and 1679-1707
from 58 to 170, i.e. by 290%42 while the jama of the Deccan rose by
co
20.3% (see Table). This increase in the size of the Deccani elements was
thus even disproportionate to the rise in the jama of the Deccan.
e.
This exacerbated what has been called the 4 jagir crisis'43 reflected in
s
the scarcity of lands to be assigned in jagir. it seems difficult to agree

vi
with Richard's criticism44 of the established view for which there is

re
enough support in contemporary accounts. The large size of pai-baqi

(land to be assigned in jagirs) in Hyderabad that Richards discovers45
al
is by no means decisive. Substantial amounts of revenues were needed

in
in the Deccan for the Imperial treasury owing to the prolonged stay of
Aurangzeb and the need to finance his own (khasa) troops and artillery.
.f
These had to be paid out of revenues collected for the Imperial treasury,
w
and for this purpose large areas of the Deccan needed to be kept
w
unassigned, so that their revenues might be collected for the treasury. In

w
this respect revenues from the pai-baqi were practically i.o different from
those of the khalisa being collected by the Imperial administration.
The presence of pai-baqi , therefore, need not imply actual availability
of jagirs that could in fact be assigned.
The crisis of jagirs created discontent among the Mughal nobility

and weakened the very basis of the Empire. The Mughals thus met
with a political failure side by side with their military difficulties.
And yet the Mughal record in the Deccan was not one of unqualified
failure. Indeed Mughal achievements in the Deccan were by no means
negligible. The long survival of the Nizam's power in the Deccan and
the rise of Mysore under Hyder Ali and Tipu bear testimony to the

377
strength of Mughal institutions. It was no small contribution of the

Mughal Empire that most of its political administrative institutions got
firmly transplanted in the Deccan. The two successor states right from
their inception till their end thrived on the institutions that were simply
survivals of, or borrowed bodily from those of the Mughals.4®
The Mughals had an important impact too on the economy of the

Deccan. The Deccan had so far been a separate economic zone,
symbolised by its golû-money as against the silver money of Northern
India. The separatness is shown by distinctly higher interest rates that
prevailed in the Deccan throughout the 17th century : even after the
universal fall in the rates during the 1640's, these continued io be higher
m
than at Agra or Surat.47
co
In all the territories annexed I" y the Mughals, they introduced their
e.
standard coinage, and thus unified the monetary system. With Mughal
conquests, gold coinage was progressively replaced by the silver in the
s
Deccan. By the end of Akbar's reign there were three mints uttering
vi
silver rupees in the Deccan : their number rose to 6 during Jahangir's

re
reign and to eight under Shahjahan. By the end of Aurangzeb's reign

al
silver mints in the Deccan had risen to twenty four, spread all over the
Deccan and southern India.
in
The process of replacement of gold by silver can be seen still better

.f
by the increased output of the Deccan mints as reflected in the surviving

w
coins. The number of surviving rupee coins throughout reflected

w
accurately the expansion of the Mughal system into the Deccan. The
w
data have been compiled from the catalogues of Museum Collections at

Calcutta, Lucknow, Lahore, and Nagpur and in the British Museum,
London.48
TABLE- II
Decades No. of coins from No. of coins from Active min

'Deccan i' mints. North Indian mint, in the Deccan
1596-1605 75 683 2
1606-1615 21 629 5
1616-1625 18 15 1
1626-1635 80 824

378
Decades No. of coins from No. of coins from Active mints

'Deccani' mints North Indian mint, in the Deccan
1636-1645 12 486 4
1646-1655 22 350 5
1656-1665 83 703 6
1666-1675 95 304 6
1676-1685 83 264 10
1686-1695 179 604 15
1696-1705 238 686 18
t'06-170749 54 138 15
m
From the last decade of Ak
in the Deccan mints; under J
co
e.
correspondence to falling Mu
s
yield on'y 21 and 18 coins res

vi
under Shahjahan the survivin

re
is a trough immediately after-

1636 settlement seems to be re
al
belonging to these decades. T

in
ons lead to a constant rise barr

apex is reached by the close
.f
Deccan mints account for a t

w
India.
w
The introduction of silver

w
result in the achievement of

had economic consequence
of the silver influx into Indi
replacement of gold in the
mechanism upon inflation in N
On the effects of interest

information after 1675. It ra
currency also helped to lower
Side by side with the mone

