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Study of Blackouts on Ethiopian Electric

Power Network and Identification of
System Vulnerabilities
A Presentation for the Partial fulfillment of the requirements for
MSc Degree in Electrical Power Engineering at AAiT, SECE
By: Moges Alemu

Advisor: Dr. –Ing Getachew Biru Worku
October 2017
Presentation Outlines
• Background
• Objective
• Methodology
• Blackout data Analysis
• Modeling and Simulation
• System Vulnerabilities
• Mitigation Methods
• Conclusions and Recommendations
29-Oct-17 AAiT, School of Elect. & Comp. Engineering, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 2
1. Background
Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP)

• Constructing & maintaining generation plants, HV TLs
& Substations.
• Main HV levels of transmission: 132 kV, 230 kV, and
400 kV (500 KV on the way to come).
• 230KV and 400 KV TLs are the most important.
• Interconnects seven regional power systems – N, NW,
S, SW, E, W, and AA & Central regions
1. Background…
EEP
• Installed capacity = 4390 MW
• Peak load = 2164 MW
• National Load Dispatch Center (NLDC) Has
jurisdiction to control the HV
• Substations
• Transmission lines
• Power plants
• Transnational exchange
• Sudan
• Djibouti
1. Background…
• EEP has been operating & managing the ICS with:
– Dispersed and geographically isolated generators,
– Complex transmission lines,
– Aged and scattered infrastructure combined with an increasing
demand in electricity consumption:
» Industrialization
» Rural electrification through UEAP
» EPS has suffered wide spread blackouts and become vulnerable
to cascading events, even for minor disturbances.
• Blackouts [Ethiopian context]:
– When the loss of electricity covers one or more regions: “Partial
Blackout” [40-80 %].
– when the loss of electricity encompasses more than 80 % of the
country: “Total Blackouts”
– 49 blackouts occurred since 2013 to mid of 2016.
1. Background…
Problem statement
• These blackouts have a great impact on the industrial

and socio-economic development of the nation.
• This has became a problem that needs to be solved
through research.
• Analyzing and studying the reasons and the
mechanisms of these blackouts would be the first step
for blackout prevention/mitigation and so,
• This study aims at evaluating the large scale blackouts in
Ethiopian power grid.
• Identify system vulnerabilities.
• Evaluating mitigation techniques.
2. Objectives
• General objective
– Ascertain & investigate major blackouts that occurred in
the past and identify system vulnerabilities.
• Specific objectives
– Collect detail data of the past blackouts and put it into
context,
– Investigate the root causes of blackouts,
– Identify sequence of events and linkage of the causes to
specific system weaknesses,
– Identify the system vulnerabilities in the grid,
– Propose possible solutions to mitigate blackouts.
3. Methodology
Data Collection Data Analysis
- Obtain blackout data from NLDC • Analysis and systematic collation of
archive. blackouts data
- Interviewing and review of • For each Blackout (specific date, time,
records/reports. etc..)
- Data collected from Feb 2016 to mid of  Review of operational policies
July 2016.  Sequence of events
 The effects of the faults – the scope
Perform Computer Simulations and extent of the disturbance.
 The cause of the disturbance
Modeling
Identify system vulnerabilities  Modeling of SLD of the interconnected
power system
 Modeling of network components
Propose mitigation methods and draw (transmission lines, transformers,
conclusions generators, loads, etc…) using
DIgSILENT PowerFactory
4. Blackout Data Analysis
The analyses of blackouts are carried

