1990

In 1990, 24 percent of GNP and 12 percent of employment were derived from manufacturing. The services sector, a
residual employer, increased its share of the work force from about 25 percent in 1960 to 40 percent in 1990. In 1990
services accounted for 44 percent of GNP.

The Philippines is rich in natural resources. Land planted in rice and corn accounted for about 50 percent of the 4.5
million hectares of field crops in 1990. Another 25 percent of the cultivated area was taken up by coconuts, a major
export crop. Sugarcane, pineapples, and Cavendish bananas also were important earners of foreign exchange. Forest
reserves have been extensively exploited to the point of serious depletion. Archipelagic Philippines is surrounded by a
vast aquatic resource base. In 1990 fish and other seafood from the surrounding seas provided more than half the
protein consumed by the average Filipino household. The Philippines also had vast mineral deposits. In 1988 the country
was the world's tenth largest producer of copper, the sixth largest producer of chromium, and the ninth largest
producer of gold. The country's only nickel mining company was expected to resume operation in 1991 and again
produce large quantities of that metal. Petroleum exploration continued but discoveries were minimal, and the country
was required to import most of its oil.

2000

There was a sense of optimism when Joseph Estrada was elected. Investors shared this sense of hope and initially
poured money into the Philippines but it didn’t take long for this optimism to evaporate. Foreign investors were turned
off by cronyism, scandals and favoritism towards Philippines companies. Estrada moved to tighten securities regulations,
liberalize the trade of grains and privatize the electricity industry. His effort to change laws limiting foreign ownership of
businesses to 40 percent was halted by his impeachment trial.

In the end Estrada proved to be a friend of big business. He revived the culture of corruption and was plagued by
charges of cronyism. This was on top of inconsistent monetary policy, slow economic growth, and uncertainty brought
about by terrorists and insurgencies. He said he was a friend of the poor yet he failed to launch one meaningful anti-
poverty program. Most of his efforts consisted of parading around with movie stars that were reminiscent of what
Imelda Marcos did. There also wasn’t much of an effort to pave roads, set up irrigations projects or build school or
collect taxes to pay for them.

From a 0.6% decline in 1998, GDP expansion picked up in 1999 (3.4%) and 2000 (4.4%). The peso (PHP) suffered from
sharp depreciations in its value from 1997 to 2000. The peso fell from PHP 26.28 to the US dollar in 1996 to PHP 39.97 in
1997, PHP 40.25 in 1999, and PHP 49.95 in 2000. The currency slide in 2000 had been attributed to the exodus of
investments from the Philippines, which media and some economists blamed on Estrada’s political and economic
leadership.

As Estrada became embroiled in scandal, the peso, the stock markets and confidence in the Philippines as a place to
invest dropped as did his approval ratings dropped. Foreign companies like Philips Electronics and Johnson & Johnson
pulled out of the Philippines. After his ouster in 2001 he left behind a huge budget deficit and debt payments that were
double what the country sent on health, education and agriculture combined. The sick man of Asia was sicker than ever.

2020

Global growth is projected at –4.9 percent in 2020, 1.9 percentage points below the April 2020 World Economic Outlook
(WEO) forecast. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a more negative impact on activity in the first half of 2020 than
anticipated, and the recovery is projected to be more gradual than previously forecast.

As with the April 2020 WEO projections, there is a higher-than-usual degree of uncertainty around this forecast. The
baseline projection rests on key assumptions about the fallout from the pandemic. In economies with declining infection
rates, the slower recovery path in the updated forecast reflects persistent social distancing into the second half of 2020;
greater scarring (damage to supply potential) from the larger-than-anticipated hit to activity during the lockdown in the
first and second quarters of 2020; and a hit to productivity as surviving businesses ramp up necessary workplace safety
and hygiene practices. For economies struggling to control infection rates, a lengthier lockdown will inflict an additional
toll on activity. Moreover, the forecast assumes that financial conditions—which have eased following the release of
theApril 2020 WEO—will remain broadly at current levels. Alternative outcomes to those in the baseline are clearly
possible, and not just because of how the pandemic is evolving. The extent of the recent rebound in financial market
sentiment appears disconnected from shifts in underlying economic prospects—as the June 2020 Global Financial
Stability Report (GFSR) Update discusses—raising the possibility that financial conditions may tighten more than
assumed in the baseline