emergence, many theories were proposed, each
LANGUAGE IN THE SYSTEM OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Ibragimova N.A.
Email: nayira@inbox.ru
Foreign languages department, Tashkent University
of Information Technologies named after Muhammad
al – Khwarizmi, Amir Timur str.108, Tashkent,
Uzbekistan
Abstract
The article is devoted to the analysis of one
of the approaches to the definition of rationality.
Researchers who develop this approach argue that
the essential signs of conscious behavior can be
identified based on a consideration of how a
person uses his natural language in
communicative actions. In this case, the above
general problem begins to be discussed at the
linguistic level. Artificial intelligence is also a
communicative system. In this case, a special
language-interface is used, which provides an
interactive form of interaction between a human
and a computer, i.e., their communication. The
question arises: does computer use the language
in the same way as a human? If we can answer
this question positively, then the AI system will
be attributed to the property of rational behavior,
if the answer is negative, then we will be able to
find out what the computer lacks in order to rise
to the level of human consciousness.
Key words: artificial intelligence,
intellectual abilities, actions, mental
operations, hieroglyphic writing, psychic
life.
1. Introduction
What is the ratio of human consciousness and
artificial intelligence systems? Is computer
capable of performing mental operations? Can
we seriously call such operations a manifestation
of intelligent activity?As the half-century
tradition of AI philosophy (philosophy of
artificial intelligence) shows, that suchquestions
are not idle and do not suggest, as it might seem
at first glance, unequivocal negative answers.
The fact is that to determine the degree of AI
system, you must first establish criteria for
implementation of intelligent actions relative to
the human consciousness itself. It is necessary to
define what we understand by essential signs of
intelligence in general, in order to try to detect
these signs in AI systems. Hence, philosophy
approached the discussion of the problems
associated with the artificial intelligence

of which defined in its own way the essential
signs of intelligence. Hence, the answers about
the intellectual abilities of artificial systems also
turned out to be different - some attributed signs
of mental activity and conscious behavior, were
denied by them.
One of the most famous in the history of AI
philosophy of critical arguments about the
rationality of artificial systems in the framework
of linguistic approach was so-called “Argument
of the Chinese room” put forward by the
American philosopher D.Searle in the early 80s.
The essence of this argument is as follows. For
example, a person who speaks only English is
placed in a room isolated from the outside world
and is provided with a Chinese text for
reading.Naturally, in view of the fact that he has
nounderstanding of the meaning of Chinese
characters, the text is a set of ink squiggles on a
sheet of paper for him - a person does not
understand anything. Then he is given another
sheet of paper, written in Chinese, and in
addition to this, a specific instruction in his
native English about how one could compare
two Chinese texts. This instruction teaches the
identification of identical symbols and the
determination of the pattern of their entry into a
more general context. When a third Chinese text
is brought in, a second English instruction is put
on it comparing the latter with the two previous
ones, and so on.In the end, after prolonged
exercise, the subject is brought a blank sheet of
paper and asked to write something in Chinese.
By this time, the person from the Chinese room
had mastered the formal symbolic patterns so
well that, surprisingly, he was really able to
write a text that was quite coherent and
comprehensible to any literate Chinese. Well,
and finally, in order to produce the proper
effect, a person is taken out of the room for
viewing in a wide glimpse and presented as an
Englishman who has learned Chinese, that the
culprit of the presentation will not hesitate to
confirm with his impeccable knowledge of
hieroglyphic writing.
2. Research area
So does our test person understand Chinese?
Searle gives a negative answer to this question.
Understanding must be accompanied by acts of
so-called primary intentionality, in which
consciousness, even before any reference to any




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 material carriers, i.e., to speech or writing, is able
to concentrate on inner intentional (semantic)
contents, which are not reduced to anything other
facts of autonomous psychic life. The
intentionality of a language is derivative, it arises
when intentionally endowing initially empty
characters with meaning, by replacing the
internal semantic content with the propositional
content of syntactically organized structures.
For the public, who evaluated the results of
training a person from the Chinese room, there
was an illusion that the subject really mastered
Chinese. The reason for this illusion lies in the
habit in accordance with which people assumed
for the propositional contents of the syntactic
forms produced by man his internal intentional
contents, which were the basis of the former. But
in fact, training in the Chinese room brought
directly opposite results. Man learned formal
operations with a sign system without any of his
own “intentional participation” in this enterprise.
