Notes and Comments

India and the International Studies

46(3) 349–356
Arms Trade Treaty © 2009 JNU
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/002088171004600304
http://isq.sagepub.com
Anuradha M. Chenoy

Abstract
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) seeks to regulate the transfer of conventional
arms on the principle that arms exporters and importers have a responsibility
to ensure that weapons are not used in violations of international law. India
wants the ATT to be limited to illicit trade. It believes that the United Nations
has various mechanisms to deal with human rights violations and that this issue
should not be linked to arms trade. Indian citizens have spoken against gun vio-
lence. Whether it is against the guns that killed Jessica Lall in Delhi or people in
the conflict zones of Manipur, Kashmir or the Maoist-affected regions, Indians
are fighting against the menace of the gun culture. The ATT is a just cause and
India needs to support it.

Keywords
Arms trade, proliferation, paramilitary, civil society, disarmament

An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), backed by the United Nations, is necessary for the
dignified survival of both state and civil society in India and South Asia. This
region suffers from violence resulting from the use of small arms and light
weapons (SALW) in armed conflicts, insurgencies, communal violence, interper-
sonal rivalries and criminal activities. Violence results not only in maiming and
death but also makes entire families and communities victims. It leads to insecurity,
tensions and threats between groups of individuals and states, and contributes to
human rights abuses. Cumulatively, the use and privileging of force to resolve
what are essentially civil conflicts, have long-term negative consequences. UN
resolutions and reports have emphasized that ‘excessive and destabilizing accumu-
lations of SALW are closely related to the increased incidents and intensity of
conflicts and high levels of crime and violence’.1

Anuradha M. Chenoy is Professor and Chairperson of the Centre for Russian and
Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi. E-mail: chenoy@gmail.com
The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees for their useful comments.
350 Anuradha M. Chenoy

Impact of SALW on India

The presence and use of large numbers of SALW impact India’s security, polity,
society and economy in a number of adverse ways. Many parts of India, from the
North-East to Jammu and Kashmir and the ‘Maoist belt’ that covers almost a third
of the country, are witnessing low-intensity/asymmetric conflicts. These are areas
where insurgents, militants and armed militia face the state police and paramilitary.
Citizens and non-combatants are caught in the crossfire.
Normal law-enforcing agencies like the local police are not equipped to handle
SALW. Since the designated role of the local police is to maintain law and order
and not to engage in low-intensity conflict, the military has to be deployed in
areas of civil conflict. The Indian military, however, has a limited role in civil
discord and can act only under emergency situations under special laws like the
Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Also, in such
cases, the military gets overstretched. Most areas under special national security
laws are known for human rights violations. As a consequence, both security of
state and human security are undermined.
The use of illicit weapons also has a divisive impact on India’s polity. Accord-
ing to the UN sources, about 40 million firearms are in circulation in India. In
many areas and cities like Delhi or Mumbai or parts of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh,
gun violence is an intrinsic part of criminal activity and is used as a solution to
resolve interpersonal conflicts and land and commercial disputes. The illegal trade
and possession of small arms are linked to a number of illegal activities; they
intersect with other forms of trafficking, including that of women and children
and narcotics.
Proliferation of SALW impacts the Indian economy. Economic activities
decline in areas of conflicts. Conflicts provide opportunities for gun runners, who
resort to means such as extortion, kidnapping, banditry and smuggling to acquire
these weapons. Trade in small arms, like trade in narcotics, generates vast un-
accounted wealth. This wealth generates political clout and helps prevent a con-
sensus on an international treaty. The demand for and supply of small arms is thus
self-sustaining. An international arms trade treaty is the only way out of this
spiral.
Illegal weapons come from various sources, the easiest route being infiltration
from the country’s vast borders and sea routes. India is surrounded by states that
have frozen long-term conflicts and by regimes that are unable to control auto-
nomous militias. South Asian conflicts, militia and traffickers spill over into each
other’s borders and are interconnected through illicit channels and trade. The
states in the neighbourhood that face instability like Afghanistan, Tajikistan and
Myanmar are interconnected with trafficking of arms.2
India has officially admitted that it is unable to control the production, import,
distribution and use of small arms in its territory and that it is unable to stop or

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India and the Arms Trade Treaty 351

even arrest people engaged in such activities. In February 2007, after the seizure
of illegal weapons from India’s southern coast, Defence Minister A.K. Antony
stated that this was ‘the tip of the iceberg’ (The Hindu, 19 February 2007). But
this is not just India’s problem, but an international one. There is no coordinated
mechanism, criteria or norms that can be applied to arms exporters or importers,
which is unusual. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO), there are trade
norms for even the music industry and fruits and vegetables. The WTO was born
out of the political and economic will of states. Global principles on arms trade
can be made effective with a similar will.