Quii Khan initiated a process
assessement and collection in

379
land-revenue system were visibly present at the opening of the 19th

century when Buchanan made a survey of the lands of southern Mysore
spread between Kaveri Pura Ghat and Coimbetore and then towards
Malabar. The measurement of land was in vogue, the cash nexus was
established, the conventional claim was a third of the produce. Even the
differential rates based on the extent of irrigation were fully established.
In the traditional Mughal way 'lands were divided into three qualities
according to the goodness of their soil." The taqavi were still advanced
and recovered in instalments.51
Munro too in his Royatwari system was influenced by the survivals

of the Mughal-Mpsore system of cash revenue-rates fixed on individual
m
surveyed fields of peasants that he found in Baramahal.52 He also
co
classified the land on a most the same lines as the Mughal administration;
and even his fixation of a third share of the produce had respectable
e.
Mughal antecedents.53
s
vi
re
NOTES & REFERENCE

al
in
1 See, for such a statement, Ishwari Prasad, History of Medieval India ,

1952, p. 23. Lane Poole declares << the Deccan was never intended by n
.f
have any conversion with Hindustan, and" to conquer the Deccan was
w
phrase for risking the loss of Hindustan." ( Aurangzeb , Bombay 143). At

The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb , Bombay 1966, p. 1C2, also em
w
the geographical difficulties. R. P. Tirpathi, however, considers the N

w
South as part of single "well defined unit" ( Rise and Fall of the Mughal
2nd ed. 1978, p. 312.
2 That «Bindhachal' was the Satpura and not the modern Vindhyas as show
A'in-i Akbari, ed. Blochmam Calcutta, ìGó1-!!, p. 476. (Cf Irfan Hábil?
of the Mughal Empire , Delhi, 1982, pp. 24 & 37). The Satpuras are muc
and have sharper slopes on either side than the Vindhyas, which form, in
section, merely the southern wall of the Malwa plateau.
3 Jadunath Sarkar, Studies in Aurangzeb' s Reign , Calcutta 1933, pp. 17-18.
4 J. Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb. ĪV, Calcutta, 1919, p. 5.
5 B. P. Saxena, History of Shahjahan of Delhi, 2nd ed. Allahabao, 1976,
He also mentions the need to find resources .
6 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals' - A Reappraisal, 4 Indian Historical
Vol. IV, no. 2, and Vol. V, nos. 1 & 2.

380
7 Abu-1 Fazl, Akbarama , Vol. III, ed. Beveridge, pp. 780-81.

8 No jama figures or any other details for Ahmadnagar are given i n the Ain- i Akbari.
9 Tuzuk'i Jahsjtgiri , ed. S. Ahmad, Ghazipur & Aligarh, 1863-64, pp. 86-88, 148.
10 Amin Qazwini,. Padshah Nama , Br. Mus. Add. 2073, pp. 442-44. Cf. Irfan
Agrarian System , pp. 102-4.
11 /47/ř, I, p. 474,
12 The calculations are based on the jama' and map-ar^a figures given in the Alias
of the Mughal Empire, pp. Vii & VIII.
13 Ruqaat-i 4 Aiamgiri , ed. Najib Ashraf, Azamgarh, 1930, pp. 121-2. For the
significance of 'month-ratios' see I. Habib, Agrarian System , pp. 26 4-6 & n. and
M. Athar Ali, Mughal Nobility , pp. 46-9.
m
14 Ruqa at, p. 129.
15 Ibid, p. 116.
co
16 'Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshahnama , II ed. Kabiruddin, Calcutta, 1868/ p. 712.
e.
17 Aurangzeb, when Viceroy of the Deccan, wrote to Shahjahan to urge that <ťthe
s
Deccan is a frontier province" and that ««for various reasons it cannot be

vi
compared with Bengal or Gujarat; thus a strong army is required to be aiways

maintained here." ( Ruqa at , pp. 106 & 122).
re
18 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mughal Empire , 1656-68, tr. A. Canstable,

al
London, 1916.
19 Lahori gives the rule that mansābdars posted in the same province where their
in
jagirs were situated were required to maintain troopers ( tabinan ) equal in number
.f
to a third of their sa)var- rank , but if their jagirs lay in other provinces, they were
w
required to bring to the brand a contingent equal to one-fourth of their sawav-

rank (Lahori, ĪI, pp. 505-7). See Mughal Nobility, pp. 54-9.
w
20 The nobles who were previously in the service of Deccan Sultanates were
w
designated "Deccani". See Selected Documents of Aurangzeb1 s Reign, ed. Yusuf

