SREI Sahaj E-Village (A) PDF

Indian School of Business
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December 22, 2016
Rajesh Chakrabarti | Digvijay Singh Sujlana
SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

It was July 2010. The top management at Sahaj e-Village Ltd., a part of SREI Infrastructure Finance
Limited (SREI), had a tough challenge on its hands. It was serving a virtually untouched rural market
through a greenfield project with a jittery workforce in place and was justifiably concerned about the
viability and sustainability of the business.
In 2007, the government of India had envisaged a plan for the introduction of government services
in the rural areas of the country. The initiative was a mammoth e-Governance project aimed at providing
a whole gamut of government services through 100,000 rural kiosks. SREI, a leading financial institution
that was also involved in promoting infrastructure projects, had seen a unique business opportunity in
this initiative.
Sahaj e-Village led SREI’s foray into the e-Governance space through this project. Under the
National e-Governance Plan (NeGP), Sahaj had taken up the task of establishing Common Service
Centers (CSCs) to “make all Government services accessible to the common man ... and to ensure
efficiency, transparency and reliability of such services at affordable costs ....” 1
Sahaj was committed to devising ways to make information and knowledge available to all. In a May
2008 article in Firstpost, Hemant Kanoria, Chairman and Managing Director of SREI said: 2
SREI has always believed in creating partnerships and through this initiative we will create
25,000 new rural partners within a span of two years across six states in India.
... This venture of creating rural infrastructure is exciting and will service about 21 crore
[210 million] rural people, i.e. about 33 percent of India’s rural population. The
government's plan is to set up 100,000 CSCs for offering such services. SREI’s share
through its operations in the six states has already touched 25 percent, which would make
it the single largest service provider in the rural areas.
1
Government of India, Second Administrative Reforms Commission 11th Report. (2008, December). Promoting e-
Governance: The SMART way forward (Chapter 7). Retrieved from http://arc.gov.in/11threp/ARC_11th_report.htm, on
February 9, 2016.
2
SREI Sahaj to create chain of IT service centres in rural India. (2008, May 30). Firstpost. Retrieved from
http://www.firstpost.com/business/biztech/srei-sahaj-to-create-chain-of-it-service-centres-in-rural-india-1866453.html.
Professor Rajesh Chakrabarti and Digvijay Singh Sujlana prepared this case solely as a basis for class discussion. This case is
not intended to serve as an endorsement, a source of primary data, or an illustration of effective or ineffective management. The
authors are deeply indebted to Catherine Xavier for her exemplary assistance and support in the writing of this case. This case
was developed under the aegis of the Centre for Learning and Management Practice, ISB.
Copyright @ 2016 Indian School of Business. The publication may not be digitised, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted
or transmitted, without the permission of the Indian School of Business.
This document is authorized for use only in Prof. Arnab Mukherji's EEP - EGMP 54 2020(AM) at Indian Institute of Management - Bangalore from Nov 2020 to May 2021.
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Dr Sabahat Azim, Chief Executive Officer, SREI Sahaj e-Village, added:
Our plan is to expand to other states and cover a large part of the country through our rural
partnership approach. It is a mammoth task, but in our one year of trial, we are convinced
that we can achieve our target.3
By July 2010, Sahaj had rolled out more than 24,500 CSCs across six states. Their service portfolio
consisted of a range of over 30 services such as digital photography, digital videography, Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) photographs, MGNREGA data
collection, government form submission, information regarding electoral processes, death certificates,
birth certificates, electric bill collection, mobile top-ups, railway and flight ticket booking, advertising,
employment and vocational training, and examination results.
THE NATIONAL E-GOVERNANCE PLAN—ROUTE TO AN ENABLED,

EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT AND ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT
The Indian government made its first attempts towards e-Governance in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The focus at that time was on networking government departments and on creating applications in the
areas of economic monitoring, defense, planning and the deployment of information technology (IT) to
manage data-intensive functions related to elections, census, tax administration, etc. These
applications were not geared towards improving service delivery to citizens, but rather towards
automating the government's internal functions. E-Governance initiatives started focusing on service
delivery to citizens only in the latter part of the 1900s. Some of these initiatives proved to be highly
successful and suitable for replication. However, there was no holistic vision of how e-Governance
should be implemented in the country. To address this gap, the Department of Information Technology
(DIT) and Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances (DAR&PG) formulated the
NeGP, which would provide a common vision, strategy and approach to e-Governance initiatives. The
NeGP aimed at improving the delivery of government services to citizens and businesses through the
electronic media. It became operational after the central government gave the plan its approval on May
18, 2006.
The NeGP identified four key infrastructural requirements to enable e-Governance services in the
country (see Exhibit 1):
1. Ensure connectivity across the administrative setup.