The propositional contents of the Chinese letters
on display only made sense to those who could
really back them up with more fundamental
intentional contents of their psyche. The man
from the Chinese room did not understand
anything of what he wrote.
3. Hypothesis
According to Searle, the test of the Englishman
is completelysimilar to the work of AI. Artificial
intelligence, in spite of any intensification in the
field of technology, can never reach the level of
human consciousness precisely because of the
impossibility of overcoming the fundamental gap
between primary and derivative intentions. With
the help of special programs that tune in to the
formal operation of symbolic formations, AI can
create illusions of the most powerful mental
activity, many times exceeding the abilities of
human consciousness. The results of such an AI
activity are, in fact, extremely beneficial to
humans. Nevertheless, we have no reason to
indulge in the illusion of the existence of
"brothers in intelligence." AI does not think. All
the work on the meaningful filling of empty
symbolic structures is undertaken by the person,
“attaching” the latter to internal intentional
contents - the true elements of intelligent life.
From the position of the linguistic approach in
AI-philosophy, the Searle argument asserts that
the language of artificial systems has no
semantics. All work in the human-computer
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interface system on the machine side occurs
exclusively at the syntactic level. The computer
is “trained” to certain programs —
communication algorithms of the symbolic
elements of the sign system, so that an
impression arises regarding their semantic
loading.
Take as an example the work of the
geographical e-encyclopedia. The AI system is
programmed to receive a request from the
person: “What is the name of the capital of
Nepal?”, To give the answer: “Kathmandu”.At
the same time, it is obvious that the computer
does not understand what is behind the
characters of the language used in this query -
semantically, they are empty for it. Simply, the
directive is given in the corresponding program:
“when a request is a single syntactic complex, to
issue another as a response”.
A machine can act like a formal logician. Apart
from any meaningful content, it is capable of
assessing the truth of complex statements based
on an analysis of the truth functions of the
components of simple attribute judgments. It is
able to assess the truth of the conclusion in the
case of a meaningful statement “If it is raining
outside, then the asphalt is wet” and in the case
of a statement made in gibberish language: “If
the guns are ruined, then the bruises are thorn”.
By combining logical electronic microcircuits,
the principle of operation of which will
correspond to the truth functions for logical
unions, in a general scheme, we can construct
an electrical circuit that simulates very complex
deductive reasoning.We know that in logic,
using the method of truth tables, we can
estimate the reliability of the derivation from a
certain number of premises. Take for example
the reasoning: “Three are suspected of the
crime: Ivanov, Petrov, Sidorov. They gave the
following testimony. Ivanov claimed that if
Sidorov committed the crime, Petrov did not
commit it. Petrov insisted that if Ivanov
committed a crime, Sidorov also participated in
this; but if Ivanov had nothing to do with it, then
he did it himself, or Sidorov. Sidorov denied his
guilt, but insisted on the guilt of either Petrov or
Ivanov. Provided everyone was telling the truth,
who is guilty? ”We formalize it in such a way as
to evaluate the accuracy of the conclusion about
the guilt of each suspect:
When building the corresponding truth tables, it
turns out that we can confidently assert Petrov’s
guilt. The AI system will come to the same
conclusion, and it will make these logical
 calculations much faster than a person.
However, this “deductive dexterity” of the
machine will only confirm Searl’s thesis - it is
this incredible syntactic power, the speed with
which characters operate, that fascinates us in
the operation of a computer. Nevertheless, no
matter how dizzying the operations connected
with the syntax of the formal sign system, the
computer will never be able to independently
ask them any semantic interpretation.
4. Research method
Based on the information about the morphology
of the language, the machine can even imitate the
production of related text. It is known that one or
another part of speech obeys the specific laws of
word formation, and therefore this process can
also be formalized. For example, reading the
phrase: “GlosseKuzdrabodlanlabokra and
refreshes bokrenka” we can assume here the
presence of parts of speech - nouns, verbs and
adjectives - the structure of which formally
resembles the usual, ie, semantically loaded
terms of our natural language. These
morphological elements, again in accordance
with certain syntactic rules, will occupy
corresponding places in sentences - places of
subject, predicate, definitions, etc. If the machine
is programmed to conform to all of these rules,
its success can also be very impressive.However,
in this case, the AI system will behave in exact
similarity with the above-mentioned character
from the Chinese room, who has learned only the
delicate handling of the syntactic elements of the
sign system according to certain rules without
any semantic interpretation.