Husain, Hyderabad, 1958, p. 64; cf. Mughal Nobility 26-7.
21 Selected Documents of Shahjahan' s Reign , cd. Y. Hus un Hyderabad, 1950, pp.
1-23, 88.
2¿ Select ed documents of Aurangzeb' s Reign , p. 64. For the actual deductions s e

ibid., pp. 8. 120, 126, IM.
23 Lahori. II, p. 712.
24 Ruqa9 at, pp. 70, 84, 91.
25 Ibid., pp. 69 & 84.
26 Ibid , p. 97. See also Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-ul Lubab , Vol. I, cd. Kabiruddin
Ahmad and Haig, Bib. Ind. Calcutta , 1860, p. 735.
27 Ibid., p. 733.

381
28 Ibid. y p. 1 17.
29 Agrarian System , p. 228.

30 Khafi Khan, I, p. 733n
31 Ruqaat , p. 13!. The plan was that of M ulta fat Khan.
32 Ibid., pp. 106 & 121. Aurangzeb complains that no pai-baqi (land to be assigned
in jagir) was left in the Deccan.
33 Ibid., p. 118.
34 Ibid, p. 116.
35 Incidently, this would suggest that there were supposed to be 27,000 to 51,000
horsemen posted in the Deccan at this time.
36 Ibid., p. 116.
m
37 Ibid., p.
co
38 Jai Singh's letters in Haft Anjuman, analysed by J. N. Sarkar, Military Despatches
of a 17 1 h Century General.
e.
39 History of Aurangzeb , IV, p. 6.
s
40 Zawabit-i Alamgiri , Br. Mus. Add. 6598 flf. I30b-132a. Cf. Agì arian System , p. 4C9.
vi
41 Nuskha-i Dii k u sha, Br. Mus. Or. 23, ff. 138b-140a. Cf. Irfan Habib, Agrariau
re
Systemy p. 346-7.
42 Mughal Nobility , p. 28.

al
43 Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics in the Mughal Court , 1701-40, 1959, pp.
in
XLVII-XLIX; Äther Ali, Mughal Nobility , pp. 92-4.

.f
44 J.F. Richards, Mughal Administration in Golkunda, Oxford, 1975, p. 2i4.

w
45 Ibid., pp. 158, 199-204 see also J. F. Richards, 'Imperial Crisis in the Deccan',
w
Journal of Asian Studies , XXXV, No. 2, 1976, pp. 239 40.

w
46 For the Nizam, see Yusuf Husain, The First Nizam The Life and Times of Nizam
ul Mulk AsafJah I, Bombay, 1963. For Mysore see N. K. Sinha. Halder Ali ,
Calcut a 1941; Mohibbul Hasan, Hisrory of Tipu Sultan % Calcutta 1951»
47 Irfan Habib, «Usuary in Medieval India' Comparative Studies in Society and

Hi story y Vol. VI, no. 4, 1965 pp. 402-4. The General world-wide fal of the 164Cs
is evident from the data collected in Sidney Homer, A History of Interest Rates >
New Bounswik, 1963, pp. 128-39.
48 Nelson Wright, Catalogue of Coins in Indian Museum^ Calcutta, Oxford, 1907.

Shamsuddin Ahmad, Supplement to Volume III of the Catalogue of Coins in Indian
Museum, Calcutta, Delhi, 1939. C. J. Brown, Catalogue of Coins in the provincial
Museum, Lucknow, Oxford, 1920 C. R. Singha, Supplementary Catalogue of the
Mughal Coins in the State Museum, Lucknow, 1965. C. J. Rodgers, Catalogue
of Coins in Government Museum , Lahore > Lahore, V. P» Rode, Catalogue of Coins

382
in the Central Museum , Nagpur, Bombay, 1969. Lane-Poole, ed. by Stuart Poole»
The Coins of the Mughal Emperors of Hindustan in British Museum, London,
1892.
49 Only two years not a full decade.

