A STUDY OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ELITE

IN

PHILIPPINE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT, 1946-19 63

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,

RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by

Dante C. Simbulan

May 1965
 & l+Q. V S 5'
'I

This Thesis represents the original work

and investigations of the undersigned.

DANTE C. SIMBULAN
 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

I. I N T R O D U C T I O N ............................. 1

The P r o b l e m ........................... 1

The Elite Concept ....................

E l i t e ................................ 7

Socio-Economic Elite ................ 10

Political Elite .................... 11

M e t h o d o l o g y ........................... 12

Research Procedure .................. 13

II. THE PHILIPPINE ELITE: HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS

AND D E V E L O P M E N T ......................... 22

The R u ling Class in Pre-Conquest Times 22

The P r i n c i p a l i a : Cacique Bureaucracy

under S p a i n ......................... 27

Subjugation, Conversion and

Collaboration ....................... 27

Principalia Metamorphosis ......... 33

C a c i q u i s m ........................... 48

The Principalia and the Philippine

R e v o l u t i o n ........................... 51
 iv

CHAPTER PAGE

The Principalia and the Americans . . 55

The Federalista P a r t y ............. 55

The Elite and !Political Democracy1 63

III. THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA I: THE CONTEMPORARY

S E T T I N G .............................. 75

The Dynamics of C h a n g e ............. 75

Factors of Persistence ............. 77

The Rural S e t t i n g .................. 80

The Urban Economic Setting: Pattern

of G r o w t h ........................... 95

Pattern of Concentration ......... 105

The Philippine Class System ......... 113

Manifestations of Class: Elite and

N o n - E l i t e ........................... 114

The Modern Principalia ........... 123

IV. THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA II: THE POLITICAL

E L I T E ................................ 133

Career Pattern and Recruitment .. . 136

A g e .................................. 136

Year of Entry to top Public

P o s i t i o n s ........................... 139

Pre-Elite Positions ................ 143

Age at Entry to Elite Positions . . 151

CHAPTER PAGE

Years in Elite P o s i t i o n s ..... 153

Socio-Economic Status and Background 157

E d u c a t i o n ..................... 158

O c c u p a t i o n ..................... 165

I n c o m e ......................... 177

Style of L i v i n g .............. 182

Associational Membership ......... 189

Ethnic Origin .................... 193

Regional O r i g i n .............. 195

Politically Dominant Families . . . 203

R e s u m e " ........................... 209

Y. THE A RT OF KEEPING POWER: THE ELITE IN

P O L I T I C S ........................... 213

The Nature of Philippine Political

Partie s ......................... 214

The Heritage of the P a s t ..... 214

The Postwar Political Parties . . 223

Common Origin and Factional

D i v i s i o n s .................. 223

Failure of Labor or Mass Parties 231

Organization and Leadership . . 244

Methods and Practices ........... 260

CHAPTER PAGE

Class, Cultural Norms and Politics 26l

Money, Goods and Services ......... 271

How M u c h ? ......................... 271

U s e s ............................. 276

S o u r c e s ........................... 293

Symbols, Slogans and Practices . . 321

Ideology and Political Formulas . 321

Other Symbols and Slogans . . . . 328

Other P r a c t i c e s .................. 335

VI. THE ART OF WIELDING POWER: THE ELITE IN

G O V E R N M E N T ............................. 354

The Formal Structure of Power . . . . 355

The Practical Aspects of Power . . . 3^2

The Rewards of O f f i c e ................ 3^7

Appointments ....................... 3^7

Office as a Means to More Power . . 375

The Economic Rewards ................ 384

Salaries, Allowances and Public

F u n d s ...................... 384

Bureaucratic Capitalism ........... 389

Recapitulation ....................... 4l4

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 418

 vii

PAGE

APPENDIX A .................................. 425

APPENDIX B .................................. 448
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................ 449
 viii

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

2.l Chinese Mestizo Population, By Provinces,

in 1810 • • • .... 41
2.2 Population and Number of Registered

Electors .... . ..
3.1 Breakdown of Land-Ownership, 50 Hectares
and above • . • .. ......
~ 82
3.2 Land Ownership in the Philippines, 1948 85
3.3 Land Ownership and Tenancy in Selected

Provinces . . ..... 88
3.4 Percentage Distribution of Families,

Income and Real Property • • • • • 126

3.5 Employed Persons by Major Occupation

Group, April, 1962 .•..•. .. 128

3.6 Highest Grade Completed by Persons

6 years Old and Over, 1960 ..• ... 128

3.7 Philippine Social Class Composition:

An Estimate . • . . •• 130
4.l Year of Birth of Political Elite 137
4.2 Year of Entry to Top Public Positions • • 140
4.3 Public Positions Held Prior to First

Election or Appointment to Top Political

Posts Indicated • • . • ...... 142

 ix

TABLE PAGE

4.3-A Public Positions Held by Representatives

Prior to First Election to Congress 144

4.4 Age at Entry to Top Public Positions • • ~2

4.5 Number of Years in Top Public Positions ~4

4.6 Number of Seats and Number of New

Members in the House of Representatives

During Given Election Years 157

4.7 Educational Attainment of Top Executive

Legislative, and Judicial Officials 159

4.8 Colleges and Universities Attended by

Top Public Officials • . • . . • 160

4.9 Comparative Data on College Attendance

of Various Elites 0 • • • • • • • 164

4.10 Listed Main Profession or Occupation of

Top Executive and Legislative Officials 166

4.10-A Listed Main Profession or Occupation of

Local Elective Officials . .... 168

4.ll Other Sources of Income of Philippine

Legislators, 1963 • . • • 180

4.12 Place of Origin of Top Political Elite,

1946-1963, by Regions • . . . 197

4.13 Comparative Places of Origin of Various

Elites . • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • 200
 x

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

I The Political Elite: Pattern of

Recruitment l.50

II Place of Origin: The Philippine Elite

(Map) . • . . • . . . • • 198
III Philippine Political Groups and Parties,

1896-1963 21.5
IV Government of the Republic of the

Philippines, 1963 . . . . . 3.56 .

V The Elite in Government: Patronage and

Favor Distribution ......... 416

 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Research for this thesis was made possible through

a scholarship grant of the Australian National University.

The writer wishes to acknowledge his debt to this

institution which also financed the fieldwork undertaken

in connection with the study. Mention must also be made

of the kind assistance given by the Graduate School of

Public Administration, University of the Philippines,

during the writer's year of field work. The latter

institution provided a room at the School in Manila to

the writer, which served as a convenient base of

operation.

To my supervisor, Professor Colin A. Hughes, of the

Department of Political Science, A.N.U., who has been

recently designated to the Chair of Political Science,

Queensland University, must go my special thanks. His

valuable suggestions, guidance, and patient cooperation

are deeply appreciated. Words of thanks are insufficient

to express the writer's indebtedness to Professor Hughes

for his kindness. The writer is also indebted to

Professor Robert s. Parker, Head of the Department, and

xi
 xii

Mr Arthur L. Burns, Reader of the Department, for their

encouragement and kind understanding throughout the

preparation of the manuscript; and to Dr Gerald E. Caiden,

R'esearch Fellow of the Department, for reading some of

the manuscript and other kindness received. Thanks are

also due to Miss Sondra Silverman and Mrs N. Staples,

who proof-read some chapters, and to Mr Hin-Seak. Leng,

who sacrificed a week-end to assist in the last few hours

. before 1 deadline'.

There are many persons who gave assistance during

the field research. Director Carlos P. Ramos of the

Graduate School of Public Administration, U.P., General

Dominador F. Garcia, Chief of Constabulary, Mr Osmundo

Abad Santos, Manager of the Philippine News Service, and

Mr Jos~ G. Morada, National President of the Philippine

Jaycees, for letters of introduction to provincial panels

in the questionnaire survey. Mr Vicente Ta.Iledo, of tlie

Daily Mirror, also gave much valuable assistance. The

Provincial Treasurer, Provincial Commanders,

Superintendents of Schools, Philippine News Service

correspondents, Jaycee officials and many other persons

in the provinces visited gave valuable help. To all

these persons go the writer 1 s many thanks. The writer

also wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the many

 xiü

contacts, informants and friends who gave much help but

whose names are too numerous to mention here.

Finally, the writer’s great appreciation goes to

his wife, Grace, who typed the draft and did the
proof-reading, in addition to taking care of six active

youngsters.
None of the above, however, are responsible for any

errors of omission or commission or for viewpoints

expressed. These are the writer’s sole responsibility.

Dante C. Simbulan
 xiv

PRECIS

This study is an attempt to describe and analyze

the Philippine elite and its role in politics and

government.

Materials lor the study were gathered during lield

investigation and research. A combination ol methods

and procedures were used including biographical analysis,

interviews, a questionnaire survey, and an examination

and analysis ol documents, ollicial records, newspapers

and periodicals.

Analysis ol data reveals the continuing pattern

ol leadership recruitment Irom a small upper strata

minority wh i c h is characterized by economic and social

prominence. This group, designated in this study as the

principalia class, has traditionally been the dominant

source ol political leaders in the country.

The claim to power ol this group is based on the

superordinate position it occupies in the social

structure. Possessing the key values necessary lor the

exercise ol inlluence such as wealth, education, prestige,

and skill, it also acquires power.

 XV

Historical, economic, and cultural factors serve

to explain the dominant position of this group in

Philip p i n e society. Historically, the principalia class

has bee n the dominant class. It evolved from the

h e re d i t a r y u p p e r class aristocracy in pre-conquest

Philippines, the maharlika class. Western colonization

did not m a t e r i a l l y affect the dominant position of its

members vis-a-vis the masses. Endowed with certain

privileges and allowed to retain their economic possessions,

they became w i l l i n g agents of successive colonial

administrations.

The absence of any far-reaching economic change has

meant the continuation of old economic and social

relations. Most land, which is of prime importance in

an agricultural economy, remains under the control and

ownership of a ver y small minority of landed families,

while the vast majority of the peasantry has retained

much of its traditional serf-like status. Commercial

and industrial growth is slow. The middle class is

weak and is closely dependent on elite support and

patronage.

Cultural factors, such as the kinship system, the

compadre system, and superior-inferior relationships

mingle with other factors to produce a complex system

 xv i

of dependency which is often exploited by the elite in

their bid for political power.

The competition to attain political decision-making

posts is characterized by the effective use of the

resources which the elite control. Political organizations

are essentially elite organized, financed, and led. The

absence of mass organizations preclude the possibility

of political alternatives outside the elite system.

The high concentration of formal power in the hands

of power-holders, accentuated by the general lack of

public opposition, gives public officials considerable

licence in the exercise of their powers. Often, these

powers are abused. In office, the elite politician

seeks to maintain, not only his position, but also to

advance his interest or the interests of his class.

Government then becomes a provider of benefits to elite

inte r e s t s .
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Politics is the study of influence and the

i n f l u ential.., The influential are those who
get the most of what there is to get.,. Those
who get the most are elite; the rest are mass.

1
Harold D. Lasswell

THE PROBLEM

Each country has its own peculiar social conditions

and stage of political development. In some countries

social stratification has become less marked, the gaps

separating the various classes have been narrowed, out­

moded institutions have been modified or changed,

consequently resulting in the rise to importance of other

groups within the community and producing a 'toning down'

effect on the influence of the more dominant group. In

others, social and economic changes have not kept pace

with changes in other spheres. The effect is the

persistence of the traditional imbalance between social

groups, an imbalance that often results in the dominant

T
Politics: Who Gets What, When, H o w , (New York: Peter
Smith, 1950), p . 3 .

1
 2

group*s enjoyment of most of the benefits from the

changes while other groups remain relatively unaffected.
This may happen when political advance is not accompanied
by similar progress in other spheres, when 1liberal
institutions* and ’political democracy* are transplanted
and superimposed over old patterns of social and economic

relations.
The fact that the Philippines has passed through a
feudal stage, whose influences are still strongly
manifested today in agrarian economic organization and
in the behavior patterns and attitudes of both the elite
and the masses is an important consideration that must
be taken into account in any inquiry into the nature of
political leadership. Entrenched landlords on the one
hand and a numerous, dependent, landless peasantry on
the other are still very much in evidence. The
introduction of laissez-faire principles and capitalist
techniques of production in the economy has not yet
produced a significant 'new middle class*. Industrial
and commercial development is still in its infancy and
many members of the landlord class have become the
leading ’middle class’ entrepreneurs.
From time to time, strikingly similar comments and
observations are made as to the present nature and
character of leadership in the Philippines, Pye, for
 3

instance, made the observation that

the dominant characteristic of all the political

systems of Southeast Asia is that they are still,
as in the traditional and colonial periods,
sharply divided between the ruling few, who
possess a distinctive outlook and culture, and
the vast majority of the population, who are
oriented to village units and the peasant* s way
of lif e. ^

Similarly, Malcolm, an American official of long residence

3
in the Philippines, observed that

The Filipino social system divides among [along?]

class lines* On the lower level are the taos,
On the higher level are the cacique s or ilustrados.
Sandwiched between the two widely separated
extremes is the middle class.

The taos are peasants who constitute the rural

laborers of the Islands. They are the largest
group in number, but provide the smallest count
in the matter of education. Hard workers in the
fields, although often paid barely living wages,
they are resigned to their lot, if not stirred by
leaders to violence. The sad fate of the taos has
been that from time immemorial they have all too
often been oppressed by their employers and preyed
upon by usurers...

The caciques are large landowners or persons of

influence. Small in number, but wealthy, well

2
Lucien Pye, 1The Politics of Southeast Asia* in Gabriel
A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.) The Politics of
Developing Areas (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1959) p. 117.
3
George A. Malcolm was Dean, College of Law, University
of the Philippines (1912-I7); Justice of the Philippine
Supreme Court (1917 -3 6 ); Staff member, Office of the
U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines (l 9 3 6 - 4 o) and
Professorial Lecturer, University of the Philippines
(1948-49 ).
 4

educated, and cultured, they constitute the

ruling class.^1
More recently, David Würfel noted that 1to a larger
extent than in any Southeast Asian country, except
bureaucratic-capitalist Thailand and Communist North

Vietnam, the Philippine economic and political elites

are coterminous1
The above and other observations made by some
scholars are remarkable in their similarity. Yet, what
is noteworthy is that in spite of such suggestion of the

existence of an oligarchical situation, the picture that

emerges is somewhat obscured, especially when viewed in
the light of other comments from the same writers. Würfel,
for example, has written elsewhere that ’the Philippines,
thanks in part to American tutelage, today enjoys the
most democratic government in Southeast Asia,1^ Malcolm,
in the same book where he described the Filipino ‘ruling
class1, has also referred to the Philippines as the 'show

4
First Malayan Republic, (Boston: The Christopher
Publishing House, 1951) P* 36.
5
David Würfel, 'The Philippines’, in George McTurnan
Kahin (ed,) Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia,
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1 9 6 1 ) p. 457*
6
Section on the Philippines, ’Comparative Studies in
Political Finance’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 25? No. 4,
November, 1 9 6 3 » p. 757*
 5

7
w i n d o w of d e m o c r a c y in the F a r East*. Coleman, drawing

on P y e 1s study of Southeast A s i a politics, has made the

g
Philippines a ’m o d e l ’ of p o l i t i c a l democracy* These

observations tend to blur the l e a d ership p i c t u r e for they

suggest the e x i s tence s i d e -by-side of ’d e m o c r a c y 1 on the

Q
one h a n d and a ’r u l i n g f e w ’ on the other.

One d i f f i c u l t y seems to be p a r t l y due to the

l i m i t a t i o n s i m p o s e d by the ’m o d e l s ’ . The symbolic

r e a l i t y -- f o u n d in the political r i t u a l s and in the

official utterances of the elite — is confused w i t h

the o b j e ctive reality. What ought to be is often m i s t a k e n

f or what is and d e v i a t i o n from the e s t a b l i s h e d social

myths is u s u a l l y l o o k e d upon with disapprobation. Fre d

R i g g s has e x p r essed this v i e w quite well and he calls it

a ’v i c i o u s c i r c l e ’: ’the more a r t i f i c i a l and remote

f r o m reality the a l i e n models, conv e n t i o n a l wisdom, and

c l i ches acc e p t e d by an ent r e n c h e d i n t e l l i g e n t s i a elite*,

he wrote, ’the more d i f f i c u l t it b e c o m e s for realistic

7
Malcolm, o p ._c i t ,, C h a p t e r I, p, 21,
8
See c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r in A l m o n d and Coleman, op, c i t .,
pp. 559-60; also T a ble 6, p. 564.
9
Much, of course, d e p e n d s on what one means by ’democracy*
but the two terms o b v i o u s l y suggest d i v e rgent connotations.
 6

thinking and scholarly research to gain acceptance —

10
the more "subversive" such activities appear to b e 1.

Many of the prescribed Philippine political science

textbooks (for college and high school), for instance,

are centered on the Constitution, treated in a straight

descriptive-historical manner. This 1singularly

denatured approach, * aptly noted Colin A, Hughes, may

in fact be ’a way of promoting elite maintenance by

pretending that the democratic constitution tells a l l 1.

Indeed, the formal structure and the mechanics of power

are very well covered, but the persons exercising power

have not received the attention that they deserve.

It was with this problem in mind that this study was

undertaken. There is a need for research on the nature

of leadership in the Philippines for in this field may

be found some of the important clues that may lead to

the proper appreciation of the serious problems facing

the country. Who, in Philippine society, become the

power-wielders? How broad, or narrow, is the social base

from which they are recruited? Are there any distinct

social formations from which they are drawn? What are

their economic interests? How do they attain positions

TÖ
Fred W, Riggs, ’A Model for the Study of Philippine
Social Structure’, Philippine Sociological Review, Vol,
VII, No. 3, July, 1 9 5 9 } P* 18,
 7

of influence and power? How do they wield power? The

answers to the above questions have vital implications

for the future.

In the quest for answers to the above questions, the
study has focused its attention on a particular group —
the modern principalia class or, in its English

equivalent, the socio-economic elite#

THE ELITE CONCEPT
The term ‘elite1, like many significant concepts,

has been utilized to advance diverse points of view. A

mere listing of the names of the proponents of the
theories of the elite and the ruling class will indicate
the dynamic nature of the concept. Men of varied

political persuasions such as Saint-Simon, Karl Marx

and Frederic Engels, Auguste Compte, Gaetano Mosca, and
Vilfredo Pareto were among the early writers on the
11
subject. Among the recent ‘elitists* may be mentioned

I1
For an analysis of Saint-Simon1s views, vide Doctrine
of Saint-Simon; An Exposition, (Boston: Beacon Press,
1958), particularly the discussion of Georg G. Iggers in
the Introduction, pp. ix-xi; also cf. Frederic Engels,
‘Socialism, Utopian and Scientific1, in Karl Marx,
Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 19^6, Vol. I, pp, 15^-56) and Gaetano Mosca,
Elementi di Scienza Politica, trans# by Hannah D. Kahn
and ed, and rev, by A. Livingston (New York and London:
McGraw-Hill Book Co#, Inc., 1939)« For Karl Marx* and
Engels1 views on the ruling classes, see Marx-Engels
Gesamtausgabe, trans, by T, B. Bottomore and W. Rubel in
 8

Karl Mannheim, Robert Michels, C. Wright Mills, Harold

12
Lasswell, and others# The term has been a l t e r n a t e l y

applied to the 'right' le ad er s (Saint-Simon) 'Scientific

priesthood' (Compte), leaders of the 'social forces'

(Mosca), 'superior' beings (Pareto) and to the men who

occupy the 'institu tio n al command p o s t s ' (C. Wright M i l l s ) .

