Sierra Leone Capacity Needs Assessment For Emergency Preparedness and Response

CAPACITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE.
CONTRACT NUMBER: SL-MOFED-97214-CS-CQS

DRAFT REPORT, NOVEMBER 2019.
PROJECT INFORMATION
Project Consultancy Services to Undertake a Capacity Needs Assessment for Emergency

Preparedness and Response
Client Projects Fiduciary Management Unit, Ministry of Finance

Free Town Emergency Recovery Project.
Office of National Security
Country Sierra Leone
Project Duration 13th August - 13th March 2020
Document Name Capacity Needs Assessment And Lessons Learned For Emergency Preparedness and
Response.
Document Version Volume
Version Date 18th March 2020.
Final Submission Date
This report was made possible by the World Bank.
Disclaimer.
The five key stakeholders, and the WB, PFMU, ONS and Freetown Emergency Recovery Project and any parties they may
expressly authorize intend this report for use. The circulation and use of the contents of this report is therefore limited,
and any analysis and interpretation of the contents must be made within the context of the TORs.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACC Adaptation to Climate Change

CAD Computer Aided Designs
CADRI Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative
CBO Community Based Organizations
CDC Center for Disease Control
CDMCs Chiefdom disaster Management Committees
COBIT Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
CRVI Climate Risk and Vulnerability Index
DDMC District Disaster Management Committee
DDRM Department of Disaster Risk Management
DEO Director Emergency Operations
DFID Department for International Development
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
DRG Disaster Risk Governance
DRR/DPR Disaster Risk Reduction / Disaster Preparedness and Response
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EIA Environmental Impact Assessments
EoC Emergency Operations Center
EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ESHIA Environmental Social and Health Impact Assessment
EVD Ebola virus disease
EWS Early Warning Systems
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FCC Freetown City Council
FERP Freetown Emergency Recovery Project
MOF Ministry of Finance
FGD Focus Group Discussion
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIS Geographical Information Systems
GoSL Government of Sierra Leone
ICS Incident Command System
ICT Information and Communication Technology
JEE Joint External Evaluation. KII - Key Informant Interviews
MAF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security MoH - Ministry of Health
MTNDP Medium Term National Development Plan
NaCSA National Commission for Social Action
NDMA National Disaster Management Agency
NEOC National Emergency Operations Center
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPDRR National Platform for Disaster risk Reduction
NSR National Situation Room
NSSG National Strategic Situation Group
ONS Office of National Security
PFMU Project Fiduciary Management Unit
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal
RDMC Regional Disaster Management Committee
SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization
SDG Sustainable Development Goals
SLP Sierra Leone Police
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
TSA Treasury Single Account
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund for Acton
WB World Bank / WHO - World Health Organization
WRI World Risk Index
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
The assistance of the ONS Representatives, Disaster Preparedness and Response inter-country and country focal points,
together with the emergency preparedness and response focal points of the 42 participating entities has been the key
to the effective collection and coordination of the data used in this assessment. Their combined efforts are greatly
appreciated. Special thanks are in order for the Director of Disaster Management at the ONS – John Vander Rogers for
your immense support through this process, Philomena I Toure, Eng. Nielford Rose and Sabiatu Bakarr for your
invaluable coordinative support.
The survey was defined and the report has been compiled by a team from Steadman Global Consulting Limited, headed
by Diana Nabukenya Katto (Capacity building and Institutional Development Expert) and Dr. Dewald Van Niekerk
(Disaster Risk Management Expert), including; Dr. Livhuwani Nemakonde (Disaster Risk Management Expert), Dr.
Bernard Barasa (Geographer and DRM Expert).
Thanks are also due to a number of people who helped in quality assurance and publishing of the report. They included:
Dr. AbuBakar Massaquoi, Rachel Dumba, DPR institutional representatives from stakeholder entities: all gave valued
assistance with various aspects of the report.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
Sierra Leone is highly prone to a number of natural and human induced hazards including floods, landslides and coastal
erosion, tropical storms, sea level rise and epidemics which when combined with communities’ vulnerabilities turns into
catastrophic disasters. With the country ranked second in Africa (after Madagascar), and in 8th place globally on the
Global Climate Risk and Vulnerability Index ranking, 2019, climatic change is expected to amplify the frequency and
severity of disasters if not already doing so, which in turn will reverse all the development gains attained.
Sierra Leone ranks low in the CRVI index due to its high-risk predisposition, susceptibility, fragility, weaknesses,
deficiencies, or lack of capacities that favor adverse effects on the exposed elements of human lives and livelihoods.
Further contributing factors include high levels of poverty, weak public infrastructure, a history of ineffective disaster
risk governance and serious fiscal problems. Skewed development processes, such as those associated with
environmental mismanagement, demographic changes, rapid and unplanned Urbanization in hazardous areas, failed
governance, and the scarcity of livelihood options especially for the poor further exacerbate the country’s vulnerability
and exposure. Recent trends in disaster occurrence further project continuation and increase in frequency, magnitude
and socio-economic impacts on the economy. The 2014/15 Ebola Virus Diseases outbreak and the 2017 mudslide
incident were particularly unique to Sierra Leones disaster profile. The daunting challenge of addressing the increasing
risk and impacts of disasters in the existing fiscal space warrants urgency for Sierra Leone to strengthen the country’s
DRM preparedness and response capacity, as well as coordination of disasters and emergencies.
This assessment was undertaken to identify existing capacities for EP & R at national, and district level, identify gaps and
challenges in EP & R and to propose recommendations on how the identified challenges and gaps can be addressed
including structural, procedural and non-structural capacity gaps. Overall, Sierra Leone had a considerable level of
institutional and Multisector capacity to undertake EP&R activities. An assessment of some key elements for emergency
preparedness and response; legal and institutional arrangements, Information systems for Disaster Preparedness and
Response; Communication and Equipment Needs; Infrastructure development Needs; Communication and Equipment
Needs found the following;
i) Legal and Institutional Arrangements.

Functionality of any government operations require backing with adequate sound and sufficient governance, legislative
and Policy frameworks. The frameworks should provide enabling laws and guidelines for the operationalization of the
respective institution, and functions that align well with standing principles and standards at all levels of government
(National, Provincial, and District, Municipal and Chiefdom levels). A review of the existing legal framework found that;
Disaster Preparedness and Response were provided for under the National Security Act, 2002. Other laws, policies and
legal guidelines for DRM and DPR included (among others), The National Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan;
2006, The Sierra Leone Disaster Management Policy: Identification of Disaster-prone Areas in Freetown; The Sierra
Leone Disaster Management Policy (Final Draft) June 2006, and the Sierra Leone National Disaster Risk Management
Policy 2018. The National DRM Policy identifies eleven (11) focus areas for disaster risk management. These focus areas
relate to the overall DRM and DPR coordination mechanism, the complete DRM cycle phases covering pre-disaster,
during disaster and post-disaster periods, and key specific supportive cross-cutting elements required for all DRM
phases. DRM Legal and Strategic Framework, Institutional and Organizational Framework; Risk Assessment, monitoring
and early warning; Disaster Preparedness, Emergency Response and Post-Emergency Recovery; Disaster Risk Prevention
and Mitigation; Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Mainstreaming; Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and
Adaptation to Climate Change (ACC); DRM Financing; Data and information Management; and Knowledge and capacity
development
Some sectors and responsible institutions had established and mainstreamed DPR into their Legislative and policy
Frameworks. Among existing legislations and policies include; the Public Health Ordinance Act, 2004, Town and Country
Planning (Amendment Act of 2001, Environmental protection Act of 2008). In 2018, the government of Sierra Leone
developed the draft National Disaster Risk Management Policy. This policy replaced the 2006 disaster Management
policy and sets out an overall framework to address DPR issues and formulation of the DRM Act. However, the draft
policy had not been approved at the time of this assessment, which necessitates increased advocacy to expedite its
approval by parliaments.
The disaster preparedness laws as previously provided for under National Security Act were incomprehensive of the
legal requirements for disaster risk management, preparedness and response guidelines and regulations. New
developments locally and internationally in the areas of DPR and DRM were stipulated, but with no updates of the
existing legal framework since 2002. Attempts to establish or amend the DRM law were made with the development of
the draft National Disaster Management Bill, 2019. The bill was drafted as a step to institutionalize and strengthen
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DRAFT REPORT: VOLUME 1 – CNA AND LLE REPORT, DECEMBER 2019.
existing DRM and EP&R capacity, as well as bridge the existing coordination gaps in the DPR process. Despite attempts
to amend the DRM law, enactment of the current NDMA bill but still short of some critical DPR / EP&R laws. For instance;
specifically, the law was inexplicit of some legal provisions including;
 Some Mandates, roles and responsibilities of some key stakeholder entities as well as administrative levels. E.g.
Institutional arrangements with clear roles and responsibilities for the monitoring and management of DPR and
Disaster Risk Management Funds and institutional arrangements for the resettlement of disaster victims.
 Some guidelines, principles and protections for inclusion of gender, vulnerable groups and disaster victim’s
especially children, people with disabilities, pregnant and lactating mothers.
 Provisions for disaster risk financing strategies to enable access to the funding streams in an efficient and timely
manner, with adequate safeguards to ensure transparency and accountability. E.g. Clear Stipulations on
National and local budget allocations for Disaster Risk Financing, Fund Administration at different levels of
government. Special funds or reserves for disaster situations, such as emergency or contingency funds, Risk
based disaster risk financing initiatives through Public private arrangements such as disaster risk insurance, re-
insurance or risk mitigation incentive schemes; Resource mobilization and accountability for local and
International monetary DRR and DPR transfers
 Financial commitments and Administrative Monitoring protocols for emergency operations.
 Frameworks for victim displacement and planned relocation which was cause for delays in completion of victim
relocation and resettlement projects
 Facilitation of effective early warning and early action.
 Minimum Housing and Infrastructure Standards and building codes.
 Environmental laws, including climate change laws, are in most cases administered separately from much of
the building and spatial planning regulation, and from existing DRM laws.
 Provisions for Quality, Accountability and Standardization of Emergency Preparedness and Response missions.
There is a general lack of standardized emergency preparedness and response protocols. Out of 31 Emergency
SOPS listed, only five were confirmed existent and satisfactory in their application and provision of critical
services and emergency assistance mainly due to the lack of funding.
 Some provisions for efficient logistics and supply chain management during emergencies.
In the absence of sufficient institutional mandates, powers and authority, execution of some DRM mandates has been
increasing difficult due to a number of procedural bureaucracies subject to current institutional arrangements.
ii) Information systems for Disaster Preparedness and Response.

Clear district coordinative and accountability mechanisms are critical to an effective emergency response. A clear
understanding of roles and responsibilities enables individuals, teams and organizations to establish working
relationships that can make all the difference during a crisis. It is also critical to establish appropriate linkages with
Government counterparts and other key partners. A number of provisions were made by the government to ensure
efficiency in EP&R information management.
Community Engagement Initiatives were in place to ensure coherent coordination system in the event of an emergency.
Particularly, the ONS with support from development partners facilitated the establishment of 22 District disaster
management committees in all districts countrywide with the exception of Freetown, which relied on community
volunteers, community and youth leaders to coordinate preparedness and response activities in disaster shock areas. In
each district, DDMCs coordinate the Disaster preparedness and response functions on behalf of the ONS and facilitated
other stakeholder engagements within the districts on issues beyond disaster risks and emergencies, e.g. land conflicts,
epidemics, floods and deforestations. Although committees in Phujehun, Kenema and Bo were found to be fully
functional, the committees in some hard to reach districts e.g. Bonthe seemed not to be functional due to inadequate
training, sensitization and funding.
Community surveillance and monitoring systems in Sierra Leone were strong and very active especially since the
outbreak of the Ebola Virus. community leadership committees and volunteers supported the DPR process but with no
formal recognition and prioritization for future preparedness planning during community level emergencies Lessons
learned from the Ebola outbreak showed that monitoring systems are stronger through the Community health workers,
peer health worker and staff, which EWS is strong.
In addition, while emerging needs and disaster risk scenarios, such as climate‐change impacts, are changing around the
world, building a culture of community preparedness and mitigation is important. Discussions with individuals in most
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disaster prone areas found high awareness but with poor attitudes and low actions taken. In regards to landslides, the
assessment identified low level of commitment and preparedness against possible landslides in surrounding
communities. Communities surrounding the last landslide site or slope areas had done very little or nothing at all since
the last landslide ahead of the next rainy season. Natural living and construction continued in some parts of the high risk
hills and activities such as deforestation. This raises the need for continuous investment in awareness raising, attitude
building and action reinforcement mechanism for individuals living in landslide prone areas.
On the contrary, individuals living in urban flood prone Figure 7: Community Awareness, Attitudes and
areas had high awareness, attitude and some made Action Orientation in Preparation for potential
some high actions are taken e.g. some downtown slum Hazards.
communities e.g. Culvert town devised some coping
mechanisms e.g. building houses on stilts and building
attics to keep essentials during floods, constructing
high water barricades and walkways which render a
certain level of disaster preparedness level and most
resilient mechanisms to reduce damages and losses
associated with floods. (See figure below). While some
flood prone areas e.g. Bonthe and Bo, had high
awareness of the floods during the rainy season rated
with high attitude, such mechanisms can be reinforced
and scaled to improve actions and adoption of
affordable and resilient solutions.
Simulation exercises and drills were undertaken at least once in six months to strengthen communities’ response
capacity to disaster crisis. The simulation exercises were especially held with regards in health readiness for epidemics
(EVD and cholera), as seen in districts such as Bo and Kenema. However, simulation exercises in other frequent hazard
criteria e.g. flood evacuations were hardly held due to lack of adequate funding and dedicated human resources to
support continued community education and training, as well as simulation exercises and drills in EP&R.
Early Warning Systems (Surveillance and Monitoring mechanisms were in place to provide timely interpretation of
weather forecasts and prompt action based on the interpretation of the data. Meteorological monitoring was however
limited due to human and financial resources, systems, equipment and lack of access to international and regional
radars. A number of stakeholders including the World Meteorological organization and UNDP have made strides in
strengthening the capacity of the meteorology system and network. The GEF project in collaboration with UNDP
supported training in operation of the new weather stations and EWS in weather monitoring and forecasting and the
expansion of the national meteorological network and coverage of the automatic weather stations through the
construction and refurbishment of eight weather stations and the Lungi aviation weather station in 8/16 districts in
Sierra Leone. However, only four functional stations by the time of this assessment. The meteorological network remains
challenged due to Poor maintenance and service of some of the newly refurbished stations; Limited capacity to support
additional meteorological forecast products beyond aviation systems monitoring; lack of equipment and reliable and
high-speed internet connectivity; not compliant with some WMO standards where we should install weather stations;
and Weak EWS information dissemination mechanisms; and lack of integration of existing early warning systems to
influence impact based EWS forecasting.
Hydrological Monitoring systems and Institutional Capacity. The National Water Resources Agency is responsible for the
coordination of all hydrological and surface flow surveillance and monitoring systems in Sierra Leone. However,
hydrological Early warning systems in Sierra Leone are still weak. Nearly all river monitoring and surface water-gauging
facilities were dysfunctional following damages during the war and other periods of instability The Ministry with support
from the UNDP established River monitoring stations, and to monitor the surface water flow. This improved the capacity
of water monitoring stations nationwide. However, there is need to strengthen the existing technical capacity to conduct
Surface water gauging to improve periodical monitoring activities. Despite previous capacity building efforts some of
the challenges identified included. Inadequate capacity to undertake River/water monitoring and Surface gauging
capacity; Weak coordinative linkages and arrangement between the water resources and other Agencies lack of
appropriate capacity in monitoring flash flood risks; and inadequate water level monitoring to provide real-time early
warning information in the case of flash floods.
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Trans-boundary surveillance and Monitoring, systems were also setup or improved in some areas to monitor Sierra
Leones boarder points and control the importation of bio-hazards. There are more than 700 entry points in Sierra Leone
some located in very inhospitable areas. Among these, only five are manned while the armed security forces regularly
patrol others. Only three of five border posts have in place the basic infrastructure for border management and control.
Among these, only two including Lunge airport and Kambia seaport are equipped with proper monitoring, surveillance,
and reporting systems to meet some international standards.
There was minimal or no active engagement with the Manu river union to conclude the bilateral or tripartite agreements
between the three states. There were no Regional Level Preparedness Arrangements between Sierra Leone and
members of the Mano River Union. Although Sierra Leone is a member of the Mano River union (Sierra Leone, Liberia,
Guinea and Ivory Coast, there are currently no binding bilateral or multi-lateral agreements on the management of cross
boarder emergency preparedness and response issues between Sierra Leone and her neighboring countries.
DPR Monitoring, Information Management and Communication systems. During the August 2017 Landslide and August
2019 floods, there was monitoring and planning during the emergency preparedness and response operations. There
was a strong commitment to the joint monitoring systems between the National Platform for Disaster Risk Management,
which met very frequently during both disasters and the One Health Performance Management System under the
Ministry of Health EoC. Both Platforms provided guidance in the development of tools and a system to support incident
wide monitoring and reporting.
There were considerable efforts to establish and strengthen Sierra Leones Disaster Management Information Systems.
The UNDP and the WB facilitated the development of the CISMILS and Hazard and Risk Profile Information System
(HARPIS). Although underutilized and under maintained, the systems enhanced the ONS-DMD and various stakeholder’s
ability to make sound decisions regarding disaster risks, hazards, and vulnerability, exposure and cross-sectoral
integration of disaster management information. The uniqueness of some disasters to Sierra Leone, especially the 2017
landslide disaster presented a sharp learning curve for the disaster management information systems. This tested the
existing linkages and coordination between key stakeholders e.g. the incident registry and hospital emergency
admissions systems which proved weak, ineffective and difficult to track of some hospitalized mudslide victims and their
subsequent relief aid. The lack of standardized EP&R data collection tools, standards and guidelines, lack of integrated
EP&R information systems linking information and data from various stakeholders and pillar institutions; lack of a proper
databases and backup systems; lack of proper equipment and infrastructure to support data and information needs;
and weak information dissemination mechanisms were especially a challenge for the disaster management information
systems.
GIS monitoring in the country are weak as well as the EP & R research function with attributes of shortages of skilled
expertise in GIS monitoring skills and equipment. In addition, EP&R Geomatics research (ONS), subsequent workloads
are inadequate due to lack of dedicated resources to gather data and undertake key research practices before, during
and after disaster events. Inadequacies in implementation and follow up of research findings by government
departments or other stakeholder’s also fell short of any research or evidence-based planning systems in EP&R. The lack
of a clear EP&R research framework hampered the harmonization of research findings between various stakeholders.
Establishment of a dedicated Research function under the proposed National Disaster Management Agency is important
for purposes of strengthening existing emergency preparedness and response capacity.
Institutional arrangements for geomatics are equally inadequate as there seems to be no practice for centralized
collection, analysis and integration of GIS information. The ONS which is mandated to undertake this task currently lacks
trained GIS, IM and telecom expertise. Data utilization is limited due to lack of regular information updates, systematic
data sharing and data sharing protocols. In addition, data is often collected using inappropriate tools e.g. phone or paper,
without an agreed and common structure or standardization, and often not digitized into central databases. Current
data is outdated and there is no mechanism for obtaining real-time information updates nor information sharing.
iii) EP&R Infrastructure development Needs

Hazard Specific Preparedness Infrastructure capacity. Long-term community preparedness and coping is a function of
the community’s ability to access proper shelter, safety and proper coping mechanisms to protect themselves from
shocks and stresses. Nearly all districts and communities prone to floods lacked the minimum requirements for effective
flood emergency preparedness and response coordination. Communities visited during the floods were grossly under-
prepared in terms of flood safe housing, evacuation and coping mechanisms.
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Emergency management spaces and places of convergence at the district and community levels were either inadequate
or lacking which limited effective coordination due to low inherent capacity of the ONS. The lack of clearly marked
evacuation routes or plans for high risk disaster prone communities and dedicated or demarcated evacuation sites for
the provision of temporary shelter spaces during the emergencies. Where in existence, the facilities were gender
disaggregated for both men, women and children were made available which reduced other risks such as sexual and
gender-based violence. The state of the identified evacuation facilities was however, very devastating and short of
proper short term emergency supplies, equipment and facilities e.g. mattresses, and mosquito nets which was cause for
some disease ailments amidst a lack of readiness or shortage of basic relief supplies and protective logistical items e.g.
basic health, safety logistics. Although the law allowed for the marking of some schools and church facilities around
disaster prone areas as centres of refuge during the floods, utilization of the school facilities as evacuation centres was
counterproductive for continued education as a priority for children of school going age in highly prone districts and
communities e.g. Freetown, (culvert and Krube town).
The MoWS through its comprehensive Response to Floods Program designed some preparedness mechanisms to
increase access to water and to reduce community WASH risks during flood shock situations. However, water
infrastructure across all districts remains inadequate to support steady supply of clean and quality water and WASH
facilities during flood shocks, which enhances disaster risk in highly prone communities. Alternative methods to support
access to clean water in some highly prone communities were established e.g. water quality surveillance, the provision
of water tank reservoirs in high flood risk areas such as Krube town and Culvert, as well as the adoption of Rain Water
Harvesting and Solar powered Bore Hall Systems. These were however limited to a few flood prone locations in Freetown
due to inadequate funding and resources.
Numerous households, especially in informal settlement remain under prepared due to lack of proper and adequate
solid waste and sanitation facilities. In some flood prone communities such as Culvert slum in the Eastern Freetown
area, there is a shortage of toilet facilities limited to three toilet/latrine facilities for a population of more than 2000
inhabitants. The level of creativity espoused by inhabitants had taken to ‘’flying missile toilets’’ which empty in the river
and ocean as expressed during a meeting with the Culvert community’s leaders led to the prevalence of some poor
hygiene induced diseases such as diarrhea and, cholera outbreaks in 2016. This raised the need for the provision of
permanent and safe sanitation facilities, particularly improve the ration of toilets and water taps per household to
reduce the level of risk and vulnerability to disease shocks
Health and Safety Surveillance and Laboratory Capacity. The existing community health preparedness mechanisms can
be rated very strong, following the establishment and engagement of well-trained community (Health Centre I facilities)
and voluntary health workers by the MoH. During periods of normalcy, these platforms provide regular community
surveillance information on the health status of communities and households through the Health Monitoring and
Information System. This system has registered numerous successes in reducing community health risks. Adoption, and
duplication of this mechanism to enhance the preparedness, surveillance and monitoring capacity of other disasters e.g.
floods and landslides in high risk areas. Facilitation, Training (e.g. first aid) and compensation of constituent individuals
in such committees will be essential in ensuing their efficiency and effectiveness.
Emergency Operations Physical Infrastructure. The existing infrastructure is inadequate of a number of minimum
requirements for robust Emergency Operations Centres accepted internationally. Currently, the existing ONS-NSR is also
inadequate of some core and critical emergency response operation facilities at the national and regional level. For
instance, there is currently no dedicated monitoring, communications facility, conference facilities for key staff (Sits a
maximum of 16 members), and conducive health, safety and ancillary structures to conveniently facilitate staff
accommodation needs during level two and level three emergency operations. Furthermore, there is a lack of dedicated
physical EoC infrastructure at the regional, district and chiefdom levels to converge various role-players involved in
emergency response, hampering coordination issues, effective communication and duplication of activities amongst
various participants. This space can also be used as a central meeting point for politicians and members of the media to
congregate during an emergency event. .
Additional constraints were identified in relation to the existing warehousing and storage facilities for non-food
emergency response supplies (ex. mattresses, dignity kits, water). Currently, there are only two such facilities in the
whole country to mention Port Loko and MacDonald. Expansion of warehousing facilities countrywide is therefore
crucial to support relief aid in the shortest response time possible *Under 48 hours) at the regional and national levels.
Other infrastructure needs identified included; Inadequate Solid waste Management Capacity a the district level, i.e.
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Solid waste Management sites and sanitation and hazard waste incinerators, dedicated volunteer training, Centre
facilities, Community information desks and community structures for gender-based EP&R among others.
iv) National Emergency Communications and Equipment Needs.

A well-distributed physical infrastructure and supply of adequate emergency response equipment is vital during
response operations. In Sierra Leone, however, response mechanisms are still inefficient partly due to lack of proper
response equipment to facilitate key response processes such as Transportation, Communications, Firefighting,
Information and Planning, Mass Care, Health and Medical Services, Search and Rescue, Hazardous Materials, Food and
Water safety, military Support, Public Information management.
The EP&R communication system in Sierra Leone relies on both technical and traditional communications methods to
convey risk related information to communities. At the community level, the assessment noted the existence and
utilization of traditional early warning tools to inform communities of impending disasters. At the national and district
level, a number of communication equipment and systems have been setup to facilitate state-wide communications
including; Toll free disaster information hotlines (117 and 300) managed by the ONS and the Red Cross; Modern online
technological platforms such as WhatsApp based emergency platforms; Local Broadcasting stations are very
instrumental in the dissemination of information to at risk communities and the public but need training in the
communication of Disaster Related information. .
There are limited resources for centralized information management. There are a number of online applications
developed by different entities e.g. FCC, Department of Sanitation, WFP, UNDP but all lack integration with any other
EP&R or institutional systems. At present, risk mapping is mandated to the ONS, there is inadequate institutional capacity
the most appropriate entity (with corresponding IT and GIS capacity) to host and disseminate risk data at the national
level. The need to develop a functional and integrated ‘’ALL’’ stakeholder encompassing National Disaster Management
Information and Communication System is important. Establishment of the system should enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of Sierra Leones Emergency preparedness and response mechanisms, support efficient vulnerability
assessments, identify lifelines and critical failures, and facilitate access to human and material resources and
demographic targeting capacity. Most importantly, this system should include some of the following general
requirements of the NDMICS.
Urban Firefighting and technical Rescue Capacity. There was difficulty in undertaking search and rescue tasks e.g. during
landslide search and rescue missions during some disasters (fire, landslides and floods). In some instances, the country
had to source some equipment e.g. heavy-duty search and rescue Flood Lights from international and local partners,
which caused delays in the response mission. Inadequate facility Safety Equipment including; Drip Diverters, Emergency
Signs, Evacuation Stair Chairs, Float Switches, Gas Detection, Gas/Water Shutoffs, Lockout-Tag out, Pipe Markers; Heavy
duty machinery (including water tankers); Specialized Marine and Fire Rescue Equipment; Floodlights for night-time
operations; Debris Removal Tools, including Chainsaws, Cutting & Pruning Tools, Power Brushes, Yard Vacs & Leaf
Blowers, Rakes, Trash Containers, Pickaxes, shovels and machetes; Sea rescue equipment for water operations;
Personnel Safety gear, Disaster Survival Kits, Disposable & Chemical Resistant Clothing, Eye Protection, Face Protection,
First Aid & Wound Care rain boots, hand gloves and helmets, Respiratory masks and basic medical supplies; Fire blankets
and fire extinguishers; dun-tables or snorkel ladders and this could cause major problems in their ability to save lives in
tall buildings
Emergency Social Services Equipment Needs. In consideration of the above, the assessment noted the existence of some
communications equipment hosted by multiple stakeholders during various disasters (floods, Landslides, Windstorms,
fires and epidemics). Despite the existence of the above equipment and facilities, Disaster response agencies such as
the Police, Fire Services, Medical Services, and Public Works Department etc. are in urgent need of technical upgrading.
These agencies are the first responders with critical roles to play in the immediate aftermath of any disaster.
Emergency Communications Capacity. Despite the existence of some communications systems and operational
equipment, the existing equipment is still inadequate of the essential communications infrastructure hardware needs.
The existing communication systems and equipment are constrained between the national, regional, district and
community levels. The systems especially lacks end-to-end communication equipment (radios) and electronic reporting
tools to initiate communications and to facilitate real-time reporting of disasters with key-players before and during and
emergency. Cross border, communications are equally weak, as surrounding communities are not equipped to inform
the ONS on emergencies or incidents. This leads to a significant delay in disaster response. Therefore, it is essential that
critical communications equipment be acquired to support the communications and operations of the EoC.
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Emergency Response Transportation and Logistics Needs. The transportation of relief supplies from warehousing
facilities also present a major obstacle. Firstly, ONS currently has no large, four-wheel drive, trucks available to transport
mass quantitates of relief aid to affected communities. During the landslide disaster response, transportation of relief
items to the intended beneficiaries delayed due to lack of logistics trucks and systemic bureaucracies in securing logistics
transportation from the MoF and RSLAF, which further hampers the response process. At the regional level, there are
no vehicles to support emergency response operations especially in densely populated and high-risk profile areas.
v) EP&R Personnel Requirement.

International support and coordination Arrangements for EP&R. The existing legal framework provides for the
involvement and participation of national, subnational institutions and international systems. These institutions provide
supplementary capacity to the ONS-DMD in addressing immediate and short-term needs during disasters. District
Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs) were also established at the district level as multi-organization groupings
established within each district, to coordinate DPR, District Council leaders, sector departments, security
representatives, key local representatives, the health organizations and any active international partners within the
area. Coordination of disaster preparedness and response operations is devolved from the national level with
operational functions at the national, regional and district levels.
Provisions for Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are in existence under the National Disaster Management Plan, 2006.
Each ESF is activated during emergency operations by the ONS-DMD. (See table in appendix 1.1 Emergency Support
Functions). In addition, the framework provides for 10 emergency response pillars with specific in-incident functions
supported by respective government and UN agencies (See appendix 1.2. for list of pillar institutions) that supplement
ONS DPR Capacity and the DPR mission. These pillars include, Coordination, Logistics, Social Protection and Psychosocial
Support, Health and Burials, Security and Safety, Social Mobilization and Communication, Food and Nutrition, Water,
Sanitation and Hygiene, Victim Registration and shelter. Shelter.;
However, there were seemingly duplications of roles between some stakeholders, which requires streamlining. There
was seemingly no pillar or cluster involvement in public information use, which is essential for emergency
communications. The pillar or cluster approach enhanced coordination amongst partners, as well as facilitating
information sharing, surveillance and the mapping of gaps of underserved areas during the emergency relief operations.
Incident Organization Structure. There exist substantial human resources capacity for EP & R support. These include,
disaster management volunteers, RSLAF, Sierra Leone Police, National Fire Force, Sierra Leone Red Cross Society, NGOS,
MoHs, and Institute of Engineers. These established functional procedures to implement the Emergency concept and
develop one comprehensive all-hazards emergency response institutional framework and response mechanism. The
response situation and surge capacity was instant, all-inclusive and ‘’all encompassing’’ of government institutions,
NGOs and health facilities in Sierra Leone, although with some capacity challenges to support all emergency operations
functions.
Search and Rescue Capacity. The National Fire Force had fire engineers on response mission to address the fire incidents
in the country. However, the force is ill equipped with only 19 working fire engineers and limited utility vehicles. The
National Fire Force has a standby team of men in working order ready respond to the fires. The firefighters are on 24-
hour standby and shifted after 8 hours in the day. In addition, an emergency line is available. The firefighters had trained
on how to respond and make the equipment ready to combat the fires. The officers have undergone in-service trainings
in the country and overseas. However, the National Fire Forces should be prioritized for training interventions focusing
on firefighting, search and rescue, fire investigation, fire prevention activities and management training, in order for
them to better support the response activities of staff from the National Disaster Management Agency.
Medical Health Care Surge Capacity. Medical Health care surge systems were active within the first 24hours during the
landslide occurrence providing health, triage and psychological support. However, surrounding health care systems
were overwhelmed with a surge of patients seeking care during the disaster, and no plan to deal with this is essential.
Notwithstanding, all medical health facilities referred for mudslide victims in Freetown were short of triage handling
capacity to meet the patient surge with hardly any triage experts in the country. Expanding medical surge capacity
throughout Sierra Leone could have benefited from international partnerships to bring in qualified and expert triage
capacity to reduce health response time. This includes identifying untapped resources in the community, enhancing
training, creating deployment plans and procedures for a tiered-care model and building upon proven approaches for
improving availability of specialty care.
xi
Training and Knowledge Building Capacity. Collaborative arrangements between the ONS and other partners particularly
the Red Cross yielded results in training of key stakeholders in the EP&R pillar roles e.g. the Police, ONS staff, security
sector and council chairpersons e.g. training on National Disaster Law. At the national level, information on DPR was
incorporated into national Primary school education curricula. Whilst endeavours to facilitate DPR integration into the
Secondary school curricula are underway by the UNDP. This has assisted inculcation of DPR knowledge and skills
amongst the youth. However, there seems to be very little progress made to integrate DPR into the Tertiary curricula
which requires concerted efforts by the ONS in collaboration with the national council for higher education to ensure
its integration, as well support for the production of DPR IEC Materials.
However, there is a general scarcity of critical mass of trainer, skills and training capacity in DPR or EPR related skills and
a lack of dedicated training institutions rendering DRM or EP&R certified or accredited training programs across the
country. Higher Learning institutions in Sierra Leone do not have curriculums or modules that speak to the training needs
of the proposed Agency, specialized trainings in DRM and DPR are largely delivered by international institutions which
is not cost efficient. While some of the institutions are under resourced in terms of skilled trainers, Initiatives to
harmonize and streamline the disaster management related trainings, modules, and the national disaster management-
training curriculum remain underserved partly due to lack of a critical mass of highly specialized and skilled DRM and
DRR experts and trainers countrywide. Furthermore, there is need for a central database of EP&R training institutions
to capture which entities (INGOS, NGOs, and government departments) provide training in which EP&R related skill to
assist improve coordination and monitoring of skills and capacity development for EP&R in Sierra Leone
At the institutional level, the ONS, directorate for Disaster Management, is understaffed at the National and district
level. The national office staff is complimented by only 7 staff, based in selected District offices throughout Sierra Leon.
The regional staff component is nearly inexistent with few regional or district coordinators. The inadequacy of key
staffing resources hampers emergency preparedness and response interventions. This becomes especially acute when
multiple regions are affected by disaster events at the same time. In such cases, staff are spread too thinly across the
country and temporary. This hampers the ability of existing staff to render quick and efficient response to affected
communities across the country.
Results of the staff survey within the DMD staff skills and training needs survey identified gaps and training needs in
emergency preparedness planning related skill areas majority of which were rated under 50% on average. Most
importantly, respondents indicated the lowest average scores in designing relief-planning systems (33%), emergency
response management planning (42%), and emergency preparedness planning (48%). Key implementing partners need
training to enhance skills in the development of contingency plans mainly due to lack of training and hands on
experience, funding, and a lack of relevant curriculum by training institutions (i.e. Universities) that would address some
of the technical skills gaps through joint ventures to address some of the capacity gaps established between ONS and
some of the INGOs active in the country on issues such as; first aid, disaster response, risk mapping and disaster risk
reductions. Local NGOs have also expressed a willingness to avail their expertise to build capacity of staff, volunteers
and affected communities in order to promote improved EP&R.
Summary of Recommendations and Capacity building Action.

