On Sovereignty

ONATE SOPHIA NOREENE 160289916 UNIVERSITY OF LONDON AUTUMN 17

Sovereignty, at its concept, is the seen as the “fundamental pillar of international

relations.” (Badescu, 2011) This concept grounds its idea on sovereignty as non-
interference – each state can do entirely what its government pleases – in its territorial
borders. This paper will seek to elaborate sovereignty as an absolute term and at the same
time, explain the changing notions of sovereignty – how the concept has evolved over
time. The concept of sovereignty can long be traced as a historically recent and
contingent form of human organization. (Welsh) That is to say, the concept was invented
in Modern Europe through the Treaty of Westphalia and the concept of sovereignty is
largely imposed on the remainder of the world. To regard sovereignty, then, as absolute,
implies that all states are equally sovereign – no more, no less. However, scholars like
Kratochwil, Rambohtsam or Woodhouse contend that an understanding of idea can never
be absolute. Thus, to say that some states are more sovereign than others would mean that
there is a restriction to the concept and that, in turn, sovereignty is limited.
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) is rooted on the principle of non-intervention by other
states in the internal/domestic affairs of a member state. Originally, sovereignty is
defined in the 1648 Treaty as the absolute power of the king (later, the state) to rule over
its populace. Interpretations of the document of the treaty would hold that it served as a
lead to the establishment of a modern system of nations-states; in which, the sovereign is
supreme domestically as well as in its relations among other states. In this manner, one
can draw that sovereignty is absolute – no more or no less. During the Cold War, it is
worth noting that any military intervention, no matter how humane the motivation for it
is, is a breach on the sovereignty of the state. (Glanville) The increased instances of
intervention in that period, be it the India’s intervention in East Pakistan or the Vietnam’s
intervention in Cambodia (later in Kampuchea) or even the intervention of Tanzania to
Uganda, the international community, including the UNSC, vehemently condemns it as it
is a direct violation of sovereignty. Despite the notion that each of the intervention in
these countries was a response to genocide violence domestically, it was still viewed as
an infringement of state sovereignty – the very concept of non-interference. In this case,
sovereignty, during the Cold War, is deemed absolute and infallible.
However, this paper argues that the concept of sovereignty has changed over time. That is
to say, one can assert that, indeed, some states are more or less sovereign than other
states. Wheeler asserts, “The traditional understanding of state sovereignty is a barrier to
international intervention (was) robbed its legitimacy in the 1990s.” One can draw out
that Wheeler insights are parallel of Vincent and Welsh’s claim: “non-intervention
imposes duties that also constrain the sovereignty of the states that bear the duty.” Welsh
argues that to claim that sovereignty is an absolute concept would imply that there is a
positive duty of all the states to preserve that right. Miller argues that to have a right of
non-interference would hold only if states do exercise a “default duty” – a conceptual
space for the bearers of the default responsibility to turn out to a different national
community from whose basic rights are unprotected for. That is to say, Welsh argues, in a
case of a genocide, to argue that everyone has equal rights and that states have absolute
sovereignty would imply that these rights should be provided for as a duty of the states to
its citizens. However, the opposite happens; Welsh, continues, that it is preposterous for
states to claim that there is absolute sovereignty and assume that there is a universal
negative duty not to commit suicide but there is no positive duty to protect for these
victims. In the case of Rwanda, the UNSC kept the genocide going because the concept
of intervention is juxtaposed on the understanding of sovereignty, which clashes in every
sense. To claim that the Hutu and the Tutsi has, as persons, a basic right not to be killed
arbitrarily yet at the same time claim that it is the job of “their” state to protect them –
each state, its own “rules” – is not to be serious about any rights in the real world. Hence,
Deng et al., (1996) defines sovereignty as a responsibility, to wit, “sovereignty carries
with it a responsibility for its population.” This later on translated to Responsibility to
Protect (R2P), which styles sovereignty as a conditional concept; the holder is only
granted to it entirely upon the fulfillment of some duties. (ICISS) Meaning, the right to
non-interference and non-intervention on the internal matters of a state is not a given, but
a contingent. To recognize that sovereignty is a responsibility, one can draw out that
sovereignty can never be absolute because the duties that are constitutive to the right
constrain the activity of every sovereign belonging to an international society – hence,
sovereignty is limited. In this manner, the form of sovereignty is a right and by this, it
dictates a feature of its content as limited.
This author of this paper leans on more on sovereignty as conditional, rather than
absolute. During the Cold War, it is no doubt that sovereignty, then, was absolute. But the
changing norms and discourses among the member states evolved sovereignty as it is
today – that it is a responsibility rather than inherent. The adoption of RtoP by the
member states (at least in principle) is in recognition that sovereignty has indeed changed
overtime. The notion that underpins this is concept is a state has a duty to its people – the
very principle of sovereignty as a responsibility and Responsibility to Protect.
To conclude, one may argue that states are absolute sovereigns during the Cold War.
However, the notion that this concept is infallible has lost its credibility when the
member states (UN) accepted RtoP. (Wheeler) Sovereignty has evolved over time, and
this time, it has been regarded as a conditional concept – and by conditional, there is an
underpin of responsibility which makes it not inherent, rather a right.