Title V.

– PRESCRIPTION
CHAPTER 3 > PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS
Art. 1139. Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. (1961)
Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is
lost, unless the possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to
Articles 1132, and without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 559, 1505, and 1133. (1962a)
Art. 1141. Real actions over immovable’s prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real
rights by prescription. (1963)
Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. (1964a)
Art. 1143. The following rights, among others specified elsewhere in this Code, are not extinguished by
prescription:
(1) To demand a right of way, regulated in Article 649;
(2) To bring an action to abate a public or private nuisance. (n)
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)
Art. 1145. The following actions must be commenced within six years:
(1) Upon an oral contract;
(2) Upon a quasi-contract. (n)
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. (As amended by PD No. 1755,
Dec. 24, 1980.)
Art. 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(1) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation. (n)
Art. 1148. The limitations of action mentioned in Articles 1140 to 1142, and 1144 to 1147 are without
prejudice to those specified in other parts of this Code, in the Code of Commerce, and in special laws. (n)
Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought
within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (1969)
Art. 1151. The time for the prescription of actions which have for their object the enforcement of
obligations to pay principal with interest or annuity runs from the last payment of the annuity or of the
interest. (1970a)
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfilment of obligation declared by a
judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. (1971)
Art. 1153. The period for prescription of actions to demand accounting runs from the day the persons who
should render the same cease in their functions.
The period for the action arising from the result of the accounting runs from the date when said result was
recognized by agreement of the interested parties. (1972)
Art. 1154. The period during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his
right is not reckoned against him. (n)
Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt
by the debtor. (1973a)

QUALIFIED THEFT VS. ESTAFA (WITH ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE)

There is confusion in charging the proper offense because of the similarities in the elements of both
offenses. However, the following principles distinguish one from the other:
The conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having material possession of the said
property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession
have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the
material possession of the employee.  The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to recognition of the juridical possession of the employer.  So long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.
 Theft vs Estafa
The crime of theft is closely related to the crime of estafa. Oftentimes, it creates confusion to the victim as
to what should be charged against his offender. However, although having similarities, these two crimes
are very much different from each other.
Theft
Theft is committed when the offender has taken a personal property of another, without the owner’s
consent. Such taking, since it is unknown to the owner, only gives the offender material possession of the
property. To define, material possession means the actual physical possession of the personal property,
where the possessor does not have a better right over such property than the owner. Then, after taking the
property, the offender misappropriates the property. The offender takes the property and uses it as if he is
really the owner.
For example, if Ana takes the mobile phone of Maria from Maria’s pouch without her consent, then Ana
should be liable for theft. In this case, Ana has physical possession of the mobile phone, and after taking
it she may use it as if it was her own.
Estafa
If the possession of the property by the offender arouse from a contract or an agreement, then the
possessor has juridical possession of the property – a right over the property, which he can claim and set
up even against the owner.
The juridical possession contemplated for the estafa refers to the delivery of the thing to the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to
deliver or to return the same thing received. If the delivery is therefore, not made under any of said
concepts, the crime is theft.
To distinguish theft from estafa, it is important to know whether the possession of the property by
the offender is only material or if it is coupled with juridical possession. For example, in the case of Ana
and Maria, if Maria agrees to lend Ana her mobile phone for a week, then Ana has a right over the mobile
phone for that week. Maria cannot take the mobile phone from Ana during the week that they have agreed
upon. Because of their agreement, Ana acquired juridical possession over the property. But, if Ana sells
the phone during the week that it was within her possession, then it is obvious that she has converted the
use of the property. She was permitted to use it, but she was not authorized to sell it. If this happens,
estafa is committed.
Qualified Theft and Estafa
Both qualified theft and estafa may be committed by abuse of confidence. However, it will be easier to
determine whether the crime is qualified theft or estafa once it is settled if the possession is merely
material or juridical. If it is only material possession and there was misappropriation, then the crime
committed is qualified theft. If there was juridical possession and it was misappropriated or converted,
then the crime committed is estafa.
Where only the material possession is transferred, conversion of the property gives rise to the crime of
theft; where both material and juridical possession are transferred, misappropriation of the property would
constitute estafa; and, where in addition to the material and juridical possession, the ownership of the
property is transferred, misappropriation would only give rise to a civil obligation. (People vs Aquino,
[CA] 36 O.G. 1886)
Theft = Material Possession + Misappropriation
Estafa = Material Possession + Juridical Possession + Misappropriation/Conversion
Civil obligation = Material Possession + Juridical Possession + Ownership
Case in point is Sheala Matrido vs. People of the Philippines, GR. No. 179061, July 13, 2009. In this case,
Sheala was the credit and collection assistant of Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. whose duty was to
collect payments from buyers of real estate properties developed by Empire East Land Holdings, Inc.,
issue receipts therefor, and remit the payments to employer in Makati City. Sheala failed to remit
payments received from its clients, so she was charged with estafa.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sheala is liable for qualified theft, not estafa. She did not have
juridical possession over the amount involved. A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of the
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. For there to be
juridical possession, the employer must recognize such, otherwise the crime committed remains to be
qualified theft.
Possession of agent vs possession of employee
The conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having material possession of the said
property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession
have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the
material possession of the employee.  The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to recognition of the juridical possession of the employer.  So long as the juridical
possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.