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27 September 2011
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1 Aim 2
2 Application 2
3 Definitions 4
4 Reason for Inclusion 11
5 Requirements 11
6 Plant and Equipment Requirements 12
7 System and procedural requirements 23
8 People requirements 33
Appendix A: Referenced documents 36
Appendix B: Record of Amendments 36
Appendix C: Petroleum Process Isolation Selection 37
Appendix D: WMC Isolation Selection Tool 42
Appendix E: Worsley Alumina Isolation Selection Point Tool 46
Appendix F: Objective and Purpose of a Permit to Work System 47
Appendix G: Sample of Expected Role Definition Detail 49
Appendix H: Temporary Equipment to Assist With Locking Electrical Equipment 51
Appendix I: Temporary Equipment to Assist With Locking Valves 54
Appendix J: Temporary Equipment to Assist With Attaching Locks 56
Appendix K: Lock Box 57
Appendix L: Isolation Locks 60
Appendix M: Isolation Points Labelling Examples 61
Appendix N: Sample of Incorrect Locking Mechanism 63
1 AIM
To ensure that all machinery and equipment is isolated, locked out and made safe (all
energy released) prior to any access, work or repair being carried out, in order to protect
the health and safety of persons.
This guideline refers to the implementation of the Anglo Fatal Risk Standard 6: Isolation and
should be read in conjunction with that Standard.
The guidelines contained in this document are considered as "highly recommended" and
deviations are to be documented and justified. Full adherence to these guidelines will not be a
factor in determining compliance with the Standards, since alternative methods can be
available if justified on a risk basis.
In case of conflict with requirements of any other Anglo document or guideline, the following
hierarchy will apply:
2 APPLICATION
This Standard is applicable, but not limited to all sources of energy including potential
kinetic, elastic, chemical, electrical, mechanical, thermal (e.g. hot liquids, solids, gases),
nuclear, static, rotational, out of balance, light and gravitational. Energy associated with
processes such as materials handling, transport, pressure, vacuum, hydraulic, pneumatic
and chemical processes, are also included. Moving and stationary machinery is included.
This Standard stipulates the minimum requirements to which the isolation, lock-out and
making safe procedures must comply.
This Standard applies to all Anglo American Group managed businesses and operations,
including contractors and visitors when involved in controlled activities.
In this document the text in a box is the replica of the Isolation Standard requirement.
This guideline has been developed to provide more detail and clarification for the
implementation of the requirements of the Standard. This should enable sites to be more
aligned with each other on what the boundaries are with regards to meeting the requirements.
This guideline is by no means exhaustive and will be updated periodically and supported by
good practice sharing. It is not intended as a template for achieving compliance.
Chemical
Thermal
Pressure / Volume
Gravitational
Kinetic
Electrical
Electromagnetic
Radiation
Nuclear
Potential
Elastic
Mechanical
Static
Rotational
Out of balance
Light
Isolation related significant incidents occur within various work groups and types of work. A
significant proportion of our potential fatalities have included steps where sources of energy
were not isolated adequately. The causes and contributing factors to these incidents have
been, but not limited to:
3 DEFINITIONS
Controlled : Controlled activities/ sites are those where Anglo American will set
activity policies and control standards and directly supervise and enforce their
application
Critical : Critical Equipment is a piece of equipment or a structure whose failure,
Equipment or not performing to design specification, has the potential to result in a
Major Accident Event.
Critical : A Critical Equipment Register is a register that provides a concise
Equipment summary of all Critical Equipment that includes its design function
Register (including operating limits), a unique identification, required
performance standards (e.g.: minimum reliability) and maintenance
requirements.
Critical System : A Critical System is a system (hardware or software, including human
behaviour) whose operation outside expected performance has the
potential to result in a Major Accident Event.
Some Critical Systems associated with the Permit to Work System
include: Firewater System, Fire and Gas Monitoring Systems,
Emergency Shutdown System and Protective Devices. Any work
associated with these devices shall require the issue of a PTW.
De-energise : Means to remove effectively all possible sources of energy from the
item, system, process, area or equipment in question.
Designated : Specific points of isolation shall be clearly labelled at all times to identify
Isolation Point the circuit or system which they have direct control of the labels shall be
applied following a process of pre-isolation identification using isolation
lists, schematic (P&ID), drawings, etc. Labels should be physically
verified before isolation.
Earthed : Means connected to the general mass of earth in such a manner that
will ensure at all times an immediate discharge of electrical energy
without danger.
Emergency : An emergency is an abnormal occurrence that can pose a threat to the
safety or health of employees, customers, local communities, or which
can cause damage to assets or the environment.
Fatal Risk : The Fatal Risk Standard is a document which outlines requirements
Standards that are mandatory to all Anglo businesses and operations and
contractors and visitors when involved in controlled activities. The
Standards address specific fatal risk areas (e.g. hazardous materials
management, molten materials management, surface mobile
equipment, isolation, etc.).
Group Isolation : Group isolations are achieved when there is a single common isolation
point that isolates more than one unit of equipment.
High Voltage : All voltage level designations to be in line with local standards and
legislations.
Isolation : Isolation Officer‟s Locks should be uniformly coloured and only used to
Officer‟s Lock secure Lock Boxes. Locks should be keyed alike for each specific area
of the operation. The keys to these locks should be strictly controlled
and only issued to specific area authorised Isolation Officers.
Job Safety : A Job Safety Analysis (JSA), sometimes known as a Job Hazard
Analysis (JSA) Analysis (JHA) is a procedure completed by the people actually
or Job Hazard conducting the work and helps integrate safety and health principles
Analysis (JHA) and practices into a specific scope of work. In a JSA/JHA, each basic
step of the job is examined to identify potential hazards and to
determine the safest way to do the job.