50 Irfau Habib finds a «Price Revolution in India' ( Agrarian System, pp. 392-9). The
rise in prices during the 17th century is further elaborated by Aziza Hasan, «Silver
Currency output of the Mughal Empire and prices in India during the 16th and
17th centuries', Indian Economic and Social History Review, VI, No. 1, March
1967, p*. 85-116.
51 Francis Buchanan, A Journey From Mad as Through the Countries af Mysore ,

Cañara, and Malabar, London, 1807, pp. 187, 188, 212-13.
52 A report of the «Board of Revenue at Madras' declares "the Royatwari system
m
had its origin in the Baramahal and Salem districts", cited in Ř. C. Dutt, The -
co
Economic History of India Under Early British Rule , London, 1908, p. 147.
53 Fifth Report from the Select Committee On the Affairs of the East India Compaay,
e.
18 »2, facsimile reprint in Irish University Press series of British Parliamentary
Papers, Colonies, East India. 3, pp.
s
vi
re
al
in
.f
w
w
w


THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE DECCAN-Economic Factors and Consequences

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THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE DECCAN-

Economic Factors and Consequences

The Deccan has generally been treated by Modern historians as a

plateaus. But the resistance offered by these physical features was

certainly not insurmountable.

strength to the criticism of the Mughal Deccan policy. It is generally

unmanageable administratively as well as politically, "Aurangzeb* like

Mughal Emperors from Akbar to Aurangzeb follow a policy of expan-

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In considering Mughal expansion, we may begin by asking whether

areas within Ahmadnagar (Ahmadnagar and Bir), which were indeed

lost during 1610-16.® Shahjahan's reign saw two major spurts of

was annexed, though its sourthern parts were ceded to Bijapur. In

Golkunda, and large portions (including Bidar ard Parenda) seized or

claimed from Bijapur. Under Aurangzeb the pressure on the Deccan

These waves of territorial expansion in the Deccan are duly reflected

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shown for 16^5.

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Year Reference Jama of the Empire Jama of the Daccan

~~l 1601 A' in-i

3 1627 Majalis-Salatin 6,30.00,00,000 1,15,67,00,000

4 1628- Bayaz-i-Khus - 8,80,00,00,000 1 82,00,00,000

33 é«i, 1.0.828, ff.

1658 Dastur-ul' Am- 9,12,24,45,84 i 1,85,64,48,000

Add. 7657, ff.

8 1687- Zawabit-i-Ala - 13,80,23,56,000 6,50,1452,140

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'C' >D' 'E' 'F'

Das % 'A' Area of the Area of the Deccan Das%of 'C'

2 18.7 9,85,592 64,627 6.6

5 20.7 10,10,266 95,998 9.5

6 20.4 10,10,266 95,998 9 5

7 32.1 10,10,266 1,17,681 11.4

8 47.1 10,28,535 1,17,681 11.4

9 39.4 12,52,367 3,46,459 27.7

10 41.2 12,52,367 3,46,459 27.7

11 46.0 12,52,367 3,46.459 21.1

12 45,3 12,52,367 3,46,459 27.7

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An important feature that emerges from the statistics is the large

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Provinces jama per sq. mile-(in

Khandesh (at 16 dam

Khandesh (at 24 damsļtanka) 38.6

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Such overestimation in the jamď of the Deccan was a fact well

of frontier territory, facing a group of hostile or potentially hostile

required of troops stationed in them.17 As a result, the Mughals had to

to maintain) in the Deccan in relation to the area under their control

was the bread of the soldiers of Hidustan.18 To maintain this army,

jagirs had to be found in the Deccan, since assignment of jagirs outside

were assigned outside the Deccan, management of jagirs at a distance

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This inevitably lea to thi iaiensification of tax-realization from the peas-

ants. The assignees in their anxiety to collect whatever proportion of

their sanctioned salary they could, necessarily neglected the long-term

interests of agricnlture. It was perhaps owing to this excessive exploita-

continued and Aurangzeb found it in a precarious position on his arrival

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