Key EP&R Summary of Recommendations and Capacity building Action.
Response
component.
Legal and  Develop and Strengthen existing Legal and institutional Arrangements for DPR in Sierra Leone
Institutional  Support for the promulgation and subsequent enactment of the NDMA bill as well as the disbandment
Arrangements of the Disaster Management function from the ONS
for DPR.  Develop Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act or regulation
 Invest in the development of standardized operation protocols for DPR.
 In addition, the law should be reviewed to explore alternative disaster risk financing strategies and
platforms
 Review, Update and mainstream DPR Policies in line with international, continental and regional
frameworks while improving coordination mechanisms for the different levels of disasters;
 Approve the proposed NDMA structure, facilitate the recruitment of specialized expertise for the ONS
and training of ONS staff in relevant EP&R skills.
Information  Strengthen capacity of existing Community Engagement systems, and facilitate training and, sensitization
systems for and formalization or institutionalization of chiefdom disaster management committees and community
Disaster volunteers as the formal coordinative structures in first response
xii

Response
component.
Preparedness  Scale up the provision of intensive community awareness campaigns, School education and training
and Response. program on natural and human-induced disaster and Reinforce risk awareness, attitude and high action
stimulating strategies to improve actions and adoption of affordable and resilient solutions through EP&R
Education and Training Capacity
 Strengthen the capacity of the Sierra Leone Meteorological agency capacity and systems and
infrastructure,
 Strengthen the capacity of the Hydrological Monitoring systems and Institutional Capacity; e.g. conduct
Surface water gauging to improve periodical monitoring activities; build institutional capacity
 Strengthen community Monitoring and Surveillance Systems through; establishment and strengthening
of regional DPR coordination arrangements between Sierra Leone and the Manu river union
 Strengthen coordination capacity between the ONS and other DPR agencies and the functionality and
capacity of existing committees and DRM frameworks through additional funding
 Develop the National Disaster Management Information Communication System (NDMICS) and response
mechanisms taking action in anticipation of events, integration of disaster risk reduction in response
preparedness and ensuring that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels
 Enhance information dissemination mechanisms, alert and rapid response systems.
 Facilitate the development of a robust targeting, identification, victim validation systems and an agreed
central database repository for all agencies and support the development and establishment of a
dedicated and centralized victim registry and identification system, post Disaster Tracking, Monitoring
and Follow up Systems, victim tracking systems and protocols
 establish a clear monitoring system and indicators based on previous plans based on quality indicators
 Support updates of Hazard and Vulnerability maps or assessments and the establishment of a clear EP&R
research
 Develop a functional and integrated ‘’ALL’’ stakeholder encompassing National Disaster Management
Information and Communication System is important
Infrastructure  Develop and/or establish dedicated administrative infrastructure for the proposed National Disaster
development Management Agency at all levels of DRM administration
Needs  establish decentralized zonal offices to allow rapid response to disaster situations, as they are extensions
of the national agency and strengthen existing inter-disciplinary actions among DPR stakeholders and
Multi-Hazard Physical Infrastructure Needs for key emergency response stakeholders
 Establish dedicated physical EoC infrastructure at the regional, district and chiefdom levels to converge
various role-players involved in emergency response, coordination, effective communication and
duplication of activities amongst various participants.
 conduct a thorough and complete EOC operational requirements and physical space survey, as the basis
for which decisions will be made on the design location, relocation, building selection or construction
site of the EOC
 Develop and expand existing warehousing and storage facilities for non-food emergency response
supplies (ex. mattresses, dignity kits, water)
 develop and/or Strengthen Hazard Specific Preparedness Infrastructure including; the identification,
refurbishment or development of clearly marked evacuation shelters, routes or plans for high risk
disaster
 scale up efforts in support of communities in high risk areas to have utilize alternative methods to access
clean water in some districts
 Support regular supply of water reagents and the recruitment of skilled water quality engineers in the
ministry and at the district level. And development of a clear water safety plan
 Support the provision of permanent and safe sanitation facilities, and undertake a comprehensive
Sanitation mapping exercise around the country and the design of scalable sanitation solutions especially
for high-risk communities is required
 Improve Health and Safety Surveillance and Laboratory Capacity through establishment and
strengthening of the capacity of existing Health Laboratory surveillance systems.
 Strengthen risk-monitoring mechanisms in remote communities.
Communication  Facilitate the acquisition of proper response equipment to facilitate key response processes
and Equipment  Acquire, establish and install critical emergency communications equipment be acquired to support the
Needs. communications and operations of the proposed NDMA and EoC e.g. administrative, coordinative
communications, surveillance and EWS equipment, Reporting equipment and emergency operational
equipment such as search and rescue equipment.
 Strengthen alert and rapid response communication systems.
 Strengthen Emergency Communications, outreach and social mobilization capacity through the
development of social mobilization and communications protocols for Emergency response
xiii

Response
component.
 Support and strengthen Urban Firefighting and technical Rescue Capacity. Support the acquisition of
equipment e.g. heavy-duty search and rescue Flood Lights from international and local partners, to
increase response time and action
 Facilitate the acquisition of Emergency Response Transportation and Logistics vehicles and trucks to
transport mass quantitates of relief aid to affected communities at the national, regional and district
level.
 Facilitate the acquisition and upgrade of Emergency Social Services Equipment for first response agencies
such as the Police, Fire Services, Medical Services, and Public Works Department etc.
Disaster  Prioritize the establishment of a dedicated National Disaster Training institute to support the
Preparedness development and supply of a critical mass of skilled and qualified DRM and EP&R trainers and workforce
and Response  Strengthen International support and coordination Arrangements for EP&R. Review and streamline
Personnel existing roles between some stakeholders, or clusters and facilitate enhanced coordination amongst
Needs. partners
 The National Fire Forces should be prioritized for training interventions focusing on firefighting, search
and rescue, fire investigation, fire prevention activities and management training
 Medical Health Care Surge Capacity. Support and strengthen the existing health care systems with a
patient surge plan during disasters
 Strengthen Collaborative arrangements between the ONS and other partners particularly the Red Cross
in training of key stakeholders in the EP&R pillar roles
 support the development of centralized database of EP&R training institutions to assist improve
coordination and monitoring of skills and capacity development in critical EP&R Fields
 Strengthen the institutional setup for EP&R training and public education framework with competent
professionals, educators, trainers in disaster management.
 Facilitate, initiatives to harmonize and streamline the disaster management related trainings curriculums
development and specialized trainings in DRM and DPR, training of skilled trainers and experts
countrywide through the development of a strong central framework of education, training and research
 Scale up simulation exercises and drills to other districts and communities with additional funding.
In conclusion, there is a considerable level of institutional and Multisector capacity to undertake EP&R activities A larger
proportion of opinions following this assessment conclude that Sierra Leones capacity needs in the governance, human,
infrastructure, systems and operational capacity grossly outweigh the existing EP&R capacity. Limitations in funding
further exacerbate operational inefficiencies in EP&R and frustrate government’s plans to improve the existing EP&R
situation countrywide, as the country remains short of the adoption of several international standards in EP&R. In terms
of emergency preparedness, the effects of hazards are tremendously reduced when people are well aware, informed
and motivated to take first actions towards a culture of prevention and resilience and in addition identify disaster risk
reduction priorities, which in turn require the compilation, analysis and dissemination of relevant information and
knowledge on hazards and their impacts. While not all hazards can be eliminated, there is considerable scope for
reducing their devastating impacts on vulnerable communities by improving disaster management arrangements for
preparedness, response and recovery activities.
Urban populations and communities in Sierra Leone, particularly downtown Freetown are growing rapidly. The civic
services and the general quality of the settlements is of a low standard in some areas. In the absence of strong
governance, will power, regulatory and enforcement capacity, such communities are subject to an ever-increasing risk
of natural as well as technological disasters. The situation is most alarming even now in the absence of well-planned and
structured settlements, considering that many of the settlements had developed with very limited sensitivity to the
disaster risks and shocks faced by those particular communities. Likewise, long-term emergency preparedness and
disaster risk reduction in a community is a function of its capacity to access resources and build assets. Household
livelihood security is the most basic means for achieving preparedness and risk reduction as it provides households with
financial, social and physical assets to protect themselves from shocks and stresses. Efforts focusing on disaster risk
reduction in poor communities need to be closely linked to livelihood Programmes. Provision of support to scale up such
Programmes as reforestation will restore the degraded landscapes and reduce further severities of floods and landslides.
In addition to this assessment, a multi-sectoral and multi-institutional capacity building and investment plan, and the
NDMA establishment report follow in a separate document, detailing the specific capacity building priorities, investment
needs and implementation plan for each EP&R component and stakeholder towards improved EP&R Efficiency and
Effectiveness.
xiv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Project Information ............................................................................................................................................................ ii
Acronyms And Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................ iii
Executive Summary. .......................................................................................................................................................... iv
Table Of Contents. ........................................................................................................................................................... xv
List Of Tables ................................................................................................................................................................... xvi
1. Background. ........................................................................................................................................................ 17
1.1. Rationale, Objective, And Scope Of The Assignment. ............................................................................................. 17
1.2. Approach And Methodology. .................................................................................................................................... 18
1.2.1. Capacity Assessment Framework. ............................................................................................................................ 18
1.2.2. Research Design, Sample Selection And Data Collection Tools. ............................................................................. 19
1.2.3. Data Analysis .............................................................................................................................................................. 20
2. Situational Assessment Of Drm Institutional Frameworks And Structures. ........................................................... 21

2.1. Sierra Leone Multi-Hazard Profile. ............................................................................................................................ 21
2.2. Social-Demographic Context, Exposure, And Vulnerability. .................................................................................... 22
2.3. Impact Of Recent Disasters On Economic Growth. ................................................................................................. 25
3. Ep&R Capacity Gaps And Establishment Needs Assessment. ............................................................................... 28

3.1. Legal And Institutional Frameworks For Ep&R ......................................................................................................... 28
3.1.1. Legal Arrangements For Disaster Preparedness And Response. ............................................................................ 28
3.1.2. Gaps In The Existing Legal And Institutional Arrangements. ................................................................................... 29
3.2. Information Management Systems For Disaster Preparedness And Response. .................................................... 39
3.2.1. Community Engagement Systems. ........................................................................................................................... 39
3.2.2. Ep&R Education And Training Capacity. ................................................................................................................... 40
3.2.3. Early Warning Systems (Surveillance And Monitoring) ........................................................................................... 41
3.2.4. Dpr Information Management Systems ................................................................................................................... 46
3.3. Ep&R Physical Infrastructure And Facility Needs. .................................................................................................... 50
3.3.1. Hazard Specific Preparedness Infrastructure Capacity. ........................................................................................... 50
3.4. National Emergency Operations Equipment Needs. ............................................................................................... 62
3.4.1. Emergency Communication Equipment Needs. ...................................................................................................... 64
3.5. Disaster Preparedness And Response Personnel Needs. ........................................................................................ 73
3.5.1. International Support And Coordination Arrangements For Ep&R. ....................................................................... 73
3.5.2. Incident Organization Structure................................................................................................................................ 79
3.5.3. Training And Knowledge Building. ............................................................................................................................ 80
3.5.4. Exercises And Drills .................................................................................................................................................... 41
4. Recommendation Lessons Learned, Conclusion................................................................................................... 84

4.1. Recommendations. .................................................................................................................................................... 84
4.1.1. Legal And Institutional Arrangements For Dpr. ....................................................................................................... 84
4.1.2. Information Systems For Disaster Preparedness And Response. ........................................................................... 84
4.1.3. Ep&R Physical Infrastructure And Facility Needs. .................................................................................................... 87
4.1.4. Emergency Communication Equipment Needs. ...................................................................................................... 89
4.1.5. Disaster Preparedness And Response Personnel Needs. ........................................................................................ 89
4.1.6. Strengthening Ep&R Programme Efficiency And Effectiveness. ............................................................................. 90
4.1.7. Ep&R Programme Sustainability Needs. ................................................................................................................... 91
4.1.8. Lessons Learned......................................................................................................................................................... 92
4.2. Conclusion. ............................................................................................................................................................... 100
Appendix........................................................................................................................................................................ 101
xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Outline of Tasks, Activities, Applicable Tools and Methods for the Assessment. ................................................. 18
Table 2: List of Institutions Consulted During the Assessment. ........................................................................................... 19
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Total Population by District 2004 - 2015 Census. ...................................................... 22
Table 4: Population Density in Sierra Leone by Region. ....................................................................................................... 23
Table 5: Sierra Leone Youth Population (15-35 years) by Region, District and Gender. .................................................... 23
Table 6: Percent female population 15-49 years by region and district .............................................................................. 24
Table 7: Multidimensional Poverty by Regions, 2017 ........................................................................................................... 24
Table 8: Checklist for the Existence of Critical Emergency Preparedness Guidelines, Protocols and procedures............ 36
Table 9: Early Warning Agencies. ........................................................................................................................................... 41
Table 10: Categories of Existing Boarder Posts in Sierra Leone. .......................................................................................... 44
Table 11: Current Administrative and Office Space Arrangements for the DMD. .............................................................. 55
Table 12: Summary of Provinces, Districts, Chiefdoms and Sections in Sierra Leone. ....................................................... 58
Table 13: Summary of Provinces, Districts, Chiefdoms and Sections in Sierra Leone. ....................................................... 58
Table 14: Proposed Physical Infrastructure Needs of Key Stakeholders in the EP&R Operations System. ....................... 59
Table 15: EOC Operations Equipment Needs. ....................................................................................................................... 62
Table 16: Urban Firefighting Equipment Needs (National Fire force) ................................................................................. 65
Table 17: EOC Emergency Communications Equipment Needs. ......................................................................................... 65
Table 18: Multi-Stakeholder Emergency Response Equipment Needs. .............................................................................. 69
Table 19: Roles and Responsibilities of Administrative Institutions in EP&R. ..................................................................... 74
Table 20: Key Stakeholder Support and Emergency Operations Functions. ....................................................................... 75
Table 21: Establishment Support Function needs of the Emergency Operations Function. .............................................. 79
Table 22: ONS-DMD Self Rating in Application of EP&R Plans and SOPS ............................................................................ 82
LIST OF FIGURES.
Figure 1: Frequency and Magnitude of Hazards in Sierra Leone. ........................................................................................ 21

Figure 2: Illustration of Hazard Profile and Most Affected Communities 2014-2019......................................................... 22
Figure 3: Five Year Trajectory of Sierra Leones WRI indicator Scores. ................................................................................ 25
Figure 4: Damage and Loss Assessment Results of the August 2017 Landslide by Sector. ................................................ 26
Figure 5: Real GDP Growth per Annum (Sierra Leone) ......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 6: Illustration of the Devastating Impact of August 2017 floods on Housing in Culvert Community. .................... 33
Figure 8: ONS-DMD Staff Self-Assessment Ratings in Undertaking Disaster Risk Assessments ......................................... 82
Figure 10: Flooded River Stream in Bo County due to Narrow Culverts and poor Maintenance. ..................................... 52
Figure 11: Illustration of Soled waste Management Systems in Freetown ......................................................................... 53
Figure 12: Level 1 Disaster Management Framework (During Normalcy) .......................................................................... 73
Figure 13: Level 2 and Level 3 Disaster Management Framework (During Emergencies) ................................................. 73
Figure 14: Individual Training Needs requirements. ............................................................................................................. 83
xvi
1. Background.
In early 2015, Sierra Leone developed her Medium-Term National Development Plan (MTNDP 2019 – 2025). The plan
seeks ‘’to build a united, peaceful, progressive, dynamic, confident, enterprising, and happy nation where the people
have access to jobs, food, education, and health services, and have equal justice and equal opportunities for all’’.
Consistent with various regional and international development agendas such as the African Union Agenda 2063, the
UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, Peacebuilding and State building Goals, the MTNDP highlights four
key national goals in a bid to transform the economy, promote diversification and stimulate growth across its primary
sectors. Among these include, a diversified and resilient green economy; a nation with educated, empowered, and
healthy citizens capable of realizing their fullest potential; a society that is peaceful, cohesive, secure, and just; and
a competitive economy with a well-developed infrastructure. Achievement of the above objectives hinged on seven
policy clusters including, addressing of vulnerabilities and building resilience as one of the new development agendas
pursued by the Government of Sierra Leone.
In-spite of the above goals, Sierra Leone is highly prone to a number of catastrophic natural and human induced
disasters including floods, landslides and coastal erosion, tropical storms, sea level rise hazards and epidemics that
have affected both the social and economic constructs of the economy. The country ranked in second place in Africa
(after Madagascar), and in 8th place globally (Global climate risk and vulnerability Index ranking, 2019), climatic
changes and a rapidly increasing exposure and vulnerability to disasters present an unprecedented challenge to the
country’s development agenda.
Table 1: Sierra Leones Ranking in the Global Climate Risk and Vulnerability Index, 2019.
Source: Global Climate Risk Index 20191
The daunting challenge of addressing the increasing disasters in the existing fiscal space warrants urgency and
greater response initiatives to strengthen the country’s resilience, preparedness and response capacity to disasters.
Strengthening the country’s emergency preparedness and response capacity is however critical. In lieu of the hazard
profile of the country and its impact on the national economy, proactive and holistic management of preparedness
and response activities is critical. The GOSL has prioritized2 reducing the country’s vulnerabilities, increasing
adaptation, preparedness, response and resilience to disasters and climate change as a means towards achieving its
goals for accelerated economic recovery, growth and social development3.
Rationale, Objective, and Scope of the Assignment.

On August 14, 2017, Freetown experienced one of its most severe landslides that ripped through settlements in the
outskirts of the city of Freetown destroying everything in its path. The event had a massive human impact, with 1,141
declared dead or missing and over 6,000 people affected. The landslide caused major destruction of infrastructure,
including 349 buildings, bridges, roads, schools, and health facilities. On the same day, flooding throughout the city
also damaged infrastructure and affected households. The landslide together with other past disasters including
1
https://www.atlas-mag.net/en/article/global-climate-risk-index-2019-african-countries-facing-climate-disasters
2
The Medium-Term National Development Plan (MTNDP 2019 – 2025).
3
by the capacity needs assessment for EP&R, November 2019
17
floods, drought, epidemics, coastal erosion, sea level rise, storm surge, tropical storms and lightning and thunder
highlighted the need for government to strengthen national preparedness and response capacity to disasters,
forming the basis for this assignment.
The objective of the assessment was to derive insights that will facilitate and strengthen the Government’s
emergency preparedness and response capacity to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts
of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions. The assignment was therefore commissioned to
contribute to the outcomes of component 2: Strengthening Institutional Capacity with the purpose of to improving
the capability and performance of the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) to manage and respond to disasters.
The specific deliverables of this assignment included; I) Inception report, Data collection schedule and data collection
tools (Included in the inception report), a validation workshop and the capacity needs assessment final report.
Addressing the recommendations of the capacity needs assessment will also help to improve efficiency, avoid
duplication of efforts and enhance the benefits of collaboration and coordination among key government and
emergency relief entities.
Approach and Methodology.

In line with the Terms of Reference (ToR), this Assignment consisted of two critical tasks including; a) the capacity
needs assessment for disaster preparedness and response; and b) establishment of the National Disaster Risk
Management Agency. Our approach and methodology to carry out the task of the assignment, specifically in relation
to the capacity needs assessment for disaster preparedness and response entailed three phases:
Table 1: Outline of Tasks, Activities, Applicable Tools and Methods for the Assessment.
Phases Key tasks Summary of Activities. Applicable Methods.
Phase 1  review of  Initial Planning and  Desktop research on national
documentations Preparation hazard profiling
 Preliminary Literature  Review of existing national (or
Reviews relevant regional) risk and
 Inception Meeting and Field vulnerability maps
Work Planning Meetings  Checklist development
 Development of data  Stakeholder Mapping.
collection tools
Phase 2  Field  Diagnostic Study at The  Key Informant Interviews
Engagements/ National, district and Local (sector departments, Agencies
data collection Level and non-governmental
 Linkages and Coordination organizations)
Among and Between  Focus group Discussions at
Institutions District levels.
 Sector-Specific Diagnosis  Community Engagements
Phase 3  Data analysis, and  Data Analysis and Report  Primary and Secondary data
report writing Writing Analysis.
 Findings validation workshop  Qualitative and Quantitative
 Consolidating Final Reports. data analysis and reporting
 Validation Workshops
1.2.1. Capacity Assessment Framework.

A combination of guiding instruments were applied. The UNISDR’s Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response
(2008), the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI) framework and the UNDP capacity development
framework were used to identify country capacity strengths and gaps (SWOT analysis) related to emergency
preparedness and response. Other frameworks consulted included the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis’ Framework for evaluating Emergency preparedness Plans and Response Strategies (2008), A strategic
Framework for Emergency Preparedness by the World Health Organization (2017) and Community emergency
preparedness: a manual for managers and policy makers of the World Health Organization (1999).
The assignment also took into consideration five important dimensions of capacity building to identify the human
resources, physical infrastructure, equipment and mobility needs. These factored in multi-hazard, multi-
18
stakeholder, multi-sectoral, multi-cycle needs and requirements at all disaster management levels (National,
Regional, and District and Chiefdom levels).
The assessment identified a number of EP&R capacity indicators including governance and institutional
arrangements, operational capacity, human and financial resources, physical infrastructure, EP&R systems and
Logistical arrangements. For governance and institutional arrangements, the focus was on availability and relevance
of legislative and policy frameworks, management and coordination, partnerships and institutional networks and
preparedness planning. The operational capacity assessment focused on organizational efficiency needs in terms of
structures for EP&R and the ability to assess risk and responsiveness to EP&R issues. Other operational capacity
parameters assessed included; checks on the robustness and functionality of existing EoC facilities, infrastructure,
EP&R information systems and the adequacy of existing research systems. A structured analytical process followed,
wherein different Agencies, MDAs, NGO, and civil society organizations consulted to assess individual institution
and collective capacity for EP and R.
This approach aided the identification of strategic physical infrastructure, Mobility and Operational equipment
needs for emergency preparedness and response in Sierra Leone. Considerations for relevant DRM institutional
setups at the international level informed some best practices for local applicability.
1.2.2. Research design, sample selection and data collection tools.

The ONS assisted in the identification of 40 key institutions, who were consulted (see table 3 below) with more than
180 respondents participating in the assessments. Data was gathered using multidisciplinary techniques involving
consultative and participatory approaches to include; Key informant interviews with officials of different MDAs,
Agencies, NGOs and Civil Society Organizations and focus group discussions with DDMCs and communities using
structured questionnaires guides. The tools were applied to best understand if the country has required capacities
for EP & R identify gaps and challenges and propose recommendations on how these capacities gaps and challenges
can be addressed by the government and all responsible EP&R institutions.
Table 2: List of Institutions Consulted During the Assessment.

Level of Institutions Contacted/ Interviewed
Engagement
National Level.  Office of National Security,
 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Free Town emergency Recovery Project,
Freetown City Council (FCC),
 District Local Council (DRM), District Disaster Management Committees, District
Health/Urban Planning/ Roads,
 National Fire Force, Sierra Leone Meteorological Agency, Sierra Leone Hydrological
Agency.
 Ministry of Defence/RSLAF, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development,
 Ministry of Health, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development,
 Ministry of Lands and Housing Corporation,
 Department of Sanitation (Solid waste),
 Ministry of Works and Transport, Ministry of Water Resources,
 Ministry of Social Welfare, gender and Children’s Affairs,
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,
 National Commission for Social Action, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF),
Sierra Leone Police, Sierra Leone Red Cross Society,
 Emergency Operation Centre (Cockrill), and
 Non-Food Warehouse (East Free town)
INGOs active in  United National Development Programme,
DRM and EP&R  World Food Programme, United Nations Population Fund for Acton (UNFPA),
 Action Against Hunger (AAH), BRAC Sierra Leone,
 Centre for Disease Control (CDC), Concern Worldwide (CW),
 Department for International Development (DFID),
 Economic Commission for West African States,
 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Organization for Migration (IOM),
Save the Children / UNICEF, Trocaire /
19
Level of Institutions Contacted/ Interviewed

Engagement
 Voluntary Services overseas, UN Women (UNWOMEN),
 World Health Organization,
 National Emergency Health Agency (Ambulances)
Other actors  Environment Foundation Africa
DRM focal point  DRM Focal Point persons in Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Phujehun
persons at the  District DRM Volunteers
district level.  District Disaster Management Committees.
Affected  The Culvert Community
communities in  6 Mile resettlement Camp
selected districts.  Communities in Bo, Kenema and Phujehun
 Selected Private sector actors.
1.2.3. Data Analysis

Prior to the analysis stage, all data collected was subjected to intensive cleaning using both computer-aided and
visual checks, to identify and rectify any errors, missing cases, outliers and extremes. Qualitative data from the in-
depth literature review, Focus Group Discussions and KIIs was analyzed using thematic, discourse and content
analysis methods. The transcripts were read to extract the emerging themes. Coding of themes was done using MS-
Word 2013 and physically using flip charts. The themes were narrowed down into main themes. Determination of
the establishment needs of the NDMA undertook a participatory design method with an aim of identifying and
aligning the needs of all relevant stakeholders.
Pertinent documents were scrutinized in attempts to inform the physical infrastructure and equipment needs. KIIs
and FGDs covered observations and insights from the staff and officers from a select of relevant institutions,
especially the ONS. At the municipal and district level, the team met with District Chiefs, Disaster Risk Management
Committees, District Local Council Chairman/Ministers, Vulnerable Populations e.g. women, youth, children,
vulnerable people.
Considerations for functional and key operational systems, including management of emergency operations, use of
ICT to increase efficiency, leadership and management systems, performance management, human resource
management, planning and budgeting, and customer engagement necessary to deliver on its mandate. Finally, cost
and investment options were developed and assessed, and overall fiscal implications for (wage and non-wage) were
provided.
20
2. Situational Assessment of DRM Institutional Frameworks and Structures.

This section presents information on multi hazards, demographics, exposure, vulnerability and Impact of Disaster
Risk on Economic Growth. This section also presents information on Multi stakeholder participation in EP & R and
supporting Legal and policy frameworks in Sierra Leone.
Sierra Leone Multi-Hazard Profile.

Sierra Leone, in West Africa is located along the Atlantic Ocean, bordering Liberia in the South and Guinea in the
North. The land itself is broken up into four quadrants: Guinean mangroves (essentially swamps along the
coastline), forested hills, plateaus high above sea level, and mountains in the east. The vulnerability of Sierra Leone
to hazards is a function of several risk factors that have increased the effects of incidental disasters countrywide.
These include the country’s topology, condition of human settlements and their infrastructure, poverty and
population demographics. Other causative factors include environmental degradation, level of public awareness,
the dynamics of public policy and environment on disaster management among others.
As a developing country, Sierra Leone is prone to disasters induced by both natural processes and human activities.
Over the past five years, Sierra Leone has experienced a number of hazards, each with their own measure of
destruction on human lives, property and livelihoods. The hazards experienced in Sierra Leone over the past
decades can be categorized as:
 Hydro-meteorological hazards: floods, hailstorm, windstorm and lightning

 Geological hazards: earthquakes, landslides and mudslides
 Biological hazards: diseases, human epidemics and invasive species, crop pests and diseases, Livestock vectors
 Human induced hazards: accidents (roads, air and water), fires (In situ - house and ex-situ -wildfires),
unplanned settlements, artisanal mining activities and civil wars
 Environmental hazards: land degradation, wetland degradation, deforestation, pollution (water, air and soil)
and poor solid waste management
The figure below further illustrates the frequency and magnitude of prevalent Natural Hazards in Sierra Leone.
Figure 1: Frequency and Magnitude of Hazards in Sierra Leone.
Source: Sierra Leone Hazard Profile, Harpis 2018.
Recurring small-scale and slow-onset disasters have particularly affected communities and households, leading to
high social economic losses. Nearly all communities across the country, especially those settled in the Western
Urban, Western rural, Eastern, Southern and Northern districts of Freetown, Bo, Mkeny, Kenema and Phujehun had
suffered the effects of at least one type of disaster. The illustration in the figure below shows some of the most
affected hazard communities and corresponding hazards are.
21
Figure 2: Illustration of Hazard Profile and Most Affected Communities 2014-2019
Source: Sierra Leone Hazard Profile 2018.
Social-Demographic Context, Exposure, and Vulnerability.

Sierra Leones population is a rapidly growing with an estimated population of 7.557 million, up from 5.5 million in
2008 (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015). Up to 62% of the total population reside in rural areas up from 58% in 2008.
The country’s land cover expands to 27,699 square miles (71,740 square kilometres) of area, ranking Sierra Leone
103rd in terms of population, and 120th in terms of area. The country ranks among the least developed countries
facing disasters and natural hazards, especially related to climate and health.
Although all regions have experienced a consistent increase in population density since 1985, the Western (796.0
P/Sq. /Km – 2154.6 P/Sq. /Km), Eastern (from 61 – 104p/sqkm), and Southern (36.5 - 71) appeared to have
experienced the greatest increase in population density since 1985 (30years). In particular, the western region
experienced the greatest increase in population density at 58 percent between 2004 and 2015, among all regions.
The second most populous city, found in the southern portion of the country, is Bo with a population of 233,684.
The two other cities with populations over 100,000 are Kenema and Makeni, which should be the basis for
extensive EP&R capacity enhancement support for the region.
Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Total Population by District 2004 - 2015 Census.
Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census.
22
Sierra Leone has a relatively high population density of 273 people per square mile (105 people per square
kilometre), especially in the urban areas, ranking 87th in the world for population density. The Western Area Urban
District, which includes the capital and largest city Freetown, has a population of 853,651 and a population density
of 1,224 people per square kilometres, while the Koinadugu district in the north has a population density of 21
people per square kilometre. The country’s population density has increased mainly as a legacy of the past civil
war, poor land tenure systems that have allowed excessive land fragmentation and reclamation, poor urbanization
systems and poverty, which is the main push factor behind the growing informal settlements in high-risk areas and
the increased vulnerability to disaster-induced shocks.
Table 4: Population Density in Sierra Leone by Region.
Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census
Sierra Leone has one of the youngest populations with 42% under 15 (See table 7 below) and one of highest youth
unemployment rates in West Africa (60%). The vast majority of the country’s rural population are engaged in
agriculture, with rice as the main cash crop, which contributes 70% - 80% of the total rice consumption. The
livelihoods of majority populations in urban areas are much more reliant in a variety of trade and small business
enterprises, which are equally susceptible to disaster-induced shocks. However, as more youth struggle to find
reliable and sustainable sources of urban livelihood, so has the prevalence of counter-productive environmentally
degrading practices such as sand mining and deforestation, especially in urban areas, further exacerbate
vulnerability and disaster risk in many communities especially those in coastal, hilly and mountainous areas.
Table 5: Sierra Leone Youth Population (15-35 years) by Region, District and Gender.
23
The female population 15-49 years account for 51.0% of the female population, as seen in Table above. About a
third of all women in the reproductive span are in the Northern Region. 4 Although the Southern Region has the
least proportion of women in the target population (1,549), it accounts for a fifth of all women in the target group.
With respect to the districts, the Western Urban Area has 16.5 per cent of all women in the age bracket compared
to Bonthe District, with only 2.7 per cent. As experienced in past incidences, women, have in nearly all situations
tended to be more vulnerable than any other gender or age group during disasters especially disease and floods
by virtue of their role as caretaker’s.
Table 6: Percent female population 15-49 years by region and district
Widespread poverty has played a critical role in increasing population vulnerability to many recent disasters,
including floods, landslides, epidemics. The Integrated Household Survey provisionally put the overall poverty
headcount at 56.7% in 2018 compared to 53.8 in 2011. About 81% of its population lives in poverty and 35% of
people living in Sierra Leone live in urban areas of the country 5. The poverty rate remains higher in rural areas
(72.2%) than urban towns (18.4% in Freetown). The southern (76 percent), northern (75.8 percent), and eastern
(67.6 percent), regions had the highest poverty rates, while the western region had the lowest 36.2 percent).
Similar results are observed for the intensity of poverty, with the southern and northern regions presenting the
highest average number of deprivations (60 and 59.6 percent, respectively), and the western region presenting
the lowest (50.2 percent). Designing responsive EP&R capacity building Programs need to target more women,
children, disabled and elderly people who may be more vulnerable to shocks by virtue of their economic stature
and employability.
Table 7: Multidimensional Poverty by Regions, 2017
Source: Sierra Leone Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019.
4
Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census
5
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sierra-leone-population/
24
Although the country’s exposure to disaster risk is estimated to be low (14.37%), Sierra Leone remains highly
vulnerable to climate and disaster risks, with an average vulnerability rating of 70.85% in the World Risk Index
(WRI) as established over the last five years which raises the need to devise strategies to lower the country’s
vulnerability. (See figure 2 below).
Figure 3: Five Year Trajectory of Sierra Leones WRI indicator Scores.

100.00
90.00
85.63 86.46 86.28 85.7 86.52
80.00 71.88
71.67 69.69 70.8 70.16
70.00 72.05
68.38 68.02 67.02
65.55
60.00 59.18 58.67
57.32 57.06 56.94
50.00
40.00
30.00
20.00 14.65 14.65 16.23

13.7
10.5012.65 10.21 10.45 11.49 9.61
10.00
0.00
2,015 2,016 2,017 2,018 2,019
World Risk Index (WRI Ranking) Exposure Vulnerability
Susceptibility Lack of Coping Capacities Lack of Adaptive capacities.
Source: Compilation of World Risk Index (WRI, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019)
Poor governance and the substantial growth of population and assets in areas exposed to natural hazards are
predominant causes of increasing levels of disaster risk. The growth of coastal populations, for instance, raises
important concerns about increased human exposure to flooding, landslides and epidemics around densely
populated areas, which was one of the factors that resulted in high rates of injuries and fatalities. Recent floods
experienced in August 2019 reportedly claimed at least six (6) lives and affected more than 8000 people, including
lactating mothers, pregnant women and children.
The country’s high predisposition to the vulnerability levels to disasters are further exacerbated by poor
urbanization, inadequate access to water supply, health and sanitation facilities, inadequate access to education,
poor urbanization, weak early warning systems. Other factors include low public awareness and inclusion of most
vulnerable populations especially women and children, weak evacuation planning systems, poor and drainage
project management practices e.g. Construction of structure project along the rivers (DAM - Bumbuna
community), insufficient coordination and preparedness, high levels of environmental degradation, and low levels
of stakeholder awareness about preventive measures.
In lieu of the above socio-economic demographics, designing and implementing pro-poor EP&R capacity building
programmes mainly targeting youth, women and vulnerable groups countrywide is more likely to generate greater
impact on future preparedness and response needs, as they constitute the highest proportion of the population
and are most at risk during disasters. There is need to prioritize the western urban, western rural, Bo, Kenema and
Makeni districts during the implementation of future EP&R Programmes as crucial districts by virtue of their dense
population and limited human and financial resources.
Impact of Recent Disasters on Economic Growth.

While climate change complications are defining a “new normal” in terms of disaster, catastrophic incidences in
Sierra Leone have increased in number, magnitude and impact on human lives, property and livelihoods. Over the
last five years, Sierra Leone recorded the highest death toll in Africa with more than 7500 lives lost, more than
20,000 made homeless or socially affected due to natural disasters. Property losses due to disasters estimated
over $99.1 million USD, significant of a considerable loss in GDP.
Landslide disasters in Sierra Leone as a whole accounted for 42 percent of nationally reported geophysical/geo
hazard mortalities between 1990 and 2014. The 14 August 2017 landslide disaster alone left over 500 people dead,
some 600 missing, with about 50,000 directly or indirectly affected in the densely populated Freetown affecting,
25
with a massive 6 kilometres mudflow submerging and wiping out over 300 houses along the banks of the Lumley
Creek. Leicester, Regent, Granville Brook, Cline Town, Moa Wharf, Hill Court Road, Kissy Brook, Dwarzark, and
Charlotte in the Mountain Rural District were among areas prone to landslides 6.
The total economic loss caused due to the estimated at about SLL 237.37 billion (USD 31.65 million) 7. Most affected
sectors of the economy included housing (real estate), amounting to SLL 115.46 billion (USD 15.39 million),
followed by social protection amounting to SLL 35.96 billion (USD 4.85 million) and health SLL 35.19 billion
(USD 4.69 million), and of the total damage and loss, respectively. These three sectors represent almost 80% of
the total damages and losses as shown in Figure 3. Road and pedestrian passages were equally affected. The
productive sectors have sustained lower amounts in damages and losses, but the harm to these sectors
significantly affects the population’s quality of life and living conditions.
Figure 4: Damage and Loss Assessment Results of the August 2017 Landslide by Sector.
Source: World Bank, Arup, Intergems, 2017.
Fires (In situ - house and ex-situ -wildfires), are particularly prevalent in the urban communities, especially in the
capital city Freetown, with a steady increase in the number of lives claimed every year due to illegal and
unprofessional connections, use of sub-standard building materials, carelessness etc. Wild or bushfires are one of
the biggest causes of forest destruction and land degradation in the country particularly in the savannah grassland
regions of the Northern Province and the forested areas of Southern and Eastern Provinces. The occurrence of
fires between 2006 and 2015 are estimated to have affected an estimated 11,000 people. Over 30 people due to
fire disasters nationwide, with almost half of that number from Western Area Urban alone. In total, 1,356 houses
were destroyed and fires nationwide damaged 459 houses8.
Between 1980 and 2010, epidemics were the deadliest hazards in Sierra Leone. During those 30 years, epidemics
were responsible of 83% of the total number of death due to disaster. From 1980 to 2010, epidemics killed at least
1,103 people and affected 13,447. Malaria, cholera and typhoid are the most regular and important killer diseases
in the country, which is plagued with inadequate access to sanitation and clean water, ineffective waste
management and pollution control mechanism, and inadequate household hygiene. Three people died of Lassa
fever in Kenema during the second week of February 2017, with concerns of continued increase in the number of
positive cases of Lassa fever9. The recent devastating Ebola virus disease (EVD) crisis in 2014/2015, in which more
than 12,000 Sierra Leonean’s were infected and nearly 4,000 dead. Headline macro-economic numbers suggest
that the EVD outbreak was indeed an economic calamity with growth plunging from 16.7% in 2012 to an estimated
4% for 2014, a 2% contraction for 2015 and an estimated fiscal effect of around US$150 million 10. More than
14,000 Sierra Leoneans were infected, of whom nearly 4,000 died.
6 Update of Sierra Leone Hazard Profile and Capacity Gap Analysis REF. NO.SLE/RFP/2017/011
7 Sierra Leone Rapid Damage and Loss Assessment, August 14th, 2017, World Bank, Intergems, APur, 2017.
8
Update of Sierra Leone Hazard Profile and Capacity Gap Analysis REF. NO.SLE/RFP/2017/011
9
Update of Sierra Leone Hazard Profile and Capacity Gap Analysis REF. NO.SLE/RFP/2017/011
10
The World Bank, Sierra Leone Ebola Impact Assessment report, 2019.
26
The correlation between disasters and declines in Sierra Leones GDP per annum has been obvious. In between
2003-2014, the country experienced its deepest economic contractions in 2015 estimated at 21% partly due to
the Ebola outbreak, from a staggering 7.8% economic growth rate
Figure 5: Real GDP Growth per Annum (Sierra Leone)
Source: Trading Economics, Statistics Sierra Leone, 2019.
Economic recovery has been slow and volatile despite Sierra Leone being declared Ebola free in March 2016.
Growth rebounded to 6.34% in 2016 only to decelerate to 5.8% in 2017 and remaining roughly stagnant at 3.57%
in 2018. The drop in GDP was exacerbated by political downturns and the economic impact of the August 2017
landslides, slowing the pace of the recovery. The current growth patterns have slightly reversed the gains in
poverty reduction: per capita income, estimated at US$506 in 2018, remains below its pre-Ebola level ($660)
compounded by a population growth rate of about 2%. Improving the country’s disaster management capacity, is
critical for reducing risk and impact of projected climate changes and disaster proneness, susceptibility and
vulnerability.
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3. EP&R Capacity Gaps and Establishment Needs Assessment.

This section assesses the existing capacity needs and requirements for establishment of a robust emergency
preparedness and response system. Most importantly, the system should have adequate and sufficient legal, policy,
strategic and institutional governance frameworks and adequate operational, human and financial capacity to support
its functionality and operationalization as well as the requirements to support the establishment of the proposed
National Disaster Management agency.
Legal and Institutional Frameworks for EP&R

Functionality of any government operations require backing with adequate sound and sufficient governance, legislative
and Policy frameworks. The frameworks should provide enabling laws and guidelines for the operationalization of the
respective institution, and functions that align well with standing principles and standards at all levels of government
(National, Provincial, and District, Municipal and Chiefdom levels). This emphasis was reiterated in the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (the Sendai Framework), which calls for a renewed focus on
reviewing and strengthening legal frameworks.
Countries must have enabling laws and legislation as a key tool for establishing DRR as a national and local priority. A
review of the existing legal framework established some of the following strengths;
3.1.1. Legal Arrangements for Disaster Preparedness and Response.