There are four basic stages in developing a JSA/JHA. These are:
selecting the job to be analysed
breaking the job down into a sequence of steps
identifying potential hazards
determining preventive measures to overcome these hazards
Lock Box : The Lock Box is a purpose designed box which has the dual function of
providing a link between multiple isolations and the PTW documentation
whilst securing the System Lock(s) key. Following isolations, all System
Lock key(s) used at Designated Isolation Points are placed in the Lock
Box.
The Lock Box is locked with an Isolation Officer‟s Lock, and fitted with
an Isolation Tag prior to Permit Users attaching their Personal Danger
Tags and locks.
The System Lock(s) key shall not be physically able to be removed
unless all Personal Locks and the Isolation Officer‟s Lock are removed.
Lockout boxes are nominally for the sole purpose of controlling multiple
locking points and/or controlling large numbers (typically >5) of
personnel.
The key to the Isolation Officer‟s Lock shall remain under control of
Isolation Officer at all times.
The Isolation Officer shall not remove the Isolation Tag and Isolation
Officer Lock from the Lock Box until the PTW has been handed back
and signed off by the Permit Holder and all Personal Danger Tags and
locks have been removed from the Lock Box.
Lock out : means to put a personal lock or appropriate device on to equipment in
such a way that it would be impossible to connect, switch on or start,
utilise or energise the equipment without removing the lock or device.
Long Term : A long-term isolation is isolation in place for more than one shift period.
Isolations
Low Voltage : All voltage level designations to be in line with local standards and
legislations.
Major Accident : A Major Accident Event is any incident with the potential to lead to any
Event of the following:
a fatality
serious environmental effect, including impairment of ecosystem
function
ongoing significant social issues
Significant adverse national media, non-government organisation
(NGO) attention, or loss of license to operate.
Make safe : Means to remove any threat or potential threat to health and safety
posed by the source of energy, equipment, any equipment in the
vicinity, any other substance or charge in the immediate area. This
includes, but is not limited to, barricading, clamping, chocking,
constraining, deflating, earthing, neutralising, purging and ventilating.
Medium Voltage : All voltage level designations to be in line with local standards and
legislations.
Multiple : Multiple isolation is a single isolation point that is locked and/or tagged
Isolation by more than one person.
Non Routine : Non Routine Work is any activity that is outside the regular activities of
Work the operation or site. Non
Routine Work is not normally covered by a management system
procedure, work Instruction or checklist.
Non Routine Work activities include, but are not limited to:
tasks that involve personnel who have not been deemed
competent using a Competency Based Training,
high risk tasks
involve multiple work teams and disciplines
Isolation of energy sources for Intrusive Work
Isolation of multiple energy sources
Working in a Confined Space
Working at Heights
Hot Work
Working with Radiation Sources
Excavation and Ground/Surface Penetration
High Voltage work
Removal of flooring or safety barriers
Installation, removal or modification of software overrides
Installation, removal or modification of hardware overrides
Inhibition of critical equipment or critical systems.
Operator : Means the person in charge of the operation of some specific
equipment or machinery.
Permit to Work : The Permit to Work Register provides an overview of the state of
Register Permits and associated documents at any time. The permit issuer shall
register all permits and associated forms (Isolations, Certificates etc.)
into the Logbook once active.
Permit-to-Work : Means a form of written declaration signed and given by the person
(PTW) legally responsible for the Plant to the person in charge of work to be
carried out on machinery or equipment that has been isolated, locked
out and made safe.
Personal : A Personal Danger Tag is a tag that is personally applied by the
Danger Tag individual prior to commencing work, on the isolated plant or equipment
(Also known as or Lock Box. The tag is secured using a Personal Lock. A personal
Isolation Tag) danger tag is a tag applied to an isolation point by the person who is
responsible that the isolation requirements for the task have been met
and is a tag that when applied prohibits all use, operation or start-up of
plant and/or equipment.
The individual who placed the Personal Danger Tag on the isolated
piece of plant or equipment or Lock Box is the only person who can
remove the tag. When completing the tag, the minimum information
should include the person‟s name, and contact number.
Personal Danger Tags are highly visible, red in colour and clearly
identified with the word Danger. An Isolation tag is a tag that is applied
to an isolation point by the person who is responsible for ensuring that
isolation requirements for the task have been met. The best practice is
for the Isolation Tag to be secured to the Designated Isolation Point
using the System Lock.
Once a tag is applied, all use, operation or start up of plant/equipment is
prohibited. Tags should be highly visible to prevent the inadvertent
operation of plant
Personal : A Personnel Locking Device is a lock provided to an individual for the
Locking Device purpose of their own protection. Personal locks and danger tags are
applied to Designated Isolation Points when Isolation is achieved. The
personal lock is individually keyed and can only be used or removed by
the key holder.
Responsible : is the manager/engineer in charge of the Operations as per legal
supervisor definitions or internal regulations.
Routine Work : Routine Work is work that does not require a PTW and is covered by a
procedure, Work Instruction or checklist. People are qualified and
deemed competent to perform the work safely.
Routine Work involves activities that:
are conducted with a medium to high level of frequency (e.g. < 3
months),
are low risk,
involve the isolation of one energy source only and
is completed by an individual or a work team.
Short Term : A short-term isolation is isolation in place for one shift period or less.
Isolations
A significant proportion of our potential fatalities have included cases where sources of
energy were not isolated adequately. The causes of and factors contributing to these
incidents have been:
Failure to identify or recognise a source of potential or stored energy;
Inadequate training or lack of competence;
Inadequate lock-out/tag-out systems;
Complacency;
Working on, or isolation of, the wrong equipment;
Inadequate design/maintenance of isolators.