out based on:
• Pre-disturbance conditions
• The type of initiating events
• The cascading events
• Final state of the system
• Blackouts trend and indices
4. Blackout Data Analysis…
Pre-disturbance conditions
• System condition was stressful during peak hours
• Some important components out of service and/or
planned outages.
• Aging equipment, loosely reconnect conductors & out-
dated relay settings.
• Natural reasons such as drought, Lack of trimming, fire,
landslide, etc…
Initiating Events
• Short circuits (51.35 %)
• Loss of power plants (16.22 %)
• Overloads (13.51 %)
• Switching and temporary transients
(10.81 %)
• Protection & communication failures
(8.11 %)
Blackouts Trend
• It is the average number of blackouts
happening per year.
• Blackout trend of EEP is 14 blackouts per year.
• E. Bombard et al [71] had analysed the
blackout trends (from 1965 to 2011).
• USA = 1.13 blackouts per year
• UCTE grid = 0.81 blackouts per year.
Blackout Indices
• Four significant blackout indices.
• Numbers of customers without service: (2015 &
2016: maximum being 4.2 million (100 %))
• Lost load (MW): largest lost load being 1401.04 MW
(Nov 28th 2015) & the lowest being 455 MW (15th Jan
2015).
• Blackout time duration: ranges from 2 hours to 22
hours.
4. Blackout Data Analysis …
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑊ℎ
𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒 =
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 (𝑀𝑊)
Table 3-17 Disturbance Severity Classification [73]

Classification Severity Interpretation
(Level) (System-minute)
0 <1 Acceptable
1 1 to 10 Not severe
2 10 to 100 Severe
3 100 to 1000 Very severe
4 >1000 Catastrophic
• Severity (system-minute): 81.25 % of blackouts were “SEVERE”

and 18.75 % of the blackouts were “VERY SEVERE”.
5. Modeling and Simulation
• The network models for this study are modelled by using
DIgSILENT PowerFactory Software.
• “DIgSILENT” – stands for “DIgital SImuLation of Electrical
NeTworks”.
• Developed by DIgSILENT GmbH, a company in Germany.
• PowerFactory is one of the prominent computer aid
engineering software for
» planning,
» designing, and
» operation of power system.
• It has a vast range of library to model electrical power
component and different tools for detail analysis.
Figure 4-1 Screen grab for PowerFactory software
Components List
Power system functions
5. Modeling & Simulation …
• PowerFactory has an inbuilt model of:
– Transmission lines, Generators, transformers, loads, etc…
• Input parameters:
Component(s) Parameters
Transmission lines Rated I, V, f; length & type; Parameters: R, X, C.
Generators Rated: V & capacity in MVA, PF , LF type, P & Q
limits, sub-transient & transient reactances.
Transformers No. of phases, rated MVA & frequency, rated voltage
(HV & LV), positive & zero sequence impedance, X/R
ratio, vector group, Tap settings (if any).
Loads P, V, PF, scaling factor, balanced/unbalanced, No. of
phases, AC/DC load.
Shunt compensators Nominal voltage, rated reactive power, # of steps,
Type and shunt controller
5. Modelling & Simulation…
The following technical analyses have
been carried out in the simulation:
• Power flow simulations to analyse system
performance under steady state conditions. The
aim is to determine:
• Voltage magnitude at the buses under steady
state and contingency conditions.
• Line, transformer and generator loadings under
steady state and contingency conditions.
• Time domain simulations (RMS) to analyse
system performance under transient conditions.
• To study the stability issues of the generating
units for disturbances.
January 6th 2016 Blackout
a) System Condition prior to the disturbance
• GG II HPP was constituted 27 % of the total generation

• Windy and rainy weather around GG II HPP
• No sufficient rainfall to fed the reservoirs of Awash II & III,
Koka and Tekeze HPPs.
• Voltages at some critical buses were deviating from 1.0
pu.
• The grid loss accounted 34.89 MW.
Figure 4-7 Voltages of critical buses prior to disturbance
1.08
1.06
1.06
1.04
1.04 1.03
1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01
VOLTAGE IN P.U
1.01
1 1
1 1
1 0.99 0.99
0.98
0.98 0.97
0.96 0.96 0.96
0.96
0.94
0.92
0.9
BUS NAME
b) Initiating Event
• A 3-phase to ground SC fault (3L-G) on GG II_Sekoru 400kV line at a
distance 7.8km from Sekoru s/s.
• Simulation is performed to see system behavior before, during and
after the disturbance has been cleared.
i) Before the disturbance
• The synchronous speed (𝜔𝑠 ) was synchronised to 1.0 pu
• The rotor angles of HPP generators prior to the initiating event
• No generator was overloaded.
• The terminal voltages & reactive powers of HPP generators were within limits
b) Electrical power O/p

