See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/235932742

THE FIRST INDO-PAKISTANI WAR, 1947-48

Article · March 2013

CITATIONS READS

0 46,060

1 author:

Peter Almos Kiss

Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF)
16 PUBLICATIONS   8 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

asymmetric warfare View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Peter Almos Kiss on 29 May 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Peter A. Kiss

THE FIRST INDO-PAKISTANI WAR, 1947-48

Abstract: The confrontation between India and Pakistan dates from the first day of their
independence from the British Empire, and the first war they fought was over the possession
of Jammu and Kashmir. The war was a limited affair – limited in its goals, in a limited
theatre, with limited means. It was the first modern war in which one of the belligerents
(Pakistan) relied on an artificially created and nurtured insurgency in the target area to realize
its political goals. The experiment – partly due to lack of doctrinal foundations and lack of
experience – had only limited success, but its results encouraged Pakistan to rely on
insurgents and irregular militias in the enemy's rear in it later wars.

Keywords: India, Pakistan, Partition of India, Jammu and Kashmir, asymmetric warfare,
Pathan tribal militia, Azad Kashmir

This short and limited war is a fascinating story for several reasons. Its most significant
element is the employment of non-state actors as combatants in service of a state’s interests.
The employment of non-state combatants was only partly successful, but the events have
shown how a modern state can deploy the principles, tactics, techniques and procedures of
asymmetric warfare against another, much stronger state. The events of the war also call
attention to the fact that contrary to the contemporary western attitude – which lingers on to
this day – there is absolutely no difference between western and Asian soldiers, when the
latter are properly trained and led. Asian officers are able to plan and execute large-scale
operations, control, move and support divisions and corps without the benefit of western
advisors, and their command performance can meet the highest standards. Asian soldiers
under Asian officers and NCOs can fight with as much skill as, and their self-sacrificing
heroism and professional behaviour can be a match to, or even surpass, any European or
American regular force.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In spite of the economic and strategic advantages the colonies represented, maintaining a
large colonial empire was a huge burden for Great Britain after World War Two. The Labour

1
Party made the dissolution of the empire a key part of its post-war agenda, and following its
electoral victory in 1945 it set about granting independence to those colonies that were
sufficiently developed to stand on their own as sovereign states – and India was among the
first.
Although the Muslims were in a significant numerical minority in India, they had dominated
the subcontinent for hundreds of years. This dominant role ended by the middle of the 19th
century, as the European empires gradually extended their rule over India. The Muslims could
not come to terms with the loss of their power, influence and privileges and adjusted to the
new social order with great difficulty. They barely tolerated the rule of the Christian infidels,
and simply could not imagine living under the rule of peoples they had subjugated and
despised for centuries – the Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs – even if independent India
promised secular democracy and free exercise of religion.1 Their mass organization, the
Muslim League, insisted on creating a Muslim state as part of the independence process.
Pakistan – the Land of the Pure – was created by combining the Muslim-majority parts of the
country (in the west Sindh, Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province, and the western part
of the Punjab, and East Bengal in the east). (See Figure 1.)
According to the law governing the independence process (the Independence of India Act) the
rulers of India’s nearly 600 states could decide to join India or Pakistan, or remain
independent. Most rulers had no real choice: geography and demographics made the decision
for them, but in the case of Kashmir the question was more complicated.2 The state's location
on the borders of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China made it a strategically important
place for both India and Pakistan. The ruler was Hindu, but the majority (about 2/3) of the
population was Muslim. However, even among the Muslims there was no consensus on the
country’s future: the most influential politician, Sheik Abdullah was opposed to India’s
partition, but if that had to be, then he stood for Kashmiri independence. The Maharaja could
not – or did not want to – make a decision: he hoped that if he delayed the decision long
enough, Kashmir could become an independent, sovereign state.
India could perhaps have accepted an independent Kashmir, but Pakistan insisted that the
Muslim-majority state should join the Muslim Pakistan. Pakistan's head of state, Ali Jinnah,
was ready to settle the matter by force, but that would have led to open war with India – and

1
As India’s independence was becoming a reality, the Muslims had reason to fear Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist,
Christian, Jaini, Jewish and other religious payback for centuries of abuse. (Goel, no year)
2
"Kashmir" as a geographic term is applied to the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir; to the Pakistani state of
Azad Kashmir; to the Kashmir valley, and to the independent principality of Jammu and Kashmir.

2
the Pakistani armed forces, which were just being created, were nowhere near strong enough.
In order to avoid the embarrassing spectacle of former colonies obtaining independence and
immediately attacking each other, the British government would also have prevented open
conflict. Even before independence was declared, the Pakistani government already applied
economic pressure: it halted traffic on the only railroad line going into Kashmir, confiscated
Kashmiri trucks and blocked the importation of essential staples and fuels (food grains, sugar,
salt, gasoline, household kerosene) into Kashmir. Economic blockades generally work slowly,
and it was not different in Kashmir’s case either. Since the blockade did not achieve results
fast enough, the leading politicians of the Muslim League and senior officers of the armed
forces (either with or without Jinnah's approval) prepared a plan which promised a swift
resolution, yet kept the risk of open conflict with India at a minimum. The plan very nearly
succeeded.

Figure 1. India and Pakistan after August 15, 1947. The red oval marks Jammu and
Kashmir. Source: http://www.oberlin.edu/faculty/svolk/367f07syllabus-main.htm

3
SPACE-FORCES-TIME-INFORMATION FACTORS
Space – Kashmir's Military-Geographic Characteristics
Jammu and Kashmir has an area of 222 000 square km; its north-south extent is 640 km, east-
west it is 480 km. Only small patches of this area are suitable for permanent human
habitation. The altitude above sea level varies between 300 and 7000 meters. Tall mountain
ranges divide the country into the following regions:
- In the north, between the Karakoram Range and the northern peaks of the Himalayas the
Northern Areas consist of the Indus valley, Gilgit, Hunza and Baltistan.
- Southeast of the Northern Areas Ladakh consists of the Ladakh and Zanskar ranges and the
Indus valley.
- The Kashmir valley and the state's summer capital, Srinagar, are south of the Himalayas.
- To the southwest, beyond the Pir Panjal range is the Jammu region and the city of Jammu,
the winter capital.
The mountain ranges are not only recognizable boundaries between the regions, but as nearly
impenetrable barriers, also play a significant role in maintaining the local ethnic, cultural and
linguistic differences. The ranges also divided the theatre of operations into four nearly
entirely isolated sectors. Possession or loss of the few narrow mountain passes played a
decisive role during the operation. (See Figure 2.)
The climate is determined by latitude (about the same as Morocco), as well as altitude. Jammu
(average altitude: 305 m) is subtropical. The Kashmir valley (1700 m) is temperate
continental, the Northern Areas and Ladakh (2500-3500 m) are high mountain deserts.3 In the
mountain ranges the unpredictable weather makes flying a hazardous undertaking. Due to the
thin air the use of parachutes is risky, and the performance of internal combustion engines is
inferior to that at sea level. Troops transferred from low-lying regions (primarily the Indian
forces) suffered greatly from the lack of oxygen and the intense cold. For the Pakistani forces
(organized primarily from local militias) this was far less of a problem.
In 1947 the infrastructure of Jammu and Kashmir was quite primitive – and whatever there
was depended on Pakistan: the all-weather roads followed the river courses and led through
Pakistani territory. From India there were only two fair weather roads into Kashmir: the dirt
road from Pathankot to Srinagar, which ran through the Banihal Pass at 2700 m elevation, and
the caravan trail from Manali to Ladakh. Only a spur of India’s well-developed rail network
ran into Kashmir – but that also ran through Pakistani territory, through Wazirabad. The

3
The elevation figures are for the low-lying areas of the regions only. The peaks are between 5000 and 7000 m.

4
throughput capacity of the roads and the weight bearing capacity of the bridges strictly limited
the numbers, equipment and supply of the forces that could be deployed.

Figure 2. The original borders and current partition of Jammu and Kashmir.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, 2003

The Srinagar and Jammu airfields were suitable for landing modern transport aircraft, but
Srinagar was usable only in daylight. The larger lakes and some stretches of the rivers were
navigable by small boats, but this had very infrequent and only limited, local tactical
significance (for example in infiltrating small raiding parties).