5 REQUIREMENTS
In this Isolation Guideline each requirement of the Isolation standard is repeated in a box,
followed by a statement of intent. This is followed by discussion and clarification of that
particular requirement.
Detail has been added to some, but not all requirements, as some sections were deemed self
explanatory.
This document does not represent a stand alone system but a list of requirements required to
be included within several safe work systems at operations. It has been developed to provide
enhanced understanding of the intent of each requirement within the isolation standard.
Also included within the General Comments sections is advice on what is expected to meet
compliance with these requirements. Of particular value are the examples obtained from
operations who have demonstrated good practice.
It is intended that guideline will be a „live‟ document and as people tender good examples of
equipment or practices these will be added to the guideline. Supporting the document
continuous improvement cycle are the opportunities that arise from reviews of significant
incidents and work conducted by the Mining and Technology Engineering Standards
Governance Custodian
This guideline is also supported by the Permit to Work Guideline and permit to work systems
are referenced throughout this document in Appendix F.
Any recommendations for improvement should be directed to the Mining and Technology
Engineering Standards Governance Custodian.
Intent
The intent of this requirement is for operations to have a system in place to ensure that
equipment entering or being constructed on a permanent and temporary basis is
suitable for isolation.
General Comments
Without formal systems in place to manage this requirement it will not be managed
effectively or efficiently and will not be sustainable in the long term.
The system should ensure that equipment requirements are assessed prior to orders
being placed and all incoming equipment is inspected to ensure it meets compliance
before being allowed to enter the site.
The system must interact with other systems and across departments on site such as,
but not limited to; security, purchasing, project and contracts management and the
contractor management systems.
It was found that some locking mechanisms of electrical breakers are not suitable for
hinged doors, as they do not capture the breaker shaft in the padlocked position. Such
mechanisms can be used only on enclosure lids which are permanently screwed on.
Appendix N.
Some handles with provision for a padlocking the breaker in the OFF position, which
capture the breaker extension shaft are sensitive to the lock shaft diameter and do not
work correctly with smaller lock diameters. In this case it is possible to use a locking
hasp, however this must be stipulated clearly in the Isolation Procedure. Appendix N.
Isolation shall provide positive protection against harm and shall be achieved by the
use of locking devices or the establishment of a physical barrier or separation.
Intent
“Locking device” - Without getting into a discussion over the definition i.e. what is a
“locking device?” the intent of this direction is to provide security of the isolation point to
prevent inadvertent de-isolation. To de-isolate requires a conscious and deliberate act.
The acceptable method of locking an isolation point is a padlock that requires a key to
operate.
Temporary fitted devices to allow the attachment of a lock are available and examples
are included in Appendix J.
General Comments
Acceptable risk
The level of acceptable risk should be determined through the Anglo risk assessment
process that is designed to ascertain the suitability of an isolation plan‟s design or the
equipment used. This assessment should be based on a calculation of the potential
consequences, exposure and probability of the release of the energy source.
Example (1) - the type of isolation for working within a tank that normally contains
hydrocarbons (confined space) would typically be different to the type of isolation
required for work on a potable water line out in the open.
Example (2) – the type of spade used in a high pressure steam would be different to the
type used in a concentrated acid line.
The better option is to have isolation devices that do not require further equipment to
attach a lock. In many cases extra equipment that enables the attachment of a lock to
secure the point of isolation is required. Examples of equipment to lockout valves and
electrical breakers are included in:
Appendix H
Appendix I, and
Appendix J
Electrical breakers with lockout capability fitted retrospectively
Valves with lock open or close capability available ‘off the shelf’
Areas of contention
There are situations where operations have particular equipment and processes which
make it difficult to achieve compliance with this requirement. Some of these situations
identified are discussed below.
„Securing (locking) of slip plates or blind flanges‟ – when isolating piping, where the use
of valves is not acceptable or not practicable, operations are installing flanges, spades
or blinds to achieve protection. Some operations secure these devices through the use
of chains, locks and tags. This approach is less about the security of the „isolation point‟
and more about providing an „interlocking process‟ within the isolation system i.e. the
key for the isolation lock can be placed within a lock box which is locked closed by
personal locks belonging to members of a work team.
The placement of locks on flanges spades or blinds although potentially possible is, for
the most part difficult or impracticable, as this equipment is not designed to be secured
in this manner e.g. how would we lock every bolt on a blind? Every bolt removal has
potential to release pressure or contents.
The purpose of the lock used for isolation is to provide a mechanism that prevents the
inadvertent removal of the isolation or change of its status. To remove isolation locks
takes deliberate action. Lock removal is completed by an authorized person who has
access to the lock‟s key and takes the necessary steps as dictated by the system
before de-isolating.
As blinds or spades are used for process control type activities, they could be
considered part of the containment envelope of the process system just as a blank that
has been located at the end of process pipe work for extended periods. To break
containment requires (should) a permit to work and in itself is a stand-alone job which
requires isolation and risk management tools to achieve in a safe manner. To break
containment takes a deliberate and focused conscious action. As this is the case then
securing the spade or blind is, for all intention purposes, not considered an isolation
point with respect to the original work.
The process piping that is blanked or blinded for an „isolation‟ is for all intention
purposes the same as the other neighbouring piping, which may have blanks or blinds
inserted for „non isolation‟ purposes. The likelihood of removal of these devices
inadvertently, is extremely low and the relationship between the installation and removal
can be adequately managed through the permit system.