71 (cont' d)
Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social
Philosophy (London: Watt s and Co#, 1956) p#225; Compte
published in 1853 a work e n t i t l e d , Systeme de p o l i t i q u e
p o s i t i v e , ou Traite de s o ci o l o g i e , an elaboration of
Saint-Simon's idea of the r u l i n g group; Mosca's ideas
on the s ubject appeared in the Elementi c i t e d above
(trans# as The Ruling C l a s s ) and Sto r ia d e l l e d o t t r i n e
p o l i t i c h e , trans# by James H. Meisel in The Myth of the
Ruling Class (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1 9 5 8 ) ; Par et o was the most elaborate of the e l i t e
theorists. His T r a t t a t o di Sociologia generale, trans#
as Mind and Society by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur
Livingston, ed, by A. Livingston, (London: Jonathan
Cape, Thirty Bedford Square, 1935) appeared in several
volumes.
12
Karl Mannheim, Man and Society (London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner a n d Co . , 1 9 4 6 ) ; Robert Michels, P o l i t i c a l
Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Glencoe, I l l i n o i s : The
Free Press, 19^9); 77 Wright Mills, Power E l i t e (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Lasswell, Lerner,
and Rothwell, The Comparative Study of E l i t e s (Stanford,
California; Stanford University Press, 1952); and
Harold D. Lasswell, P o l i t i c s : Who Gets What, When, How,
(New York: Peter Smith, 1950)*

For the more a r t i c u l a t e c r i t i c i s m s of the e l i t e theory,

see James H. Meisel (The M yth of the Ruling C la ss , c i t e d
above) Carl J . Fried r i ch , (The New Image of the Common
Man, Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1950) and Robert A. Dahl
' Cr it ique of the Ruling E l i t e Model' The American
P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol, 52, 1958*
 9

Marx1 ruling class, of course, refers to those who own

and control the means of production#
In spite of the fact that the elitist and ruling
class writers have not always been talking of the same
groups (although, there is an obvious overlapping), they
seem to be unanimous on one point: they were analyzing
individuals, social groups or classes possessing certain
characteristics or attributes that placed them at the top
or near the top of the social structure#
For purposes of this study, then, the term elite
shall be made to refer to those individuals who are
’holders of high positions in a given society’# 1 3 Under
this definition, there could be as many elites as there
are values# Thus, there may be elites of wealth (economic
elite), power (political elite), prestige (social elite),
^k
and so forth. Also, elite status may be attained by
any individual who becomes ’successful’, that is to say,
who acquires the key values of the society which are
necessary for the exercise of influence# The elite
concept, therefore, is theoretically independent of the
class concept.

13
Lasswell, The Comparative Study of Elites, ibid., p#6.
14
Ibid
 10

But there is a tendency f o r the c o n c e n t r a t i o n of

these v a l u e s not only in the same hands but also in the

same social strata* W e a l t h m a y not only b r i n g more

w e a l t h but m a y also f a c i l i t a t e the a c q u i s i t i o n of power,

prestige, and other values* In short, when persons

become ’e l i t e ’ in r e l a t i o n to several of these key v a l u e s

and have, therefore, a h i g h gene r a l i z e d influence, we

15
say that they are the elite of society*. Furthermore,

in a c o u n t r y c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a m a rked degree of social

stratification, w i t h wide gaps di v i d i n g social classes,

there will l i k e l y be a h i g h inequality in the sharing

and d i s t r i b u t i o n of key v a l u e s such as wealth, education,

power, prestige, and skill a m o n g the various social

classes* Under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ’the elite concept

m ay be u s e d w i t h r e f erence to the u p per s t r a t a * ••in

w h i c h case it includes not only the i n d i v iduals with

-j ^
high generalized influence but also their f a m i l i e s ’*

The term socio-economic elite as used in this study,

therefore, merely emphasizes the m e m b e r s h i p of an

individual, who occupies a h i g h pos i t i o n in the

f u n c t i o n a l hierarchy, in a social class hierarchy. In

T3
Ibid*
16
G. W i l l i a m Skinner, L e a d e r s h i p and Power in the C h i n e s e
C o m m unity of T h a i l a n d (New York: Cornell U n i v e r s i t y
P r e s s , 1958) p T 79•
other words, the term socio-economic elite merges the
elite concept (which normally refers to a group of
1successful' individuals) with the class concept. The

term socio-economic elite, as shall be seen later, also

becomes useful as an analytical tool in determining
whether there is an overlap or coincidence between the

political elite and the socio-economic dominants (socio­

economic elite).
Political elite, or the elite of power, refers to
the ’power holders of a body politic1 and includes1the
leadership and the social formations from which leaders
17
typically come,,.1. Again, there is no assumption made
that the power holders come from a distinct social
formation. This was in fact one of the objects of the
empirical investigation conducted by the study and the
data gathered are presented and analyzed in Chapter IV.

The distinction is necessary, for, as p>revi°usly

mentioned, if key values such as wealth, prestige, and
power merge in the same hands, then we have located the
elite.

Finally, it should be pointed out that those who

compose the elite may themselves fall into different
gradations. From the definition given, it is clear

T7
Lasswell, The Comparative Study of Elites, op, cit.,
p. 13
that the elite may be seen as individuals with varying

degrees of influence depending on how much of the key

values of wealth, prestige, power, education, etc#,

they possess# But as a class, they are easily

distinguishable from the masses#

There are terms used in the study such as principalia,

cacique, and others but these were actual names given to

particular groups in Philippine society and are defined

or explained as they are encountered in the text.

METHODOLOGY

No single 'approach1 was adopted in this study# The

nature of Philippine society, with its class and economic

system and its semi-fused structures whose functions

often overlap, necessitated the adoption of a broad focus

in order to better understand the full implication of

leadership. This implies that leadership and power must

be seen in the context of the total social environment

and existing institutions; it also stresses the need

for the techniques and findings of other related

disciplines such as history, sociology, anthropology and

economics. Behavioral techniques in the gathering of

empirical data have been employed but historical and

institutional analysis have not been abandoned. This

was a complicated and difficult task but was considered

necessary for a deeper understanding of the problem.

 13

The aim was to look closer at the trees but at the same

time not to get lost and see none of the forest.

Research Procedure. Fieldwork for the study was

carried on from December, 1$62 to December, 1963* During

these twelve months, compilation of elite biographical

materials, intensive interviewing, examination and

analysis of documents, official records, newspapers and

periodicals were made. Provincial field trips and a

questionnaire survey were also conducted.

Since one of the main aims of the study was to

discover who become the political leaders in point of

social and economic characteristics, the first task was

to identify the individuals who have held certain public

18
positions during the period under review. Accordingly,

biographical data were gathered on top officials who

have served from 1946-63, namely, all the Presidents,

Vice-Presidents, Cabinet members, (those listed in the

Official Directories), Senators (1947-64), members of

the House of Representatives, and Justices of the Supreme

19
Court. The data gathered were reduced into tables,

78
This portion of the research operation is an adaptation
of Lasswell et a l 1s, suggested framework of elite
research. Cf. The Comparative Study of Elites, op. cit.
19
Further details of the procedure, major sources of
data, and treatment of the material are given in Chapter
IV. See particularly Footnote 8.
 14

using the comparative frequency metric, to determine

whether the members of the political elite have common

social class characteristics which can give clues to

the social circulation of the power holders* Did new

types of political leaders appear? How did the leadears

compare with the rest of the population in point of

social class characteristics? Data on age, year of

entry to top public positions, pre-elite positions, age

at entry to elite positions, and years in elite positions

gave a collective picture of the career and recruitment

pattern of the political elite.

A simultaneous operation was the questionnaire

survey conducted sometime in February 1 9 6 3 . It was not

the intention of the survey to discover provincial

21
'power e l i t e s 1 as suggested by Schulze and Blumberg

20
This technique is the accumulation of data on certain
selected characteristics of an elite group during a given
time period and making a comparative analysis to determine
what changes have taken place within the group. These
characteristics are then compared with the rest of the
society, (Cf. Lasswell et a l •, The Comparative Study of
Eli t e s , op. cit., p. 27)
21
Cf. Robert 0. Schulze and Leonard U. Blumberg, 'The
Determination of Local Power Elites', The American Journal
of Sociology, Vol. 63, No. 3>November, 1957* This method
of trying to locate the local 'power elite* in the
Philippine setting, incidentally, was found ineffective
in the Hulo study; vide Mary R. Hollnsteiner, The
Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality (UP:
C D R C , 1 9 6 3 ) p. 214.
 15

since the study was focused rather on the national elite.

Instead, the main objective was to form a general picture

of the composition of those who were considered the

local socio-economic dominants, the bases of their

influence and ’p r o m i n e n c e 1 and their participation in

22
politics#

Five knowledgeable persons in each province were

selected to compose the panel, namely the Provincial

Treasurer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the

Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary,

the President of the local Jaycee, and the provincial

correspondent of the Philippine News Service# A covering

letter of instructions explaining the questionnaire and

the meaning of ’prominent* and ’influential’, together

with corresponding letters of introduction were attached

to the questionnaire. All in all, 3^4 questionnaires

were distributed (five in each of the 5 6 provinces or

280, and 84 for the pre-tests to junior and senior cadets

22
A sample of the form appears in the Appendix#
23
Director Carlos P. Ramos of the Graduate School of
Public Administration, University of the Philippines
kindly furnished the covering letters of introduction
for the Provincial Treasurers and the Division
Superintendent of Schools, General Dominador F. Garcia
(Chief of Constabulary) for the PC Commanders, Mr, Jose
G. Morada (National President of the Jaycees) for the
Jaycee officials, and Mr, Osmundo Abad Santos (Manager
of the Philippine News Service) for the provincial
newspapermen.
 16

of the Philippine Military Academy who came from

different provinces of the Philippines). The response

was about 5 2 ^ ( 189 out of 364) and each province had at

least a panel member who responded# There were some

provinces where all panel members responded# An average

of twenty families in each province were mentioned#

As previously stated* the aim was to form a general

picture of the local socio-economic dominants* As it

turned out, however, the questionnaire data furnished

important information which was found useful in the

analysis of the top political elite# Many of the top

power holders from 1946-63 (except those originally from

Metropolitan Manila) were mentioned. Information

concerning the socio-economic bases of their influence

(land ownership, profession, or business) and members

of their families and relatives (by blood or affinity)

who were elected or appointed to important public

office provided the necessary clues which were checked

against official and other sources#

A master list of landowners with holdings of 50

hectares and above was particularly found useful# This

was kindly furnished to the writer by Mr. Arturo P.

Sorongon who made a study of landed estates in the

 17

Phil i p p i n e s in 1955* Data on ownership or control of

banks, insurance companies, mas s media, public u t i lities

(shipping lines, l and transportation, electric p o w e r

plants, telephone) forest concessions and p a s t u r e leases

were also a c c u m u l a t e d from the Central Bank, Office of

the Ins u r a n c e Commissioner, R a d i o Control Office, Public

Service C o m m i s s i o n and the B u r e a u of Forestry,

The p r o v i n c i a l c o n t a c t s esta b l i s h e d through the

questionnaire survey wer e also found usef u l d u r i n g the

provincial field trips c o n d u c t e d from A p r i l to June 1 9 6 3 *

I n t ensive i n t e rviews were conducted in seven p r o vinces

(ilocos Sur, Pampanga, Albay, Negros Occidental, Cebu,

M i s amis Oriental, and Davao) a l t hough side trips to

several other p r o v i n c e s were made along the way. Members

of the p r o v i n c i a l panel w ere the m a i n c o n tacts who

introduced the w r i t e r to p e r s o n s m e n t i o n e d in the

questionnaire survey. B o t h the informal and the guided

i n t e r v i e w m e t h o d s were utilized. The p o ints of

c o n c e n t r a t i o n w ere on the n a t u r e and c o m p o s i t i o n of the

local elite, the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the local and the

n a t ional elite, the s o cio-economic base of the elite,

24
D e p a r t m e n t of Finance, A Study of L a n d e d Estates in
the P h i l i p p i n e s , by A r t u r o P. Sorongon (Manila: ICA,
1955 J •
 18

the requisites for local political leadership, the

manner in which social, economic and political influence
is exercised, ownership and control of the local mass
media, and the thinking of the elite on the major questions

or issues of the day. Inquiries were also made on the

recent history of the political contests in the various
provinces visited. Two hundred and twenty-seven persons

were met through the panel members. Of these, 108 were

government officials (Governors, Vice-Governors,
Provincial Board members, City Mayors, vice-Mayors,

Town Mayors, Councilors, Provincial Treasurers,

Constabulary and police officers, military personnel,

Judges and Fiscals); 39 were professionals (lawyers,

physicians, teachers, etc.), 12 were local political
party leaders, 17 were businessmen, 10 were press and
radio people, 9 were religious leaders, k were labor
leaders, 8 were executives of private business and
industrial firms, 9 were big landowners and 11 were
plain folks. Of these 227j however, only 118 were
intensively interviewed.
The material for the rest of the study came from
historical documents, official records, newspapers and
periodicals, other published and unpublished sources,
and interviews with national officials and political
 19

party leaders* These are indicated in the bibliography

and footnotes* Observations were made while Congress

was in session, especially during the deliberations on

the Land Reform Code, Interviews with some Senators,

Congressmen, and landowners were made in connection with

the bill. Party conventions of the Nacionalista Party

and the now defunct Labor Party,political rallies in

Manila and Pampanga, and the conduct of the election in

Manila, Quezon City and Pasay City were likewise

observed.

The study is organized as follows: Chapter II

traces the historical beginnings and development of the

Philippine elite from pre-colonial times to the end of

the colonial period. Attention is focused on the

position of the elite in the social structure and the

characteristics which distinguished them from the rest

of the society. Elite functions and roles at various

stages of Philippine history and elite relations with

the colonial administrations are also discussed.

An examination of the postwar status of the modern

principalia, or the socio-economic elite, is made in

Chapter III. Analysis of the social and economic

setting is made to determine whether a rearrangement in

the social structure has occurred Did the old

 20

principalia disappear? Did a new type of elite develop?

In other words, was there a transformation in elite
composition or were new recruits merely added? Chapter
III also examines the present class system; a rough

estimate of the various social class categories including

the modern principalia class is likewise made.
Chapter IV is a statistical and analytical study of

the political elite. Empirical data bearing on the

career patterns, socio-economic background, regional
origin, etc,, are presented and analyzed. The objective

is to determine the ties of the political elite with

the social structure, whether there are any distinct
social formations from which they were drawn. What were
the common characteristics of the political elite? A
discussion of the politically dominant families is also
included, (a selected list of these families as
established from official sources, provincial interviews,
and the questionnaire survey is in the Appendix).
Chapter V deals with the nature of Philippine
political parties and the role of the elite in these

political organizations. The rest of the discussion

centers on the methods and practices employed by the

elite in their competition to attain political decision­

making posts. Chapter VI examines the manner in which
 21

power was exercised with the aim of illustrating the

position of the power-wielders vis-a-vis the total
society. How were elite interests and positions

maintained?
Finally, the last chapter contains a summary of

findings of the study.

 CHAPTER II

THE PHILIPPINE ELITE: HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS AND

DEVELOPMENT

Philippine society has traditionally been rigidly

stratified and leadership has always been closely

associated with the top strata of society. Whether under

native or foreign rule, this pattern has persisted

through the centuries — from pre-colonial times to the

present.

A. THE RULING CLASS IN PRE-CONQUEST TIMES

Before the coming of the Spaniards in the early part

of the sixteenth century, Philippine society did not' form

a single national unit but was fragmented into small,

independent organizations called barangays. Antonio

de Morga, a high Spanish offical who came to the

Philippines about the time when the Spaniards were

consolidating their control and one of the recognized,

chroniclers of pre-Spanish Philippines, reported that

1
Barangay is a Hispanized term derived from b a l a n g a y , the
name of the boats in which the early Malay settlers came
to the Philippines, and which was also applied to their
political organizations. Cf. Eufronio M. Alip, Political
and Cultural History of the Philip p i n e s . (Mani1a : A1ip
and Sons, 195^-) P •56 .

22
 23

T h e r e were no kings or lords throughout these

islands who ruled over them as in the m a n n e r of
our k i n g d o m s and provinces; but in every i s l a n d
and in each pro v i n c e of it, m a n y chiefs were
r e c o g n i z e d b y the natives themselves. Some
were more p o w e r f u l than others, and each one
h a d his f o l l owers and subjects, by districts
and families; and these obeyed and respected
the c h i e f .2

The b a r a n g a y , w h i c h was a fami l y - g o v e r n m e n t structure,

c o n s i s t e d g e n e r a l l y of from thirty to one h u n d r e d families

a l t h o u g h there were some large b a r a n g a y s and b a r a n g a y

3
c o n f e d e r a t i o n s having up to 7,000 inhabitants.

B a r a n g a y s o c iety was divided into three m a j o r

classes: (l) the m a h a r l i k a , or nobility; (2) the t i m a w a ,

or freemen; and ( 3 ) the serfs and slaves (aliping

n a m a m a h a y and aliping s a g i g i l i d ) .^

The n o b i l i t y was the ruling class. F r o m its ranks

w as d r a w n the d atu w h i c h meant 'chief or 'monarch'. In

2
A n t onio de M o r g a (Jose P. Ri z a l ' s edition). Sucesos de
las Islas F i l i p i n a s , l 6 0 9 , in B l a i r and Robertson, The
P h i l i p p i n e Islands, 1 4 9 3 - 1 8 9 8 (Cleveland, Ohio: T he Arth u r
C l a r k Co., I 907 ) vol.XVI, p . 1 1 9 •
3
Cf. Maximo M. Kalaw, P h i l i p p i n e G overnment (Manila: 1948)
p.ll; J o h n L e d d y Phelan, The H i z p a n i z a t i o n of t h e
P h i l i p p i n e s (Madison: The U n i v e r s i t y of W i s c o n s i n Press,
1959) p . 15.
4
Alip, o p . c i t . , p.6l. Some h i s t o r i a n s treat the serfs
a nd slaves as separate classes but as Phelan noted, the
rs l a v e s ' res e m b l e d debt peons h a v i n g some similar
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as the serfs a l t h o u g h they are in a m u c h
l o w e r category. Cf. Phelan, o p . c i t . , pp.20-1.
 24

other regions, the ruler was called rajah, had,] 1 , or

sultan. Thus at the time of the conquest of Manila, it
was ruled by Rajah Lakandula, a direct descendant of
Rajah Malang Balagtas, one-time ruler of the Madjapahit
Empire.^ Other titles conferred on the members of the
nobility were Gat and Lakan for men (the equivalent for

'Lord» in English or 'Don' in Spanish), and Dayang for

6
women.
The timawa. were next in rank to the nobility. They

paid no taxes, owned lands and were free to select their

own occupations. They, however, owed allegiance to the
datu, accompanied him in his hunting or fishing trips.

They also went to war with him.

The aliping namamahay were basically debt peons who
worked for the maharlika or the timawa. Owning no lands
or work animals, they built their homes on lands owned by
their superiors. For tilling the lands of their lords,
they received as compensation a portion of the harvest.

They were essentially the equivalent of the present-day

Ibid., p.l42. In the Moslem regions of Mindanao today,

leadership is still mainly exercised by the sultans, datus,
hadjis, etc .
6
Vide, Luther Parker, 'The Gats and the Lakans', Philippine
Magazine, vol.XXVII, January 1931-
 25

k a s a m a s or taos in rural Philippines. The aliping

s a g i g i l i d , t h o u g h called slaves, were not p r e c i s e l y

chattels as the slaves in R o m a n times or N o r t h A m e r i c a

in the s e v e n t e e n t h to the n i n e t e e n t h centuries. W h i l e at

times they c o uld be sold (if they were not h o u s e h o l d

servants), they c o u l d own and dispose of property. They

c o uld also a t t a i n freedom by purchase, marriage,

v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n of the lord etc.

7 The c h i l d r e n of the

serf and the a l i p i n g s a g i gilid ac q u i r e d the status of

t h e i r parents.

C h i e f t a i n or d a t u status was h e r e d i t a r y but a memb e r

of the m a h a r l i k a might become a dat u through w e a l t h and

physical prowess.