2. Create a centralized repository of data with consolidated services, applications and
infrastructure to enable the efficient delivery of government-to-government (G2G),
government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-business (G2B) services through a
common web-based portal.
3. Create a web-based portal which would facilitate the crucial interface of citizens with the
government to enable messaging and data routing along with application operability.
4. Set up Internet-enabled service centers across the country that would serve as pivotal
service delivery points to the rural and semi-urban citizens of India.
The next step was to operationalize these requirements. The government identified three key
elements to implement the NeGP: CSCs, the State Wide Area Network (SWAN) and the State Data
Centre (SDC) scheme. The CSCs were intended to serve as front-end delivery points for government,
private and social sector services to the rural population in an integrated manner. The SWAN was to
ensure effective connectivity, while the SDC was to provide a secure host of data and application.
3
Ibid.
2 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)
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CSC SCHEME
As a first step towards implementation of the NeGP, the Indian government approved the Common
Service Centres scheme(CSC), which made these centers the face of the government for the entire
plan.
The CSC scheme had the objective of establishing about 100,000 kiosks across the country, one
each for every six census villages. The objective was to develop a platform that could enable
government, private and social sector organizations to align their social and commercial goals for the
benefit of the rural population in the remotest corners of the country through a combination of IT-based
and non-IT-based services. The CSC scheme had the unique characteristic of having being
implemented as a public-private partnership (PPP). Previously, government guidelines had offered the
option to be able to use the PPP model to outsource the establishment, operation and maintenance of
the SWAN and the SDC; however, the National Informatics Centre (NIC), a science and technology
organization that played a major role in steering e-governance applications in government departments,
was given this responsibility because of capital expenditure considerations.
By early 2009, the central government realized that the implementation of a project of this size and
scope would pose significant project management challenges at the national level. The government
addressed this concern by floating a CSC special purpose vehicle (SPV) under the CSC scheme in July
2009. This would be established in addition to the originally conceptualized centers under the PPP
model, allowing the government to progressively migrate to an e-Governance platform and enable
services through the CSC network. CSC e-Governance Services India Ltd would monitor the scheme
on behalf of the government, both at the national and state levels. (see Exhibit 2(a) for key
responsibilities).
The CSC SPV, apart from providing monitoring services, had evolved its own corpus of service
offerings (see Exhibit 2(b)). The evolution of its portfolio was an indicator of how far the scheme had
come since its conception and also gave a hint of how private partners had been operating under the
PPP mode.
Implementation of the CSC Scheme
To achieve the goals of the NeGP and to enable the state-specific implementation plans to benefit
from economies of scale, aggregation of best practices, etc., the Department of Information Technology
(DIT) proposed a 3-tier implementation framework:
Tier III: At the base would lie a network of local Village-level Entrepreneurs (VLEs). They would
form the core of the whole CSC scheme, with the responsibility of providing services to the
rural customer. The VLE network was envisioned to function on the franchisee model.
x Tier II: The middle-level would comprise the Service Centre Agencies (SCAs), which would have
the responsibility of operating, managing and building the VLE network and business. It would
be a private entity and would be given territorial responsibility for rolling out the CSCs in one or
more districts. Each district in turn would cover about 100-200 CSCs.
x Tier I: The top tier would comprise the state designated agency (SDA), whose role would be to
facilitate the implementation of the CSC scheme within the state and to provide the requisite
policy, content and other support to the SCAs. This would be a public sector unit (PSU)/ society
or any other entity controlled by the state government.
In addition, the CSC scheme proposed the involvement of a national-level service agency (NLSA),
which would provide program management support to the DIT for the rollout. It would also monitor the
implementation of the scheme to enable the DIT to review its progress. The government appointed
Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd. (IL&FS) as the NLSA to coordinate the entire initiative.
SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 3
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Role of the NLSA
IL&FS’s role as the NLSA was critical for the identification, customization and implementation of the
scheme's physical and digital infrastructure, which would enable it to achieve economies of scale. The
expected functions of IL&FS included national-level facilitation, identification of the requisite technology
(hardware, software, back-end and front-end architecture), and conducting market research and field
surveys. IL&FS was also mandated to: (a) provide a roadmap that would enable various stakeholders
to ensure the progressive training and capacity building of all stakeholders, particularly the VLEs; (b)
indicate the level of financial support that would be required to ensure the operability of the scheme;
and (c) facilitate the expansion of products and services by identifying private sector services such as
microfinance, telemedicine, education, etc., in line with the overall public interest. The NLSA was also
supposed to ensure that the branding, advertising and marketing of the CSCs did not have an adverse
impact on the provision of government services to citizens.
IL&FS conducted a number of state-wide studies that provided the initial directions and guidelines
for the establishment and operation of the CSCs. (Exhibit 3 (b) lists the various objectives of the studies).
One of these studies was a detailed benchmark study of different regions of the country to assess
demand and viability, identify content, create an appropriate service package, evaluate the suitability of
a location for establishing a CSC, etc. The major output of the study was the identification and mapping
of nodal villages (NVs) where the CSCs would be stationed. The study identified state-specific
peculiarities vital in the planning and execution of the scheme in a way that would best address the
development needs of the local population. It profiled NVs on the basis of a list of attributes such as
topography, connectivity, availability of amenities, etc. (Exhibit 4 lists the entire set of attributes). To
decide on the location of the kiosks, IL&FS carried out a micro-level analysis that involved studying the
inputs obtained on responses to three queries. The first was the willingness of households to buy and
pay for products and services. Questionnaires were administered to households about their willingness
to pay for a set of 30 products and services. The study used the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM)
to tap consumer willingness:
For each service, the consumer was shown a range of prices (stated prices) that he would
be willing to pay, and was thereafter prompted to choose the price he would be willing to
pay for the service. If he wanted to choose the lowest price for a service, he was told of
the advantages of getting the service from the kiosk and the savings that would arise from
the coping costs on transportation, including repeated visits to procure the service, if he/
she were to avail the product/ service from the kiosk. In this manner, the household was
persuaded to reconsider their willingness to pay for the service by going for higher price
levels within the limits of affordability. 4
The second query was targeted at the household's present buying behavior and the third at its
present expenditure on all household items. This enabled the study to report the amount the consumer
was currently paying and whether he was currently using the products and services that he would be
willing to buy and pay for. In the final analysis, the baseline survey identified locational criteria, a basket
of priced services and the revenue potential for CSCs. Further elements critical to the effective
implementation of the CSC scheme were identified as:
x Role of the state government x Role of the SDA