Based upon the points raised above, if an operation uses flanges, spades or blinds to
achieve “positive protection” and they decide not to treat them as designated isolation
points i.e. „lock them out‟, then to achieve compliance they must have in place:
Isolation of equipment using a control circuit to open breakers and „secure‟ the isolation
At some operations people working on underground conveyors and long wall equipment
are relying on the use of an „isolation switch‟ which uses a control circuit to activate the
main electrical breaker remotely. This achieves isolation of the „primary energy source‟.
Once the breaker is open the control circuit switch is locked out. There is typically a
layered protection approach to this system with redundancies built in to allow for
potential failures in the control circuit and associated equipment.
This approach does not strictly meet the intent of this requirement as the primary energy
source is not secured at the point of interruption. “All separations or physical barriers
shall be provided with either a permanent or temporarily fitted locking device”.
There are other considerations though on the effectiveness of the chosen method as
there are typically controls in place to maintain or improve the integrity of the system.
For example at one of the operations other controls are in place, these are:
Conduct a risk assessment and analysis of the isolation requirements for all
activities to do with the conveyors and long wall equipment. The standard risk
assessment process would not be a suitable tool for this application.
Challenge every situation identified that cannot be isolated to provide “positive
protection”.
Determine that the risk identified is tolerable.
Apply for an exemption
3. Personal Locking Devices
Intent
The intent is to have personal locks that require a key to open and only one key to be
available for each lock. The lock specifications should be such that the manufacture
never produces locks with the same key and the blanks for key locks are available only
from the manufacturer, to prevent unauthorised duplication of a key.
No master key should be available for personal locks. The personal lock key must be in
the possession of the individual the corresponding lock is protecting.
If an owner of the lock is not present and unable to be contacted during de-isolation
process, the lock can be broken and destroyed, provided that a written permit to do so
is issued by a responsible supervisor, in accordance with an approved procedure.
General Comments
The lock intended for Isolation lock out is a specific lock and shall not be confused with
other locks, such as access control and process locks.
Isolation lock issued to a person must be registered to his/her‟s name and the lock
number must be recorded. The issue of a lock must be done by the person‟s supervisor.
Self issue of Isolation locks is not permitted.
Some operations are purchasing locks with multiple keys then rely on individuals or
their supply department to dispose of the „extra‟ keys. This is not good practice and
examples of this approach failing are often found.
The better approach is to purchase purpose made isolation locks and provide the
supplier with the site‟s requirements to prevent personal locks from arriving on site with
more than one key. The typical colour for personal locks is red.
Lock Boxes
In some situations where the use of multiple locks attached to an isolation point
becomes difficult to manage or when there are multiple isolation points required for a
particular task, then a lock box arrangement is recommended.
A typical decision trigger for using a lock box is when a single, standard, isolation lock
hasp (6 holes) is not large enough for everyone to „lock on‟.
Another trigger in use is when isolation requires more than 3 personal locks to
complete; a lock box arrangement is used. The „three lock rule‟ allows for „simple‟ or low
complexity isolations to be undertaken by individuals e.g. for a pump – two valves and
the electrical motor breaker.
Further examples of lock boxes that have been designed and developed to suit the
operation are included in Appendix K.
Designated isolation points shall be labelled clearly to identify the circuit or system being
isolated or locked out. These labels shall be applied following a process of pre-isolation
identification using the lock-out procedure.
Intent
The intent of this requirement is that equipment used for isolation is labelled with
information that enables people isolating to easily identify it and the system or energy
source it isolates.
The labels must be applied after a review of the plant and equipment to identify what
points are required to isolate the energies present.
Process and instrument drawings (P&IDs) and wiring diagrams must be up to date
before labelling the isolation points.
Where such diagrams or P&IDs are not available a specific procedure based on a Risk
Assessment shall be drawn and isolation points labels then identified in line with such
procedure.
When people are isolating they must identify the isolation point using the label prior to
operating the isolation device.
General Comments
The better practice for labelling is to use easily recognisable permanent labels at the
“designated isolation points”. It should be clearly evident as people travel around
equipment where the isolation points are.
Most operations struggle with the enormity of this task. In many cases, the P&IDs need
to be updated in order to have accurate detail to include on the label.
The detail on the label should be able to provide people with enough information to
determine what equipment the isolation point relates to, the corresponding P&ID or
electrical drawing information (if applicable) and the related energy source.
It is recommended that valve labelling be attached beside the associated valve rather
onto the valve as the valve may be removed for service and re-located to another
location.
All designated isolation points fitted with personal locking devices shall be tagged.
The isolation tagging system shall ensure that:
isolation points are identified positively, including the name of the person
locking out
the reason for the isolation is identified clearly
Isolation tags are highly visible to prevent inadvertent operation.
Intent
The personal Danger Tag (Isolation Tag) shall be secured to the personal isolation lock.
A „danger tag‟ should be in place where ever a personal lock is used i.e. isolation point
or lock box.
Personal danger tags shall be highly visible and contain the following minimum
information:
isolation points for the duration of the isolation and contain all of the required
information.
General Comments
The first lock and tag onto the isolation point should be the person isolating and they
should also be the last lock and tag off unless ownership is formally transferred to
another person. In this case this person should be the last „off‟ and so forth.
In case of a lock box the danger tag of the person/persons performing the isolation is
sufficient.
Another method to satisfy the intent of this requirement is to include at the isolation
point, or lock box, a tag (isolation tag) with most of the generic information required. The
personal locks, as they are added, should have permanently applied the people‟s name,
company and role (sometimes a photo). In this case all the requirements of the protocol
are met provided the lock is easily recognizable as a personal isolation lock. An
example of this type of personal lock is included within requirement # 3 of this guideline.
Using string to hold tags onto locks is not acceptable practice. The tag should be
secured to the lock by the shank of the lock using an eye or hole installed in the tag
during manufacture.