Disaster Preparedness and Response were provided for under the National Security Act, 2002. In light of this
international guidance, the legal framework for disaster reduction and resilience in Sierra Leone is enshrined under the
Sierra Leone National Security and Central Intelligence Act of 2002, and the draft National Disaster Management
Agency Bill, of November 2019. Key policy documents in use include;
 The National Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan; 2006

 The Sierra Leone Disaster Management Policy: Identification of Disaster-prone Areas in Freetown;
 The Sierra Leone Disaster Management Policy (Final Draft) June 2006.
 Sierra Leone National Disaster Risk Management Policy 2018
The National DRM Policy identifies eleven (11) focus areas for disaster risk management. These focus areas relate to
the overall DRM and DPR coordination mechanism, the complete DRM cycle phases covering pre-disaster, during
disaster and post-disaster periods, and key specific supportive cross-cutting elements required for all DRM phases.
Overall, the policy advocates for the development of strategic tools and approaches for National Disaster Preparedness
and Response Plan, systematic development and review of sectoral preparedness and response plans for all key
hazards, risks and disaster types, through adequate mechanisms and processes and the design of a national system to
ensure adequate response to both disasters and potential future disasters.
Amongst other things, the policy seeks to ensure DRM and DPR priorities are outlined as well as requisite institutional
capacities for stronger disaster preparedness and response. The focus areas are:
 Focus area 1: DRM Legal and Strategic Framework

 Focus area 2: Institutional and Organizational Framework
 Focus area 3: Risk Assessment, monitoring and early warning
 Focus area 4: Disaster Preparedness
 Focus area 5: Emergency Response and Post-Emergency Recovery
 Focus area 6: Disaster Risk Prevention and Mitigation
 Focus area 7: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Mainstreaming
 Focus area 8: Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Adaptation to Climate Change (ACC)
 Focus area 9: DRM Financing
 Focus area 10: Data and information Management
 Focus area 11: Knowledge and capacity development
The Policy further acknowledges that the implementation framework for disaster risk management in Sierra Leone is
not a separate sector or discipline, but rather an approach designed to harness skills and resources across all
stakeholder institutions taking an integrated, multi-hazard, inclusive approach to address vulnerability, risk assessment
28
and disaster management. The policy further acknowledges the need for DRM mainstreaming into all key sectoral
policies, strategies or programs at the central level.
Some sectors and responsible institutions had established and mainstreamed DPR into their Legislative and policy
Frameworks. Among existing legislations and policies include; the Public Health Ordinance Act, 2004, Town and Country
Planning (Amendment Act of 2001, Environmental protection Act of 2008). In 2018, the government of Sierra Leone
developed the draft National Disaster Risk Management Policy. This policy replaced the 2006 disaster Management
policy and sets out an overall framework to address DPR issues and formulation of the DRM Act. However, the draft
policy had not been approved at the time of this assessment, which necessitates increased advocacy to expedite its
approval by parliaments.
3.1.2. Gaps in the existing Legal and institutional arrangements.

Although the law currently outlines mechanisms for management of human, financial resources, coordination and
communications procedures during emergencies, there are some gaps that need to be strengthened in principle.
The disaster preparedness laws as previously provided for under National Security Act were incomprehensive of the
legal requirements for disaster risk management, preparedness and response guidelines and regulations. New
developments locally and internationally in the areas of DPR and DRM were stipulated, but with no updates of the
existing legal framework since 2002. Attempts to establish or amend the DRM law were made with the development
of the draft National Disaster Management Bill, 2019. The bill was drafted as a step to institutionalize and strengthen
existing DRM and EP&R capacity, as well as bridge the existing coordination gaps in the DPR process. Despite attempts
to amend the DRM law, enactment of the current NDMA bill, but still short of some critical DPR / EP&R laws and
guidelines.
In the absence of sufficient institutional mandates, powers and authority, execution of some DRM mandates has been
increasing difficult due to a number of procedural bureaucracies subject to current institutional arrangements. The
Government’s proposal for the institutionalization of DRM and DPR as semi-autonomous functions under one umbrella
body is sensible. Corollary to the passing of NDMA, bill, the idea of proactivity in DPR and disaster resiliency has been
maturing vice the usual reactive mind set and conservative bureaucratic processes. Promulgation of the NDMA bill
should especially streamline authority and autonomy of the disaster management function of government to the
proposed National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA), strengthen institutional sovereignty, improve the efficacy
of critical decisions especially regarding DPR finance, human and operational capacities, eliminate some bureaucratic
approval processes and redundancies which otherwise limits expedient emergency action, and attract increased
funding for DRM and DPR activities. Provision of additional support for the disbandment and devolution of the
proposed NDMA from the ONS is thus justified.
The law was inexplicit of some mandate, roles and responsibilities of some key stakeholder entities as well as
administrative levels. In some unique incidents, particularly the mudslide, there was little distinction between pillars or
cluster leads impeding policy implementation, consistency and credibility of partners. This also caused confusion and
duplication of rather critical human, financial and logistical resources in other pillars and delays in the delivery of
emergency action and timely response and thus need to be streamlined. At the community level, the DPR and DRM
legal framework was inexplicit of the role of chiefdom or community level structures e.g. village leaders, traditional
leaders, settlement and community leaders and community volunteers at the local or community level. However these
platforms operate informally and not within the confines of the existing legal framework. Coordination by the pillar
system also seemed centered at the national level, with less focus on hubs at the local government level. Assignment
of roles and responsibilities for principle tasks to be accomplished at the national and subnational levels, input from all
relevant sectors and the community, as well as the private sector is important for effective coordination and
implementation of the plans.
Some critical institutions and sectors lacked proper and up-to-date policies and legislations to support DPR activities. For
example, the National Fire Force lacked proper legislation i.e. fire safety legislation. Although the existing policy
required mainstreaming of DPR into their sectoral policies and plans, nearly 80% of MDA’s within the DPR framework
had still not mainstreamed DRM or EP&R into their strategic or operational plans, procedures and practices, due to
lack of funding and training. Essentially, mainstreaming of DRM and EP&R practices at the district, community and
institutional level, will improve district preparedness and response capacity in future disasters.
29
The law lacked explicit Legal facilitations to support the development of Institutional and Sectoral contingency plans at
all administrative levels and a clear delineation of Multisector cooperation. Some hazard or disaster specific
preparedness and response plans were inexistent with the exception of the National Flood Preparedness Response
Plan, 2016 (ONS-DMD), and the Sierra Leone National Action plan for Health Security (2018-22). The law needs to
establish;
 Clear provisions requiring DPR entities to develop and regularly update contingency plans; and business
continuity plans in particular for critical infrastructure owned by government and the private sector;
 Contingency plans based on inclusive and all-hazard risk mapping, risk assessments and gender and
vulnerability analysis including climate risk assessments.
 Development of hazard specific disasters preparedness plans including; Landslides, windstorms and other
natural and human induced.
 An outline of the entities responsible for offering contingent preparedness awareness programs across all levels
of society including; training, education and drills to raise awareness in DPR activities in schools at elementary,
secondary and tertiary levels as well as other awareness education programs targeting out of school children,
youth and vulnerable groups.
Standard response guidelines for National Security as referenced in the past, broadly considered issues of disaster
management but only security issues and profiles level 1, level 2 and level 3 used as response mechanisms. However,
the guidelines were short of a number of provisions for disaster preparedness and response as well as multi-hazards
DPR response
The law lacked explicit position of legal guidelines, principles and protections and inclusion of gender, vulnerable groups
and disaster victim’s especially children, people with disabilities, pregnant and lactating mothers. Actions to protect
vulnerable groups during disaster incidents were notable as emphasized by the Department of Social Welfare which
facilitated the resolution of many sensitive women and child protection issues. One of the key success despite the
limitations has been the finalization of a Plan of Action for Child Protection in Emergencies by the Ministry of Social
Welfare and Gender and the constitution of gender, child protection and youth representatives in community
leadership committees of high-risk disaster-prone areas such as the slums, which enhanced the preparedness of the
country and communities. Accompanying legislation or policy frameworks need to be established to give clear
directions relating principles, protective laws and guidelines for vulnerable groups to facilitate;
 Expedient access to free and proper emergency services and facilities e.g. health during disasters or related
emergencies.
 Establishment of a database on separated and unaccompanied children during the disasters, which is essential
for family tracing and reunification.
 Prevention and management of Gender based violence.
The law lacked some explicit provisions for disaster risk financing strategies to enable access to the funding streams in
an efficient and timely manner, with adequate safeguards to ensure transparency and accountability. Among these
include;
 Clear Stipulations on National and local budget allocations for Disaster Risk Financing. Sierra Leones financial
resources for EP& R are constrained. However, national allocations of financial resources to EP&R are still very
low and in most cases are insufficient for the needs of various disaster situations, which has increased national
dependence on donor support. The law should clearly establish mandates the allocation of funding from the
annual government budget for disaster situations.
 Fund Administration at different levels of government. The law should specifically allocate sufficient funding of
the national and local budget allocations to meet, as a minimum, the ongoing costs of institutional
arrangements and low level disaster risks, identify special funds for preparedness and response, allocate or
require local governments to allocate funds; and also, allocate funds for use by communities including a wide
range of community EP&R stakeholder groups.
 Special funds or reserves for disaster situations, such as emergency or contingency funds. There is not a
dedicated central emergency fund to draw upon in for short-term response or prolonged recovery
interventions (lasting more than 3 months) with limited budgets available from the national government to
fund these activities. The law should specify sources of separate funds for risk reduction, preparedness and
30
response, allow contributions from external sources and include provisions for replenishment. It will also be
necessary to either create a central disaster EP & R fund, and/or to encourage line departments to actively
budget for EP & R within their yearly budgeting process.
 Institutional arrangements with clear roles and responsibilities for the monitoring and management of DPR and
Disaster Risk Management Funds, This legislative or policy direction is crucial as officials from government
departments lamented the current bureaucratic red tape, which often slows down the release of funds to
acquire EP & R equipment, resources and relief aid. Currently, these delays can be up anywhere between 3-5
days, slowing down the pace of response and community recovery. Procedures for the rapid release of funding
in the event of a disaster including in the absence of a state of emergency or state of disaster; and Transparency
and safeguards against misuse of funds. Accompanying legislation or policy frameworks need to be established
to give clear directions relating to the rapid disbursement and access to the pooled funds.
 Risk based disaster risk financing initiatives through Public private arrangements such as disaster risk insurance,
re-insurance or risk mitigation incentive schemes. There is growth in the use of insurance or similar risk-sharing
mechanisms to support economic resilience to disasters in Sierra Leone. At the community level, some groups
had established Savings and Credit Cooperatives Organizations within an intention to support disaster victims
in high flood risk communities but with no policy support or proper bylaws. In another instance, some Private
sector actors have adopted insurance as a risk reduction mechanism during the floods season. However, the
law needs to support or encourage incentives for disaster risk insurance in high-risk sectors and industries, as
a risk management and transfer and risk-sharing mechanism to reduce damage and loss after a disaster.
 Resource mobilization and accountability for local and International monetary DRR and DPR transfers.
Establishment of clear criteria for receipt of international funds (grants, loans, and contingent credit and
procedures.
 Participation in international risk financing schemes such as risk pooling or re-insurance schemes, requiring
comprehensive disaster and risk analysis as a pre-requite for participation in international risk financing
schemes and ensuring robust to robust financial management, accountability, reporting and audit systems.
 Establishment and utilization of strong financial response tools, forecast based triggers and accountability
mechanisms e.g. cash and voucher programs across all relevant a sectors to assist affected persons, facilitate
the use of anticipatory finance, including forecasts-based triggers for the early release of response funding
ahead of the impact of disasters, and provide the adaptation of social protection programs and mechanisms to
channel assistance before and after disaster events, in particular, for meeting the needs of vulnerable groups.
Financial commitments and Administrative Monitoring protocols for emergency operations. Through NaCSA, the ONS
established an emergency support functions based upon pillars such as relief, shelter. Some monitoring mechanisms
were established to ensure effective coordination and control. However, the lack of documented guidelines and
protocols makes audit and accountability very difficult. NACSA has since set-up a robust e-payment system structure.
Point of sales were introduced at the resettlement camps including Juba, Old schools camp, Razak, Culvert and Kama
Yama. The anti-corruption court is vigilant in ensuring accountability of all social protection programmes to ensure
accountability. However, the following challenges followed during this operation;
However, there were no standard guidelines or protocols for resource mobilization.
Rather, coordination meetings held between the ONS and Pillar institutions during an emergency decided on the
procedures for receiving and disbursing cash and non-cash items, but these remain undocumented. Donors and
stakeholders deposit money to a dedicated bank account. Donors deposit a banking slip, which becomes the basic
reference for audit, accountability and compliance, but with no standard protocols for fund administration and
management.
Frameworks for victim displacement and planned relocation and seemed inexistent causing delays in completion of victim
relocation and resettlement projects. There is currently no institution mandated to coordinate the relocation of disaster
victims. Equity, variance and conflict issues between victims relocated from the ‘’2015 floods’’ and ‘’2017 mudslide
incidents suggested, there was not in place standard or minimum shelter facility requirements, procedures and
guidelines in Relief Camps. The law should require
 The development of concrete actions for victim displacement and resettlement as well as integration of the
resettlement projects with other social protection and social welfare mechanisms.
 Procedural and substantive rights to establish important safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of victim’s
rights.
31
 Conflict resolution and grievance management.
NACSA with the WFP registration system designed a humanitarian cash transfer system. As a ‘’piggyback’’ of a previous
cash transfer prototype for the beneficiaries adapted to use in different situations. Lessons learned from the 2015
Ebola crisis called for the utilization of E-Payment and cash transfer systems as the safest and most accountable
payment system. Utilization of existing e-payment systems piggybacks on the wide coverage and inclusion of urban
victims to mobile phones and mobile money systems. Using household numbers. However, accompanying legislation
or policy frameworks need to be established to give clear directions relating to the Cash transfers. Most importantly
reduce delays in addressing cash transfer discrepancies with legislations to improve;
 Coordination of the decision making process between government departments, INGO and donor
organisations, to reduce delays in cash transfers to disaster victims in the shortest time possible.
 Establishment of a minimum cash-disbursement thresholds as government agencies allocated differential
amounts to affected person in several instances. This legislation should deal with unnecessary procedures in
determining cash transfer thresholds which have often been too long to sustain meaningful response.
 Engagement of financial literacy and inclusion of communities in of high-risk urban and rural areas. Low
financial inclusiveness would otherwise frustrate the utilization of e-payment systems in future disaster cash
transfer systems especially during highly contagious disaster periods such as Ebola.
 Consideration of livelihoods improvement and maintenance needs for the communities being transferred.
Perhaps the lack of a proper emergency social protection preparedness and response planning system could
have hampered the successes of this programme.
 Collaborative arrangements of complimentary programmes. The need for maximum impact is of the essence.
Facilitation of effective early warning and early action.

Following the review of the National Disaster Management policy, the ONS developed and adopted the National
Disaster Management Preparedness Plan and National Disaster Management Response Plan in 2016. The plan provides
a comprehensive all-hazard approach to national the incident management spectrum of activities and mechanisms
including preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response and recovery. The plan was developed through the
harmonisation of different contingency plans for individual hazards with inputs from Agencies, other MDAs, NGOs and
the private sector.
 The law clearly sets out the roles and responsibilities of key actors responsible for the early warning system,
establishes clear provisions for the collection, dissemination and share of disaster risk knowledge (Multi hazard
risk mapping, risk assessments), monitoring and forecasting. Specific EP&R measures and early warning systems
are equally provided for by the plan.
 The plan further outlines the defining protocols for disaster response in Sierra Leone to include, level 1 (Minor),
level 2 (Major Disasters), and level 3 (Extreme disasters)
 The Plan defines and outlines the national coordinating structures, processes and disaster management
protocols employed at the national level.
However, the law lacks some clear standards and guidelines and should be updated. Some of the gaps identified
included;
 Coordination of early warning systems between responsible institutions. Rather, EWS actor seemingly work in
isolation with no clear laws or standards to guide their coordination and interactivity. This has impacted the
effectiveness of the EWS systems and active linkages at the national, district, community and transboundary
regional level.
 There seemed to be no standards for the systematic collection sharing and dissemination of risk information
and data relating to hazards, exposure, vulnerability and capacity.
 Sufficient EWS budget allocations to support continuous monitoring and forecasting capacity.
 EWS institutions to produce impact based early warning information and clear messages for community
utilization. These messages should be accessible to all, especially vulnerable groups
 Agencies responsible for EWS to implement feedback mechanisms across all platforms to confirm receipt.
 Engagement of private media houses to disseminate early warnings upon request and at no charge.
 Incorporation of indigenous community early warning and early action mechanisms should be considered as
relevant constructs of the EWS system, which is not considered with existing laws.
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Minimum Housing and Infrastructure Standards. Urban populations and communities in Sierra Leone, particularly
downtown Freetown are growing rapidly. The civic services and the general quality of the settlements is of a low
standard in some areas. In the absence of strong laws, regulatory and enforcement capacity, communities in disaster
prone areas continue to face the ever-increasing risk of natural as well as technological disasters. The situation is most
alarming even now in the absence of well-planned and structured settlements, with very limited sensitivity to disaster
risks and shocks, and others falling short of building back better principles.
Figure 6: Illustration of the Devastating Impact of August 2017 floods on Housing in Culvert Community Short of
Building back better Principles (Before and After Pictures of one house).
Photo Credit: Councillor Hoodie Munu, Ward 420, Culvert Community, August 2019.
More and more, the core aim of the current policy to have “safer, adaptive and disaster resilient communities toward
sustainable development” should be internalized in all aspects of national and local governance. Building codes
standardizing the material and construction technology parameters are in existence with the Ministry of Housing.
However,
 Sectoral disaster laws relating to building safety, land use planning, informal settlements, environmental and
natural resource management, and the newly emerging laws on climate change adaptation have been weak or
under-developed.
 Urban informal settlements represent the most challenging aspects of building and planning regulation since,
by definition, they fall outside the usual regulatory frameworks. Currently, the policy and bill to curtail
development in areas that are inaccessible by 25 degrees of slope are underway with the Freetown City council.
Concerns regarding existing safety in building and construction mechanism, land use and spatial planning also
require strengthening through increased local government funding, human resources capacity building and
advocacy for ‘cultural and behavioural change towards increased compliance’.
Steps need to be taken to formulate appropriate National Building Codes and development regulations for pro-poor
settlements in the country especially in the slum areas. These may initially be treated as guidelines, and gradually
formalized into techno-legal tools for ensuring safe pro-poor housing development. This will ultimately reduce
vulnerability of the population in poor housing facilities.
Environmental laws, including climate change laws, are in most cases administered separately from much of the building
and spatial planning regulation, and from existing DRM laws. Coordinative arrangements between these sectors is
important to reduce underlying emerging risks linked to climate change. An important aspect of environmental
regulation deserving more study is the potential use of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) as a DRR and DPR
tool concerning the construction of new developments.
Provisions for Quality, Accountability and Standardization of Emergency Preparedness and Response missions. The
existence of proper quality standards and SOPS facilitates swift or expedient quality emergency response and
coordination. Disaster management mechanisms are fast adopting proactive methods of emergency management. In
line with section 32 and 33 (b) of the Sendai framework, the objectives of any response operation must fit its purpose.
Both the outcomes and the costs of managing an emergency are constituted in the following objectives, including:
 Timely, event-specific operational decision-making using the best available information, policy,
 Technical advice and plans
33
 Collection, collation, analysis, presentation and utilization of event data and information
 Acquisition and deployment of resources, including surge capacity, services and material to support all
emergency operations
 Preparation of public communications and coordination with response partners to support audience
awareness, outreach and social mobilisation
 Monitoring financial commitments and providing administrative services for emergency operations.
Although the law or policy provides for the establishment of minimum standards for emergency response, there is a
general lack of standardized emergency preparedness and response protocols. Out of 31 Emergency SOPS listed, only
five were confirmed existent and satisfactory in their application and provision of critical services and emergency
assistance mainly due to the lack of funding.
The checklist in table 13 below shows an assessment of critical emergency preparedness guidelines, protocols and
procedure. There is need to establish clear standards, guidelines and protocols to harmonize future emergency
response actions and processes, facilitate effective coordination among key actors, and reduce delays in response. In
addition, the Law needs to explicitly
 Require all DPR actors to utilize established standards and guidelines during response, monitoring and
evaluation of DPR activities, undertake post disaster monitoring and evaluation and documentation of lessons
learned, taking into consideration, vulnerable groups and gender specific indicators.
 Establish clear guidelines for management of mass casualties during an emergency especially vulnerable
groups.
 Establish coordinated, harmonized approaches for to undertake post disaster assessments across all sectors
 Establish Public and Victim grievance mechanisms. Appoint or assign a definite structure to address Grievance
Management issues for Disaster Victims and Affected Persons, especially vulnerable groups as well as provide
for the appointment of a team of legal aid assistants to support victims during such incidences.
 Establish prevention of fraud and corruption mechanisms, e.g. establish reporting mechanisms, function
specific rapid financial, human and procurement controls,
Logistics and Supplies.

Disaster Logistics chains in Sierra Leone are tied to the ONS as the central coordinator and the military as the first
response base for emergency logistics Experience during the August 2017 landslide and the recent floods showed that
there is an inadequate response capacity for relief items for EP&R. In both situations, the ONS and the military were
constrained with very basic relief stockpiles compared to the needs of the affected communities.
Although emergency logistics budgets were in existence within the army, some areas of disaster preparedness were
not catered for and the budget is not mainstreamed with DRM. Tying emergency logistics requirements to the ONS
and military raises the need to expand military logistics to meet some of the basic emergency logistics requirements.
The military aid provisions and associated line ministries need to undertake a humanitarian logistics needs assessment
and should be able to complement existing budgets that can at least meet first response basic needs.
The presence of several humanitarian partners, INGOs, and UN agencies in the country, presented opportunities for
complimentary relief supplies and logistics. During the 2017 landslide, WFP provided food supplies within the first 48
hours; Sierra Leone Red Cross provided blankets and some shelter items while UNICEF responded with health and
nutritional supplements for children and safe water and sanitation kits for women and children. In addition, ONS in
close coordination with WFP focused on immediately developing a strategy to identify, monitor and assist vulnerable
groups, which would otherwise be forgotten in the overall emergency response. UNICEF identified female and
adolescent headed households, separated and unaccompanied children, young mothers widowed by the landslide
received particular attention in the framework of the sector-specific responses.
Coordination mechanisms of non-cash relief supplies from various INGOs was inefficient mainly due to lack of proper
protocols. Tremendous logistic challenges ensued due to information gaps, which limited the provision of timely
logistics and supplies during all incidences.
 Coverage, targeting and duplication, in the response, were significant due to the constant movement and
changing needs of the affected population especially those in the camps.
34
 Identification and quantification of various INGO relief supply capacities seemed very difficult. There was no
pre-defined documented stock registry or database of available relief items from government institutions and
NGOs. With this realty in mind, need was expressed to establish a relief supplies INGO forum and a central
logistics and warehouse database registry system to document existing and possible non-cash contributions as
well as the expansion of existing stockpile and relief supply warehousing facilities in Sierra Leone. Establishment
of a centralized stock registry should essentially strengthen coordination systems in non-cash supplies; reduce
duplication of certain relief and response items and shortages of others. A centralised facility will strengthen
existing preparedness and response planning mechanisms and capacity amongst all stakeholder.
 There was no minimum logistics and relief package established at the time of response. While some NGOs were
happy to use this opportunity to ‘’showcase’’ their might and strengths, others struggled for mere recognition
with small handouts which could not meet the needs of the entire population or single households.
 It took some time before a clear assessment of the humanitarian needs in affected areas was finished. Only
then was a comprehensive out-reach system established on ground. Perhaps because there were delays in
establishing clarity of the levels of assistance needed by displaced persons. Although the draft policy and draft
bill mentions compensation structures for disaster victims, unless otherwise provided for in a separate tool,
establishment of explicit Guidelines for minimum standards of relief items for persons affected by disasters is
important especially in determining;
o The minimum requirements to be provided in the relief camps in relation to shelter, food, drinking
water, medical cover and sanitation;
o Special Provisions for Vulnerable groups
o Ex-gratia assistance on account of loss of life as also assistance on account of damage to houses and
for restoration of means of livelihood; and
o Such other relief as may be necessary.
 The lack of registered local supplier’s database, restricted the national banking network and the limited capacity
of government counterpart departments to initiate procurement makes made the local procurement process
very restrictive. The established government emergency supply procedures are also sometimes an impediment
to decentralization of emergency procurement operations. Pre-disaster preparedness phase should identify
food suppliers (supermarkets, local farmers) in at risk communities and sign cooperation agreements with them
to provide food items during disaster response. Resettlement areas, such as those at Mile 6, should also have
warehousing capacity in close proximity to assist with the continued recovery of disaster-affected
communities. Identification and registration of local suppliers at the district level will provide the much-
needed reduction in emergency procurement timelines and rapid response in the affected townships, revive
and support small businesses at the communities and ensure ready supply of low-cost relief items.
 The lack of an integrated logistics and supply chain system led to duplications in the supply chain and difficulties
in reconciliation of supplies to some communities. During the floods, some communities such as culvert
received two lots of supplies from two agencies while some others received no supplies at the cost of manual
or poor supply and logistics management systems. In other situations, rationing of available relief supplies was
difficult due to lack of proper logistical monitoring systems at existing warehouse facilities. As a result, items in
storage risked expiry and damage from rodents’ infestations in existing the warehouses.
 Post registry, the government was providing some relief support and within weeks, the displaced people were
being encouraged to return to their place of origin, which raised concern to the holistic approach in sustainable
re-instatement. In absence of proper livelihood support and shelter, disaster victims and affected persons will
not be able to reinstate normalcy. Addressing the above capacity constraints could potentially reduce some of
the underlying factors for rapid response capacity to under 48 hours.
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Table 8: Checklist for the Existence of Critical Emergency Preparedness Guidelines, Protocols and procedures.
Specific Standards, Are the relevant What is the Justification Are the Plans, profiles or materials developed and approved to Follow during preparedness Relevance to the Are the Guiding
Guidelines, Protocols or Documents in missions? Yes/No, What is the current practice? Please provide a clear Justification/ /Observations. Are there any gaps in the Administration Exists. Instruments in
Procedures Checklist Up-to-date and existing practice? existence and relevant
in Existence? to Hazards
(Yes or No)
District Level
Windstorms
Landslides
Epidemics
Chiefdom
Regional
National
Floods
Level
Level
Level
 Undertaking Disaster  No  The ONS is mandated to undertake this process. However, there are currently no guidelines for this process. However,
Risk Assessments the ONS has been using the Miral tool, which is the basic questionnaire on investigation. The tool is also ineffective in
capturing some key information and need to be developed. These are also inexistent at other administrative levels.
 Hazard Profile Maps  Yes  In 2017, the WB supported the development of the all Hazard profiles as well as district hazard maps for at least twelve
districts. However, this need updates every three years
 Disaster Management  Yes/No  There is a plan developed in 2006, however, the plan needs to be updated. There are no plans at the regional and district
Plans level.
 Contingency Plans  Yes/No  Although some contingency plans are in existence, these were only existent at national level and not at the regional, and
district or community level. There is need to support al Key EP&R stakeholders in the development of proper contingency
plans at all levels. ( National, District and Community level)
 Emergency Response  No  The ONS established the Disaster preparedness and response plans in (2006), however, this needs to be updated to
Plans reflect international standards. These are also not in existence at the regional and district levels.
 Public Education  No  However, the process was underway to develop strategic communication guidelines at the time of the assessment. This
Guidelines. still requires approval and dissemination to relevant administrative and community
 Information, education  Yes/No  The ONS relies on UNICEF guidelines and protocols. These will need to be cascaded downwards to the districts and
and Communication community level through training.
guidelines  UNDP in Partnership with AVSI also supported the development of IEC materials for primary school DPR education.
 Disaster Training and  No  The practice is in existence, however, the protocols are undocumented. These will need to be cascaded downwards to
Simulation Guidelines the districts and community level through training.
 Community Liaison and  No  The practice is in existence. However, the protocols are undocumented. These will need to be cascaded downwards to
Mobilization guidelines the districts and community level through training.
 Training and Capacity  No  No. The Guidelines have not been developed, streamlined or harmonized for local adoption. Rather, all participating
Building guidelines NGOs have their own curriculums, which need to be harmonized.
 Resource Mobilization  No  No. although the practice is in existence, the protocols remain undocumented and inexistent
and Logistics Planning
protocols
36
Evacuation Procedures and  No  Currently, there are no evacuation plans in place to facilitate the speedy evacuation of disasters affected areas to ensure
Protocols of victims to safe that further damages do not ensue. A clear evacuation plan and process could have the added benefit of making it easier
havens to reach affected households and deliver subsequent distribution of aid.
 No evacuation procedures and protocols established especially in high-risk communities such as slums. There is need to
map out evacuation routes/site maps and procedures. The agreed procedures communicated to community leaders and
community members ahead of disaster periods e.g. floods. Funding should be provided to ensure the role out of
extensive awareness project relating to evacuation procedures across the country
Medical First Aid  Yes/No  Medical first aid procedures are handled in a haphazard manner with ambulances from various hospitals and national
Procedures to the facilities The ONS and MoH rely on the Red Cross guidelines. These have not been scaled to regions or districts.
wounded and traumatized Development of these materials may also need to be translated into local languages with relevance to the districts.
Emergency Data and  Yes/No  The National Situation manual implemented by the Situation Room is the guiding tool for this operation.
Information Management
Procedures.
Disaster Communication  Yes/no  Reporting mechanisms do exist in practice from the national level to the situation room. However, Coordination was slow
and Reporting Systems in implementation of action points as some NGOs due to lack of proper procedures and protocols. During the last
landslide, messaging and information dissemination was considered poor from ONS and consequently they were not
communicating effectively. The lack of ONS strategic communications protocols for emergencies further limited
information sharing and communication effectiveness during emergencies
Search and Rescue  No.  There is no protocol for search and rescue missions and needs to be developed.
Damage, Loss and Needs  Yes, No.  The ONS in partnership with international partners uses the Mira guidelines of the United Nations world food program.
Assessment (Incident and  However, most government agencies and INGOs use different assessment methodologies and data collection techniques,
technical assessments which do not harmonize with the existing ONS/MDA assessment tools. Consequently, each assessment produces a
different assessment of the magnitude of the damages, losses and importantly the exact persons affected. This situation
causes a confusion amongst response stakeholders in terms of resources needed, what relief activities have to be
conducted, and who should receive relief aid. There is need to remedy this situation by formulating a national Post-
Disaster assessment methodology and procedure. Development of these protocols in unison with INGOs, Government
departments (directly involved in EP&R) and local NGOs will foster data harmonization, Information sharing agreements
and allow for rapid access to collected damage and loss data between all EP & R partners.
Identification Selection of  No  There is no protocol to guide the identification, definition and determination of affected persons, which need to be
Beneficiaries established as the starting point.
Distribution of Non-cash  No.  Although the protocol for basic human needs (water, food and shelter) for vulnerable – children, lactating mothers, aged
Relief Items and and physically disabled are in place, the protocol on the minimum standard package for the distribution of relief items is
emergency supplies still inexistent.
(water, equipment and
flood)
Guidelines for Cash Grant  Yes/No  Yes –there is a protocol with NACSA. However, all other key actors and partners have their own standards, which vary
Distribution from agency to agency. This requires harmonization and standardization. The protocol is applicable for all.
Water and Sanitation  Yes  The protocol exists with the Ministry of water resources and ministry of health and sanitation. However, the existing
Improvement Protocols protocol is short of chlorination guidelines and needs an update.
Health Care in emergency  Yes  These exist with the MOH and sanitation. Normally when people are seriously impacted, the ONS engage a protocol use
procedures they and us the ambulances. The protocol is applicable at all levels.
 In terms of case management procedures, we have spotted the development of case management guidelines for priority
diseases. Cholera, Malaria, yellow fever 2010.
37
Restoring Family Links  Yes  The protocol exists with the ministry of Social welfare. The guidelines and practices involve tracing, linking lost families
Support (RFLS) and provide social welfare.
Monitoring and Evaluation  No  The practice has been barely in existence with the ONS. Only partner NGOS have taken the initiatives. Lessons learned
(AAR) are hardly documented by government MDAs due to lack of time and funding to produce in-depth research.
Deployment of National  Yes,  Deployment guidelines are in existence under the existing emergency response guidelines.        
Disaster Response Teams
Essential Relief: Items  No.  In practice, these have been varying depending on the available resource envelop. However, there is need to establish        
the minimum relief item requirements.
Emergency Relief  Yes/No  The practice exists but with no standard Procurement procedures or guidelines in place. During the last landslide, the        
Procurement ONS faced Stockpile management issues. Thousands of people were impacted and there was no stock. Rather, many
bureaucratic procedures delayed efficient response to over 72 hours.
Transportation and Storage  Yes/No  The practice exists. However, it is not documented. The ONS has to apply to the ministry of finance for tracks, which at        
of Relief Items times causes delays due to approval processes.
Responsibilities of Key  Yes/No.  There is no stakeholder register and no stock of their capabilities for future disasters. The practice exists however; there        
stakeholders in Logistics is no standard procedure or protocol for receiving relief items, which needs documentation.
Recovery Needs  No.  No protocol for that. The assessments are done with no guidelines or protocols. Ad hoc meetings with partners in        
Assessments. meetings but with no reference points
Mobilization of Resources  No  There are no guidelines or protocols for resource mobilization despite the practice.        
(Cash and Non-Cash Items)
Temporary Shelters.  No  No. the practice is existent however there is no evidence of formal protocols or guidelines        
Financial Resources  No  Cash disbursement is all practice but not in principles        

Management Procedures
Human Resources  Yes/No  The practices are in existence. Various MDDs and agencies deploy their personnel to the leverage assistance roles;        
Management Procedures however, no protocol exists to this effect. The ONS has however signed some MoUs with government MDAs e.g. the
in DR. army but no protocols for voluntary staff are established.
Legal Aid for Disaster  No  Legal aid services have not been provided for disaster victims and therefore, it is important to integrate the service        
Victims especially in grievance management during relief and response periods.
Guidelines for Building  No  Reference is made to existing international agreement or the Sendai framework. However, these have not been        
Back Better Guidelines domesticated into national guideline and needs to be domesticated.
Technology disaster  No –  ONS received assistance from UNOPS due to lack of capacity at the time of the landslide, when they added we did not        
Recovery. have the technology and all we did was receive the information.
Health and Social Services  Yes/No  Although a health recovery system is in place, SL does not have ambulance norms and standards. Also lacking are the        
Recovery Support Function standards for purchase and accreditation of different equipment for EP & R for land, air or water transport.
Disaster Risk Insurance  No  No protocols exist to guide or encourage disaster risk insurance mechanisms. However, in some communities such as        
Krube town, SACCOs have been established to support high risk and affected families to build back houses and resilience
within their communities. There’s need to establish bye laws to support such initiatives
Psycho-social Support  No  The guidelines and protocols do not exist        
Community rehabilitation  No  The guidelines and protocols are inexistent although some communities have been supported by some international        
agencies
Community Resettlement  No  The protocols and procedures are not in existent.        
38
Information Management Systems for Disaster Preparedness and Response.
3.2.1. Community Engagement systems.

Clear district coordinative and accountability mechanisms are critical to an effective emergency response. A clear
understanding of roles and responsibilities enables individuals, teams and organizations to establish working
relationships that can make all the difference during a crisis. It is also critical to establish appropriate linkages with
Government counterparts and other key partners. MPAs under this section identify key activities for ensuring a
coherent coordination system in the event of an emergency.
The ONS with support from development partners facilitated the establishment of District disaster management
committees in all districts countrywide. Currently, there are 22 DDMCs spread-out in all districts countrywide except
Freetown. In each district, DDMCs coordinate the Disaster preparedness and response functions on behalf of the
ONS, support the development of contingency plans, conduct community sensitization, monitoring of emergent
hazards, conduct hazard assessments, coordinating response actions and to provide psychosocial support to the
victims, dissemination and institutionalization of byelaws to curb the triggers of disasters in accordance with the
guidelines for the establishment of DDMCs, 2014. In other instances, the DDMCs facilitated other stakeholder
engagements within the districts on issues beyond disaster risks and emergencies, e.g. land conflicts, epidemics,
floods and deforestations. Although committees in Phujehun, Kenema and Bo were found to be fully functional, the
committees in some hard to reach districts e.g. Bonthe seemed not to be functional due to inadequate training,
sensitization and funding.
Freetown however, did not have an established or constituted DDMC but rather relied on community volunteers,
community and youth leaders to coordinate preparedness and response activities in disaster shock areas. Leadership
committees were established to address multi-dimensional needs of their respective communities. The community
leadership forum at Culvert comprised various roles constituted with the emergency preparedness and response
support functions and an appropriate representation of members by gender, youth, cultural groups and
development sector. Major concerns arose, however, due to failure to integrate or take formal recognition of the
role of community volunteers in emergency preparedness and response.
As volunteers are situated closest to the community level where disasters occurs, they are in a good position to
respond to any emergencies. The roles of community volunteers need stronger recognition and prioritisation for
future preparedness planning efforts first responders during community level emergencies. Preparedness
programme effectiveness needs may capture development of volunteer’s capacity and capability at the community
level, as they are more familiar with the dynamics of such communities. Formalization or institutionalization of
chiefdom disaster management committees and community volunteers as the formal coordinative structures is
crucial to strengthen the first response capacity for EP & R at the community level.
Inadequate district operational capacity and arrangements to respond to hazard specific emergencies. The ability to
respond in the immediate aftermath of an emergency depends on the level of operational readiness in place.
Experience shows that in most emergencies there is an initial assistance gap because major response operations take
on average at least three to four weeks to reach full capacity. Operational preparedness aims to reduce this gap to
the extent possible and indicates the minimum level of readiness that should be in place to deliver humanitarian
assistance and protection in a principled and accountable manner.
Community surveillance and monitoring systems in Sierra Leone are strong and very active especially since the
outbreak of the Ebola Virus. Lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak showed that monitoring systems are stronger
through the Community health workers, peer health worker and staff, which EWS is strong. Community based
surveillance system in Sierra Leone are mostly dependent on the community health workers and volunteers e.g.
VHTs. In terms of early warning, a lot of work has been done in EWS and this helped a lot in controlling the disease
outbreaks such as the recent measles outbreak in Kambia and Phujehun.
Adoption of the ‘’One health Surveillance and Reporting System’’, under the MoH/CDC/WHO established joint
monitoring and reporting frameworks and engagements involving DDMCs, CHWs and VHMTs, farmer extension
workers, community leaders, traditional healers etc. The platform, which is mostly active at the peripheral level,
39
encourages continuous monitoring and reporting with or without disaster through the Emergency Operations Center
system. The platform enforces daily, weekly and monthly reporting by the community leaders or volunteers in
various fields. Cumulatively, CHWs and DDMCs should report to the district into the District health information
system. The CDC and WHO facilitated the establishment and training of community surveillance officers, Community
health workers through PHOs in epidemiology (beginners, intermediate and advanced stage) and support to the
surveillance and Health Care units who conduct regular supervision. The CHWs also provide support for clinical
diarrhea, malaria, pneumonia. Using the existing health referral system, the CHWs refer cases they cannot handle.
The disaster management system needs to duplicate the successes of this system through to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness of existing community surveillance systems.
EP&R Education and Training Capacity.