5
Forces
The Indian Army had been one of the most significant components of the British Empire’s
armed forces; the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force were far less important, but they were
far from negligible forces. During World War II the armed forces of British India expanded to
2 500 000; Indian forces fought in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The officer
corps was 2/3 British, but as time passed, an increasing number of Indian officers also reached
substantial rank. In 1947, following post-war demobilization, the strength of the armed forces
was about 460 000 (12 000 officers and 440 000 non-commissioned officers and other ranks).
The various Indian principalities had their own armed forces; these amounted to another
75 000.
According to the Independence of India Act, two thirds of the personnel and material
resources of the armed forces were to go to India, one third to Pakistan; as the princely states
joined either India or Pakistan, their forces were also incorporated into the two national
armies. Nearly 150 000 men and 160 000 tons of war materiel had to be shifted to Pakistani
territory from India4 and from the other colonies of the empire. Due to the shortage of the
available time a fair and equitable division of materiel (and particularly of installations) was
impossible. The airbases were mostly in Pakistani territory, but only nine of the 46 training
establishments were there. The arsenals, supply dumps, repair installations and naval bases
were all in Indian territory.
The commanders of the armed forces were British officers (General Messervy in Pakistan,
General Lockhart in India). Instead of the Pakistani and Indian heads of state, they reported to
a British Commander In Chief (Field Marshal Auchinleck). Their actions and decisions served
the interests of Britain, rather than the national interests of India and Pakistan.
The Indian Armed Forces
In the division of British India’s army the new Indian Army obtained 88 infantry battalions,
12 armoured regiments and 19 artillery regiments.5 These were organized into 10 divisions
(nine infantry and one armour), an independent armour brigade and two parachute brigades.
Loss of entire units and one third of personnel significantly reduced the battle readiness of the
forces. However, several entirely Hindu, Sikh and Gurkha battalions were unaffected. Even
the mixed battalions generally lost only one or two companies, but the units themselves, with

4
It is a frequently repeated Pakistani complaint that the Indian authorities sabotaged the delivery of war materiel:
instead of functional weapons, munitions and equipment they delivered mostly scrap.
5
Following the British pattern of organization, the armour, cavalry and artillery regiments were in reality
battalion-sized formations.

6
their special traditions and histories, remained and served as the cores that could be
augmented by newly recruited personnel and could be organized into larger formations.
Local militias – either spontaneously organized, or raised by the Indian Army – also took part
in some operations, especially in Ladakh.
The Indian Air Force was a respectable force, even after some of its equipment and
personnel were transferred to Pakistan. It had well trained and experienced personnel (900
officers and 10 000 non-commissioned officers and other ranks, 820 civilian technicians and
administrative staff), and was equipped with modern aircraft (Tempest and Spitfire fighters
and C47 Dakota transports). These forces were organized into seven fighter squadrons and
one transport squadron. The transport squadron had only eight C47 aircraft, but its lift
capacity was multiplied by renting civilian airliners. Bomber squadrons were organized only
in late 1948, but these took no part in the war. The greatest problem of the Air force was the
shortage of adequate bases.
The Indian Navy came into existence with 19 warships (frigates and smaller surface
combatants) and 15 other vessels (tugs, landing craft, etc). The Navy did not play any role in
combat operations.
The Pakistani Armed Forces
The centuries of rejectionist attitude of India’s Muslims had a particularly grave effect on the
organization of the Pakistani Army. In the British Indian Army there were several entirely
Hindu, Sikh and Nepali (Gurkha) battalions, but very few entirely Muslim ones. Pakistan
received 33 infantry battalions, six armoured and nine artillery regiments from The British
Indian Army – but most were not complete units, only their various elements. Many Muslim
soldiers opted for service in India, so even the Muslim companies were arriving in Pakistan
without their full complement. Therefore, most formations lacked the hard and firm core,
which could have been organized into larger combat formations. The shortage of officers was
another serious problem: the planned 150 000-man army needed a minimum of 4 000 officers,
but there were only 2 300 available, among them a major general, two brigadiers and 53
colonels.6 As a temporary solution British and other European officers were hired. In spite of
the difficulties, organization proceeded fairly quickly. New regiments were formed by
amalgamating parts of old ones; under strength formations were filled with units and men
arriving from India, Africa, the Middle East and the other parts of Asia, as well as new
recruits. In August 1947 a two-brigade division (the 7th) was formed in Rawalpindi. By

6
Hassan, 2004. p. 32

7
October that year there were already ten infantry brigades and one armour brigade (with 13
light tanks) guarding Pakistan’s borders. The brigades were organized into four divisions in
West Pakistan and one division in East Pakistan.
Pathan tribal militias from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province played an important role
in the Pakistani operations in Kashmir. Every Pathan tribe was instructed to raise a lashkar
(battalion) of about 1 000 men, to serve as assault forces. In September 1947 the lashkars
were concentrated around the border garrisons, where they were provided with arms,
ammunition and vehicles.7 The Pathans were a warlike people, but they were no soldiers.
They were familiar with small arms, but could not operate advanced weapons and
communications equipment. They were masters of the tactics commonly employed in tribal
warfare (raiding, hit and run attacks, ambushes, long distance opportunistic sniping), but they
were not familiar with the principles of modern tactics, and military discipline was completely
alien to their nature.8 To compensate for some of these shortcomings every lashkar had a
number of Pakistani officers and non-commissioned officers (either “recently discharged” or
“on leave”) assigned to it to operate the communications equipment and crew-served
weapons, and to provide tactical advice.
Kashmiris in favour of joining Pakistan established local volunteer militias, first in the area of
Poonch, later in other areas of west and south Kashmir. A prominent politician of the Muslim
League, Kurshid Anwar, became the commander of the militias.9 The militias fought
primarily in the vicinity of their recruiting areas, and gradually became the semi-regular
forces of the provisional government of Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir).
Three aviation squadrons formed the nucleus of the Pakistani Air Force. Personnel strength
was 220 officers (among them 65 pilots) 2 000 non-commissioned officers and other ranks,
and 400 civilian technicians and administrative staff. The equipment consisted of modern
fighter (Tempests and Spitfires) and transport (C47 Dakota) aircraft. The air force was
initially organized into two fighter squadrons and one transport squadron. As Pakistan had
been British India’s western border region and its initial line of defence against a Russian
threat, the three squadrons had a choice of seven airbases. The Air Force played only a limited
role in the course of events: Pakistan wanted to maintain the pretence of having nothing to do

7
According to Indian sources the payment promised to the lashkars was to loot the Maharaja’s palace and
treasury in Srinagar. Their logistic support was minimal: they were issued weapons and ammunition in their
assembly areas, but subsistence, billeting and treatment of their wounded was up to them – obviously at the
expense of the local population.
8
Much of this assessment holds true of the Pathans to this day.
9
The weak point of the militias – and of the entire enterprise – was the lack of firm, centralized leadership.

8
with events in Kashmir – in any case, the two fighter squadrons could not have stood against
the much stronger Indian Air Force.
The Pakistani Navy commenced operations with eight warships and eight other vessels, and
no naval bases. The navy played no role in the Kashmiri operations.
The Kashmiri Forces
Kashmir had its own armed force: about 9 000 men organised into four brigades (a total of
eight infantry battalions) as well as a household cavalry regiment. Kashmiri units participated
in the wars of the British Empire under their own officers and had some battlefield
experience, but the standard of their training was not particularly high. As a part of the British
Empire, Kashmir had had no reason to fear a foreign invasion, therefore the army performed
border security, constabulary and parade functions. A major problem was that nearly one
fourth of the personnel were Muslims, who sided with the Pakistani forces in the first days of
the conflict. In the course of events some of the non-Muslim units were disbanded, others
were amalgamated into the Indian Army.
Time
Studying the timeline of landmark events, it is surprising how quickly they followed each
other. The immediate preliminaries, from India’s partition to the first attacks by the Pathan
tribal militias, took only four months. The major combat operations, from landing the first
Indian troops in Kashmir to the ceasefire agreement took hardly more than a year. With the
electoral victory of the Labour Party in England independence was undoubtedly assured, and
the most closely affected local political decision makers probably made some plans in
advance. But the devil is in the details – and detailed plans could be developed and executed
only after Parliament passed the Independence of India Act, and the local political elites
learned of the plans and intentions of the British administration that was still in control of
India’s government.
From an operational perspective, time was not on the side of Pakistan: the initial operations
required close timing and had to be executed within narrow time-constraints. When these
failed, Pakistan could not match the pace at which India built up its forces in the theatre. On
the other hand, time may have served Pakistan strategically. With the passage of decades the
international community seems to have accepted Pakistan's occupation of the Northern Areas
and western Kashmir as permanent. On the other hand, legitimacy of India's sovereignty over
the rest of Kashmir has been put into doubt by continuous Muslim insurgencies in the
Kashmir valley and to a lesser extent in Jammu (supported by Pakistan), as well as Pakistan's
diplomatic efforts.