x Connectivity x Location of CSCs
x Revenue support x Integration of existing kiosks
x Enablement plan for G2C services
In order to understand the problems faced by Sahaj, the senior management needed to understand
the role of the state government and the SDA.
4
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services. (2011). Report on baseline survey to identify locational criteria, basket
of priced services and revenue potential for CSCs—West Bengal (p. 15).
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The Role of the SDA
In line with the three-tier implementation framework, the state governments appointed a
departmental entity as the SDA. The overall responsibility for the successful implementation of the
scheme lay in the hands of the SDA. The scope of the decisions to be made by the SDA ranged from
the degree to which the new scheme would be integrated with the existing physical, digital and
institutional infrastructure of the state government, to the policies to be followed to ensure effective
implementation. It was the SDA that would monitor the flow of sanctioned funds and elicit further
financial support by monitoring and forecasting the progress of the scheme. Following this, the SDA
would initiate the rollout in stages. As part of the first stage, the SDA was to work with various state
departments in a series of steps:
1. Since the state departments were to act as the service provider for e-Government services, the
SDA was to facilitate the identification of the various departments that could provide G2C
services that could be delivered through a CSC electronically. It would then send the notification
identifying the complete set of services and corresponding service providers to the Department
of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), government of India. 5 The SDA was
supposed to mentor and provide the required support to the respective departments in framing
policies to facilitate the integration of existing ICT-enabled government schemes into the CSC
scheme. It was also supposed to facilitate interaction between the state departments and the
SCAs to enable the delivery of G2C services through the CSCs.
2. The state departments would be directed to carry out back-office computerization for the
identified services across levels, i.e., headquarters, district, tehsil 6 and block levels.
3. Last, the departments were to take the necessary action, in terms of addressing gaps in
logistics, human capital, etc., in order to make the CSC scheme a success.
In the second stage of the rollout, the SDA, by issuing directives to the district administration, would
ensure further interaction between the SCAs and the government. This stage was critical for the
effective, efficient and economical implementation of the scheme. The steps were as follows:
1. The district administration, along with various departments and SCAs, was to organize
awareness and sensitization workshops for the masses in each of the zones. The main
objective was to portray the business potential of the CSC scheme in order to attract
prospective VLEs.
2. As a follow up to the workshops, the district administration was to assist SCAs in identifying the
exact location for the CSC as per IL&FS's survey report. It was also to play a critical role in the
selection of the VLEs.
3. Working from the list of G2C services identified by the state departments, the district
administration was to help prioritize the services to be provided as per the requirements of the
district. This exercise was to ensure the delivery of district-level G2C services by the CSC.
4. Following the prioritization exercise, the district administration would certify the district-level
G2C services that the CSCs would deliver.
5. The district administration had to ensure the complete and timely rollout of the CSC scheme by
committing to resolving the various problems and issues that cropped up during each stage of
the rollout.
A closer look at Sahaj’s implementation of the scheme in Uttar Pradesh (UP), a large state in
northern India, aided in better understanding the implementation of the 3-tier framework.
5
http://vikaspedia.in/e-governance/resources-for-vles/common-service-centres-programme.
6
Tehsil is an area that constitutes a sub-district or administrative division in India.
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Implementation of the 3-Tier Framework—The UP Story
In UP, CSCs were designated as Jan Seva Kendras (JSKs). For the purpose of establishing a JSK,
the SDA divided the state into seven zones. It specified the number of JSKs in each of these zones as
well as their location, and then selected an SCA for each zone through a transparent, open bidding
process. The list of selected SCAs with their corresponding bids towards the revenue support expected
from the government and the number of JSKs under their purview is given in Exhibit 5(a).
With the institutional setup in place, the SDA then focused on a plan to offer G2C services in the
zones. This included the timely dispersal of revenue support, which formed the basis of the bid, and
providing the technology architecture as specified in the NeGP. Since revenue support was based on
the availability of G2C services, the state had to develop appropriate G2C service enablement plans,
at least for key government services. The UP government, through its appointed SDA, decided on
certain key services that each JSK would provide—these included e-Governance services, utility
collection and land records—along with the revenue model (see Exhibit 5(b)). The SCAs across the
state offered a multitude of services ranging from education and health to agriculture, retail, etc. Exhibit
6 lists the complete set of prospective key government services that the JSKS could provide.
With the CSC implementation story in place, it was critical for the management to gain a granular
understanding of the selection process of entities for the project. For this purpose, the Sahaj team
decided to re-examine the records related to Sahaj’s foray in UP.
THE BIDDING STORY