While emerging needs and disaster risk scenarios, such as climate‐change impacts, urban agglomeration, migration,
environmental degradation, and industrial development are changing around the world, building a culture of
community preparedness and mitigation is important.
Discussions with individuals in most disaster prone areas found high awareness but with poor attitudes and low
actions taken. In regards to landslides, the assessment identified low level of commitment and preparedness against
possible landslides in surrounding communities. Communities surrounding the last landslide site or slope areas had
done very little or nothing at all since the last landslide ahead of the next rainy season. Natural living and construction
continued in some parts of the high risk hills and activities such as deforestation. This raises the need for continuous
investment in awareness raising, attitude building and action reinforcement mechanism for individuals living in
landslide prone areas
On contrary, individuals living in urban flood prone areas had high awareness, attitude and some made some high
actions are taken e.g. some downtown slum Hazards.
communities e.g. Culvert town devised some
coping mechanisms e.g. building houses on stilts
and building attics to keep essentials during floods,
constructing high water barricades and walkways
which render a certain level of disaster
preparedness level and most resilient mechanisms
to reduce damages and losses associated with
floods. (See figure below). While some flood prone
areas e.g. Bonthe and Bo, had high awareness of
the floods during the rainy season rated with high
attitude, such mechanisms can be reinforced and
scaled to improve actions and adoption of
affordable and resilient solutions.
Figure 7: Community Awareness, Attitudes and

Action Orientation in Preparation for potential
CSOs, media and NGO play the most dominant role in community education and training. As numerous implementing
partners are involved in public and community awareness raising, the need to strengthen existing coordination
mechanisms for all partners is critical to reduce resource duplication, establish synergies and eliminate traces of
wastage. Likewise, EP&R public education and training materials e.g. Manuals, tool kits, guiding and training
instruments for communities to be harmonized and targeted for at all levels of programme implementation to assure
quality and standardization.
A number of partners including the WB/FERP and UNDP supported the ONS in the provision of intensive community
awareness campaigns and provided guidelines regarding natural and human-induced disasters. The UNDP, EPA, Brac
Sierra Leone were particularly involved in the delivery of community EP&R education and awareness programmes
with their footprint in districts such as Portee, Rokupa and Portloko – Gbere junction. The communities were trained
in various EP&R and DRR skills including; Mapping out vulnerable areas, identifying opportunities for support,
40
Seasonal calendars, Vulnerability Mapping and historical timelines, Impact and damage assessments, Financial loss
assessment and annual reporting, sensitization of communities on environmental safety issues e.g. constructing in
ecologically sensitive areas and Resilience building at the community level – Preparedness. Such programmes
although with scalable outcomes and impact are limited due to inadequate skilled resources, equipment and funding,
for which considerations should be made.
School education and training programmes. The ONS with support from the UNDP rolled out the pilot programme
for ‘’child led EP&R education and training’’ to influence early behavioural and culture change, attitudes and
perceptions of children in the districts of Maguruka, Kambia and Kono, Makeni, Bo and Phujehun. At the time of this
assessment, only phase one and two of the project had been implemented. The programme mainly aims at
introducing DRM learning opportunities to school children through curriculum Integration and regular training of
teachers. These programmes should however be scaled up to also target children out of school.
In addition, mechanisms to increase community involvement and awareness of the importance of disaster
preparedness and response were held e.g. observing the annual International day for Disaster Risk Reduction was
observed, attracting several participants including government officials, school going children and members of
affected communities. Scaling up and augmentation of public education and training programmes at the community
level with some alternative programmes provides more sustainable solutions and yields better-prepared
communities than single dimension public education programmes:
3.2.2. Exercises and Drills

Simulation exercises and drills were undertaken at least once in six months to strengthen communities’ response
capacity to disaster crisis. The simulation exercises were especially held with regards in health readiness for
epidemics (EVD and cholera), as seen in districts such as Bo and Kenema. However, simulation exercises in other
frequent hazard criteria e.g. flood evacuations were hardly held due to lack of adequate funding. In addition, the
ONS as the central agency responsible for DPR education and training lacks dedicated human resources to support
continued community education and training, as well as simulation exercises and drills in EP&R. The scalability of the
simulation exercises and drills to other districts and communities is however contingent on the availability of funding
which needs to be put into consideration.
3.2.3. Early Warning Systems (Surveillance and Monitoring)

Mitigation of the adverse effects of disasters requires early warning mechanisms to be in place, timely interpretation
of weather forecasts into early warning messages and prompt action based on the interpretation of the data. With
so many lives at stake, every second counts in the disaster management process. Early warning systems can be
technical or indigenous in their nature. Both these types emerged out of consultations with participants.
Communities were using indigenous early warning methods to send signals about emergent hazards. Some of the
Indigenous EWS identified include monitoring of the color of the river and water run off as a flood EWS during the
rainy season. If the water flowing was brown it meant that floodwaters are coming down – color is due to lose soil
caused by deforestation in hilly areas.
Hazard Monitoring tools were observed to be in use, although with some deficiencies. There is a number of players
involved in disaster detection and early warning, resource mobilization and disaster response, information and
communication, being the central spine along which the disaster information is transmitted. The following are some
of the stakeholders, Key players and Interrelationships in the EWS system:
Table 9: Early Warning Agencies.

Responsible EWS Role and Responsibility in EWS
Agency Orientation
 Sierra Leone  Weather and  Sierra Leone Meteorological Agency is responsible for
Meteorological Maritime producing the weather forecasts. The entity is responsible for
Agency: Monitoring monitoring all atmospheric activity across the country.
Systems  Detection and early warning data for adverse weather
conditions. This entity monitors the weather conditions in the
country, including forecasts of rain, sun, wind, etc. It picks up
41
Responsible EWS Role and Responsibility in EWS

Agency Orientation
indicators for adverse weather conditions like flash floods and

mudslides caused by excessive rain precipitation, drought due
to prolonged dry spell and typhoons due to excessive winds.
 Data on detection and warning of adverse maritime wave and
tide levels. This entity monitors the water bodies, tracking
their variables like wave strength and size, tide levels and
trends. It therefore picks up adverse tide and wave levels.
 National Water  Hydrological  Protect and Manage the country’s water resources
Resources Agency Monitoring  Surface Water Monitoring Systems
Systems  Water Resources Management and Hydrology.
 Ministry of Health  State wide  Detection and early warning of disease outbreak data. This
Disease entity monitors and manages disease outbreaks. The focus is
Surveillance mainly on highly contagious and fatal diseases that have a
and potential of developing into epidemics. It picks up indicators
Monitoring. and cases of outbreaks and spearheads interventions for
containing the outbreaks.
 Ministry of  Animal and  Detection and warning of pest outbreaks. This entity monitors
Agriculture and crop pest and manages pest outbreaks for especially crop and animal
Forestry disease husbandry. It picks up indicators and cases of pest outbreaks.
surveillance &
monitoring.
 Environmental  Environmental  The entity picks up information on environment and forestry
Protection Agency safety disaster situations like excessive pollution and fire outbreaks.
monitoring
and
Surveillance
 Government  Health  Hospitals are key players in the disaster response, so many
Hospitals: Systems victims have to seek medical attention, and therefore
Monitoring knowledge of bed capacity is important before the
victims/casualties can be dispatched to the hospitals. The
hospitals for numbers of beds, nurses and doctors available
for emergency response to the disaster situations
 The General  Community  The public is the main beneficiary of all the disaster
Public: Surveillance information. After gathering and processing data from various
and disaster detection entities, will disseminate notifications to
monitoring the public in coordination with the other disaster response
and reporting entities.
The capacity challenges of each of the above systems is further discussed below;
Meteorological Monitoring Systems and Institutional Capacity.

As it is a new agency, the Sierra Leone Meteorology Agency is still facing a number of challenges that need to be
overcome in order to have a functional weather monitoring system. These challenges relate to human and financial
resources, systems, equipment and lack of access to international and regional radars.
The Meteorological Agency is said to have been one of the best capacitated in West Africa until the war in 2000.
Nearly all-weather forecasting stations were destroyed during the war leaving only two functional weather stations
countrywide. Various stakeholders including the World Meteorological organization and UNDP have made strides in
strengthening the capacity of the meteorology system and network. The GEF project in collaboration with UNDP
helped to expand the national meteorological network and coverage of the automatic weather stations through the
construction and refurbishment of eight weather stations and the Lungi aviation weather station. The stations are
positioned in 8/16 districts in Sierra Leone. The GEF further supported trainings in the operation of the new weather
stations and EWS in weather monitoring and forecasting.
42
Poor maintenance and service of some of the newly refurbished stations had however reduced the capacity of the
eight to only four functional stations by the time of this assessment. Limitations of the existing meteorological
weather station network capacity imply that meteorological monitoring capacity in some districts is still very weak
and communities in some disaster prone and high-risk areas are underserved by the existing meteorological services.
Ultimately, this cramps up preparedness and response information systems and limits impact based EWS forecasting
and reporting. Strengthening of the existing EWS system will require the expansion of the existing meteorological
network, critical to ensure countrywide effectiveness and robustness of the early warning systems.
Limited capacity to support additional meteorological forecast products beyond aviation systems monitoring. The
existing system is unable to undertake maritime weather forecasts and to support the provision of analytical impact
based sector specific products e.g. drought forecasting for agricultural systems improvement and preparedness,
transport and road safety information, climate change information, health monitoring, education etc. This is mainly
due to lack of a robust and sophisticated weather system and limited use of global meteorological product platforms
e.g. weather data to the World Meteorological Organization.
Existing systems are also limited in the provision of reliable real-time data, due to slow and intermittent internet
connectivity11 to external platforms for weather monitoring and forecasting. ‘Every second counts before and during
shock. Delays in internet connectivity mean that the quality and timeliness of the weather data and information in
real-time which further predisposes communities to risk.
Data quality assurance improved tremendously with the adoption of the WMO meteorological models, and the
satellite imaging systems, which provided real time images during the rainy season. The model provides reliable data
outputs, which are often validated by the agency. The models are also able to provide details on the Intensity, timing
and distance e.g. the 4km distance of an impending disaster. The lack of quality management frameworks for
collecting data and conducting forecasts and noncompliance with ISO certification standards, which lowers the
credibility of some of the information. Besides the international level, the agency does not also meet the standards
of the regional body (GTS).
In addition, the existing stations are not compliant with some WMO standards where we should install weather
stations and specifics on what we should have. E.g. wind parameters, winter heights etc. wind precipitation, etc. but
because of the location, they will not be representative for that location e.g. generator for the tower and you want
to measure the actual temperature of the environment and because of that risk they do not accept the data.
Remittance of key weather forecast information to the WMO, ACMAD (African Centre for Meteorological Application
Development as per the signed agreements is non-existent which lowers the credibility of Sierra Leone weather, air
and maritime data systems.
Weak EWS information dissemination mechanisms. The UNDP supported the Meteorological agency to develop an
online weather forecasting system as a platform for the provision of secondary weather data and public information
access. However, these forecasts were not adequately translated into early warning messages and lacked ease in
interpretation by all consumers to prepare for disasters, especially floods and windstorms which affect the accuracy
and quality of early warning messages. Strengthening of communication and coordination mechanisms between DPR
institutions and the Met to ensure coordination in the messaging for and release of early warning to communities.
However, weather forecast information does not always reaching intended users due to inadequate funding and lack
of proper agreements and MoUs between the Met agency and mass broadcasters. For example, the weather
forecasts generated by the Meteorological agency are not freely aired on all available media platforms. Some media
institutions still attach costs to sharing and dissemination of early warning messages, which is not always financially
possible. Consequently, messages are not always broadcasted and the intended users are not linked to existing
communication loop. The responsibility towards national security and safety should be the role of all key players.
Establishment of PPPs with ‘’ALL MEDIA HOUSES’’ in the dissemination of disaster risk related information.
Other meteorology capacity challenges identified include;
11
Sierra Leones Internet speed is less than 1.8 mbps per second, which is among the lowest in the world compared to
counties such as Singapore and America with over 80Mbs per second.
43
 Lack of integration of existing early warning systems to influence impact based EWS forecasting.
 Thresholds, activation protocols, roles and responsibilities for “early action” are not clearly defined and
communicated.
 Limited community readiness and awareness and utilization of meteorological forecasts.
 Limited human and financial capacity to ensure maintenance of existing early warning systems.
Hydrological Monitoring systems and Institutional Capacity.

The National Water Resources Agency is responsible for the coordination of all hydrological and surface flow
surveillance and monitoring systems in Sierra Leone. However, hydrological Early warning systems in Sierra Leone
are still weak. Some of the challenges identified include the following: Monitoring river flow and Surface Rivers using
rain gauges. Communities were trained as part of the programmed areas to use the rain gauges so that they can
operate the systems. These are also very important in flood mitigation to monitor floods and river flows. Various
community group e.g. women groups are actively involved in informing, raising awareness and disseminating
information to community members in the vulnerable areas e.g., slums and informal settlements. Remarkable results
were reported in improved surveillance following the establishment of the online-based platform for water resources
and sanitation platform which facilitated the integration of community surveillance information, and early WASH
emergency response.
River/water monitoring and Surface gauging capacity in Sierra Leone is still inadequate despite previous capacity
building efforts. Nearly all river monitoring and surface water-gauging facilities are dysfunctional following damages
during the war and other periods of instability. The Ministry with support from the UNDP established River
monitoring stations, and to monitor the surface water flow. This improved the capacity of water monitoring stations
nationwide. However, there is need to strengthen the existing technical capacity to conduct Surface water gauging
to improve periodical monitoring activities.
Weak coordinative linkages and arrangement between the water resources and other Agencies. The one health
system has been instrumental in improving coordinative and collaborative arrangements between MDAs under the
environmental health pillar. However, the linkages between the meteorological centers are still weak. EWS
information generated from the natural water resources agency is not adequately translated into water and
sanitation results. Coordination and collaboration between WASH Stakeholders 12 is also weak as members of this
pillar hardly have any joint monitoring mechanisms or platforms, except during emergencies.
The National Water Resources Agency currently does not have appropriate capacity in monitoring flash flood risks.
Historical flood data and capacity of processing, flood monitoring and prediction techniques are lacking. The existing
emergency plans for flash floods include some precautions, e.g. drainage system, remain complete. E.g., there is no
comprehensive plan to capture and store floodwater, as the existing drainage system is insufficient. The inadequacy
of water level monitoring systems across the country, early warning information gaps exists in in providing sufficient
warning in the case of flood events. In addition, some major rivers do not have water-monitoring equipment
installed. Furthermore, these systems are not connected to reliable power systems. For efficiency, the water
monitoring systems require connectivity to solar power sources to ensure consistency in monitoring can occur and
that the alarm systems are triggered to alert the community during high tide.
Transboundary Monitoring and Surveillance Systems

Sierra Leones boarder is very porous with seven districts bordering Guinea and Liberia. There are four categories of
border posts in Sierra Leone as further illustrated in the table below;
Table 10: Categories of Existing Boarder Posts in Sierra Leone.

Category No. of existing Description. Gaps/Challenges.
border posts
Class A 5  Manned by  Only five are manned including Kambia,
points SLAP, RSLAG Phujehun/Kenema, Koinadugu and Kailam,
Port officials, and the tripartite board, Sierra Leone Guinea
NRA, and Liberia Joint.
12
These include Ministry of works, lands, agric (deforestation and afforestation), Water and risk manage mention the
policy aspect, local government.
44
Category No. of existing Description. Gaps/Challenges.

border posts
Immigration at
the.
Class B 1  Boarder post  Manned with single revenue officials, lack
Points proper structures and surveillance systems
Class C 1  Boarder post  Manned with single revenue officials, lack
points proper structures and surveillance systems
Class D Over 600  Illegal Crossing  There are no institutional representatives
points in the
country
Management of trans-boundary and trans-migratory disasters in Sierra Leone are handled from a national security
concern. There are more than 700 entry points in Sierra Leone some located in very inhospitable areas. Among these,
only five are manned while the armed security forces regularly patrol others. Only three of five border posts have in
place the basic infrastructure for border management and control. Among these, only two including Lunge airport
and Kambia seaport are equipped with proper monitoring, surveillance, and reporting systems to meet some
international standards.
Since the Ebola crisis, various efforts to improve transboundary EP&R have since been established by the
government. At least four MoUs have been signed between Kambia, Phujehun, and Liberia, kabala and Guinea to
enforce joint actions on transboundary migratory disasters under the Manu river union. Cross border, sessions with
neighboring Guinea and Liberia on trans-migratory disasters have also been held on public health, cross boarder
flooding, wildlife safety and security, agriculture and livestock or fire. However, there was minimal or no support
from the Manu river union to conclude the bilateral or tripartite agreements between the three states. This
necessitates increased advocacy for enhanced trans-boundary security enforcement and regional preparedness.
Trans-boundary surveillance and Monitoring, systems have also been setup or improved in some areas and should
be scaled up where necessary. The one health system enforced Joint boarder control operations and patrols to man
porous border points every day in clusters of two weeks.
 In situations of disasters, the armed forces patrols deploy technical teams to assess the extent of damages
and disasters. These support regular monitoring and reporting on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture,
environment and health. However, the inadequacy of human resources and proper equipment at these
border posts risks the country of various trans-migratory shocks including biohazards (disease, pests) and
potent for other security risks.
 To strengthen their capacity, the MoH facilitated training of some members of the armed forces in the
identification and management of bio-disasters. However, the armed forces are currently limited by the lack
of proper and modern border surveillance technology e.g. drone monitoring and surveillance equipment,
and inadequate human resources to sustain existing patrols especially in disaster prone border areas.
 However, the transboundary surveillance systems cannot work well unless the communities are involved.
These are very principle to data gathering and therefore should be supported technically and financially to
provide credible data. The WHO provided trainings to communities and people at points of entry to enhance
their skills and capacity to identify biohazards and other disaster risks.
 IOM developed SOPs for cross-border surveillance systems and entry focal point persons to monitor disease
outbreaks such as measles and Lassa fever, to further strengthen trans-boundary surveillance, and
monitoring system. Establishment of disaster specific cross boarder SOPS and templates ensured that any
issues of public health are treated at source and provided mechanisms to stop public health risks from
crossing.
Lessons learned from the Ebola crisis showed progress in that area of surveillance and monitoring. Corporation and
partnership for surveillance has been established. There is still a gap in the level of vigilance exercised by communities
at the boarders There is need to strengthen coordination capacity between the ONS and other stakeholders
information before an incident.
45
The ONS has the primary responsibility of dealing with cross boarder issues under the national security act and
national level coordinative arrangements through the existing command structure, for emergency preparedness and
response. The structure defines the chain of communication, command and control to ensure proper authority is
maintained throughout disaster preparedness and response activities. As indicated in the National Disaster
management framework, there are a number of institutions and agencies (government and non-governmental) in
the field of EP & R that support the operations of the ONS at different levels (international, national, subnational,
local levels. Among these, include government MDAs, the local government, NGOs, UN agencies and CBOs, with
international humanitarian agencies (usually INGOs) which play a very dominant role.
The law explicitly requires coordinating bodies to meet regularly, during normalcy and during periods of active
response. Regular meetings of pillar institutions and simulation exercises are however limited or inexistent due to
inadequate funding. Additional funding is also required for consistency of the ONS oversight support function to all
ESF and DPR partners, to enhance their functional and operational capacity.
There was no evidence of joint EP&R reporting mechanisms between the ONS and other key actors except during
disasters and ‘’one health’’ reporting system managed by the ministry of health. The EPA, which is strongly involved
in preparedness related activities, only reported the Ministry of Agriculture. This showed weaknesses in the existing
surveillance, monitoring, preparedness, coordination and reporting. Establishment and strengthening of timely joint
disaster coordination, surveillance, monitoring and reporting mechanisms has improved the existing health
monitoring system substantially and should be duplicated for the National EP&R systems to enhance its efficiency
and effectiveness.
There were no Regional Level Preparedness Arrangements between Sierra Leone and members of the Mano River
Union. Although Sierra Leone is a member of the Mano River union (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Ivory Coast,
there are currently no binding bilateral or multi-lateral agreements on the management of cross boarder emergency
preparedness and response issues between Sierra Leone and her neighbouring countries. Regional coordination and
cooperative arrangements can be improved with the establishment of binding agreements and common
understandings between Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries to reduce cross boarder or trans-migratory
disaster risks.
Linkages between the Government non-governmental organisations, international agencies and civil society groups
are in existence and are strong. However, in the absence of a fully functional Emergency operations centre, and lack
of clear EP & R frameworks and coordination mechanisms for INGOs, there is no clarity of roles, responsibility, or
registry of capacities during EP&R. Joint coordination and monitoring are enabled heavy resource wastage,
duplication, and delays in response to increasing shocks. Establishing clarity in the role of specific INGOs in the
existing disaster coordination mechanisms and taking stock of their EP&R capacity is essential for purposes of
strengthening the existing coordination mechanisms and avoiding duplication of resources. A clear disaster response
protocol, outlining roles and responsibilities of all EP & R stakeholders is necessary to avoid delays and resource
duplications in future response events.
Strengthening the functionality and capacity of existing committees and DRM frameworks may require additional
funding to ensure their continued functionality and operationalization. Establishment of pseudo all-inclusive and
well-facilitated technical working committees as an alternate platforms for EP&R coordination can potentially reduce
the irregularity of coordination platforms between key actors and stakeholders and facilitate discussions on EP&R
issues and encourage joint planning, monitoring and information sharing between key actors.
3.2.4. DPR Information Management Systems
Rapid Data Collection, Assessments and Victim Registration.

In response, ONS conducts an onsite assessment of hazards to take stock of the affected people and property. ONS
prepares hazard assessment reports and disseminates to the partners and the other relevant stakeholders.
In addition, SL does not have a pre-designed victim registry system or database for disaster victims. This was a cause
for delays during the rapid response to mudslide victims and distribution of relief on time. The data collection and
capture systems of affected communities seemed uncoordinated. The mudslide incident particularly presented a
unique test to the registry data and information system as all agencies seemed to be developing their own databases.
There was not a centralized victim registry system. In an attempt to salvage the situation and provide rapid response,
46
multiple agencies and stakeholders resorted to developing their own victim registry database with each claiming
credibility of their own system. After several contentions, WFP provided a suitable system using the MIRA tool to
register all victims. The system captured all critical data fields relevant for follow up. However, registration stalled
due to poor data scoping. Utilization of existing tools was slow as no officials had been trained promoting the need
for crash programme trainings in data entry during the disaster.
NACSA supported the registration process with over 60 well-trained staff in data collection and the capability to
deploy both in the region and in free town using the ODK system, which uses a standard set of tools in terms of data
collection and pictographic capture, which aided the development of single IDs for registered victims.
 Identification and registration of cash transfer beneficiaries seemed contentious due to lack of clear targeting
principles and protocols that were unique to the mudslide. Issues around the data was highly contentious
until the establishment of the WFP registry scope system that also allowed printing of beneficiary, IDS for
those affected during the mudslide. There is still, however challenges to this effect:
 The lack effective and efficient victim registry systems during the recent mudslide and floods further
hampered rapid response. The lack of robust targeting, identification, victim validation systems and an
agreed central database repository for all agencies was noted to have been the main challenge behind
several duplicated efforts. Disaster victim’s data integrity risked compromise, amidst limited relief aid to be
distributed to legitimate victims. Development and establishment of a dedicated and centralized victim
registry and identification system and protocols will allow data integrity and ultimately reduce the response
turnaround time to under 72 hours.
 The uniqueness of the mudslide and landslide disaster presented a sharp learning curve for victim registry
and information systems. This tested the existing linkages and coordination between the incident registry
and hospital emergency admissions systems which proved weak, ineffective and difficult to track of some
hospitalized mudslide victims and their subsequent relief aid. Over 50 injured persons and most affected
victims were left out of the registry and later on affecting other systems, particularly the cash transfer
registry. There was lack of proper victim registry guidelines, and inadequate hospital preparedness capacity
to integrate and report victim data.
 There was difficulty in Verification of affected persons for Inclusion into the relief programme due to
loopholes in the registrations system. Validation of non-inclusion claims and exclusion errors was made
worse by some community leaders whose integrity cost as little as ‘’something’’ from other community
members. Building the integrity of community leaders in high-risk disaster-prone areas is important to
enhance their awareness, focus and conscience towards ‘’saving lives, rather than making money’’ during
humanitarian response operations.
 Post Disaster Tracking, Monitoring and Follow up Systems. Development of disaster victim tracking systems
- In response to the landslide shock, many disaster victims were taken to different hospitals without any
follow-up mechanism to track their recovery progress and so many did not receive the intended relief aid.
Therefore, this system will relevantly monitor the movement of patients and affected people to the
settlement areas or hospitals EP&R Database. The system stores data on risks, exposed elements at risk to
hazards and vulnerable communities. The database sits at ONS however; it is not functional and needs
operationalization.
EP&R Monitoring, Information and Communication systems.

During the August 2017 Landslide and August 2019 floods, there was monitoring and planning during the emergency
preparedness and response operations. There was a strong commitment to the joint monitoring systems between
the National Platform for Disaster Risk Management, which met very frequently during both disasters and the One
Health Performance Management System under the Ministry of Health EoC. Both Platforms provided guidance in
the development of tools and a system to support incident wide monitoring and reporting. However, there is need
to establish a clear monitoring system and indicators based on previous plans based on quality indicators.
Rapid assessments of risks and vulnerabilities and response needs of affected communities and victims were
conducted instantly by the ONS using the Miral tool and MDCA software tools provided by the WFP. The lack of
adequate human resource capacity to undertake monitoring activities during the disaster limited the role of the ONS
47
in both instances. However, inclusions of volunteers from the Sierra Leone Red Cross and WFP, expedited the
assessment to reduce the turnaround time for response, hence the need for further training.
Government of Sierra Leone received immense support from the UN Agencies to undertake Monitoring & Evaluation
activities. Nearly all supporting agencies and NGOs keenly produced after action review reports relevant to their
clusters or pillars. Each agency interviewed had in place a designated Information Management Officer for their
respective pillars and clusters to support the Cluster Coordinators. Coordination with UN agencies was established
and within the areas of Information Management, PME enhanced its cooperation with the Information Management
Unit of the UN WFP and UNDP Resident Coordinator’s office.
Activities on the enhancement of partnerships in emergencies, knowledge management initiative, and impact study
relating to disasters especially the landslide were included in the specific section work plans. The information
reported by some agencies was however inconsistent with others. Central validation and corroboration of some
information was necessary to ensure consistency. That said, it is imperative for the ONS to have in place a fully
capacitated EP&R monitoring capacity to ensure data consistency during future incidences.
Lack of standardized EP&R data collection tools. This allowed duplication of work and conflicts between various
stakeholders and may have affected data quality assurance and verification needs. Development of standard EP&R
data gathering tools and training of all users and stakeholders will be key in ensuring successful utilization and roll
out of the system.
The introduction of Electronic Monitoring and Reporting Tools installed with the WFP Cobol tool had significant
impact on data accuracy, consistency and timeliness e.g. IPad. Interviews with key respondents found that a number
of staff at the national and district level were provided with tablets installed with the Cobol tool to aid data entry and
verification into the disaster registry information system and is said to have improved efficiency in rapid assessment
and response. The use of electronic monitoring and reporting tools also aided joint monitoring and assessment and
the establishment of proper baseline information confirming 300 victims.
There has been considerable efforts to establish and strengthen Sierra Leones Disaster Management Systems.
Intergems13 with support from UNDP and the WB facilitated the development of the Hazard and Risk Profile
Information System (HARPIS). This system was developed following the update of Sierra Leones Hazard profile in
2017. The Sierra Leone (HARPIS-SL) integrates Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Management Information
System (MIS) systems and mobile data collection technology to provide as a sophisticated Web tool for collecting,
managing, visualizing, mapping, analyzing, monitoring, evaluating and reporting on various aspects of disaster risks,
hazards, vulnerability, exposure and disaster management in Sierra Leone. This integrated and holistic platform puts
the HARPIS-SL on a sturdy foundation. The system enhanced the ONS-DMD and various stakeholder’s ability to make
sound disaster risks, hazards, and vulnerability, exposure and cross-sectoral integration of disaster management
information14. This however remains underutilized and under maintained.
UNDP also facilitated development of the CIDMILS weather forecasting systems and platform. Both systems provided
access to ready information to the public on the road conditions, hospitals e.g. during disasters. Weather stations
across the country feed real time data and information into this system and all the sectors can develop this into the
national data base management system.
However, systems Utilization has been very poor with very limited traffic from both state actors, non-state actors
and the public. Perhaps, the low utilization of the systems was due to slow handover by the UNDP, inadequate
ownership and capacity by government and the lack of training of key staff and stakeholders involved in DRM as it
took over 6 months to train some key government officials in the use of the system. This platform could be a great
link for the production of live weather updates, but remains underutilized due to lack of linkages with other
corresponding and correlated information systems.
13
A local consultancy firm specialized in environment, geography and disaster risk assessments. Also responsible for
the development of Sierra Leones Hazard Profile Maps.
14
https://www.harpis-sl.website/
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In the context of natural catastrophes and public disaster management, a number of information management issues
have challenged the ONS as the central coordination point. Some of the critical Information system gaps identified
include;
Although efforts to integrate the existing systems have been undertaken with the HARPIS, there need to integrate
information systems of a number of EP&R stakeholders. This will provide well-analyzed disaggregated information
to various end-user categories.
 The lack of integrated EP&R information systems linking information and data from various stakeholders and
pillar institutions. Nearly all institutions have their own independent information systems that are not
centralized or linked to the ONS coordination or situation room functionality. For instance, the Ministry of
water and sanitation uses its AKVO flow a mobile monitoring software to collect data for the automatic
assessment of flood information. The system has been effective in providing real time analysis of the situation
and bottlenecks to inform and direct the resource requirements to support affected populations. The Free
town city council has in place, its own mobile based evacuation system relevant to communities in flood risk
areas e.g. down town free town. Perhaps, similar systems can be developed for other districts and integrated.
The lack of integration of all systems means there is always insufficient information and gaps in analysis of
preparedness and response operations. This could negatively affect the holistic response capacity of
government and risk more loss due to shocks.
 Lack of a proper databases and backup systems to store critical information gathered by some agencies or
stakeholders. For example, the national disaster database (HARPSI) hosted at ONS is allegedly inactive. Efforts
to harmonize the existing meteorological information were made by the ONS with drastic improvements;
however, there are still gaps and inadequacies evident of the system. For instance, there is currently no
meteorological database as all information gathered and stored manually and needs digitization. This has
hampered effective data analysis, trajectory and simulation, which require timeliness and non-conflicting
information datasets.
 Lack of proper equipment and infrastructure to support data and information needs of some critical agencies.
For instance, The National Fire Force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs is mandated to provide firefighting
and humanitarian assistance to airport and municipal fire teams. However, the agency does not have VHS
related infrastructure to facilitate communication and information sharing in the country. The force relies on
the use of phones, which is not sustainable.
 Beyond ONS and other agency involvement, dissemination of real-time information is still inadequate for the
public and affected communities. Triggers of real-time Information alert systems are still weak as the private
sector is also forced to react to disasters, establish appropriate procedures, define responsibilities, and make
decisions. In such times of emergency, information systems (IS) are important instruments used to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster-handling activities in companies.
 Some websites such as HARPIS.net are in existence; however, there is lack of dedicated websites for some
institutions and agencies providing Disaster risk information such as the ONS. Strengthening the existing
information systems requires the establishment of regularly updated and dynamic websites to support the
dissemination of this information. These institutions must also have the requisite human capacity to ensure
their regular updates with real-time information.
Geomatics
The general findings from the assessment reflect critical GIS needs across the four aspects of hardware, software,
human resource and data in the counties, which have to be addressed if the country is to enjoy the benefits of GIS
informed spatial planning.
Hazard and Vulnerability Assessments Sierra Leone has been developing hazard and vulnerability profiles since 2004,
at the national and district levels. Among these include the Sierra Leone National Hazard Assessment (WB, UNDP,
2004): the THIRA assessment, MoH 2016, ‘’Update of the Sierra Leone Hazard Profile and Assessment 2017). The
Sierra Leone Multi-city Hazard review and assessment report of the three largest cities in Sierra Leone: Freetown,
Mkeny and Bo). Commonly, hazards identified through assessment for Sierra Leone included landslides, floods
49
(inland and costal), mudslides, disease outbreaks and urban fires. The National emergency preparedness plan, 2016
further agitates for conducting risk assessments in the country.
Climate change possess significant threats that can potentially alter existing disaster risk profiles. This raises the need
for regular reviews and updates of existing hazard and vulnerability assessments taking into account future climate
scenarios. The EPA has already established a climate change Secretariat to provide early warnings on future scenarios
of extreme events. The proposed NDMA can draw on the secretariats expertise to help inform climate sensitive
hazard and vulnerability assessment once established.
Land parcel information maps (e.g. registry index diagrams, cadastral maps) and Development plans of various kinds
(e.g. land use plans, zonings plans, market plans etc.) map data was available with the ONS, with at least a few of
such maps. Topographic maps and imagery were also readily available/used maps. Neither the ONS nor DRM district
offices visited had such maps readily available which would otherwise limit planning and regular zoning.
The DRM policy research function at the institutional level is mandated to the ONS-DMD as the lead institution with
support from institutions such as the Sierra Leone Urban Research Centre. The Centre is responsible for undertaking
research on problematic urban development and the proliferation of urban risk in Sierra Leone and to complement
existing institutional research capacity. The ONS-DMD conducted some research in joint efforts and collaboration
with other institutions to document lessons learned of previous response situations on the economic, infrastructure
and livelihood impacts of disasters and surrounding communities.
GIS monitoring in the country are weak as well as the EP & R research function with attributes of shortages of skilled
expertise in GIS monitoring skills and equipment. In addition, EP&R Geomatics research (ONS), subsequent workloads
are inadequate due to lack of dedicated resources to gather data and undertake key research practices before, during
and after disaster events. Inadequacies in implementation and follow up of research findings by government
departments or other stakeholder’s also fell short of any research or evidence-based planning systems in EP&R. The
lack of a clear EP&R research framework hampered the harmonization of research findings between various
stakeholders. Establishment of a dedicated Research function under the proposed National Disaster Management
Agency is important for purposes of strengthening existing emergency preparedness and response capacity.
Institutional arrangements for geomatics are equally inadequate as there seems to be no practice for centralized
collection, analysis and integration of GIS information. The ONS which is mandated to undertake this task currently
lacks trained GIS, IM and telecom expertise. Data utilization is limited due to lack of regular information updates,
systematic data sharing and data sharing protocols. In addition, data is often collected using inappropriate tools e.g.
phone or paper, without an agreed and common structure or standardization, and often not digitized into central
databases. Current data is outdated and there is no mechanism for obtaining real-time information updates.
There is need to Invest in GIS structures in districts focusing on all four components of a GIS (Human, Financial,
systems and equipment) as opposed to only concentrating around hardware acquisition. Local governments must
allocate resources to hire and support continuous training of GIS professionals. Furthermore, there is need to
establish a system through which national institutions can collaborate with counties for data standardization and
sharing, as well as knowledge transfer e.g. with the WMO. Capacity building is the key to successful adoption of GIS
in the districts. GIS Guidelines and a GIS center at CoG are needed as well as provision of generic GIS lab structure
guideline is urgent • Pervasive partnerships are key to success.
EP&R Physical Infrastructure and Facility Needs.
3.3.1. Hazard Specific Preparedness Infrastructure capacity.

