Survival

Global Politics and Strategy

ISSN: 0039-6338 (Print) 1468-2699 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20

Israel’s Four Fronts

Daniel Byman

To cite this article: Daniel Byman (2019) Israel’s Four Fronts, Survival, 61:2, 167-188, DOI:
10.1080/00396338.2019.1589094

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1589094

Published online: 19 Mar 2019.

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Israel’s Four Fronts
Daniel Byman

Most observers seem to agree that Israel faces war, but they disagree on
where war will occur. Israel is beset on every border. The International
Crisis Group (ICG) warns that Israel and Hamas are in perpetual tension
and once again ‘on the brink’ of a full-scale confrontation in Gaza.1 Marwan
Muasher, Jordan’s former foreign minister, argues that a third intifada in
the West Bank is ‘very likely’.2 A senior US intelligence officer sees ‘real
potential’ that Israel might go to war with the Lebanese militia Hizbullah,
and that such a war could drag in Iran and other regional powers.3 Even if
Israel dodges those three bullets, Ehud Yaari, a respected Israeli analyst,
assesses war between Iran and Israel in Syria as ‘almost inevitable’.4 The
Trump administration’s decision to withdraw US forces from Syria and
chaotic regional diplomacy are further complications, removing a steady-
ing force in the region and pushing Israel to take more matters into its
own hands.
Yet the situation is not as dire as it might seem. Israel has always had
to balance multiple foes and the risks of simultaneous conflicts. After the
state’s founding in 1948, its leaders wrestled with the threat of renewed war
from neighbouring countries and the threat of terrorism. Over the years, the
dangers have evolved. Although it is highly unlikely that Israel will be wiped
off the map by invading armies given its superior military capabilities, the

Daniel Byman (@dbyman) is a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. This article draws on several short pieces written for lawfareblog.com.

Survival | vol. 61 no. 2 | April–May 2019 | pp. 167–188DOI 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589094

168 | Daniel Byman

potential for lower-level conflict on multiple fronts remains. Indeed, Israel is

quite likely to use limited military force on a regular basis in the months and
years to come. But there is a reasonable chance that it can avoid an all-out
war and limit conflict to sporadic military campaigns.
In Lebanon, the most formidable of Israel’s foes, Hizbullah, has thou-
sands of skilled fighters battle-hardened by combat in neighbouring
Syria and a massive rocket arsenal that can threaten all of Israel. Unrest
in the West Bank, though marginal since the collapse of the second inti-
fada a decade ago, is a standing concern, with the relatively cooperative
Palestinian Authority (PA) that rules there weak and discredited. In Gaza,
Hamas remains hostile to Israel, but it too is weak and hardly eager for
another round of fighting with the powerful Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
Violence might erupt there, however, should Hamas decide that it must
gain world attention or disrupt efforts to further isolate it. Syria is the
latest threat and a potential wild card. Although the civil war has weak-
ened President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which never reconciled with
Israel, Iran and Hizbullah are exploiting Syria’s instability, and Israelis
fear the country will become a more potent source of Iranian influence and
attacks – essentially another Lebanon.
Israel must also reckon with potentially troubling new actors such as
Russia and a supportive but unpredictable United States that appears
committed to reducing its role in the region. Barack Obama was wary of
entanglements in the Middle East. President Donald Trump not only har-
bours comparable unease, but, unlike Obama, he is openly sceptical about
the value of US military deployments abroad. Even after Trump departs,
the US is less likely to be a stabilising influence in the Middle East than it
was prior to the Iraq invasion and occupation in 2003. Its policy towards
Israel will see-saw, often with fewer restraints on Israel, which makes self-
defeating policies from Jerusalem more likely.
Israel still needs to prepare for conflicts on all fronts, ranging from
massive rocket attacks from Lebanon to less lethal provocations from Gaza.
At times, this will require Israel to strike its enemies from the air or other-
wise use limited force. However, if Israel is to avoid the worst, it should try
to bolster the PA and those Palestinians more supportive of peace. In Syria,
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 169

Israel will have to build up its deterrent posture against Iran, as it has done
against Hizbullah in Lebanon. This is likely to require regular uses of force
but also care to ensure that violence does not escalate or provoke interna-
tional terrorism against Israel.
The Israelis should also try to drive a wedge between Tehran and
Damascus. At times, this will mean military strikes and other limited uses
of force to enforce Israel’s red lines. Beyond that, Israel may need to prod
Moscow to use its influence with Damascus. The Israeli government should
also change its policy towards the United States, moving away from its
embrace of the Republican Party to a more even-handed approach. Ideally,
the Trump administration would in turn become more even-handed,
restraining Israel from its worst impulses, and acting as a stabilising force
in the region. So far, however, the White House appears eager to make the
regional situation more rather than less dangerous.

A fourth war with Hamas?

The summer 2018 fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza was the
latest exchange that the Israeli military and others worried could esca-
late into a full-blown war.5 Israel clashed with Hamas in Gaza in 2008–09,
2012 and 2014, losing almost 100 soldiers and civilians, and inflicting more
than 3,000 fatalities in response to Hamas’s rocket attacks and other prov-
ocations. Some of the Palestinian dead were Hamas members, but many
were civilians, with the balance hotly disputed. Between 2014 and 2018,
Israel regularly bombed Gaza to stop rocket attacks and punish Hamas
– operations the Israeli military calls the ‘campaign between the wars’.6
Palestinian political scientist and former minister Ghassan Khatib has
warned that ‘the situation in Gaza is unsustainable. It has to explode in
one way or another.’7
The ICG notes that a conflict could arise for several reasons.8 A Hamas
operation meant to provoke Israel or retaliate for an Israeli strike could be
unexpectedly bloody, causing serious casualties on the Israeli side and trig-
gering a wide response. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, facing
domestic political difficulties, might favour a significant military operation
in the months leading up to an election to shore up political support. Or
170 | Daniel Byman