a) Rotor Angle
HPP Generators 𝛿𝑖0 (radians)
Beles (Gr1, Gr2, Gr3, Gr4) -0.32
Fincha (Gr1, Gr2, Gr3, Gr4) -0.382
GG III (Gr1) -0.738
GG II (Gr1, Gr2, Gr3, Gr4) -0.738
Awash III (Gr2) -1.491
Koka (Gr1, Gr2) -1.041
Tekeze (Gr1) -0.777
GG I (Gr1, Gr2) -0.635
Melkawakena (Gr4) -0.911
ii) During the disturbance
Generally, speed of HPP generators
increased
GG I & GG II
• GG I & GG II HPP generators were
accelerating fast (1.011 pu =
50.55 Hz)
• GG III and Awash III HPP gen
speeds’ not much (1.003 pu =
50.15 Hz)
• Those generators near to the
disturbance were accelerating
faster than remote generators.
• The same logic applies for the
terminal voltage.
𝟐𝑯𝒊 𝒅𝝎
= 𝑷𝒎𝒊 − 𝑷𝒆𝒊 ,
𝝎𝒔 𝒅𝒕
ii) During the disturbance…
• The terminal voltages of GG I & GG II HPP generators were dipped below 0.4 pu
• The voltages at GG III, Awash III & Melkawakena HPP generators were sagged below
0.7 pu.
• Voltages at Tekeze, Fincha & Beles HPP gene terminals were declined to 0.86 pu
• Reactive power exceeds limit.
a) Terminal voltage b) Reactive power
ii) During the disturbance…
• The electrical power output (𝑃𝑒𝑖 )
of each HPP generator
decreasing drastically.
• The turbine power input (𝑃𝑚𝑖 ) of
each generator was constant.
• 𝑃𝑚𝑖 > 𝑃𝑒𝑖 for each HPP
generators, the generator’s
speed was increased.
𝟐𝑯𝒊 𝒅𝝎
= 𝑷𝒎𝒊 − 𝑷𝒆𝒊 ,
𝝎𝒔 𝒅𝒕
ii) During the disturbance:
• The voltages at Sekoru & GG II 400kV were collapsed (0.015 pu)
• The voltages at critical buses found at AA region were dipped below 0.60 pu
• The voltages at Tekeze 230kV, B/Dar II 230kV and Beles 400kV buses were
sagged to 0.84 pu.
January 6th 2016 Blackout ….
iii) After the fault has been cleared:
• Standard setting requirements of protective relays for an

earth fault proposed for EEP by SINO HYDRO Corporation
Ltd., is taken.
• A fault clearing time of 150 ms – 450 ms is used.
iii) After the fault has been cleared with 150 ms
• The speed of generators were recovered to the normal
operating ranges with damped oscillations.
• The terminal voltages were recovered to steady state
values.
• The reactive powers supplied were also within limits.
• The voltages at critical buses were returned to the acceptable
operating ranges.
• The frequency deviation observed were within limits.
• The voltages across and the currents through GG II_Sebeta II
400kV and GG I _Sekoru 230kV lines within the ranges
a) Currents b) Voltages
c) Cascading Events
• For a fault clearing time of 150 ms:
– No overloaded equipment was observed on the system
– The parameters of each component (generators, lines, etc.)
and buses are within limits
• The system survivability was up to a fault clearing time of 400ms
(obtained from the simulation results).
• However, if the fault clearance time reached to 450ms, the
system would no longer be survived.
• The sequence of cascading events observed on the SCADA and
the simulation result obtained are synonymous for a fault clearing
time of 450ms.
c) Cascading Events….cont’d
• The speed of GG II HPP was GG II & GG III

reached to 1.039 pu (51.95 Hz) at
around 0.532 seconds.
SE-1
• The speed of GG III HPP was shot