There was no precedent for a scheme of this scale and scope anywhere in the world. IL&FS, in its
capacity as the NLSA, conducted feasibility studies across geographies. It studied different contractual
arrangements with the VLE—“on their own rolls”, franchisee and individual VLE mode (i.e. specified
revenue sharing)—under a PPP mode. IL&FS divided each state into multiple zones; each zone was a
unit of award that was available for operation under the PPP mode. The zones were awarded via a
competitive bidding process (unlike the selection of the NLSA) to an individual or a consortium of
players. From the studies, IL&FS concluded that the scheme would not be viable if the entire risk of
operating a CSC was borne by a private entity for the first four years of operation. The bidders were
thus recommended to include an element of revenue support per CSC per month which would be
provided by the Indian government for the first four years on a quarterly basis.
As the management reviewed the SREI’s bids, they were surprised by the zero and negative quotes
for zones in UP and Tamil Nadu. Going back to the data for UP (Exhibit 5(a)), they found that it was not
only SREI but also multiple other players who were confident of not requiring any revenue support from
the government. Oddly enough, the private sector was ready to bypass any subsidy offerings from the
government and move ahead with negative quotes; in other words, they were prepared to pump their
own money into the scheme even though nobody knew a great deal about the business. The
management was familiar with the National Highways Authority of India’s (NHAI) multi-stage bidding
process, in which firms had to pre-qualify based on their technical and financial expertise and their track
record on similar projects. They wondered why no such process had been followed for a scheme that
could prove to be a game changer. However, lack of structure and information asymmetry did not seem
to be a road block in the process, and the negative bids showed the private sector's confidence in
capturing the service agreements for establishing these centers of e-Governance and G2C services.
Sahaj's interest in how SREI had carried out its bidding strategy continued to grow. In West Bengal,
the first state where SREI had placed its bids, it had faced one particularly tough competitor, Reliance
Communications, who drove the bids for revenue support from the government towards the zero mark.
Given that this was a greenfield project and that West Bengal was one of SREI's six preferred markets
as well as the seat of its headquarters, SREI could not afford to lose the bid on West Bengal. SREI also
harbored future plans that were set on staging its headquarters for this scheme in West Bengal. SREI
continued to bid competitively and won in many of the zones. Eventually, Reliance exited West Bengal,
and SREI was left in charge of all the zones in the state.
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Bidding followed in the rest of the states. Knowing what to expect from the competition at the bidding
stage, SREI went ahead with a mixed bundle of quotes to ensure it won its choice of virgin markets. As
a consequence, SREI secured zones in all of its six target states. In three of those states—West Bengal,
Assam and Bihar—SREI won some zones with positive quotes. In the other three states of Tamil Nadu,
UP and Odisha, it won on the basis of negative quotes. By the end of the bidding process, SREI had
managed to gain a presence in the states of its choice. As Sahaj's management browsed through the
final list of SREI’s operational zones and its overall bidding performance in West Bengal (see Exhibit
7), they also examined the final list of selected SCAs (see Exhibit 8). Even though SREI gained
complete charge of West Bengal, it appeared that in other states, the zones had been allocated in a
rather haphazard manner to the lowest bidder. They were puzzled by the manner in which allocations
had been made in such cases where the players had exited the process midway. In their view, a rational
process would have involved allocation based on the growth of an already existing private entity’s
operations in the space.
Setting aside the issues thrown up in the bidding process for the moment, the management decided
to get a better understanding of what was expected of Sahaj as a SCA.
THE CSC IDEOLOGY
The architects of the NeGP had envisioned that G2C services would form the basis of service
delivery. Once in place, these services would drive footfalls towards the CSC, which the SCAs and
VLEs would use to operate and supply business-to-consumer (B2C) products and services, to the
extent that 60% of their business would come from B2C operations. The government had realized that
the VLEs could not turn a CSC into a sustainable business solely by providing G2C services such as
issuing birth certificates, selling of land records, etc. After all, in a village of 2,000 households, how
many people would be born every month, how many every year? More often than not, issuing a land
record was a once-in-a-lifetime exercise for a rural household. The government kept these
considerations in mind when drafting service agreements with the private sector.
The Master Service Agreement
SCAs had to sign service agreements with their public partners to undertake the delivery of
government services on a PPP basis. The state governments, along with the respective SDA, were to
be the public entity in partnership with the private SCAs chosen via competitive bidding. As per the
signed agreement, the onus to develop, finance, design, build, roll out, establish, manage, operate and
maintain the CSCs was on the SCA. The Master Service Agreement (MSA) also clearly defined the
mandate of the SCA in terms of the number of CSCs to be established and the timeline of the rollout.
Notable excerpts from the MSA include:
SCA shall set up and operationalize the CSCs at its own cost and expense within 12
months from the effective date, as per deliverables outlined in the RFP [request for
proposal] document of this MSA.
... The SCA shall enter into arrangements at its own cost and risk with the non-Government
content and service providers for IT and non-IT based services delivered through the
CSCs.
... The SCA shall select, train, facilitate and enter into appropriate arrangement with the
VLEs at its own cost and risk in accordance with the provisions of the RFP and this MSA
for establishing, managing, operating and maintaining the CSCs.
The state government was to ensure the timely delivery of government services using information
and communications technology (ICT) through the privately built, owned and operated CSCs. The state
government was also to ensure the timely dispersal of revenue support as per the bid documents under
the following constraint: “Once the SCA has set up and made operational 50% of the CSCs, SCA shall
be eligible for 50% of the revenue support for these operational CSCs. Balance 50% shall be deferred
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till roll out of the 100% CSCs.”7 (See Exhibit 5(b) for a sample financial model). Several other terms (or,
rather, restrictions) clearly stated the level of “partnership” that was to exist between the public and the
private entity. For example, the SCA was not entitled to receive any capital support/ subsidy from the
state government for the rollout of the scheme, and it was required to finance the rollout through its own
resources or through funding it had arranged at its own cost. These terms hazed the dynamics of the
“partnership”. Other examples taken from the MSA agreement were:
The SCA and its VLEs shall be authorized to collect the transaction charges from the users
for the Government applications/ services as specified in Appendix B of Schedule 3 and
as may be revised from time to time, at rates fixed by [the Government]. The SCA/ its VLEs
shall promptly deposit the [Government's] or a Government utility service provider’s share
of such transaction charges, at the pre-agreed rates and within the time specified as
maybe, along with the applicable/ stipulated/ mandatory fee, if any.
Sharing of costs and profits between SCA and VLEs shall constitute an internal inter se
matter between the SCA and the VLE as per mutual agreement.
With the operational and financial terms set, the MSA also defined the role of the CSC-SPV. The
CSC-SPV could be a designated/ nominated agency of the SDA. Its responsibilities included laying
down operating and financial discipline within the CSC system; providing a framework for a collaborative
decision-making process; catalyzing and maintaining content aggregation on an ongoing basis; and
building a common “identity” for the scheme.
What intrigued Sahaj's management was that it seemed as though the SCA was on a chariot that
was to be pulled by three horses—the state government, the SDA and the SPV—who were not
necessarily going in the same direction. They re-read the document to ensure that there was no mention
of a definite timeline for the government and its departments to deliver on the establishment of the SDC,
the payment gateway or the in-house digitalization of sensitive data. The management also compared
the delivery on the promises by the SDAs with where Sahaj stood on various service attributes (see
Exhibit 9).
The management now focused on Sahaj and the actual rollout.
THE ROLLOUT
Going through the documents, the management understood that Sahaj was designed for the sole
purpose of establishing world-class, ICT-enabled infrastructure aimed at empowering rural India. Sahaj
was to be led at the grassroots by an inspired team of village entrepreneurs with the help of employees
engaged in delivering both government and consumer products and services.
Organization Design
In order to facilitate its purpose, Sahaj e-Village Ltd was structured on two broad business themes:
retail and strategy. The Retail Business Division (RBD) and Strategy Business Division (SBD) each had
its own Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and team.
The RBD's mission was to make rural people's lives easier by offering them the convenience of
accessing numerous services at a Sahaj CSC in their locality. In addition, by setting up arguably the
largest IT connected networks in rural India, this division of Sahaj also planned to provide a robust
service delivery, advertising and branding channel. This would target corporate players who wanted to
reach out to 280 million potential rural consumers across six major Indian states. The RBD was to
provide its target audience (which comprised some of the most marginalized communities in India) with
direct access to modern, state-of-the-art technological facilities. These facilities, as envisioned in the
NeGP, were to be brought into their lives by members of their own community through the support of
Sahaj. This would ensure a transformation in these historically deprived regions of India.
7
Extracted from the Master Service Agreement.
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The SBD was formed with the intention of putting in place an efficient and effective government
interaction mechanism. It was mandated to provide technology-based support and solutions to various
government programs and projects and to implement the various aspects of social sector programs
conceptualized and initiated by the central and state governments. The SBD was thus analogous to the
front wheel of a three-wheeler, giving direction to the entire organization with the RBD being the driving
force. Right from the SBD's inception, the RBD and SBD took turns filling these roles, thereby making
it an integrated system. This enabled Sahaj to keep up its pace in order to ensure a progressive rollout
followed by a continuous addition of products and services to its portfolio of offerings.
Challenges in the Rollout
The Sahaj rollout was initially spread over two years (2007 and 2008). The first two years brought
to light many challenges in the implementation as envisioned by the NeGP. To add to this, the Sahaj
team also became aware of the hidden gaps in the entire implementation plan of the scheme. Lack of
clarity on some terms of the MSA signed with state governments, the NLSA's lack of consideration for
customization in conducting studies across geographies, and delays in the delivery of government
services via IT-enabled platforms were some of the main hurdles that the Sahaj team faced. The MSA’s
“Definitions” section did not define what exactly was meant by a “rollout”. Thus, determining what a
complete rollout entailed was left to subjective interpretation. One particular term of reference stated
that:
The SCA would select, train, facilitate and enter into appropriate arrangements with the
VLEs at its own cost and risk in accordance with the provisions of the RFP, and this MSA
for establishing, managing, operating and maintaining the CSCs.
Some of the private players had initially suggested that a complete rollout of a CSC would mean
setting up the required physical infrastructure for the center plus the selection and placing of a VLE at
that center. The government did not agree. Its rationale was that a rollout meant that a particular CSC
was providing government services and was thereby being utilized. The government suggested that
this could be detected by an online monitoring tool (OMT). The SDC would provide this OMT to the
SCA, who would then install it in the VLE workstation. This OMT would flag the network every time a
VLE was online to transact any of the online government services.
The government went ahead with the OMT installation, but soon realized that owing to poor network
security at the VLE level, VLE workstations were heavily prone to viruses, which attacked the
functioning of the OMT. As a result, a vast majority of VLEs would require their work stations to be
formatted on almost a weekly basis. Since the VLEs lacked the training to do this, it was the
responsibility of the SCA to carry out this unforeseen exercise. The VLEs themselves were not
particularly concerned by a malfunctioning OMT. They only raised a complaint when it came in the way
of their ability to carry out successful transactions on the platform. Taking notice of this, some SCAs
were able to convince the government that a rollout should mean that a CSC was transacting on a
regular basis.
Sahaj's field teams had reported to Sahaj headquarters (HQ) that the establishment of centers in
many areas was unviable. Their observations spoke to the fact that the NLSA had conducted its studies
in 2006-2007 and these were based on the last available census data from 2001. Citing an example
from areas prone to floods in UP, the record showed that since 2001, many villages identified as nodal
villages had been either washed away or evacuated. Migration to urban areas and village-level
insurgency were also among the reasons why many of the identified villages were not viable locations
for setting up CSCs.
The Beginnings of the Rollout
Sahaj had a mandate to set up over 28,000 CSCs. According to the MSA, the rollout was to be
completed within a 12-month timeframe. In order to fulfill its obligations, Sahaj HQ organized teams to
solicit investments from various corporate players. To acquire an immediate presence across its
operational areas, Sahaj opened offices in every district under its purview, while opening offices in sub-
divisional zones as well. Through these offices, Sahaj held awareness and sensitization camps at the
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grassroot level. They also used these offices as training centers for VLEs. These teams helped set up
the physical support infrastructure and assisted the VLEs in partnering with various organizations, such
as banks, for loan tie-ups. As the 12-month timeframe allotted for the rollout neared its end, the Sahaj
HQ had managed to put in place a strong human infrastructure. With over 1,000 employees across six
states at its 107 deep rural offices looking after 25,000 kiosks, Sahaj had by far become the largest
player in the business as far as rural India was concerned. By 2010, Sahaj had managed to roll out a
total of 21,942 CSCs across the six states under its mandate. Of this number, 15,513 were set up in
2009, the very first year of the rollout. (See Exhibit 10 for a summary of the rollout figures).
With the physical infrastructure in place, the realization that G2C services alone would not guarantee
the financial viability of a kiosk slowly started setting in. The unforeseen delays in delivery of online
government services made it imperative for the HQ to address the sustainability issue. The Sahaj HQ
thus mapped the type of products and services it would offer as part of its B2C operations (see Exhibit
11). Even though the product and services portfolio had already been structured, inordinate delays
within state departments in identifying the services to be disseminated though the CSCs coupled with
a general lack of fervor on the part of the state hierarchy in pushing the state departments were sending
jitters across the Sahaj HQ. On the one hand, the SBD was trying to make the concerned people in the
government understand the grave impact these delays were having on the scheme, while on the other,
the RBD had its hands full convincing its network of VLEs and its own employees to keep faith in the
scheme. Even though the VLEs had been selected, there was not a single transacting VLE, as
evidenced by the financials of the organization for the first two years (see Exhibit 12).
With G2C services nowhere in sight, there was a spate of frustration and negative energy spreading
among the Sahaj VLEs. For most VLEs, the initial attraction of the CSC scheme was that they saw
themselves becoming “virtual tehsildars." 8 The VLEs envisioned that all block-level government
services would be routed through an entity controlled by them alone. In the absence of these services,
the associated prestige could not be theirs. VLEs interpreted the situation as Sahaj not being able to
deliver on its promises. With their faith breached, it was in fact the SCA, and not the government, that
the VLEs took to task for the delay in rolling out G2C services. Many regions saw the emergence of
VLE unions, which put the SCAs under tremendous pressure. Along with diminishing goodwill, many
regions had to cope with heavy attrition among VLEs. The situation had reached boiling point, and was
on the verge of undoing all the effort that had been made towards a timely rollout.
The Challenges Ahead
To add to its existing problems, Sahaj had the further challenge of structuring a viable and
sustainable B2C model. While, in theory, the idea of G2C services being the driver and the B2C
business taking advantage of the scheme sounded promising, in reality, setting up a single service
delivery business and making it profitable proved to be a Herculean task. Even the government had
understood that it was beyond the scope of any one party or agency to deliver services to 650,000
villages, and hence had gone ahead with the project in a collaborative mode.
The understanding was that B2C products and services were to contribute 60% of the business at
the CSCs. To make this happen, it was critical for the private players to have prior knowledge of playing
the B2C game in rural areas. Just as in the case of G2C space, where it was essential to get inputs
from someone within the administrative setup to understand the timing and quantity of the demand for
various G2C services, it seemed to make sense to have players from, say, the fast moving consumer
goods (FMCG) or the telecommunications sector, to operate the B2C side of things under this project.
Even the Brazilian Business Correspondent (BC) model chose players with a prior understanding of the
dynamics of rural markets. A cursory look at the profile of the private players showed that eight out of
10 companies involved in the CSC project were IT/ ITES exporters. FMCG and telecommunications
players were nowhere to be seen. Even in the Indian government's Business Correspondent scheme
(Bank Saathi Yojana, later renamed Swabhimaan), most of the private players involved were IT
companies. It seemed that putting in place the IT infrastructure for the project came to be treated as an
end, and the overriding modus operandi was to set up a shop that would attract people and hence drive
8
In India, a tehsildar is a revenue officer of a district or sub-division.
ISB070
footfalls. Where IT was to be the enabler, it became instead the end in itself. No attention was given to
the sales and marketing skill set possessed by the selected SCAs. The question that needed to be
asked was this: How was IT in itself supposed to consolidate the fragmented nature of demand, a
characteristic trait in rural areas? How was it to reduce the cost of acquisition of a customer in order to
make the B2C model viable in the absence of G2C services?
To add to this, no sales and marketing viability studies — which could help in setting up B2C
operations — were conducted in the identified nodal villages or at the gram panchayat 9 level. With no
market assessment available, how could one determine a rural customer's level of stickiness to these
CSCs? Why had the SCAs not demanded such studies to be made available? Did they expect the
envisioned G2C services to be enough?
THE ROAD AHEAD

