1. The document discusses the role of gunpowder in the conquests and military tactics of the Mughal Empire under Akbar. It argues that while gunpowder played an important role, it was not the sole or determining factor in the empire's success as postulated by the "gunpowder empires" hypothesis.
2. Other important factors discussed include Akbar's alliance building with Rajput rulers through marriage, his centralization of administration and finances, and his incorporation of different religious and cultural traditions into governance.
3. The sieges of Chitor, Ranthambor and other forts followed standard patterns where heavy guns could not always be used due to difficulties in transportation, and trenches
1. The document discusses the role of gunpowder in the conquests and military tactics of the Mughal Empire under Akbar. It argues that while gunpowder played an important role, it was not the sole or determining factor in the empire's success as postulated by the "gunpowder empires" hypothesis.
2. Other important factors discussed include Akbar's alliance building with Rajput rulers through marriage, his centralization of administration and finances, and his incorporation of different religious and cultural traditions into governance.
3. The sieges of Chitor, Ranthambor and other forts followed standard patterns where heavy guns could not always be used due to difficulties in transportation, and trenches
1. The document discusses the role of gunpowder in the conquests and military tactics of the Mughal Empire under Akbar. It argues that while gunpowder played an important role, it was not the sole or determining factor in the empire's success as postulated by the "gunpowder empires" hypothesis.
2. Other important factors discussed include Akbar's alliance building with Rajput rulers through marriage, his centralization of administration and finances, and his incorporation of different religious and cultural traditions into governance.
3. The sieges of Chitor, Ranthambor and other forts followed standard patterns where heavy guns could not always be used due to difficulties in transportation, and trenches
ROLL NO – 22 Q. Gunpowder was the key which unlocked the doors of Akbar’s conquests. Elaborate. The creation of the Mughal Empire was more than a political transition. The achievements of Babur and his successors and even those of their enemies irrevocably changed the nature of warfare in South Asia. A new style of combat built around gunpowder, infantry and combined arms tactics replaced an old order based on the warhorse and elephant. This process changed not only how Indian armies fought on the battlefield but how they were assembled, deployed, supported and financed. As these armies evolved they posed unique challenges to the states that maintained them and required the creation of new civilian institutions political, administrative and economic. The transformation reached its culmination in the 17th century, when the Mughal Empire emerged as what was arguably the world’s most powerful state—guarding borders from Central Asia to the southern tip of India, keeping more than a million soldiers under arms and controlling nearly a quarter of the world’s economic output. What had started as a ragtag band of fallen nobles and soldiers of fortune armed with a few newfangled weapons and clever tactics had become the “Moguls” of myth and legend, regarded with awe and fascination by their Western contemporaries and enshrined in their languages as the very embodiment of wealth and success. Under the first three Timurid rulers of India, gunpowder artillery had certainly emerged as an important equipage of war, contributing significandy to the establishment of a highly centralized state structure under Akbar and to the consolidation of Mughal rule in the conquered territories. During the reign of Akbar, gunpowder played a very important and key role in the siege of grand forts. The gunpowder empires hypothesis by McNeill and Hodgson which basically states that the success of the Mughal empire was determined by the use of gunpowder right from Babur’s times. P.K. Gode has mentioned that in the second half of the 15th century cannon and musket were being used in Gujarat, Malwa and Kashmir but the most effective military strategy was adopted by Akbar. There is no denying the fact that Akbar was a great general and an excellent administrator. However Gode’s works are influenced by the English translations or on the information reproduced in secondary works which leaves a significant part of the original Persian chronicles unnoticed. The conquests of the Chitor, Ranthambor and Kalinjar from 1568 to 1569 played a huge role in furthering the establishment of the Mughal Empire under Akbar. Chitor, the capital of Mewar, was a fortified city and not a proper citadel and hence it was difficult to conquer a well-structured fortress like Chitor. Udai Singh was the ruler of Chitor and he had acquired the knowledge that Akbar was short of siege equipment, hence he prepared Chitor for a siege instead. Akbar set up a camp outside Chitor on 20 October, 1567 with the help of Asaf Khan Harawi who was the jagirdar of Bayana, the nearest Mughal territory to Chitor. The initial attacks from the Mughal forces did not bear any fruit and in turn suffered heavy losses from the archers and musketeers on the walls. Eventually two mines and a sabator trench were excavated along with the casting of a twenty five pounder gun in the camp. Rajah Tudar Mal and Khan Mir –i Bahr were the supervisors for the excavation of the sabat. The charges under the wall were exploded and that made a large breach in the walls of the fort. The death of Jaymal Singh brought down the spirits of the Rajput army as he was the officer in charge of Chitor. Akbar ordered a massacre the next day for which three hundred elephants were used. Abu al- Fazl’s reports state that eight thousand members of the garrison died, nearly thirty thousand peasants were imprisoned or executed and only a few Rajput musketeers could escape. The siege of Ranthambor in 1568 (976) followed a nearly similar pattern of conquest to Chitor. The construction of sabatallowed the Mughal forces to carry fifteen heavy guns to the hill top. The guns were called zarbzanand fired balls weighing three hundred pounds and this in turn made it fairly easy for the Mughal army to breach the walls and damage the buildings. Massacre was avoided through the treaty between Surjan and Akbar. Kalinjar