9
Information
Dividing British India’s intelligence organization, the Intelligence Bureau, was also part of
Partition, but neither India, nor Pakistan benefited from this. They took over empty offices
and bare shelves: the British destroyed the Bureau’s holdings. In any case, neither country
would have profited much, even if the Bureau’s files had remained intact. The Information
Bureau’s primary function had been to support the perpetuation of British rule, and the
information it had collected on individuals and organizations that threatened that rule would
not have been useful in the conflict.
Thus, India’s government and armed forces were deaf and blind on August 15, 1947 – the day
of independence. Pakistan fared only marginally better: the director of the IB (Gulam
Mohamed) and much of its staff were Muslims and chose to enter Pakistani service – although
they took no useful information with them, they did have the professional skills needed to
build up an intelligence organization quickly.
At the beginning of the war Pakistan had a clear informational advantage, nevertheless. It
could focus its available intelligence assets on the selected target area, and as the belligerent
with the initiative, it knew when, where and in what strength it was going to attack. Pakistan
could not retain this advantage for long, once operations commenced.

THE BELLIGERENTS’ PLANS

Independent India has always been more fortunate with its generals than with its politicians
(perhaps starting with the heart and soul of independence, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi).
The Indian political elite that came into power in 1947 was strongly influenced by Gandhi’s
philosophy of ahimsa (nonviolence): “peace-loving India” will have no need for strategic
defence plans or intelligence organizations – perhaps it could even do without armed forces.
Without a functioning intelligence organization neither the Indian government, nor the armed
forces were provided with timely and reliable information on the events in Kashmir, so they
did not prepare any plans either to seize Kashmir by force, or prevent a Pakistani attempt to
do so.
The situation was different in Pakistan. When the economic blockade proved to be
ineffective, Pakistani politicians and the officers of the armed forces drew up a plan
(Operation Gulamarg) for a faster and more decisive resolution of the problem:
- irregular forces (primarily Pathan tribal militias) launch raids into Jammu and Kashmir
along the border, in order to force the dispersal of the state forces into many small
defensive packets.

10
- a revolutionary movement in the Northern Areas (that could not be reached from India)
shakes off the Maharajah’s rule and declares the territory’s accession to Pakistan;
- militias raised in the Northern Areas launch an offensive into Ladakh and occupy it before
the Indians could send in reinforcements;
- Muslims in the western and southern regions of the state (near the Pakistani border) revolt
and provoke violent government reaction;
- tribal militias recruited in Pakistan's Pathan regions execute cross-border raids to lure the
Kashmiri forces to the border region, where they can be defeated in detail;
- the Pathan militias invade the Kashmir valley and Jammu, ‘in order to support their fellow
Muslims suffering under Dogra oppression’; militia forces also infiltrate deeper into
Kashmir, to interdict the Srinagar airfield and the far weather road from India to the
Jammu region, and thereby prevent or delay the arrival of Indian reinforcements.
- the Pathan raiders occupy Kashmir’s capital, Srinagar;
- Pakistan dispatches regular forces to Kashmir, in order to ‘restore order,’ and at the same
time discretely force the Maharaja to join his state to Pakistan.
The Pakistani planners expected to be able to create an irreversible fait accompli by the time
India could react, and at the same time deny Pakistan’s role in the events. They started to
execute the plan even before the official date of independence.10
The goal of the Maharaja of Kashmir was to play off India and Pakistan against each other
long enough and thereby retain Jammu and Kashmir’s independence. If that was not possible,
his “Plan B” was to join India to Kashmir.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Indian historiography divides the war into ten phases, which seems way too many for such a
brief and limited conflict.
August – October 1947
In spite of the intentions of British, Indian and Pakistani politicians, India’s partition was
accompanied by serious violence. In the summer of 1947 riots broke out in the Punjab,

10
Pakistani sources are generally silent about this plan. According to the Pakistani version of events the
Pakistani government, the political leaders and the armed forces were only passive observers of the events –
albeit they sympathized with the Kashmiris. If Pakistanis played any active role, that was only due to
individual initiative. The one significant exception is Muhammad Akbar Khan: Raiders in Kashmir, who
discusses some parts of the plan.

11
Muslim refugees streamed into Pakistan, Sikhs and Hindus were fleeing to India.11 The
violence soon reached Jammu and Kashmir. The state forces did their best to maintain order
by suppressing both Hindu and Muslim violence, but whenever they tried to curb Muslims,
the press and the local Muslim politicians accused them of carrying out Hindu state terror
against a peaceful, innocent, defenceless religious minority. Pakistani propaganda accused the
Maharaja of planning the extermination or mass expulsion of the Muslim population. In
August open revolt broke out in Poonch and the first Muslim militia was raised.12 Attacks on
police stations and army garrisons became more frequent, and the organization of the Azad
Kashmir (Free Kashmir) government was begun.
In early September attacks from Pakistani territory commenced. Pathan groups of several
hundred men raided Hindu and Sikh villages along the border, then fled back to Pakistan
when government forces responded. The Pakistani Army supported the raiders with arms,
ammunition, communications equipment and transport, and its patrols entered Kashmiri
territory on several occasions. The Pakistani authorities feigned ignorance of the incidents and
of the role of the Army and at the same time kept accusing the Kashmiri government of
atrocities against the Muslim population.
By the middle of October the situation was ripe for a general offensive. The incidents were
becoming more serious along the 300 km long border, and they were occurring in
unpredictable locations at unpredictable times. The state forces could not protect every village
and every vulnerable point; they could only react to the attacks, but could not prevent them.
Their forces gradually became fragmented and they became incapable of concerted action.
Late October 1947 – Pathan invasion
The general offensive started on two fronts on October 22, 1947 (See Figure 3.):
- Five Pathan lashkars (5 000 men) broke into the Kashmir valley from the direction of
Abbottabad. The Muslims serving in the Kashmiri state forces mutinied, killed their non-
Muslim fellow soldiers and officers and joined the Pathans or the local militias. The
attackers occupied Domel and on the 23rd they destroyed a state forces battalion, but near

11
Violent confrontation between India's religious communities is nothing new – the English-language Indian
press even has special expressions for it: “communalism” and “communal violence.” However, the "communal
violence" that accompanied Partition was far worse than anything seen before: a mass migration of 10 million
people, and casualties approaching one million.
12
There were plenty of men who were familiar with weapons and had some combat experience: about 60 000
discharged veterans lived in Kashmir – many of them Muslims.