With all this feedback from the ground, the top echelon at Sahaj had to now decide on its future
course very carefully. Sahaj stood the risk of losing face along with the investments it had made in
physical and human infrastructure over a two-year period. Sahaj was faced with the very volatile
situation of having to cater to a virtually untouched market via a greenfield project with a very nervous
workforce in place.
The team had just recruited a new CEO, Sanjay Kumar Panigrahi, to lead the company. An MBA in
Marketing from the Institute of Rural Management, Anand (IRMA) and a National Merit Certificate
holder, Panigrahi had over 28 years of rich and diverse experience in marketing, sales, distribution, new
business development and organization development across geographies and industries, including
more than 20 years at Amul under the leadership of Dr. Verghese Kurien. He had successfully led the
marketing and sales functions of leading brands, including Amul, Fevicol, M Seal, Fevikwik, and Dr Fix-
it. As the CEO of Sahaj, he had been given the mandate of converting and expanding the existing
physical and technological network into a viable and sustainable rural business setup through the
marketing and sales of products and services.
The top team at SREI had pinned their hopes on their new CEO's ability to deliver, but they were
also well aware of the enormity of the challenges that lay ahead. The need for a new strategy was
becoming stronger every day, and unfortunately, they did not have the luxury of time.
9
Gram Panchayat is a local self-government organization of elected leaders at the village or town level..
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EXHIBIT 1
NATIONAL E GOVERNANCE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE
NeGP Common Infrastructure
S S
S C
W S
D S
A D
C C
N G
The state-wide network The repository of data The e-portal maintained Service centers to be
to ensure connectivity. was to be operated and by the state government, operated by village- level
NIC was identified as the maintained by the NIC. as the common delivery entrepreneur in a PPP
designated authority to platform for G2C mode
ensure the establishment services.
of SWAN.
** Abbreviations
SWAN – State-wide Area Network
SDC – State Data Center
SSDG – State Service Delivery Gateway
CSC – Common Services Centre
Source: Second Administrative Reforms Commission. 11th Report, Promoting e-Governance: The SMART Way
Forward, Chapter 7. December 2008.
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EXHIBIT 2
CSC SPV
a) Key Responsibilities
Set up on July 16, 2009 and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, SPVs had the following
responsibilities:
1. Ensuring systemic viability and sustainability of the CSC scheme.