to 1.039 pu at around 0.718
seconds.
• The speed of Awash III HPP was
1.037 pu (51.85 Hz) at around
0.718 seconds.
• These HPP generators tripped by
Overfrequency (OF) protections.
Figure 4-14: Generators speed for a fault clearing time of 450 ms

c) Cascading Events….
After SE-1,
• As GG II HPP generators had tripped, the system
lost 27 % of the total generation.
• The balance between the load and the generated
power had been violated
• The system frequency had been deteriorated
• The voltages at critical buses (load buses) were
depressed
• The system entered into the emergency
conditions
After SE-1,
Figure 4-17 Speed and rotor angle profiles of HPP generators after SE-1
After SE-1,
• The remaining generators were overloaded (exceeds 1.0 pu).
• Reverse power flow on GG I HPP (- 0.616 pu at 1.106 sec). (Figure b)
SE-2 • The voltage across GG II_Sebeta II 400kV line was increased to 1.172
pu after 1.651 seconds. ( Figure a) (b)
(a) GG II_Sebeta II 400kV
Overload
GG I (P = - 0.616 pu)
After SE-2:
• The remaining generators were
overloaded
• Their speed reached 0.925 pu
(46.25 Hz)
– MW tripped by OC
– Koka tripped by UF
– The remaining generators
tripped by UF
After SE-2…
• The voltages at critical buses
were worsened.
– Kality I 230kV, Legetafo 230 kV,
Sekoru 400kV & Gefersa 230kV Voltage sag
bus voltages were decreased
below 0.90 pu.
– At this condition there was no
way to restore the system.
– The cascade tripping continued
till the system was collapsed
within 60 seconds.
c) Cascading Events…..
Summary of the analysis
High-speed fault clearing: is crucial for preventing blackouts

from happening
• The amount of kinetic energy gained by the generators during a
fault is directly proportional to the fault duration.
• The reduction of the clearing time results in a reduction in the
accelerating area and an increase in the possible deceleration
area.
• Consequently, the stability is enhanced.
Summary of Simulation Results
N.B: More simulation results and discussions are included in the
study.
• From the analysis, most of the causes were linked to the ff technical problems:
Blackout Major Cause(s)

January 6th • Slow breaker action/poor relay settings
2016 • The fault was not cleared as fast as possible
December • Incorrect planned interruption
11th 2015
December • Violation of N-1 security criterion
22nd 2015 • The N-1 contingency provision prior to the disturbance
has already been availed as one of the double line of
Sululta_Gefersa 230 kV was under shut down
August 14th • Poor protection system coordination + negligence/lack of
2015 awareness
6. System Vulnerabilities
• Vulnerability Analysis: involves studying the effect of
the removal of a system component on the entire grid.
– 1st : the most severe line outages are identified using
performance indices (PIs)
» Performance Indices (PIs):
• Evaluate the relative severity of a line outage.
• Active power performance index (PIp ) & Voltage
performance index (PIv ).
– 2nd : Contingency analysis is performed for the most
severe lines to identify the weak areas of the grid.
» Contingency analysis: the analysis of abnormal system
conditions (bus voltage violations & component
overloading.)
Active power Performance Index (PIp )
𝑵𝒍 𝟐𝒏
𝑾 𝑷𝒍
𝐏𝐈𝐏 = ෍
𝟐𝒏 𝑷𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝒍
𝒍=𝟏
• Where:
• 𝑃𝑙 is the MW flow of line 𝑙
• 𝑃𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥 - is the MW capacity limit of line 𝑙
• 𝑊 – Real power weighting factor (in general, 𝑊 = 1)
• n- a positive number (n = 1, 2, 3… etc...). If n is a large number,
the 𝑃𝐼𝑃 will be a small number if flows are within limits and it
will be large if one or more lines are overloaded
𝐈𝐟 𝐏𝐈𝐩 ≥ 𝟏. 𝟎 𝒑𝒖, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒂𝒊𝒅 𝒕𝒐 𝒃𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆
Voltage Performance Index (PIv )
𝑵𝑩 𝒔𝒑 𝟐𝒏
𝑽𝒊 − 𝑽𝒊
𝐏𝐈𝐯 = ෍ 𝒘ൗ𝟐𝒏 𝒔𝒑
𝑽𝒊
𝒊=𝟏
• Where:
• 𝑉𝑖 is the voltage magnitude corresponding to bus i
𝑠𝑝
• 𝑉𝑖 Specified voltage magnitude corresponding to bus i
• 𝑁𝐵 - Number of buses in the system voltage magnitude
either below a specified minimum or above a specified
maximum
• 𝑤 - Real non-negative weighting factor (in general 𝑤 = 1)
𝑰𝒇 𝐏𝐈𝐯 ≥ 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐 𝒑𝒖, 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒍𝒊𝒏𝒆 𝒊𝒔 𝒔𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒆
6. System Vulnerabilities…cont’d
Analysis Results of PIs