So, on the basis of the Searle`s argument of the
Chinese room, we can assert that, from the point
of view of the linguistic approach, AI-philosophy
will be considered an essential feature of
intelligent activity to be the ability to interpret
the semantic system of signs. And this is not the
sign of artificial intelligence systems.
The argument of the Chinese room provoked
heated discussions within the framework of the
tradition of AI philosophy. Here were found both
his followers and opponents. Some argued that
the ability to semantic interpretation really could
not be attributed to the AI system, others insisted
that in a certain sense this ability could not be
attributed to even a person. At the same time, all
tacitly agreed with the theses regarding syntax.
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An interesting point in the study of this problem,
which we would like to draw attention to in this
article, is that a decade later, the same D. Searle
revised his own argument in a very original way.
This time, the question was about syntax. But
can we, in fact, assert - since we did it earlier -
that a machine is capable of executing syntax
procedures within a given sign system? Now the
American philosopher gave a negative answer to
this question.
In order to clarify the meaning of Searle's
argument, let us again recall, to begin with,
an Englishman who studies Chinese.The
critical argument regarding semantics began
with the fact that a person does not
understand the meanings of symbols written
on paper. Mastering the formal rules of
operations with these symbols, he masters a
certain syntactic technique that creates the
illusion of semantic awareness. However, in
describing this linguistic action, have we not
missed one important point that we should
pay attention to even before the start of the
formulation of a critical argument regarding
semantics? What exactly can a person see on
the sheets of paper put at his
disposal?Strictly speaking, on the physical
level on a sheet of paper only a chaotic set
of ink spots of various shapes is visible. It
turns out that before stating his ignorance
about the semantics of the language, a
person from the Chinese room should
already define a certain syntactic
interpretation! He must understand these
inkblots on a sheet of paper precisely as
signs, which may have been united by some
system of functioning rules, making up a
single whole - language. He has to
understand that these inkblots in principle
can mean something.When considering how
a particular subject — whether a person or a
machine — masters and uses the language,
the syntax should not arise according to the
principle of Deus ex machina. There is no
syntax on the physical level in the medium
of the material carriers of linguistic
structures. In order for a material object to
be familiar, it should be given not only a
semantic interpretation, which will show
what this sign actually means, but also,
above all, a syntactic interpretation, which
will show that this material object can in
principle denote, i.e. is a sign.
 It is known that computer science was based
on the ingenious in its simplicity idea that
was produced by American mathematicians
and technicians, in particular Claude
Shannon, the combination of logic and
electricity. By that time - the 30th years of
the twentieth century. - in logic, a new
approach has already firmly established
itself, based on the merging of formal-
logical symbolism and the language of
mathematics. First, on the basis of J. Boole's
algebra, which was a formalization of
arithmetic operations, it was proposed to use
the algebraic language to formalize the
logical process of reasoning. Symbols were
introduced for all possible logical constants
that characterize the formal elements in
judgments - logical unions.Negation "-",
disjunction "V", conjunction "&",
implication " ", identity " ". Then it was
proposed to replace the logical referents
“true” and “false” with arithmetic symbols 1
and 0.Then G. Frege and other philosophers
of the analytical tradition built a system of
referencing for each logical union — these
were the so-called truth tables. Thus, it
became possible to evaluate the truth of any
complex utterance based on the analysis of
the components of its simple utterances and
their truth functions. All this, in turn, led to
the possibility of formal control over the
system of discursive reasoning in general,
i.e. to the evaluation of the logical sequence
and the need for conclusions from the
premises of any degree of complexity.
The novelty of the computer science idea
was only that it was proposed to interpret the
presence or absence of voltage in an
electrical circuit as signs of arithmetic
symbols 1 and 0, respectively. So there was
a digital computer. Now all the logical ideas
on the analysis of reasoning could be
modeled at the electrical level by creating
the corresponding circuit elements - first
electric lamps, then transistors, and, finally,
electronic microcircuits coded to perform an
imitation of the truth function of any logical
union.
Let's pay attention to the key elements of
this process of interpretation. First, the
numbers 1 and 0 were understood as the
signs of logical referents "true" and "false."
In this case, arithmetic turned out to be
syntax for logical semantics. But does this
syntax mean “machine ontology”? That is, is
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computer hardware really a bunch of zeros
and ones? If this were the case, the idea of
computer science would not be of any value.