12
 Uri they met with stiff resistance: the state forces withstood their attacks for a while, then
destroyed the bridge over the Uri River and withdrew towards Baramulla.13
- The Azad militias attacking in the Jammu region were also met with stiff resistance, and
they achieved their objectives only after some serious fighting. They seized the border
towns (Bagh, Rawalkot, Rajauri, Beri Pattan) one after the other, surrounded Poonch and
cut the Poonch-Jammu road, but by the time they reached Jammu the Indian forces were
already on the move. Jammu remained in Indian hands and subsequently served as the base
of Indian operations in the south.
Soon after the attacks commenced (on 24 October), the Azad Kashmir government was
formed under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim.14 Henceforth two governments existed in
the state, each claiming full jurisdiction over the entire territory.
The operations in the south (in the Jammu region) were useful because they distracted the
defender’s attention and forced him to split his forces. But the key to Kashmir was the
Kashmir valley and the key of the valley was Srinagar – seizing the city was the most
important goal of the invasion. However, the men in the lashkars were warlike tribal militias,
not disciplined, regular forces. Their physical toughness, courage and fighting spirit cannot be
doubted, but obedience and carrying out orders without discussion were not their strong
points – strategic foresight or an understanding of time and space factors even less so. Their
weakness – lack of discipline – became apparent in the operations around Uri.
For disciplined, well trained and well led troops the destroyed bridge over the Uri River
would have been a challenge, but not an obstacle to success: crossing the river without
vehicles was no problem, and the distance between Uri and Srinagar is somewhat over 100
km – with light equipment a matter of two, or at most three days' forced march. However, the
lashkars refused to give up their vehicles (which they needed more for carrying their plunder,
than for transporting personnel), and thus they delayed the advance for nearly four days. As a
result of this delay they reached Baramulla (30 km from Srinagar) only on October 26. Once
they seized the town, the only force between them and Srinagar was a roadblock manned by
50 men of the state forces, five km east of Baramulla. The situation required a fast,
determined advance, before the state forces could react or receive reinforcements, but the

13
The fact that the Commander in Chief of the Kashmiri state forces, Brigadier Rajinder Singh, could collect
only 150 men for the defence of Uri, and he felt compelled to direct the defence himself, shows the desperate
state of his forces. Brigadier Singh himself fell during the retreat from Uri.
14
This was actually a second attempt at creating a government: the first Azad Kashmir government had been
formed on 4 October, as the revolt of the Muslims in the Poonch area was gathering strength. However, since
this government was established in Pakistan (in Rawalpindi), it lacked credibility.

13
lashkars’ lack of discipline showed again. Instead of a fast and determined advance, they
indulged in looting and the massacre of Baramulla’s Sikh and Hindu population.
These delays gave the Maharaja time to make up his mind and appeal to India for assistance.
The Indian government was ready to provide it, but only on the condition that Kashmir
accedes to India. Accession duly took place on October 26, and Indian forces entered the
conflict the next day.15
October-November 1947 – Relief of Srinagar and Indian counteroffensive
Moving sufficient Indian forces and their equipment into Kashmir over the difficult terrain, on
bad roads and weak bridges, in steadily worsening weather would have taken several months.
However, instead of months, there were only hours available. Obviously the forces had to be
flown in. The key to Kashmir’s relief was therefore the Srinagar airfield, at an altitude of
1655 m, with a short, grass runway and primitive navigation equipment.
The first Indian troops to land were one rifle company and the battalion headquarters of the
1st Battalion, Sikh Regiment (1 Sikh), at 0930 on October 27. Instead of establishing a
defensive perimeter, constructing defensive positions and sending out careful probing patrols,
the battalion commander (Lt Col Dewan Ranjit Rai) left a small force at the airfield for
security, and immediately advanced in the direction of Baramulla. The company joined the
state troops at the roadblock and forced the advancing militia to halt, but could not hold the
position. It made a fighting withdrawal towards Srinagar and established a blocking position
on a commanding height 20 km from the city.16 This position held up the Pathans’ advance
for several days: they did not have the tactical skills necessary to assault dug-in infantry
supported by airstrikes, and due to the many marshes and lakes in the area, they could bypass
it only with great difficulty.
In the time thus gained, the Air Force flew in the remaining rifle companies of 1 Sikh, as well
as the other three battalions of the 161st Infantry Brigade, a machinegun company and an
artillery battery. As Indian strength increased, additional blocking positions were established
and strong patrols were sent out – just in time to throw back a Pathan raiding force that did
nanage to bypass 1 Sikh’s roadblock and advanced on the airfield from the southwest
(November 3 1947).
As Indian reinforcements (including an armoured car troop and a rifle troop of the 7th Indian
Light Cavalry) were coming into Srinagar by air from the Delhi area and by road from
Jammu, the commander of 161st Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Sen), extended the brigade’s
15
Pakistan has disputed the legality of accession ever since.
16
The company lost 24 men in the withdrawal, among them Lt Col Rai.

14
defensive perimeter to include the city of Srinagar, and planned to advance west and drive the
Pathans out of the Kashmir valley. Before the offensive could begin, the brigade’s defensive
positions were attacked by the massed Pathan militias (November 7 1947), and the Army of
Independent India fought its first real battle.

Figure 3. Operations in October-November 1947 (Drawn by the author)

The battle started with Pakistani militias attacking the Indian defensive positions manned by
the 1 Sikh and the 1st Battalion, Kumaon Regiment (1 Kumaon), and one company of 4

15
Kumaon in reserve. The defenders were seriously outnumbered, but their training, discipline
and leadership made up for lack of numbers. While the attackers were held by the fire of 1
Sikh, two armoured cars and the rifle troop of the 7th Indian Light Cavalry made a wide
turning movement (much of it through enemy-held territory). When they got into position
behind the attackers, 1 Kumaon made an unnoticed advance on the Pathans’ right flank. Thus,
when the coordinated attack of the armoured cars and 1 Kuamon went in, the attackers were
caught between three fires: Indian defensive positions to the front, machinegun fire from the
armoured cars to their rear, and a flanking attack. They withdrew hastily, leaving behind 700
dead and most of their vehicles, equipment, ammunition and supplies.17 (See Figures 3 and 4.)
The pursuing Indian forces recaptured Baramulla the next day, then Uri on the 13th. With the
recapture of Uri all Pakistani forces were forced out of the Kashmir valley.

Figure 4. Battle of Shalateng, November 7 1947. (Drawn by the author)

17
Sen, pp. 78-100.

16
After the recapture of Baramulla and Uri the Indian forces concentrated on clearing the
Jammu region.
- On November 16 the 50th Parachute Brigade advanced from Jammu towards the
northwest, in order to recapture the lost towns. This attempt was only partially successful:
the relief force reached Kotli on November 26, but it could hold the town only until it was
evacuated.
- A relief force reached Poonch from the direction of Uri on 25 November. It fought its way
into the city, but could not raise the siege. Poonch remained under siege for another year.
- Meanwhile Azad Kashmir forces captured Mirpur on November 25, looted it and
massacred its Hindu and Sikh population.
In the north the Pakistani forces were more successful. A local insurgent movement, the Jang-
i-Azadi Gilgit-Baltistan, carried out a quick revolution. Supported by the Gilgit Scouts (a
locally raised paramilitary force led by British officers) they declared the establishment of the
“Gilgit Islamic Republic” and elected a provisional government, which 14 days later gave up
independence and acceded to Pakistan. A task force consisting of Gilgit Scouts and local
militia occupied the Burzil Pass and commenced infiltration into Kashmir’s Gurais region.
Another task force surrounded Skardu, the last government garrison in the Northern Areas.
December 1947 to April 1948 – winter and spring offensives
As winter set in, the intensity of operations decreased. For the Indian forces the weather was a
serious problem: many soldiers saw snow for the first time in their life, they were not
accustomed to the cold weather at all, and there was not enough winter clothing and footwear
available (shortages were gradually eased by local purchases). The locally recruited Azad
militias and the Pathan fighters – who were generally used to the weather of high mountains –
were far less affected by winter conditions. In early December the Azad militias occupied
Janghar, but in January they lost Kot, and their attacks on Naoshera and Uri also failed.
The build-up of Indian forces continued during the winter, and by early spring there were five
brigades deployed in the state. In the March-April Indian offensive (Operation Vijay) in the
south three brigades (50th Parachute, 19th Infantry and 20th Infantry), supported by a light
armour squadron (A Squadron, Central India Horse) advanced along the Naoshera-Rajauri
road and recaptured Janghar (March 17 1948), then changed direction and occupied Rajauri
(April 12 1948). (See Figure 5.)