• Ranking is performed for the most severe line
outages by considering:
• A loading violations of 100 % and
• Voltage violations outside the range 0.90 pu to
1.1 pu.
• The main weaknesses of the transmission
network are on the lines feeding Addis Ababa
region.
Figure 5-1 Line outages ranked in terms of 𝐏𝐈𝐩
8
7.3238
6 Line loading performance Index (PI)

5.041 5.041 5.041
5
4 3.591
3.523
3.169
3 2.537
2.381
1.83
2 1.641
1.559
1.337
1.15
1.093 1.045 1.023
1
AAiT, School of Elect. & Comp. Engineering,

29-Oct-17 45
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Figure 5-2 Line outages ranked in terms of 𝐏𝐈𝐯
0.12 0.1124
0.1 Voltage Performance Index (PIv)

0.0906 0.0906
0.087
0.08
0.065
0.06 0.055
0.0472
0.0433
0.04 0.0374 0.0356
0.034
0.0313
0.0261 0.0261 0.0254 0.0254 0.0254
0.022
0.02
AAiT, School of Elect. & Comp. Engineering,

29-Oct-17 46
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
6. System Vulnerabilities ….cont’d
• Contingency Analysis results
– Base case simulation
» Koka 10.5/15/132 kV transformers were overloaded
• (their capacity did not matched with the generators)
• These transformers should be upgraded through
rehabilitation projects.
» No voltage violation exists,
» The HPP gens are operating at, or close their specified limits
(P, Q, V).
– Contingency simulation results:
» Several violations with respect to components overloading
and bus voltage are observed
» With these violations, it is unlikely that the system would be
able to operate
Figure 5-5 Vulnerabilities ranked based on number of outages
that lead to voltage limit violations of buses
12
11 11
10
9 9
6 6 6
6
5 5 5
4 4 4
4
3
2 2 2
2
1 1 1
Number of outages lead to out of limit voltages
Table 5-3 Vulnerabilities ranked based on number of outages lead to overloads
Overloaded elements Number of outages lead to overload Highest percentage loading
Combolcha _Tr (230/132kV) 12 204.1
Kality I_Akaki I 132kV line I 12 119.9
Kality I_Akaki I 132kV line II 12 119.9
Gefersa_Addis North 132kV line 6 129.9
Cotobie_Weregenu TP 132kV Lin 5 141.9
Sebeta I_Mekanisa 132kV line 4 164.2
Gefersa_Kality I 132kV line 3 109.6
Ghedo_230/132/15kV Tr 2 213.7
Legetafo_Ayat GIS 132kV line 2 137.6
Cotobie_Ayat GIS 132kV line 2 137
Sekoru_230/132kV Tr 2 133.1
Alamata_Combolcha 230kV line 1 149.7
D/Markos 400/230kV Tr 1 135.7
Cotobie_Addis East II 132kV line 1 124.4
Sululta 400/230kV Tr1 1 117.6
Sululta 400/230kV Tr2 1 117.6
Combolcha_Legetafo 230kV line 1 107.7
BDR_TR1 (400/230kV) 1 102
BDR_TR2 (400/230kV) 1 102
Metu_230/66/15kV Tr 1 101.5
6. System Vulnerabilities…cont’d
Summary of vulnerability analysis..
• Most of the severe lines are those lines feeding the