District and community flood Preparedness Capacity. Long-term community flood preparedness and coping is a
function of the community’s ability to access proper shelter, safety and proper coping mechanisms to protect
themselves from shocks and stresses. Nearly all districts and communities prone to floods lacked the minimum
requirements for effective flood emergency preparedness and response coordination. Communities visited during
the floods were grossly under-prepared in terms of flood safe housing, evacuation and coping mechanisms. Viable
ways to a safer living and preparedness require concerted efforts on the part of the government agencies, voluntary
organizations, and most importantly the community itself. Flood preparedness and response capacity at the district
and community level can however be strengthened if the gaps identified are adequately addressed. Among these
included;
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Emergency management spaces and places of convergence at the district and community levels were either
inadequate or lacking which limited effective coordination due to low inherent capacity of the ONS. Establishment
of district disaster management administrative offices and institutionalization of technical staff is important to
improve the coordination, mobilization and functionality, of the DDMCs.
Lack of clearly marked evacuation routes or plans for high risk disaster prone communities and dedicated or
demarcated evacuation sites for the provision of temporary shelter spaces during the emergencies. Where in
existence, the facilities were gender disaggregated for both men, women and children were made available which
reduced other risks such as sexual and gender-based violence. The state of the identified evacuation facilities was
however, very devastating and short of proper short term emergency supplies, equipment and facilities e.g.
mattresses, and mosquito nets as illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 7: Illustration of the Devastating State of Flood Evacuation Facilities in Culvert Community.
Although the law allowed for the marking of some schools and church facilities around disaster prone areas as
centres of refuge during the floods, utilization of the school facilities as evacuation centres was counterproductive
for continued education as a priority for children of school going age. This was halted at the cost of accommodating
flood victims during emergencies in highly prone districts and communities e.g. Freetown, (culvert and Krube town)
which was to UNICEFs goal of continued education during disasters. Identification or development of proper
community evacuation sites for most at risk communities is viable for sustainable preparedness practices. However,
in the absence of financial resources, the government needs to identify and capacitate some facilities within affected
communities ahead of the floods to reduce flood-induced shocks.
 Shortage of basic relief supplies and protective logistical items e.g. basic health, safety logistics, which were
in short, supply. As such, victims in disaster prone communities were further exposed to diseases such as
malaria and other water borne diseases in the case of floods. Government needs to increase district
contingency budget for logistical support purposes. The plans should also be integrated into the district
development plans to ensure risk responsiveness and ultimately, fast response action.
Inadequacy water infrastructure across all districts to support steady supply of clean water during flood shocks. The
MoWS through its Comprehensive Response to Floods Program designed some preparedness mechanisms to
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increase access to water and to reduce community WASH risks during flood shock situations. Several projects such
as the free town Dry Season Water Supply Project supports both short to medium-term measures with a goal to
increase water access to at least 90% from the current 60%. In the short and medium-term, alternative methods to
support access to clean water in some districts were established including;
 Inadequate water infrastructure and drainage systems e.g. narrow Culverts. Nearly all major cities
experiencing floods in Sierra Leone inherited old colonial water infrastructure systems. As the climate
conditions and populations have changed and grown over time, the exiting network of water infrastructure
is inadequate to manage the excessive down pour and flow of rainwater received in some Sierra Leone. (See
picture below). A considerable level of investment has been provided to expand the existing water
infrastructure. However, there is need for bigger investments in the construction, expansion and proper
maintenance of new and existing water infrastructure in flood prone cities in Sierra Leone to reduce flood
risks and resilience capacity.
Figure 8: Flooded River Stream in Bo County due to Narrow Culverts and poor Maintenance.
Source: Consultant, August 2019
 Provision of water tank reservoirs in high flood risk areas such as Krube town and Culvert with support from
Irish aid. Overall, 40 new community water tanks, were completed during the dry season and during crisis
management time like the Ebola. This increased water storage capacity and provided an opportunity to
demonstrate simple rain water harvesting techniques to community and local authorities. The tanks however
experience constant periodic breakdowns due to water buzzes and lack sustainable self-sufficient feeder
systems. Inadequacies of the Guma Valley Water System face issues with the distribution network hence why
the ministry resorted to use of water browsers to automatically fill existing tanks. Beneficiary communities
failed to take ownership and responsibility by filling the tanks regularly. This meant that the solution is
ineffective and unsustainable, without proper and efficient clean safe water feeder system.
 Adoption of Rain Water Harvesting and Solar powered Bore Hall Systems. Although Sierra Leone has an
abundant supply of rain, rainwater harvesting is not widely practiced in high flood risk prone areas as a
preparedness measure. In Kono, Pujhenun, Kambia districts, UNDP under the climate change project funded
and piloted the rainwater harvesting and installation of solar powered boreholes. Both Programmes are
adoptable and scalable and can be promoted or expanded during the wet season to scale up access to clean
safe water.
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Inadequate Water Quality surveillance and laboratory Capacity. With support from UNICEF, the Ministry of Water
and Sanitation established the central water quality laboratory in Freetown and peripheral laboratories in the
districts with the exception of the two newly created districts i.e. Falaba and Karane. However, some of the labs were
said to persistently lack regular supply of water reagents. There is an inadequate supply of skilled water quality
engineers in the ministry and at the district level. Perhaps, this is due to lack of a clear water safety plan, limited
funding and human capital. Facilitation of water quality management programs at the community level during floods
with the provision of over 500,000 tabs Aqua Safe tablets, proper treatment of drinking water and proper use of
disinfectants to clean sewer and open drainage. This program as supported by WHO/UNICEF and Action Aid reduced
incidences of water borne diseases during floods, according to WHO disease surveillance reports, but was limited to
Freetown. Expansion and duplication of this program to other flood prone areas will yield broader results in district
and community wash preparedness. The above projects have high duplication and replicable capacity and should be
adoptable to other high-risk communities.
Efforts to improve the existing water quality monitoring and information systems were made by the Ministry of
Water and Sanitation. Currently, the ministry set up the sanitation technology guidelines to scale up water quality at
the national level. The establishment of a linkage of the MoWS information system to the District Health Information
System (DHIS 2) is expected to support improvements in monitoring, surveillance and analysis of water and sanitation
related risks. However, the ministry currently has no database for sanitation facilities. There is need for; additional
funding to strengthen water and sanitation systems monitoring and data collection, A centralized and fully equipped
environmental health laboratory, Facilitation of PPPs for the management of municipal solid waste and health bio
hazards, Structured sanitary land fields with the capacity to carry the existing solid waste deposits and construction
of incinerators at the national and district level to reduce biohazard risks, Improvement of existing water and solid
waste treatment plants with the capacity to disaggregate liquids, sludge and solid waste.
Numerous households, especially in informal settlement remain under prepared due to lack of proper and adequate
solid waste and sanitation facilities. In some flood prone communities such as Culvert slum in the Eastern Freetown
area, there is a shortage of toilet facilities limited to three toilet/latrine facilities for a population of more than 2000
inhabitants. The level of creativity espoused by inhabitants had taken to ‘’flying missile toilets’’ which empty in the
river and ocean as expressed during a meeting with the Culvert community’s leaders led to the prevalence of some
poor hygiene induced diseases such as diarrhea and, cholera outbreaks in 2016.. There is dire need for the provision
of permanent and safe sanitation facilities, particularly improve the ration of toilets and water taps per household
to reduce the level of risk and vulnerability to disease shocks. This requires a comprehensive Sanitation mapping
exercise around the country and the design of scalable sanitation solutions especially for high-risk communities. The
pictures below illustrates the situation of solid waste management in the Culvert community.
Figure 9: Illustration of Soled waste Management Systems in Freetown
Health and Safety Surveillance and Laboratory Capacity. The existing community health preparedness mechanisms
can be rated very strong, following the establishment and engagement of well-trained community (Health Centre I
facilities) and voluntary health workers by the MoH. During periods of normalcy, these platforms provide regular
community surveillance information on the health status of communities and households through the Health
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Monitoring and Information System. This system has registered numerous successes in reducing community health
risks. Adoption, and duplication of this mechanism to enhance the preparedness, surveillance and monitoring
capacity of other disasters e.g. floods and landslides in high risk areas. Facilitation, Training (e.g. first aid) and
compensation of constituent individuals in such committees will be essential in ensuing their efficiency and
effectiveness.
Inadequate capacity of existing Health Laboratory surveillance systems. The CDC and the WHO supported the MoH
in the development of labs at regional and national (Freetown, Bo, Kenema research lab and Mkeny), technical
support and funding to achieve the minimum standards for laboratory facilities. The laboratories are a strong
element of the disease surveillance system. The labs are involved in gathering samples within the region for further
testing and community surveillance. There are four major tiers of labs, level 1 PHUS district, regional labs and the
CPHIL. The first level labs were assumed to have the rest menu per laboratory level like the CHC level based on the
basic package and are yet to get up to 50%.
In terms of capacity, a disease surveillance system were strong in the area of virology because several partners
pushed for its strengthening. Conversely, surveillance systems in the areas of bacteriology are still inadequate and
risk fast spread of disease in the event of an outbreak. However, there is a general shortage of qualified laboratory
technicians countrywide and hospital staffing provisions (1 staff per facility and others 2 per facility). Most of the
CHO labs are running more of TB testing although most facilities lack specialized TB doctors.
Simulation exercises for the laboratory technicians proved the likelihood and capacity to test and implore highly
contagious diseases such as Ebola and Lassa fever. However, there is still a gap at the public health laboratories
capacity to test for diseases such as meningitis. They say epidemics do not occur all the time, which places them at
risk. Accreditation
Laboratory Quality management systems (LQMS). Nearly all laboratories in Sierra Leone were rated one star at the
Ebola outbreak. The CDC and WHO since supported two labs through the LQMS including the NTR and Fourabay,
which both scored a star one using the SLIPTA tool. Despite the above efforts, lab samples still have to be delivered
to the NTR and Fourabay for testing due to lack of capacity at the district and regional level. SLAMTA goals are still
very low at with nearly 0% of the laboratories countrywide meeting less than or a simple one star standard. This
shows weaknesses within the regional and district laboratory system. The MoH and partners need to further
strengthen the existing laboratory systems through:
 Establishment of a regional hub system infrastructure and staffing to ensure quick monitoring and
surveillance;
 Establishment of more district-based labs (at least one in each district) by either construction, weight lifting
or refurbishment especially in hard to reach areas.
 supported the recruitment of quality staff and training in LQMS to improve the existing Lab referral systems
and reduced risk of in-Lab sourced infections:
 Support the implementation of LQMS system and SLAMTA accreditation of some lands to at least three and
four stars quality according to the requirements of the ISO standard 15189/2012.
Within the health monitoring information system, all heads of facilities have transitioned from paper based to
electronic based systems using tablets. However, poor or weak internet connectivity at the district level continues
to hamper efficiency and effectiveness in reporting and Data Quality Assurance.
Risk monitoring in remote communities was limited in terms of EWS real time reporting due to lack of effective and
efficient information and communication services and equipment. This leads to a significant delay in disaster
response. The development of social media applications or feedback mechanisms could provide an interesting
avenue for the reporting and communication of risk between ONS and all at risk communities in Sierra Leone. The
real time data collected by users affected by disasters can be used to better coordinate response activity and
determine exact resource needs. This information can speed of the overall response time of stakeholders involved
in response.
Administrative Infrastructure Needs. Fully functional Disaster management and EP&R institution requires the
existence of adequate space to accommodate administrative, Emergency operations, communications, and health
and safety facilities. Table 24 below identified, as some of the physical infrastructure needs to support ongoing EP&R
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functions and operational activities of the existing Disaster Management Institution at the National, regional and
district level. The functions of the directorate are administratively located at various regional and district local
government offices, while no dedicated office space and facilities were in existence in some districts and at the
chiefdom levels. Currently, the office space provisions available at both levels constitute the following.
Table 11: Current Administrative and Office Space Arrangements for the DMD.
Administrativ Location/ Available Size of existing Staff Positions accommodated.
e Level Situation Infrastructure infrastructure
National Level ONS  Directorate  25 Square meters  Director of DRM (1)
office.
 DRM Staff  40 Square Meters  Assistant Directors (2),
office Researchers (2),
 Logistics officer (1),
 Data Assistant (1)
 Situation Room  70 Square Meters  Situation Room
Coordinator (1).
 NDMP Committee (18)
Regional level Local  1 Staff Office  25 Square Meters  Regional Security
Governmen  (Bo District) Coordinators (2)
t offices.  1 Staff Office  25 Square Meters  Regional Security
 (Kenema Coordinators (2)
District)
 1 Staff Office  25 Square Meters  Regional Security
 (Phujehun) Coordinators (2)
 1 Staff Office  25 Square Meters  Regional Security
(Mkeny ) Coordinators (2)
District & None  None  None  None
Chiefdom
At the national level, delivery of some core DRM and EP&R functions has been grossly constrained by the inadequacy
or lack of some critical administrative infrastructure.
At district and chiefdom levels, coordination and management of regular EP&R activities have constantly been
conducted in temporary facilities by DDMCs. Physical infrastructure shortages negatively impacted on the
management and administration of all DRM activities as staff have no space to conduct meetings and carry out other
administrative and operational tasks. Acquisition, expansion or establishment of dedicated office infrastructure at
the national, regional, district level and Community level is important to enhance institutional functional capacity,
efficiency and effectiveness in coordinating the functions of the agency. The physical infrastructure allocated to the
NDMA should be large enough to accommodate all its functional requirements to include at the minimum;
Administrative Offices for daily work of NDMA Staff, a NEOC, training Centre for disaster related training, briefing or
Conference rooms for meetings, seminars and workshops, Emergency information and Communications Room,
Storage and warehousing facilities, staff rest rooms, and other ancillary facilities such as kitchen, etc.
Emergency Operations Physical Infrastructure.

The existing infrastructure is inadequate of a number of minimum requirements for robust Emergency Operations
Centres accepted internationally. Currently, the existing ONS-NSR is also inadequate of some core and critical
emergency response operation facilities at the national and regional level. For instance, there is currently no
dedicated monitoring, communications facility, conference facilities for key staff (Sits a maximum of 16 members),
and conducive health, safety and ancillary structures to conveniently facilitate staff accommodation needs during
level two and level three emergency operations. Furthermore, there is a lack of dedicated physical EoC infrastructure
at the regional, district and chiefdom levels to converge various role-players involved in emergency response,
hampering coordination issues, effective communication and duplication of activities amongst various participants.
This space can also be used as a central meeting point for politicians and members of the media to congregate during
an emergency event. .
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Additional constraints were identified in relation to the existing warehousing and storage facilities for non-food
emergency response supplies (ex. mattresses, dignity kits, water). Currently, there are only two such facilities in the
whole country to mention Port Loko and MacDonald. Expansion of warehousing facilities countrywide is therefore
crucial to support relief aid in the shortest response time possible *Under 48 hours) at the regional and national
levels
National Emergency Operations Infrastructure Needs. The ONS-DMD situation room is the primary national-level
hub for operational communications and information pertaining to domestic incident management. The situation
integrates and provides overall steady National threat monitoring and situational awareness for domestic incident
management on a 24/7 basis and is expected to work closely and collaboratively with other key stakeholders within
the EP&R governance framework.
The National GIS platform. Most importantly, the facility should be capable of serving as the central coordination
point for: all emergency operations, information gathering and dissemination, coordination with local governments,
outside contractors, mutual aid and volunteer organizations during and after an incident. Coordination of Command
Operations, Planning, collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information and for coordinating development of
Incident Action Plans, Logistics, Emergency Finance and Administration. During emergencies, the facility operates
under three primary conditions:
 Level 1 (Normalcy): No emergency incident exists sufficient to warrant full EoC activation;
 Level 2 (Emergency without warning): an incident occurs requiring full activation of the EOC;
 Level 3 (Emergency with warning): the EOC is brought into full or partial activation to pre-emptively reduce
the impact of impending incidents, and respond to the impact of the incident when it transpires.
In consideration of the above core functions and activation procedures, there is need to have a specifically built
physical facility with adequate office space to accommodate the various functional and emergency operational
activities of the ONS and to scale up the capacity of existing Emergency Operations facilities. The sizes and
operational capacity of EoCs can range in scope from an activated conference room through a multiple space centre
located in general building to a standalone specialized facility. However, the facility should, at the minimum, be able
to accommodate and provide the following spaces:
Proposed space Function/Purpose
Management  To accommodate all designated Staff and administrative positions responsible for
Designated Office space the EOC operations. The office and administrative space should be sufficient in
with private meeting size to accommodate the required staff members that may be present for a given
Rooms situation as determined by the commander.
A fully equipped  To facilitate coordination and liaison with other National, Regional, District,
National Situation Community and bub-group regulatory agencies and officials affected by the
Monitoring room location and specific nature of the incident.
EOC Operations and  To accommodate members of the National Disaster Management platform and
Conference facility Identified representatives from local response agencies, contractors, volunteer
agencies, and any other group with significant response roles in emergency
response from the EOC. Extensive presentation, communication data processing
aids for key personnel are maintained in the operations room.
Media Monitoring  For public information sources including TV, radio, and wire services to gather
facility information on incidents and determine accuracy of public information
Emergency information  To facilitate daily communications between affected communities at the
& Communications National, Regional, district and community level.
centre
GIS Monitoring Facility  Continuous monitoring, capture, store, manipulate, analyse, manage, and
present spatial or geographic data
Training Media and  Continuous training of EOC staff and key stakeholders drilled in the proper
Public Information processes and procedures for coordinating full-scale emergency response effort.
Centre to facilitate The centre will need to be fitted with simulation equipment to facilitate hands on
trainings for DPR staff.
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Proposed space Function/Purpose
Server room  Database and information security purposes. Dedicated space is needed for the
electronic switching and computer equipment. Generally, consider providing a
consolidated equipment room for all telephone systems, network equipment,
computer servers, radio equipment, audio-visual playing and distribution
equipment, recording equipment and other electronic equipment needed to
serve the emergency response function.
 Adequate Storage, warehousing and parking space Constructed and securely located to provide balanced
protection of assets against emergency incidents that can impact the facility. These facilities should also
ensure that necessary equipment is available on site and storage of equipment and materials from
contractors.
 Ancillary/Health and safety Facilities including a kitchen, gender exclusive toilets, bathrooms and changing
rooms. The EOC should have designated hot and cold beverage area and microwave areas serving the
operations room and the communications room so individuals in each of the spaces do not have to leave
their post to obtain beverages and light snacks
 Restrooms, Shower and Locker Rooms. Rest room facilities, with separate toilets for males and females,
should be provided directly off the operations and communications rooms to minimize the downtime
required for breaks. All toilet facilities must be accessible for disabled individuals. Consider providing space
allocations for toilets at 5.5 square meters (60 square feet) per fixture and showers at 2 square meters (20
square feet) for each stall.
 Security and Reception Areas. The EOC requires control of personnel entering the EOC Operations Room or
the EOC Operations Suite.
 Emergency accommodation Facilities- In times of declared natural disasters and emergencies, the Office is
expected to activate the National Emergency Operations Centre to coordinate and manage the response
activities and to address the needs of the general population 24/7. Staff may be required to be on duty for
extended stays. The facility should therefore be able to accommodate a minimum number of staff to ensure
24-hour operation and functionality of the facility. While it should be designed to provide habitable space
during an emergency, full shelter protection and long-term survival provisions need to be provided from a
designated shelter location for staff in the incident command line.
The requirements for space and furniture will vary with the size and purpose of the EOC, and available or affordable
within the budget for the EOC. Some spaces may be shared with other permissible functions, particularly storage, as
long as the space is easily accessible during times of emergency.
In consideration of the above core functions and activation procedures, there is need to have a specifically built
physical facility for the NDMA with adequate office space to accommodate the various different functional activities
of emergency operations and management by the NDMA and NEOC to scale up the capacity of existing Emergency
Operations facilities. The sizes and operational capacity of EoCs can range in scope from an activated conference
room through a multiple space center located in general building to a standalone specialized facility. However, the
EOC facility should, at the minimum, be able to accommodate and provide:
Establishing and determining the actual design of Sierra Leones NEoC and REoC facilities, there is need to conduct a
thorough and complete EOC operational requirements and physical space survey. The survey should be performed
regardless of the existence of the situation room at the ONS as the basis for which decisions will be made on the
location, relocation, building selection or construction site of the EOC. The requirements survey should identify all
activities that will be performed by the individual staff of the EOC, and the resources necessary for execution of those
activities. Considerations should be given to circulation and construction layout requirements, expansion
requirements, flexible use of space and space needs for ongoing operations. Also important is the need to develop
and approve proper national standards and guidelines for the for space requirements of the EOC. Furniture and
Equipment. Should as they contribute directly to the EOC’s ability to function, need to be put into consideration
during the design of the facilities.
3.3.2. Multi-Level Physical Infrastructure Needs.

Section 14 (1) (2) (3) and (4) of the draft National Disaster Agency Bill provides for the establishment of regional,
district, and chiefdom agency officers in every administrative zone of the country. Thus, puts into consideration the
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four administrative regions, Eastern, Northern and Southern Provinces, and the Western Area, 14 Districts and 149
Chiefdoms countrywide, as further illustrated in the table below. Each of the geo-political zones of the country were
established to decentralize disaster management and ensure active participation of the grassroots. There are plans
to establish additional zonal offices and call centres in the country to further facilitate rapid action to distress alerts.
With the decentralized approach, the NDMA and NEoC’s response time for the assessment and delivery of relief
assistance in urgent situations is expected to improve significantly. Establishment of decentralized zonal offices is
justified to allow rapid response to disaster situations, as they are extensions of the national agency.
Table 12: Summary of Provinces, Districts, Chiefdoms and Sections in Sierra Leone.
Province Districts Chiefdoms Sections
Northern  Tonkoli 11 87
 Bombali 14 148
 Portloko 11 152
 Koinadugu 11 106
 Kambia 7 64
Southern  Bo 16 111
 Bonthe 12 78
 Moyamba 14 142
 Phujehun 12 95
Eastern  Kailahun 14 89
 Kenema 17 105
 Kono 15 82
Western  Western Area Urban 8 64
 Western Area Rural 4 25
Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2018.
At the regional level, the bill provides for the establishment of regional disaster management offices – RDMO’s
(where necessary) and the regional disaster Management Committee (RDMC) under the leadership of chief minister.
At the district level, the bill provides for the establishment of District Disaster Management Offices (DDMOs) (where
necessary) and the establishment of District Disaster Management Committee (DDMCs). At the community level, the
Chiefdom disaster management offices and chiefdom disaster Management Committees (CDMCs) are also provided
for as the lowest administrative level of disaster management in Sierra Leone. In consideration of the above, it is
recommended that the following physical infrastructure be considered for establishment.
Table 13: Summary of Provinces, Districts, Chiefdoms and Sections in Sierra Leone.
Level Physical Infrastructure Needs
Regional Level:  Regional Disaster management Agency offices
 Regional Warehouse facilities
 Alternate Emergency Operations Center in the event of failure of the National EoC
 Boarder Security Checkpoints.
District level  District Disaster Management offices (if Necessary)
 District emergency Operations centres (If necessary)
 Public Education and training facilities.
Chiefdom level  Temporary Meeting Spaces.
 Community information desks and community structures for gender-based EP&R
 Evacuation Facilities in High Risk areas
3.3.3. Multi-Stakeholder Multi-Hazard Physical Infrastructure Needs.

Disaster preparedness and response are multi‐disciplinary functions, involving a number of Ministries/Departments,
Agencies and INGOs. Institutional mechanisms, which would facilitate this interdisciplinary approach are therefore
important. In line with this principle, there is need to provide adequate physical infrastructure for key stakeholders
in the emergency response process. The need for warehousing with the ability to store food items was seen as ideal,
Resettlement areas, such as those at Mile 6, should also have warehousing capacity in close proximity to assist with
the continued recovery of disaster-affected communities. The table below further shows the physical infrastructure
needs of various stakeholders as identified during the assessment.
58
Table 14: Proposed Physical Infrastructure Needs of Key Stakeholders in the EP&R Operations System.
EP&R Institution. Previous initiatives Observations/ Gaps Identified/Challenges Physical Level of
Orientation. Infrastructure Needs. Establishment
Security  Sierra Leone   Lack of an emergency control room to  Emergency  National

Police. monitor the emergencies during control room Level.
disasters.
Logistics   WFP donated a warehouse or   
logistics space in Portloko to
support emergency operations
with the region. The facility awaits
official handover and receipt from
WFP/WB to ONS post EVD, 2015.
Firefighting  National Fire   Lack of an emergency control room to  Emergency  National
Force. monitor the emergencies during control room Level
disasters.
Information  Sierra Leone  The construction, building, and  Inadequate Radar and weather  Radar and  District
and EWS Meteorological coordination centre for all Monitoring station to augment the Weather level
agency emergencies in the country. capacity of Meteorological service to Monitoring
 MoH track evolving weather patterns that Stations
might pose risk
Mass Care  National   None  None  None
Commission for
Social Action
(NaCSA)
 Ministry of  Existence of Hospitals and  Inadequate community health facilities  Community  Community
Health Laboratories at the district level. e.g. HC IIs and HC Is Health facilities Level
(HC I)
Health and  Ministry of   Inadequate incinerator facilities to  Incinerator  Regional
medical Health. manage the biohazard waste facilities Level
Services   Inadequate medical laboratory facilities  Medical  District
to handle disease references such as TB laboratory Level
facilities
Search and  Republic of   Lack of-time emergency control room to  Emergency  National
Rescue Sierra Leone monitor the emergencies during control room level
Armed Forces disasters.
59

 Sierra Leone   Lack of time emergency control rooms  Emergency  National

Red cross. control room level
Water and  Ministry of  UNICEF has established water  However with limited capabilities  Expansion of  District and
Sanitation Water and quality monitoring labs in most of because of inadequate staffing. existing piped  Community
Sanitation the districts: The labs facilitate However, with Water quality water level
monitoring water quality in the management issues – the concerned infrastructure
country with the aim to reduce ministries do not have the capacities to
water borne disasters such as conduct rapid water quality
cholera, typhoid etc. and are assessments.
functional  Inadequate WASH Community  Scale of WASH  Community
 About 40 new community water infrastructure e.g. toilet and water community Level
tanks were completed during the facilities infrastructure.
dry season and during crisis  Inadequate Solid waste Management  Solid waste  Regional
management (Ebola crisis) in the Capacity. There are only two Solid waste management level
different parts of the country. The Mg’t sites at solid waste management facilities
water tanks are functional though sites – Kingtom and Kisii.
inadequate to meet the water  Inadequate faecal sludge treatment  Faecal sludge  Regional
supply needs of the people. capacity for city effluent treatment sites Level
Hazardous  Ministry of  For compliance with service level  Lack of time emergency control room to  Emergency  National
Materials and Environment agreements, some incinerators monitor the emergencies during control room
Waste and the EPA were built during the recent Ebola disasters.
crisis, however there are
dysfunctional in the districts, as
they have not been maintained.
With the many hospitals in the
country and population, the
management of bio-hazardous
wastes remains a challenge.
Volunteers  Sierra Leone  Dedicated Training, Centre  Lack of a dedicated volunteer training,  Dedicated  National
and Red cross. facility located within the SLRC, Centre facility, Inadequate furnishings, volunteer level
Donations Inadequate furnishings, equipment and the necessary training facility
equipment and the necessary administrative technology applications
60

administrative technology
applications.
Food  Ministry of  FAO has constructed a laboratory  Inadequate Storage and warehousing  Storage and  District
Agriculture, in Makeni District to facilitate crop facilities at the Regional and district Warehousing Level
Forestry and and animal disease surveillance. levels facilities
Food Security The lab is functional with the
(MAF) required equipment and
personnel to conduct research.
The country has only four
effective incinerators working in
Makeni, Kenema, Bo and
Freetown.
Gender and  Ministry of   Lack of Community information desks  Community  Community
Social labour, gender and community structures for gender- information Level
Development and Social based EP&R desks and
Development gender EP&R
centres
61
National Emergency Operations Equipment Needs.

A well-distributed physical infrastructure and supply of adequate emergency response equipment is vital during
response operations. In Sierra Leone, however, response mechanisms are still inefficient partly due to lack of
proper response equipment to facilitate key response processes such as Transportation, Communications,
Firefighting, Information and Planning, Mass Care, Health and Medical Services, Search and Rescue, Hazardous
Materials, Food and Water safety, military Support, Public Information management. This section therefore
addresses the Equipment needs to facilitate future emergency preparedness and Response needs in Sierra Leone.
The specific Equipment needs of the EOC are further described in the table below:
EOC Operations Equipment Needs

The EOC’s function is directly related to its ability to communicate. Most importantly, the equipment needs of the
NEOC include administrative, coordinative communications, surveillance and EWS equipment, Reporting
equipment and emergency operational equipment such as search and rescue equipment. In addition to the above
communications equipment, the EOC is an office with all of the usual office requirements: computers, printers,
copiers, document scanners, a fax machine, application hosting and data storage server(s), office supplies, forms
designed to provide paper-based backups, in case of technology failure, etc. The specific Equipment needs of the
EOC are further described in the table below:
Table 15: EOC Operations Equipment Needs.

EoC Orientation Equipment Needs Levels of Administration
 Administrative  A telecommunications system or network comprising a  National, regional and

Office and variety of choices depending on available connectivity District Level
Equipment options.
Needs  Workstation computers with internet connections and  National, regional and
either a mobile or a hardwired telephones for the call District Level
centre and all other offices.
 EOC technological solutions incorporate hardware and  National, regional and
software systems, internal and external District Level
telecommunications, and all aspects of information
management,
 National  Large screen video displays support visual  National EOC Level
Situation representation of the status of the event and its
Monitoring contextual aspects that influence decision-making.
room  Workstation computers (desktops and laptops) with
internet connections and a mobile or a hardwired
telephones for their daily correspondence with all other
offices and stakeholders.
 EOC Operations  For all levels of the EOC, the ability to conduct  National level
and Conference teleconferences is a key capacity, which optimally
facility includes video conferencing.
 Multiple display mediums should be provided, including
electronic displays and hard copy displays.
 Media  In addition, media-monitoring capacity (television, radio,  National Level
Monitoring etc.) is required. It is useful to have video recording and
room playback capability.
 Multiple display mediums should be provided, including
 Emergency  The EoC should be equipped with workstations of 3.7  National and Regional
Information and square meters (40 square feet) to allow operations staff level
Communications to focus on analytical tasks without the disruption of the
centre commotion in the operations room. A group printer,
paper and office supplies, and manual reference library
should be centrally located in this area.
 Each workstation should be equipped with acoustical  National and Regional
furniture panel system separating the workstation from level
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EoC Orientation Equipment Needs Levels of Administration
adjacent workstations. Each station should have at least

1500 mm (5 feet) of work counter, overhead shelves for
manuals and forms, electrical connections, telephone
service, data connections and task lighting.
 Secure storage is required for classified messages and  National Level
orders. These must be designed to Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility standards
 Should have acoustical treatment with acoustical ceiling,  National level
carpeted floor and acoustical insulation isolating the
communications room from other spaces in the EOC.
 Training room  Multiple display mediums should be provided, including  National level
 GIS Monitoring  The information and planning rooms should be equipped  National level
Room with Computer Aided Design (CAD) oriented computer
work station for working with the Geographical
Information System (GIS), large format plotters, display
screens, colour printers and copiers, supply of boards for
mounting large format presentations, and flat files for
storage of large format presentation media.
 Server room  Server Computers  National level
 Consider providing cable trays, caddies, wall raceways
and other means for maintaining organization of the
extensive cabling serving the equipment. Separate paths
for power and communications cables.
 Air conditioning systems
 Equipment  The storage room should be equipped with 600 mm (24  National Level
Storage Room inch) deep shelving as well as floor area for larger items,
 Docking station for handheld radio.
 Colour coded vests for each section.
 Basic office supplies, Basic kitchen supplies (i.e. paper
napkins, plates, cups), Minimal amount of canned food.
 100 emergency blankets, Minimal amount of bottled
water, Laptop Computers for store keepers
 Storage,  Air Conditioning Systems  National and Regional
warehousing  The storage room should be equipped with 600 mm (24 level
and parking inch) deep shelving as well as floor area for larger items.
space
 Ancillary/Health  Water dispensers and coffee bar with microwave, sink  National, regional and
and safety and small refrigerator so staff can obtain beverages and District Level
Facilities light snacks without having to leave their duty posts.
 Security and  Coffee machines, cold drink dispensers, refrigerators for  National, regional and
Reception Areas storage of personal food supplies, a self-service sink and District Level
microwave ovens should be provided.
 Emergency  Either a closet or a storage locker will be required to  National level
accommodation allow staff resting to temporarily store their belongings.
Facilities Storage should be a minimum of 0.3 cubic meters (8
cubic feet).
 Collapsible and stackable Sleeping furnishings should be  National Level
for ease of storage and conversion of space to other
functions.
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3.4.2. Emergency Communication equipment Needs.

The EP&R communication system in Sierra Leone relies on both technical and traditional communications methods
to convey risk related information to communities. At the community level, the assessment noted the existence
and utilization of traditional drums sounded as early warning tools to inform communities of the need to evacuate
during impending disasters. At the national and district level, a number of communication equipment and systems
have been setup to facilitate state-wide communications including;
 Toll free disaster information hotlines (117 and 300) managed by the ONS and the Red Cross. During the
Ebola crisis, about 10 toll-free hotlines were in existence, serviced in different districts town centres.
However, there is still inadequate connectivity of the lines at the district and community level. In preparation
for prompt responses, there is an urgent need to establish a toll-free line by the DDMCs in consideration of
their proximity to the communities. Moreover, additional hotlines need to be established to support the role
of DDMC offices. However, where they exist, most communications systems are still dependent on manual
human systems and are highly inefficient. The need to improve existing communications technology
especially alert and rapid response systems is critical. Whether to have one recognized emergency hotline
number should be checked by, the ONS as an effort to avoid confusion during emergencies.
 Modern online technological platforms such as WhatsApp based emergency platforms. Presently the
meteorological agency relies on social media platforms such as WhatsApp and an online mobile app. Both
tools have been instrumental in bridging the existing communication gap especially between the ONS and
DDMCs. The lack of data coverage in some parts of the country raises some questions on the effectiveness
of this method of communication as a primary avenue for early warning messaging. Where-as this has been
helpful over the past years, it is not sustainable or reliable for monitoring and information management.
Majority such systems have not been tested in the event of a breakdown of mobile telecom networks. The
existence of signed of MoUs between Natcom, the mobile companies and ONS to link the meteorological
system feeds,
 Local Broadcasting stations are very instrumental in the dissemination of information to at risk communities
and the public. Alerts are placed with the media with the purpose to reduce damages and losses attributed
to particular disasters. However, the role of the media seems under acknowledged in the existing institutional
framework for EP&R. The need to emphasize the role of electronic media and information technology
requires integration with not only the disaster response but also overall disaster management strategy. The
sensitivity of disaster related information, media reporters need training as strategic stakeholders in disaster
communication to effectively convey information on emergencies.
 An appropriate publicity management plan for disaster management are essential to impart timely and
correct information to the public. Establishment of dedicated channels by the ONS at the national and
regional level could also provide real time information during a calamity. The media (audio-visual, broadcast,
print and electronic) plays a very critical role in the pre-disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness
activities by ensuring appropriate community awareness generation and dissemination of accurate and
informed reporting of events to many reachable and hard to reach parts of the Sierra Leone society.
However, there are limited resources for centralized information management. There are a number of online
applications developed by different entities e.g. FCC, Department of Sanitation, WFP, UNDP but all lack integration
with any other EP&R or institutional systems. At present, risk mapping is mandated to the ONS, there is inadequate
institutional capacity the most appropriate entity (with corresponding IT and GIS capacity) to host and disseminate
risk data at the national level.
The need to develop a functional and integrated ‘’ALL’’ stakeholder encompassing National Disaster Management
Information and Communication System is important. Establishment of the system should enhance the efficiency
and effectiveness of Sierra Leones Emergency preparedness and response mechanisms, support efficient
vulnerability assessments, identify lifelines and critical failures, and facilitate access to human and material
resources and demographic targeting capacity. Most importantly, this system should include some of the following
general requirements of the NDMICS.
Emergency Communications, outreach and social mobilization. Communications protocols for Emergency
response in Sierra Leone are in existence and highly followed through level one, level two and level three response
64
situations. The national communication staff in Sierra Leone, with some support from the ONS and various private
media houses, produced high quality human-interest stories, video footage and images for global distribution. In
all emergencies, structured mechanisms and systems were in place to communicate to key stakeholders and the
public. However, The ONS and partners were further constrained by the lack of in-house videography and
photography capacity including, human financial and technical capacity that compromised information integrity
on human-interest stories and visual material required.
Urban Firefighting and technical Rescue Capacity. There was difficulty in undertaking search and rescue tasks e.g.
during landslide search and rescue missions during some disasters (fire, landslides and floods). In some instances,
the country had to source some equipment e.g. heavy-duty search and rescue Flood Lights from international and
local partners, which caused delays in the response mission. Inadequate facility Safety Equipment including; Drip
Diverters, Emergency Signs, Evacuation Stair Chairs, Float Switches, Gas Detection, Gas/Water Shutoffs, Lockout-
Tag out, Pipe Markers.
Table 16: Urban Firefighting Equipment Needs (National Fire force)

Equipment Needs Level.
 Heavy duty machinery (including water tankers)  National, Regional Level

 At least 3 Fire trucks situated at the National Facility in 
Freetown
 Specialised Marine and Fire Rescue Equipment  National level
 Floodlights for night-time operations  National level
 Debris Removal Tools, including Chainsaws, Cutting &  District and Community Level
Pruning Tools, Power Brushes, Yard Vacs & Leaf Blowers,
Rakes, Trash Containers, Pickaxes, shovels and machetes
 Sea rescue equipment for water operations.
 Personnel Safety gear, Disaster Survival Kits, Disposable &  District and Community Level
Chemical Resistant Clothing, Eye Protection, Face Protection,
First Aid & Wound Care rain boots, hand gloves and helmets
 The facility does not have dun-tables or snorkel ladders and 
this could cause major problems in their ability to save lives
in tall buildings
 Respiratory masks and basic medical supplies  District and Community Level
 Fire blankets and fire extinguishers  District and Community Level
Despite the existence of some communications systems and operational equipment, the existing equipment is still
inadequate of the essential communications infrastructure hardware needs. The existing communication systems
and equipment are constrained between the national, regional, district and community levels. The systems
especially lacks end-to-end communication equipment (radios) and electronic reporting tools to initiate
communications and to facilitate real-time reporting of disasters with key-players before and during and
emergency. Cross border, communications are equally weak, as surrounding communities are not equipped to
inform the ONS on emergencies or incidents. This leads to a significant delay in disaster response. Therefore, it is
essential that critical communications equipment be acquired to support the communications and operations of
the EoC.
Table 17: EOC Emergency Communications Equipment Needs.

Equipment Needs Relevance/Description Administrative
Level
 Telephone  Much of the activity occurring in the EOC relies directly on  National,
Equipment. telephone communication. This should include commercial lines, Regional,
PBX systems, phone headsets, mobile phones, secure phones, District and
satellite phones and wireless phones. AutoVIN, cellular Community
telephone and hardwired single point-to-point telephone lines level.
(P-lines)
65
Equipment Needs Relevance/Description Administrative

Level
 Radio Equipment.  The EOC will need a system to support access to multiple radio  Regional,
communications between the various support agencies and field District and
personnel. For remote locations at the regional, district and Community
community level, radio or satellite telephony may be the only level.
options. Capability to expand radio communications within the
building is also desirable. Headsets are recommended for use in
the operations centres.
 Visual display  Technology capability of the EOC should allow for computer-  National,
units generated displays, as well as additional visual aid supports, such Regional,
as multiple display terminals, video projection, drop down level.
screens and large wall-mounted monitors. A large-scale multiple
screen display system should be considered. These may be front
projection, rear projection, flat panel display, large CRT or other
technologies. Briefings. Command Operations Displays News
Broadcast Displays Other Displays Media Content display and
video routing options.
 “Giant Voice”  Applicable in high risk and densely populated areas to support  Community
Base Broadcast EWS communications before a disaster. Level
 Intercom and  These may be integrated into the telephone system. This can  National,
public address include a public address system and a meeting room speaker Regional,
systems for use system. District and
during Community
emergencies.
 Audio-Visual  Appropriate audio-visual equipment should be installed in the  National and
equipment. Meeting Room. Regional
 Audio Visual  For instance, cameras, drones should also be considered for  National and
Recording recording capabilities. Regional
Equipment
 GIS mapping  Display and analysis of spatial information on highly prone and  National level
equipment. affected areas.
 Broadcast  The communication system may require an antenna for radio  National and
Antenna or and microwave communication. Regional
satellite radio
For effective coordination and communication, it will be important for all key stakeholders and first responders to
be equipped with Mobile satellite telephones such as that illustrated below.
Mobile Emergency Communications Needs.