An isolation, lock-out and making safe procedure shall be in place to ensure correct
isolation and that all equipment is made safe prior to gaining access or commencing
any operation, cleaning, maintenance or repair work requiring access to parts of a
machine or removal of a guard or interlock. The procedures shall define clearly the
responsibilities of all parties involved.
Intent
All sites shall have a documented isolation, lockout and tag out procedure and include
definitions of appropriate treatment for routine isolations, non-routine isolations, group,
master and/or multiple isolations, short-term isolations and long-term isolations
(“mothballing” procedures are only required prior to such activity).
The isolation system shall contain direction on how isolations are managed for all work
activities. The isolation system shall be applied to all activities on site, including
contractor activities (e.g. construction, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and
return to service, emergency, modification or demolition of equipment).
General Comments
Specific isolation procedures should be available where the isolation task is considered
high risk. Similarly if the energy sources potential and/or the equipment/system
complexity are considered to pose significant risk to the incoming work teams.
The equipment section of the isolation standard is often not effectively implemented
with respect to contractor and hire equipment. The resources required to maintain a
system that rigorously assesses and monitors the equipment entering site is often not
available at operations. For those sites with security controlled entry points the task is
easier as the gatehouse personnel can assist by becoming the „gatekeepers‟ of the
system that check to determine whether equipment has been approved to enter site.
Having single point accountability for contractors at operations will assist the site in
implementing an effective assessment and monitoring system.
Many of the isolation related significant incidents (~ 20%) that have occurred have been
during the construction phrase of an operation. Often the knowledge of contractor
employees on the project‟s isolation systems is lacking. Training, supervision and
auditing are key to ensuring the systems chosen are used effectively. It is difficult to
introduce new people to the many systems in place at construction sites and ensure
they have a thorough knowledge of the isolation system. Construction workers are often
exposed to many types of systems as they move from one job to the next.
Intent
The intent of this procedure is to formalize the process steps to; safely isolate / de-
isolate plant and equipment; transfer ownership of plant / equipment between the
normal plant „owner‟ and maintenance personnel and/or other work groups. This
process shall be included within the operation‟s isolation system documentation.
There will be degrees of formality in the record keeping side of this process. It is
acknowledged there will be situations where this requirement may not strictly apply e.g.
mobile equipment isolation, process operator „own‟ isolation, etc. See the “Situations
where formal recording of this requirement may not apply” section below.
General Comments
A typical permit to work system manages these requirements and provides other
benefits such as defining the scope for people who receive „ownership‟ of equipment.
An overview of the objective and purpose of a permit to work system is available in
Attachment E - Objective and Purpose of a Permit to Work System.
The lack of, or, failure to have effective permit to work systems has been identified as a
root causes in many significant catastrophes. Failures such as people working on or
isolating the wrong equipment can be avoided using a permit to work system.
For work considered to be „routine‟, low risk and not of a complex nature, other systems
could be used to manage these requirements. See Definitions for further explanation on
the definition of „routine‟ and „non-routine‟.
Many operations are not recording the handover and hand back steps. This is typically
in situations where there is reliance on a tagging system alone and no other formal
system documentation is used i.e. no permits.
A good example of this practice is the typical mobile equipment isolation where a lock
and tag are the only formal visible declaration of „ownership‟ of the equipment. The
transfer of ownership from the driver to the maintenance personnel is often not formal or
does not occur „face to face‟.
The use of this type of system needs careful monitoring to ensure it remains formal and
is not used for situations where a permit to work system is more appropriate.
During normal operation of equipment where power is present and isolation forms part
of the operating procedure a separate isolation procedure is not required.
8. Risk Assessment
The lock-out procedure shall begin with a risk assessment to ensure that work is
undertaken safely.
Intent
The intent of this requirement is for operations to have formally assessed how they
have decided to complete isolations for general and specific situations. The chosen
isolation methods must result from following a formalized risk assessment process.
This process may be completed during the development of the Isolation Procedure and
cover general situations e.g. isolation of mobile equipment electrical circuits, isolation of
high voltage equipment etc.
Furthermore the above requirement must be a part of any change and be embedded in
the Change Management procedure.
General Comments
General risk assessment techniques should be used to develop isolation selection tools.
Once the energy sources are identified the assessment technique chosen should
involve a qualitative calculation of the risk through the examination of the potential
consequences of exposure to the energy source and the likelihood of this exposure
occurring. The likelihood should be considered as a function of exposure and
probability. See the Anglo Risk Management Standard AA GTS 2.
Whilst assessing the risk, consideration should be given to the characteristics of the
energy source, equipment, associated systems and the intended work area. The scope
of the intended work should also be considered. All of these factors establish the risk
profile for which an isolation method is selected.
The use of Isolation Selection Matrixes for assessing the characteristics of risk and
determining isolation methods is an effective approach to manage this issue.
The three factors are the Effect Factor (Location of work/equipment and potential of
energy source), Release Factor (pressure and line size and Time Factor (duration and
frequency of task).
There are similar tools in use at minerals processing operations and an example is
available in Appendix D - WMC Isolation Selection Tool and an approach used within
the Appendix D - Worsley Alumina Isolation Point selection.
The Isolation Procedure (lock out) shall include, but not be limited to:
The role of work instructions, checklists, tagging requirements and the permit to
work system
Related systems such as the Permit to Work, Excavation / Penetration, Hot Work,
Confined Space, Emergency Isolation process, …etc. should be outlined within
the isolation protocols and procedures for each operation.
Changed requirements associated with the duration of the isolation and task/s, or
when tasks take longer than planned to complete
As work is completed on isolated equipment, unforeseen situations, that affect the
scope or expected duration of work, may arise. The isolation procedure shall
include how the operation will manage any changes associated with the isolation.