Hamas might decide that a confrontation, even one it will lose, is preferable
to the status quo because it will focus international attention on Gaza.
Yet the uneasy peace since 2014 suggests that a conflagration is not inevi-
table, and if it were to occur could probably be contained. Hamas has few
means to challenge Israel directly, and its indirect methods, such as dem-
onstrations and flaming kites, are reaping few lasting rewards. Hamas is
failing at governance and diplomatically isolated, and retains relative politi-
cal strength only because alternative and more peaceful Palestinian voices
are even more discredited. It may again try to attack Israel, but the result is
likely to be a punishing Israeli response that leads to a brief international
outcry but no change that benefits Hamas.
Hamas has been unable to govern Gaza effectively and win over
Palestinians through administrative competence. Egypt and Israel have
imposed a tight blockade, and the PA has successfully used its control
over much of the money going to the Palestinian community to under-
mine Hamas.9 The PA has also assumed control of Gaza’s border crossing,
depriving Hamas of the taxes it once collected at the terminals. The Trump
administration cut funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,
which has provided food for many Gazans. Blackouts are common in Gaza,
and unemployment hovers at around 60%.10 Although Hamas faces no real
challenge to its rule in Gaza, it also strives to distinguish itself from Fatah,
the main secular political party and core element of the PA, through its
ability to govern and its willingness to fight Israel, but it is failing in both
respects. In 2012 and 2014, Hamas sought to use a confrontation with Israel
to grab world attention and ensure its resistance credentials. Its weak politi-
cal position gives it an incentive to do so again.
Hamas, however, has yet to come up with a winning strategy against
Israel. Although Hamas’s rhetoric remains hostile, the effectiveness of Israel’s
missile-defence system limits Hamas’s ability to harass with indiscriminate
rocket attacks, as it has done in the past. Israel’s destruction of parts of
Gaza in the various wars and bombing campaigns exacerbates the misery
of Gazans with little for Hamas to show in return. In April 2018, Hamas
tried a new approach by instigating the ‘March of Return’ protests, blending
its operatives in with Palestinian civilians, and encouraging women and
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 171

children to penetrate the security barrier surrounding Gaza.11 This stratagem

briefly made headlines and generated outrage against Israel, particularly
after Israeli snipers killed more than 100 unarmed Palestinians to stop the
barrier from being breached.12 Hamas also shot an Israeli border guard in
July, launched flaming kites from Gaza in an attempt to have them land in
Israeli fields, and staged an occasional gun or bomb attack.13 But any public-
relations victory was fleeting. The West Bank did not erupt in vicarious
protest, its residents remaining ‘quiet bystanders’ amid the Hamas–Fatah
political disjuncture.14 The most enduring aspect of the march and associated
measures may simply be the continued use of women and children, mass
mobilisation and lower-tech techniques to gain world attention.
Indeed, the choice of a less violent approach than
rocket fire shows Hamas’s limits.15 In contrast to
2014, Hamas now fears it cannot instigate another Hamas fears it
full-on war with Israel because doing so would likely
result in widespread destruction in Gaza at little cost
cannot instigate
to the Israelis. Some analysts argue that Hamas is another war
more receptive than ever to a long-term truce with
Israel, which would open up Gaza economically and
with Israel
otherwise allow Hamas to rule, in exchange for an
end to its attacks.16 On top of having poor military options, Hamas is diplo-
matically isolated. Hamas hoped that the Muslim Brotherhood government
that ran Egypt from 2012 to 2013 would ease economic pressure. This never
really happened, and hardline Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi has
proved to be a bitter enemy, closing the Rafah border crossing, reinstating
arrests of Palestinians in Egypt, and cracking down on the movement of
arms and militants between the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza. Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are also wary of supporting Hamas
because of its Muslim Brotherhood origins and ties.
Even Hamas’s relationship with Iran has been bumpy. Since the 1990s,
Iran has trained Hamas operatives. Over time, it provided Hamas with
a wide range of weapons and transferred technological know-how that
enabled the group to develop its own missile capability in Gaza. In addi-
tion, after Hamas won elections there in 2006, Iran provided it with tens of
172 | Daniel Byman

millions of dollars, so that the group could manage the sudden and heavy
burden of governance.17 But the wars in Syria and Yemen, where Hamas and
Iran back opposite sides, have frayed relations, leading Iran to dramatically
curtail its support for Hamas.18
Nevertheless, Iran values its relationship with Hamas. It has long played
up the Palestinian cause in its rhetoric, and ties to the group give Iran cred-
ibility as an Islamic power as opposed to merely a Shia one. When Israel
went to war in Gaza in 2012 and 2014, Iran increased its aid, despite tension
over Syria.19 Yet in Iran, as in much of the Arab world, there is Palestinian-
issue fatigue, and domestic problems, including the dire economic crisis
there, have taken priority.20 For now, however, Iran and Hamas appear to
have reached a modus vivendi, and with Syria winding down, this may
become stronger. Iran resumed aid to Gaza in May 2017, following a change
in Hamas’s leadership.
Ironically, Hamas and Israel both have the same answer to Gaza’s trou-
bles – the PA – albeit with vastly different caveats. From Israel’s point of
view, if the PA took control of Gaza, it could be a peaceful alternative to
Hamas and an acceptable channel for international aid. Hamas, for its part,
recognises that it cannot govern Gaza given all the pressure and isolation it
faces, and remains eager to pass the burden to the PA. But Hamas will not
surrender its weapons, as Israel and the United States demand, for two main
reasons. Firstly, Hamas considers itself an anti-Israel ‘resistance’ move-
ment, and pursuing a conciliatory posture would undermine its credentials.
Secondly, Hamas’s leadership fears the PA would arrest and torture Hamas
members.21 The PA brutalised Hamas when it controlled Gaza before 2007,
and Hamas has reciprocated against PA loyalists remaining in Gaza.22
Hamas and the Fatah party have periodically reconciled, but any coopera-
tiveness has usually been quickly disrupted.23 The PA is reluctant to try to
bring prosperity to Gaza since doing so would allow Hamas to get back on
its feet. Thus, Israel increasingly recognises that the PA is unlikely to be the
solution to the Gaza dilemma. Israel proposes a return to the status quo,
whereby Hamas would disarm and release Israeli prisoners without Israel
making releases of its own, as a prelude to any comprehensive deal – terms
it knows Hamas would not accept.
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 173

A third intifada in the West Bank?