17
Figure 5. Operations between December 1947 and April 1948. (Drawn by the author)

The siege of Poonch continued. The garrison (which had been designated 101st brigade) built
a short emergency airstrip, and after December 12 the Indian Air Force kept the defenders
supplied with munitions and provisions and evacuated the wounded. The capacity of the air
bridge was sufficient to fly in provisions for the 40 000 refugees trapped in the city as well.

18
In the Northern Areas the militias commenced Operation Hammer (February, 1948), in order
to exploit their early success. Their objective was to take Skardu, then seize Kargil, occupy
the Zoji Pass, and finally seize Leh. At this time Leh's garrison consisted of a single rifle
platoon (33 men). It was reinforced only at the very last minute: in mid-February 1948 forty
volunteers (each carrying an extra rifle) crossed the Zoji Pass (a particularly difficult feat in
mid-winter), and joined the defenders. With the extra rifles they armed a locally raised militia,
and also built an emergency airstrip.18
The Pakistani commanders realized that the Indian forces, now in firm control of the Kashmir
valley, could exploit their central location to initiate offensives in several directions, and the
tribal militias would not be able to block them. Therefore they deployed a gradually
increasing proportion of the Pakistani Army in the threatened sectors. In the spring of 1948
regular army battalions, later entire brigades and artillery regiments participated in operations.
May to December 1948
In the spring of 1948 the Indian forces gradually became dominant in every sector. In early
May the steadily increasing forces were organised into two divisions: the units in the south
were subordinated to the Jammu and Kashmir Division and those in the Kashmir valley to the
Srinagar Division. The two divisions were subordinated to a temporary corps headquarters,
the Jammu and Kashmir Force.19
In the Kashmir valley Muzaffabarad was the objective of a two-pronged Indian advance. In
the attack in the north the 163rd Infantry brigade seized Tittwal (March 23 1948) and Keran,
but the southern attack by two brigades (161st Infantry and 77th Parachute) deploying from
Uri failed: the Pakistani government wanted to keep Muzaffabarad at any price, and deployed
two regular brigades (the 10th and the 101st) to support the militias in the area.20 At least five
more regular brigades were deployed between Muzaffabarad and Mirpur as reinforcements
for the Pathan and Azad militias.
The Indian forces made another attempt to relieve Poonch in June 1948. The 101st brigade
broke out of the city at the same time as the 19th Infantry Brigade advanced on the besiegers
from the direction of Rajauri. The attempt failed: the Indian forces could not break through

18
At 3300 meters altitude this was the world's highest airstrip at the time, and it was doubtful that the C47
Dakotas of the Indian Air Force would be able to land and take off at such altitude. To dispel the doubts the
first C47 to land piloted by Colonel Mehar Singh, the commander of air operations. Major General Timayya,
the commander of the Srinagar Division sat in the co-pilot's seat. (May 24 1948)
19
Subsequently the Jammu and Kashmir Division became the 26th Division, the Srinagar Division became the
19th Division, and the Jammu and Kashmir Force became the 5th Corps.
20
Khan, 1970. pp. 82-92.

19
the siege lines. The next attempt in October-November 1948 was a far more thoroughly
prepared operation by three infantry brigades, supported by an armoured squadron and
airstrikes. On October 13 1948 the 268th Infantry brigade delivered a diversionary attack
from the Naoshera area in the direction of Kotli, in order to secure the left flank of the main
attack. The 5th and 19th Infantry Brigades carried out the main attack between November 8
and 19 1948 from the Rajauri area, with the support of a light tank squadron of Central India
Horse. The 101st Brigade broke out of the city again, and on November established a
permanent linkup with the 19th Infantry Brigade. This ended the siege of Poonch (See Figure
6.).
In the Northern Areas the situation initially developed in a more promising manner for
Pakistan, but eventually the offensive there failed just as those in the Kashmir valley and in
Jammu. The Pakistani forces (primarily local militia) surrounded and besieged Skardu, Kargil
and Dras. They ambushed and destroyed the two Indian battalions despatched to relieve
Skardu (May 10 1948), then seized Kargil (May 22 1948) and Dras (June 11 1948). The
Skardu garrison held out in the old Kharpocho Fort for over six months and surrendered only
after it ran out of food and ammunition. The besiegers massacred most of the defenders, as
well as the Hindu and Sikh civilians who had sought refuge in the fort.
When Skardu fell on August 14 1948, the last obstacle was removed from the way of an
offensive to take Leh. At this time the Leh garrison consisted of a company of regulars and
150-200 militiamen. Due to weather conditions the emergency airstrip was often closed, but
the Indian Air Force could always deliver sufficient munitions for the defenders to hold their
own, and in the last minute (August 23 1948) they managed to fly in a Gurkha battalion,
which beat back the Pakistani attack.
The first Indian attempt to retake Kargil and Dras and relieve the pressure on Leh (Operation
Duck, September 1948) was a failure. The entrance of the Zoji Pass21 that leads from the
Kashmir valley to the north was held in considerable strength by the Pakistani forces. The
terrain at the entrance of the pass favours the defender: there is no vegetation to conceal troop
movements, and the steep mountain sides reduce manoeuvre room to next to nothing. The
Pakistani defensive positions, carved into the steep mountain slopes, were impossible to hit
either from the air or by indirect fire from the ground, and they were impervious to the direct
fire of the attacking infantry. The gallantry of the Indian assault troops was not enough to

21
The Zoji Pass is a narrow, 3 km long corridor at an altitude of 3600 meters, squeezed on either side by
mountains of over 5000 meters.

20
overcome lack of cover and concealment, no manoeuvre room and the defenders’ interlocking
fields of fire.

Figure 6. Operations between May and December 1948. (Drawn by the author)

To break through the pass, Major General Timayya had an armour squadron of the 7th Light
Cavalry brought up from the south. The squadron was moved from its deployment area in
Akhnur to the new attack's assembly area in Sonomarg (440 km) in secret. The turrets of the
tanks were dismounted and transported on trucks, under canvas. The convoy moved only at

21
night, and when it arrived in Srinagar, the city was placed under curfew. These precautions
paid off: Pakistani intelligence remained unaware of the Indian preparations.
The appearance of the armoured squadron (November 1 1948) was a total surprise for the
Pakistani forces in the pass. At such altitude and in such difficult terrain they did not expect
tanks; they had made no preparations for anti-tank defence, had no antitank weapons, and
their training had not included field expedient anti-tank measures. The tanks were impervious
to Pakistani small arms and mortar fire, and the direct fire of their guns could finally destroy
the Pakistani bunkers that indirect fire artillery and air strikes had not been able to hit. The
tanks and their supporting infantry soon forced the Pakistani defenders out of the pass, and
continued to advance towards Dras and Kargil.22 On November 15 1948 they took Dras, and
on the 24th they linked up with the Gurkhas advancing from Leh. (Figures 6 and 7.)
Forcing the Zoji Pass, the recovery of Kargil and Dras and the relief of Leh was the war's last
significant series of combat operations. There were some subsequent efforts to improve
already occupied positions, but these actions had no significant effect on the conclusion of the
conflict.
January 1 1949 – ceasefire
By the end of 1948 India's armed forces responded to the logistical challenge of long
distances, bad roads and rickety bridges, mobilized their significantly larger resources and
were ready to crush the Pakistani forces, and occupy Pakistani territory. Pakistani forces were
losing everywhere, and there were no resources in reserve, whose mobilization could have
turned the situation around. India was close to victory, yet in November 1948 the government
requested UN mediation to resolve the conflict.
After some political manoeuvres, lengthy negotiations and some last minute operations a
ceasefire came into effect on January 1, 1949 – but the Kashmiri problem has remained
unresolved ever since. The belligerents retained their positions: the ceasefire line of January
1949 – the Line of Control – has become a de facto international border between India and
Pakistan. The two countries fought two more wars for the possession of Kashmir (in 1965 and
1999). To this day significant guerrilla activity has been going on, which – according to
India's accusations – Pakistan supports with arms, training, propaganda and money.

22
Major General Timayya was a firm believer in leading from the front: in the attack on the Pass he was
directing operations from the lead tank's turret.