The method of hand over or transfer between the outgoing and incoming „owners‟
of the isolation is required to be documented and should include the transfer of
information about any changes. The same formal handover between work teams
is also required.
In situations where a permit system is not used or is not designed to cover these
aspects, for particular situations, then the isolation guideline shall satisfy this
aspect.
The requirements for formal contact with representatives in charge of each facility
area affected, (responsible supervisors) and the process for granting written
authorization to proceed
The transfer of „ownership‟ from the plant and equipment owner to others is
required to be formally authorized. This authorization shall be recorded and
„signed off‟ by the normal owner of the plant or equipment.
This „hand over‟ of the owner ship (also the „hand back‟) is another function of a
permit to work system. In situations where a permit system is not used or is not
designed to cover these aspects, for particular situations, then the isolation
procedure shall satisfy this aspect.
The procedures should include the necessary steps required to ensure the plant
and processes associated with the critical equipment/systems are left in a safe
state following isolation. A documented risk based contingency plan to ensure the
safety of personnel and equipment shall be completed.
Software overrides being left in place after they should be removed (with similar
impacts to the two points above).
The presence of bridges not being identified clearly - so that misunderstandings of
the present status of functionality occurs between individuals or groups, with
potential safety (or productivity) impacts resulting.
9. Isolation Verification
All parties involved shall identify the equipment before the authorised person de-
energises isolates or locks out equipment. All parties involved shall ensure that the
equipment cannot be energised or operated inadvertently. There shall be provision
for multiple locks, if required. Each person working on the equipment shall apply his
own personal lock to prevent the isolation being removed.
Intent
The intent of this requirement is for all the parties involved in the task to verify that they
are protected against harm from inadvertent operations. The key words in this
requirement are “verify”.
Verify means to confirm that all the steps required to effectively isolating energy sources
and hazardous materials has been completed. This includes firstly the identification of
the energy sources or hazardous materials then what systems contain them, whether
the isolation methods chosen are appropriate, and lock and tags have been applied.
General Comments
In the case of high risk situations the use of a second/ independent person is
recommended to perform the verification step. This approach introduces a fresh set of
eyes to the planning and application of this plan thus reducing the opportunity for
human error. Dependant on the complexity of the equipment being isolated it is often a
good practice to involve the people who will be working on the isolated equipment.
The verification process is an important step in isolating equipment and is often not
completed effectively or at all. To maintain effective verification processes requires
considerable focus to ensure the process doesn‟t degrade. The verification process
offers extra layers of protection and is typically one of the last barriers between injury
and no injury. To remove this may not have an adverse outcome straight away. That is
until there are other failures in controls earlier in the process.
10. Testing
Once equipment has been isolated and locked out, it shall be the responsibility of the
authorised person to safely test that the equipment is made safe (all energy is
discharged). The type of test shall depend on the equipment but, in all cases, all
energy shall be discharged or controlled. This test shall be described in the lock-out
procedure. Only instruments approved for this purpose shall be used for these tests.
The tests shall include, but not be limited to:
pressure
voltage, including induced voltage
redundant charges
elevated equipment
enclosed areas
hazardous chemicals (particularly in confined spaces)
stored electrical energy
temperature
equipment under tension (e.g. conveyor belt)
equipment requiring regular operator access (e.g. chutes, screens)
Sources of gas
Mobile equipment.
Intent
The word in this requirement is to ensure operations have systems in place to check the
appropriateness and effectiveness of the isolation application. The key is to test to
confirm that the energy source is contained or dissipated (try/test or test for dead)
General Comments
Example:
Testing the Isolation for V-belt change requires an attempt to start the drive locally
and remotely.
Testing the Isolation for removal of the electric motor will require also to test the
cable phases and neutral for no voltage.
Approved instruments refer to instruments required for the test, such as multimeters, HV
test probes etc. Instruments shall also conform to local legislation
In reviewing significant incident reports it is often found that this step, which is the last
barrier before an isolation incident, is not performed.
Interlocks on electrical equipment may impact upon the ability to perform a try/test step
easily. This must be addressed in the Isolation Procedure
All machinery or equipment that can cause harm in the immediate area shall also be
made safe.
The isolation, lockout and make safe requirements should be extended to all the
equipment, facilities and processes in the immediate area that could harm the crew in
charge of the work been conducted. This is especially relevant in those “continuous
flow” types of processes where activities are interdependent.
The best way to approach this requirement in case of low or medium risk sort of activity
is through the Job Safety Analysis typically conducted before work is initiated by the
people involved. In the case of high risk type of activities, the work permit should handle
this authorization.
13. Signage
A warning sign, stating that specific machinery has been de-energised because work
is in progress, shall be posted at the points of isolation.
This requirement can be satisfied with the use of proper personal or isolation (system)
tags where the reason for isolation is clearly specified as per requirement 5 of this
Standard. A specific warning sign should only be required when a tag is not in place at
the isolation point, for whatever reason.
Only after all these procedures (Elements 7-13) have been adhered to, shall work
commence on the equipment.
Intent
The intent of this requirement is to manage the risk adequately. Where a „complete‟
isolation cannot be achieved, a procedure shall be in place to mitigate hazards. Special
cases are those where any one of the following is not achievable:
Many operations have not conducted a systematic formal assessment of site to identify
special situations described. Relying on picking up these situations on a case by case
basis is not the best practice. An assessment of the operation to identify these
situations should be conducted and appropriate controls documented.
After completion of the work, a hand-over procedure back to the operator shall be in
place.
For audit trail and risk management, the responsible supervisor shall, on a regular
basis:
re-assess the competence of the authorised persons
audit the lock-out records and “permit to work” documents
undertake a risk assessment on the lock-out procedure
undertake planned task observations.