5. Results of the research
The fact of the matter is that physics has no
syntax at all. The presence of voltage in an
electrical circuit is not yet one. This is only
the presence of voltage in the electrical
circuit. Let us imagine in the course of the
situation that we are screwing a light bulb
into a cartridge of a desk lamp with a poor
quality of contact of current conductors. The
light bulb then lights up, then goes out - will
we consider these physical layer events to be
the transmission of, say, some encrypted
code? In this case, of course, no. This is
precisely the primary interpretative step - to
understand a certain level of electrical
voltage as a sign. And so far no matter what
sign: a logical referent or, say, a warning
about the danger of fire. The physical level
as a material carrier of linguistic expressions
must first be semantically firstly received a
syntactic interpretation, which is set
externally, through the user by this sign
system.
When using the electronic encyclopedia I
ask a question about the capital of Nepal and
get a proper answer, then the machine not
only does not understand the meanings of
the symbols with which it operates
according to a certain algorithm, it does not
even constitute a formal syntax system. At
the physical level, after about one case of a
high voltage level, in a certain part of the
circuit another case arises - that’s all. In
order for these high voltage facts to be
understood as signs that can obey certain
operational rules of their combination, it is
necessary to set the initial syntactic
interpretation, which the programmer will
use later in formulating the corresponding
algorithm of operations.
Interestingly, in connection with the
appearance of this argument regarding the
syntax of the AI system in cognitive science,
discussions around the so-called
homunculus problem erupted with new
force. In parallel with the development of
computer science and AI philosophy in
cognitive science based on modern advances
in neurophysiology, research based on
interpreting the brain as a digital computer
began to manifest itself very aptly. It is
known that at the physical level, the
 movement of neurons is, in a certain sense, Jose; Reid, Ian; Leonard, John J. (December
the movement of electric charges, and neural
2016). "Past, Present, and Future of
circuits can be likened to electrical circuits.
Simultaneous Localization and Mapping:
If we understand a computer as a cluster of
information encoded in digital form, then it Toward the Robust-Perception Age". IEEE
would be equally possible to treat the work Transactions on Robotics. 32 (6): 1309–
of the brain. In this view, the brain turned 1332. arXiv:1606.05830.Bibcode:2016arXiv1606
out to be similar to a machine, where 05830C.doi:10.1109/TRO.2016.2624754.
“hardware” is the physical presence of
neural connections, on which syntactic and [2] Chan, Szu Ping (15 November 2015). "This
semantic interpretations are superimposed.
is what will happen when robots take over the
However, even if the syntax does not belong
world". Retrieved23 April 2018.
to physics, but is introduced to the material
level externally, then a problem arises. Who
sets such syntactic interpretations? [3] Russell, Stuart J.; Norvig,
Everything is simpler with the computer that Peter (2009). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern
we buy in the store - here the user sets the Approach (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, New
interpretation. But what about the brain? It Jersey: Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-604259-4.
turns out that in addition to who is the
physical carrier of neural connections, there
[4] McCorduck, Pamela (2004), Machines Who
must also exist someone who interprets
Think (2nd ed.), Natick, MA: A. K. Peters,
these neural connections as syntactic
elements of the system. This is how the Ltd.,ISBN 1-56881-205-1
problem of the homunculus arises - a kind of
“mind in the mind,” the one who interprets [5] McCorduck, Pamela (2004), Machines Who
physics. In essence, from the point of view Think (2nd ed.), Natick, MA: A. K. Peters,
of material ontology, there are no zeros and Ltd.,ISBN 1-56881-205-1
ones in the brain, like in a computer.
In general, the problem of the homunculus
deserves more attention and may be the
subject of study of a separate work. We will
not further develop this topic here. In
accordance with the intended purpose, we
should understand the issue of differences in
the use of language by the AI system and the
person in order to fix the essential signs of
rationality.The conclusions we come to on
the basis of the above sum of arguments are
as follows.
1. The ability of human consciousness to
assign both semantic and, above all,
syntactic interpretations to any material
formations of the natural world so that these
formations receive the status of a sign
system should be considered essential signs
of rationality from the point of view of the
linguistic approach in AI philosophy.
2. The artificial intelligence system does not
possess the above abilities.

References

[1] Cadena, Cesar; Carlone, Luca; Carrillo,

Henry; Latif, Yasir; Scaramuzza, Davide; Neira,

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