These p r i n c i p a l i t i e s and lordships were i n h e r i t e d

in the m a l e line and b y s u c c e s s i o n of f a t h e r and
son and t h e i r descendants. If these were lacking,
then their b r o t h e r s and c ollateral relatives
succeeded. T h e i r duty was to rule and g o v e r n
their su b j e c t s and followers, and to assist them
in their i n t e r e s t s and necessities. W h a t the
chiefs r e c e i v e d from t h e i r followers was to be
h e l d by them in great v e n e r a t i o n and respect;
and they wer e served in t h eir wars and voyages and
in their tilling, sowing, fishing, and the building
of their houses. To these duties the na t i v e s
at t e n d e d v ery p r o m p t l y w h e n e v e r summoned b y their
chief. T h e y also p a i d the chief tribute (which
they called b u i z ), in varying quantities, in the
crops that they gathered. The d escendants of
such chiefs, a nd t h eir relatives, even thou g h they
did not inherit the lordship, were h e l d in the same

7
Phelan, o p . c i t . , p.21; Alip., o p ♦ c i t , , p . 63 .
 26

respect and consideration. Such were all

regarded as nobles, and as persons exempt from
the services rendered by the others, or the
plebians, who were called timaguas (timaw'a,
R i z a l ). Exactly the same right of nobility
and chieftainship was preserved for the women
as for the men. When anyone of these chiefs
was more courageous than others in war and
upon other occasions, such a one obtained more
followers and men; and the others were under
his leadership, even if they were chiefs.
These latter retained to themselves the
lordship and particular government of their own
following, which was called barangay among
t h e m .8

The members of the maharlika class, in keeping with

their status, lived pompously. Thus, Morga described a

street s c e n e :

Both men and women, especially the chiefs, walk

slowly and sedately upon going to their visits,
and wh e n going through the streets and to the
temples; and are accompanied by many slaves,
both male and female, with parasols of silk
which they carry to protect them from the sun
and rain. The women walk ahead and their
female servants and slaves follow them; behind
these walk their husbands, fathers, or brothers,
with their men-servants and s l a v e s . 9
y
As a ruler, the datu had immense powers and

exercised multi-functional roles. He was law-giver,

judge, chief executive, and military leader. As judge he

was often assisted by a group of elders called maginoos

8
Morga, op. cit., pp.119-21.
9
Morga, cited in Alip, op. cit., p.6l
 27

who also belonged to the maharlika class. He had

control of the land although the actual title was vested
in the barangay. He also controlled trade, fishing, etc.

There is, however, one important characteristic of

this pre-conquest power structure. Although the social
divisions were fairly rigid (but not as rigid as the
Indian caste-system), it was ’bound together in a kinship

system of mutual dependence essentially patriarchal in

character.

Phelan also noted that because of this feature,

knowledgeable Spanish observers recognized that the
Philippine dependency system ’lacked the harshness and
brutality of European slavery’.12

B. THE PRINCIPALIA: CACIQUE BUREAUCRACY UNDER

SPAIN

SUBJUGATION, CONVERSION AND COLLABORATION

The colonization of the Philippines by the Spaniards
brought an end to the absolute dominion of the ruling
datus over their respective jurisdictions. The
highly-fragmented nature of the barangay governmental
units facilitated their conquest by the foreigners.

To
Alip, op. cit., p .56.
11
Phelan, op. cit., p .22 .
12
Ibid.
 28

The Initial p o l i c y of the Spaniards in conso l i d a t i n g

t h eir pol i t i c a l control was the a d o p t i o n of the

e n c o m i e n d a system. U n d e r this system, vast areas of lands

w e r e a p p o r t i o n e d a m ong ’loyal and d e s e r v i n g ’ Spaniards

who beca m e k n o w n as e n c o m e n d e r o s . The indios (as the

S p a n i a r d s c a lled the Filipinos) who l i v e d w i t h i n these

areas were p l a c e d u n d e r the control of the e ncomenderos

13
and were forced to p a y tribute.

In trying to b r i n g about the complete s u b j u g a t i o n of

the Filipinos, the Spaniards h ad to utilize force and

religion. Priest and soldier, cross and sword, were both

employed. The e n c o m e n d e r o s , particularly, were brutal in

t h e i r methods:

The religious, fearing that the conquered w o u l d

be r e p e l l e d b y the r e l igion of the conquerors,
o f t e n d e c r i e d the forceful m e t h o d s wit h w h i c h
the e n c o m e n d e r o s went about their task. Such

13
The encomiendas in the Philippines w ere not the
p r e c u r s o r s of the latifundia or h a c i e n d a system w h i c h
d e v e l o p e d m u c h l a t e r in the n i n e t e e n t h century. Rather,
t h e y wer e d e s i g n e d m o r e as p o l itical subdivisions in
w h i c h the e n c o m e n d e r o was g i v e n the p o w e r to collect
t r i b u t e in his e n c o m i e n d a as well as the basic powers
a nd duties of g o v e r n m e n t such as executing and enforcing
the laws of the C h u r c h and the State, p r e s erving peace
and order, giving religious instruction, providing
m i l i t a r y protection, etc. Subsequent d e v e l opments showed,
however, that the en c o m e n d e r o s were m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in
the exercise of t h eir p o w e r of tr i b u t e col l e c t i o n and
n e g l e c t e d their o t h e r duties. Cf. R e c o p i l a c i o n de Leyes
de los Reynos de las I n d i a s , 3rd ed3 (M a d r i d : A n d r e s
O r t e g a , 177^) L i b r o VI, Titulo IX.
 29

fears, a l t h o u g h plausible, proved in fact

groundless. A c t u a l l y by their very b l ood
and fire m e t h o d s the e ncomenderos r e n d e r e d
a service to the r e l i gious by breaking the
b a c k b o n e of n a t i v e r e s i s t a n c e .1^

This ’s e r v i c e 1 rendered b y the e n c o m enderos to the

religious f a c i l i t a t e d the c o n v e r s i o n of the Filipinos.

The friars c o n c e n t r a t e d first on the c h i l d r e n of the

datus and t hen on the datus themselves.

What the r e l i g i o u s u s u a l l y requested was that

some of the c h i l d r e n be c o m m itted to their
care. The chieftains might shun the m o n a s t e r y
for some time, but out of a c o m b ination of
c u r i o u s i t y and fear they w o u l d han d over some
of their c h i l d r e n to be ed u c a t e d by the
religious. E v a n g e l i z a t i o n f o l lowed a standard
pattern. The c h i l d r e n of the chieftains were
first indoctrinated, and then the chieftains
t h e m selves w e r e p e r s u a d e d . 15

W i t h the c o n v e r s i o n of the datus to Catholicism, the

c o n s o l i d a t i o n of S p a n i s h control over the rest of the

p o p u l a t i o n followed.

The datus were d e s t i n e d not to lose their leading

roles i n s o f a r as t h eir r e l a t i o n with their people was

concerned. La c k i n g a d e q u a t e personnel to preserve their

a u t h o r i t y in the Islands, the Spaniards d e c i d e d to

utilize the m e m b e r s of the nati v e u p p e r class to assist

the ce n t r a l government in a d m i n i s t e r i n g the villages.

Ik
Phelan, op. ci t . , p.5^+*
15
I b i d . , p .55•
 30

It should be noted that during this time, as throughout

the Spanish rule, there were only a few thousand Spaniards

in the Philippines, with most of them concentrated in

Manila. The central government therefore had to resort

to the friars and the native members of the upper

class to exercise their control over the i n d i o s . The

Spaniards, following the tested principle of divide et

imp e r a , were careful not to disturb the social status of

the local chieftains. Th e y changed the Filipino title

datu to the Hispanized Cabeza de barangay (head of the

barangay). Th e y also conferred upon the datus certain

privileges designed to make them loyal.

As early as 1573 the Agustinian prelates urged

Philip II to preserve this group [the nobility]
as a privileged class. In 159^ Philip II granted
two concessions to the headsman of the
Philippines, privileges previously granted to
the Indian caciques in America. Both the
headsmen and their eldest sons were exempt from
the paying of the annual tribute as well as from
participation in compulsory labor projects.
They also enjoyed certain honorific tokens of
prestige. They enjoyed honors similar to
Hidalgos of Castile, including the privilege of
using the Spanish "don".17

16
I b i d . Cf. also Tomas de Comyn, Estado de las Islas
Filipinas en 1810. Las Islas F i l i p i n a s . Progresos en
70 a n o s . J.F. del Pan (e d .) (Manila: 187771 John
Bowring, A Visit to the Philippine Islands in 1 8 5 8 ,
R e p r i n t e d l M a n i l a : Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963)
p .68 .
17
Phelan, op. c i t . , p.122.
 31

Primarily because of this treatment as a

privileged group, the members of the Filipino upper

class became willing agents of Spanish colonial

administration. They were employed by the Spaniards as

tribute collectors in their respective barangays. This
function, as we have noted, was not a new one for the

cabezas. The only difference was that under the new

dispensation, they had to hand over the tributes collected

to the encomenderos. Because the cabezas were given
quotas to collect and were required to pay whatever

shortage, they often collected more than what was

required. In this task, they employed methods that often
matched those of the Spaniards.
Tributes far exceeded the official tariff...the
tribute rolls were seldom kept up to date, with
the result that sons often had to pay the tax on
a dead father. The encomenderos were collecting
their tribute with blood and fire methods
without providing their wards with any of the
protective services established by law. The
agents of the encomenderos were harsh and brutal.
Native chieftains, who frequently acted as
tribute collectors, were a scourge. Many
encomenderos compelled their wards to pay tribute
in a scarce commodity, which goods the encomendero
then resold at a handsome profit.
The widespread abuses that accompanied the
encomienda system disgusted even the Spanish friars who

18
Ibid. P.95.
 32

made representations with the King leading to its

eventual abandonment as a method of political control. 19
Alcaldias (provinces) and pueblos (towns) replaced them

and became the local units of government. The alcaldias

were headed by the Spanish alcalde mayores.

The establishment of the pueblos opened new positions

to the native upper class. The highest official of the

pueblo was the gobernadorcillo (literally, petty governor)

and the title of capitan was conferred upon him. The

gobernadorcillo was assisted by tenientes (deputies),

alguaciles (subordinate employees), a constable, and

20
inspectors of fields, cattle, etc. The position of
gobernadorcillo was 1elective1 with the franchise limited
to twelve of the most senior cabezas who made three
nominations in the presence of the parish priest, the
outgoing gobernadorcillo and the Spanish alcalde mayor
(provincial governor). The final choice was made either
by the central government or, in the case of more remote

19
The exact date of abolition of the encomienda system in
the Philippines is not known. While provincial governments
and towns intended to replace them started to be organized
by the end of the sixteenth century, records show that up
to 1766, there were still several thousands of private
encomiendas. See Blair and Robertson, vol. L, p.78.
20
Kalaw, op. cit., p.25*
 33

provinces, by the provincial governor. The other

officials of the pueblo were also selected during the
. . 21
meeting.
22
These then, composed the principalia class: the
hereditary cabezas and the whole set of 1elective1

officials. Throughout Spain’s rule of over three hundred

years, they monopolized public positions open to
Filipinos. They constituted the voting and privileged

class in Filipino society.

PRINCIPALIA METAMORPHOSIS

The principalia as a class, however, underwent some

changes. Apart from the loyal collaboration which the

members gave to the conquerors owing to the privileges

they enjoyed under pax hispanica, and which separated
them from their fellow countrymen, there were other
changes that took place. Acquiring Spanish education and
learning the Castilian language, they became ’different’
from their people who were not given the same

opportunities. Living in the poblaciones or cabeceras,

21
Initially, all adult males nominated three candidates
and the Spaniards selected one to serve as gobernadorcillo,
but this was changed in 1642 by Governor Corcuera. See
Blair and Robertson, op. cit., vol. L, pp.208-9.
22
Principalia is derived from principales, i.e., the
’principal' members of the community.
 34

they became mor e is o l a t e d from the masses of their

countrymen. Finally, the infus i o n of the m e s t i z o

element, r e s u l t i n g from the racial m i x ture b e t w e e n

S p a n i s h officials, soldiers, priests and prosperous

Chinese merchants on the one han d and Filipino w o m e n on

the other, p r o d u c e d the me s t i z o character, not only in

o u t l o o k and culture, but also in physical features as

well which, up to this day, is so p r o m i n e n t l y m a n i f e s t e d

in the p r i n c i p a l i a class. T h e s e changes warrant closer

examination.

E d u c a t i o n was one of the most n e g l e c t e d aspects of

S p a n i s h colonial administration. T h e r e was no attempt

at all to e s t a b l i s h a s y s t e m of popular edu c a t i o n for

n e a r l y 300 y e a r s of S p a n i s h rule. W h a t e v e r edu c a t i o n

that existed was p r a c t i c a l l y limited to the p r i n c i p a l i a

class. Phelan, for example, n o ted that the aim of

training the sons of c h i e f t a i n s (who often b o ard f or a

few years at the pari s h r e s i d e n c e called the c o n v e n t o )

was to have * an elite class who could act as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s

23
b e t w e e n the S p a n i a r d s a n d the Filipino m a s s e s * .

J o s e p h R. Hayden, Professor of Political S c i e n c e of

M i c h i g a n U n i v e r s i t y and a f o r m e r A m e r i c a n V i c e - G o v e r n o r

23
Phelan, o p . c i t . , p.58-9*
 35

of the Philippines, wrote on the state of Spanish

education:

Toward the end of the Spanish regime a one-room

school for boys and another for girls was
found, with the great stone church and convent
facing the plaza in almost every center of
population in the Islands [~cabecera or
p o b l a c i o n ] . But these schools, in which the
catechism, mechanically taught with the
liberal aid of the rod, was the chief subject
of instruction, were attended chiefly by the
children of the upper-class Filipinos, those
who lived in the towns where the schools were
situated. A very few of the wealthier 'Indios’
set their sons and daughters to advanced and
expensive private institutions, somewhat
comparable to American boarding s c h o o l s . ^

It was only towards the end of Spanish rule that the

authorities began to think of popular education. In

1863, a Royal Decree was issued providing for a system

of primary instruction for the first time^^ but, as

Del Rosario noted*

24
Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in
National Development (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1945) pp.517-8.
Among the 1 advanced and expensive’ private schools
referred to by Hayden are the University of Santo Tomas
(established by the Dominican Order in l 6 l l ) , Colegio de
San Juan de Letran (D ominicans-1620), and Ateneo de Manila
(Jesuits- 1 8 5 9 ) for boys and the ’colegios' for girls are
Colegio de Sta. Isabel ( 1 6 3 O), Colegio de Sta. Rita ( 1 7 1 9 )
Colegio de la Concordia ( 1 8 6 8 ) , Assumption Convent ( 1 8 9 2 ).
Up to this day, many of these religious educational
institutions are among those that are referred to as the
’pres t i g e ’ schools in the Philippines. Originally
established by the Spaniards for their children, they
soon accepted the children of the upper class Filipinos.
(Cf. 1903 Census of the Philippines, vol. I, p.336.)
25
Tomas G. del Rosario, ’Education under Spanish R u l e ’ in
1903 Census of the P h i l i p p i n e s , vol. Ill, p.576.
 36

All the laws, decrees, circulars etc., which

were issued for the purpose of encouraging
and strengthening the education of the people
were dead letters, because the [Spanish]
parish priests scattered throughout the
country, making use of their influence,
privileges and governmental powers,
tenaciously and constantly opposed the
education of the popular masses.26

As of 1903j or four years after the Americans

replaced the Spaniards as the colonizers, there were

only 76,627 persons or 1.6 per cent of the population

ten years old and over who had education beyond primary
27
instruction. We can assume that these were mostly

members of the principalia.

The cabecera complex, or as what the anthropologist

28
Donn Hart calls today the Philippine plaza complex1 ,
started to manifest itself as a definite settlement

pattern when the Spaniards built their churches in

centrally-located areas and wanted the Filipinos to be

resettled ba.jo de campana (literally, ’under the bells’).

26
I b i d . , p .5 9 ^ •
27
190 3 Census, vol.II, p p .15 and 78.
28
Professor Hart made an anthropological community study
of settlement patterns in the Philippines in 1950 to 1952.
His findings show the distinct concentration of the
principalia in and around the plaza. (The plaza is often
used interchangeably with poblacion, centro or cabecera♦)
See Donn V. Hart, The Philippine Plaza Complex: A Focal
Point in Culture Change (Yale University: Southeast Asia
Studies, Cultural Report Series, 1955)*
 37

Phelan observed that 1the results cer t a i n l y were not as

s w e eping as the m i s s i o n a r i e s wanted, but preconquest

d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t l y r e d uced so that

Filipinos wer e brought into some contacts w i t h Hi s p a n i c

c u l t u r e 1 .^

A m o n g these ‘F i l i p i n o s brought into some contacts

with Hispanic c u l t u r e 1 and who settled in the cabecera or

plaza w i t h their res i d e n c e s clustered a r o u n d the church,

school and town h all were i n c luded most of the members of

30
the p r i n c i p a l i a . T his i n t e r e s t i n g aspect of

p r i n c i p a l i a rese t t l e m e n t p a t t e r n and its implications

shall be exp l o r e d f u r t h e r in the s u c c e e d i n g chapters, but

what is important to not e at this point is that this

p h e n o m e n o n c o n t r i b u t e d to the d e v e lopment of a d i s t inctive

o u t l o o k a m o n g the p r i n c i p a l i a , since they were the ones

most i n f l u e n c e d by H i s p a n i c culture through their close

contacts w i t h the S p a n i a r d s w h ile the b u l k of the indio

p e a s a n t r y r e m a i n e d in t h eir remote villages.

The m e s t i z o element of the prin c i p a l i a class, unlike

its M e x i c a n and other L a t i n - A m e r i c a n counterparts, was

not solely a m i x t u r e of the S p a n i s h and the native.

29
Phelan, o p . ci t , , p.49*
30
Cf. Hart, o p . ci t .
 33

Rather, it was predominantly a racial mixture of the

Filipino with the Spanish and Chinese, with the latter

being much more numerous.
Most of the Spaniards who came to the Philippines

as a general rule, did not bring women with them.

John Bowring who made a visit to the Philippines in

1858 noted that 'the number settled in the islands of

women of European birth is small, and generally speaking

they are the wives of the higher Spanish functionaries

and of superior officers in the army and navy, whose

term of service is generally limited1.31 As a result,

racial mixing between the Spaniards and upper-class

32
Filipino women were not uncommon. Bowring noted that
...it is seldom that the highest society is
without a large proportion of mestiza ladies,
children of Spanish fathers and native
mothers. The great majority of the merchants
and landed proprietors belong to this class,
and most of the subordinate offices of
government are filled by them. 33
The available evidence on this racial mixing suggests
that they were mostly informal unions. One historian,

for instance, writes that 1in those days mestizo and

31
Bowring, op. cit., p.68.
32
Phelan, op. cit., p.106-7*
33
Bowring, op. cit.
 39

34
illegitimate were synonymous terms1. There were also
cases of don.juanismo among the friars and 1flagrant
violations of the monastic vow of chastity obviously
set a demoralizing example to the rest of the clergy*. 35

The number of Spanish mestizos was however small

and did not probably exceed more than 35?000 by the end
of Spanish rule. The primary reason for this, as

already mentioned, is that the Spaniards never settled in

the Philippines in great numbers. In contrast, the

Chinese mestizos exceeded 200,000 at this time. 37

The Chinese had had contacts with the Filipinos
even antedating that of the Spaniards. Available

evidence, however, indicates that they began settling in

the Philippines in greater numbers with the start of the
Spanish galleon trade between Manila and Acapulco in the
o O
latter half of the sixteenth century. Chinese

34
Phelan, o p . c i t .
35
I b i d . , p . 39•
36
See E. Wickberg, *The Chinese Mestizo in the Philippines1
Journal of Southeast Asian H i s t o r y , v o 1.5? n o .1 (March
1964) p.98.
37
Wickberg refers us to Ferdinand Blumentritt, TDie
mestizen der Philippinen-Inseln1 , Revue coloniale
internationale. I, n o .4 (October I 885 ) pp.253? 257?
Foreman, Ahuja, and others. V i d e , Wickberg, op.cit.
38
Cf. William L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York:
E.P. Dutton, 1939)*
 40

merchants traded silk for M e x i c a n silver, and brought

o t h e r imports f r o m C h i n a and d i s t r i b u t e d them in M a n i l a

and C e n t r a l Luzon. By the 1 5 8 0 ‘s they were in sufficient

numbers to be a s s i g n e d by the S p a n i a r d s a separate colony

39
in M a n i l a c a l l e d the P a r i a n . S k i l l e d in commerce and

trade and as artisans, they soon m o n o p o l i z e d these

activities.