22
Figure 7. Operations in the Northern Areas and in Ladakh. (Drawn by the author)

23
THE WAR'S BALANCE SHEET
Casualties
The war caused surprisingly few casualties – at least as far as the Indian armed forces are
concerned: they lost 1 500 dead and 3 500 wounded (many of the latter were returned to their
units after recovery). There are no reliable data on the Pakistani losses, which is not
surprising: due to the nature of the Pakistani forces, there could have been no reliable record
keeping.
The Kashmiri civilian population sustained the heaviest losses. According to the accounts of
independent observes – those of foreign (primarily British) citizens and journalists – the
Pathan tribal militias treated the non-Muslim civilians with remarkable brutality (and they
were not particularly gentle with the Muslims, either). But instead of reliable data, there are
only estimates available on the numbers of victims.
Foreign Influence
At the time the events unfolded, the independence and sovereignty of the belligerents were
not yet complete. They depended on the former colonial power for economic progress, supply
of war materiel and diplomatic support. Furthermore, some of their highest decision making
and executive institutions were still directed by British civil servants, and the commanders of
their armed forces were all British officers. These civilians and soldiers protected and
promoted the momentary interests of the British Empire, instead of those of Pakistan or India.
Therefore neither the Indian, nor the Pakistani political elites could influence the outcome of
the war to the extent they wanted to.
The British government considered Pakistan more important for the long-term interest of
Great Britain, but wanted to avoid a war between former colonies right after their
independence. Therefore, the war's intensity had to be limited: militia raids and small border
clashes could be written off as the growing pains of independence, but they could not be
allowed to spread to other regions. The British officers and civil servants therefore had to
manoeuvre between neutrality and favouring one side or the other. They were so successful in
this, that outside Jammu and Kashmir there were hardly any holdups in the partition process:
Muslims continued to stream into Pakistani territory from India, and non-Muslims from
Pakistan to India. The transfer of Muslim units and individuals who selected Pakistani service
also continued in an orderly manner.23

23
It is worth noting that the sources discussing the Kashmiri events of 1947-48 – whether they are Indian or
Pakistani – accuse the British government and the British officers and civil servants of supporting the other
side.

24
Land Forces
On both sides infantry played the dominant role. This was due to three principal factors: the
terrain, the inventory and the nature of the enemy. The rugged terrain (especially that outside
the Kashmir valley) restricted vehicle movement to a few bad roads. Most off-road movement
had to be carried out on foot, with the equipment either man-packed or on mules. Also, the
equipment available in the belligerents' inventories was nowhere near the scale of
contemporary European (much less American) forces: brigade-scale operations were routinely
supported by a few mountain howitzers and mortars, even for the better equipped Indian
forces. In any case, artillery was of limited utility against the Pathans who appeared
unexpectedly as ghosts among the rocks, and disappeared just as quickly. The Pathan and
Azad militias occasionally deployed a few mortars, and in the last months of the conflict
Pakistani artillery also appeared, but also on a very limited scale.
Artillery played a significant role in the defence of Poonch: in the early phase of the siege the
Indian Air Force flew in a light mountain battery, which kept the besiegers' mortars away
from the emergency airstrip. In larger engagements (the battle of Shalateng, the recapture of
Baramulla, the relief of Poonch) the artillery again played a significant role, but the number
and calibre of the available guns limited the effectiveness of their fire.
The Pakistani planners counted on quick success and did not expect the quick reaction of the
Indian armed forces; consequently they failed to prepare the militias to fight against armoured
forces, and failed to provide them with anti-tank weapons. As a result, armoured formations
could play a decisive role on three occasions (the battle of Shalateng, the relief of Poonch and
in the Zoji Pass), even though the forces were very small in every case, and their equipment
(Daimler armoured cars and M5 Stuart light tanks) were already obsolescent in 1947-48. The
experience gained in the war had a great influence on the development of Indian tactics in
later Indo-Pakistani wars.
Air Forces
From the very first day of the conflict to the very last the Indian Air Force was in complete
control of the air. As soon as the first Indian ground forces secured the Srinagar airfield,
Spitfire and Tempest fighters were flown in and commenced air operations, even though there
was hardly any aviation fuel available locally.24 Control of the air guaranteed air supply to
remote garrisons, as long as an airfield was available.

24
Sufficient fuel stocks were eventually built up, but initially the transport aircraft landing at the Srinagar airfield
had their tanks drained until they had only sufficient fuel left to return to India.

25
In addition to maintaining air supremacy, the fighters were also used for reconnaissance and
for ground support for the land forces (e.g. prior to the battle of Shalateng) – although due to
the extreme dispersal of the Pakistani forces these functions were not nearly as useful as they
would have been in more conventional theatre. Indian control of the air hampered Pakistani
air reconnaissance and concentration of forces, and on the rare occasions when the aircraft of
the belligerents met in the air, the Indians always prevailed.
The air transport squadron (No. 12) played a particularly prominent role in the conflict. Its
pilots flew in nearly impossible weather conditions, undertook missions that promised certain
death – they landed on airfields under enemy fire and lit only by the torches of local citizens.
Since the squadron's lift capacity (eight C47 Dakota aircraft) was not sufficient to support for
any length of time the forces deployed in Kashmir, the Air Force leased some 30 civilian
airliners.
The Indians also tried to compensate for their lack of bombers by using large explosive
devices rolled out of the doors of C47 transports. These did little or no damage (hardly any to
the enemy, at any rate), but they served as a morale booster to the Indian forces. Bomber
squadrons were organized late in 1948 (using refurbished American B17 bombers), but these
came too late to play a role in the war.
The above paragraphs are not intended to belittle the service and gallantry of the officers and
men of the Pakistani Air Force. However, it is a matter of record that Pakistan held back its
fledgling Air Force, partly for political reasons, in order to maintain the deniability of the
country's involvement in Kashmir, and perhaps partly to husband a scarce, but very valuable
resource.
Militias
The employment of militias was very advantageous for Pakistan. They could be deployed in
offensive operations when the combat readiness of the regular forces was still very low. Also,
the militias were quite expendable. Playing the roles of "freedom fighting forces
spontaneously organized by the local population" and "volunteers helping their Muslim
brothers suffering under Hindu oppression," the militias also concealed Pakistan's role – or at
least made it deniable to an audience that was willing to be deceived. For every independent
observer, every Indian politician and every soldier it was obvious that Pakistan was
orchestrating the events, but "obvious" was not sufficient reason to start an international
conflict.
Since they had no doctrinal foundations and had little experience in the employment of
irregular forces, the Pakistani officers directing the operations had unrealistic expectations

26
about the endurance, discipline and combat readiness of the militias, and had to improvise
when the latter failed to perform as expected. Although the lashkars' lack of discipline
deprived Pakistan of success in the first operation (and thereby deprived it of victory),
Pakistan still managed to seize the strategically significant 1/3 of Jammu and Kashmir's
territory.
The Principles of War
Both the Indian and the Pakistani Armed forces were inheritors of British military traditions,
and their officers (most of them veterans of World War II), followed the contemporary British
principles of war.25 For the disciplined and well trained regular units of the Indian armed
forces the application of these principles was second nature. The case was different for the
Pakistani armed forces. Until regular Pakistani forces entered the conflict, the poor discipline
and limited combat capabilities of the Azad and tribal militias allowed only limited
application of the principles of war. In the following paragraphs only a few outstanding
examples of the principles' application will be discussed.
Selection and Maintenance of the aim. The objectives of the Azad Kashmir forces and tribal
militias were selected on the basis of sound reasoning – force the Kashmiri state forces to
divide their strength, defeat them in detail, then make a quick dash for the capital and seize
the person of the ruler. Initially their operations were surprisingly successful. However, the
objective must also be within the capabilities of the available forces – and this was not the
case. The bravery and fighting capabilities of the Pathans cannot be doubted, but the lashkars'
lack of discipline caused significant delays, and they did not achieve the most important
objective (Srinagar and the person of the Maharajah). After the failure at Srinagar the
objective changed: retain territory hitherto captured and occupy further territory in those
regions (e.g. in Ladakh) where the Indian forces were weak. In this they were partly
successful: although they could not retain the Kashmir valley, they did retain a narrow
crescent along the state's western border, and retained the Northern Areas.
The Indian armed forces – especially considering the very short time available – also selected
the first objective correctly: the key to Kashmir was Srinagar, and in the given situation the
key to Srinagar was the airfield. Achieving this objective proved to be well within the
capabilities of the Indian forces. Once Srinagar was secured, the correctness of the selection
and maintenance of further objectives was debatable. After Baramulla and Uri had been

25
The analytical framework for this analysis is the set of principles in general use in the British Empire’s forces
in the late 1940’s, as they had been set down by Field Marshal Montgomery in 1946. Romilly: The principles
of War in Today’s World.