The intent of this requirement is to have a formal review program in place that ensures
the isolation and related systems are continually improving. The program shall monitor
system and in field compliance on a regular basis and shall be documented. The results
of these audits/ reviews shall be used to monitor the adequacy of the system.
As part of the continual review process incident report trends should be considered
when reviewing systems.
System documents should be included within the sites document control system.
All safety incidents, including near hits, shall be reported, investigated and analysed.
Corrective and preventative actions shall be taken and closed out and the learning‟s
shared as per the ANGLO SAFETY WAY Standard 11.
A formal system should be in place to review isolation related internal and external
incidents. The aim is to review lessons learnt from these incidents to assess the
potential for these events occurring at each operation.
If the person cannot be located and it is decided the lock needs to be cut off then the
work area should be inspected to ensure they are not present. The person responsible
for that area of the plant should be involved in the decision making processes and
provide authorization to remove locks.
Isolation or lock removal by other than the „standard‟ isolation process requires, should
also be investigated and an incident report should be issued.
8 PEOPLE REQUIREMENTS
18. Operator Identification
The person in charge of the operation of the equipment shall be clearly identified and
this shall be recorded. This person shall be identified as the operator for the
purposes of this Standard.
19. Training
All individuals issued with personal locking devices shall be provided with training
and have their competence assessed on a regular basis.
Intent
Every person that could be potentially exposed to work under isolation procedures
should receive basic awareness training on isolation basics in order to understand the
The person Authorised to do the Isolation / lockout must have specific training and shall
be tested and appointed in writing by the responsible supervisor
Intent
Clear responsibilities are established over the day to day application of the isolation
procedures. It is important that each role and the corresponding responsibilities within
the isolation system are clearly defined and documented. The accountability and
responsibilities for these roles should be clearly documented within the system.
Some good examples of detailed role definitions are included as appendixes within the
Permit to Work Guideline. An abstract of two of the roles associated with a permit to
work system is included in Appendix G – “Sample of Expected Role Definition Detail”.
The people selected for key roles within isolations systems should be assessed prior to
being nominated for roles to ensure they possess the correct attributes required by
these important roles. A „ZERO HARM ethos is essential.
General Comments
A competency based training system and field assessment shall be in place to approve
personnel before they conduct isolation processes.
The practical component should be completed such that people are exposing to „real
life‟ situations and equipment.
Behaviour based observations shall include tasks and activities associated with
isolation (e.g. observing someone actually isolating equipment and systems).
The operation shall have a system to review the observation system results with flags
(categories) to assist with the monitoring process. These flags shall be monitored to
identify trends.
Any need for additional specific retraining shall incorporate the results of these
observations.
The authorised person shall be responsible for the safe execution of isolation and
lock-out duties as per the lock-out procedure (Element 7).
The isolation, lockout and making safe task shall only be conducted by qualified
individuals whose competency has been regularly verified and authorized as such by
management. The competency based training principles discussed in the previous
requirement are also applicable in this case.
The preferred standard of isolation is Double Block and Bleed for a Hazard Factor of 450 or less.
When this standard can be achieved the results of the Hazard Factor calculation should be
recorded on the Isolation Certificate, and DBB arrangements confirmed.
If the preferred standard of isolation, double block and bleed cannot be met, the process isolation
selection method should be referred to, to ensure work can progress in a compliant manner with a
lower isolation standard. This should be recorded on the isolation certificate.
If the Hazard Factor result is greater than 450, then a full risk assessment, Job Safety
Analysis (JSA) is required.
This assessment should be recorded within the JSA and the OIM/Site Manager should
sanction the isolation standard proposed.
A JSA shall be conducted for isolations with a Hazard Factor above 450 or for Confined
Space Entry.
Process control valves and other operated valves, e.g. Emergency Shutdown Valves ESDV,
should not be relied upon, unless they are capable of being tightly shut off, disconnected from their
power source (if powered), locked in the shut position and the isolation proved to be effective by a
competent person carrying out a test.
Isolations of plant are of no value if they are not secure. It is vital that the isolation is maintained
throughout the work; generally all isolations should be made secure against disturbance. The
security mechanism can be a complex key system, a simple chain and padlock or a durable self-
locking tie wrap. Each secured valve should also be tagged and identified on the relevant isolation
certificate.
Many process valves are designated on P&ID‟s as locked; the use of these valves is controlled via
a register. The Area Production Supervisor is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the register.
Each locked valve is also tagged indicating whether it should be open or closed, and quoting the
register number.
The register contains details of valve numbers, the P&ID and line numbers, valve positions and
locations. A controlled set of P&ID‟s should be kept with the register.
This tool is based on Quantitative Risk Assessment techniques and is designed to assist the
selection of an appropriate method of isolation of process plant using recognizable, readily
available parameters that are relevant to the hazard. The tool should be used along with common
sense, technical judgment and experience, especially when the tool provides a result hat is close
to a boundary between isolation methods.
PARAMETERS
1. Effect Matrix
Type of fluid (in terms of its flammability, toxicity or other hazardous properties, e.g.
high/low temperatures, corrosion potential, etc.). See Table 2.
Situation (determining the potential for casualties, escalation or damage if there is a
release of energy). See Table 1.
These two parameters combined give an indication of the type of effect that might arise if the
isolation fails. (See Table 3 – Effects Matrix)
Note:
Vapour cloud explosions in congested or confined areas or jet fires may have the potential
for knock on effects. Toxic releases may affect people over a wide area. If escalation is likely,
consider increasing the severity of the situation type to a higher category.
In the case of a product containing more than one substance, use the most onerous
substance type in the matrix.