T he Chinese, like the Spaniards, mixed racially with

F i l i p i n a women. M a r r i a g e s a nd i n f ormal unions produced

a C h i n e s e m e s t i z o p o p u l a t i o n at first in M a n i l a (with

most of them c o n c e n t r a t e d in the B i nondo a r e a ) , and later

in the provinces. W i c k b e r g points out that conscious

attempts of the S p a n i a r d s in c o n v e r t i n g the C h i n e s e to

C a t h o l i c i s m c o n t r i b u t e d to the c r e a t i o n of these m e s t i z o

communities.

.. .the fact that m a r r i a g e s b e t w e e n C h i n e s e

and i n d i a s , w h e n b o t h partners were C a t h o l i c s
were l e g a l l y r e c o g n i z e d and e n c o u r a g e d resul t e d
in the c r e a t i o n of special c o m m unities of
m e s t i z o . The mos t important of these was the
B i n o n d o community, across the r i ver f r o m the
w a l l e d city of M a n i l a . ^

A pparently, the aim was to create fa dep e n d a b l e group of

C a t holic C h i n e s e m e r c h a n t s and artisans loyal to S p a i n 1

39
Phelan, o p . c i t , , p.ll.
40
W i c kberg, o p . c i t . , p.68-9*
 41

TABLE 2.1

CHINESE MESTIZO POPULATION, BY PROVINCES, IN 1810*

PROVINCE INDIOS MESTIZOS

Albay 103,935 2 ,3 9 8 .5**

Antique 39,325 -

Bataan 23,985 5,596.5

Batangas 127,920 3 ,997.5
Bulacan 143,910 20,037.5
C agayan 76,752 162.5
Calamianes 15,990 -

C amarine s 159,900 2,398.5

Capiz 87,145.5 396.5
C araga 19,183 -
C avit e 51,967 7 ,195.5
C ebu 151,905 4,797
Ilocos 361,270 4,797
Iloilo 167,895 1,599
Laguna 95,940 3,198
Leyte 68,007.5 306.5
Mindoro 13,169 -

Misamis 18,388.5 -

N egros 41,574 799.5

Neuva Ecija 9,750 -

Pampanga 127,920 20,937.5

Pangasinan 159,900 3 ,997.5
Samar 88,595 791.5
Tayabas 71,955 162.5
Tondo ( N . Manila
and Rizal) 143,910 35,077.5
Zambales 23,985 474.5
Z amboanga 1,500 500

2,395,676.5 120,621

-x-

Source: Tomas de Comyn, 'Estado de las Islas Filipinas

en 1 8 1 0 '. Las Islas Filipinas. Pro^resos en 70 a n o s ,
J.F. del Pan (e d .), in Wickberg, op, c i t . , p . 7 2 .
**
The strange decimal figures are due to the use of the
factor 6.5 (number of persons per tribute) multiplied by
the number of tribute-payers adopted by Comyn, The above
figures are, therefore, estimates based on the tributes
paid.
 42

and perhaps a group of Catholicized Chinese mestizos

that ’would excel in higher education and assist the

Dominicans in the spiritual conquest of China’.

4l

By 1810, the Chinese mestizo population, whose

distribution in the provinces is shown in Table 2.1, had

reached an estimated 120,621. (See Table)

It can be seen from the Table that the areas of
mestizo concentration are Tondo (which then included a

major portion of Manila and what is now the province of

Rizal), the Central Luzon provinces of Bataan, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Pangasinan, the Southern Tagalog provinces

of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna and some provinces of the

Visayan Islands. Importance is attached to these

figures for, as shall be seen later,

42 the areas of

mestizo concentration are also those that produced the

most number of top public officials.
How did the Chinese mestizos attain positions of
prominence? It should be noted that the mestizos, being
part-Filipinos, spoke the dialects and knew the ways of
the Filipinos better than the Spaniards. These were

distinct advantages. Like their Chinese fathers, the

41
Ibid., p.68-9 .
42
See Chapter IV (Section on ’Regional Origin*).
 43

m e s t i z o s were p r i m a r i l y m e r c h a n t s at first but soon

e x p a n d e d into landholding. S t a r t i n g as inquilinos

(lessees) of h a c i e n d a s owned by religious c o r p o rations

and other landholders, they a c c u m u l a t e d w e a l t h by

s u b l e t t i n g the lands they l e ased at a profit, or by

e m p l o y i n g Indio k a s a m a s (share tenants).

S o m e of the lands in q u e s t i o n were sublet by

the i n q u i l i n o s for amounts in excess of the rent
owed by the inquilino to the landowner. Others
were w o r k e d a c c o r d i n g to the k a s a m a h a n system,
by w h i c h the actual tiller r e c e i v e d a per c e n t a g e
of the crop, the inquilino t a k i n g the rest, from
w h i c h he p a i d his r e n t . 43

T h e r e were two other m e thods of w e a l t h and land

a c c u m u l a t i o n w h i c h were c o n n e c t e d w i t h each other (and

w h i c h are still in use up to this d a y ) . One of these

was usuri o u s money - l e n d i n g . T h e C h r i s t i a n i z e d indios had

t a k e n to their n e w r e l i g i o n with enthusiasm, particularly

in the c e l e b r a t i o n or o b s e r v a n c e of r e l i gious occasions

such as f i e s t a s , baptisms, m a r r i a g e feasts, funerals,

etc. These occasions e n t a i l e d a great deal of spending

for there were man y saints to be h o n o r e d and m a n y guests

to be invited. T he peasantry, perhaps f o l l o w i n g the lead

of their 1leaders* , i n d u l g e d in their own little w ay in

43
I b i d , , p.74; C f . J o a q u i n M a r t i n e z de Zuniga, O . S . A . ,
E s t a d i s m o de las islas F i l i p i n a s (ed.) W.E. Retana, two
v o l s . (Madrid! 1893) v o l .I , pp.43-8, 334-5*
 44

’ cons p i c u o u s consumption* . T h e y b o r r o w e d m o n e y from

their landlords and other m o n e y - l e n d e r s at usurious

r a tes of interests. F o r those who h a d no lands, this

was one sure w a y of sinking deeper into debt peonage and

poverty. For those who had small plots of land, it was

one w ay of l o s i n g them. The common instrument in the

l a t t e r t r a n s a c t i o n was the pacto de retro or 1deed of

sale w i t h right to r e p u r c h a s e * . The borrower mortgaged

his land for r e a d y c a s h and was g i ven a definite time

w i t h i n w h i c h to 1r e p u r c h a s e ’ it. I n most cases, the

indio small l a n d h o l d e r was seldom able to r e deem his

44
land w h i c h then went to the money-lender.

The C h i n e s e and C h i n e s e m e s t i z o s went into this

money-lending business extensively. The Chinese mestizos

p a r t i c u l a r l y started to accumulate mor e and more lands

such that the S p a n i a r d s became c o n c e r n e d and ’as early as

1768 there were laws against the use of the pacto de retro
specifically, against its use by the C h i n e s e and the
Uk
C h i n e s e m e s t i z o s .r

44~
Zuniga, i b i d . , p p . 3 6 4 - 5 } 398, 440, 4 9 2 - 3 } cited in
Wickberg, i b i d . , p . 76 .
45
Wickberg, op. c i t . , p.77; Cf. ’C o n t r a t o s u s u r a r i o s ’ ,
R e v i s t a g e n e r a l de l e g i s l a c i o n y .jurisprudencia, X XV
(Madrid: l864")Tp.l76.
 45

There were good reasons behind this land accumulation

which led to the growth of the hacienda system in the

nineteenth century.

A succession of events led to the expansion of

commerce and trade. The establishment of foreign trading

houses in Manila started from I8l4, the termination of

trade monopoly by the Spanish Royal Company in 1835? the

opening of the port of Manila to foreign trade in 1837

and other ports in 1855? all these produced an expansion

of Chinese and Chinese mestizo activities who *sent their

purchasing agents eastward to Leyte and Samar, southward

to Caraga and M i s a m i s , and westward to Negros and Panay

to buy up local products for sale to foreign merchants in

46
Manila* .

The mestizos of Cebu, Molo and Jaro carried on

an important trade collecting raw materials in
the Visayas and transporting them to Manila
where they sold them to Chinese or European
merchants for exports overseas.47

There was an important consequence of these increased

trading activities. As Philippine agricultural products

such as leaf tobacco, hemp, sugar, coffee, etc. began to

be exchanged in increasing amounts for the European and

46
I b i d . , p .82 .
47
Ibid.
 46

other m a n u f a c t u r e s that came into the country, lands

for c o m m e r c i a l a griculture also started to be in great

demand. The r ush for land began. This process was

v i v i d l y d e s c r i b e d by D a v i d Barrows, one of the early

A m e r i c a n off i c i a l s in the country:

To this p e r i o d [of c o m m ercial expansion] is due

the p r o p a g a t i o n of the h e m p fields of A m b o s
C a m a rines, A l b a y and Sorsogon; the p l a n t i n g of
the i n n u m e r a b l e coconut groves; the sugar
h a c i e n d a s of P a m p a n g a and Negros; the tobacco
fields of C a g a y a n and the I l o c a s provinces;
the coffee of B a t a n g a s ... One thing is to be
noticed, and is important in e s t i m a t i n g the
future d e v e l o p m e n t of the Islands. The money
that was inves t e d here was not b r o ught in by
c a p i t a l i s t s but was m a d e h e r e . H a c i e n d a s arose
fro m small b e g i n n i n g s , and this c o n t i n u e d
p r o s p e r i t y a p p a r e n t l y s u f f e r e d no d i m i n u t i o n or
c h e c k u n t i l it was i n t e r r u p t e d by the ravages
and d e s o l a t i o n of warfare. One point must be
noticed, however, in r e g a r d to the a d d i t i o n of
this w e a l t h to the islands and that is that it
was n ot evenly d i s t r i b u t e d among the population
but went to e n rich c e r t a i n families l a r g e l y
S p a n i s h and mestizos, as w ell as the old native
aristocracy — the " p r i n c i p a l e s " . T h e great
mass of the p o p u l a t i o n s e c u r e d few gains or
m a t e r i a l benefits from this i n c r e a s e d w e a l t h of
the archipelago.48 (Emphasis supplied.)

That the C h i n e s e m e s t i z o , has taken his formal place

in p r i n c i p a l i a ranks by v i r t u e of his w e a l t h (and

p r e stige r e s u l t i n g fro m such w e a l t h ) , was ob s e r v e d by

Zuniga. I n Binan, Laguna, he says, the C h i n e s e who h ad

settled and m a r r i e d there and the C h i n e s e me s t i z o s are

48
D a v i d P. Barrows, ’H i s t o r y of the P o p u l a t i o n 1 , 19Q 3
C e n s u s , vol.I, p p . 445-6.
 47

the ones who have the best h o uses for they are the ones

To what can we account this r e m a r k a b l e rise to

prom i n e n c e of the m e s t i z o ? A s i d e fro m their skilled

m o n e y - m a k i n g activities and m e t h o d s of land accu m u l a t i o n

a l r eady described, they w e r e also loyal supporters of

S p a n i s h h e g e m o n y in the Philippines. C o r r e c t l y ass e s s i n g

their stakes in the society, they beca m e ardent u p h olders

of the status q u o . Like their other p r i n c i p a l i a

counterparts — the S p a n i s h m e s tizo and n a t i v e

a r i s t o c r a c y -- they have become t h o r o u g h l y Hispanized.

Thus, W i c k b e r g notes:

If the m e s t i z o s * p o l i t i c a l record was a p p a rently

pro-Spanish, their cultural r e cord was certainly
so. T h ere seemed to be no a ttachment to Ch i n e s e
culture, and, i n s tead a v e r y s t rong af f i n i t y for
a P h i l ippine v e r s i o n of H i s p a n i c culture. Their
interest in C a t h o l i c i s m was p a r t i c u l a r l y strong.
I n d i v i d u a l l y and c o r p o r a t e l y they g e n e r o u s l y
endowed local C a t h o l i c churches, the centers of
local S p a n i s h cultural influence. T h e i r contests
wit h the indio gremios w e r e v e r y often m a t t e r s of
precedence in religious festivals, seating in the
churches, and the l i k e . .. The C h i n e s e m e s t i z o ,
clearly, was as h i s p a n i z e d — if not more so —
as was the u r b a n i z e d i n d i o .50

The f o r e g o i n g disc u s s i o n s h ave been f o c u s s e d on the

changes that have o c c urred w i t h i n the p r i n c i p a l i a . T h ese

49
Zuniga, op. c i t . , vol.X, pp.44-5, cited in Wickberg,
o p . c i t , , p .75.
50
Wickberg, op. cit,, p.89.
 48

changes, however, did not m a t e r i a l l y affect the basic

c h a r a c t e r of the p r i n c i p a l i a as a class. I f there was

any effect at all, it was towards a further

d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the m e m b e r s of the p r i n c i p a l i a from

the masses. T h e i r v i r tual m o n o p o l y of public office and

higher education, their r e c o g n i t i o n and treatment by the

Spaniards as a special p r i v i l e g e d group, their common

stakes in society, their d i s t i n c t l y different culture

and o u t l o o k as compared to that of the m a sses -- all

these p r o d u c e d an e x t r a o r d i n a r y h o m o g e n e i t y in the

p r i n c i p a l i a class in spite of its ethnic diversity.

CACIQUISM

One of the outgrowths of p r i n c i p a l i a o l i g a r c h y is

what is o f t e n k n o w n as c a c i q u i s m . Pelzer stated that

The S p a n i a r d s i n t r o d u c e d the term cacique or

chief, into the P h i l i p p i n e s f rom H a iti and
a p p l i e d it to the d a t o s , or cabezas de b a r a n g a y ,
and the other l e ading families of a community.
By r e c o g n i z i n g them, the S p a n i a r d s h e l p e d the
caciques to preserve their power over the people
and gave them the oppo r t u n i t y of g e t t i n g more
and mor e land into their hands, of m a k i n g more
and mor e people f i n a n c i a l l y dependent u p o n them
( i n a s m u c h as they were the t a x - c o l l e c t o r s ) , and
of r e d u c i n g f r e e holders to the status of
t e n a n t s .5 1

51
K a r l J. Pelzer, P i o n e e r Settlement in the Asiatic
T r o p i c s (New York: A m e r i c a n G e o g r a p h i c a l Society, 1945)
p . 8 9 . See also J a m e s A. Le Roy, P h i l i p p i n e Life in T o w n
and C o u n t r y (New York: G.P. P u t n a m 1s Sons, I 9O 5 )
pp.173-^.
 49

C a c i q u i s m , as it d e v e l o p e d in the Philippines, broadly

means 'boss r u l e * . As already d e s cribed above, the

n e w l y - c o m m i s s i o n e d cabezas took to their task as agents

of the S p a n i a r d s w i t h enthusiasm. A c t i n g as interm e d i a r i e s

b e t w e e n the S p a n i a r d s and their people, they took the

various opportunities for e n r i c h m e n t . T h e oppressive

polo (f o r c e d labor) and the v a n d a l a (com p u l s o r y sale of

far m p r o d u c t s to the g o v e r n m e n t ) ^ were two such forms of

enrichment. Som e of the lands that used to b e l o n g to the

b a r a n g a y g r a d u a l l y became private pro p e r t y of the

53
cabezas. M u c h later, w h e n the S p a n iards a t t empted to

issue land titles only a few acquired t h e m and these were

often c a c i q u e s . Pelzer states in this connection:

To the great m a j o r i t y of peasants, a c c u s t o m e d

to u n w r i t t e n rules of land tenure, the land law
was too involved, the idea of land title too
s t r a n g e . .. T h e c o m p a r a t i v e l y few people who
a c q u i r e d legal titles were m o stly persons
b e l o n g i n g to the cacique group, and these often
laid c l a i m to m o r e land than actually they had
a right to. Thu s in m a n y cases peasants who
had felt secure in the pos s e s s i o n of their land
and h a d not k n o w n or cared about titles were
s u d d e n l y c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the fact that a
w e a l t h y person, w i t h the law behind him, was

52
V i d e B l a i r and R obertson, op. c i t ., vol.XVII, p p . 78-80;
v o l .L , p .221.
53
Phelan, op. c i t . , p.117*
 50

c l a i m i n g their land. T h e s e pe a s a n t s were then

d r i v e n from it or forced to beco m e t e n a n t s . 54

The r e t e n t i o n of the pre- c o n q u e s t system of debt peonage

(now c a l l e d k a s a m a h a n ) m a i n t a i n e d the t raditional

s o c i o - e c o n o m i c base of the p r i n c i p a l i a and kept the indio

to their serf status. H a v i n g b o t h w e a l t h and local

p o l i t i c a l power, and given their role as enforcers of

oppressive c o l onial policies, the t e n d e n c y towards

'bossism* seemed inevitable. The principalia metamorphosis

that has b e e n d i s c u s s e d also c o n t r i b u t e d a great deal

towards caciquism. H a v i n g b e come ‘different* from the

indios and h a v i n g d e v e l o p e d a f f i n i t i e s w i t h the Spaniards,

it was e x p ected that they act more like the latter.

W h a t e v e r p o s i t i o n the S p a n i a r d s gave him, w h e t h e r as a

p r o s e c u t i n g attorney, as a m u n i c i p a l president, or even

as the chief p r o p e r t y owner, ‘he d o m i n a t e d everything...

an d he d i r e c t e d the masses like a g o d ‘ .55 A n article

54
Pelzer, o p . c i t . , p .90. T h i s technique of l a n d g r a b b i n g
by the caciques was a m ong the causes of later a g r arian
u p r i s i n g s and, in some cases, the cause of k i l l i n g s of
landlords in the h a nds of the dispossessed. A case in
point is the H a c i e n d a E s p e r a n z a in N u e v a Ecija. From
its original are a of 6,000 h e c t a r e s in 1906 (l h e c t a r e =
2.47 acres), it e x p a n d e d to 1 5 , 7 0 0 hectares in 1 9 2 5 *
A b o u t 5,000 c l a i m a n t - f a r m e r s lost the subsequent judicial
p r o c e e d i n g s and b e came ‘i n t e r d i c t o s ‘ .
55
‘E l R e n a c i m i e n t o * cit ed in Le Hoy, o p . c i t . , p.185.
 51

56
w h i c h a p p e a r e d in a local n e w s p a p e r d u r i n g the

R e v o l u t i o n gave a d e s c r i p t i o n of the cacique as a person

’who a l w a y s claimed the p r e r o g a t i v e of g u i d i n g the

affairs of the c o m m u n i t y ’ .

... In all the d e t a i l s of public life, y o u

wil l see h i m interfering, either d i r e c t l y or
indirectly, by means of his agents, in order
to f u r t h e r his own p e r s o n a l i n t erests and swell
his pockets. D u r i n g election time, he does a
great deal of m a n i p u l a t i n g , m a k i n g justice
c o n f o r m to his p e r s o n a l w h i m s . . . 57

C a c i q u i s m , in fact, was one of the causes of the

P h i l i p p i n e R e v o l ution.

THE PRINCIPALIA AND THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION

T h e P h i l i p p i n e R e v o l u t i o n of 1 8 9 6 was an u n e x p e c t e d

result of the r e f o r m m o v e m e n t started by the i l u s t r a d o s ,

the a l i e n a t e d i n t e l l e c t u a l m e m b e r s of the p r i n c i p a l i a .