2. Monitoring the outcomes being achieved by the CSCs.
3. Enabling delivery of G2C and B2C services via the CSCs.
4. Providing a standardized framework for collaborative decision making.
5. Catalyzing and maintaining content aggregation on an ongoing basis.
6. Building stakeholder capacity and best practices sharing.
b) Services
G2C B2C Education Financial Inclusion Other

PAN** Card Financial Services Adult Literacy Kiosk Banking Skill development,
Issuing (BSFL Loan Details, (SBI) Pre-employment
LIC premium training,
payment)
Election Services Utility Payments Digital Literacy Insurance Skill mapping,
(Polling booths in (Mobile/ DTH/ Data awareness (TATA Job placement,
Gujarat) card) AIA) Monitoring job
placement
Aadhar* Train Ticketing, Bus Distance Coming Soon— Coming Soon—
Enrollment Ticketing (IRCTC, Education Micro Insurance Agriculture
Red Bus) (IGNOU, MKCL, Micro Pension information to
NIELIT) farmers
e-Commerce (CSC
Bazaar)
Coming Soon—
Hungama Music
* Aadhaar is a 12-digit individual identification number issued by the Unique Identification Authority of India on
behalf of the Government of India.
** Please refer to the List of Abbreviations for all abbreviations in this exhibit.
Source: CSC SPV website, https://apna.csc.gov.in, accessed on February 11, 2016
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EXHIBIT 3
NLSA DETAILS
a.) About Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services
Promoted by financial institutions and with a mandate to catalyze the development of infrastructure
in the country, Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (IL&FS) is one of India's leading
infrastructure development and finance companies. It focuses on the commercialization and
development of infrastructure projects and creation of value-added financial services.
b.) Objectives of the study to be conducted by the NLSA (IL&FS)
1. To test the criteria for selection of the CSC locations

a. Minimum size of the population to be covered by each CSC, and the number of villages
to be included in the cluster
b. The factors that affect the sustainable use of the CSCs
2. To identify the mix of services that are required by the community within easy reach pertaining
to:
a. The e-governance related service requirements which translate to (requiring front-end
and back-end applications) income saving and access to efficient services
b. Services linking to income enhancement opportunities (requiring front-end and back-
end applications)
c. Development related information and services (requiring front-end and back-end
applications)
d. Other services (requiring only front-end applications)
3. The costs presently incurred for procurement of these services, and the affordability and
willingness to pay for these services if they are available in a CSC (especially the price point for
government services). This will provide information on the rural community’s disposable income
that can be accessed by the project.
Source: IL&FS website, www.ilfsindia.com, accessed on February 10, 2016.
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EXHIBIT 4
ATTRIBUTE LIST FOR NODAL VILLAGE PROFILING
1. Profiling nodal villages