Although the situation is far better in the West Bank than in Gaza, Palestinians
living in the former are frustrated. The overall economy is stagnating, and
they depend heavily on international aid.24 Unemployment is at almost 20%,
and youth unemployment is twice that.25 Even more importantly, West Bank
Palestinians are farther from achieving their own state than they have been
in decades. No Israelis or Palestinians believe serious peace talks are on the
horizon, and the much-heralded Trump administration peace plan, though
not formally released at the date of publication, appears to be an unformed
set of proposals that echoes Israeli positions. Spurred by a sense that the
Trump administration stands behind them, Israeli settlement growth has
accelerated.26 Even worse, new settlements are deep in the West Bank rather
than contiguous to Israel, where they might plausibly have been folded into
a land swap as part of a peace deal.
So far, significant violence has not broken out primarily because the
PA’s 30,000-strong security apparatus is highly effective in policing much
of the West Bank.27 With Israeli support, PA security forces have restored
law and order after the collapse of authority during the second intifada and
kept a lid on Hamas and other militant groups. The PA security forces do
this in part to help Israel and gain goodwill from the United States and
other Israeli partners. But the primary reason is their own fear of dissent
and desire to crush any potential opposition. US training helped improve
the quality of the PA forces, and US officers tried to improve coordination
between Israeli and Palestinian security officials. In addition, Hamas has
not been able to mobilise masses of supporters in the West Bank. Even when
Gaza Palestinians went to war against Israel in 2008–09, 2012 and 2014, the
West Bank did not erupt in mass violence.
As analysts Neri Zilber and Ghaith al-Omari point out, however,
Palestinian security forces cooperate with Israel against Hamas and other
terrorist groups in part because they see such cooperation as a path to
statehood.28 It is hard to claim that independence is getting closer when
Israelis build more settlements deep in the West Bank, existing settlers
attack Palestinian civilians with impunity and Israeli security forces arrest
Palestinians in areas theoretically controlled by the PA. If the path is a dead
174 | Daniel Byman

end, cooperation is in jeopardy. Because statehood seems farther away

than ever, security coordination with Israel is unpopular, and PA forces are
increasingly seen as collaborators because of the continuing, indeed deepen-
ing, occupation.29 In addition, the Palestinian security forces’ suppression of
Hamas and of dissent in general, often with excessive force, further dimin-
ishes their legitimacy.
Moreover, Israelis worry that the PA security forces could turn against
them. During the second intifada, the PA personnel that Israel helped
arm and train in the 1990s went from fighting terrorists to helping them,
often initiating or joining in attacks on Israel, or looking the other way as
Hamas and Fatah members wreaked havoc. In addition, in 2007, Hamas
seized control of Gaza after winning legislative elections there and in the
West Bank. Its several thousand operatives routed perhaps 20,000 Fatah
and PA security-force members who fell apart during the confrontation,
riven with their own leadership divisions and poor morale.30 Israel thus
wants the PA security forces to be strong enough to crush Hamas but
weak enough to be subordinate, which may be a practically infeasible
balance to strike.
Despite these problems, a violent Palestinian response is less likely
than popular frustration suggests due to public suspicion of both Hamas
and Fatah, and the fragmentation of Palestinian politics.31 Khatib notes
that grassroots leadership and organisations in the West Bank are lacking.
Political analyst Mkhaimar Abusada assesses that strife between Hamas
and Fatah has led to ‘fatigue and exhaustion’ among Palestinians, with the
leaders of both movements lacking public trust and respect.32 This might
change. Both the first and second intifadas grew in part out of grassroots
mobilisation prompted by a failure of political leadership at the top. But
sustaining any mobilisation, violent or peaceful, would be difficult. The
PA has civil society on lockdown, and Israel is primed to stop any con-
certed provocation that might turn violent. The shadow of the last intifada
still hangs over the West Bank, and the Palestinians there are not eager for
another round of violence. The middle class that has emerged in recent
years would be particularly averse to a renewal of conflict.33 Ali Jarbawi,
a professor at Birzeit University in the West Bank, notes that an intifada
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 175

would inflict a ‘heavy price’ on the Palestinians and that they have no
good options for revolt.34 ‘It is easier to raise slogans about a new intifada
than to build a strategy for one’, he says.
The collapse of Arab support also reduces the likelihood of violence.
During the first intifada in 1987 and the second intifada in 2000, the
Palestinian territories became the centre of the Arab world’s stage. Today,
however, the Palestinians are a regional sideshow. Syria and continued
fallout from the Arab Spring consume far more attention. No Arab leaders
are raising the Palestinian banner. Finally, Israel itself is prepared for a
return to violence. Before the second intifada broke out, Israel let many of
its intelligence networks among Palestinians wither, instead relying on the
Palestinian security services to suppress violence. Now the security barrier,
checkpoints, a military presence and aggressive intelligence collection are
all in place. Palestinians harbour few doubts that Israel would come down
hard should even small-scale violence erupt.
Perhaps the West Bank’s most ominous problem is the weakness of the
peace camp there. The Palestinian security forces may tire of being seen as
collaborators. This risk for Israel is particularly high in a succession crisis,
when some leaders may try to drum up violence and accuse their rivals
of being Israel’s puppets.35 This is not likely to lead to a third intifada, but
it could increase day-to-day disturbances and otherwise upset the West
Bank’s relative calm.

Hizbullah: Israel’s deadliest foe

Israel and Hizbullah regularly spar, and the latter’s intervention in the
Syrian civil war expanded their conflict’s front line. In the years since the
war began in 2011, Israel has attacked Hizbullah’s weapons depots and
forces in Syria, and Hizbullah boasts that it shot down an Israeli F-16.36 Mara
Karlin, a leading outside analyst, believes war is ‘almost inevitable’ and that
‘the real questions are how and where – not if – the impending conflagration
will occur’.37 Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah’s leader, also declares that Israel
‘always threatens’.38 Yet the spectre of war has hovered for over a decade,
and despite regular skirmishes neither side has gone over the brink. What
explains this enduring peace, and will it last?
176 | Daniel Byman