T he ’p r o p a g a n d i s t s ’ as the y were called were a group of

y o u n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s who left the P h i l i p p i n e s and studied

in Europe, m ost of them in Spain, in the latter h alf of

the n i n e t e e n t h century. In Spain, they a g i t a t e d for

m u c h - n e e d e d reforms in the Philippines. It should be

n o t e d that the Spaniards, d u r i n g the latter part of their

rule, d e v e l o p e d a g r o w i n g su s p i c i o n of some of the

edu c a t e d m e m b e r s of the p r i n c i p a l i a . The inc r e a s i n g

56
C o l u m a s V o l a n t e s , X, n o . 21, A u g u s t 23, 1899* C i t e d in
C e s a r A. Majul, P o l i t i c a l and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Ideas of the
P h i l i p p i n e R e v o l u t i o n ( Q u e z o n City: U n i v e r s i t y of the
P h i l i p p i n e s , 1957) p 7 6 l .
57
Ibid.
 52

n u m b e r of those who came fro m E u r o p e w i t h liberal ideas

f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d this suspicion. The Spa n i a r d s became

mor e repressive, e s p e c i a l l y a f ter the Cavi t e M u t i n y of

1872. Three Filipino priests, Fr. Burgos, a Spanish

mestizo; Fr. Zamora, a C h i n e s e mestizo, and Fr. Gomez, a

pure b l o o d Tagalog, w ere m i s t a k e n l y i m p l i c a t e d in the

u p r i s i n g and e x e c u t e d in the g a r r o t e .
58 The Cavi t e

M u t i n y p r o d u c e d w a ves of a r r ests and b a n i s h m e n t s to the

M a r i a n a s Islands.
59 S o o n p r o p a g a n d a and agi t a t i o n for

reforms at home and a b r o a d b e g a n to mount. A m o n g the

de m a n d s were to m ake the P h i l i p p i n e s a province of Spain,

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the S p a n i s h Cortes, removal or e x p ulsion

of the friars (who h a d become b i g l a n d o w n e r s ) ,

60 _
s e c u l a r i z a t i o n of the parishes, etc. F r o m the above

demands, it can be seen that the ‘propagandists' were

reformers and not rev o l u t i o n a r i e s . I n a p l a t f o r m d r awn

in one of their L o d g e m e e t i n g s in Spain, they demanded:

1 . . .we want our c o u n t r y d e c l a r e d a S p a n i s h province, with

58
Alip, o p . c i t ., vol.II, pp.88-9.
59
The Marianas Islands then formed part of the Spanish
dominion.
60
Alip, o p . c i t . , p.89.
 53

all the rights and obligations. In a word, we want

reforms, reforms, reforms’

But the reformers produced a revolution instead. A

mass organization called the Katipunan led by Andres

Bonifacio, a M a nila worker, started an uprising in 1896.

The reaction of the caciques to the armed uprising is

illuminating. Many of them flocked to the Spanish

authorities to make protestations of loyalty to Spain.

Many denounced the K a t i p u n a n . Le Roy stated in this

connection that

Everywhere natives of position hastened to assure

the Spanish authorities of their loyalty, this
being almost as true in the Tagalog towns outside
of Cavite as elsewhere in the Islands. Some of
these were mere sycophants, some (particularly in
Pangasinan, Pampanga, La Union, N orth Ilocos, and
the K a g a y a n Valley) really meant it, and all
without exception felt such a step to be necessary
for their own s a f e t y ...52

But in 1898, when the Revolution showed signs of

succeeding as the power of ’m o t h e r 1 Spain began to crumble,

the caciques changed their tune and began to join its

banners. A m o n g the ’la t e c o m e r s ’ were many of those who

a few years ago were denouncing not only the Katipunan

61
See Teodoro M. Kalaw, La Masoneria Fili p i n a (Manila:
Bureau of Printing, 192Ö) p.98.
62
Le Roy, o p . c i t . , p . 93*
 54

but even the reformer-propagandists' . Don Felipe

Buencamino, for instance, wrote a manifesto praising
Governor General Weyler and demanding 'death to the
o

traitors who disturb our public peace and tranquility1.

In I898, he was a Cabinet member of the Revolutionary
Government. A close look at the composition of the

Malolos Congress (1898-I899) will show that most of its

64
members represent the cream of Filipino aristocracy.

63
Quoted in Majul, op. cit ., p.60. Part of the manifesto
reads: 'It is true that the innocent can live calmly under
the protection and the civic courage of the Governor and
Captain General, His Excellency, Senor Don Valeriano Weyler.
We are sure that the most worthy Marquis of Tenerife [Weyler]
...likes and loves us, for the many decrees which he has
issued for all branches of government are clear and evident
proofs thereof... What more then can we ask for or
desire? One would have to be blind, or be bereft of
reason not to recognize the blessings that we enjoy under
the beneficent shadow of the Spanish Flag. Death to the
traitors who disturb our public peace and tranquility...
Long live General Weyler... Long live the Philippines,
for Spain, and for Spain our beloved mother country.'
Gen. Weyler, praised to high heavens by the caciques in
the Philippines, incidentally was the same Weyler who
started the 'concentration camps* in Cuba. During the
Cuban Revolution, he herded men, women and children in
'Campos de reconcentracion* where 'scores of thousands
fell victim to starvation and disease...^0 ,000 perished in
Havana alone. See Lowry Nelson, Rural Cuba, (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1950) PP*34 and 36.
64
'...in their personalities [membership] they were
representative not of the people as a whole, but of a
minutely educated class separated from the ignorant masses
by a gulf so great as to be almost incomprehensible to the
American without experience in the Orient' (Hayden,
op. cit., p.165).
 53

No doubt, there were capable men among this group of

‘l a t e c o m e r s 1 in the Revolution. A m o n g these may be

mentioned Cayetano Arellano, Florentino Torres, Benito

Legarda and T.H. Pardo de Tavera. But these men

abandoned the Revolutionary cause as easily and as fast

as they joined it. When the former American ‘allies*

against the Spaniards showed determination and ability

to crush the Philippine Republic, many of the principalia

Revolutionary officials began to waver. As early as

October, 1898 , some started deserting A g u i n a l d o ‘s cabinet.

Pardo de Tavera resigned as Director of Diplomacy on

October 3 O , I 8 9 8 , on the pretext that he differed with

Aguinaldo on foreign policy.

65 After the Mabini Cabinet

fell, Paterno who now headed the new Cabinet began talking

of ‘autonomy* under the Americano. Soon, the principalia

‘revolutionaries* began the exodus to Manila.

C. THE PRINCIPALIA AND THE AMERICANS

THE FEDERALISTA PARTY

On December 2 3 , I9OO , ‘one-hundred and twenty-five

pro-American upper-class Filipinos met at No. 36 Calle de

Villalobos, Q u i a p o , Manila, and organized the Federalista

65
See C.A. M a j u l , ‘The Life and Mind of M a b i n i ’ , This
Week, June 1 , 1958 , p . 2 9 *
 56

Party1. Among the founders of this Party were Pardo

de Tavera, Cayetano S. Arellano, Frank S. Bourns (an

American manager of a big lumber company and close

associate of Dean Worcester), Florentino Torres, Ambrosio

Flores, Jose Ner, Tomas Del Rosario, Arsenio Cruz Herrera,

Felipe B u e n c a m i n o , Fable, Roxas, Artacho, Tirona, Dancel,

Reyes and others. It must have been heart-breaking to

the revolutionary fighters for independence, many of

whom were still fighting and dying in the battlefields,

to find many of their former 'leaders1 now organizing a

party whose main platform was annexation to A m e r i c a !

M a b i n i , in one of his letters to a friend (Aquilino C a l v o ) ,

bitterly lamenting this betrayal, wrote that 'those who

tire after a few months of struggle do not serve for

/ ry

anything except to carry the yoke of slavery'. The

Republican Army also issued orders to arrest and shoot

any member of the Federalista Party and confiscate his

property.^ One order even went to the extent of

threatening to shoot any local officer of the Revolutionary

66
Report of the Philippine C o m m i s s i o n , o p . c i t ., p .131•
67
Quoted in M a j u l , Mabini, Life and M i n d , op._ci t . , June 8,
1958, p .36.
68
D. Worcester and J.R. Hayden, The Philippines, Past and
P r e s e n t , (New York: The MacMillan Co., 193^) p p .277-338.
 57

government 1who tolerated the e x i s t e n c e of the

6Q
F e d e r a l i s t a P a r t y in his j u r i s d i c t i o n 1.

But all these c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e s were of no avail.

W i t h the full b a c k i n g of the A m e r i c a n Army, the

F e d e r a l i s t a P a r t y soon spread its influence and

o r g a n i z a t i o n throughout the A r c h i p e l a g o so that 1the

p a r t y i n c luded in its m e m b e r s h i p s u b s t a n t i a l l y all of
70
the men of first importance in the I s l a n d s * . The

F e d e r a l i s t a P a r t y 1s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s in its c o l l a b o r a t i o n

w i t h the A m e r icans were impressive. Its

tireless p e a c e - m a k i n g efforts res u l t e d in the

surrender of f o u r t e e n generals, twenty-eight
colonels, twenty majors, six chiefs of
guerrillas, forty-six captains, one h u n d r e d
and six lieutenants, two t h o usand six h u n d r e d
and forty soldiers, and 4,440 cannon [sic]
guns and r e v o l v e r s . 71

F o r this effective h elp in the 'pacification*

campaign, the F e d e r a l i s t a s w e r e g i v e n a ppointments by

the Americans to most of the p o s i t i o n s open to F i l i pinos

69
Ibid.
70
Charles Elliott, T he P h i l i p p i n e s to the E n d of the
C o m m i s s i o n G o v e r n m e n t ( I n d i a n a p o l i s , 191^) p p . 409-10.
71
D a p e n Liang, The D e v e l o p m e n t of P h i l i p p i n e P o l i t i c a l
P a r ties (Hongkong: S o u t h C h i n a M o r n i n g Post, 1939~) pT63.
V i d e *A H i s t o r y of the F e d e r a l P a r t y * , A p p e n d i x * A * ,
P h i l i p p i n e C o m m i s s i o n R e p o r t , P art II, H o u s e Doc., vol.9»
n o .2, 5 7 t h Congress, 1st Session, I 9O I - I 9O 2 (Washington:
Gove r n m e n t P r i n t i n g Office, I 9O 1 ) p p . l 6l- 72 .
 58

at the time. William H. Taft, first Civil Governor of

the Islands (later President of the U.S.), acknowledged

this when he said:

...the fact that a man was a member of the

Federal Party was always a good recommendation
for him for appointment, for the reason that we
regarded this Federal Party as one of the
great elements in bringing about pacification,
and if a man was in the Federal Party it was
fairly good evidence that he was interested in
the government which we were e stablishing...72

By 19O 3 , three Federalistas — Dr Trinidad Pardo

de Tavera, Don Benito Legarda, and Don Jose Luzuriaga --

were already members of the top governing body: the

72
Philippine Commission. From I9O I - I 9O 6 , most of the

appointive and elective posts — national, provincial,

74
and local — were in their hands. Other high positions

given to top F e d e r allstas were the following: Don Cayetano

Arellano - Chief Justice, Supreme Court; Don Victorino

Mapa - Associate Justice, Supreme Court; Don Florentino

Torres - Associate Justice, Supreme Court. Other

prominent Federalistas became Bureau Directors, Judges

72
Senate Document No. 331? Part 1, Congress, 1st
S e s s i o n , p .67 •
73
Report of the Philippine C o m m i s s i o n , op. cit., pp.l40-l.
74
Ibid.
 59

of Courts of First Instance, and public prosecutors. 75

Among the latter were those who had a hand in the

prosecution and sending to the gallows or to long prison

terms, hundreds of their countrymen who only a short

while ago were being ’led' by them (before their surrender

to the A m e r i c a n s ) . Recto observed:

It is well to remember that under this Act

[Ley de Ba n d o l e r i s m o , Act No. 518, Nov 12, 1902]
within a period of ten years only, hundreds of
Filipinos who remained in the mountains in
opposition to the American regime were sent to
the gallows, or imprisoned for life or for 30
or 25 years. These were General Macario Sakay
and his fellow officers and men, and hundreds
of others. Separate criminal informations
were filed against them in the various courts
of first instance of the country, and in all of
them the different .judgments of conviction were
affirmed unanimously by our own Supreme C o u r t .76
(E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d .)

What sort of men were the Federalistas? An examination

of the background of some indicates their mixed loyalties,

their upper class background, their ethnic origins, and

the high positions they occupied.

Dr Trinidad Pardo de Tavera (First President of the

Federalista Party). He descended from *a line of noble
families in S p a i n 1 , born in 1837; educated at Ateneo,
University of Santo Tomas (M.D.) and Paris, France;
taught medicine under Spanish Dominicans, U.S.T. In the

75
Claro M. Recto, ’The Role of Political P a r t i e s ’, i 9 6 0
Commencement Address, University of the Philippines,
Manila C h r o n i c l e , April 1 9 5 I960 .
76
Ibid.
 60

latter part of the Revolution (1 8 9 8 ), he joined and

became Secretary of Foreign Relations in the
Revolutionary Government; seeing imminent defeat from
the Americans, he resigned in October, 1 8 9 8 ; escaped
to Manila where he 1founded La Democracia in 1 8 9 9 5 the
first pro-American daily in the Phili p p i n e s 1 .
( ‘B iography1 , Encyclopedia of the P h i l i p p i n e s , vol.III,
pp . 424-5•)

Don Cayetano Arellano (Co-founder, Federalista

P a r t y ) . Son of Don Servando Arellano, a Spaniard, and
Dona Crisfora Lonzon of Orion, Bataan; educated under
the care of a Dominican friar, San Juan de Letran U . S . T . ;
served under the Spaniards as Re^idor (City Councilman
of M a n i l a ) ; member, Council of Administration; one of
the ‘latecomers1 in the Revolution, he nevertheless
became Secretary of Foreign Affairs of its government;
escaped to Manila while Philippine-American war was going
on; ‘with the advent of the American sovereignty,
Arellano cooperated with General Otis in the organization
of the C o u r t s 1 . He became Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court in 1899* (Various sources.)

Dr Frank S. Bourns (only American co-founder of the

Federalista Party) . Manager of an American timber
company; member of the Taft Commission; was in the
Philippines twice before the American occupation of the
Philippines ‘on zoological collecting trips with Dean C.
W o r c e s t e r 1 ; ‘during the early days of American occupation,
he was employed in various capacities and established a
spy system, coming into contact with all kinds of natives,
whose confidence he gained through his knowledge of the
languages and his method of treatment*. (l903 Census of
the Philippines, vol.I, Washington: U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1 9 0 5 5 P»505; Senate D o c .331 j 5 7 th Congress, 1 st
Session, pp.319-20.)

Don Florentino Torres (Co-founder, Federalista

P a r t y ) . Born in 1844; educated in San Juan de Letran,
U . S . T . ; served in Spanish government as Fiscal Interino
of Binondo; Judge, CFI (1888-I8 9 1 ) ; ‘Teniente Fiscal de
la A u d i e n c i a * , Cebu; 1899 — first Attorney General
during the U.S. Military government; became Associate
Justice, Supreme Court. (Various sources.)

Don Ambrosio Flores (Co-founder, Federalista Party).

Born in Manila, he was a First Lieutenant in the Spanish
 61

Army; later joined the Revolution; became a General;

Secretary of War in the Luna Cabinet. After joining the
Federalistas, he was appointed the first Provincial
Governor of Rizal. (’Biography’, Encyclopedia of the
Philippines , vol.HI, p.472.)
Don Felipe Buencamino (Co-founder, Federalista
Party). Born in San Miguel, Bulacan; educated under
private tutors, and U.S.T.; was ’Realtor1 of Audiencia
of Manila, Fiscal, and Judge, under the Spaniards.
’Buencamino at the start was not a thorough-going
revolutionist... In fact, he was...an officer of the
Spanish army...fought in Kamansi...Mt. Arayat where he
displayed his fighting spirit...was decorated [Oct 16,
1897] by the Spanish government with a cross of Charles
III...was appointed by Gov. Gen. Agustin, Lieutenant
Colonel of the Voluntary Force, consisting of eight
hundred soldiers. ...was made a full colonel... made
notable engagements in San Antonio Abad, Zapote Bridge
and Muntinglupa [against Filipino Revolutionaries]...
On September 26, 1898, he was ’Secretario de Fomento’ of
the Revolutionary Government...changed allegiance...
joined Federal Party and was appointed member of Civil
Service Board. (’Biography*, Encyclopedia of the
Philippines, vol.III, p.336.)
Don Gregorio Araneta (Member, Federalista Party) .
Born in Molo, Iloilo; educated at Ateneo and U.S.T.; was
auxiliary Register of Deeds and later member of Advisory
Board (1898) under the Spaniards; joined Revolutionary
Government in I898 and became Secretary of Justice,
Aguinaldo Cabinet; 1899- appointed member of Supreme
Court in U.S. Military Government; I9OI-I9G6 Prosecuting
Attorney, Manila; 1906-Attorney General; 1907-member,
Philippine Commission. (Various sources.)
There was a definite partiality towards the members
of the F ederalis ta Party shown by the Americans. The same

method followed by the Spaniards in their dealings with

local leaders in the initial phase of their conquest was
now being re-enacted but on the national level. There were

’several expedients’ used by the Americans, according to

Recto:
 62

To Insure the s u p remacy of the F e d e r a l Party,

liquidate the remnants of the r esistance
movement, d i s c o u r a g e all i n d e p e n d e n c e propaganda,
and stabilize the n e w regime, several expedients
were r e s o r t e d to:

1. M o n o p o l y of pat r o n a g e for those a f f i l i a t e d

w i t h the F e d e r a l Party;

2. E n a c t m e n t of the S e d i t i o n L a w (Act No. 2 92 ,

Nov. 4, 190l) w h i c h made it a criminal offense
‘for any p e r s o n to ad v o c a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e or
separation from the U.S., w h e t h e r by pe a c e f u l or
other means, or to p u b l i s h pa m p h l e t s a d v o c a t i n g
such i n d e p e n d e n c e or s e p a r a t i o n 1 ; and

3 . A p p r o v a l of the Act of B r i g a n d a g e or ‘L e y de
B a n d o l e r i s m o 1 (Act No. 518, Nov. 12, I 9O 2 ) u n der
the pro v i s i o n s of which any p e r s o n could be
sentenced to death, to life or fro m 25 to 30
years imprisonment, for s t e a l i n g a carabao if it
could be proved, even by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence,
that the a c c u s e d was a m e m b e r of an armed band
o r g a nized f or the purpose of st e a l i n g carabaos
or other p e r s o n a l property, w i t h o u t the n e e d of
e s t a b l i s h i n g that he a c t u a l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in the
r o bbery but that he was a m e m b e r of the b a n d . 77

Th e facts c i t e d above by R e c t o a nd other evidence

such as the arrest and i n c a r c e r a t i o n of political and

labor leaders k n o w n for t h eir a d v o c a c y of i n d e p e n d e n c e

d i s prove the b e l i e f that ‘even b e f o r e A m e r i c a n rule was

fully established, the Fili pi nos were encou ra ged to

create political p a r t i e s * .^ (Emphasis supplied.)

77
Ibid.
78
L uc ie n W. P y e , ‘The Po l it i c s of S o u th e a s t A s i a * , in
Gab riel A. A l m o n d and J am es S. Coleman, Th e Politics of
De v e l o p i n g Ar eas (Princeton, N e w Jersey: P r i n c e t o n
U n i v e r s i t y Press, i 960 ) p.97* A m o n g those jailed un der
the ‘Se di ti o n A c t 1 were Dr D o m i n a d o r Gomez and four other
 63

TSE ELITE AND *POLITICAL DEMOCRACY1

The four decades beginning from the year 1900 may

be considered as the period of intensive Americanization

ia the Philippines. The impact of this influence,

however, was greatest in the political sphere. The

political party system, government organization, electoral

practices, e t c . , were all patterned after the American

model.