2. Distribution of nodal villages by topography and village size
3. Road connectivity
4. Rural electrification and telephone connectivity
5. Distribution of facilities and amenities (e.g., primary health centers, fair price shops, post and
telegraph offices, general stores, etc.)
6. Presence of community building organizations (CBO) and knowledge leaders
7. Places of social activity and community gatherings
8. Profile of primary and secondary occupations
9. Major crops, cropping patterns and agrarian and non-agrarian wage rates, and major challenges
faced by farmers
10. Markets at differing distances for buying and selling different goods and products
11. Major cottage industries—type of employment and marketing channels
12. Major forestry and allied agricultural activities—type of employment and marketing channels
13. Presence of industries and industrial employment
14. Migration patterns
15. Village youth—educational attainment, occupations, major challenges and aspirations for
knowledge and skills
16. School infrastructure and performance
17. Availability of tuition classes and incidental cost
18. Village issues and causes of dispute (e.g. land, water, family feuds, abuse of women, etc.)
19. Village needs (e.g. health, agriculture, training, financial inclusion, entertainment, etc.)
20. Knowledge and access to government programs
21. Knowledge on kiosks, interest, preference of kiosk location and operators
Source: Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services. (2011). Report on Baseline Survey to Identify Locational Criteria,
Basket of Priced Services and Revenue Potential for CSCs —West Bengal.
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EXHIBIT 5
SERVICE CENTER AGENCIES IN UTTAR PRADESH (UP) AND REVENUE MODEL
a.) Selected Service Center Agencies (SCAs) in UP and Bidding Details
Revenue Support
Total No. of
Zone Related Divisions Selected SCA Name (INR per CSC per
JSKs
month)
Moradabad Moradabad, Saharanpur CMS Computers Ltd 1,615 890
Varanasi Varanasi, Allahabad, SREI Infrastructure 3,669 0

Mirzapur Finance Ltd
Faizabad Faizabad, Azamgarh Comat Technologies Pvt. 2,601 2,106
Ltd
Lucknow Lucknow, Gorakhpur, SREI Infrastructure 4,449 10
Basti Finance Ltd (-ve bid) i.e. SCA to
pay UP government
Bareilly Bareilly, Deipatan Comat Technologies Pvt. 2,120 0
divisions Ltd
Agra Agra, Meerut 3i Infotech Ltd 1,688 14
(-ve bid) i.e. SCA to
pay UP government
Kanpur Kanpur, Jhansi, CMS Computers Ltd 1,767 0
Chitrakoot Dham
b.) Sample Revenue Model (in INR)
Charge to citizen
Share of UP Share of SCA/ Utility provider to
Type of transaction (maximum retail
government/ SDA VLE pay
price per sale)
e-Governance Services 10 0 10 0
Utility collection 0 0 4 4
Land Record 25 10 15 0
Source: Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 11th Report, Promoting e-Governance: The SMART Way
Forward, Chapter 7. December 2008., http://arc.gov.in/11threp/ARC_11th_report.htm, accessed on February 9, 2016.
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EXHIBIT 6
PROJECTED G2C SERVICES
Rural Development Health Education

• MGNREGA database • Pregnant women databse • MDM Scheme data
• MGNREGA photo for I-card • Polio drive at PHC & CHC • SSA database
• IAY beneficiary database Level • Other databases
• SGSY beneficiary database
• SHG database
Animal Husbandry Agriculture Planning Development

• Livestock database • Farmers database • BPL/APL card preparation
• Production database • Landholding pattern • Data entry for other programs
• Type of crops
• Farmers hub
• Soil health card preparation
Food & Civil Supplies Financial Service Others

• Ration card preparation data • PAN card preparation • UIDAI
entry • Financial inclusion database • NABARD various schemes
• Fair price shop database • I card preparation (WHAT IS • Village industries & Khadi
I- CARD?) board
• Employment exchange
• Utility bill payment
* Please refer to the List of Abbreviations for all abbreviations in this exhibit.
Source: Company Sources (Sahaj).
EXHIBIT 7
SREI OPERATIONAL ZONES IN WEST BENGAL
Revenue Support
Zone Area No. of CSCs (INR per CSC per
month)
1 Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Coochbehar 780 3,250
2 Uttar Dinajpur, Dakshin Dinajpur, Malda 649 2,000
3 Murshidabad, Nadia 935 2,000
4 North 24 Parganas, Paschim Mednipur 966 700
5 Burdwan, Purulia 894 2,090
6 South 24 Parganas, Howrah 978 700
7 Hooghli, Bankura 832 2,000
8 Purba Mednipur, Birbhum 763 2,000
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EXHIBIT 8
SELECTED SERVICE CENTER AGENCIES (SCA)
Total No. of No. of

Name of Service Center
Sl Mandate Rollout Name of states (Zone)
Agency
CSCs CSCs
Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Bihar,

1 Sahaj e-Village Ltd 28006 26486
Assam, Odisha, UP
Rajasthan, Gujarat, Andhra
2 CMS Computers Ltd 17354 16332 Pradesh, Maharashtra, UP,
Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Basics Ltd. & Bhartiya Meghalaya , Tripura, Odisha,
3 4096 4200
Samruddhi Finance Ltd. Punjab, Maharashtra
4 AISECT 6000 6000 MP, Chhattisgarh, Punjab
Reliance Communications Gujarat, MP, Uttrakhand,
5 7597 7597
CSC Project Maharashtra
Punjab, Puducherry, Nagaland,
6 Tera Software 2739 2091 Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal
Pradesh
7 J&K Bank 1081 565 Jammu & Kashmir
8 All India Development 600 600 Jharkhand
Assam, Manipur, Rajasthan,
Himachal Pradesh, Bihar,
9 Zoom Developers 13636 9770
Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh,
Mizoram
10 NICT 2158 2158 MP
11 SPANCO 3166 3050 Maharashtra
12 IL&FS 45 45 Sikkim
13 3i Infotech 7303 0 Goa
14 Vayam Technologies Ltd 6409 6409 Andhra Pradesh
15 United Telecom Ltd 2943 2943 Jharkhand
16 SARK 1361 1012 Bihar
17 TIMES 852 518 Andhra Pradesh
18 Kerala State IT Mission 2694 2694 Kerala
19 AP Online 765 702 Andhra Pradesh
20 e Sampark 13 13 Chandigarh
21 eGram SDA 7695 7695 Gujarat
22 Lokvani Kendra 836 836 UP
23 Comat Technologies 800 800 Karnataka
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EXHIBIT 9
SCA VS SDA PERFORMANCE (2009-2010)
SCA SDA
Connectivity 70% Appointment of Nodal Officers Done
Managing SD Done e-Readiness Only 5 of 70
services out
Monitoring Done Policy regulatory support Yes
Content and Service Done Integration of services <1% of e-district
Management services
operational
Coordination with SPV Done Help in identifying CSC No
Creating awareness at the Done Selection of SCAs Done
village level
Training VLEs Done Facilitating training and capacity No
building
Scouting VLEs 80% Awareness No
Monitoring and disbursing Partial
revenue support
EXHIBIT 10
SAHAJ CSC ROLLOUT 2007-2010
State 2009 2010 Total
Assam 2,452 381 2,833
Bihar 3,547 1,073 4,620
Odisha 1,571 855 2,426
Uttar Pradesh 960 85 1,045
Tamil Nadu 2,269 3,100 5,369
West Bengal 4,714 935 5,649
Total 15,513 6,429 21,942
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EXHIBIT 11
SAHAJ PROSPECTIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
• General Insurance • Two-wheeler and tractor