ATT as the Way Forward

It was the global nature of the problem of SALW that prompted the United Nations
to commit itself to address their illicit trade,3 which came to be known as the
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons. India was party to this commitment. In July 2006, a
UN conference to propose global principles for international arms transfer was
held. A draft treaty, known as the Global Principles on Arms Trade and Transfers,
was proposed and endorsed by well-known persons, NGOs and civil society
groups. Despite pressure from civil society groups, this conference ended with-
out an agreement. In October and December 2006, the UN General Assembly
passed a historic vote on the ATT with the support of the majority countries. Only
the US voted against the treaty; India, Pakistan, Israel, Russia and some others
abstained.
Here, we analyze India’s abstention from and reservations on ATT. The draft
ATT proposes a set of rules to regulate the transfer of conventional arms based on
the principle that arms exporters and importers have a responsibility to ensure that
weapons are not used in violation of international law. This draft draws on ex-
isting international law and intends to establish norms for state practice. The treaty
will establish basic standards for international arms transfer and work out how
these norms can be applied and made operative. The ATT will not impose new
norms but will reinforce states’ existing responsibilities under international law
and provide a mechanism for their consistent and effective application to the trade
in weapons.
The ATT proposes that countries importing arms must meet criteria like pro-
motion of democracy, protection of human rights, non-involvement in civil war
and armed conflict, etc. The global principles that make up the treaty oppose the
sale of arms to states that support terrorism in any way. The treaty advocates
marking of weapons to identify their source and end use. It also argues for regis-
tration of brokers. In sum, the treaty advocates greater transparency of arms sales
and use. While pointedly targeting trade in illegal arms, it in no way affects the
legitimate security needs of countries or legal transfer of arms.

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352 Anuradha M. Chenoy

India’s Arguments in the UN First Committee

At the United Nations, India seriously critiqued the illicit arms trade and the threat
it poses to India, South Asia and the world. India supported the unanimous
declaration in 2001 that called for a Programme of Action (POA) and argued for
drafting an arms trade treaty. India also supported the international conventional-
arms registry. However, during the Small Arms Review Conference on 27 June
2006, India had several reservations and in the vote for drafting such a treaty in
October and December 2006, India and Pakistan silently supported the United
States’ opposition to the treaty by abstaining, whereas most traditional allies of
the US, from both the West and East, who belong to the club of exporters and
importers of arms (for instance, Great Britain and Japan), supported the treaty.
India defended its decision to abstain by advancing the arguments that there
was need to maintain a consensus and ‘any exercise to further elaborate the pro-
visions of the programme (of Action, 2001) may not be very conducive to pre-
serving the consensus’ (Rao 2006). This is while India is aware that, more often
than not, there is no consensus on critically important international instruments
like the Kyoto Protocol and International Criminal Court (ICC).
India has consistently argued that effective national measures for control of
SALW are critical for preventing and combating illicit trade and since the POA
obliges states to carry this out, no further elaboration is necessary. India has ex-
pressed the belief that it is the primary responsibility of states and not the inter-
national community to control SALW (Rao 2006), and that ‘it is the lack of
effective implementation of existing obligations and not the absence of common
international standards’ that is to be blamed. Thus, India prefers that existing laws
on small arms be implemented and tightened. The fact, however, is that while
nearly all states maintain laws and regulations over SALW, many lack the capacity
to implement them due to their weak governance structures and inability to con-
trol borders. In other states, these laws need updating and strengthening. India
recognizes the lack of capacity of states around its own borders to effectively con-
trol SALW; therefore, its argument on strengthening state laws is not convincing.
Further, India’s argument contradicts the very idea of international law. Because
if states exercise this kind of restraint and responsibility, there would not be any
need for international law at all: it is the lack of rule-based normative international
order that leads to continuous violations, conflict and illicit activities. Further, the
WTO and the agreements that have been signed on trade are significant. Besides,
treaties such as the ATT and the ICC are primarily to address failed, weak and
predatory states, whose actions cause the worst cases of genocide, spillover to
other states and have global impacts. India and other responsible states that have
national legislation and democratic institutions to safeguard against such vio-
lations should not fear such clauses. In fact, such clauses will help rather than
deter states like India, and they should thus promote them for other states. Since