Hizbullah’s military capabilities are formidable. It has over 100,000

rockets and missiles and can fire at least 1,000 per day, targeting almost
every major city in Israel.39 Hizbullah also manufactures weapons in
Lebanon, producing drones and guided missiles, among other systems.40 In
the past, the group’s rockets had only crude guidance systems and mostly
landed on Israeli fields or other unpopulated parts of the country. Now,
however, Hizbullah has systems like the Fateh 110 that use advanced guid-
ance systems.41 If another conflict were to break out, Israel would face the
potential loss of power plants, its airport, and political and cultural sites.
Israel’s layered missile-defence and anti-rocket systems like Iron Dome and
David’s Sling offer some protection, but they would be tested by the scale and
scope of Hizbullah’s arsenal. Politically, Hizbullah is also secure. In the May
2018 parliamentary elections, the group won additional seats, and its power
grew at the expense of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the leader of Lebanon’s
Sunni Muslims. Hizbullah already had a de facto veto over government
decisions in Lebanon, and its strong election performance strengthened it.
Hizbullah’s participation in the Syrian civil war is a source of both
strength and weakness. The thousands of fighters Hizbullah sent to Syria
played a major role in reinforcing the Assad regime and ensuring its sur-
vival. In Syria, Hizbullah also gained and imparted many valuable skills.
Its fighters learned to work with Russian airpower, use tanks and even
execute small airborne operations.42 They acquired an array of more con-
ventional systems, including T-72 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The
group taught reconnaissance and weaponry skills to Syrian forces, those of
Afghan and Pakistani origin and other Iranian proxies, while indoctrinating
them with Hizbullah’s revolutionary and anti-Israel message.43 Hizbullah’s
members even served as commanders. Blooded fighters and tested com-
manders make Hizbullah stronger.
At the same time, Hizbullah has endured reputational damage. Before
the war, it gleaned some respect from Lebanon’s Sunni Muslim and
Christian communities for its relative lack of corruption, its effective provi-
sion of services in areas it controlled and its steadfast opposition to Israel.
However, Hizbullah’s backing of the Assad regime’s savagery against the
Sunni Muslim opposition made Hizbullah look, to much of the Sunni Arab
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 177

world, like an Iranian- and Syrian-controlled sectarian militia rather than

an Islamic resistance force. Its support among Lebanese Shi’ites remains
strong, but they bore the brunt of the casualties Hizbullah suffered in Syria
– at least 1,400 dead – and are not eager to fight another war that promises
more bloodshed.44
In addition, Hizbullah’s military endeavours in Syria would not neces-
sarily prove useful in a conflict with Israel. Hizbullah’s forces assaulted
lightly armed and poorly trained rebels mainly in urban parts of Syria. The
skills that required would do them little good defending south Lebanon
against well-trained Israeli forces. Although Hizbullah’s conventional
capabilities are stronger than ever, the group’s tanks would be death traps
when up against Israel’s superior forces and hardware.
If Hizbullah fought in the larger formations they used
for assaults in Syria, the Israeli Air Force and helicop- Hizbullah is
ters would devastate them. In contrast to 2006, the IDF
is focused on Hizbullah as an adversary and has stepped
not eager to
up its customised training, intelligence and other prep- take on Israel
arations for fighting the group in case of war. Should
war arise in Lebanon, Hizbullah would seek to use its
rockets and focus its forces on defending this arsenal from Israeli air and
ground attacks. It has dug over 1,000 tunnels and bunkers to hide weapons
and fighters.45 If Israel again invaded Lebanon to disrupt the rocket attacks,
Hizbullah would try, as it did in 2006, to take advantage of south Lebanon’s
steep valleys to force Israeli forces into narrow areas where they would be
vulnerable to attack. Israel, however, learned from its 2006 debacle and is far
less likely to repeat the mistakes of the last war.
Given these military and political limits, Hizbullah is not eager to take on
Israel. Although Hizbullah still seeks the eradication of the Jewish state as a
matter of doctrine and rhetoric, it is well aware that this is not realistic. In the
May 2018 elections, it ran on domestic issues, not the fight against its putative
Zionist enemy.46 Indeed, its campaign slogan was ‘We will construct and we
will protect’ – a far cry from a new war with Israel. Moreover, Hizbullah’s Shia
rival Amal gained some seats in the May elections, playing up Hizbullah’s
unpopular intervention in Syria. Because Hizbullah wants to wield power in
178 | Daniel Byman

Lebanon, it is less likely to use the country as a platform for the fight against
Israel, especially if it can employ Syria for that purpose instead.47
In fact, from an Israeli point of view, Hizbullah’s strong political position
in Lebanon is a vulnerability that enhances Israel’s deterrent. On account
of Hizbullah’s increased political influence after the 2018 elections and
central role in the Lebanese government, it is more credible for Israel to
hold the entire state responsible for any actions emanating from Lebanon
and threaten massive retaliation there – an approach recently endorsed by
Israeli Naftali Bennett, a rising political force in government.48 Israel can
disrupt Lebanon without resorting to the massive bombing that occurred
during the 2006 war.49 Small raids and other circumscribed forms of mili-
tary pressure would scare off investment and tourism. Such an approach,
however, would fly in the face of past US policy, which has sought to
separate the Lebanese government from Hizbullah and to strengthen gov-
ernment forces. Since 2006, the United States has provided almost $2 billion
in equipment to the Lebanese army and helped train its forces.50 Israel is
subject to other political constraints. Israeli retaliation against Hizbullah’s
strongholds would entail heavy civilian casualties, as Hizbullah’s forces are
intermingled with Lebanon’s population. Although Israeli policymakers
would blame Hizbullah for cynically using human shields and the Trump
administration would back them, pictures of dead civilians would lead
much of the world to blame Israel.
Iranian policy is uncertain, and this raises many questions for
Hizbullah’s future course. On the one hand, Trump’s decision to scuttle the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – that is, the Iran nuclear deal – has
diminished Iran’s stake in preserving regional order. On the other, Tehran’s
leaders may fear that Trump’s decision is a prelude to war and want to
avoid ratcheting up tensions. Hizbullah’s future role in Syria also remains
unclear. When Syria was strong and Lebanon was weak, the Assad regime
harassed Israel from Lebanese territory, using proxies there to keep the
fight against Israel away from Syria. Now that the roles have been reversed,
with Hizbullah and Iranian forces deployed in Syria and provoking Israeli
strikes on Syrian turf, it may prove difficult to keep the Syrian and Lebanese
theatres distinct. Israel, for its part, has to worry that the Syria and Lebanon
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 179

fronts will merge in a crisis, producing a taxing ‘northern war’, as Israeli

officials describe it.51
The most likely result is that Israel and Hizbullah will maintain a violent
peace. As in 2006, however, miscalculation and provocations could lead to
unexpected escalation. A conflict that begins in Syria may not stay confined
there. Both sides are better prepared for war this time, and any resulting
conflict is likely to be more painful for all concerned.