Mobile Command Centres are vehicles or pre-packaged equipment that can be relocated to wherever required in
response to an emergency incident. The Mobile Command Centres provide capability for Emergency Operations
team members to execute coordination and management activities in the event of an emergency incident where
the facility based emergency operation center cannot be activated or maintained in response to the emergency
incident. Mobile Command Centres may be one or multiple vehicles that can be driven to any location where they
are needed. Mobile Command Centres can also consist of a set of shipping containers with the necessary
equipment to set up and establish EOC functions at any facility where the emergency operations team can
assemble.
Mobile Command Centres may have the capability for providing service enroute from one location to another, as
well as service when they set up at a stationary site. Mobile Command Centres provide for continuous command
and control capability during periods when the primary or alternate EOC will not be in operation, such as when
emergency teams are transferring between a primary and alternate EOC. The Mobile Command Center also
provides capability to provide command and control for localized field operations. The Mobile Command Center
should provide both operations and communications capability, which may be separated into multiple vehicles
that travel together. See appendix 3 for the outline of requirements.
66
Mobile Description or Specification Targeted Emergency No. of

satellite Radio Response Equipment
Stakeholders required.
 Voice: 4.0 kbps voice (AMBE+2 codec)  National Disaster  A minimum
 Support speech to/from the PSTN / Management of 100-radio
ISDN / 2G / 2.5G / 3G terrestrial Agency. satellite
network  National phones to
 Supporting DTMF, Emergency Call Emergency be
Teleservice Operations Centre distributed
 SMS: Short message service  Ministry of Health between
 PS Data:  Emergency the
 Symmetric IP (Forward: 32 and 64 Hospitals and National,
kbps, Return 32 and 64 kbps) (CBR) clinics. regional
 Standard IP bit rates up to 384/240  National fire force and District
kbps on shared channels (384  National level and at
downstream/ 240 Ambulance Facility the
 upstream)(VBR)  District Disaster chiefdom
 Interface unit, with built in Bluetooth Management level
 Antenna unit, BGAN antenna with a Committees
inbuilt GPS Receiver Unit  Sierra Leone
 USB cable Armed Forces
 Battery (Rechargeable  Sierra Leone Police
 AC/DC adapter with EN 50075 AC plug  Free town City
 Getting Started manual and CD, council
including Inmarsat common PC User  Sierra Leone Red
Interface, the ”BGAN cross Volunteers
 Launchpad”, Voice mail, Call Line
Identification Presentation (CLIP), Call
Forwarding on Mobile Busy / No Reply
/ Not Reachable, Call Waiting (CW) Call
Barring
3.4.3. Multi-Stakeholder Equipment Needs.

In consideration of the above, the assessment noted the existence of some communications equipment hosted by
multiple stakeholders during various disasters (floods, Landslides, Windstorms, fires and epidemics).
Emergency Response Transportation and Logistics Needs.

The transport of relief supplies from warehousing facilities also present a major obstacle. Firstly, ONS currently has
no large, four-wheel drive, trucks available to transport mass quantitates of relief aid to affected communities.
During the landslide disaster response, transportation of relief items to the intended beneficiaries delayed due to
lack of logistics trucks and systemic bureaucracies in securing logistics transportation from the MoF and RSLAF,
which further hampers the response process. At the regional level, there are no vehicles to support emergency
response operations especially in densely populated and high-risk profile areas. Thus it is vital for the proposed
National Disaster Management Agency to at least have between 5-10 of their own four-wheel drive, trucks
available to transport mass quantitates of relief aid to affected communities.
Emergency Social Services Equipment Needs.

In consideration of the above, the assessment noted the existence of some communications equipment hosted by
multiple stakeholders during various disasters (floods, Landslides, Windstorms, fires and epidemics). Despite the
existence of the above equipment and facilities, Disaster response agencies such as the Police, Fire Services,
Medical Services, and Public Works Department etc. are in urgent need of technical upgrading. These agencies are
the first responders with critical roles to play in the immediate aftermath of any disaster. The communication,
transportation and technical operation capabilities of these organisations need to be built on a priority basis. For
instance, the national fire force lacks specialized fire equipment to bring down fires on high raised buildings. Table
36 below further illustrates the specific equipment needs of multi-stakeholder institutions as identified during the
assessment.
67
Despite the existence of the above equipment and facilities, Disaster response agencies such as the police, fire
services, medical services, public works departments etc. are in urgent need of technical upgrading. These agencies
are the first responders with critical roles to play in the immediate aftermath of any disaster. The communication,
transportation and technical operation capabilities of these organisations need to be built on a priority basis. For
instance, the national fire force lacks specialized fire equipment to bring down fires on high raised buildings. The
facility does not have dun-tables or snorkel ladders and this could cause major problems in their ability to save lives
in tall buildings e.g. the new city hall, which has 15 floors. In addition, the fire facility lacks sea rescue equipment
for water operations. The table below further illustrates the specific equipment needs of multi-stakeholder
institutions as identified during the assessment.
68
Table 18: Multi-Stakeholder Emergency Response Equipment Needs.

EP&R Institution. Observations/Findings Existing Equipment and Equipment Needs Level.
Orientation. Capacity
Planning and  Office of  Inefficiency in existing communication  Radio and  Radio and telephony Equipment.  National,
Coordination. National systems due to lack of quick and telephone systems  (See More in Section above) regional
Security communications equipment during a with secure  Communications equipment including and District
disaster and two-way communication connections to Batteries, Portable Device Chargers,
equipment (radios) or electronic existing Two Way Radios, Weather Radios
reporting systems (emergency reporting emergency
apps) available to facilitate the reporting hotlines, fire and
of disaster and to coordinate role- medical service
players in response providers and law
enforcement
 Lack of internet enabled and systems   Field Computers and I-Pads  National,
integrated electronic data capturing regional
tools for capturing affected persons and District
details during response which has
limited data synchronisation between
government agencies as well as INGOs
 Inadequate Communication systems   Radio and telephony Equipment.  National,
and equipment to disseminate early  (See More in Section above) Regional,
warning messaging to the general public District and
or via existing disaster management Community
volunteers
Resource  ONS.  Inadequate in-house transportation and   Administrative and Logistical Mobility  National,
Management Mobility for key staff and logistical trucks. regional
resources and District
  Shelter Operations including Blankets 
 Bottled Water, Cots & Beds,
Emergency Water & Food Rations,
Linens, Paper Products & Dispensers,
Pillows, Portable Coolers
 Sports Drinks & Thirst Quenchers
69

Early Warning  Sierra  Inadequate capacity to Monitor Floods   Flood Monitoring Sensors and  District and
Systems Leone and Sea Rise in highly prone areas. Equipment Community
Information Meteorolo Level
and Planning gical  Radar and weather station equipment  Eight Weather  Radar and weather station Monitoring  District and
Agency to augment the capacity of Monitoring equipment Community
Meteorological service to track evolving Stations Level
weather patterns that might pose risk countrywide.
  To strengthen their capacity, the   proper and modern border  Districts
MoH facilitated training of some surveillance technology e.g. drone surroundin
members of the armed forces in the monitoring and surveillance g boarder
identification and management of equipment, areas
bio-disasters.
 However, the armed forces are
currently limited by the lack of
proper and modern border
surveillance technology e.g. drone
monitoring and surveillance
equipment, and inadequate human
resources to sustain existing patrols
especially in disaster prone border
areas.
Resource  ONS.  Inadequate in-house transportation and   Administrative and Logistical Mobility  National
Management Mobility for key staff and logistical trucks. and
resources  regional
Level
70

Landslide  Republic of  Inadequate emergency response  Flood Lights  Heavy duty machinery (including  National,
Search and Sierra equipment during some disasters (fire,  First Aid Kits caterpillars, bull dozers, water Regional
Rescue Leone landslides and floods) tankers) and District
Armed  Difficulty in undertaking some tasks e.g.  Specialised Marine and Fire Rescue level
Forces during landslide search and rescue Equipment  District and
 National missions  Water Rescue Equipment Community
Fire Force  Emergency Lighting Equipment Level
 District including Floodlights for night-time
Disaster operations, Batteries, Handheld
Manageme Flashlights, Headlamps, Lanterns,
nt Light sticks, Spotlights, Temporary Job
Committee Site Lights,
s  Pickaxes, shovels and machetes
 Safety gear, rain boots, hand gloves
and helmets Respiratory masks and
basic medical supplies Fire blankets
and fire extinguishers
 Flood Lights  Traffic Control Equipment, Barrier
 First Aid Kits Tapes, Flares, Traffic Cones
Wash  Ministry of  Contamination of water and sanitation  Water purification,  Aqua Tabs  District and
Water and facilities due to inadequate Supply of  Cleaning supplies  Community
Sanitation Water treatment kits and Equipment Level
 Inadequate Flood Management and  WASH based  Dewatering Equipment including  District and
Control Equipment. information Adapters, Carpet-Flood Dryers, Community
system called Cooling Fans & Air Circulators, Level
AKVO flow that Couplers, Dehumidifiers,
helps to monitor,  Moisture Meters, Pipe & Test Plugs,
assess and collect Portable Engine Driven Pumps, Pump
data to develop Accessories
reports identifying  Squeegees, Suction & Discharge
bottlenecks in the Hoses
WASH system  Sump Pumps, Wet-Dry Vacuums
71

Volunteers  Sierra  Basic equipment to assist them in carry   First aid kits, fire extinguishers, ropes,  District and
and Donations Leone Red out their duties as first responders. pickaxes, shovels and machetes and Community
cross. safety gear Level
Energy  Ministry of    Power Restoration Equipment  District
Energy and including; Electrical Plugs & Level
Mineral Connectors, Engine & Motor Oils,
Resources Extension Cords & Power Strips
 Fuel & Gas Cans
 Fuel Caddies, Fuel Transfer Tanks
 Generator Accessories
 Generator Transfer Switches
 Portable & Inverter Generators
 Standby Generators
Mass care  Ministry of  Ambulance Capacity  District  Regular maintenance of ambulances.  District
Health and ambulances Level
Sanitation received during
the Ebola Crisis.
  Strong surveillance systems for the  Laboratories  Expansion of laboratory services and  District
monitoring of diseases outbreaks and established in equipment at the district level. Level
environmental health issues have also some districts  Laboratory Equipment needs
been set up within the Ministry of 
agriculture, Environmental Health,
RSLAF and Depart of Health
Transportation   Sierra Leone Armed forces  Transport vehicles  Transportation trucks to aid logistical  District
 Existence of partnerships and MoUs (Trucks) and mass victim transportation needs Level
with private sector entities for heavy during emergencies
duty equipment like caterpillars, bull  Memorandums of Association with
dozers etc. to deal with these kinds of some local private companies to
disasters to deal with these situations as [provide to recover and secure
rapidly as possible, people
72
Disaster Preparedness and Response Personnel Needs.
3.5.1. International support and coordination Arrangements for EP&R.

DPR and EP&R coordination and management functions are institutionalized and centrally mandated to the ONS under
the National Security Act, 2002. The legal framework provides clear mandates, roles and responsibilities of multi-sector
institutions and stakeholders responsible for Disaster Preparedness and Response at the National level, putting into
consideration all hazard types including slow and sudden onset hazards.
Furthermore, the existing framework established mechanisms for coordinating DPR activities. The Sierra Leone
National Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan (2006) and the approved Standard Response Guidelines, 2018
provide for the National disaster Management and coordination Architecture. Section 4 of the Guidelines provides for
Disaster and Emergency Management and identifies five DPR coordination structures within the National Disaster
Management mechanisms bringing together representatives from all relevant governmental and non-governmental
actors. These mechanisms include;
 The National Platform for Disaster risk Reduction (NPDRR), chaired by the vice president or the NCOORD
provides for the creation of national policy. The platform was developed in line with the EP&R concept and
comprehensive all-hazard institutional response mechanism.
 The National Strategic Situation Group,
 The National Situation Room, and
 The Operational MDA Lead and the District Disaster management committee
 The ONS DMD secretariat which acts as coordination hub for all emergency operations.
Figure 10: Level 1 Disaster Management Framework (During Normalcy)
During emergencies the NPDRR and NSSG brings together the national executive and technical leaders from different
MDAs with the responsibility for command, control and coordination. The platform is responsible for activating and
overseeing the national response operations at the National Situation Room (NSR), which is activated 24 hours during
Level 2 and/or three emergencies. The NSR links with the primary operational MDA to coordinate all response efforts
in the shape of the British gold, silver and bronze incident command mechanism, as illustrated in the figure below.
Figure 11: Level 2 and Level 3 Disaster Management Framework (During Emergencies)
73
Furthermore, Institutional and coordinative arrangements have been forged with key stakeholders in DPR to
implement the provisions of the law, and ground national and sectoral plans on climate change and disaster risk
management. Some critical arrangements established include;
The existing legal framework provides for the involvement and participation of national and subnational institutions.
These institutions provide supplementary capacity to the ONS-DMD in addressing immediate and short-term needs
during disasters. District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs) were also established at the district level as multi-
organization groupings established within each district, to coordinate DPR, District Council leaders, sector departments,
security representatives, key local representatives, the health organizations and any active international partners
within the area. Coordination of disaster preparedness and response operations is devolved from the national level
with operational functions at the national, regional and district levels.
Table 19: Roles and Responsibilities of Administrative Institutions in EP&R.

Admin Level Roles and Responsibility.
National –  Developing policy frameworks, DRM and EP&R guidelines;

Level.  Establishment and operationalization of formal links with sectoral line agencies, with
Institutions complementary sectoral responsibilities for EP&R
responsible for  Integration of EP&R aspects into their regular development work into development policies,
EP&R. and programs targeted at reducing the vulnerability of rural livelihoods to natural hazards
 Leading communication with the general public and sectoral agencies at different levels.
 Guiding and Assisting in the development of early warning systems, and in declaring
states/phases of emergency during disasters.
International  Provision of coordinated aid/support for response material resources and preparedness
Level (includes action e.g. Goal Ireland, USAID, and the World Bank.
INGOs, NGOs  Health and Nutrition (The UN System in Sierra Leone, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNFPA,
and Global USAID, Red Cross, UNWOMEN)
Development  WASH (SL Red Cross, UNICEF, OXFAM, JICA, WFP, World Vision)
Agencies.  Food Assistance (WFP, Save the Children)
 IDP Camp Management and Emergency Shelter (Red Cross, Save the Children, JICA, Oxfam,
WFP, Habitat for Humanity), Information Management and Logistics (UNICEF, WFP, OCHA)
 Emergency Communication infrastructure (Red cross, UNICEF, WFP)
 Non-Food Items (Red cross, UNHCR, Oxfam, Save the Children)
 Education and Social Protection (UNICEF, UNAIDS, UNFPA)
 Relief Management (WFP, UNICEF, USAID)
District Level  Coordinating and mediating actions between the national and local levels.
 Local administration, implementation of disaster mitigation, preparedness, response,
recovery and livelihood development Programmed
 Reporting to the ONS and other national institutions relevant to EP&R.
 Participation in the preparation of risk maps and vulnerability profiles, developing and
implementing contingency plans, supplying essential inputs, proposing and supporting
livelihood diversification, disseminating early warning messages, preparing immediate
needs assessments and providing relief.
Community  In the absence of well-functioning markets, local governments and safety nets, Community
Level organizations and institutions provide essential goods and services to poor and vulnerable
groups.
 Supporting livelihood development, enhancing prevention and mitigation, providing rapid
assistance during emergencies, and stimulating livelihood recovery after a disaster.
 Contribute to the design and implementation of comprehensive local EP&R plans within the
framework of national EP&R programs, e.g. Participating in local hazard risk diagnoses and
vulnerability assessments, awareness raising of risks and practical and affordable
preparedness, response and coping measures.
 Other activities may include; maintaining public infrastructure, preparing evacuation plans,
setting up rescue and volunteering committees, providing shelter, food, water, and other
vital assistance during emergencies, and helping to restore livelihoods after a disaster.
Source: Volume 1: Sierra Leone National Disaster Management Plan, 2015, WHO EP&R framework.
74
Provisions for Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are in existence under the National Disaster Management Plan,
2006. Each ESF is activated during emergency operations by the ONS-DMD. (See table in appendix 1.1 Emergency
Support Functions). In addition, the framework provides for 10 emergency response pillars with specific in-incident
functions supported by respective government and UN agencies (See appendix 1.2. for list of pillar institutions) that
supplement ONS DPR Capacity and the DPR mission. These pillars include, Coordination, Logistics, Social Protection and
Psychosocial Support, Health and Burials, Security and Safety, Social Mobilization and Communication, Food and
Nutrition, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, Victim Registration and shelter. Shelter as illustrated in the table below;
However, there were seemingly duplications of roles between some stakeholders, which requires streamlining. There
was seemingly no pillar or cluster involvement in public information use, which is essential for emergency
communications. The pillar or cluster approach enhanced coordination amongst partners, as well as facilitating
information sharing, surveillance and the mapping of gaps of underserved areas during the emergency relief
operations.
Table 20: Key Stakeholder Support and Emergency Operations Functions.

EP&R Pillar. National Institution. Other Role and Responsibility in Emergency Preparedness and
Stakeholders and Response.
Specialized UN
Agencies
During
Planning and  Office of National   Overall Coordination of Emergency
Coordinatio Security (Co-led Preparedness and Response Procedures.
n. by the Ministry of
 Coordinate and dissemination of information
Foreign Affairs
and International
Cooperation)
 Office of National
Security
 Various District
Local Councils
Early  Sierra Leone   Forecasting and Surveillance of potent disasters
Warning Meteorological and impending catastrophes.
Agency
 MAF, Mows’ etc.
 National Water   Monitoring of surface flow water.
Resources
Agency.
Logistics  Republic of Sierra   Coordination of logistical and resource support
Leone Armed during the response and early recovery phases
Forces (Co-led by to include emergency relief supplies, space,
the Ministry of office equipment, office supplies, and
Finance and telecommunications, contracting services,
Economic transportation services and personnel required
Planning supporting response phase activities.
 ONS  WFP &  Provides overall coordination of transportation
Other UN assistance to ONS, other governmental and
Agencies private agencies, and voluntary organizations
requiring transportation capacity to perform
disaster missions.
Emergency  ONS  Other UN  Timely provision and Release of Contingency
Finance  MOFED Agencies funds during a disaster.
Emergency  Ministry of  Media  Provision of assurance on the provisions of
Communicat Information and  Telecommu required communications support to
ions Communication. nications operations.
Networks
75
Specialized UN
Agencies
During
 Office of National   Social Mobilization and Communication
Security Co-led  Provision of assurance on the provisions of
by the Ministry of required communications support to
Information and operations.
Communications
Public Works  Ministry of   Monitoring building standards, Inspection and
and Works and Public Demolition Structures deemed hazardous to
Engineering Assets. public health;
 Technical assistance and damage assessment
including structural inspection.
 Debris clearance and removal, and restoration of
public facilities.
 Ministry of   Conduct damage assessment, emergency debris
Works and Public clearance, temporary construction of
Assets. emergency access routes, emergency
restoration of critical facilities including potable
water, water supply systems, and water for
firefighting;
Firefighting  National Fire   Fire Fighting and Provision of Humanitarian
Force. Assistance.
 To detect and suppress wild-land, rural and
urban fires resulting from or occurring
coincidentally with a disaster. All fire personnel
will report to this ESF.
Information  Ministry of  Media  To collect process and disseminate information
and Planning Information and  Mobile about a potential or actual disaster to facilitate
Communication. Telecommu response and planning processes; forward
 nication situation reports to State Emergency Operations
companies Centre and coordinate information for press
release.
Mass Care  ONS   Coordinate bulk distribution of emergency relief
supplies to disaster victims.
 National   Coordinated efforts to provide sheltering.
Commission for
Social Action
 Ministry of   Emergency first aid in the event of a potential or
Health actual disaster;
 Hospitals
 MAF  World Food  Feeding in the event of a potential or actual
disaster
 Ministry of Social   Disaster Welfare Inquiry system regarding status
Welfare of victims;
Resource  ONS.  NGOs  Coordination of logistical and resource support
Managemen  RSLAF  World during the response and early recovery phases
t  Sierra Leone Red Vision, to include emergency relief supplies, space,
cross Caritas, office equipment, office supplies, and
 World Food telecommunications, contracting services,
Programme transportation services and personnel required
 Save the supporting response phase activities.
Children  Provides overall coordination of transportation
and assistance to the NDMA departments, other
76
Specialized UN
Agencies
During
 Food and governmental and private agencies, and
Agriculture voluntary organizations requiring transportation
Organisatio capacity to perform disaster missions. A primary
n priority of this Function will be the coordination
of evacuation transportation.
Health and  Ministry of  World  To provide a coordinated response to medical
medical Health and Health needs following a disaster; provide a structure to
Services Sanitation. Organizatio receive assistance from Disaster Medical
 District Disaster n Assistance Teams (DMATs) and Volunteer
Medical medical personnel. Provision of technical
Assistance support in medical services. Lead the WASH
Teams programme
Search and  Republic of Sierra   To undertake search and rescue activities
Rescue Leone Armed including developing search patterns and
Forces procedures to locate disaster victims in
 Sierra Leone Red damaged urban areas; and locating, extricating
cross. and providing for the immediate medical
treatment of victims trapped in collapsed
structures.
 To support emergency debris clearance,
temporary construction of emergency access
routes, emergency restoration of critical
facilities including potable water, water supply
systems, and water for firefighting; emergency
demolition or stabilization
Hazardous  Ministry of   To respond to an actual or potential discharge
Materials Environment and and/or release of hazardous materials.
the EPA
Food and  Ministry of  World Food  To identify, secure and arrange for the
Nutrition Agriculture, Programme transportation of food and water assistance to
Forestry and the impacted areas to include obtaining disaster
Food Security food stamp assistance.
 Feeding in the event of a potential or actual
disaster
Environment  Environmental  Sierra 
Protection Leone
Agency Conservati
on Society
Water and  Ministry of  UNICEF  To ensure water safety and sanitation during an
Sanitation Water and emergency.
sanitation
 Guma Valley
Water Company.
 Sierra Leone
Standards
Bureau
Energy  Ministry of   To facilitate restoration of energy systems
Energy. following a disaster; coordinate the provisions of
 National Power emergency power and fuel to support response
Authority operations as well as provide power and fuel to
normalize community function.
77
Specialized UN
Agencies
During
 Coordinate the provisions of emergency power
and fuel to support response operations as well
as provide power and fuel to normalize
community function.
Military  Republic of Sierra   To coordinate the use of military assets in
Support Leone Armed supporting all other ESFs.
Forces
Victim  Ministry of Social  UNFPA  Victim Registration
Registration Welfare, Gender
and Child
Protection
Shelter  Ministry of   Coordination and Arrangement for temporary
Lands, country shelter for victims during a disaster.
Planning and
Environment.
Volunteers  Sierra Leone Red  Volunteer  To expedite the delivery of donated goods and
and cross. Corps voluntary service to support relief efforts; will
Donations  coordinate the operation of the Regional Relief
Centre.
 This ESF work closely with Mass care, food, and
water supplies.
Law  Sierra Leone   To provide command, control and coordination
Enforcemen Police (SLP) of all State and local law enforcement
t and operations.
Security  Provision of security during emergencies
 Sierra Leone   Ensures Security of government and victims
Police (SLP) during a disaster.
Animal  Ministry of   To provide direction and coordination of animal
Services- Agriculture, issues before, during and after an actual or
Animal Forestry and potential disaster situation to facilitate overall
Control Food Security animal related activities.
(MAF)
Gender and  Ministry of  UNICEF  Prevention and Management of gender based
Social Gender and Violence During a Disaster (GBV)
Welfare Labour  Victim Registration
Development.
Social  Ministry of Social  UNICEF  Provision of psycho social support to victims
Protection Welfare, Gender
and and Child
Psychosocial Protection
Support
Relief and  NACSA   Supervise shelter pillars (there are 10 pillars)
Rehabilitatio  Provide technical input on infrastructure during
n. recovery period on flood emergency
Urban  District Local   Hosting of DDMC,
Planning Council Bodies  Emergency awareness raising
e.g. Free Town  Liaison with local authorities Resource
City Council. mobilisation
 Provision of leadership for DDMC
 Monitoring and supervision of emergency
response activities
78
Specialized UN
Agencies
During
 Formulate and enforce bye laws
Advocacy  ONS  Politicians  Galvanize support for victims at all levels

 EPA
 CSO (Civil  Monitor the emergency process and sensitize on
Society disaster issues at community level
Organisatio  Providing awareness raising campaigns
ns)
 INGOs and  Provision of food and non-food items to victims
NGOs  Provide logistical support to DDMC
 They contribute to recovery activities
3.5.2. Incident Organization Structure.

There exist substantial human resources capacity for EP & R support. These include, disaster management volunteers,
RSLAF, Sierra Leone Police, National Fire Force, Sierra Leone Red Cross Society, NGOS, MoHs, and Institute of Engineers.
These established functional procedures to implement the Emergency concept and develop one comprehensive all-
hazards emergency response institutional framework and response mechanism.
Table 21: Establishment Support Function needs of the Emergency Operations Function.
Structure Responsibility centre. Existing Human Resources Gap/ Needs
Establishment
Needs.
Emergency  ONS  Stakeholder Communication and liaison were seemingly a single
communications journeyman role undertaken by the director of DMD, amidst
and Information managing other critical and multiple tasks.
Dissemination  Lack of a communications and public relations unit in the ONS.
Such a situation lowers the credibility and timeliness of the
communications.
Resource  ONS.  Shortage of Logistics management staff.
Management
EWS  Sierra Leone  Lack of weather Data modelling capacity

meteorological  Lack of skilled work force and training to repair existing weather
centre monitoring equipment machines and equipment. Heavy
reliance on external consultants which is not sustainable
 automatic weather stations, e.g. censor repairs
MoH  Ministry of Health  Shortage of Trained Laboratory Technicians
Health and  Ministry of Health.  There are no case management and trauma experts.
medical Services  Entomology and epidemiology.
 Lab scientists or technicians at district level. These are absent
due to lack of qualified personnel in these areas at this level.
WASH, Food and  Ministry of  Inadequate staff capacity and skills in i.e. Waste Management,
Water Agriculture, WASH, Food safety, Occupational safety experts.
Forestry and Food  Need for waste engineers
Security (MAF)  Need for water quality Engineers.
  Although, intensive training has been undertaken for
implementing agencies, training and monitoring needs to be an
on-going process and will require long term human resource
support for both the ministry of gender and the ONS.
79
The response situation and surge capacity was instant, all-inclusive and ‘’all encompassing’’ of government
institutions, NGOs and health facilities in Sierra Leone, although with some capacity challenges to support all
emergency operations functions.
Search and Rescue Capacity. The National Fire Force had fire engineers on response mission to address the fire
incidents in the country. However, the force is ill equipped with only 19 working fire engineers and limited utility
vehicles. The National Fire Force has a standby team of men in working order ready respond to the fires. The
firefighters are on 24-hour standby and shifted after 8 hours in the day. In addition, an emergency line is available.
The firefighters had trained on how to respond and make the equipment ready to combat the fires. The officers have
undergone in-service trainings in the country and overseas. However, the National Fire Forces should be prioritised
for training interventions focussing on firefighting, search and rescue, fire investigation, fire prevention activities and
management training, in order for them to better support the response activities of staff from the National Disaster
Management Agency.
Medical Health Care Surge Capacity. Medical Health care surge systems were active within the first 24hours during
the landslide occurrence providing health, triage and psychological support. However, surrounding health care
systems were overwhelmed with a surge of patients seeking care during the disaster, and no plan to deal with this is
essential. Notwithstanding, all medical health facilities referred for mudslide victims in Freetown were short of triage
handling capacity to meet the patient surge with hardly any triage experts in the country. Expanding medical surge
capacity throughout Sierra Leone could have benefited from international partnerships to bring in qualified and
expert triage capacity to reduce health response time. This includes identifying untapped resources in the
community, enhancing training, creating deployment plans and procedures for a tiered-care model and building
upon proven approaches for improving availability of specialty care.
3.5.3. Training and Knowledge Building.

Collaborative arrangements between the ONS and other partners particularly the Red Cross yielded results in training
of key stakeholders in the EP&R pillar roles e.g. the Police, ONS staff, security sector and council chairpersons e.g.
training on National Disaster Law.
Training of DDMCs and volunteers on emergency preparedness and response at community levels. At the district
level, the DDMCs as part of the first response teams were trained in disaster EP&R activities and mitigation. However,
discussions with some of the beneficiaries expressed the need for refresher training in response functions including,
early warnings dissemination and utilization; search and rescue; first aid; trauma management; reproductive health,
shelter restoration and livelihood resuscitation, among others. There is need for training of trainers (TOT)
programmes within the DDMC teams to sustain learning at the community level.
Lack of central database to monitor or coordinate training for EP&R staff and volunteers. There is need for a central
database of EP&R training institutions to capture which entities (INGOS, NGOs, and government departments)
provide training in which EP&R related skill to assist improve coordination and monitoring of skills and capacity
development for EP&R in Sierra Leone. This activities such as waste management, WASH, food safety, occupational
safety, water quality management, entomology and epidemiology, meteorology, contingency planning, evacuation
drills, GIS data collection at the National and regional levels.
Community training, knowledge building and engagement. Government and other agencies should work together to
encourage the general public to participate in the disaster management program through series of training program
promotions. Training should also be given to workers in the focused area where the disaster e.g. floods usually occurs
during rainy season. This initiative will also enhance the knowledge and make the workers aware and know how to
prevent and what to be done in the real situations. Other than that, training is also able to enhance emergency
communication and at the same time building effective disaster preparedness and response. Exchanging information
at all levels of the society through symposiums, workshops, seminars and training can increase the intensity of
awareness and participation of the communities in the prevention and preparedness programme. Information
sharing can retain the skills learned and improve readiness during disasters.
At the national level, information on DPR was incorporated into national Primary school education curricula. Whilst
endeavours to facilitate DPR integration into the Secondary school curricula are underway by the UNDP. This has
assisted inculcation of DPR knowledge and skills amongst the youth. However, there seems to be very little progress
80
made to integrate DPR into the Tertiary curricula which requires concerted efforts by the ONS in collaboration with
the national council for higher education to ensure its integration, as well support for the production of DPR IEC
Materials.
There is a lack of dedicated training institutions rendering DRM or EP&R certified or accredited training programmes
across the country. Higher Learning institutions in Sierra Leone do not have curriculums or modules that speak to
the training needs of the proposed Agency, specialized trainings in DRM and DPR are largely delivered by
international institutions which is not cost efficient. While some of the institutions are under resourced in terms of
skilled trainers, Initiatives to harmonize and streamline the disaster management related trainings, modules, and the
national disaster management-training curriculum remain underserved partly due to lack of a critical mass of highly
specialized and skilled DRM and DRR experts and trainers countrywide.
Strengthening human resource capacity for EP & R requires a strong central framework of education, training and
research. Achieving the holistic goal for EP&R requires a strong institutional setup for EP&R training and public
education framework with competent professionals, educators, trainers in disaster management. Development of
these capacities in DRM agencies for all related government departments, EP & R stakeholders and the private sector
is crucial. This also heightens the need to prioritize the establishment of a dedicated National Disaster Training
institute to support the development and supply of a critical mass of skilled and qualified DRM and EP&R trainers
and workforce. These may vary across hazards and vulnerability, prevention and mitigation, preparedness, early
warning, relief and recovery in a systematic manner.
Training Needs for DPR Institutions.

The ONS, directorate for Disaster Management, is understaffed at the National and district level. The national office
staff is complimented by only 7 staff, based in selected District offices throughout Sierra Leon. The regional staff
component is nearly inexistent with few regional or district coordinators. The inadequacy of key staffing resources
hampers emergency preparedness and response interventions. This becomes especially acute when multiple regions
are affected by disaster events at the same time. In such cases, staff are spread too thinly across the country and
temporary. This hampers the ability of existing staff to render quick and efficient response to affected communities
across the country.
Skills and capacity development interventions are currently hampered by a lack of funding and a lack of relevant
curriculum by training institutions (i.e. Universities) that would address some of the technical skills gaps through joint
ventures to address some of the capacity gaps established between ONS and some of the INGOs active in the country
on issues such as; first aid, disaster response, risk mapping and disaster risk reductions. Local NGOs have also
expressed a willingness to avail their expertise to build capacity of staff, volunteers and affected communities in
order to promote improved EP&R.
Inadequate skills and expertise in Emergency preparedness and response planning. Results of the staff survey within
the DMD staff skills and training needs survey identified gaps and training needs in emergency preparedness planning
related skill areas majority of which were rated under 50% on average. Most importantly, respondents indicated the
lowest average scores in designing relief-planning systems (33%), emergency response management planning (42%),
and emergency preparedness planning (48%). Key implementing partners need training to enhance skills in the
development of contingency plans.
In addition, the ONS is short of skilled human resources to conduct holistic emergency needs assessments. As
illustrated in the figure below, findings of the skills assessment show that nearly 100% of the respondents at ONS
rated themselves to have less than 50% expertise in undertaking critical tasks related to hazard profiling, vulnerability
and Risk assessments, mainly due to lack of training and hands on experience.
81
Figure 12: ONS-DMD Staff Self-Assessment Ratings in Undertaking Disaster Risk Assessments
Undertaking Residual risk and emergency risk analysts 35
Undertaking Risk Communication and Spatial planning 37
Conducting Mitigation Analysis and risk auditing 45
Developing Safety Design, implementation and monitoring

33
frameworks
Familiarity with international DRM and DRR standards and
37
International Protocols?
Familiarity with existing DRR and DM policies, legislation,
47
and ability to implement?
Undertaking Climate‐change Adaptation and Resilience
43
Planning
Conducting Preparedness planning exercises and
47
mainstreaming at the national, regional, district and…
Conducting Multi-Hazard Risk Analysis and Vulnerability
40
Assessments
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
The departmental skills gaps assessment also found that nearly 50% of the staff respondents within the ONS were
familiar with some relevant EP&R SOPS, policies and legislations as further illustrated. Familiarization and training of
existing staff, especially those in lower cadre positions in the relevant SOPS is critical in ensuring awareness, accuracy
and applicability. In addition, staff identified the need for training in the application of GIS monitoring tools e.g. Arc
GIS to strengthen internal capacity to map and interpret GIS related information.
Table 22: ONS-DMD Self Rating in Application of EP&R Plans and SOPS
Knowledge, Skill and Ability area Average %
 Conducting Multi-Hazard Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessments 40.0%

 Conducting Preparedness planning exercises and mainstreaming at all levels. 46.7%
 Familiarity with existing DRR and DM policies, legislation, and ability to implement? 46.7%
 Familiarity with international DRM and DRR standards and International Protocols? 36.7%
 Developing Safety Design, implementation and monitoring frameworks 33.3%
 Conducting Mitigation Analysis and risk auditing 45.0%
 Undertaking Risk Communication and Spatial planning 36.7%
 Undertaking Residual risk and emergency risk analysts 35.0%
 Emergency preparedness planning 48.3%
 Emergency response management planning 41.7%
 Emergency responders (search, rescue, first aid, critical care) 30.0%
 Relief (shelter, water, sanitation, waste, food, rehab) management 33.3%
 Impact (Damage & Loss), , needs assessment 40.0%
 Recovery (livelihood, environment, sustainability) planning 41.7%
 Knowledge support system to support DPR planning and implementation 36.7%
According to the skill needs assessment self-rating scores; designing relief planning systems (33%), integrating DRR
into sustainable development (35%), emergency response management planning (42%), and emergency
preparedness planning (48%). Key implementing partners need training to enhance skills in the development of
contingency plans. Nearly all staff (100%) further emphasized the need for training in the utilization of GIS tools,
warehouse logistics and stores management for disaster response and disaster laws of Sierra Leone, Conducting
Damage and loss assessments, and implementing among other needs. These findings are further illustrated in the
figure below;
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Figure 13: Individual Training Needs requirements.
Simulation Exercises
Climate change and Adaptation
Early Warning Systems for DRM
Disaster Communications and Public Relations
Data management and analsyis
Warehouse, Logistics and Stores management
Disaster Resilience and Recovery for Sierra Leone
Disaster Laws for Sierra Leone
Oil Spill Management
ICT in disaster Risk management (GIS training)
Damage and Loss Assesment
Basic ICT Training
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
There is inadequate staff capacity and skills in i.e. Waste Management, WASH, Food safety, Occupational safety,
Water Quality Management, Entomology and epidemiology, meteorology, disaster risk management, risk
communication, early warning and disaster data collection, analysis and communication. In addition, cross-cutting
skills pertaining to gender sensitive disaster response and impact assessment techniques were also seen a crucial to
enhance ONS efficiency during EP&R. Yet, disaster preparedness and response institutions lack proper training
opportunities in DPR related skills due to lack of funding to facilitate staff participation in training interventions.
The existing warehousing infrastructure is the lack of training of staff that work at these facilities. Staff need to be
trained on how to monitor and maintain a registry system of all relief supply in and out flows in the facilities. This will
enhance rapid disbursement of needed relief supplies during emergency events and help to track which supplies
need to be restocked during the disaster preparedness phase.
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4. Recommendation Lessons Learned, Conclusion.

This section discusses the recommendations, lessons learned and conclusions.
Recommendations.
4.1.1. Legal and Institutional Arrangements for DPR.
The government with support from donors should support for the promulgation and subsequent enactment of the
NDMA bill as well as the disbandment of the Disaster Management function from the ONS should be prioritized to
eliminate bureaucratic approval processes and redundancies, additional funding and ensure expedient emergency
action.
Develop and Strengthen existing Legal and institutional Arrangements for DPR in Sierra Leone. The government
should develop Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management Act or regulation to establish comprehensive
legal provisions to facilitate; among other critical disaster laws; facilitation of effective early warning and early
action laws; principles and protections for gender and vulnerable groups, frameworks for the resettlement, social
protection and recovery of disaster victims, require DPR related institutions to ensure contingency planning;
promotion of disaster resilient infrastructure, housing and property rights; Environmental laws including climate
change laws; provisions for quality, accountability and standardization of EP&R missions (SOPS) and coordination
mechanisms for non-cash-relief item and local emergency logistics and supply chains.
In addition, the law should be reviewed to explore alternative disaster risk financing strategies and platforms to
enable funding streams to be accessed in an efficient and timely manner, with adequate safeguards to ensure
transparency and accountability. More so, the law should be reviewed to stipulate more explicit provisions for;
National and local budget allocations for disaster risk financing; cash transfer systems and fund administration at
different levels of government; Special funds or reserves for disaster situations or contingencies; institutional
arrangements, roles and responsibilities for the monitoring and management of disaster risk finances; risk based
disaster risk financing initiatives through public private arrangements such as disaster risk insurance and re-
insurance or risk mitigation incentive schemes; resource mobilization and accountability for local and international
monetary DPR transfers; and the establishment or utilization of strong financial response tools, forecast based
triggers and accountability.
Review, Update and Strengthen DPR Policies in line with international, continental and regional frameworks while
improving coordination mechanisms for the different levels of disasters; Sierra Leone needs to adopt and
domesticate International standards and best practice frameworks for DRM e.g. the Sendai Framework (2015): and
the Paris agreement to have “safer, adaptive and disaster resilient communities toward sustainable development”
should be internalized in all aspects of national and local governance. Government should also establish policy
guidelines at the macro level to inform and guide the preparation and implementation of disaster management
and development plans across sectors and facilitate the development of EP&R Bylaws. In addition, the policy should
provide for (among other gaps), expedient access to health care by the MoH and ONS during emergencies,
promotion of disaster Risk Insurance initiatives especially at the community level e.g. establishment of SACCO’s,
enforce disaster-resilient infrastructure through proper investment in research. In addition, the government needs
to support the development and mainstreaming of DPR into sectoral legislations, policies and plans to facilitated
structured responses in EP&R.
4.1.2. Information systems for Disaster Preparedness and Response.