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India and the Arms Trade Treaty 353

India has a leadership role and wants to enhance its international prestige, it needs
to support such treaties.
India’s main problem with the ATT, as argued by Indian representatives, is that
the focus of the ATT should be on the ‘root’ of the trade that is illicit rather than
expanding to the ‘licit trade’ and that the treaty should deal with the consequences
of illicit trade in SALW like armed violence, internal conflicts and underdevel-
opment. Linked to this is the traditional Indian argument that the United Nations
has various mechanisms to deal with human rights violations, underdevelopment,
etc. Since it is the primary responsibility of states to combat illicit trade in SALW,
the United Nations should indicate ways to strengthen international cooperation
on this (Government of India 2007; Rao 2006).
In this context, the following points are underlined:

1. Any regulation without binding clauses has limited success unless accom-
panied by a strict normative framework.
2. There is a well-established and continuous link between the licit and illicit
trade that has been shown repeatedly.
3. India should logically fear the drastic use and impact of small arms rather
than fear the binding clauses that address universally accepted principles of
international humanitarian law. The ATT only reiterates those principles
that have already been universally accepted and are in place. They coincide
with Articles 1, 55, and other Articles of the UN Charter (the most likely to
be breached is the right to life). They are part of the non-derogable pro-
visions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the Rome Statute of the ICC. India is an established and unshakeable
democracy with legitimate institutions that safeguard citizens’ rights. It has
national instruments to address human rights issues and adheres to major
international conventions. Therefore, India should have the confidence to
accept such international instruments.
4. The development of such national criteria will strengthen India’s national
claims on security rather than erode them.

India has stated that it is concerned primarily with an instrument that will
enable identification and tracing illicit SALW. The UN Conventional Arms
Register is a step in this direction and this is clearly enunciated in the global prin-
ciples for ATT. India has argued that it would like this treaty to include a clause
that prohibits sale of arms to non-state actors. This point, however, is implicit in
the global principles of the draft treaty that forbid sale to any illegal entity. Under
international human rights law, states are responsible for their actions and their
agents, and they have a duty to prevent abuse committed by private persons,
whether or not they are acting on behalf of the state. Failure to exercise due
diligence by not taking steps to protect citizens can amount to violation of human
rights law. At the same time, it is well-established that the source of illicit trade is

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354 Anuradha M. Chenoy

often the legal trade that comes from states’ incapacity to secure arms. The ATT
addresses the issue of brokers and India has often witnessed the power of
brokers.
The global principles can further India’s interest in a number of ways:

1. The ATT code governs all arms transfers and stipulates that countries im-
porting weapons must meet criteria such as promotion of democracy. This
is in favour of India and in context with the problems it faces from non-
democratic countries. Further, India has signed an agreement with the US
on promotion of democracy.
2. The global principles oppose sale of arms to states that support terrorists
and are engaged in aggression.
3. The treaty opposes sale of weapons to states which systematically violate
human rights (for example, conduct arbitrary executions, genocide). India
does not fall into this category. India is a victim of irresponsible arms trans-
fers and this treaty can work in its favour.

At the same time, India is also one of the biggest importers of small arms and
is positioning itself to become an exporter of these. As a player in the global arms
market, India should take an interest in curbing the illegal flow of weapons. As
former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (2006) stated:

Our energy, our emphasis and our anger is directed against illegal weapons, not legal
ones. Our priorities are effective enforcement, better controls and regulation, safer stock-
piling, and weapons collection and destruction. Our targets remain unscrupulous arms
brokers, corrupt officials, drug trafficking syndicates, criminals and others who bring
death and mayhem to our communities, and who ruin lives and destroy, in minutes, the
labour of years. To halt the destructive march of armed conflict and crime, we must stop
such purveyors of death.