In the analysis of this transplantation of political

institutions to a different setting, several important

factors need to be considered.

The first of these is the social setting itself.

When the Americans gained control of the Philippines,

Philippine society was very much the same as it was during

the early Spanish times. David Barrows, General

Superintendent of Education, said in his Senate testimony

in 1 9 0 2 :

We find in the Philippine I s l a n d s . ..two generally

large elements, one of which is commonly known as
the gente i l u s t r a d a , which is the cultivated class,
and the other is the gente ba.ja, or the subordinate
class ...

78 (continued)
Leaders of the Union O b r e r a . These were also the
organizers of the original Partido Nacionalista in 1901
vhich was suppressed by Governor General Taft. Other
Dolitical parties which were not permitted to exist were
the Partido L i b e r a l , the Democrata Party of 1902, and the
Republican Party formed in I9O 5 . Of. Dapen Liang, op . c i t , ,
3.66; J.R. Hayden, o p . c i t ., P«9^7j footnote 4*.
 64

If you go into a town of ten or twelve thousand

people you will meet a dozen, and generally less,
families who represent the dominant social
element there, who are cultivated, who have
received some Spanish education, who have
wealth, social position...they live in handsome
houses, and they have great social influence...

My observation...is that they are directly

descended, or at least their social prestige is
a direct inheritance, from the conditions which
the Spaniards found there three hundred years
a g o . . . The rest are a population who have no
education, who have no wealth, and who are
controlled economically and socially by the
upper class...79

Similarly, a member of the principal!a (a Provincial

Governor) described the nature of the social structure in

his province of Negros in 1902:

Wealth and poverty in the country are, as a

rule, permanent. The former is the patrimony,
if so it can be called, of the higher class...
because it pursues the ideal of living
comfortably, luxuriously, and in pleasure...
Almost all are engaged in agriculture... Poverty
is characteristic of the working class, and is
of a permanent character.80

Don Mena Crisologo, Governor of Ilocos Sur, described

the masses as ’very docile and obedient to constituted

authorities and so timid that, although they suffer

vexation from the persons who exercise some authority in

8i
their towns, they seldom c omplain1 . Don Joaquin Ortega,

79
1903 0 e n s u s , vol.I, p.510.
80
I b i d ., p.5 2 6 .
81
I b i d . , P.511.
 65

Spanish mestizo Governor of La Union, described in 1902

the Ilocano peasant as ’submissive, obedient, and of a

timid character’

On the other hand, the Spanish bishop of Vigan, a

Dominican friar, said in a testimony before an American

committee that ’the natives [caciques] are always prone

to abuse their authority. If someone here is not above

them [justifying priestly domination] they will abuse

their authority all the t i m e . .. They are terrible to

O o
their own people -- very tyrants [sic].* ^

William H. Taft described caciquismo as the

’subjection of the ordinary uneducated Filipino to boss

or master who lives in his neighborhood, and who, by

reason of his wealth and education, is regarded as

entitled to control by the ignorant t a o . .. Those who

are educated and wealthy among them adopt European customs,

84
European dress, European manners with eagerness.’

The mestizo element continued to be dominant in

society. This was further bolstered by the addition of

full-blooded Spaniards to the ranks of the principalia at

82
Ibid.
83
I b i d . , p.508.
84
Ibid;., P.531.
 66

the beginning of American rule. It should be recalled

that there were Spaniards who have made their fortunes

in the form of land and other interests, while they were

the rulers in the Philippines. Under the terms of an

American legislation, most of these Spaniards who chose

to remain in the Islands became ’Filipino citizens’ .

The Philippine Bill of 1902 passed by the U.S. Congress

provided that:

All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands

continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, and
as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the
crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth,
eighteen hundred and nin e t y - e i g h t .85

These Spaniards who became Filipino citizen

remained at the top of the social strata even after

S p a i n ’s defeat in the war. H a y d e n ’s comments are

revealing:

In the Philippines the significance of the

division of society into two widely separated
classes between which a small middle class is
slowly developing is accentuated by the fact
that the upper class is largely composed of

85
Section 4, Article 4, Philippine Bill of 1902.
 67

Filipinos with a noticeable infusion of

Chinese and Spanish blood. By no means all
of the population who are of Spanish or
Chinese extraction belong to the upper class;
few people are found in the upper levels of
society, however, who have no blood
relationship with one or the other of these
foreign races... That together they furnish
a disproportionately large percentage of the
leaders in every field of activity throughout
the Islands.
...There has...been a certain amount of
feeling, even among Filipinos, that the
creation of a strong unified Philippine state
would be made more difficult by the
overweighting of the upper class by Filipinos
who are differentiated from the great body of gg
the people by noticeably foreign characteristics.
The above are the more or less unanimous comments
of both local and foreign observers. This is the social

setting when the American colonial administration passed

Act No. 82 on January 31? 1901} creating municipal

governments and extending the franchise to any of the
following:
1. Those who occupied the position of municipal
capitan, gobernadorcillo, alcalde, teniente, or
cabeza de barangay or municipal councilman;
2. Those owning real property worth at least
^500, Philippine currency, or who pay annually
any kind of tax to the sum of ^30 or over;
3. Those able to speak, read and write English
or Spanish.87

86
Hayden, op, cit,, pp.26-7*
87
I9O 3 Census, vol.I, op. cit., p. 372 .
 68

The American authorities, by requiring the above

qualifications (although without specifically mentioning

it), practically limited the franchise to the principalia
class. Three separate groups appeared to be included in

the qualifications, but these were in most cases the same

group of people. American Vice-Governor Hayden himself

acknowledged that 1under these qualifications the

electorate closely approximated the small group of
Filipinos who had comprised the principales in the pueblos
88
during the Spanish regime1.

A direct consequence of this policy was that in the

first municipal elections held in 1901 , only 49?523

persons (or 1.8 per cent) qualified as electors out of a
89
population of 2,695}801 in 390 municipalities. The
following table provides a good comparison in the number
of people allowed to vote during the first two decades
of American rule. (See Table 2.2.)
From the Table, it can be seen that during the
early critical years of political tutorship — when the
foundation of the party and electoral systems were being
laid — political participation was limited to no more

88
Hayden, o p . c i t ., p.267.
89 '
Report of the Philippine Commission, 190l 5 vol.I, p.32.
 69

TABLE 2.2
POPULATION AND NUMBER OF REGISTERED ELECTORS

YEAR POPULATION* REGISTERED PER CENT

ELECTORS**
(Thousand) (Thousand)
1901 2,695*** 49.5 1.8
1903 6 ,624 150.1 2.4
1907 7,844 104.9 1.3
1912 8,575 248.2 2.8
l^l^**** 10,324 717.3**** 6.9****

* Handbook of Philippine Statistics, 1903-1959,

p.5 •
** Reports ol the Philippine Commission, vol.I,
1901, p .32; 1906, p.156; 1907, p.201;
pp.49-50; Encyclopedia ol the Philippines,
vol.XI, pp.208 and 520.
*** Population in 390 towns.
**** The property qualification was removed in
1916.

than 3 per cent of the population; even three years after

the elimination of the property qualification (in 1916),
the electorate was still less than 7 per cent of the
population.
The political party system that evolved was, in the
main, a continuation of the Federalista experience and

tradition. The Nacionalista Party which replaced the

F ederalis ta as the party from I9O7 to 1946 was only
’different1 in the sense that its members, unlike the

Federalistas, did not want the Philippines to be annexed

 70

permanently to America but wanted independence. From

the point of view of recruitment of its leaders and
members, it was exactly the same as the Federalista
Party. Its membership consisted in the main of the cream
of the Philippine plutocracy -- landlords, propertied
professionals, and businessmen. In fact, not a few of

its leaders and members were former ^

Federalistas.90
Writing on the nature of Philippine political parties,

Recto pointed out that they 'were born and nurtured

before we had attained the status of a free democracy'.91
The result [he said] was that they have come to
be caricatures of their foreign model with its
known characteristics — patronage, division of
spoils, political bossism, partisan treatment
of vital national issues. I say caricatures
because of their chronic shortsightedness
respecting those ultimate objectives the
attainment of which was essential to a true and
lasting national independence. All over the
period of American colonization they allowed
themselves to become more and more the tools of
colonial rule and less and less the interpreters
of the people's will and ideals. Through their
complacency, the new colonizer was able to
fashion, in exchange for sufference of
oratorical plaints for independence and for
patronage, rank and sinecure, a regime of his
own aims and in his own self-interes t .92

90
This aspect of party defections, carried over today,
will be discussed in Chapter V.
91
Recto, op. cit.
92
Ibid.
 71

Recto*s observations do not seem to be overdrawn

when one looks at the record. The members of the elite,
secure in their positions of power and with no effective
challenge from non-elite sources, became mostly
pre-occupied with petty struggle for power among

thems elves.
One result of this was the development of
personalismo of the Latin-American variety. Individual

politicians, feeling 'powerful1 enough, began to assert

themselves as the leaders. This was of course in line

with the cacique tradition. But the American colonial
administration encouraged it. In a master-ward

relationship, it is much more convenient for the master

to be dealing with a few 'bosses* than with many of the
wards. The Speaker of the Assembly had, since 1907? for
instance, been openly recognized as the 'Leader of the
Filipino People* and 'the American administration, which
openly recognized his extra-legal but vital position as
the first citizen of his country, by necessity and choice
dealt with the Speaker in matters of legislation, and to
a much lesser extent those of appointment and
administration*.9 3 An American member of the Philippine

93
Hayden, op. cit., p.171.
 72

Commission revealed, for example, that during the later

years of the Forbes administration, legislation became

largely a matter of private arrangement between the

9h
American Governor-General and the Speaker. As early

as 1 9 1 0 5 some members of the Assembly were actually

accusing Speaker Osmena of 1c a ciquism1.95

Osmena was the Leader up to 1 9 2 1 . Quezon started

to challenge O s m e n a 1s personal leadership with the

creation of a Senate in the bicameral Philippine

Legislature in 1 9 1 6 , after the former became the Senate

President. From then on there was a continuous struggle

between the Osmena faction and the Quezon faction. Their

factional names reveal the nature of their power

struggle: O s m e n a 1s faction was called the Unipersonalista

faction while Quezon's (the challenger) was called

Co l e c t i v i s t a . This ceaseless personal fight went on until

1935 when there was a 'fusion1 between the warring groups

and Q u e z o n ’s paramount dominance remained unquestioned

until his death in America in 1944. During this latter

period, also, a system of one party government by the

94
C.B. Elliott, o p . c i t . , p.1 2 3 .
95
See J.A. Robertson, 'The Extraordinary Session of the
Philippine Legislature and the work of the Philippines
A s s e m b l y 1 , American Political Science R e v i e w , IV
(November, 1910) p .516.
 73

Nacionalista Party of Quezon and Osmena developed.

Senator Juan Sumulong, attacking this one-party

arrangement in an article in 1935 entitled ’Despues de

la Coalicion, el D i l u v i o ’ said that the system received

the support of the rest of the principalia oligarchy

becaus e

...even those who were most offended and most

mortified [by the personal contest between
Quezon and Osmena] forgot their anger when they
began to perceive that the abnormal political
situation might bring about the desired
disintegration of the political oligarchy
which had completely dominated our national
politics for a quarter of a c e n t u r y .96

The oligarchy, Sumulong added, had been alternately under

Osmena and Quezon ’but had always been managed by both in

association and in comm u n i t y ’ .97

Senator Sumulong himself belonged, in a wider sense,

to the oligarchy that he assailed, but he was a sort of

intellectual ’rebel’ — one who might even be accused of

’subversion’ had he written the following today:

I do not wish it understood that I favor a

political status quo in the belief that the
existing majority and minority parties represent
all the legitimate interests of the country...In
reality, I am of the belief that the majority
and minority parties represent almost exclusively

96
Philippines H e r a l d , April 27? 1935* Quoted in Hayden,
o p . c i t . , p.369-7 0 .
97
Ibid.
 the intelligentsia and what we would call the
Philippine plutocracy, and that the needy
classes have no representation in these parties,
and for these reasons they have no voice nor
vote, even only as minorities, in the
formulation of governmental policies. This
belief has often made me wish to see in the
legislative and executive branches of the
government authorized spokesmen of the
laboring class, be they called socialists,
sakdalists or communists.98

98
Ibid.
 CHAPTER III

THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA I: THE POSTWAR

SETTING

This chapter examines the postwar social and

economic setting with the aim of determining what
changes, if any, occurred which might have produced a
rearrangement in the class structure* Did the old
principalia disappear and was it replaced by a new one?
In short, did a new elite class develop? In order to
answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the
nature of the Philippine social structure from the
background of its environment.

A. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

No society may be said to be truly static for

structures are generally in flux. Sociologists,
however, speak of a 'changing1 society and a ’static1
society depending on the presence or absence of certain
dynamic factors that may produce social and economic
changes resulting in the restratification of society.
Thus, a ’changing’ society may be characterized by

75
 76

limited extremes of wealth and poverty, rapid

industrialization, wide occupational opportunities,

minimum of class distinctions, education open to all

with needed ability, etc, A s t a t i c 1 society

manifests the opposite of the above; its economy is

agrarian based, great social and economic inequalities

exist, class distinctions are markedly apparent, and

an aristocracy is dominant in the social, economic and

political spheres."*-

Philippine society manifests a dualism which

defies a simple explanation, Fred Riggs, in his proposal

for the study of the Philippine social structure,

suggested the term ‘prismatic’ instead of ’underdeveloped'

or ’transitional'to describe this characteristic.^

Some of the common indices of ’change', such as the

increase in educational facilities, signs of

industrialization and commercial growth in Manila and

in some urban centers, are apparent. Also, it is

commonly observed that the Philippines is one of the

T
Cf. Chester L. Hunt, ’Social Class Structure’, in Hunt, etal.,
Sociology in the Philippine Setting (Manila: Alemar's,
1954), pp.154-5.
2
For an illuminating discussion of the model, see Fred
W, Riggs, ’A Model for the Study of Philippine Social
Structure’, Philippine_Sociological Review, July 1959,
vol.VII, no, 3 , pp.l-39.
 77

m os t ’w es ter ni zed * among the ’d e v e l o p i n g ’ states

(and ’w e s t e r n i z a t i o n ’ is of ten a s so ci at ed w i t h change

i n the social structure, even p r o d u c i n g a n e w elite

O
class). In spite of all these, however, one

so c io log is t r e m a r k e d that the ’[Philippine] class

st r uc tu re has s ho wn relatively little change from pre-

4
S p a n i s h days to the present time.* To what ca n we

at t ri b ut e this seeming contrad ic tio n?

B. F A C T O R S OF P E RS IS TE NC E

As was n o t e d in the pr eceding chapter, b o t h Sp ai n

and the U n i t e d St ate s erected the superst ru ctu re of

th e i r colonial re gim es u p o n the f o u n d at i o n s of existing

social and ec on om i c institutions. In the process of

consolidating t h e i r control, both u t i l i z e d ef fe c t iv e l y

the p r i n c i p a l i a , t he reb y i n s t i t u t i o n al i z i ng the status

and role of the l a t t e r as a ruling class. A direct

co n se qu en c e of this policy was of course the p r e s e r v a t i o n

of the social and economic do mi n a nc e of this group.

The advent of ’free e n t e r p r i s e ’ , public education,

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government, and p o p u l a r elections, in

3
C f . , for instance, H u g h H. Smythe and Ma bel M. S m y t h e ,
The N e w N i g e r i a n El ite (Stanford, California: Stanford
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , i 9 6 0 ), Cha pt er V.
4
Hunt, o p . c i t ., p.158.
 78

the American period did not essentially alter the

existing power relations. Since the basic economic

structure remained essentially intact, 'change', or

what others would call 'modernization' became

circumscribed. The innovations did not permeate evenly

to all levels of society. Traditional pattern of

economic and social relations continued to persist and

the prosperity associated with 'progress’ had

generally been confined to a limited group in society.

This does not imply, however, that the

principalia continued to be a caste-like elite and

that entry to elite status is closed. Elite status

is largely determined by the possession of certain

key values essential to the exercise of influence.

Such values as wealth, skill, power, respect, and

enlightenment are often the desired values of people

in most societies. Theoretically, therefore, elite

status may be attained by any individual who acquires

these values and is not limited to any particular

class.

But the sharing and distribution of these values

differ from culture to culture, from country to

country. Where these are widely shared or distributed,

larger and broadly-based elites may emerge; where

 79

there is high inequality in their sharing, a small and

narrowly-based elite often results. There is, however,

the tendency of concentration or agglutination of

these values in the same hands since possession of any,

some, or all of these values enchances the acquisition

of more of the same or the other values. The better-

off an individual is, the more opportunities in life

he enjoys. Wealth may not only bring more wealth but

also facilitates the acquisition of power, prestige,

etc. Those categorized as belonging to the elite of

wealth may also be the best educated, the most skilled,

the most prestigious, and the most influential in the

field of decision-making.

In a country where no far-reaching social and

economic change has yet affected the vast masses of

the people and where wide gaps separate social classes,

the possession of these values tend to be concentrated,

not only in the same hands but also in the same social

strata. As Skinner had aptly remarked, 1in nicely

stratified societies the elite concept may be used

with reference to the upper strata of a society, in

which case it includes not only the individuals with

5
high generalized influence but also their families’.

5
G. William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the
Chinese Community of T h a i l a n d (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1958), p.79•
 80

T HE RURAL S E T TING

The P h i l i p p i n e s of the 1960’s is still b a s i cally

an agric u l t u r a l country wit h about 7 0 to 75 per cent

of the people living in the rural areas.^ The dominant

p o s i t i o n of a griculture in the economy is indicated by

the fact that in 1 9 6 2 over 6l per cent of the employed

l a b o r force were engaged in a g r i c u l t u r e and related

activities; m a n u f a c t u r i n g and c o m m e r c e a c c o unted for

7
only 11.2 and 9*7 per cent, respectively.

The land is favoured w i t h f e r t i l i t y and rich

n a tural r e s o urces but b e c ause of the extreme i nequality

in land ownership, the semi-feudal, subsist e n c e - t y p e

of land tenure, and the b a c kward m e t h o d s of c u l t i v a t i o n

6
The extent of u r b a n i z a t i o n in the P h i l ippines has not
b e e n clearly established. The term ’u r b a n 1 has been
d e f i n e d to include chartered cities and poblaciones
(centers of m u n i c i palities). But, as C r e s s e y has
p o i n t e d out, ’extensive rural areas exist w i thin the
legal limits of most c i t i e s ’ and that most of the
m u n i c i p a l admini s t r a t i v e centers or p o b l a c i o n e s ’are
rural villages and should n ot be c o n s i d e r e d as urban
c o m m u n i t i e s ’. (Paul F. Cressey, ’U r b a n i z a t i o n in the
P h i l i p p i n e s ’, Sociology and Social R e s e a r c h , vol. 44,
n o . 6 (J u l y - August 19 60), p p .402-9• Nevertheless,
a c c o r d i n g to the above definition, the 1948 Census
figure for u r ban p o p u l a t i o n was 24.1 per cent; the
i 9 6 0 Cens u s figure was very much l o wer (l4.3 per cent)
but was disregarded. (Bureau of Census and Statistics,
1 9 6 2 Statistics, 1 9 6 2 Stat i s t i c a l H a n d b o o k of the
P h i l i p p i n e s (Manila: B u r e a u of Printing, 1 9 6 3 ) , p . 20.
7
P h i l i p p i n e Statistical Survey of H o u s e h o l d s , n o . 11,
’L a b o r F o r c e ’ (Manila: April, 1 9 6 2 ), Table 13; p.21.
 81

resulting in very low productivity, the vast majority

of the peasantry live in grinding poverty.