• Gas cylinder booking sales
• Renewal premium • Learning solutions
• Ezeego1.com • Life insurance
• PFRDA*
High Ticket, Low High Ticket, High

Engagement Engagement
Low Ticket, Low Low Ticket, High

Engagement Engagement
• Utility Payments • Agriculture services

• eg. BSNL bill payment, • Consultation services
mobile and DTH charges, • Commercial tax
IRCTC ticketing, courier • G2C
service
• UID
* Please refer to the List of Abbreviations for all abbreviations in this exhibit.
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EXHIBIT 12
SAHAJ FINANCIALS 2008-2010 (IN INR MILLIONS)
Sl. Particulars 2008-09 (in Millions) 2008-10 (in Millions)

A Shareholders Fund 10 10
B Debt 514.5 1168.5
C Service Turnover 913.5 517
1 Financial Services 1.9 62.9
2 e-Learning 0.2 30.4
3 Consumer Products 0 0
4 Financial Inclusion 0 0
5 e-Tailing 0 0
6 Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 0 0
7 Rural Media 0 0
8 G2C Services 0 0
9 Connectivity Charges 0 9.8
10 CSC Fees 0 23.9
11 IT Hardware Sales 0 0
12 VLE Hardware Sales 911.4 390
D Revenue Support 150.7 371.4
E Misc. Income 1.7 3.3
F Total Income 1065.9 891.7
G COGS 905.1 423.7
H Gross Profit 160.8 468
I Operating Expenses 106.6 328.7
1 Employee Cost 31 79.8
2 Admin Expenses 35.6 168.7
3 Connectivity Charges 0 60.5
4 Other IT Cost 0 0
5 Sales & Marketing Exp. 0 19.7
6 Other Operating Expenses 40 0
J EBIDTA 54.2 139.3
O No. of VLEs 0 0
P No. of Transacting VLEs 0 0
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
APL Above Poverty Line

BPL Below Poverty Line
BSNL Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
CSC Common Services Centre
DAR&PG Department of Reforms and Public Grievances
DIT Department of Information Technology
DTH Direct-to-home (Broadcasting Service)
G2C Government to Citizen
IAY Indira Awas Yojana
IGNOU Indira Gandhi National Open University
IL&FS Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services
IRCTC Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Limited
MDM Mid-day meal
MGNREGA Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
MKCL Maharashtra Knowledge Corporation Ltd.
MMPs Mission Mode Projects
NABARD National Board for Agriculture and Rural Development
NeGP National e-Governance Plan
NIC National Informatics Centre
NIELIT National Institute of Electronics and Information Technology
NIOS National Institute of Open Schooling
NLSA National Level Service Agency
PAN Permanent Account Number
PC Personal Computer
PFRDA Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority
PPP Public Private Partnership
RBD Retail Business Division
SBD Strategy Business Division
SCA Service Centre Agency
SDA State Designated Agency
SDC State Data Centre
SGSY Swarnajyoti Gram Swarojgar Yojana
SHG Self Help Group
SSA Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan
SSDG State Service Delivery Gateway
SWAN State-wide Area Network
UID Unique Identification Number
UIDAI Unique Identification Authority of India
VLE Village Level Entrepreneur

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Indian School of Business

December 22, 2016

Rajesh Chakrabarti | Digvijay Singh Sujlana

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

Dr Sabahat Azim, Chief Executive Officer, SREI Sahaj e-Village, added:

THE NATIONAL E-GOVERNANCE PLAN—ROUTE TO AN ENABLED,

1. Ensure connectivity across the administrative setup.

Implementation of the CSC Scheme

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 3

Role of the NLSA

x Role of the state government x Role of the SDA

4 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

The Role of the SDA

Implementation of the 3-Tier Framework—The UP Story

THE BIDDING STORY

6 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

THE CSC IDEOLOGY

The Master Service Agreement

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 7

The management now focused on Sahaj and the actual rollout.

Challenges in the Rollout

The Beginnings of the Rollout

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 9

The Challenges Ahead

THE ROAD AHEAD

12 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

1. Ensuring systemic viability and sustainability of the CSC scheme.

G2C B2C Education Financial Inclusion Other

Source: CSC SPV website, https://apna.csc.gov.in, accessed on February 11, 2016

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 13

a.) About Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services

b.) Objectives of the study to be conducted by the NLSA (IL&FS)

1. To test the criteria for selection of the CSC locations

Source: IL&FS website, www.ilfsindia.com, accessed on February 10, 2016.

14 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

1. Profiling nodal villages

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 15

a.) Selected Service Center Agencies (SCAs) in UP and Bidding Details

Varanasi Varanasi, Allahabad, SREI Infrastructure 3,669 0

b.) Sample Revenue Model (in INR)

16 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

Rural Development Health Education

Animal Husbandry Agriculture Planning Development

Food & Civil Supplies Financial Service Others

Source: Company Sources (Sahaj).

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 17

Total No. of No. of

Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Bihar,

Source: Company Sources (Sahaj).

18 | SREI Sahaj e-Village (A)

Source: Company Sources (Sahaj).

State 2009 2010 Total

Assam 2,452 381 2,833

Bihar 3,547 1,073 4,620

Odisha 1,571 855 2,426

Uttar Pradesh 960 85 1,045

Tamil Nadu 2,269 3,100 5,369

West Bengal 4,714 935 5,649

Total 15,513 6,429 21,942

Source: Company Sources (Sahaj).

SREI Sahaj e-Village (A) | 19

• General Insurance • Two-wheeler and tractor

High Ticket, Low High Ticket, High