The proposed treaty is in keeping with India’s historic role and is a plea for
non-violence and civil order. India, until the 1980s, played a leading and stellar
role in disarmament and arms control legislation. The plan of former Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi for universal nuclear disarmament has been repeatedly
cited by those who still adhere to such idealistic principles. India’s Constitution,
its directive principles of state policy and national laws support gun control. India
has in place a legal and adjudicatory system for controlling small arms and their
production and use. It has an autonomous National Human Rights Commission to
address human rights violations. These national laws conform to international
standards. Hence, India should not worry about the binding clauses. The worry
should reside in states that are habitual violators of human rights and do not
conform to democratic principles. Surely, India should not be seen to be supporting
such states by opposing the treaty. It is logical that the international community
adopts a treaty to regulate illicit arms trade. This will also strengthen India’s for-
eign policy of peace and commitment to international disarmament.

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India and the Arms Trade Treaty 355

Civil Society Support for the ATT

Campaigners who have worked at the grassroots level mustering support for the
ATT have got spontaneous support from every region in India, from the North-
East through Bihar to South India. It is the unarmed civilians who suffer gun vio-
lence and it is they who want provisions to end this. As part of a global civil
society initiative for arms control, people from all over India have signed the
‘Million Faces’ petition with enthusiasm and hope that their voices will reach
their government. Seminars held by the Control Arms Foundation of India (CAFI)
have found supporters amongst intellectuals and civil society activists. Clearly, a
consensus on controlling arms is emerging in Indian civil society. India being a
vibrant democracy, people’s support in taking such policy decisions is important,
especially because it is their security that is at stake. Indian citizens have spoken
against gun violence. Whether it is against the guns that killed Jessica Lall in
Delhi or people in Manipur, Chhattisgarh or Kashmir, the public in India is fighting
against this menace. Will India not support its citizens in this just cause?

Notes
1. UN General Assembly, July 2001, available at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/
smallarms/files/2001conf2e.pdf. Accessed on 9 February 2007.
2. The figure of 2 million legally authorized weapons in Pakistan is quoted in the Small
Arms Survey, 2002. In 2001, the Musharraf government launched a country-wide anti-
arms drive in a bid to curb the ‘Kalashnikov culture’ that provides easy access to illegal
weapons. The campaign led to the recovery of over 210,000 illegal arms in eighteen
months. This is just a fraction of the estimated number of weapons in circulation in
the country. Dawn, 14 January 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/
smallarms/2003/0115pak.htm.
3. At the UN Small Arms Conference in July 2001, the international community recognized
the need to control the state-sanctioned trade in small arms. A key provision in this
regard is found in Section II, Paragraph 11 of the UN Programme of Action: ‘Member
states undertake to assess applications for export authorizations according to strict
national regulations and procedures that cover all small arms and light weapons and
are consistent with the existing responsibilities of states under relevant international
law’. At the same conference, a proposal to ban the transfer of hand-held and shoulder-
supported missile launchers to non-governmental parties received nearly universal
support. Unfortunately, the US delegation opposed the ban, and prevailed. The US
group also opposed proposals to register new weapons with identifiable, unalterable
serial numbers.

References
ANNAN, KOFI. 2006. Text of speech to the UN Small Arms Review Conference, NewYork,
26 June.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. 2007. Government of India’s response to the UN Secretary-General’s
request for views on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a comprehensive,
legally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import
and export and transfer of conventional arms, 30 April.

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356 Anuradha M. Chenoy

THE HINDU. 2007. ‘Antony: Arms haul off Chennai may be “the tip of the iceberg”’, 19
February, Delhi edition.
RAO, HAMID ALI. 2006. ‘Statement on India’s position, at the Small Arms Review Con-
ference, 27 June’, Ministry of External Affairs, http://www.un.int/india/2006/ind1232.
pdf. Accessed on 9 February 2007.

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