Community Engagement systems. Facilitate training and, sensitization, formalization or institutionalization of
chiefdom disaster management committees and community volunteers as the formal coordinative structures in
first response. The disaster management system needs to duplicate the successes Adoption of the ‘’One health
Surveillance and Reporting System’ ’of this system through to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of existing
community surveillance systems to encourage continuous monitoring and reporting with or without disaster
through the Emergency Operations Centre system.
EP&R Education and Training Capacity. Reinforce risk awareness, attitude and high action stimulating strategies to
improve actions and adoption of affordable and resilient solutions. Government should also strengthen existing
coordination mechanisms for all partners CSOs, media and NGO in community education and training is critical to
reduce resource duplication, establish synergies and eliminate traces of wastage. Likewise, support the
development and dissemination of EP&R public education and training materials e.g. Manuals, tool kits, guiding
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and training instruments for communities to be harmonized and targeted for at all levels of programme
implementation to assure quality and standardization, Scale up the provision of intensive community awareness
campaigns, School education and training programmes on natural and human-induced disasters through the
provision of financial, training and provision of skilled resources and equipment.to support drills. Community
awareness programmes should however be scaled up and augmented with some alternative social economic
development programmes as a more sustainable solution to yield better-prepared communities than single
dimension public education programmes:
Strengthen the capacity of the Sierra Leone Meteorological agency capacity, systems and infrastructure. Facilitate
the maintenance and refurbishment or expansion of the existing meteorological network to ensure countrywide
effectiveness and robustness of the early warning systems. In addition, government should develop individual and
institutional capacity to provide additional meteorological forecast products and utilization of global
meteorological product platforms e.g. the WMO. Improve institutional broadband connectivity; develop quality
management frameworks for weather date monitoring and forecasting; Support institutional compliance towards
GTS, WMO and ISO certification or standardization. Strengthen existing EWS information dissemination
mechanisms, communication and coordination mechanisms between DPR institutions and the Met to ensure
coordination in the messaging for and release of early warning to communities; establish proper agreements and
MoUs between the Met agency and mass broadcasters; or support the establishment of PPPs with ‘’ALL MEDIA
HOUSES’’ in the dissemination of disaster risk related information; and support the Meteoroglocal agency to train
communities in the utilization of Meteorological forecasts.
Strengthen the capacity of the Hydrological Monitoring systems and Institutional Capacity; e.g. conduct Surface
water gauging to improve periodical monitoring activities; build institutional capacity to provide impact based early
warning information targeting specific sectors; Strengthen existing coordination and collaboration mechanisms
between the natural s water resources agency and other Stakeholders; and strengthen existing capacity in
monitoring flash flood risks, capacity of processing, flood monitoring and prediction techniques e.g. drainage
system, and support the development of a comprehensive plan to capture and store floodwater, as the existing
drainage system is insufficient. For efficiency, the water monitoring systems require connectivity to solar power
sources to ensure consistency in monitoring can occur and that the alarm systems are triggered to alert the
community during high tide.
Strengthen community Monitoring and Surveillance Systems. Establish and strengthen regional DPR coordination
arrangements between Sierra Leone and the Manu river union. This will require increased advocacy for enhanced
trans-boundary security enforcement and regional preparedness., In addition, improve and scale up trans-
boundary surveillance and Monitoring, systems, strengthen community involvement and awareness to enhance
their skills and capacity to identify biohazards and other disaster risks; Duplicate the successes of the ‘’one health
platform’’ to strengthen existing surveillance, monitoring and reporting system to ensure efficiency and
effectiveness of existing community surveillance systems. Under the CDC/WHO/MoH established joint monitoring
and reporting frameworks and engagements involving DDMCs, CHWs and VHMTs, farmer extension workers,
community leaders, traditional healers etc.
Strengthen coordination capacity between the ONS and other DPR agencies. Support consistency of the ONS
oversight support function to all ESF and DPR partners, to enhance their functional and operational capacity;
improve regional coordination and cooperative arrangements with the establishment of binding agreements and
common understandings between Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries to reduce cross boarder or trans-
migratory disaster risks. Support the establishment of a fully functional Emergency operations centre, and clear EP
& R frameworks and coordination mechanisms for INGOs. furthermore, there will be need to establish clarity in
the role of specific INGOs in the existing disaster coordination mechanisms and taking stock of their EP&R capacity
for purposes of strengthening the existing coordination mechanisms and avoiding duplication of resources.
Strengthen the functionality and capacity of existing committees and DRM frameworks through additional funding
to ensure their continued functionality and operationalization. Establishment of pseudo all-inclusive and well-
facilitated technical working committees as an alternate platforms for EP&R coordination can potentially reduce
the irregularity of coordination platforms between key actors and stakeholders and facilitate discussions on EP&R
issues and encourage joint planning, monitoring and information sharing between key actors.
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The government should develop the National Disaster Management Information Communication System (NDMICS)
and response mechanisms, taking action in anticipation of events, integration of disaster risk reduction in response
preparedness and ensuring that capacities are in place for effective response and recovery at all levels. In addition,
the government should have in place a fully capacitated EP&R monitoring capacity to ensure data consistency
during future incidences; strengthen institutional capacity to adopt DRM Technology and Communication Systems
Standards, Guidelines and Procedures.
Establishment of this system will however require additional investment in proper electronic monitoring and
reporting tools for easy and expedient monitoring and reporting during disasters. These tools should be availed at
the National, district and Community level to all DDMCs and Community volunteers. These tools should further be
supported to facilitate deeper integration of DPR information systems of a number of EP&R stakeholders and
provide well-analysed disaggregated information to various end-user categories to strengthen exiting information
needs and analysis of preparedness and response operations.
Enhance information dissemination mechanisms, alert and rapid response systems. This will most especially require
the establishment of dedicated dynamic websites for DPR related institutions. These institutions must have,
however the requisite human capacity to ensure regular updates with real-time information. The government
should also prioritize training of media reporters as strategic stakeholders in disaster communication to effectively
convey information on emergencies, establish appropriate publicity management plans for disaster management
to impart timely and correct information to the public. There will be need to establish dedicated media
communication channels at the national and district level to provide real time information; and develop a
functional and integrated ‘’ALL’’ stakeholder encompassing National Disaster management Information and
Communication System .
Support the integration of existing information systems of a number of EP&R stakeholders. This will provide well-
analysed disaggregated information to various end-user categories; establish proper databases and backup
systems to store critical information gathered by some agencies or stakeholders: proper equipment and
infrastructure to support data and information needs of some critical agencies. For instance, The National Fire
Force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs is mandated to provide firefighting and humanitarian assistance to
airport and municipal fire teams. However, the agency does not have VHS related infrastructure to facilitate
communication and information sharing in the country and strengthen dissemination mechanisms; activate and
support the maintenance of existing DPR websites e.g. the HARPIS; and strengthen EWS information dissemination
to the public and other affected communities.
Facilitate the development of a robust targeting, identification, victim validation systems and an agreed central
database repository for all agencies and support the development and establishment of a dedicated and centralized
victim registry and identification system, post Disaster Tracking, Monitoring and Follow up Systems, victim tracking
systems and protocols to allow data integrity and ultimately reduce the response turnaround time to under 72
hours; Establish proper victim registry guidelines, and Strengthen hospital preparedness capacity to integrate and
report victim data. Furthermore, government should support integrity building missions for community leaders in
high-risk disaster-prone areas to enhance their awareness and conscience towards ‘’saving lives, rather than
making money’’ during humanitarian response operations.
Strengthen EP&R Monitoring, Information and Communication systems. Government needs to establish a clear
monitoring system and indicators based on previous plans based on quality indicators; strengthen existing human
resource capacity to undertake monitoring activities during the disaster limited the role of the ONS in both
instances.in addition, the ONS should have in place a fully capacitated EP&R monitoring capacity to ensure data
consistency during future incidences and the development of standard EP&R data gathering tools and training of
all users and stakeholders to ensure successful utilization and roll out of the Electronic Monitoring and Reporting
system.
Support updates of Hazard and Vulnerability maps or assessments and the establishment of a clear EP&R research
frameworks to support the harmonization of research findings between various stakeholders. In addition,
government should Align existing institutional arrangements for geomatics to centralized data collection, analysis
and integration of GIS information; strengthen ONS capacity in GIS, IM and telecom expertise, support of regular
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information updates, systematic data sharing and data sharing protocols; acquire appropriate data collection tools
e.g. and standardized protocols for obtaining real-time information updates.
In addition, the government should Investment in GIS structures in districts focussing on all four components of a
GIS (Human, Financial, systems and equipment) as opposed to only concentrating around hardware acquisition.
Local governments must allocate resources to hire and support continuous training of GIS professionals.
Furthermore, there is need to establish a system through which national institutions can collaborate with counties
for data standardization and sharing, as well as knowledge transfer e.g. with the WMO. Capacity building is the key
to successful adoption of GIS in the districts. GIS Guidelines and a GIS centre at CoG are needed as well as provision
of generic GIS lab structure guideline is urgent • Pervasive partnerships are key to success
Develop a functional and integrated ‘’ALL’’ stakeholder encompassing National Disaster Management Information
and Communication System is important. Establishment of the system should enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of Sierra Leones Emergency preparedness and response mechanisms, support efficient vulnerability
assessments, identify lifelines and critical failures, and facilitate access to human and material resources and
demographic targeting capacity.
4.1.3. EP&R Physical Infrastructure and Facility Needs.
Develop and/or establish dedicated administrative infrastructure for the proposed National Disaster Management
Agency at all levels of DRM administration. The government should acquire, expand or establish dedicated office
infrastructure at the national, regional, district level and Community level will to enhance institutional functional
capacity, efficiency and effectiveness in coordinating the functions of the agency (See Volume 2 of this assessment
for detailed infrastructure and equipment needs).
In addition, government should establish decentralized zonal offices to allow rapid response to disaster situations,
as they are extensions of the national agency. In addition, the government should strengthen existing inter-
disciplinary actions among DPR stakeholders and Multi-Hazard Physical Infrastructure Needs for key stakeholders
in the emergency response process. Specialized facilities for the administrative functioning of the National and
District Disaster Management Agencies with adequate office space to accommodate the various different
functional activities of emergency operations and management. Including the convergence of members of the
media during an emergency. The government should also establish and facilitate operational requirements and
physical space survey.
Establish dedicated physical EoC infrastructure at the regional, district and chiefdom levels to converge various role-
players involved in emergency response, coordination, effective communication and duplication of activities
amongst various participants. These facilities should have inbuilt GIS monitoring platforms, and capable of serving
as the central coordination point for: all emergency operations, information gathering and dissemination,
coordination with local governments, outside contractors, mutual aid and volunteer organizations during and after
an incident. Coordination of Command Operations, Planning, collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information
and for coordinating development of Incident Action Plans, Logistics, Emergency Finance and Administration. While
the EoC should be designed to provide habitable space during an emergency, full shelter protection and long-term
survival provisions need to be provided from a designated shelter location for staff in the incident command line.
However, the government should conduct a thorough and complete EOC operational requirements and physical
space survey, as the basis for which decisions will be made on the design location, relocation, building selection or
construction site of the EOC. The requirements survey should identify all activities that will be performed by the
individual staff of the EOC, and the resources necessary for execution of those activities. Considerations should be
given to circulation and construction layout requirements, expansion requirements, flexible use of space and space
needs for ongoing operations. Also important is the need to develop and approve proper national standards and
guidelines for the for space requirements of the EOC. Furniture and Equipment. Should as they contribute directly
to the EOC’s ability to function, need to be put into consideration during the design of the facilities.
Develop and expand existing warehousing and storage facilities for non-food emergency response supplies (ex.
mattresses, dignity kits, water) to support relief aid in the shortest response time possible *Under 48 hours) at the
regional and national levels.
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The government should develop and/or Strengthen Hazard Specific Preparedness Infrastructure capacity.
 Support the identification, refurbishment or development of clearly marked evacuation shelters, routes or
plans for high risk disaster prone communities and dedicate or demarcate evacuation sites for the provision
of temporary gender distinct shelter spaces during the emergencies putting into consideration the need to
stock short term emergency supplies, equipment and facilities e.g. mattresses, and mosquito nets. The
government should also provide additional funding to identify and capacitate some facilities within affected
communities ahead of the floods to reduce flood-induced shocks. The evacuation plans should also be
integrated into the district development plans to ensure risk responsiveness and ultimately, fast response
action. Bigger investments in the construction, expansion and proper maintenance of new and existing
water infrastructure in flood prone cities in Sierra Leone is also encouraged to reduce flood risks and
resilience capacity.
 Expand existing water infrastructure across all districts to support steady supply of clean water during flood
shocks. In the short and medium-term, scale up efforts in support of communities in high risk areas to have
utilize alternative methods to access clean water in some districts e.g. Provision of water tank reservoirs in
high flood risk areas and the adoption of Rain Water Harvesting and Solar powered Bore Hall Systems
especially during the wet season to scale up access to clean safe water.
 In addition, government should develop strategies to enhance existing Water Quality surveillance and
laboratory Capacity, support regular supply of water reagents and the recruitment of skilled water quality
engineers in the ministry and at the district level. In addition government should support the development
of a clear water safety plan, and facilitate the implementation of water quality management programs at
the community level during floods; support the establishment of a water and sanitation database for WASH
facilities especially in urban areas; a centralized and fully equipped environmental health laboratory,
Facilitation of PPPs for the management of municipal solid waste and health bio hazards, Structured
sanitary land fields with the capacity to carry the existing solid waste deposits and construction of
incinerators at the national and district level to reduce biohazard risks, Improvement of existing water and
solid waste treatment plants with the capacity to disaggregate liquids, sludge and solid waste.
 Government needs to support the provision of permanent and safe sanitation facilities, particularly
improve the ration of toilets and water taps per household to reduce the level of risk and vulnerability to
disease shocks. A comprehensive Sanitation mapping exercise around the country and the design of
scalable sanitation solutions especially for high-risk communities is required.
 Improve Health and Safety Surveillance and Laboratory Capacity through establishment and strengthening
of the capacity of existing Health Laboratory surveillance systems. Establish a regional hub system
infrastructure and staffing to ensure quick monitoring and surveillance; and strengthen disease
surveillance system in bacteriology; support the recruitment of qualified laboratory technicians
countrywide and hospital staffing provisions (1 staff per facility and others 2 per facility). Reinforce
simulation exercises for the laboratory technicians in public health laboratories capacity to test for
diseases. Support Laboratory Quality management systems (LQMS) labs at the district and regional level;
Establish of more district-based labs (at least one in each district) by either construction, weight lifting or
refurbishment especially in hard to reach areas; Supported the recruitment of quality staff and training in
LQMS to improve the existing Lab referral systems and reduced risk of in-Lab sourced infections; Support
the implementation of LQMS system and SLAMTA accreditation of some lands to at least three and four
stars quality according to the requirements of the ISO standard 15189/2012.
Strengthen risk-monitoring mechanisms in remote communities. The government should support the expansion
and coverage of reliable internet connectivity at the district level continues to hamper efficiency and effectiveness
in reporting and Data Quality Assurance. Within the health monitoring information system, all heads of facilities
have transitioned from paper based to electronic based systems using tablets. Establish effective and efficient
information and communication services and equipment and develop social media applications or feedback
mechanisms to broaden avenues for the reporting and communication of risk between ONS and all at risk
communities in Sierra Leone.
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4.1.4. Emergency Communication equipment Needs.
Facilitate the acquisition of proper response equipment to facilitate key response processes such as Transportation,
Communications, Firefighting, Information and Planning, Mass Care, Health and Medical Services, Search and
Rescue, Hazardous Materials, Food and Water safety, military Support, Public Information management. (See
appendix for list of itemized equipment and responsibility centers)
Acquire, establish and install critical emergency communications equipment be acquired to support the
communications and operations of the proposed NDMA and EoC e.g. administrative, coordinative communications,
surveillance and EWS equipment, Reporting equipment and emergency operational equipment such as search and
rescue equipment. In addition, government needs to strengthen existing logistics transportation capacity with at
least 5-10 four-wheel drive, trucks available to transport mass quantitates of relief aid to affected communities.
(See Volume 2 of this assessment for detailed infrastructure and equipment needs); and build or strengthen the
communication, transportation and technical operation capabilities of Emergency Support organizations on a
priority basis.
Strengthen alert and rapid response communication systems. The government should establish emergency hotline
number should be checked by, the ONS as an effort to avoid confusion during emergencies; facilitate the
development and signing of MoUs between media houses and Natcom, the mobile companies and ONS to link the
meteorological system feeds, training media reporters and strategic stakeholders in disaster communication to
effectively convey sensitive disaster related information. In addition, the government should establish an
appropriate publicity management plan for disaster management, essential to impart timely and correct
information to the public as well as establishment of dedicated channels by the ONS at the national and regional
level to provide real time information during an emergency
Strengthen Emergency Communications, outreach and social mobilization capacity through the development of
social mobilization and communications protocols for Emergency response. Establish structured mechanisms and
systems to communicate to key stakeholders and the public; Support the ONS and partners in monitoring and
documenting lessons learned with the acquisition of in-house videography and photography capacity on human-
interest stories and visual materials.
Support and strengthen Urban Firefighting and technical Rescue Capacity. Support the acquisition of equipment
e.g. heavy-duty search and rescue Flood Lights from international and local partners, to increase response time
and action. In addition, the government should invest in essential communications systems and operational
equipment between the national, regional, district and community levels (Including transboundary levels),
especially end-to-end communication equipment (radios), Mobile satellite telephones and electronic reporting
tools to initiate communications and to facilitate real-time reporting of disasters with key-players before and during
and emergency to reduce delays in disaster response.
Facilitate the acquisition of Emergency Response Transportation and Logistics vehicles and trucks to transport mass
quantitates of relief aid to affected communities at the national, regional and district level.
Facilitate the acquisition and upgrade of Emergency Social Services Equipment for first response agencies such as
the Police, Fire Services, Medical Services, and Public Works Department etc. are in urgent need of technical
upgrading as well as communication, transportation and technical operation capabilities of these organisations.
4.1.5. Disaster Preparedness and Response Personnel Needs.
Strengthen International support and coordination Arrangements for EP&R. Review, streamline existing roles
between some stakeholders, or clusters, and facilitate enhanced coordination amongst partners, as well as
information sharing, surveillance and the mapping of gaps of underserved areas during the emergency relief
operations.
Strengthen National Search and Rescue Capacity. Prioritize training of the National Fire Forces focussing on
firefighting, search and rescue, fire investigation, fire prevention activities and management training, in order for
them to better support the response activities of staff from the National Disaster Management Agency. In addition,
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the support the recruitment of additional fire engineers and limited utility vehicles. The National Fire Force has a
standby team of men in working order ready respond to the fires.
Medical Health Care Surge Capacity. Support and strengthen the existing health care systems with a patient surge
plan during disasters. Build health care capacity to handle triage cases and facilitate the development of in-country
triage capacity to reduce health response time. This includes formation of international partnerships for triage and
community training, development of deployment plans and procedures for a tiered-care self-care model.
Strengthen Collaborative Training and Knowledge Building. arrangements between the ONS and other partners
particularly the Red Cross in training of key stakeholders in the EP&R pillar roles e.g. the Police, ONS staff, security
sector and council chairpersons e.g. training on National Disaster Law. Priority should be given to; Training of
DDMCs and volunteers on emergency preparedness and response at community levels. And provision of training
of trainers (TOT) programmes within the DDMC teams to sustain learning at the community level;
In addition, government should support the development of centralized database of EP&R training institutions to
assist improve coordination and monitoring of skills and capacity development in critical EP&R Fields; Government
and other agencies should work together to encourage the general public to participate in the disaster
management program through series of Community training, knowledge building and engagement and the
integration of DPR into the Tertiary curricula as well support for the production of DPR IEC Materials.
Strengthen the institutional setup for EP&R training and public education framework with competent professionals,
educators, trainers in disaster management and. These may vary across hazards and vulnerability, prevention and
mitigation, preparedness, early warning, relief and recovery in a systematic manner.
Prioritize the establishment of a dedicated National Disaster Training institute to support the development and
supply of a critical mass of skilled and qualified DRM and EP&R trainers and workforce Additional support can also
be provided for the development and establishment of dedicated training institutions rendering DRM or EP&R
certified or accredited training programmes across the country;
Facilitate, initiatives to harmonize and streamline the disaster management related trainings curriculums
development and specialized trainings in DRM and DPR, training of skilled trainers and experts countrywide
through the development of a strong central framework of education, training and research,
Facilitate the recruitment of Specialised skills for the ONS; approve the proposed NDMA structure; Conduct a
Training needs assessment post disbandment of the proposed NDMA e.g., training in the utilization of GIS tools,
warehouse logistics and stores management for disaster response and disaster laws of Sierra Leone, Conducting
Damage and loss assessments, and implementing among other needs. And other unique skills e.g. Waste
Management, WASH, Food safety, Occupational safety, Water Quality Management, Entomology and
epidemiology, meteorology, disaster risk management, risk communication, early warning and disaster data
collection, analysis and communication. In addition, cross-cutting skills pertaining to gender sensitive disaster
response and impact assessment techniques training opportunities in DPR related skills due to lack of funding to
facilitate staff participation in training interventions.
The government should scale up simulation exercises and drills to other districts and communities with additional
funding.
4.1.6. Strengthening EP&R Programme Efficiency and Effectiveness.

In designing new EP&R programmes, special focus should be placed on the special needs of the vulnerable
populations that is, children, women, aged and the disabled. Socio-cultural needs should be accounted for in all
phases of disaster management planning. In the context of Sierra Leone, this need is further accentuated by the
fact that two and half decades of turmoil and suffering has left a large section of the population physically and
mentally affected, and left without adequate protection from the vagaries of nature. The results of this project
should therefore be hinged to the strategy for addressing the risk reduction needs of these vulnerable groups.
In addition, the design of new EP&R programmes should integrate special programmes targeting gender and youth
led socio-economic development, empowerment and livelihoods improvement programmes for affected and
vulnerable communities to increase programme impact and sustainability. A detailed gender statement or
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statement on inclusion of prioritised target groups) for all new projects, adhering to best practices and the law and
policies governing inclusion of prioritised target groups should be established.
In lieu of the country’s socio-economic demographics, designing and implementing pro-poor EP&R capacity
building Programmes mainly targeting youth, women and vulnerable groups countrywide is more likely to generate
greater impact on future preparedness and response needs, as they constitute the highest proportion of the
population and are most at risk during disasters. There is need to prioritize the western urban, western rural, Bo,
Kenema and Mkeni districts during the implementation of future EP&R Programmes as crucial districts by virtue of
their dense population and availability of limited human and financial resources.
Preliminary evidence suggests that collaboration is contributing to learning, innovation, and creativity among EP&R
organisations. To maximize this effect, the proposed capacity-building programme should focus on building both
bonding and bridging social capital. This means finding a balance between developing deeper bonds of trust with
a set of peer organisations who are coordinating programmatically (bonding), while also looking outward and
seeking out new ideas, relationships, and information from a diverse set of actors (bridging– would include national
and international, EP&R and non EP&R). The latter is usually harder to do, but is critical to innovation and to
problem solving. Concretely, all actors involved in EP&R should encourage organisations to seek out and participate
in relevant, novel conversations wherever they are happening (both inside and outside their sector). EP&R
organisations can then bring back new ideas, case studies, and approaches to their core partners and adapt them
to communities and context. This returns to bonding capital.
Establish clear roles among consortium partners. This should include a set$ of agreed guidelines for how
management decisions will be undertaken, in crisis settings. Issues to address include whether decisions should be
by consensus among all EP&R consortium collaborates, whether the global grant holder and/or donor have specific
roles, how to incorporate national and local partners in to the decision-making processes, who makes decisions on
reallocation of resources, and a mechanism for who can arbitrate when needed to advance difficult decisions.
Within multi-stakeholder platforms, implement a mechanism for regular feedback on preparedness and response
concerning the project and personnel. This could allow for proactively heading off difficult decisions.
In designing new EP&R Programmes, special focus should be placed on the special needs of the vulnerable
populations that is, children, women, aged and the disabled. Socio-cultural needs should be accounted for in all
phases of disaster management planning. The results of this project should be hinged to the strategy for addressing
the risk reduction needs of these vulnerable groups. In addition, the design of new EP&R Programmes should
integrate special Programmes targeting gender and youth led socio-economic development, empowerment and
livelihoods improvement Programmes for affected and vulnerable communities to increase programme impact
and sustainability.
4.1.7. EP&R Programme sustainability Needs.
There is a strong prevalence of recurrent counterproductive environmentally degrading practices e.g. sand mining
and deforestation. These continued to downplay the results of such programmes in some high risk and vulnerable
community areas. Such activities are mainly embarked on by unemployed youth seeking unsustainable sources of
day-to-day urban livelihood. Increasing the frequency and scalability of environmental safety programmes requires
additional financial and technical support to secure a sustainability and scalable impact. The programme impact
levels will essentially increase with special considerations for the design, integration and targeting of gender and
youth led socio-economic development, empowerment and livelihoods improvement programmes for affected
and vulnerable communities. Such programmes may include Vocational skills training, agriculture improvement
and value addition or any other sustainable environmentally safe economic activity and source of livelihood.
Teaching clean energy consumption in rural areas e.g. introduction of mud stoves instead of environmentally
degrading wood consumption reduced fuel demand and consumption by 90%. Alternative clean energy sources
are also inconsideration in some communities with programmes to introduce and install solar electricity. The
programme has been increasingly thorough with steady growing uptake and adoption. The government in the last
year has removed tariffs on clean energy. Private sector involvement is steadily growing as well as local demand
for clean energy apparatus. Although some clean energy methods such as the mud-stove are relatively new and a
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work in progress, CSOs such as centre for environmental bio-diversity have expanded their learning centres to
provide demonstrative learning facilities to communities, which seem to be more effective.
In the hillside areas, the EPA encourages and supports communities in afforestation to replace plant cover. Such
programmes should be expanded and scaled up to ensure greater impact and sustainability. Some communities
staying in the fragile areas have adopted a number of environmental protection mechanisms with support from
the EPA. These activities mostly include revegetation of degraded areas that had previously been prone to floods
and windstorms. Planting of indigenous tree species in these degraded areas, communities have managed to
reduce their overall level of disaster risk to shocks.
In terms of knowledge sharing and preparedness, men are more knowledgeable of disaster issues than the women
are. Differential vulnerabilities and capacities of men and women in the disaster management and EP&R context
had been adopted for most affected and high-risk communities to further unpack gender.
4.1.8. Lessons Learned.

During this assignment, discussions and deliberations between the consultant and key stakeholder respondents
identified several lessons learned from recent disasters experiences in Sierra Leone. This section therefore
discusses some of the lessons learned as presented below;
Section Lessons Learned.
Leadership and  The applications of good governance principles ensures timely and cost-effective
Governance outcomes during an emergency yields National support and involvement of all key
partners. Good governance ensures the whole of Government and “whole of country
adoption of core principles of accountability and transparency at all levels, which is
critical for effective and efficient EP&R.
 Involvement of strong leadership and local government Institutions enhances

Coordinative arrangements and institutional Efficiency during emergencies. During the
recent August 2019 floods, strong leadership of critical institutions improves the
vigilance of disaster management committees resulting in better operational efficiency
and coordination. Sufficient balance and definition of Presidential and political strategies
in guiding policy-decisions during crises help to improve existing coordinative
arrangements.
EP&R Legislative  Weak enforcement of Laws and regulations on safety of physical infrastructure and
Frameworks informal settlements exacerbate disaster risks in highly prone areas. This especially
concerns the existing mechanisms in enforcing safety in building and construction, as
well as land use and spatial planning, which are essential forms of regulation to reduce
underlying risk and avoid creating new risks in human settlements. Development of
extensive regulation in these areas will strengthen law enforcement along with the
provision of adequate resources at the local government level and a weak ‘culture of
compliance’, resulting in local authorities sufficiently prioritizing DRR.
 Continued prevalence of counterproductive practices e.g. sand mining and

deforestation downplay the results of emergency preparedness training and
sensitization programmes for high risk and vulnerable community areas. Such activities
as mainly embarked on by unemployed youth seeking unsustainable sources of day-to-
day urban livelihood. Increasing the frequency and scalability of environmental safety
programmes requires additional financial and technical support to ensure scalable
impact and sustainability. The design and integration of special programmes targeting
gender and youth led socio-economic development, empowerment and livelihoods
improvement programmes for affected and vulnerable communities helps to increase
programme impact and sustainability.
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 Critical public infrastructure and housing should be strengthened through proper risk
assessment, codes of practice and design standards targeted at ‘’building back better’’.
In retrospect, however, infrastructure in some communities especially slums do not
follow any standards. Rather, structures are re-erected and in some instances in worse
state than before.
 Weak enforcement of Laws and regulations on environmental safety especially of

physical infrastructure and informal settlements exacerbate disaster risks in highly
prone areas. This especially concerns the existing mechanisms in enforcing safety in
building and construction, as well as land use and spatial planning, which are essential
forms of regulation to reduce underlying risk and avoid creating new risks in human
settlements. Development of extensive regulation in these areas will strengthen law
enforcement along with the provision of adequate resources at the local government
level and a weak ‘culture of compliance’, resulting in local authorities sufficiently
prioritizing DRR.
EP&R Policy  Strengthening emergency preparedness and response should not be a solution for
Frameworks inadequate urban planning. In the past, there has been a lot of action for preparedness
and response as majority are a result of under planning. The new NDMA should work
with the local planning systems to avoid duplication of efforts to fit the purpose of
human safety and livelihood.
 Mainstreaming and integration of DRR and EP&R principles in national and sectoral
adaptation planning and programmes enhances the capacity of institutions to respond
to impending disasters as they fall due and reduces the risk of loss arising from disasters
in ALL sectors of the economy. Underlying risks created by changing social, economic,
environmental conditions, resource use, and the impact of hazards, including those
associated with climate variability, climate change and extreme weather events must be
addressed in.
 Disaster Risk Insurance mechanisms especially in high-risk prone areas and communities
such as slums reduce the risk of loss of both property and livelihoods. Government needs
to support financial risk-sharing schemes, particularly disaster risk insurance,
reinsurance, and other financial modalities for risk transfer. Community led recovery
initiatives such as communities in high-risk prone areas should also support SACCOs with
sound policies and byelaws to scale up growth utilization and uptake.
Preparedness  Mainstreaming and integration of DRR and EP&R principles in national and sectoral
Planning. adaptation planning and programmes enhances the capacity of institutions to respond
to impending disasters as they fall due and reduces the risk of loss arising from disasters
in ALL sectors of the economy. Underlying risks created by changing social, economic,
environmental conditions, resource use, and the impact of hazards, including those
associated with climate variability, climate change and extreme weather events must be
addressed in.
 Likewise, long-term emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction in a community

is a function of its capacity to access resources and build assets. Household livelihood
security is the most basic means for achieving preparedness and risk reduction as it
provides households with financial, social and physical assets to protect themselves
from shocks and stresses. Thus, efforts focusing on disaster risk reduction in poor
communities need to be closely linked to livelihood programmes. Provision of support
to scale up such programmes as reforestation will restore the degraded landscapes and
reduce further severities of floods and landslides.
 Devolution of EP&R plans and financing down to the community level improves response
timelines (all other factors constant). The local authorities are key and they should
93
devolve these activities and they would give the impression that they are working with
the council, council has never been at the center of this process and establish a unit
within the council that will be responsive to disasters at the city level.
 The development and existence of standard operating protocols, infrastructure,

equipment and specialized expertise ahead of any disaster enhances the efficiency and
effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response procedures. Most importantly,
this is applicable to search and rescue, victim registry, cash and non-cash distribution,
resource mobilization, stockpile management, team deployment guidelines and
protocols among others.
 Simulative exercises if conducted frequently increase community familiarization with

disaster management processes and procedures and reduce the risk of loss for affected
and high-risk prone communities. Government thus needs to support their frequent
undertakings by providing additional and dedicated funding to increase their impact
countrywide.
 Establishment of centralized Stockpile registry systems for Non-cash items (NCIs) ease
reduce delays in response turnaround time during emergencies. During the 2017
landslide, however, identification and quantification of various INGO relief supply
capacities seemed very difficult. Coordination of INGOs non-cash relief supply support
lacked harmony and was inefficient. With this realty in mind, need was expressed to
establish a relief supplies INGO forum and a central logistics and warehouse database
registry system to document existing and possible non-cash contributions as well as the
expansion of existing stockpile and relief supply warehousing facilities in Sierra Leone.
Establishment of a centralized facility and registry should essentially strengthen
coordination systems in non-cash supplies; reduce duplication of certain relief and
response items and shortages of others.
 Establishment of centralized Stockpile registry systems for Non-cash items (NCIs) ease
reduce delays in response turnaround time during emergencies. During the 2017
landslide, however, identification and quantification of various INGO relief supply
capacities seemed very difficult.
Coordination  Existing evidence shows that the more funding received by the ONS to facilitate the
committee meetings, the more regular their convergence.
 Strengthened networks and partnerships facilitate better integration and augmentation

of available resources, and capacity including local expertise. Recognising the presence
of limited technical and financial resources and institutional capacity at all administrative
levels of DRM, collaborations and partnership between Government agencies and
stakeholders essentially complements the existing national capacity, consistent with the
Sierra Leone Government vision. This is critical in harnessing key disciplinary skills,
expertise, financial and other resources across the nation. The establishment and /or
strengthening of existing decision-making processes and organisational arrangements
ensures timely and effective disaster risk reduction and disaster management outcomes.
Emergency  Strengthened networks and partnerships facilitate better integration and augmentation
Financing and of available resources, and capacity including local expertise. Recognizing the presence
Resource of limited technical and financial resources and institutional capacity at all administrative
Mobilization levels of DRM, collaborations and partnership between Government agencies and
Mechanisms stakeholders essentially complements the existing national capacity, consistent with the
and Strategies Sierra Leone Government vision.
 Effective measures for disaster preparedness are dependent on well-functioning