A new front in Syria?

Israel was dealt a bad hand when it comes to regional security, and Syria is
the latest – and trickiest – card in the deck. Israel did not back a faction in
Syria when rebellion and then civil war broke out in 2011, calculating that
chaos made intervention difficult and believing an open intervention could
do more harm than good. Tehran considers the Syrian regime a strategic
ally and sent several thousand Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
forces to fight when the regime looked near collapse in the early years of the
conflict, eventually alongside thousands of Hizbullah fighters and still more
Shia militia members from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Fearing signifi-
cant casualties, the IRGC gradually assumed a more limited posture in Syria
and focused on leading and directing operations.52 Throughout the conflict,
Israel has used military strikes and diplomacy to stop the flow of advanced
weapons from Syrian and Iranian arsenals to Hizbullah, and to keep Iran’s
and Hizbullah’s forces far from its border along the Golan Heights.53
Israel’s strategic calculus has changed, however, as the stakes have
increased. Russia has intervened in Syria and is providing the regime with
advanced air-defence systems like the S-300, hindering Israel’s freedom of
action in the region.54 The Assad regime has clawed back territory from the
Sunni rebels, benefited by the US-led decimation of the Islamic State (ISIS).
The Trump administration also recently announced that US forces would
leave Syria. All of these factors stand to increase Iran’s role and freedom
of action there. Israelis worry about an Iranian-controlled land bridge that
extends from Iran through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, and is adamant
about avoiding any lasting Iranian militarisation in Syria, a goal shared by
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among others.
180 | Daniel Byman

As the Syrian regime has consolidated its position, so has Tehran.55 Iran
has bases in Syria and is constructing weapons-production plants there.
Both its officers and proxies are well integrated into the regime’s military
effort, and often play leading operational roles. Even though it is gradually
winning the civil war, the Syrian regime still cannot stand on its own two
legs. US ambassador James Jeffrey notes that while the United States may
control the air in much of the Middle East, ‘Iran controls the sand’.56
Israel has stepped up its efforts, bombing Syria almost daily in 2017. In
May 2018, Israel struck 50 airfields, weapons depots, intelligence sites and
other Iranian targets within Syria in its most extensive military operation
there since 1974, and its most significant campaign against Iranian targets
ever.57 It also has struck at Hizbullah and other Iranian proxies operating
near the Israeli border. Iranian military responses have been feckless. In
2018, Iranian forces fired rockets from Syria into the Israeli-controlled Golan
Heights.58 Most of them ended up landing in Syria or being intercepted by
Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defence system. Israeli jets also destroyed a rocket
launching pad near Damascus.59 For now, Iran and Hizbullah appear to
recognise that escalation is a losing game. When assisting with the Assad
regime’s offensive in Daraa, Hizbullah limited the number of fighters it
deployed and did not flaunt its presence.60
Russia plays a critical role in Syria. It is the only state that has good rela-
tions with all three regional combatant states: Syria, Iran and Israel. The
Netanyahu government has actively tried to maintain a serviceable relation-
ship with Moscow, a change from the customary frosty relations, and urged
Russian President Vladimir Putin to restrain Iran in Syria.61 In September
2018, however, bilateral relations became strained when the Syrian mili-
tary accidentally downed a Russian plane during an Israeli airstrike, which
Russia blamed on Israel.62 This prompted the announcement of the S-300
deal and may portend a more hostile relationship. Thus far, Israeli raids and
defence systems have kept the threat limited, but it is not clear how long
crisis stability will endure given that the Syria front presents convenient
opportunities for Iran to threaten Israel. Iran can also escalate in other thea-
tres. Its ties to the Houthis in Yemen, for example, enable Tehran to target
Israeli shipping in the Red Sea.63 And international terrorism remains an
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 181

option for Iran, which has instrumentalised Hizbullah and its own opera-
tives around the globe when striking Israel directly looked infeasible.64

In Trump we trust?
Israel has long relied on the United States to shape events in the region.
Indeed, part of the reason for Israel’s cautious policy on Syria is that the US
under Obama sought to avoid intervention, and Israel did not want to get
ahead of the US.65 The Trump presidency, however, marks a stark departure
from Obama’s tenure and the constraints that went with it.66 Trump has
good relations with Netanyahu, whom Obama found distasteful. The Israeli
leader is one of the few foreign leaders Trump seems to like. In addition,
many of Trump’s senior officials vie with one another to maintain strong
links with Israel. Gone are the days when a US administration would chas-
tise Israel for building more settlements in the West Bank or killing civilians
in Gaza.
Yet the Trump administration’s policies also carry several serious risks
for Israel. Trump is sceptical about US intervention in the Middle East and,
in general, has not tried to orchestrate its geopolitics. When important allies
like Qatar fight with other allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Trump
merely eggs Qatar’s rivals on from the sidelines. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE are engaged in a destructive and fruitless war unconstrained by
Washington. In Syria, Trump is withdrawing the small number of deployed
US forces, despite the continued presence of ISIS and concerns that Iranian
militias might fill the void. It would be beneficial for Israel if the United
States maintained its military presence in eastern Syria, coordinated Turkey
and other allies in pressuring ISIS, and prevented Iran from building bases
there that provide land bridges from Iraq into Syria. The Trump team also
will not save Israel from its worst instincts. Already, there is an anything-
goes perception among Israeli leaders.67 In the past, they have often
regarded the United States as an overbearing but ultimately responsible
parent. They have been openly resentful of the US for admonishing Israel
not to expand settlements in the West Bank or putting too much pressure
on the Palestinians, but the Israelis realised the strategic relationship was
worth such concessions. Now, however, the light always seems to be green.
182 | Daniel Byman

US support for Israel is also becoming more and more politicised domes-
tically. According to one 2018 poll, Republican support for Israel is almost
three times higher than Democratic support.68 Israel is courting the US evan-
gelical community more than ever. Although many Democratic politicians
consider themselves staunch supporters of Israel, Democrats appear to be
particularly critical with respect to settlements and human-rights issues.69
In addition, Netanyahu’s vocal and public criticism of the Iran nuclear deal
antagonised Democrats, and Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the deal
has only rubbed salt in the wound. Democratic support is therefore fragile,
and the close relationship between Trump and Netanyahu, following the
poisonous one between Netanyahu and Obama, only exacerbates this politi-
cisation. Israel should be worried that policies it initiates today with US
support might come under intense criticism when Trump is gone.