2. Release Matrix
Line size and system pressure (these parameters will largely fix the potential release
rate and therefore the extent of the area that could be affected).
These two parameters give a measure of the size of effect and they provide a „release‟ factor from
the Release Matrix (see Table 4.)
System pressure
>10000KPa >5000KPa >2000KPa >1000KPa <1000KPa
>200mm 10 8 6 5 4
150mm 8 6 5 4 3
Line size
100mm 6 4 3 3 2
50mm 4 3 2 2 1
<25mm 3 2 2 1 1
3. Time Matrix
A frequent isolation for relatively long periods needs to be of a relatively high rating than an infrequent
one, which is to be in place for only a short time. These two parameters provide a „time‟ factor from the
time matrix (see Table 5).
Duration
> 7 days > 1 Shift < 1 Shift
Daily - 10 10
Frequency
Weekly - 10 7
Monthly 10 7 3
Annually 7 3 2
Occasionally 3 2 1
Note: the more frequent isolation introduces a greater risk that is also increased as the intended
duration increases. It is more difficult to maintain procedural controls due to handovers at shift
change between different groups of workers.
In determining frequency of isolation account needs to be taken of the “group effect” of a number of
items of similar duty on a plant e.g. a pump might typically require a seal change once every 12
months and therefore the frequency of isolation in the time matrix is annual. However if 4 such
pumps are installed the frequency of isolation would have to be increased to monthly.
4. Hazard factor
Combining the contributions of the three factors derives the hazard factor for isolation:
Note:
In all cases the seal integrity of each isolating valve for standard 2 and 3 must be
confirmed prior to thee issue of a work permit.
Bleeds and vents should be closed once it is confirmed that the energies have been
controlled.
Provide a process for Supervisors to provide clearance and authorise non routine or high risk
work
Clearly identify the location, specific plant and equipment and the nature and scope of the
work to be carried out in relation to the area and process involved
Ensure that all hazards are identified and that appropriate controls are in place prior to work
commencing and that they remain in place during work progress
Clearly identify the person(s) (employees and/or contractors) who:
- have overall responsibility for the control of the work
- are responsible for the execution of the work
- may be affected by the work.
Identify and document:
- personal protective equipment specific to the work
- other permits required for the scope of work to be completed
- safety devices such as pressure relief devices, interlocks, fire and gas detectors, deluges etc
that have been inhibited or isolated
- emergency response procedures and equipment (where applicable).
Provide communication:
- to those affected by the work and status of progress until completion
- to personnel involved in carrying out the work ensuring they are briefed as to the scope and
limitations of work, the isolations, the hazards and controls
- between those persons carrying out the work and those persons responsible for the overall
control of the work.
Provide a documented formal hand-over process to ensure the relevant plant and equipment
is available for taking out of service and the nominated work will not affect the safety of the
rest of the facility
Ensure the isolations required for safe work is identified, documented, effected and tested
(refer to AFRS No. 6)
The plant and equipment, where required, has been decontaminated and as far is practicable
the working environment has been made safe for personnel, without specialised personal
protective equipment (which should be a last resort)
Provide authorisation to commence work
Enable the efficient coordination of PTWs by ensuring that active permits are displayed in a
central location (e.g. control room or permit issue office) and a copy is available at the
workplace
Provide a system that manages situations where the work continues beyond the completion
of a single shift (for 24 hour operations) or beyond the end of the work day
Ensure that personnel carrying out the work have the appropriate skill and knowledge
Provide a formal hand-back process to ensure the work area is safe to return to
normal operation when the work is completed
Provide a record of a safe system of work for non routine tasks or high risk work.
Competency required:
Comprehensive in depth knowledge of the work environment and the processes including the
area related hazards
Comprehensive in depth theoretical and practical knowledge of the Permit to Work System
Knowledge of competencies and skills required to perform work in their designated area
Technical skills related to the work being performed (e.g. Training in Risk Assessment,
JSA/JHA, High Voltage awareness, Radiation awareness, Hot Work, Confined Space Entry
etc.).
Responsible for:
Ensuring that work and isolations that impact upon Critical Equipment and Systems are
authorised by the senior area management
Involving the site HSE Emergency Response Section for the isolation of fire de tection and
suppression systems
Initiating the removal of hazard controls following hand back of the PTW
Authorising closure of the PTW
Maintaining the integrity of permit records and archiving system ensuring PTW documentation
is archived according to site policy.
Isolation Officer
Competency required:
Technical skills to be able to perform and verify isolations within their designated area
Comprehensive theoretical knowledge of the process equipment and systems within their
designated area (for production areas)
Comprehensive theoretical and practical ability to manage particular isolations within their
area or discipline
Comprehensive knowledge of the Permit to Work System including the responsibilities of the
Isolation Officer, Permit Issuer, Permit Holder, Permit User.
High Voltage Isolation Officer
Technical skills to be able to perform and verify High Voltage isolations within their designated
area. This work shall only be performed by qualified electrical people and is not required for the
other non High Voltage isolations.
Is responsible for:
This equipment is part of the master lock range and is available through any master lock supplier.
7C5RED
Universal Fit effectively locks out all valves from 9.5mm to 101.5mm
Single model fits a variety of sizes and styles eliminating the need for valve specific lockout
devices
Easy to use, compact and flexible
Complete with high-visibility, re-usable, write-on safety labels
Designed for harsh environments
429 428
Locking mechanism is sensitive to padlock shaft diameter. When 4mm lock is applied the locking
pin does not positively prevent the handle from turning. It can be seen that when the locking plate
is not pressed in the holes are not fully blanked off and small diameter lock can be inserted.
Picture on the right shows the locking plate fully pressed in, thus locking the handle in the OFF
position.