Land ownership is heavily concentrated in the

hands of relatively few families. This heavy

concentration was shown by a government study of

landed estates published in 1955 which shows that of

a total farm area of 5»7 million hectares (l hectare =

2.47 acres), nearly 2.4 million hectares were owned

by only 1 3 j 859 persons having farm-holdings of 50

g
hectares and above. It should be noted that this

does not even give the entire picture for this list

of landowners showed that not a few of them belong to

the same family (by blood or affinity).^ In several

cases, the same persons were listed as having

holdings in various provinces. (These are, therefore,

counted separately as though they were different

individuals.) Nevertheless, it was shown that only

8
Department of Finance, A Study of Landed Estates in
the P h i l i p p i n e s , by Arturo P. S o r o n g o n ( M a n i l a : ICA,
1 9 5 5 ) • The writer is indebted to Mr Sorongon for
having furnished him with the complete list of
landowners included in the above mentioned study.
9
A landlord of Negros interviewedby the writer, for
example, stated that ‘a great number of the hacenderos
here in Negros are related to each other and most of
them come from I l o i l o . 1 This was confirmed by other
hacenderos from Iloilo and Negros and the w r i t e r 1s
data on intermarriage among the elite.
) 82

about O .36 per cent of the people owned 4 l .3 per cent

of the nation*s total farm area. The biggest landowners

(i.e., those owning 1,000 hectares or more) owned

315 ,466 hectares and there were only 221 of them in

the whole country.10 (See Table 3»l)* It may be

expected that some change ca n have occurred since the

government study was made some ten years ago and two

1land reform* laws have been passed since then.11 Any

TABLE 3.1
BREAKDOWN OF LAND-OWNERSHIP, 30 HECTARES
AND ABOVE

Area Category N o . of Per cent of Area Owned Per Cent

Owners All Families (Hectares) of Total
Farm Area
30-200 11,770 0.29 1 ,142 ,196 20.0
201-500 1,445 0.04 435,257 7.6
5 0 1 -1,000 423 0.02 2 8 6 ,885 4.9
1,000 and over 221 0.01 5 1 5 ,466 9.0

-3-

in
2,379,804

i—1
Total: 13,859 0.36
Source: Department of Finance, A Study of Landed
E states in the P h i lippines, 1955, by
Arturo P. Sorongon, o p . c i t . Total farm
area at the time of the study was 3 »726,338
hectares; population was 22.2(m).
To
A Study of Landed E s t a t e s , o p . c i t . Among the 221
top landowners are Americans, Spaniards, Spanish
m e s t i z o s , the Church and some religious corporations,
naturalized Chinese, Chinese mestizos (with Chinese
surnames) and others who, though having Hispanized
names, may include descendants of m e s t i z o s , too. The
sultans and datus of Mindanao are the exceptions.
11
Republic Act no.l400 (1955)» known as *Magsaysay*s
Land Reform Act* and 'The Land Reform Code of 1 9 6 3 ',
passed during the Macapagal administration.
 83

change in the situation, however, may not be

significant because the ’land r e f o r m ’ laws have not

really been implemented. As of 1 9 6 1 , for instance,

six years after the passage of M a g s a y s a y ’s Land

Reform Act (R.A l400), the government had acquired less

12
than 20,000 hectares. As for the new Land Reform

Code of 1 9 6 3 * no expropriations have been made under

13
it as of this writing. Ln fact, the change seems

to be towards the direction of continued land

accumulation by the propertied class on the one hand

and growing landlessness and tenancy on the other.

In 1903} for example, only 18 per cent of agricultural

workers were tenants. This figure increased to

35 per cent in 1933> 37*4 per cent in 1948, and 48

per cent in 1956 . In 1961, it was already 50 per cent.

12
Land Tenure Administration, Annual Report, FY I 9 6 I-2 ,
(Manila), p.18.
13
The 1 9 6 3 Land Reform Code has already been
questioned in the courts by the landed interests for
its ’dubious constitutionality’ and by President
M a c a p a g a l ’s own party cronies in the Senate. See,
for example, ’Liwag tags DM land program Poll S t u n t ’,
Manila C h r o n i c l e , September 12, 1964, p.l; Sunday
T i m e s , September 20, 1964, p.l2-A.
14
For 1 9 6 1 , see LTA, Annual R e p o r t , o p . c i t ., p.3;
for 1948 see Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, ’Philippine Agricultural Statistics’, vol.I,
p .6; the rest appear in United Nations, ECAFE, 5th
A nnual Report of the Consultative_Committee
(Wellington, New Zealand, 1 9 5 7 ), p.155*
 84

A c o m p a r i s o n of land o w n e rship (of land 50 h e c t a r e s

and above) during a fift y - y e a r p e r i o d (1903-53) also

c o n firms the i n c r easing rate of lan d accumulation.

I n 1903) 0.8 p er cent of the p e o p l e owned 35 p e r cent

of total f a r m area; in 1 9 5 3 ) 0.3^ of the p e o p l e owned

15
4 l .5 p er cent of total farm area. In other words,

while the n u m b e r of landowners o w ning 50 h e c t a r e s and

a b ove h a d p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y decreased, the total area

of their l a n d h o l d i n g s had c o n s i d e r a b l y increased.

In m a r k e d contrast to this v e r y small m i n o r i t y of

l a n d e d g e n t r y were the nu m e r o u s pe a s a n t s — tenants

and farm l a b o r e r s — who, in m a n y cases, did not own

even the p a t c h of land on w h i c h t h eir nipa huts stood.

Just what is the extent of landle s s n e s s ? The Land

T e n u r e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n made the f o l lowing estimate in

1961 :

A v a i l a b l e census statistics show that 50

p e r cent of all Filipino f a r mers are
tenants. However, if far m laborers are
included, the same s t a t istics show that
about s e v e n out of every ten persons
g a i n f u l l y emplo y e d in a g r i c u l t u r e are
tenants and farm laborers — a ratio of
70 to 100. C o n s i d e r i n g that the
p e r c e n t a g e of farms o p e r a t e d by tenants
and far m l a b o r e r s is a p o p u l a r m e a sure

15
1903 Census of the P h i l i p p i n e s . V o 1. I V ,
’Agricultural, Social and I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s ’,
pp.254, 278, 289-
 85

of landlessness, there is then in the

Philippines a high percentage of
landle s s n e s s .

It should be noted that there were almost six

million gainfully employed persons in agriculture in

17
1962. From the percentage estimate made above by

the LTA, it would mean then that there were about four

million landless peasants in the Philippines.

The land situation in 19^8 is shown in the

following Table:

TABLE 3.2
LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE PHILIPPINES
19^8
TYPE AND AREA PER CENT
CATEGORY OWNING
A. AGRICULTURAL LAND
100 hectares and above 0.18
20-99 hectares 1.68
5-19 hectares 6.00
Below 5 hectares 26.60
None 65.50

B. NON-AGRICULTURAL LAND*
With Land 3*0
Without Land 97-0 (<

Includes mineral land, forest and swamp

16
Land Tenure Administration, Annual Report FY 196l- 2 ,
o p . c i t ., p .3.
17
Philippine Statistical Survey of H o u s e h o l d s , n o .1 1 ,
o p . c i t ., p p . 22-23*
 86

TABLE 3-2 (cont.)

TYPE AND AREA PER CENT

CATEGORY OWNING

C . COMMERCIAL LAND

With Land 2.0

Without Land 98*0

Total Number of Families: 3*5 (m ) = 100.0 per cent.

Source: 1948 Census, Summary of Population and

Agriculture (Manila: Bureau of Printing,
1934), v o l . m , pp.2284-83, 2298-99,
2270-71* Figures have been reduced to
perce n t a g e s .

The landlessness among the people indicated in Table

3.2 had increased since 1948 for, as already mentioned,

the rate of tenancy had jumped from 37*4 per cent in

1948 to 30 per cent in 1961 . One of the major causes

of tenancy is land alienation by small landholders

and 'part-owners’ as a result of indebtedness to

landlords and other usurious money-lenders. This

continuing land alientation was also confirmed by

McMillan and Rivera in their 1954 Survey of Households

in Central Luzon. Among those categorized as "part-

owners* (that is, a portion of their holdings has been

alienated and were already reduced to part-tenant status),

83 per cent of them came from families which were "full-

18
owners*. That there is a direct connection between

18
Generoso F. Rivera and Robert T. McMillan, An
Economic and Social Survey of Households in Central
Luzon (Manila: June 1934), p.64.
 87

landlessness and tenancy on the one hand and

c o n c e n t r a t i o n of land o w n e r s h i p among a few families

on the o t h e r is illustrated in Table 3*3*

The f i gures in Table 3*3 show that tenancy, in

general, i n c r e a s e s w i t h l a ndlessness. The d a t a also

reveal that c o n c e n t r a t i o n of l and ownership increases

w i t h b o t h l a n d l e s s n e s s and tenancy. In the h e a v i l y

tenanted provinces of N u e v a Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac,

Capiz, and Negros Occidental, for instance, between

0.66 p e r cent to 0.77 per cent of total of families

o w n f r o m 38.9 p e r cent (Nueva Ecija) to 72.3 p e r cent

(Pampanga) of all farm lands. In these provinces,

the trends seems to indicate that about one p e r cent

of the p e o p l e ow n b e t w e e n 80 p e r cent and 9 0 p e r cent

of all far m lands. This t r end is also m a n i f e s t e d in

the o t her provinces. In summary, the c o m b i n e d data in

the 19^-8 A g r i c u l t u r a l Census, Tables 3*1> 3*2 and

3.3 a nd the g o v e r n m e n t study on l a nded estates clearly

bring out two important points: first is that the

vast m a j o r i t y of the people in this p r e d o m i n a n t l y

agricultural c o u n t r y are landless; and second, that

the m i n o r i t y owning land are further d i v i d e d into

two: the b i g l a n d h olders who comprise less than one-

h alf of 1 p e r cent, yet o wn n e a r l y o n e - h a l f of all

 88

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 89

there is to own in agricultural lands, and the small

landholders who are predominantly concentrated in the

beiow-three-hectare category.

The land tenure system has retained much of its

traditional features. It is the general practice among
landowners, most of whom are absentee-landlords living
in the urban areas, to fragment their lands into small,

uneconomic holdings averaging between two and three

hectares and employ tenants or farm laborers. 19

This practice in the land tenure system has been one

of the most enduring practices that has persisted

through the centuries. One writer noted that
...there has been a remarkable historical
continuity in Philippine agricultural
organization. Wealthy Filipinos have
exploited their holdings by means of
tenant farming and debt peonage from
preconquest times to the present. The
pre-Hispanic mamamahay, his seventeenth-
century successor, the casamajan farmer
in the eighteenth-century, and the modern
tenant farmer all have cultivated the land
under various systems of share-cropping
and debt peonage that differ among
themselves only in detail but not in
substanc e. 20
19
Tenancy is generally of two kinds namely, share-
tenancy (kasama system) and leasehold or cash-tenancy
(inquilino system) but 1some 95 per cent of all tenant
farmers are share (kasama) tenants1. (U.N., Report on
the Progress in Land Reform, New York: Department of
Economic Affairs, 195^> p.132; cf. I960 Census of
Agriculture (Bureau of Census and Statistics, Manila,
1 9 6 3 )} Table 51 (By province).
20
Phelan, op, cit., p.15#
 90

There are several explanations that may be

suggested for this notable continuity of the landlord-

tenant relationship. The first is that most landowners
find it more advantageous to utilize cheap and abundant
labor intensively. To engage in large-scale fanning
requires large capital outlays which could be profitably
invested elsewhere. Landowners also have to pay higher
wages to semi-skilled farm workers and possibly deal
with an organized body of farmers from which, at the
moment, they are relatively free. Under the present

arrangement they only have to deal with tenant families

individually. Also, since some of their lands are not
contiguous, having acquired these from small holders
in separate parcels, the most ’practical' way is to
have the former owners work for them as tenants.
Finally, the practice is a habitual carry-over from
the age-old cacique-system. Land ownership in the
Philippines is not merely an economic fact. It still
carries with it immense cultural values that
immediately elevates the landowner above the mass.
Belonging to the landed gentry means having peasants
under one’s control and authority. For the landlord-
tenant relationship is not, as one landlord would like
to put it, an ordinary ’form of partnership in which
 91

the landlord contributes the land and..•the tenant

21
contributes his labor. The kasama does not qualify
as Adam Smith’s ’economic man’ who tries to advance
his interest by entering into a rental contract with

the landlord as an equal bargainer. Rather, he is

not unlike the sert, born into a system where his status

and roles are already determined. He may sometimes

be fortunate to have a ’generous’ landlord; or ’reform

laws’ may even be passed by a landlord-dominated
Congress. But as long as the landlord-tenant
relationship remains, he will continually be the
victim of an inferior status that keeps him in poverty,
indebtedness, and even exploitation. Speaking of the
Filipino tenant, a U.N. study reports:
The share tenant works under the full and
exclusive authority of the landlord, who
has a "first and preferential lien over
all but 15 per cent of the tenant s share
of the crop to cover any indebtedness to
the landlord. The tenant’s situation is
further aggravated by grossly usurious
rates of interest [ranging from 25 per cent
to 400 per cent] on borrowed moneys,
lack of an economic marketing system,
regressive tax system and oppressive
tenancy practices."^2

21
’A Landlord Speaks up’, Philippines Free Press,
April 6, 1963? p.46.
22
U.N., Progress in Land Reform, op. cit., pp.132, 213
 92

The landlord-tenant relationship, therefore,

contributes to the preservation of the principalia --

non-principalia dicothomy.

Aside from the tenants are the farm laborers and

small owner-cultivators. The farm laborers are hired

on a daily wage or piece-work basis* They, too, are

landless and their lot is no better than the kasamas

for they receive very low wage rates and labor under

extremely poor working conditions* The farm laborers

in the sugar plantations of Negros (called sacadas),

for example, are exploited both by the hacenderos

and the contratistas. The latter are labor contractors

who earn money by acting as middlemen with the sacadas

as their ’merchandise1. A Jesuit priest trying to

unionize the sacadas described how the system works:

There are between twenty to thirty thousand

sacadas recruited every year who come mostly
from Panay island and are brought to Negros
during the milling season by contratistas.
A contratista enters into a contract with
a hacendero binding himself to supply so
many laborers. He gets an advance from
the hacendero, usually an average of
^40.00 per laborer. The money is given
to the family of the laborer to tide them
over while the laborer is away. Although
it is later on deducted from the sacada1s
earnings it is sometimes givento him
with interest. The sacada is also often
cheated in food, in the weighing of the
sugar cane that he cuts, hauls and loads.
 93

The contratis ta gets a c o m m i s s i o n and he

earns over ^1.00 per d a y p e r laborer that
he supplies. Some of the c o n t r a t i s t as
are public officials, town m a y o r s and
chiefs of p o l i c e . 23

’The carabao (water b u f f a l o ) 1, said the informant, 1is

sometimes b e t t e r off than the sacada. The owner, at

least, takes care of it when it gets sick, so it can

w o r k again. W h e n a sacada falls ill w h ile w o r k i n g

in the fields, he is sent a w a y and r e p laced w i t h a

24
he a l t h y o n e . ’ D u r i n g the sugar b o o m in 1 9 6 3 ? profits

of h a c e n d e r o s rose by over 2,000 p er cent. The wages

of their l a b o r e r s (,£*2.50 — or about six shillings a

day), however, r e m a i n e d the same. A columnist wrote

in this connection:

The sugar b o o m is still zooming, but the

wo r k e r s of Sugarlandia are still e a r ning the
same. I can just imagine how they feel
seeing their "amos" [bosses] buy more cars

23
Personal interview, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,
June 6, 1 9 6 3 » Some Negros l a n d l o r d s have b r a n d e d the
priest a ' c o m m u n i s t 1 because of h i s efforts in trying
to organize the s a c a d a s . ’He has b r o u g h t trouble
h e r e ’, one h a c e n d e r o informed the writer.
24
A typical c o n t r a c t b e t ween a h a c e n d e r o and
c ontratis ta p r o v i d e s that the c ontratis ta must supply
the hac e n d e r o (planter) with ’a b l e - b o d i e d w o r k e r s ’
and ’in case one or more of the said laborers f a i l e d
to w o r k due to illness or o t her c i r c u m s t a n c e s not the
fault of the planter, the c o n t r a t i s t a will i m m e d i a t e l y
replace the said laborer in order that the w o r k of
m i l l i n g a c t i v i t i e s of the p l a n t e r s shall not be
h a m p e r e d . ’ (C o n t r a c t to S u pply L a b o r e r s w i t h B o n d , a
contract b e t w e e n a Negros l a n d l o r d and a c o n t r a t i s t a ).
 94

and jewels, remodel their homes and acquire

mor e lands while they are snowed u n der by
r i sing p r i c e s . • .Here are the har d facts of
the sugar boom; The old u n f l u c t u a t i n g price
was ^14 pe r picul, p r o d u c e d at a cost of
J*12 p er picul. While the p r ice of sugar
has r i s e n to ,1*6 6 . 2 5 * the cost of p r o d u c t i o n
has r i s e n to only about ^15« The income
of the sugar b a r o n has thus shot up from
J*2 to J*51*25 p er picul. If he has a net
p r o d u c t i o n of 5*000 p i c u l s p e r crop year,
for instance, this means an increase of
net income f rom ,[*10,000 to J*2 5 6 , 2 5 0 per
crop year. On the other hand, the wage of
the s u gar p l a n t a t i o n workers remains
s t e a d y at ,1*2 . 5 0 a day! ^5

The p l i g h t of the sacadas has aroused official concern

but the system is carried on. The G o v e r n o r of Antique,

one of the p r o v i n c e s that s u pply s a c a d a s , for instance,

acknowledged that the term sacada hurt the entire

province but ’the stigma is now being erased since

the sacadas are not being exploited as m u c h as b e f o r e ’•

The last group among the p e a s a n t r y also w o r t h

m e n t i o n i n g are the small owner-cultivators. Their

h o l dings are v ery small, their m e t h o d s of c u l t i v a t i o n

25
Jose L. Guevara, ’Point of O r d e r ’, M a n i l a T i m e s ,
M a y 27, 1963 p.4.
A h a c e n d e r o (who was a hig h p r o v i n c i a l government
official in 1 9 6 3 ) reasoned out that ’the l a b orers are
all right w i t h w h a t they p r e s e n t l y g e t ’. He added
that they do not complain u n l e s s ’o u t s i d e r s ’ agitate
them because ’t h e y ’re used to that kind of l i f e ’.
Personal interview, Bacolod City, June 6, 1 9 6 3 .
26
I n t e r v i e w by J.L. Rivera, ’The Sacadas -- V i c t i m s of
G o v e rnment N e g l e c t ’, P h i l i p p i n e s F ree P r e s s , Jul y 20,
1963, p.10.
 95

are crude and their families are large.2^ Because of

these factors, among others* they often become indebted

to big landlord and other money-lenders who usually
exact usurious rates of interests.

THE URBAN ECONOMIC SETTING-: PATTERN OF GROWTH

The Philippine economic system may be said to

result from the combination of two legacies. The first

is the feudal-type of agricultural arrangement

institutionalized by the Spaniards in the encomienda

and, later, in the hacienda and kasama system. The

second is »free enterprise«. ‘The Philippine society«,

says Frank Golay, 'for better or for worse, has made
an unambiguous decision to organize its economy on
the basis of private initiative...in which economic
activity by the individual is rewarded liberally.

This enterprise type of economic organization is a

legacy of American colonial rule...»28

27
The average farm area cultivated by owner-cultivators
is about 2.5 hectares. The average Filipino family is
composed of six members, but peasant families are
generally much bigger. Cf. Ernie Singson, «All Tenants
Live m Poverty« Manila Bulletin, February 6, 1963.
28
Frank H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and
Economic Development (New York: Cornell University
Press, 1961), p.4 . y
 However, 'free enterprise’ principles such as

’free competition’, ’free market'} ’freedom of

contract’, etc*, have a limited social area of operation.