* * *

Israel faces no major conventional military threat. Yet its foes’ very weak-
nesses could lead to military clashes in Lebanon and Gaza, and unrest in
the West Bank. They will not win militarily, but a clash with Israel is a way
to rally flagging supporters, shore up their legitimacy and attract world
attention. At a tactical level, Israel needs to do a better job preparing for
less violent, hybrid measures such as Hamas’s March of Return. This may
involve developing and using non-lethal weapons to neutralise flaming
kites and repel demonstrators charging the barrier.70 The Trump adminis-
tration may tolerate Israel’s killing of 100 Palestinian civilians, but other US
administrations are less likely to do so, particularly if Israel continues to
throw its lot in with the Republican Party.
In Syria, it is incumbent on Israel to create a stable situation despite numer-
ous enemies and uncertain geopolitics. This calls for a reliable deterrent,
which will require Israel to make its red lines clear to all actors, including Iran
and Russia, and to act forcefully and decisively when they are violated. At
times, military strikes in Syria on Iranian facilities and those of its proxies may
be necessary. The long-term goal would be to drive a wedge between Syria
and Iran, making it clear that Syria will pay a price when Iran is too aggres-
 Israel’s Four Fronts | 183

sive there. The time is not yet ripe for this decoupling, as the Syrian regime is
still desperate for outside assistance. But as Assad regains control over Syria,
he will be more receptive to distancing himself from Iran. In the meantime,
the United States could transfer additional missile-defence systems and tech-
nologies to help Israel control its border with Lebanon and Syria.
Israel hopes to keep Hamas weak but Gaza stable, a balance that may
prove difficult to hold. In Gaza, Israel and the United States should try to
improve economic conditions and urge the PA to take more responsibility.
Israel, however, must be wary of pushing Hamas too close to the brink. As
Israeli security analyst Gabi Siboni points out, ‘If Israel collapses the Hamas
regime, what comes after? Every alternative is awful.’71 Without taking down
Hamas, however, Israel could promote stability in Gaza and in the West Bank
by restoring political credibility to pro-peace Palestinians. The greatest source
of Hamas’s strength is the PA’s political weakness, and it is likely to grow as
the leadership fragments and the prospect of meaningful peace talks dwin-
dles. Serious restraints on settlements and moves towards peace negotiations
could reverse these trends and serve Israel well in the long term.
Netanyahu appears to have acknowledged that Russia’s prominence as a
regional player has increased, while the United States’ has diminished: for the
first time in decades, Israel now faces a formidable air defence and air force on
its border. Netanyahu is courting Putin, and Israel has tried to get Moscow to
force its Syrian and Iranian allies not to deploy Iranian or Hizbullah’s forces
near the Israeli border.72 The S-300 sale is a tremendous setback, and Israel
will need to woo Russia more energetically to prevent additional high-tech
transfers. Here the Trump administration’s servile attitude towards Moscow
might pay off: the US could press Russia to halt such transfers. The Kremlin’s
response would be an indicator of whether Russia will play a constructive
role in the region. Along these lines, the US Congress can help Israel if the
White House is unwilling to do so. Although Congress should remain sup-
portive of Israel and consider military aid to mitigate the missile threat from
Syria, it should not cheerlead every Israeli initiative, recognising that many
have more to do with Israeli domestic politics than Israeli security. Congress
should also encourage Israel to resume peace talks, halt settlement building
and otherwise practice and encourage political moderation.
184 | Daniel Byman

An overarching hope is that a future Israeli leader will adopt a more

sensible approach to the United States than Netanyahu has taken. Rather
than betting heavily on one party, he or she should understand that power
in Washington will change hands regularly, and that Israel needs a long-
term partner more than any short-term advantage. The United States, for
its part, would ideally restrain Israel from engaging in self-defeating behav-
iour with respect to Gaza and the Palestinian cause more broadly. Sensible
policies, however, may not return for years, and the politicisation of the
US–Israel relationship may lead the US to veer from uncritically supportive
to unsupportively critical, to the detriment of both countries.

Notes
1 International Crisis Group, ‘Averting
War in Gaza’, 20 July 2018, https://
www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-
north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/
israelpalestine/b60-averting-war-gaza.
2 Carnegie Middle East Center, ‘How
Likely Is the Outbreak of a New
Palestinian Intifada in the Coming
Years?’, 8 February 2018, http://carnegie-
mec.org/diwan/75452?lang=en.
3 ‘An Israel–Hizbullah War Could
Easily Draw in Iran, US Intel Official
Warns’, Times of Israel, 14 March
2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/
an-israel-hezbollah-war-could-easily-
draw-in-iran-us-intel-official-warns/.
4 Ehud Yaari, ‘Bracing for an Israel–Iran
Confrontation in Syria’, American
Interest, 30 April 2018, https://www.
the-american-interest.com/2018/04/30/
bracing-israel-iran-confrontation-syria/.
5 Michael Bachner and Judah Ari Gross,
‘IDF Says War in Gaza Approaching,
Communities Near Strip Could Be
Evacuated’, Times of Israel, 9 August
2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/
idf-says-war-in-gaza-approaching-
communities-near-strip-could-be-
evacuated/.
6 Mitch Ginsburg, ‘Israel Fighting a
“Campaign Between the Wars” Says
IAF Chief’, Times of Israel, 29 January
2013, https://www.timesofisrael.com/
israel-fighting-a-campaign-between-
wars-says-iaf-chief/.
7 Isabel Kershner, ‘Hamas
and Israel Are in a Perilous
Cycle. Is War a Miscalculation
Away?’, New York Times, 21 July
2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/07/21/world/middleeast/
israel-gaza-hamas.html?smprod=nytcore-
ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-sharek.
8 International Crisis Group, ‘Averting
War in Gaza’.
9 ‘Hamas Condemns PA Actions to
Undermine Lifting of Gaza Siege’,
Middle East Monitor, 11 July 2018,
https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20180711-hamas-condemns-
pa-actions-to-undermine-lift-
ing-of-gaza-siege/.
10 International Crisis Group, ‘Averting
War in Gaza’.