was ruled by Rajah Ram Chand, who was also the ruler of the principality of Bhath or Pannah. As soon as Ram Chand came to know about the fall of Chitor and Ranthambor, he decided to submit and sent pishkash to Akbar. Streusand mentions that the three sieges do not support the gunpowder hypothesis given by McNeill and Hodgson. It was moreover difficult to maintain sieges as carrying heavy guns overland became a problem. The military system supplanted the existing elephant based system. J.F. Richards has mentioned that Akbar spent a large part of his resources on the construction of fortresses at Agra, Allahabad, Lahore and Ajmer. Akbar, for establishing his personal and dynastic supremacy, ordered the construction of FatehpurSikri. It becomes important to understand the significance of Mughal forts as bulwarks against revolt. The evidences for this can be traced down from the incidents of Sultan Khusraw’s revolt against Jahangir in 1606 and this was the time when Dilavar Khan the governor- designate of Lahore prepared the city for defence against Dilavar Khan. The gunpowder hypothesis needs to be revised as this and other incidents where the artillery or the infantry armed with firearms did not play an important role. Moreover the ability to breach walls alone does not fully support the gunpowder hypothesis as mentioned by McNeill and Hodgson. Firearms contributed to centralization, a very significant characteristic of the gunpowder empires. It is, therefore, understandable that the appearance of gunpowder artillery synchronized with a distinct phase of internal consolidation leading to a limited territorial expansion in the case of more prosperous regional kingdoms of fifteenth century. Internal consolidation was always marked by the strengthening of king's control over the nobles and, more importantly, by the suppression of the local chiefs some of whom hitherto enjoyed autonomous status on account of their large caste or tribal following and forts held by them in peripheral zones. This is evident from the history of Gujarat and Bahmani Empire under Mahmud Begarha (1459-1511)9 and Muhammad Shah (1463-82) respectively. The significance of the gunpowder, artillery and other militarily aspects are insufficient in covering all of the aspects of the Mughal empire. Almost all of the Islamic polities suffered from inadequate measures to ensure a proper centralized empire as the monetary systems, rudimentary level of banking systems and the inefficiency of the systems to ensure the distribution of salaries did not make way for the smooth functioning of the political and administrative systems. J.F. Richards also mentions that the Mughal polity was held together by a political economy that was constantly fed by flows of honours and gifts. The military labour market of the agrarian society north India witnessed the origin of two concepts- namak which was the marketable pay of the soldier and naukarithe honourable service in the warband. D.H.A. Kolff has mentioned that since the zamindars or the peasants were always under the risk of experiencing some sort of violence, armed gangs were very common in the countryside. He also has given examples of the agriculturalists of Baroda, where the men had to serve in the army as during the dry seasons of the year they had no work. The troops who were getting paid from provincial land revenue greatly outnumbered those paid directly from the central treasury. The troops who participated in successful campaigns, usually got promotion and jagirs were given. In order to maintain a standard order in provinces, the Mughal provincial army had to function as contingents.The Mughal army had to confront a series of private zamindars or peasant armies. Two officials were involved in the tax paying or in the land revenue system at a local or parganah level, i.e., a Qanungu who kept records of the cultivated area, crop production and revenue demand and the other one was a chawdhri who was usually the leading zamindar and he paid directly to the imperial recipient. The Mughals usually received 90 per cent of the land revenue because the imperial representative or the collector was more powerful and had no risk of action taking against him by the ruler. Akbar’s expansion policy also played a major role in defining his success as a ruler. D.H.A. Kolff has described marriage alliances to be the chief factor in establishing the political relationships with the Rajputas. The second phase of expansion began with the absorption of the Rajput states and the annexation of the Muslim kingdoms, Malwa, Gujarat and others. The Mughals absorbed the principality of Pannah (1561), the Gakkhar country, the hills between the Indus and the Beas in the Punjab and part of Marwar (1563-4). With the exception of Mewar and Orissa, the Mughals were able to rule the major part of the country. Akbar’s relationships with the kings of different principalities like Amber, Jodhpur, Gujarat, Bikaner and Jaisalmer reflects that Akbar was a great ruler. As we have seen that the gunpowder hypothesis provided by McNeill and Hodgson can only fit in the Mughal Empire’s framework when seen with other aspects of the empire as well. The sieges also followed a standard pattern where the guns usually couldn’t be used as it was difficult to drag guns overland and instead of them the sabat played an important role. The Mughal empire and more specifically Akbar had the ability to incorporate several elements from different religions and culture into his governance. Akbar’s policy of sulh –i- kul, peace for all, clearly indicates the respect he had for different sects of the society. J.F. Richards has mentioned that by 1583 Akbar had rejected public prayer and other features of the orthodox Islamic practices too. He has also laid emphasis on the fact that Akbar had a great ability to maintain and establish relationships with rulers of different principalities through the carrot and stick method combined. D.H.A. Kolff has stated that the group of military settlers acquired a position in the agricultural arena and according to Abu’lFazal this group of men constituted a major part of the military from North India. The expansion of was not only defined by the use of gunpowder, artillery and war, other significant elements like negotiations and treaties between the Mughal rulers and other rulers as mentioned by Douglas Streusand also should be given due weightage. 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