Central and Addis Ababa regions (high load centers).
• Most of the network vulnerabilities wrt bus voltage
violations and component overloadings are occurred on
those buses & components found at high load centers.
• The EEP transmission network security is much weaker
and violates the N-1 security criterion.
7. Mitigation Methods
• The vulnerability analysis and the blackout simulation studies
proved that most of the system collapses were linked to the ff
problems :
– Poor protection system coordination, Breaker not fast enough to clear
the fault, Poor planned outages, and
– Violation of the N-1 criterion and other security rules outlined in the
operating policy guidelines of EEP.
• not having additional paths (double circuit lines) for the major lines.
• Not using EMS/SCADA at major s/s (e.g. Sebeta I & Gefersa).
• Therefore, the better way of mitigating the impacts of the
disturbances are:
– High-speed fault clearing, Fine protection system coordination,
proper planned interruptions, and adhering to the security rules.
7. Mitigation Methods……
i) Carry out planned interruptions based on power

system studies
• Planned outages are important to maintain the system intact if

and only if they are carried out with detailed power system
studies.
• However, the planned interruptions of December 11, 2015 were
caused system collapse.
• The planned interruption of Gelan 400kV and 230kV buses for
the aim of voltage regulation was weakening the system.
• Here, a simulation is performed with Gelan 400kV and 230kV bus
bars energized.
7. Mitigation Methods….cont’d
• The speed of HPP generators were
returned to the normal operating ranges.
• No overdamped oscillation on GG III HPP
gen.
• The terminal voltages were synchronized
to 1.0 pu
• The voltage across Sebeta I _Mekanisa 132kV line once dipped to 0.5 pu during
the disturbance and returned well above 0.92 pu.
• The current through it was returned to 0.85 pu.
• No overloaded line was seen after the fault has cleared
7. Mitigation Methods…cont’d
• The currents through and the voltages across
transformers were within acceptable ranges.
• No power system parameters would exceed
limits.
• Hence the planned interruptions of 11th
December 2015 was bad decision
 All the solution methods are tested,

and the results indicated that they can
reduce the impacts of disturbances.
8. Conclusions & Recommendations
• In simple terms, what has been observed in this
study:
– The EEP system has been susceptible to blackouts and is
vulnerable to cascading events.
– The major causes being linked to
» poor protection system coordination,
» Slow fault clearing/ technical,
» Incorrect planned interruptions,
» Violation of the n-1 criterion and other security rules of EEP.
– Therefore, EEP has to explore the proposed showcased
solutions to:
» Deliver reliable power to the customers,
» Contribute its part for the industrial & socio-economic
development of the country.

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AAiT

Study of Blackouts on Ethiopian Electric

By: Moges Alemu

Ethiopian Electric Power (EEP)

• These blackouts have a great impact on the industrial

The analyses of blackouts are carried

Table 3-17 Disturbance Severity Classification [73]

• Severity (system-minute): 81.25 % of blackouts were “SEVERE”

Power system functions

a) System Condition prior to the disturbance

• GG II HPP was constituted 27 % of the total generation

b) Electrical power O/p

iii) After the fault has been cleared:

• Standard setting requirements of protective relays for an

• The speed of GG II HPP was GG II & GG III

• The speed of GG III HPP was shot

Figure 4-14: Generators speed for a fault clearing time of 450 ms

Summary of the analysis

High-speed fault clearing: is crucial for preventing blackouts

Blackout Major Cause(s)

Analysis Results of PIs

6 Line loading performance Index (PI)

AAiT, School of Elect. & Comp. Engineering,

0.1 Voltage Performance Index (PIv)

AAiT, School of Elect. & Comp. Engineering,

Number of outages lead to out of limit voltages

Summary of vulnerability analysis..

• Most of the severe lines are those lines feeding the

i) Carry out planned interruptions based on power

• Planned outages are important to maintain the system intact if

 All the solution methods are tested,

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