11 Eytan Gilboa, ‘“Sharp Power”:
Hamas’s Dirty War Against Israel’,
BESA Center, 17 April 2018, https://
besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/
hamas-dirty-war/.
12 Kershner, ‘Hamas and Israel Are in a
Perilous Cycle. Is War a Miscalculation
Away?’.
13 David M. Halbfinger, ‘At Gaza
Protests: Kites, Drones, Gas, Guns and
the Occasional Bomb’, New York Times,
8 June 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/06/08/world/middleeast/
gaza-israel-protest-fence-border.html.
14 Hillel Frisch, ‘The Test of the March
of Return: Violence in the West Bank’,
BESA Center, 9 April 2018, https://
besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/
march-return-west-bank/.
15 Hussein Ibish, ‘The Nonviolent
Violence of Hamas’, Foreign
Policy, 6 April 2018, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/06/
the-non-violent-violence-of-hamas/.
16 Michael Kobi, ‘Time to Reach
a Settlement with a Functional
and Restrained Entity in the
Gaza Strip’, Institute for National
Security Studies, 22 May 2018,
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/
time-reach-settlement-functional-
restrained-entity-gaza-strip/.
17 Sarah El Deeb, ‘Haniyeh: Iran
Pledges $250M in Aid’, Washington
Post, 11 December 2006, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/07/11/AR2006071100742.
html.
18 Sima Shine and Anna Catran, ‘Iran’s
Policy on the Gaza Strip’, Institute
for National Security Studies, 2017,
http://www.inss.org.il/publication/
irans-policy-gaza-strip/.
Israel’s Four Fronts | 185
19 El Deeb, ‘Haniyeh: Iran Pledges
$250M in Aid’.
20 Shine and Catran, ‘Iran’s Policy on the
Gaza Strip’.
21 Ulrike Putz, ‘A Visit to Fatah’s Torture
Chamber’, Der Spiegel, 21 June 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/hamas-opens-doors-of-
notorious-prison-a-visit-to-fatah-s-
torture-chamber-a-489898.html.
22 Amnesty International, ‘Gaza:
Palestinians Tortured, Summarily
Killed by Hamas Forces During 2014
Conflict’, 27 May 2015, https://www.
amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/05/
gaza-palestinians-tortured-
summarily-killed-by-hamas-forces-
during-2014-conflict/.
23 Ali Adam, ‘Who’s to Blame for
Failed Palestinian Reconciliation?’,
Al-Monitor, 5 April 2018,
https://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2018/04/
palestine-reconciliation-sanctions-
abbas-hamas-accusations.html.
24 Jack Khoury, ‘Standard of Living in
West Bank Dropping for First Time in
Years, World Bank Warns’, Haaretz, 15
March 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/
middle-east-news/.premium-world-
bank-report-standard-of-living-in-the-
west-bank-is-dropping-1.5908617.
25 Ibid.
26 Jacob Magid, ‘Most New West
Bank Homes Being Built in
“Isolated Settlements” – Monitor’,
Times of Israel, 26 March 2018,
https://www.timesofisrael.com/
most-new-west-bank-homes-being-
built-in-isolated-settlements-monitor/.
27 Neri Zilber and Ghaith Al-Omari,
‘State with No Army, Army
with No State’, Policy Focus 154,
186 | Daniel Byman
Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, March 2018, https://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/
Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus154-
ZilberOmari.pdf.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Yohanan Tzoreff, ‘From the First
Intifada to the “March of Return”’,
Institute for National Security
Studies, 11 April 2018, http://
www.inss.org.il/publication/
first-intifada-march-return/.
32 Michael Young, ‘How Likely Is
the Outbreak of a New Palestinian
Intifada in the Coming Years?’, Diwan,
8 February 2018, http://carnegie-mec.
org/diwan/75452.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Nathan Stock, ‘Renew Palestinian
Democracy to Avert a Succession
Crisis’, Lawfare, 22 July 2018,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/
renew-palestinian-democracy-avert-
succession-crisis.
36 Sulome Anderson, ‘Israel and
Hizbullah Are Girding for War – and
the Next Round Could Be Horrific’,
Nation, 5 April 2018, https://www.
thenation.com/article/israel-and-
hezbollah-are-girding-for-war-and-
the-next-round-could-be-horrific/.
37 Mara Karlin, ‘Israel’s Coming
War with Hizbullah’, Foreign
Affairs, 21 February 2018,
https://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/israel/2018-02-21/
israels-coming-war-hezbollah.
38 ‘Hizbullah’s Nasrallah: If There
Will Be a War with Israel – We Will
Win’, Jerusalem Post, 25 May 2018,
https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/
Leader-of-Hizbullah-US-sanctions-on-
Iran-will-not-yield-results-558391.
39 Hanin Ghaddar and Nader Uskowi,
‘Iran Will Spare Hizbullah in Its
Conflict with Israel, for Now’,
Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 5 June 2018, https://
www.washingtoninstitute.
org/policy-analysis/view/
iran-will-spare-hezbollah-in-its-
conflict-with-israel-for-now.
40 Mona Alami, ‘Mideast Braces for War:
Israel vs. Iran-backed Hizbullah’,
Al-Monitor, 3 March 2018, https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2018/03/lebanon-syria-israel-
iran-war-weapons-war-achievements.
html.
41 David Kenner, ‘Why Israel Fears
Iran’s Presence in Syria’, Atlantic, 22
July 2018, https://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2018/07/
hezbollah-iran-new-weapons-
israel/565796/.
42 Nicholas Blanford, ‘Lebanese
Hizbullah Offers a Glimpse of
Its Firepower’, Atlantic Council,
21 November 2016, http://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
new-atlanticist/lebanese-hezbollah-
offers-a-glimpse-of-its-firepower.
43 Alami, ‘Mideast Braces for War: Israel
vs. Iran-backed Hizbullah’.
44 Amir Taheri, ‘Exclusive: Why
Iran’s Intervention in Syria Proved
so Costly’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 14
March 2018, https://aawsat.com/
english/home/article/1204601/
exclusive-why-iran’s-intervention-
syria-proved-so-costly.
45 Blanford, ‘Lebanese Hizbullah Offers
a Glimpse of Its Firepower’.