27
retaken, the next logical objective of the offensive would have been Muzaffabarad: the city
was the key to the valley of the Jhelum River, it was also the gateway through which the tribal
militias had invaded the Kashmir valley, and through which further invasion forces may
come. But instead of continuing with the already successful offensive, the Indian forces
changed the focus of their operations to the Jammu region, where they achieved only limited
success. In fairness to the Indian commanders, three widely separated fronts (the Kashmir
valley, the Jammu region and the Northern Areas/Ladakh) competed for their attention, and
they tried to answer the demands of every front.
Maintenance of the forces’ morale and combative spirit. After the passage of over six
decades it is difficult to assess how successfully this principle was applied, but the available
sources, as well as the progress of the operations indicate that combative spirit remained high
on both sides throughout the conflict. It is particularly noteworthy that for nearly a year and a
half the Pakistanis managed to keep in the field a large number of Pathan mountain tribesmen,
who were (and are) generally considered unreliable and unsuitable for long-term, high
intensity operations.
Offensive action. The belligerents continuously strove to exploit the advantage inherent in
possessing the initiative, and tried to achieve their goals primarily by offensive action. Forces
that were compelled to assume a defensive posture (e.g. the Poonch garrison) strove to
conduct active defence and kept the enemy off balance by constant patrolling and raiding
activity. When – due to Indian superiority – the Pakistani militias and regular units were
forced on the defensive by late 1948, they also employed the most active tactics, techniques
and procedures of active defence.
Surprise. In the initial phase of the conflict Pakistan achieved operational surprise with the
offensive in the direction of Srinagar, but due to the nature of the forces employed, could not
exploit the opportunity thus created. The tribal militias' tactics (raids, ambushes, guerrilla
warfare) often caused tactical surprise to the Indian forces, but due to the militias’ inadequate
training and light equipment, they could not aggregate their tactical successes into operational
success. Nevertheless, at the strategic and political levels of war the militias introduced a new
and unexpected uncertainty factor, which caused significant difficulties to the Indian political
leadership.
The Indian forces – due to the availability of resources and to superior discipline – had better
success in exploiting tactical and operational surprise. Two armoured cars unexpectedly
appearing behind the tribal militias decided the outcome of the battle of Shalateng – which in
turn led to clearing the militias out of the Kashmir valley in a few days. The sudden

28
appearance of tanks in the Zoji Pass was a tactical surprise to which the Pakistani forces had
no response, and were compelled to withdraw from Ladakh – the tactical surprise led to a
strategic success.
Concentration of forces. The Kashmiri state forces – in reality more of a constabulary than an
army – violated this principle as they responded to the series of raids initiated from Pakistani
territory. As they tried to defend an increasing number of threatened points, they were
operating in smaller and smaller units that had little or no contact and could not support each
other. This made them vulnerable to defeat in detail by the attackers.26
The Indian forces made the same mistake on the strategic level. After the relief of Srinagar
and the reoccupation of Baramulla and Uri they divided their forces in order to meet the
challenges of three widely separated fronts, as related above. As a consequence they failed to
achieve success in several operations, or achieved only limited results. At the tactical and
operational level concentration of the Indian forces was correct: the Indian commanders
would rather accept that some areas remained in enemy hands for some more months, but did
not divide their forces.
The Pakistanis concentrated sufficient forces for the attack on Srinagar, but after the failure of
that operation they had a constant problem with concentration. In the first place, the tribal
militias had their own ideas on how the war should be conducted, and seldom accepted advice
(much less commands) from Pakistani offices. Also, keeping the concentrated forces
adequately supplied would have required a reliably functioning logistical system – something
Pakistan could not provide. Furthermore, the Indians' complete control of the air made
concentration a risky undertaking, as it provided desirable – and vulnerable – targets to air
strikes.
Economy of forces. For different reasons economy of forces was crucial for both sides. The
numerical strength, combat readiness and logistical capabilities of India's armed forces were
far superior to those of the just forming Pakistani armed forces. Nevertheless, the great
distances, bad roads and limited air transport capacity severely limited the size of the forces
that could be kept in the field for an extended period. Furthermore, India's forces were also
required in other theatres. Therefore, sufficient force – but not one man more – had to be
employed to execute every task, and there could be no idle units in the theatre. The events
showed that the Indian commanders generally applied this principle correctly.

26
In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war India successfully employed the same tactics against the Pakistani forces
deployed in East Pakistan (Bangladesh).

29
Economy of force was even more important to Pakistan. The Pakistani forces were inferior to
their Indian counterparts in nearly every military metric, and the employment of the militias
was clearly a measure to husband scarce resources. With their guerrilla tactics and – perhaps
even more important – with their fierce reputation the Pathan tribal warriors tied down Indian
forces that were far out of proportion to their numbers. In addition, they were combat
experienced, yet cheap and expendable forces, and were available in large numbers at the
right time – when the Pakistani forces were being created and needed every soldier to man the
regular units.
By the time operations were coming to a close in late 1948 the Pakistani officers had learned
to coordinate and harmonize the differing capabilities of regular and Azad militia battalions
and Pathan lashkars. When the various forces were organized into composite brigades, the
regular battalion would serve as a firm base of operations, protection for the other forces, and
a source of significant firepower. Around this base the Azad militia battalion, relying
primarily on its familiarity with the area of operations, would form a wide security belt.
Relying on these for support, the Pathans with their raids, ambushes and general
unpredictability, as well as their reputation could dominate areas far out of proportion to the
actual forces employed.27
Security. Both belligerents committed some serious mistakes, as well as achieved some
remarkable successes in protecting their forces from unexpected attack. The Pakistani forces,
especially in the early days of the conflict were particularly lax in matters of security, due to
the nature of the forces employed. A striking example of this is the movement of the 7th Light
Cavalry’s two armoured cars and riflemen during the Shalateng battle. They had to march
several kilometres through enemy-held territory; the Pathans saw them and waved to them,
assuming them to be Pakistani forces, and realized their mistake only when the armoured cars
started firing into the rear of the Pakistani positions.
Perhaps the most obvious such Indian mistake, which affected not only the security of the
deployed forces, but also jeopardized the success of their operations, was the failure to occupy
the passes leading out of the Kashmir valley. No doubt, this would have required significant
forces (at least 3-4 battalions), whose maintenance at the end of long and tenuous supply lines
would have been a serious logistical challenge. On the other hand, the transfer of a squadron
of the Indian 7th Light Cavalry from Akhnur to Sonomarg was an especially noteworthy
success. The Indians moved the squadron 440 km to an assembly area near Sonomarg, and