Effective, Integrated and People-Focussed Early Warning Systems that deliver accurate
94
Early Warning and understandable information in a timely manner. Government of Sierra Leone thus
systems recognises the need to strengthen its early warning systems in response to specific and
urgent needs and the circumstances in the country and communities. This includes the
need to communicate over isolated populations in hard to reach districts such as
Bonthe. These systems need to be integrated with the global network supporting early
warning and vice versa but must be tailored so that information remains community
focussed and address all hazards.
 Effective Use of information systems increases the effectiveness of disaster risk

reduction and disaster management at national, divisional, provincial, district and
community levels. Information management, knowledge creation and accessibility
vitally enhances disaster risk reduction and disaster management mechanisms for
retaining and/or strengthening cultural, traditional and contemporary knowledge. Public
awareness and education, incorporating traditional coping mechanisms and local
knowledge, will enhance individual and community resilience. Formal disaster risk
reduction and disaster management training, institutionalized through national,
divisional, provincial, district and community levels educational Programmes, will
improve the country’s DRM human Capital needs.
 Integration of environmentally safe programmes e.g. Teaching clean energy

consumption in rural areas e.g. introduction of mud stoves instead of environmentally
degrading wood consumption reduced fuel demand and consumption by 90%.
 Establishment of integrated and online-based platform for water resources and

sanitation improves surveillance monitoring, information and reporting remarkably and
triggers early response.
 Establishment of disaster specific cross boarder SOPS and templates ensured that any
issues of public health are treated at source and provided mechanisms to stop public
health risks from crossing.
Public education  Community engagement works well with democratic accountability to support rapid
and training emergency response and to educate the community and accountability. These needs to
be understood and improve coordination to avoid duplication.
 The effects of hazards are tremendously reduced when people are well aware, informed
and motivated to take first actions towards a culture of prevention and resilience and in
addition identify disaster risk reduction priorities, which in turn require the compilation,
analysis and dissemination of relevant information and knowledge on hazards and their
impacts. While not all hazards can be eliminated, there is considerable scope for
reducing their devastating impacts on vulnerable communities by improving disaster
management arrangements for preparedness, response and recovery activities
 The sustainability and scalability of the outcomes and results of public education and
training programmes on a larger scale is contingent on the availability of funding which
needs to be put into consideration.
 Targeting younger school going children in DRR and EP&R Education and training
Programmes integrating them into the curriculum and training the teachers attracts
better results and behavioural change impact as reported in Pilot Programmes in school
DRM in the districts of Maguruka, Kambia and Kono, Makeni, Bo pujhenun in phase one
and two.
Program  Integration of socio-economic, livelihoods improvement programmes for affected

effectiveness victims especially women, and youth into resettlement programmes creates more
sustainable and longer lasting solutions for community resettlement. For instance, the
95
resettlement of the 2015 flooding and 2017 landslide victims would have been a much
more sustainable programme if, a number of social welfare and socio-economic
programmes had been incorporated into the programme.
Community  Environmental health lessons learned in the aftermath of major disasters indicate that
Based Disaster “professional-only” approaches were not effective in engaging the community). This
Preparedness mechanism should therefore be adopted, and duplicated to enhance the preparedness,
surveillance and monitoring capacity of other disasters e.g. flood and landslide high-risk
areas. Facilitation, Training (e.g. first aid) and compensation of constituent individuals in
such committees will be essential in ensuing their efficiency and effectiveness.
 Disaster Risk Insurance mechanisms especially in high-risk prone areas and communities
such as slums reduce the risk of loss of both property and livelihoods. Government needs
to support financial risk-sharing schemes, particularly disaster risk insurance,
reinsurance, and other financial modalities for risk transfer. Community led recovery
initiatives such as communities in high-risk prone areas should also support SACCOs with
sound policies and byelaws to scale up growth utilization and uptake.
 Critical public infrastructure and housing should be strengthened through proper risk
assessment, codes of practice and design standards targeted at ‘’building back better’’.
In retrospect, however, infrastructure in some communities especially slums do not
follow any standards. Rather, structures are re-erected and in some instances in worse
state than before.
 During disasters, the MoH adopted a community-focused approach to emergency

preparedness in line with the Environmental Public Health Performance Standards,
which describe how to optimize performance and capacity of environmental public
health systems and programs (CDC, 2011b). Environmental health lessons learned in the
aftermath of major disasters indicate that “professional-only” approaches were not
effective in engaging the community)
 Strengthening Community Based Preparedness and Response has been identified as an

effective strategy to involve members of vulnerable communities in a collaborative
approach to emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. A CBPR strategy
emphasizes respectful co-learning and empowering partnerships among researchers,
practitioners, and communities Partnerships can be strengthened by joint development
of research agreements regarding design, implementation, analysis, and dissemination
of the results. It is therefore critical to develop effective training of the EH and EPR
workforce on community-based participatory methodologies that would prepare them
to engage communities by building partnerships for disaster resilience capacity.
WASH  The joint response efforts and combined synergies of the WASH, e.g. UNICEF and Health
Preparedness Clusters supported continued success in the prevention of water and sanitation related
and Coping diseases in the flood affected areas.
Mechanisms
during Floods.  Increasing community risk awareness enhances community preparedness. Community
preparedness and awareness plans are essential, to reduce urban disaster risk due to
shocks. With the introduction of relatively simple, effective risk reduction measures into
existing urban improvement practices and involvement of communities in decision-
making, degrees of protection can be afforded within the most vulnerable urban
settlements, which in the long term contribute to both protecting lives and livelihoods,
and poverty reduction.
 Utilization of the school facilities as evacuation centres meant that all school activities
for children of age stopped at the cost of accommodating flood victims during school
96
going days. This was counterproductive to UNICEFs goal of continued education during
disasters.
 Increasing community risk awareness enhances community preparedness. Community

preparedness and awareness plans are essential, to reduce urban disaster risk due to
shocks. With the introduction of relatively simple, effective risk reduction measures into
existing urban improvement practices and involvement of communities in decision-
making, degrees of protection can be afforded within the most vulnerable urban
settlements, which in the long term contribute to both protecting lives and livelihoods,
and poverty reduction.
 Various agencies and actors, particularly UNICEF provided health education focused on
good personal hygiene, sanitary habits, consumption of safe drinking water, fly proof
latrines, and the use of insecticide treated bet-nets. The joint response efforts and
combined synergies of the WASH, led by UNICEF and Health Clusters successfully
prevented outbreaks of water and sanitation related diseases in the flood affected areas.
Food security  Household Food and Nutrition preparedness. Nearly all communities in the floods and
mudslide incidents had been under prepared and food insecure and required immediate
handouts. Efforts focusing on disaster risk reduction in poor communities need to be
closely linked to livelihood development programmes, as an increase in subsequent
levels of income, food security and skill will enhance the community’s disaster coping
capacity. Provision of support to scale up such programmes and reduce further
severities of floods and landslides.
 FAO promoted and implemented climate smart farmer preparedness practices and
introduced best practices such as crop diversification from flood shock crops such as
rice, and livestock emergency preparedness programmes to restore livelihoods during
the recovery process. There is evidence that this intervention helped farmers and
families in the rural areas of Koinadugu to ‘’get back on their feet’’. However,
preparedness for conditions such as malnutrition continue to be of significant challenge
in the affected areas due to the overriding difficulties most people experience in
rebuilding their livelihoods, consequent of the frequent disasters; with their incomes
lower; the costs of, at least, some essential commodities higher and an increasing
percentage of the household budget spent on food.
EP&R  Effective Use of information systems increases the effectiveness of disaster risk
Monitoring, reduction and disaster management at national, divisional, provincial, district and
Information and community levels. Information management, knowledge creation and accessibility
Communication vitally enhances disaster risk reduction and disaster management mechanisms for
systems. retaining and/or strengthening cultural, traditional and contemporary knowledge. Public
awareness and education, incorporating traditional coping mechanisms and local
knowledge, will enhance individual and community resilience. Formal disaster risk
reduction and disaster management training, institutionalised through national,
divisional, provincial, district and community levels educational programmes, will
improve the country’s DRM human Capital needs.
 The introduction of Electronic Monitoring and Reporting Tools installed with the WFP
Cobol creates significant impact on data accuracy, consistency and timeliness e.g. IPad.
The tools improved efficiency in rapid assessment and response. The use of electronic
monitoring and reporting tools also aids improvements in joint monitoring and
assessment and the establishment of proper baseline information confirming 300
victims.
 The development and existence of standard operating protocols, infrastructure,

equipment and specialized expertise ahead of any disaster enhances the efficiency and
97
Emergency effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response procedures. Most importantly,

Response this is applicable to search and rescue, victim registry, cash and non-cash distribution,
Operations. resource mobilization, stockpile management, team deployment guidelines and
protocols among others. Prioritization of the development and establishment of
standard guidelines and protocols for EP&R should improve the response time during
future disasters as coordinated by the ONS or proposed NDMA.
 The pillar or cluster approach applied in the Sierra Leone context enhances coordination
amongst partners, as well as facilitating information sharing, surveillance and the
mapping of gaps of underserved areas during the emergency relief operations
 The uniqueness of the mudslide and landslide disaster presented a sharp learning curve
for victim registry and information systems.
 Deployment of ‘’all ONS staff ‘’ meant disengagement from the core business of the ONS,
which could imply an increased security risk to the country.
 It took some time before a clear assessment of the humanitarian needs in affected
areas was finished. Only then was a comprehensive out-reach system established on
ground. In absence of proper livelihood support and shelter, people will not be able to
reinstate normalcy
 Introduction of early recovery programmes reduces dependency. We piloted that during
the mudslides. Coordination this should be quick to enable quick decision making before
the victims of the incidents start to – more than 72hours. Even here in Freetown, we are
talking about months and sometimes nothing is done for the communities.
 Resettlement of high-risk communities requires the development of concrete actions

for people to move. Programme designers must have appropriate and sustainable
actions, procedures to motivate behavioural, and situation changes in disaster
vulnerable areas. In Malawi for instance, the Red Cross provided shelters, mud locks,
models Tapeline, and bigger plastic city to cover the roofs of communities in flood prone
areas, which encouraged them to resettle in higher land.
 Programme designers must have appropriate and sustainable actions, procedures to

motivate behavioural, and situation changes in vulnerable areas. There seems to have
been very limited consideration for the availability of social services e.g. basic or quality
education, health and sanitation facilities blaming government for obvious failures of
the project. The proximity and access to proper schools and health facilities was too far
for convenience. Children in both camps trekked at-least 10 miles before reaching the
nearest primary or secondary school. The worries of pregnant women could have lasted
months before receiving a proper maternal and neo-natal health care. WASH facilities
established were inadequate which in some instances favoured sickness. It did not make
sense, however, why the inhabitants of the mudslide resettlement camp were to pay a
minimum amount of Le 1,000,000 in monthly rent to the PPP platform for their
establishment, yet majority were already vulnerable and struggling to create means for
minimum livelihoods for their families.
 Resettlement of the 2015 flooding and 2017 landslide victims would have been a much
more sustainable programme if, a number of social welfare and socio-economic
programmes had been incorporated into the programme. Rather, victims continue to
blame government and the ONS for the failures of the project e.g. poor livelihoods,
inadequate access to schools, and sanitation and health care facilities among others. In
some areas, livelihoods improvement programmes such as basic trainings financial
literary, water health and sanitation, early child development, Sexual and gender-based
violence and the emphasis of small enterprise development, nutrition and health are
quite commendable in building sustainable survival beyond existing social protection
98
programmes. In all these modules, four things are emphasized, small-scale business,
nutrition and health of the family. Adoption of early recovery mechanisms are however
encouraged to reduce dependency. Integration of socio-economic, livelihoods
improvement programmes for affected victims especially women, and youth into
resettlement programmes creates more sustainable and longer lasting solutions for
community resettlement.
Staffing and  Efficient operation of the ONS-DMD requires adequate levels of expertise from its staff
Human who must interface with their departmental counterparts. The responsibilities for
Resources bureaucratic management of crises and determination of DRM policy goals must be
clear for all the actors involved. Likewise, the establishment of a semi-autonomous
agency is expected to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of EP&R operational and
response procedures.
 Augmentation of human resources with the utilization of volunteers e.g. the Sierra
Leone Red Cross and WFP expedites emergency response processes e.g. rapid
assessments the assessments and reduces the turnaround time for response. The role
of volunteers should therefore be recognised and institutionalized within the EP&R
system.
Gender  Cluster partners agree that the gender and child protection cluster has played a key role
in contributing towards a more a coordinated, effective and holistic emergency response
to issues affecting the protection of children and women and should be institutionalized.
99
Conclusion.
Overall, the assessment found a considerable level of institutional and Multisector capacity to undertake EP&R
activities. Some of this capacity included; the existing of some policies, plans and standard operating procedures,
infrastructure, Equipment, human and financial resources, clear legal and institutional frameworks and some EWS
systems capacity to support the operationalization and functionalization of each institutions mandates and
functions towards EP&R and ultimately, sector specific growth and economic development. Considerations of
international Non-government organizations (INGOs) in country provide supplementary financial and non-
financial capacity for EP & R, to ensure efficiency and sufficiency during emergencies.
However, a larger proportion of opinions following this assessment conclude that Sierra Leones capacity needs in
the governance, human, infrastructure, systems and operational capacity grossly outweigh the existing EP&R
capacity. Limitations in funding further exacerbate operational inefficiencies in EP&R and frustrate government’s
plans to improve the existing EP&R situation countrywide, as the country remains short of the adoption of several
international standards in EP&R.
In terms of emergency preparedness, the effects of hazards are tremendously reduced when people are well
aware, informed and motivated to take first actions towards a culture of prevention and resilience and in addition
identify disaster risk reduction priorities, which in turn require the compilation, analysis and dissemination of
relevant information and knowledge on hazards and their impacts. While not all hazards can be eliminated, there
is considerable scope for reducing their devastating impacts on vulnerable communities by improving disaster
management arrangements for preparedness, response and recovery activities.
Urban populations and communities in Sierra Leone, particularly downtown Freetown are growing rapidly. The
civic services and the general quality of the settlements is of a low standard in some areas. In the absence of
strong governance, will power, regulatory and enforcement capacity, such communities are subject to an ever-
increasing risk of natural as well as technological disasters. The situation is most alarming even now in the absence
of well-planned and structured settlements, considering that many of the settlements had developed with very
limited sensitivity to the disaster risks and shocks faced by those particular communities.
Likewise, long-term emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction in a community is a function of its
capacity to access resources and build assets. Household livelihood security is the most basic means for achieving
preparedness and risk reduction as it provides households with financial, social and physical assets to protect
themselves from shocks and stresses. Efforts focusing on disaster risk reduction in poor communities need to be
closely linked to livelihood Programmes. Provision of support to scale up such Programmes as reforestation will
restore the degraded landscapes and reduce further severities of floods and landslides.
In addition to this assessment, a multi-sectoral and multi-institutional capacity building and investment plan, and
the NDMA establishment report follow in a separate document, detailing the specific capacity building priorities,
investment needs and implementation plan for each EP&R component and stakeholder towards improved EP&R
Efficiency and Effectiveness.
100
APPENDIX.
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101
Appendix 1: Costed Investment Plan for the Development and Strengthening of Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity in Sierra Leone.
EP&R Response Strategic initiative Specific Action Implementation Timelines Cost Responsibility
System Estimates Center
Element
2020 2021 2022
1st 2nd Q1- Q1- (USD)
Half Half Q4 Q4
Legal and  Develop and Strengthen  Develop Extensive Disaster Preparedness Laws and regulations for 100,000 ONS
Institutional existing Legal and institutional EP&R, DRM.
Arrangements Arrangements for DPR in Sierra  Support for the promulgation and subsequent enactment of the 10,000 ONS
NDMA bill as well as the disbandment of the Disaster Management
for DPR. Leone
function from the ONS
 Invest in the development of standardized emergency operation 80,000 ONS
protocols for DRM and EP&R and explore alternative disaster risk
financing strategies and platforms
 Review, Update and mainstream DPR Policies in line with 80,000 ONS
international, continental and regional frameworks while improving
coordination mechanisms for the different levels of disasters;
 Facilitate the development of  Support the development of district level Hazard Emergency 100,000 ONS
Hazard Specific EP&R plans at Preparedness and contingency Plans.
the National and District level.
 Support the adoption and  Training of EP&R personnel in Good Governance principles at all levels 30,000 ONS
Advancement of good of administration including National, district and community level.
governance principles in DPR.
Information  Scale up the provision of  Strengthen capacity of existing Community Engagement systems 30,000 ONS
systems for intensive community (DDMCs and Community Volunteers), training, sensitization
Disaster awareness campaigns, School  Support the formalization and institutionalization of chiefdom disaster 15,000 ONS
management committees and community volunteers as the formal
Preparedness education and training
coordinative structures in first response
and Response. programmes on natural and
 Reinforce risk awareness, attitude and high action stimulating 120,000 ONS
human-induced disaster. strategies to improve actions and adoption of affordable and resilient
solutions through EP&R Education and Training Capacity
 Design and integrate socio-economic development, empowerment 120,000 ONS
and livelihoods improvement programmes targeting gender, youth
and affected or vulnerable persons
 Strengthen the capacity of the  Support the refurbishment, maintenance and expansion of the 1,000,000 ONS
Sierra Leone Meteorological existing radar and weather monitoring stations,
 Invest in Radar and Weather Station Monitoring Equipment 200,000 Meteorology
102
Element
2020 2021 2022
Half Half Q4 Q4
agency capacity and systems  Facilitate the Development of Meteorological capacity to provide 50,000 Meteorology
and infrastructure additional met products.
 Facilitate the development of quality management frameworks for 50,000 Meteorology
collecting data and conducting forecasts and non-compliance of with
ISO, WMO and GTI standards.
 Facilitate the establishment of PPPs to strengthen dissemination of 15,000 Meteorology
risk related information.
 Strengthen the capacity of the  Acquire Install Training of Staff and Flood Monitoring Sensors and 20,000 NWRA
Hydrological Monitoring Equipment.
systems and Institutional  Conduct Surface water gauging to improve periodical monitoring 20,000 NWRA
activities; build institutional capacity
Capacity; e.g.
 Training of personnel in the use the rain gauges so that they can 20,000 NWRA
operate the systems to facilitate monitoring of river flow and Surface
Rivers using rain gauges.
 Facilitate the recruitment of skilled staff to monitor floods. 10,000 NWRA
 Strengthen community  Facilitate the establishment and strengthening of regional DPR 50,000 ONS
Monitoring and Surveillance coordination arrangements between Sierra Leone and the Manu river
Systems union in DPR.
 Strengthen community transboundary surveillance systems. 50,000 ONS
 Strengthen coordination capacity between the ONS and other DPR 40,000 ONS
agencies and the functionality and capacity of existing committees
and DRM frameworks
 Develop the National Disaster  Establishing the National Disaster Management Information 1,000,000 ONS
Management Information Communication System (NDMICS)
Communication System  Enhance information dissemination mechanisms, alert and rapid 50,000 ONS
response systems.
(NDMICS) and response
 Facilitate the development of a robust targeting, identification, victim 25,000 ONS
mechanisms taking in
validation systems and an agreed central database repository for all
anticipation of events, agencies and support the development and establishment of a
integration of disaster risk dedicated and centralized victim registry and identification system,
reduction in response post Disaster Tracking, Monitoring and Follow up Systems, victim
preparedness and ensuring tracking systems and protocols
that capacities are in place for  establish a clear monitoring system and indicators based on previous 20,000 ONS
plans based on quality indicators
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Element
2020 2021 2022
Half Half Q4 Q4
effective response and
recovery at all levels
 Support updates of Hazard and  Facilitate successful adoption and Investment in GIS structures in 100,000 ONS
Vulnerability maps or districts focussing on all four components of a GIS (Human, Financial,
assessments and the systems and equipment) T raining and hardware installation
 Pervasive partnerships are key to success establish a system through 10,000 ONS
establishment of a clear EP&R
which national institutions can collaborate with counties for data
research standardization and sharing, as well as knowledge transfer e.g. with
the WMO.
 GIS Guidelines and a GIS centre at CoG are needed as well as provision 20,000 ONS
of generic GIS lab structure guideline is urgent •
 Hire and support continuous training of GIS professionals. 20,000 ONS
Infrastructure  Develop and/or establish  Conduct a thorough and complete EOC operational requirements and 20,000 ONS
development dedicated administrative physical space survey, as the basis for which decisions will be made on
Needs infrastructure for the proposed the design location, relocation, building selection or construction site
of the EOC
National Disaster Management
 Establish decentralized zonal offices (rent) to allow rapid response to 150,000 ONS
Agency at all levels of DRM disaster situations, as they are extensions of the national agency
administration Establish dedicated physical EoC infrastructure at the regional, district
and chiefdom levels to converge various role-players involved in
emergency response, coordination, effective communication and
duplication of activities amongst various participants.
 strengthen existing inter-disciplinary actions among DPR stakeholders 20,000 ONS
and Multi-Hazard Physical Infrastructure Needs for key emergency
response stakeholders
 Develop and expand existing warehousing and storage facilities for 120,000 ONS
non-food emergency response supplies (ex. mattresses, dignity kits,
water)
 Develop and/or Strengthen  Facilitate the identification, refurbishment or development of clearly 60,000 ONS
Hazard Specific Preparedness marked evacuation shelters, routes or plans for high risk disaster
Infrastructure;  Scale up efforts in support of communities in high risk areas to utilize 60,000 ONS
alternative methods to access clean water in some districts
104
Element
2020 2021 2022
Half Half Q4 Q4
 Support regular supply of water reagents and the recruitment of 60,000 ONS
skilled water quality engineers in the ministry and at the district level.
And development of a clear water safety plan
 Support the provision of permanent and safe sanitation facilities. 60,000 ONS
 Undertake a comprehensive Sanitation mapping exercise around the 30,000 ONS
country and the design of scalable sanitation solutions especially for
high-risk communities
 Improve Health and Safety  Facilitate the establishment of regional and district laboratories 1,000,000 MoH
Surveillance and Laboratory
Capacity through Establishment  Strengthen risk monitoring mechanisms in remote 50,000 MoH
and strengthening of the capacity
communities.
of existing Health Laboratory
surveillance systems.
Communication  Facilitate the acquisition of  Acquire, establish and install critical emergency communications 200,000 ONS
and Equipment proper response equipment to equipment be acquired to support the communications and
Needs. facilitate key response operations of the proposed NDMA and EoC e.g. administrative,
coordinative communications, surveillance and EWS equipment,
processes
Reporting equipment and emergency operational equipment such as
search and rescue equipment.
 Strengthen alert and rapid  Strengthen Emergency Communications, outreach and social 20,000 ONS
response communication mobilization capacity through the development of social mobilization
systems. and communications protocols for Emergency response
 Support and strengthen Urban  Support the acquisition of equipment e.g. heavy-duty search and 100.000 ONS
Firefighting and technical rescue Flood Lights from international and local partners, to increase
Rescue Capacity. response time and action
 Facilitate the acquisition of Emergency Response Transportation and 200,000 ONS
Logistics vehicles and trucks to transport mass quantitates of relief aid
to affected communities at the national, regional and district level.
 Facilitate the acquisition and upgrade of Emergency Social Services 80,000 ONS
Equipment for first response agencies such as the Police, Fire Services,
Medical Services, and Public Works Department etc.
 
105
Element
2020 2021 2022
Half Half Q4 Q4
Disaster  Facilitate the approval of the  facilitate the recruitment of specialised expertise for the ONS 20,000 ONS
Preparedness proposed NDMA structure,  Facilitate training of ONS staff in relevant EP&R skills. 40,000 ONS
and Response  Prioritize the establishment of  Support the development and supply of a critical mass of skilled and 250,000 ONS
Personnel a dedicated National Disaster qualified DRM and EP&R trainers and workforce
Needs. Training institute  Strengthen Collaborative arrangements between the ONS and other N/A ONS
partners particularly the Red Cross in training of key stakeholders in
the EP&R pillar roles
 Strengthen Human Resource  Establishment of a dedicated National Disaster Training institute 300,000 ONS
capacity for EP & R and establish a  Develop national disaster management-training curriculum 50,000 ONS
strong central framework of  Providing additional and refresher training in response functions. 50,000 ONS
education, training and research.
 Strengthen International  Review and streamline existing roles between some stakeholders, or N/A ONS
support and coordination clusters and facilitate enhanced coordination amongst partners
Arrangements for EP&R.  Scale up simulation exercises and drills to other districts and 50,000 ONS
communities with additional funding.
 Prioritize training of the National Fire Forces in interventions focussing 50,000 ONS
on firefighting, search and rescue, fire investigation, fire prevention
activities and management training
 Medical Health Care Surge  Support and strengthen the existing health care systems with a 40,000 ONS
Capacity. patient surge plan during disasters
 Develop and Strengthen  Support the development of centralized database of EP&R training 50,000 ONS
National EP&R training institutions to assist improve coordination and monitoring of skills and
Capacity. capacity development in critical EP&R Fields and a strong central
framework of education, training and research
 Strengthen the institutional setup for EP&R training and public N/A ONS
education framework with competent professionals, educators,
trainers in disaster management.
 Facilitate, initiatives to harmonize and streamline the disaster 50,000 ONS
management related trainings curriculums and specialized trainings in
DRM and DPR
 Train of skilled trainers and experts countrywide through the 50,0000 ONS
development.
106
Table 23: Proposed Administrative and Office Space Needs for the Proposed NDMA and NEOC.
Proposed Administrative and Office Space Needs Proposed Minimum Space Positions Accommodated
requirements Grade Number
Structure.
Office of the Director General Location Description
Office of the Director General NDMA HQ Office Space + Private meeting area. Director General (DG) Grade 15 1
Office of the Deputy Director General (Preparedness) NDMA HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Deputy Director General Grade 14 1
area. (Preparedness)
Office of the Deputy Director General (Response) NDMA HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Deputy Director General (Response) Grade 14 1
area.
Secretaries NDMA HQ Shared Office Space Secretaries Grade 4 3
Department of Policy Development & Research
Office of the Director (Policy Development and research) NDMA HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Director Policy Development & Grade 12 1
area. Research (DPDR)
Office of the Assistant Director (Policy and Research NDMA HQ Office Space + Assistant Director Policy and Strategy Grade 11 1
Departmental Office (Policy and Research) NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Senior Policy Analysts Grade 10 2
Area. Monitoring and Evaluation officer Grade 9 2
Research Assistants Grade 7 2
Department of Disaster Risk Reduction
Office of the Director Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) NDMA HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Director Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Grade 12 1
area
DRR Planning Unit.
Departmental Office (DRR Planning) NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director DRR Planning. Grade 11 1
Area Response Operations Planning Officer Grade 9 1
Public Education and Simulations Unit.
Office of the Assistant Director (Public Education & Simulations) NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director Public Education and Grade 11 1
Area Simulations
Public Education Unit Office NDMA HQ Open Sitting area + Training Room Public Education Officers Grade 9 16
RDMA Simulations Coordination Officer Grade 9 2
DDMA
Community Development Unit.
Office of the Assistant Director (Community Development) NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director Community Grade 11 1
Area Development
Office of the Regional/District CDOs. RDMA Office Space + File Registry or storage Regional/District Community Grade 9 16
DDMA Area Development Officers
Department of Training and Capacity Building.
107
Structure.
Office of the Assistant Director (Training and Capacity Building) NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director Training and Capacity Grade 11 1
Area Building
Training Unit RDMA Open Sitting area + Training Room Training and Capacity Building officers Grade 9 16
DDMA
Emergency Information Center (Call Center) Location Description 1
Office of the Director Emergency Operations NEOC HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Director Emergency Operations (DEO) Grade 12
area
Office of the Assistant Director (Emergency Information Center) NEOC HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director Emergency Grade 11 1
Area Information Center
Emergency Information center NEOC HQ Call Center Sitting area + Training Information Officers (Call Center) Grade 7 10
Room + Visual Monitoring facility
area + Navigable walk ways + Server
area.
GIS Monitoring Unit
GIS Monitoring and Coordination Unit Office NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director GIS Monitoring Unit Grade 11 1
NEOC HQ Area GIS Monitoring Officers Grade 7 2
Communications and Public Liaison Unit.
Office of the Assistant Director Communications and Public NEOC HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Assistant Director Communications and Grade 11 1
Liaison area Public Liaison Unit
Media Monitoring Unit Office NEOC HQ Open Sitting area + Visual Monitoring Senior Communications Officer Grade 10 1
facility area + Navigable walk ways Media Monitoring Officers Grade 7 4
Regional & District EOC Units.
Office of the Regional Emergency Operations Coordinator REOC Office Space + Small Private meeting Regional Emergency Operations Grade 10 4
RDMA area + Small Visual Monitoring Area coordinators.
Office of the District Emergency Operations Coordinator DDMA Office Space + Small Private meeting District Emergency Operations Grade 9 16
area Coordinators.
Situation Room.
Situation Room Coordinator NEOC HQ Open Sitting area + Visual Monitoring Assistant Director Situation Room Grade 11 1
facility area + Navigable walk ways
Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation Unit
108
Structure.
Office of the Assistant Director (Recovery and Rehabilitation Unit NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Assistant Director Recovery and Grade 11 1
Area + Small meeting area Rehabilitation Unit
R&R Project Management Unit Office NDMA HQ Shared Office Space + Storage R&R Project Management Officers. Grade 10 2
Finance and Administration Department

Office of the Director Finance and administration NDMA HQ Office Space + Small Private meeting Director Finance and Administration Grade 12 1
area (DF&A)
Finance and Accounting Department .
Department of Finance NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Senior Accountant Grade 11 5
Area Accounts Assistants Grade 7 16
Human Resources and Administration Dep’t.
Office of the Human Resources Management Officers NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Human Resources and Admin Manager Grade 11 1
Area
Office of the Regional Human Resources Officers RDMA Office Space + File Registry or storage Regional Human Resources and Admin Grade 10 4
Area officer
District Administration offices DDMA Office Space + File Registry or storage Administration Officer. Grade 7 16
Area
Procurement and Logistics Unit.
Office of the Head of Procurement and Logistics NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Procurement and Logistics Manager Grade 11 1
Area
Regional Logistics Offices RDMA Office Space + File Registry or storage Logistics Officers (Dispatch) Grade 5 4
Area
Regional Stores and Warehousing Facilities RDMA Storage and Warehousing space + Stores and Warehouse Keepers. Grade 5 6
Small Office area
IT Unit.
Department of IT Services NDMA HQ Shared Office Space + Storage Senior IT officer Grade 10 1
RDMA IT officers Grade 7 6
Legal and Compliance
Internal Audit Unit.
Office of the Head of Internal Audit NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Internal Auditor Grade 11 1
Area
Internal Audit Unit Office NDMA HQ Shared Office Space + Storage Senior Internal Auditor (SIA) Grade 10 2
RDMA Audit Assistants Grade 7 6
109
Structure.
Legal Unit
Office of the Head of Legal and Compliance Services NDMA HQ Office Space + File Registry or storage Legal and Compliance Officer Grade 11 1
Area
Legal Unit Office NDMA HQ Shared Office Space + Storage Senior Legal Officer Grade 10 1
Legal Assistant. Grade 7 1
Corporate Support Positions.
Nil NDMA HQ None Drivers (National, Regional and District) Grade 3 25
DDMA
Reception NDMA HQ Security checkpoint Area facility Security Officers (National, Regional Grade 3 6
RDMA and District level)
Staff Room NDMA HQ Kitchen, Pantry or convenience Cleaners (National, Regional and District Grade 2 6
RDMA Rooms. level)
110
Table 24: Proposed Administrative Mobility Needs for the NDMA/NEOC Operations
Job Grade Position No. of Administrative Departmental Motor Bikes Relief Trucks Delivery Van
Proposed Vehicle Utility Vehicle (Excel0 (Mercedes (Toyota
Staff (4Runners) Benz Artego) Hiace)
Office of the Director General
Grade 15 Director General (DG) 1 1
Grade 14 Deputy Director General (Preparedness) 1 1
Grade 14 Deputy Director General (Response) 1 1
Policy Development &Research
Grade 12 Director Policy Development & Research (DPDR) 1 1
Grade 11 Assistant Director Policy and Strategy 1 1
Disaster Risk Reduction
Grade 12 Director Disaster Risk Reduction (DDRR) 1 1 1
DRR Planning Unit.
Grade 11 Assistant Director DRR Planning. 1 1
Public Education and Simulations Unit
Grade 11 Assistant Director Public Education and Simulations 1 1
Grade 9 Public Education Officers 16 16
Grade 9 Simulations Coordination Officer 2 2
Community Development Unit.
Grade 11 Assistant Director Community Development 1 1
Grade 9 Regional/District Community Development Officers 16 16
Department of Training and Capacity Building.
Grade 11 Assistant Director Training and Capacity Building 1 1
Grade 9 Training and Capacity Building officers 16 16
Emergency Operations
Grade 12 Director Emergency Operations (DEO) 1 1 1
Emergency Information Center (Call Center)
Grade 11 Assistant Director Emergency Information Center 1 1
GIS Monitoring Unit
Grade 11 Assistant Director GIS Monitoring Unit 1 1
Communications and Public Liaison Unit.
Grade 11 Assistant Director Communications and Public Liaison Unit 1 1
Regional & District Emergency Operations Unit.
Grade 10 Regional Emergency Operations coordinators. 4 4
Grade 9 District Emergency Operations Coordinators. 16 16
111
Job Grade Position No. of Administrative Departmental Motor Bikes Relief Trucks Delivery Van
Proposed Vehicle Utility Vehicle (Excel0 (Mercedes (Toyota
Staff (4Runners) Benz Artego) Hiace)
Office of the Director General
Situation Room.
Grade 11 Assistant Director Situation Room 1 1
Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation Unit
Grade 11 Assistant Director Recovery and Rehabilitation Unit 1
Finance and Administration Department
Grade 12 Director Finance and Administration (DF&A) 1 1
Grade 11 Human Resources and Admin Manager 1 1
Grade 11 Procurement and Logistics Manager 1 1
Grade 5 Logistics Officers (Regional Dispatch) 4 4 6 6
Grade 11 Internal Auditor 1 1
Grade 11 Legal and Compliance Officer 1 1
Corporate Support Positions.

Grade 3 Security Officers (National, Regional and District level) 6 6
Total 24 6 72 6 6
112
Appendix 3: Proposed Mobile Emergency Communications Command & Control Center Specifications.
Minimum Capabilities Minimum Capabilities Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
(Component) (Metric)
Chassis Feet 48‘–53‘ custom trailer, bus 35‘–40‘ motorhome 25‘–35‘ Gas or diesel Converted SUV or
chassis, conventional chassis with or without motorhome chassis, or Travel Trailer, or 25‘–
cab/van chassis, or diesel slide-out room custom trailer (trailer does 40‘ custom built
motorhome chassis with or require additional tow trailer (trailer does
without slide-out room vehicle) require additional
tow vehicle)
Interior Workstations 6–10 workstations, with 4–6 workstations, with 2–4 workstations 1–2 workstations
private meeting area for private meeting are for
Command personnel Command personnel
Radio Frequency 1 Unit RF Communications with RF Communications with RF Communications with RF Communications
Transceivers adjoining agencies, State adjoining agencies, State adjoining agencies, State within jurisdiction
agencies through mutual aid agencies through mutual agencies through mutual and with adjoining
transceiver and any other aid transceiver and any aid transceiver agencies
frequencies other frequencies
Internet Access Speed High bandwidth capabilities High bandwidth Cellular system; Faxing Via cellular system
via satellite such as capabilities via satellite through cell or satellite (portable)
Video Teleconferencing N/A INMARSAT or V–Sat such as INMARSAT or V– system (4,800 bps)
High-Speed Fax Speed Sat; Faxing through cell or
satellite system (4,800
bps)
Voice Communications Type of System PBX office-style telephone PBX office-style telephone PBX office-style telephone Through individual
through Landlines, Cell Lines, system & Cellular PBX system & Cellular PBX system cell phones only
and Satellite. System (ML500 or similar) System (ML500 or similar)
On-Scene Video Monitoring. N/A Through Camera and video Through Camera and
System video System
Computer-Assisted Dispatch. N/A Yes Yes Yes.
Computer/Server N/A Hardwired and wireless LAN. Hardwired and wireless Hardwired and wireless Basic computer
Capabilities. Workstations should have LAN. Workstations should LAN. Workstations should systems only (power
Ethernet connection and have Ethernet connection have Ethernet connection source must be
113
Minimum Capabilities Minimum Capabilities Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
(Component) (Metric)
120 vac protected and 120 vac protected and 120 vac protected provided from
receptacle. All computer receptacle. All computer receptacle. All computer outside vehicle)
based software packages based software packages based software packages
pre-installed pre-installed pre-installed
Personnel Function IT Support, Driver/Operator IT Support, Driver/Operator Driver/Operator
with CDL certification, and Driver/Operator, and
Communications Support Communications Support
Deployment Capabilities All types should be capable of:
 Operating in environment with little to no basic services, including no electrical service, no phone lines, and
no cell towers
 Providing own power generation and fuel supply to operate a minimum of 3-4 days without refuelling
 Sustaining long term deployment as well as short-term responses
 Facilitating communications between multiple agencies (Federal, State, county, and municipal agencies)
 Operating as forward EOC
 Minimal set up time
 Serving basic personnel needs such as a bathroom, mini-refrigerator, microwave, and coffee maker where
space is available
Adopted from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency, November 2019.
114
Appendix 5: Concept of EoC Physical Infrastructure Needs and Requirements.
Proposed space Function Physical layout.
Management  To accommodate all designated Staff and
Designated administrative positions responsible for
Office space the EOC operations. The office and
with private administrative space should be sufficient
meeting Rooms in size to accommodate the required staff
members that may be present for a given
situation as determined by the
commander.
A fully equipped  To facilitate coordination and liaison with Figure 14: Layout of a Modern Emergency Situation Room..
National other National, Regional, District,
Situation Community and bub-group regulatory
Monitoring agencies and officials affected by the
room location and specific nature of the
incident.
115
EOC Operations  To accommodate members of the EoC

and Conference NDMA platform and Identified
facility representatives from local response
agencies, contractors, volunteer agencies,
and any other group with significant
response roles in emergency response
from the EOC. Extensive presentation,
communication data processing aids for
key personnel are maintained in the
operations room.
116
A media  for public information sources including
Monitoring TV, radio, and wire services to gather
room information on incidents and determine
accuracy of public information

An Emergency  to facilitate daily communications Figure 15: Layout of a Modern Emergency Information and Communications Center.
Information and between affected communities at the
Communications National, Regional, district and community
center level.

117
GIS Monitoring  Continuous monitoring, capture, store, Figure 16: Layout of a Simple Modern GIS Monitoring Unit.
Room. manipulate, analyze, manage, and present
spatial or geographic data
118
Training Media  Continuous training of EOC staff and key
and Public stakeholders drilled in the proper
Information processes and procedures for
Centre to coordinating full-scale emergency
facilitate response effort. The center will need to be
fitted with simulation equipment to
facilitate trainings for EoC staff.
Server room  Database and information security

purposes. Dedicated space is needed for
the electronic switching and computer
equipment. Generally, consider providing
a consolidated equipment room for all
telephone systems, network equipment,
computer servers, radio equipment,
audio-visual playing and distribution
equipment, recording equipment and
other electronic equipment needed to
serve the emergency response function.
119
120

Sierra Leone Capacity Needs Assessment For Emergency Preparedness and Response

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CAPACITY NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE.

CONTRACT NUMBER: SL-MOFED-97214-CS-CQS

Project Consultancy Services to Undertake a Capacity Needs Assessment for Emergency

Client Projects Fiduciary Management Unit, Ministry of Finance

Country Sierra Leone

Project Duration 13th August - 13th March 2020

Document Version Volume

Version Date 18th March 2020.

Final Submission Date

This report was made possible by the World Bank.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACC Adaptation to Climate Change

i) Legal and Institutional Arrangements.

ii) Information systems for Disaster Preparedness and Response.

iii) EP&R Infrastructure development Needs

iv) National Emergency Communications and Equipment Needs.

v) EP&R Personnel Requirement.

Summary of Recommendations and Capacity building Action.

Key EP&R Summary of Recommendations and Capacity building Action.

Key EP&R Summary of Recommendations and Capacity building Action.

2. Situational Assessment Of Drm Institutional Frameworks And Structures. ........................................................... 21

3. Ep&R Capacity Gaps And Establishment Needs Assessment. ............................................................................... 28

4. Recommendation Lessons Learned, Conclusion................................................................................................... 84

Figure 1: Frequency and Magnitude of Hazards in Sierra Leone. ........................................................................................ 21

Source: Global Climate Risk Index 20191

Rationale, Objective, and Scope of the Assignment.

Approach and Methodology.

1.2.1. Capacity Assessment Framework.

1.2.2. Research design, sample selection and data collection tools.

Table 2: List of Institutions Consulted During the Assessment.

Level of Institutions Contacted/ Interviewed

1.2.3. Data Analysis

2. Situational Assessment of DRM Institutional Frameworks and Structures.

Sierra Leone Multi-Hazard Profile.

 Hydro-meteorological hazards: floods, hailstorm, windstorm and lightning

Figure 1: Frequency and Magnitude of Hazards in Sierra Leone.

Source: Sierra Leone Hazard Profile, Harpis 2018.

Figure 2: Illustration of Hazard Profile and Most Affected Communities 2014-2019

Source: Sierra Leone Hazard Profile 2018.

Social-Demographic Context, Exposure, and Vulnerability.

Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Total Population by District 2004 - 2015 Census.

Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census.

Table 4: Population Density in Sierra Leone by Region.

Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census

Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census.

Table 6: Percent female population 15-49 years by region and district

Source: Statistics Sierra Leone, 2015 Population and Housing Census.

Table 7: Multidimensional Poverty by Regions, 2017

Source: Sierra Leone Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019.

Figure 3: Five Year Trajectory of Sierra Leones WRI indicator Scores.

20.00 14.65 14.65 16.23

World Risk Index (WRI Ranking) Exposure Vulnerability

Susceptibility Lack of Coping Capacities Lack of Adaptive capacities.

Impact of Recent Disasters on Economic Growth.

Source: World Bank, Arup, Intergems, 2017.

Figure 5: Real GDP Growth per Annum (Sierra Leone)

Source: Trading Economics, Statistics Sierra Leone, 2019.

3. EP&R Capacity Gaps and Establishment Needs Assessment.

Legal and Institutional Frameworks for EP&R

3.1.1. Legal Arrangements for Disaster Preparedness and Response.

 The National Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan; 2006

 Focus area 1: DRM Legal and Strategic Framework

3.1.2. Gaps in the existing Legal and institutional arrangements.