46 Avi Issacharoff, ‘Iran vs. Israel: Is
a Major War Ahead?’, Atlantic, 11
May 2018, https://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2018/05/
iran-israel-syria/560210/.
47 Eldad Shavit, ‘The Parliamentary
Elections in Lebanon: Hizbullah’s
Victory Within the Political Status
Quo’, Institute for National Security
Studies, 10 May 2018, http://www.
inss.org.il/publication/parliamentary-
elections-lebanon-hezbollahs-victory-
within-political-status-quo/.
48 Ibid.
49 ‘Bennett: Terror Group’s Election
Success Shows Hizbullah Is
Lebanon’, Times of Israel, 7 May
2018, https://www.timesofisrael.
com/bennett-terror-groups-election-
success-shows-hezbollah-is-lebanon/.
50 Jack Detsch, ‘Pentagon OKs $90
Million for Lebanese Army amid
Hizbullah Gains’, Al-Monitor, 15
May 2018, https://www.al-monitor.
com/pulse/originals/2018/05/
pentagon-ok-90-million-leba-
non-army-hezbollah.html.
51 Ashish Kumar Sen, ‘Are Israel
and Iran Headed to War?’,
Atlantic Council, 4 May 2018,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.
org/blogs/new-atlanticist/
are-israel-and-iran-headed-to-war.
52 Yaari, ‘Bracing for an Israel–Iran
Confrontation in Syria’.
53 Sen, ‘Are Israel and Iran Headed
to War?’.
54 Amos Harel, ‘With Russia’s S-300 in
Syria, Israel Will Have to Think Twice
About the Next Strike’, Haaretz, 26
September 2018, https://www.haaretz.
com/israel-news/.premium-russia-s-
300-syria-israel-think-twice-striking-
Israel’s Four Fronts | 187
iran-targets-1.6495106.
55 Yaari, ‘Bracing for an Israel–Iran
Confrontation in Syria’.
56 Testimony of James Jeffrey,
‘Confronting the Full Range of
Iranian Threats’, Hearing before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House
of Representatives, 115th Congress,
First Session, 11 October 2017, pp.
7–14, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/
FA/FA00/20171011/106500/HHRG-115-
FA00-Transcript-20171011.pdf.
57 Issacharoff, ‘Iran vs. Israel: Is a Major
War Ahead?’.
58 Isabel Kershner, ‘Iran Fires Rockets
into Golan Heights from Syria,
Israelis Say’, New York Times, 9
May 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/05/09/world/middleeast/
israel-iran-attack.html.
59 Issacharoff, ‘Iran vs. Israel: Is a Major
War Ahead?’.
60 ‘Hizbullah Reportedly Commanding
Syrian Fighters near Israeli
Border – Exposing Limits of Israeli
and US Policy’, Haaretz, 5 July
2018, https://www.haaretz.com/
middle-east-news/syria/hezbollah-
reportedly-commanding-syrian-
fighters-near-israeli-border-1.6245173.
61 David M. Halbfinger and Ben
Hubbard, ‘Netanyahu Says Putin
Agreed to Restrain Iran in Syria’,
New York Times, 12 July 2018, https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/
world/middleeast/syria-israel-putin-
netanyahu.html.
62 Liz Sly, Anton Troianovski and
Ruth Eglash, ‘Russia Revives
Allegations of Israeli Culpability in
Downed Plane in Syria’, Washington
Post, 23 September 2018, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/
188 | Daniel Byman
world/middle_east/russia-revives-
allegations-of-israeli-culpability-in-
downed-plane-in-syria/2018/09/23/
ac6741de-bf36-11e8-9f4f-
a1b7af255aa5_story.html?utm_term=.
fcfcf8e37f33.
63 Assaf Orion and Amos Yadlin, ‘Iran
in the Nuclear Realm and Iran in
Syria: A New State of Play’, Institute
for National Security Studies, 14
May 2018, http://www.inss.org.il/
publication/iran-nuclear-realm-iran-
syria-new-state-play/.
64 Yoram Schweitzer, ‘Iran’s Dilemma:
Respond to Israeli Actions in Syria
with Terror Attacks Abroad?’,
Institute for National Security
Studies, 22 May 2018, http://
www.inss.org.il/publication/
irans-dilemma-respond-israeli-
actions-syria-terror-attacks-abroad/.
65 Yaari, ‘Bracing for an Israel–Iran
Confrontation in Syria’.
66 Natan Sachs, ‘Israel and Trump
Are at Odds on Syria’, Brookings
Institution, 11 April 2018, https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/
order-from-chaos/2018/04/11/israel-
and-trump-are-at-odds-on-syria/.
67 Kershner, ‘Hamas and Israel
Are in a Perilous Cycle. Is War a
Miscalculation Away?’.
68 ‘Poll: Democratic Support for Israel,
Palestinians Nearly Identical’,
Times of Israel, 23 January 2018,
https://www.timesofisrael.com/
poll-democratic-support-for-israel-
palestinians-nearly-identical/.
69 Tamara Cofman Wittes and Daniel
B. Shapiro, ‘How Not to Measure
Americans’ Support for Israel’,
Brookings Institution, 29 January
2018, https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/29/
how-not-to-measure-americans-
support-for-israel/.
70 Ariel Levite and Jonathan Shimshoni,
‘The Gaza Challenge: Social Warfare
Strategy in Action’, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 15
May 2018, https://carnegieendowment.
org/2018/05/15/gaza-challenge-social-
warfare-strategy-in-action-pub-76357.
71 Kershner, ‘Hamas and Israel
Are in a Perilous Cycle. Is War a
Miscalculation Away?’.
72 ‘Hizbullah Reportedly Commanding
Syrian Fighters near Israeli Border –
Exposing Limits of Israeli and
US Policy’.