27
Khan, Akbar, 1970. pp. 106-107

30
widened the road and reinforced the bridges from Sonomarg to the Zoji Pass – all in complete
secrecy.
Flexibility. In this respect the Pakistani forces were at a disadvantage, especially in the early
phases of the conflict. The low tactical and operational capacity of the Azad Kashmir forces
and tribal militias limited the operations that could be carried out. They lacked the regular
forces’ cohesiveness, which allows a unit to keep up its morale and quickly to regain its
equilibrium after a reverse. However, to a certain extent this was counterbalanced by the
strong ideological support Islam provides its adherents; booty was a strong motivating factor
– and the absence of regulations and doctrines allowed wide latitude for initiative,
experimentation and improvisation.
Due to their superior tactical and operational training, the Indian forces successfully employed
the concepts of the mobile defensive-offensive: they often occupied strong defensive positions
that the enemy could not bypass and had to attack from a disadvantageous posture. This way a
single rifle company of 1 Sikh held up the lashkars advancing from Baramulla towards
Srinagar. The Indian forces’ tactical superiority allowed them to switch from attack to defence
and from defence to attack (e.g. in the battle of Shalateng). The Pakistani forces, on the other
hand, employed defensive-offensive concepts with success only after regular forces begun to
take a more active role in operations (e.g. in the defence of Muzaffabarad).
The disciplined Indian regular forces did have sufficient cohesiveness to overcome their
reverses. Their commander learned from their failures and instead of giving up their
objectives, they would concentrate larger forces and more resources and would return after
some weeks or months, trying different methods and tactics, until they succeeded. On the
other hand, aside from a few outstanding achievements (e.g. breaking through the Zoji Pass),
the Indian commanders’ general lack of initiative led to a number of missed opportunities.
Sustainability. India inherited a tried and tested, well functioning war machine, and put all its
components – including its logistical component – to good use in the conflict. Pakistan's case
was somewhat different. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the forces, they had no
administration in the traditional, military sense of the word (i.e. regulations, forms, minutes,
chain of command, functioning logistical system, and all the rest). Nevertheless, for 14-15
months the Pathan lashkars, the Azad militias and the steadily growing regular forces were
supplied with munitions and subsistence, to some extent their casualties were also cared for,
and they not only gave a good account of themselves, but also managed to retain significant
areas when the ceasefire came into force.

31
Cooperation. The Indian forces operated on the basis of doctrines and regulations, and
applying the principle of cooperation was not a problem for them. For the heterogeneous
Pakistani forces the Pathan militias' wilful behaviour was initially a source of significant
problem, and an obstacle to the adequate application of cooperation. Their behaviour led to
the failure of the operation against Srinagar. In subsequent operations, as the Pathans
recognized the advantages of cooperation, their behaviour gradually changed, and those who
remained in the theatre until the end became quite reliable partners for the regular and Azad
forces.

A MILESTONE OF FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE

Interstate wars, fought by the regular forces of nation states have become rare events since the
end of World War II. Armed conflict between non-state belligerents and the state’s security
forces, generally fought within the borders of one state (insurgency, civil war) has become the
dominant form of warfare – the age of asymmetric warfare has arrived.28 The first conflict
between India and Pakistan is one of the milestones, and Pakistan is one of the pioneers of
this process. Unlike subsequent asymmetric conflicts, non-state belligerents played the
decisive role only during the first few months of this war (between August 1947 and about
January 1948), then conventional forces and conventional tactics begun to dominate
operations, and the irregular forces gradually came under central control. Even so, the events
have shown that by employing the principles and tactics of asymmetric warfare, a modern
state can promote its interests against another, much more powerful state, and has a good
chance of achieving results far out of proportion to the resources it invests.
Pakistan evaluated the experiences of the Kashmir experiment as positive, and in its
subsequent wars has given an increasing role to non-state actors. It deployed them with
significant success in Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation forces, and against India. Its
regular forces were defeated in every war against India, but by employing non-state
belligerents it nevertheless managed to introduce a strategic and political uncertainty factor
into the relationship between the two countries that significantly reduced the difference in
strength between them. What Pakistan has been unable to achieve through its armed forces, it

28
The theory of generations in warfare was developed in the 1980’s in the United States to explain this
phenomenon. According to this, developments in warfare constitute an evolutionary process, but in this process
dialectical qualitative changes can be identified, which divide it into recognizable generations. The social and
political changes in the 20th century, as well as the explosive developments in technology have brought about
a new generational shift – we are in the age of fourth generation warfare. (Strachan, 2007, Kiss, 2009,
Somkuti, 2009)

32
has achieved by more or less open support to non-state belligerents: it has provided arms,
training and a safe haven to religious and ethnic minorities rebelling against India’s central
government. For sixty years it has successfully prevented the integration of Jammu and
Kashmir into India, and has continuously subverted the cohesion of the Republic of India.
In the 1960’s India also deployed these tactics with considerable success against Pakistan –
one result of this success was the Indian victory in the war in 1971 and the independence of
Bangladesh. Pakistan’s stability and cohesion has always been far more uncertain than those
of India, therefore India has far more opportunities to destabilize Pakistan, than the other way
around. However, based on purely political considerations (whose analysis is beyond the
scope of this essay) India has stopped supporting Pakistani resistance movements.

Cited sources
– Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948. Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
Thomson Press (India) Limited, New Delhi. 1987.
Abbas, Hassan: Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on
Terror, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2005. ISBN 978-0-7656-1496-4.
Ali, Syed: "The Perils of Covert Coercion," in: Freedman Lawrence: Strategic Coercion –
Concepts and Cases, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. ISBN 0-19-829349-6.
Amin, Agha Humayun: "The Pakistan Army till 1965," Strategicus and Tacticus, Lahore,
1999.
Amin, Agha Humayun: “The war of lost opportunities,” Defence Journal, Karachi, April and
May 2000.
Ankit, Rakesh: "The Cold War and its Impact on the Evolution of the Kashmir Crisis, 1947-
48," Journal of the Oxford University History Society, St. Hilda’s College, Oxford, 2009.
Bajwa, Kuldip Singh: Jammu and Kashmir War, 1947-1948: political and military
perspective, Har Anand Publications, New Delhi, 2003
Barua, Pradeep: The state at War in South Asia, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 2005.
ISBN, 978-0-8032-1344-9.
Cohen, Maurice: Thunder Over Kashmir, Orient Longman Ltd, Hyderabad, 1955. ISBN 81-
250-0016.
Dasgupta, Chandrashekhar: War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48, Sage Publications,
New Delhi, 2002. ISBN 0-7619-9588-9.
Goel, Sita Ram: Muslim Separatism – Causes and Consequences, Voice of India, New Delhi,
s.a.
Gupta, Sisir: Kashmir – a Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, London,
1966.
Khan, Muhammad Akbar: Raiders in Kashmir, 160 p. Jang Publisher's, Lahore, 1970. ISBN
969-36-0025-8.

33
 Khan, Muhammad: "National Liberation Struggle of Kashmiris in the Regional and Global
Setting," PhD dissertation, University of Karachi, Karachi, 2000.
Kiss, Álmos Péter: "Generációk a hadviselésben – a negyedik generáció," Hadtudományi
Szemle, Budapest, 2009/2.
Lamb, Alastair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury,
1991. ISBN 0-907129-06-4.
Praval,K.C.: Indian Army after Independence, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1987. ISBN
81-70642-014-7.
Romilly, Martin: “The Principles of War in Today’s World,” in The British Army 2011 – A
Balance of Capabilities for an Unpredictable World, Newsdesk Communications Ltd,
London, 2011. ISBN 978-1-906940-41-6. pp. 25-27.
Sen, Lionel Protip: Slender Was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48, Orient
Longman, Hyderabad, 1969.
Somkuti, Bálint: "A 4. generációs hadviselés," Hadtudományi Szemle, 2009/2.
Strachan, Hew: "British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq," RUSI Journal; London,
December 2007; Vol. 152, No. 6, pp. 8-11.
Swami, Praveen: India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The covert war in Kashmir, 1947-
2004, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006. ISBN: 0415404592.
Vas, Lt Gen. E. A. Without Baggage: A personal account of the Jammu and Kashmir
Operations 1947-1949. Natraj Publishers Dehradun, 1987. ISBN 81-85019-09-6.

Sources consulted, but not cited

– Field Service Regulations, Vol. III, Operations – Higher Formations, 1935, HMSO, 1942
Canadian reprint.
Cohen, Maurice: Thunder over Kashmir, Orient Longman Ltd. Hyderabad, 1955.
Fuller, J.F.C.: The Foundations of the Science of War, Hutchinson C Co, London,1926. 1993.
USA reprint.
Hinds, S.R.: Battle of Zoji La, Military Digest, New Delhi, 1962.
Sandhu, Gurcharan: The Indian Armour: History Of The Indian Armoured Corps 1941-1971.
Vision Books Private Limited, New Delhi, 1987. ISBN 81-7094-004-4.
Singh, Maj K Brahma. History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (1820–1956). Lancer
International New Delhi, 1990.

34

View publication stats