’Free enterprise’ has not supplanted the semi-feudal

arrangement in the rural areas, but has complemented

it; hence, it exists side-by-side with the hacienda

and kasama system. The field of ’competition’ is

dominated by foreign capital and a relatively few

wealthy families. The government also enters the field

but the widespread system of patronage and spoils

liberally mixed with the kinship system where the

socio-economic dominants, their relatives and henchmen

occupy key posts in ’public corporations’ often turn

it into something like a branch of private enterprise,

characterized by what are commonly referred to as

’anomalies’, ’graft’, and ’corruption’. (This

government participation will be discussed in Chapter

V I ).

Foreign capital occupies a dominant position in

the economy, particularly in large enterprises. Like

most colonized countries, the Philippines became a

profitable area of investment for foreign capital.

Cheap labor, raw materials, land, and tariff preferences

gave big profits and attracted investors. By 193 6 ,

 97

the picture of foreign investment was described by

Kurihara as follows:

The American investment in the Islands before

the war was about a fifth of the total
investment. According to a survey, made by
the U.S. Department of Commerce, of direct
investment in the Philippine at the end of
19365 the investment in the Philippines
stood at $9 2 ,000,000 while American
investments in China amounted to $91*000,000
and those in the Netherlands East Indies
were estimated at $70,000,000. Outside
capital also dominated banking and public
utilities in the Philippines. Sugar
production was controlled largely by
American and Spanish capital. Gold, iron
ore, and chromite production was controlled
largely by American and to a certain extent
by British capital. Spanish interests
dominated the tobacco industry. Half of
the investment in the cordage industry was
American, the other half Spanish. Chinese
capital dominated the timber and lumber
industry. Chinese and Japanese together
controlled about two-thirds of the retail
tra d e .29

The total investment in the sugar industry in 1935 was

estimated at over ^^>00 (m) ; J?185 (m) of this was invested

in sugar centrals broken down as follows: American —

33 per cent, Spanish — 23 per cent, other aliens —

30
1 per cent, Filipino — 43 per cent. In coconut oil

29
Kenneth K. Kurihara, Labor in the Philippine Economy
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1945)*
p p . 11-12.
30
A.V.H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of
the Philippines (Manila: American Chamber of Commerce
of the Philippines, Inc., 1958), p.31*
 98

production, ’there were some 8 large plants, 2 of

w h ich were American-owned, 2 British, 1 Chinese, and

31
1 Filipino’ The three Jargest soap f a c t o r i e s were

American, Swiss and Chinese, There were 30 companies

manufacturing tobacco p r o d u c t s and 60 p e r cent of the

capital was Spanish; the rest was American, Swiss,

C h i n e s e a nd Filipino, Just imme d i a t e l y before World

War IT, the following f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s were

reported: A m e r i c a n -- $258,5 (m) p er cent or 60 per

cent of total f o r e i g n investments; C h inese — 47*8 (m)

or 11 p er cent; Spanish — 4l (m) or 10 per cent;

B r i t i s h -- $37-8 (m) or 9 per cent; Japanese --

32
$32,2 (m) or 8 p e r cent; O t h e r s $ 6,6 (m) or 2 p er cent.

The p o s t w a r f o r e i g n investment p i c ture in the

Philippines followed the prew a r p a t t e r n w i t h U.S,

capital to p p i n g the list. In the b e g i n n i n g of 1 9 6 2 ,

p r i v a t e U,S. direct investment was p l a c e d at $440 million,

d i s t r i b u t e d in mining, public utilities, oil refining,

plantations, trade, manufacturing, banks, insurance,

I b i d , The statistics a p p e a r i n g h e r e are based on

the W a r i n g - D o r f m a n report of 1937 c i ted in Hartendorp,
I b i d , , p p . 30-34.
32
’Summary of the Report, T e c h n i c a l Committe to the
President of the P h i l i p p i n e s ’, A m e r i c a n - P h i l i p p i n e
T r ade R e l a t i o n s , (Washington: 1 9 4 4 ) , p , 6 ,
 99

and others. 3J
3 Carroll found in his 1962 study of
’large1 Filipino manufacturing establishments (i.e.,
those, employing 100 or more workers) that ’about two
cases of foreign entrepreneurship were found for every
case of Filipino entrepreneurship1.^ (Emphasis

supplied). Of the 92 entrepreneurs finally included

as ’Filipinos’ in his study, ’21 reported at least
one grandparent born outside the Philippines and five

of these reported one parent born abroad’.35

Since after the war, there has been increasing

agitation among the Filipino elite for ’Filipinization*
of industry and some gains seem to have been made on
this score. Having acquired political control from
the Americans, their next task seems to be towards

33
Foreign Information Service, First National City Bank
of New York, ’Philippines: Return to a Free Market
Economy’ (Pamphlet, January, 1963)» pp.5-6.
34
John J. Carroll, ’Filipino Entrepreneurship in
Manufacturing’ Philippine Studies, vol.10, 1962, p.106.
After other exclusions, Carroll came up with a list of
275 entrepreneurs employing 100 or more workers of
which I83 were foreign and 92 were Filipinos.
35
Ibid. This also illustrates the mestizo component in
the business group. In the list of top property owners
in the City of Manila, the same ethnic composition as
in ownership of big estates was noted: Americans,
Chinese, Spaniards, Spanish and Chinese mestizos, the
Catholic Church and some religious orders. There were
also other Europeans, (Source: City Assessor’s Office,
Manila, 1963).
 100

having a greater participation in the control of the

economy. This is manifested in slogans like ’Filipino

First1, and in legislation such as the ’Nationalization’

[actually, ’Filipinization1] of Retail T r a d e , ^ There

are, however, several difficulties encountered by the

elite in their drive for greater control of the

economy. First, American investors are protected by

the ’parity' amendment to the Philippine Constitution

which gave them the same rights as Filipino citizens

in the disposition, exploitation, development and

utilization of all Philippine natural resources, ’and

the operation of public utilities shall, if open to

any person, be open to citizens of the United States and

to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,

directly or indirectly, by United States citizens’.37

Another difficulty is the elite’s commitment to ’free

enterprise’ and their recognition for the need of

foreign capital in the economic development of the

country. Also, some of the elite are connected in one

way or another with foreign firms, either as business

associates, stockholders, or members of the board of

36
Republic Act No. 1180, passed in 195^+ mainly affected
the Chinese who controlled the retail trade.
37
See Amendment to the Philippine Constitution titled,
’Ordinance Appended to the Constitution’, under Art. XV.
 101

directors* Some lawyer-politicians (who are top

gov e r n m e n t officials) are legal c o u n s e l s or have

38
other conn e c t i o n s w i t h some big f o r e i g n firms. As

shall be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r (in C h a p t e r Vi) this du a l i t y

of p o s i t i o n s has p r o duced some i n t e r e s t i n g results.

In spite of these inconsistencies in the e l i t e 1s

position, however, there seem to be strong grounds

for c o n c e r n in the extent of fo r e i g n control of the

economy. The rationale of p a r i t y ’, for example, was

to attract f o r e i g n capital; data shows, however, that

during the 10 - y e a r period from 1 9 3 0 to i 9 6 0 , 'foreign

capital r e c e i v e d for investment a m o u n t e d to only

$1 9 * 2 million; remittances of earnings, profits and

d i v i d e n d s by fo r e i g n firms a m o unted t o . . . $2 1 5 * 7

m i l l i o n 1, 39 In other words, there was a heavy capital

d r a i n from the country instead of the expected rapid

economic development.

The 'free trade* wit h A m e r i c a d u r i n g the

C o m m o n w e a l t h period extended through 1954, or eight

y e ars after independence, c ontributed to the

38
See for example, 'Justice M a r i n o on S t o n e h i l l ’s "Blue
Book" L i s t ’ ; also, 'NP's R e p l y to M a r i n o Raps', b o t h
in P h i l i p p i n e s Free P r e s s , July 20, 1 9 6 3 » pp.6-7? and
6 8 - 6 9 ? respectively.
39
S a l v a d o r Araneta, 'U.S. P r i v ileges in our Land'
M a n i l a T i m e s , S e p t ember 17? 1964, p.l.
 102

development of a shaky agricultural economy. (This

'free trade' extension, also part of the Bell Trade

Act of 1946, ended in 1954; thenceforth, an annual

j per cent increase in duty was provided until

January 1, 1973» when full duties shall be imposed.)

This arrangement, in the words of Jenkins, 'tailored

the economy of the Islands to fit the American

market'.^

...lo the United States came agricultural

raw materials and products needed for
manufacture in this country, and from
this nation went industrial goods and
commodities vital to an underdeveloped
economy. American exports also included
foodstuffs such as wheat and flour, for
owing to excessive specialization on
export products the Philippines though an
agiicultural nation, was unable to feed
it self,^1

The big plantation owners and hacenderos were benefited

by this arrangement for it assured them of a ready

market for their products at premium prices. However,

it proved harmful to the economy as a whole since the

American market demanded raw agricultural products

such as sugar, copra, hemp, etc., and American, Filipino,

and other investors channelled their capital into

4Ö
Shirley Jenkins, American Economic P olicy Toward the
~~~r^PPines (California: Stanford University Press.
1954), p.34.
4l
Ibid., p.38.
 103

these few, specialized crops, while the country's

industrialization became retarded due to the influx of

42
duty-free manufactured goods from the U.S,

Furthermore, these ventures required the maximum use

42
The trade with the United States under the arrangement
of 'free trade' embodied in the Bell Trade Act of 1946
are revealing. Since there were no reciprocal
arrangements until the Laurel-Langley revision in 1955?
American manufactured goods entered the Philippines
duty-free in unlimited quantities while Philippine
exports to the U,S. were limited by 'quotas'. The
following were the trade figures during the post-war
'free trade’ period:
Exports 10 Percentage Imports from Percentag
U.S, of Total U.S. of Total
(Million t ) Export s (Million t ) Imports
1946 76.8 59.8 515*0 87.0
1947 304.1 57.5 880.0 86.1
1948 415.7 65.4 939.2 8O .3
1949 363.8 71.7 938.6 80.0
1950 491.2 72.8 5-10.5 74.5
1951 276.3* 64.7 349,8* 71.4
1954 500.0 60.7 606.0 67.1
1955 506.0 60.4 704.0 65 •6

Sources: Central Bank of the Philippines Annual

Reports (1st, 1949), p.39 (2nd, 1950),
pp. 29 -3 0 ; Bureau of Census and Statistic s,
Statistical Handbooks, 1959» PP .129-33;
1963, P* 113.
*
Central Bank, Statistical Bulletin, vol.XIV, no,4,
December, 1962, p.157* Figures are in U.S,
dollars,
 io4

of unskilled labor which received very low wage rates,

contributing to the depressed level of existence of

the Filipino peasantry.

The nature of investments were not conducive to

rapid economic growth. The Filipino capitalist is

known for his 'timid’ nature. He invests in ’sure’

ventures such as land and real-estate speculations,

export-import business, logging, etc. and follows the

Schumpeterian 1cluster-effect1, i.e., the tendency to

imitate a successful venture instead of innovating into

a new one resulting in the heavy concentration of

capital in high-profit areas.

43 While perhaps

profitable to the investor and has less risks, it is

exploitative rather than developmental in character

and the slow and unbalanced economic development of

the country is partly due to this factor. The survey

report of the staff of the IBRD described the

industrial base as 'narrow1 and 'consists essentially

of a range of consumer goods' industries heavily

43
Cf. Benito Legarda, Jr., 'Our Growing Entrepreneurial
Class', Progress (Manila Times Publishing Co., 1959);
p p . 36-39«
 105

dependent on imported r a w m a t e r i a l s ’* M a n y of these

industries, particularly those c a t e g o r i z e d as ’n ew and

n e c e s s a r y ’, have been e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h government

subsidies and t a x - e x e m p t i o n privileges; but they are

m o s t l y what are c o m monly r e f e r r e d to as packaging,

a s s e m b l i n g or finishing establishments*
45 Some are

extensions or affi l i a t e s of p a rent com p a n i e s abroad*

PATTERN OF C O N C E N T R A T I O N

One i n t e r e s t i n g feature of most P h i l i p p i n e business

o r g a n i z a t i o n s is their e x c l u s i v e nature. T h e y are often

family a f f a i r s with the f a t h e r as president, a son the

vice-p r e s i d e n t , the wife is treasurer, d a u g h t e r s or

s o n s - i n - l a w are directors* T h e s e are c a lled the

’closed f a m i l y c o r p o r a t i o n s ’. C a r r o l l ’s findings, for

instance, show e d that the e n t e r p r i s e s fo u n d e d by 72

out of the 92 e n t r e p r e n e u r s in his study were

44
I n t e r n a t i o n a l B a n k for R e c o n s t r u c t i o n and Development,
’P r e l i m i n a r y Report*, J a n u a r y 4, 1 9 6 2 , a p p e a r i n g in
’State of the N a t i o n M e s s a g e of P r e s ident D i o sdado
M a c a p a g a l ’ J a n u a r y 22, 1 9 6 2 , A p p e n d i x II, p .6. The
c o n t r i b u t i o n to employment is r a ther small. In i960,
for example, the 1,884 m a n u f a c t u r i n g es t a b l i s h m e n t s
e m p l o y i n g 20 or more w o r kers had an average employment
of only 150,878 out of 9*1 m i l l i o n in the labor force.
(Bureau of Q n s u s and Statistics, i 960 Annual Survey
of M a n u f a c t u r e s , vol.V, p p . 42-43; P h i l i p p i n e Statistical
S u rvey of_H o u s e h o l d s , B u l l e t i n N o , 7* Table 4, p . 1 3 ).
45
Cf. H i l a r i o n Henares, ’Bold, N e w I n d u s t r i e s ’,
Progre s s , op* cit * , p,25#
 106

family-controlled. 6 Most of the business

organizations on the local level (provinces and

municipalities) except the branches of the big

corporations centered in Manila, follow this *family—

type1 of organization. There are also the inter­

family corporations which are business alliances of

two or more elite families. Finally, there are the

1open’ corporations whose stocks are sold to the public.

The last group are, however, few in number as shown by

the listings in the stock exchange. ^ A further

illustration of the limited nature of public

participation in business is the fact that in 1959,

there were only 50,000 stockholders in the whole

Philippines or about one—fifth of 1 per cent of the

popjula tion. ^

46
John J, Carroll, 1The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur*
A Study of the Origins of Business Leadership in a
Developing Economy*, Ph.D. thesis in Sociology, Cornell
University, 1962, p.259. Cf. also »Progress through
h amily Solidarity*, series published in Weekly Granhic,
Manila, 1964-65, —
47
The Manila Stock Exchange had only about 90 corporations
listed and that ’not more than 60 were actually traded* as
compared with 882 corporations in manufacturing alone
(employing 20 or more workers). H.D. Charlesworth and
R.W, Hooley, ’Financing Economic Development in the
Philippines: The Role of a Private Development B a n k * ,
Philippine Economic Journal. vol.II, no . 3, November 1,
1963» p. 3 4 ; i960 Annual Survey of Manufactures (Manila:
Bureau of Printing), vol.V, Table 10, p . 320.
48
Espiritu, op. cit., p,4 3 .
 107

The pattern of concentration in land ownership,

it appears, is duplicated in the business sector.

Many of the top businessmen, in fact, belong also to

the big landowning families such as the Madrigals,
Lopezes, Aranetas, Jacintos, Elizaldes, Osmenas,

Cojuangcos, Sycips, Zobels, De la Ramas, Yu Ke Thai,

Sorianos, Tuasons, Aboitizes, etc., to cite a few
examples. Among this top group are the old Spanish
and mestizo families, discussed in the preceding
chapter, whose fortunes were built in the latter part
of Spanish rule and the early part of the American
regime. These families operate or are connected with
big business empires that are nationwide in their
scope. The Elizaldes (a full-blood Spanish family but
of Filipino citizenship), for example, have 18 business
entities invoMng mining (gold, silver, copper, iron),
sugar plantations, insurance, shipping, sugar centrals,
and mass-media (radio broadcasting and TV, with
chains of radio stations all over the country). This
single family employs 'no fewer than 20,000 people
whose dependents number around 100,000 !.49 The Arane ta

1*9
1On the Economic Side1 Philippines Free Press,
February 2, 1 9 6 3 , p.12. A member of the family,
Joaquin M. Elizalde, was Cabinet member during the
Quirino administration.
 108

family operates the Araneta University, FEATI University,

Republic Flour Mills, AIA Feed Mills, Republic Soya,

Premier Paper these under the management of Salvador

Araneta, with his wife Victoria (of the Lopez family);

Jo Antonio Araneta, lawyer and businessman is president

of Botica Boie, Gregorio Araneta, Inc,, and Erlanger

and Galinger; Vicente Araneta is president of the

Equipment and Marketing Corporation and the Gregorio

C* A
Araneta Machineries, Inc,, (GAMI)."1 The family has

also substantial shares in the FEATI Bank, The Lopez

family has a network of interests in sugar mills,

plantations (sugar, rice and coconut), jute bag factory,

inter-island shipping, insurance, banking, real estate,

educational institutions, mass media (l national daily,

4 TV stations, and 23 radio stations all over the

Islands), a lime factory, and a cement factory , ^

50
G,L. Galvan, ’Progress through Family Solidarity’,
Weekly Graphic, August 26, 1964, p«35* The following
family members have held top government posts1 Salvador —
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;
J, Antonio — Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue;
Vicente — Head, Agricultural Co-operative and Credit
Financing Administration. Brother Luis is a successful
architect, Fr. Francisco Araneta is Rector of the Ateneo
University. (Ibid. See also Appendix, Manila).
51
List of owner-operators, Radio and Television, Radio
Control Office, Department of Public Works and
Communications; The Philippines W h o ’s W h o , by D.H. Soriano
 109

The Co.juangco family has its interests in extensive

sugar and rice plantations, one plantation practically

encompassing a whole town in Central Luzon, owns

controlling stocks (90 per cent) in one bank and about

30 per cent in another; operates sugar mills, has

interests in shipping, insurance, etc. ‘The family

name Cojuangco is synonymous with untold wealth in

52
Tarlac and Bulacan p r o v i n c e s 1, wrote their biographer.

5 1 (co n t )
and Isidro L. Retizos (Quezon City: Capitol Publishing
House, Inc., 1957 ed.)• The father, Don Benito Lopez
was former Iloilo Governor; Fernando was former Vice-
President and Senator at the time of writing. He was
also co-founder of the Democratic Party in 1963 and
one of the top leaders of the powerful fsugar b l o c 1.
(See also Appendix, Iloilo.)
As of 19633 eight families own or control all the 10 TV
commercial stations and 78 of 95 commercial radio
broadcasting stations. These families are the Lopezes,
Roceses, Elizaldes, Sorianos (American), Stewarts
(American, but under the name of the Filipina wife),
Lindenbergs (American?), Ceas (former Senator), and
Eduardo Lopez. Three of these families (Lopezes, Roceses,
and Sorianos) also own or control almost all of the
national dailies and weekly magazines. The single exception
is the Manila Daily Bulletin, owned by Hans Menzi, some
Americans and o t h e r s . ( S o u r c e : Radio Control Office
and interviews with members of the press.)
52
W h o ’s W h o , ibid. , p.70; Interview with a banking
official. Jose, Sr. was former member, House of
Representative and Governor of the government* s
Rehabilitation Financing Corporation; his son Jose, Jr,,
is Tarlac*s Representative; a son-in-law (son of a
former Cabinet) is T a r l a c ’s Governor; the wife of Jose,
Sr, belongs to the Sumulong family of Rizal (another
’politically d o m i n a n t ’ family) and a son-in-law operates
one of the largest private Universities (enrolment over
30,000) in the Philippines. (See Chapter IV, ’Politically
Dominant Families* and Appendix, Tarlac.)
 110

The above were cited as illustrations of the nature

and extent of the economic activities of the top families*

The concentration of ownership and control of land and
business (including private educational institutions and
the mass-media) is further bolstered by intermarriages

among the elite. Thus, the Aranetas married into the

Lopezes and the Yulos into the Aranetas, the Osmenas

into the De la Ramas and Jacintos, the Cojuangcos into

the Sumulongs, the Aquinos and Reyeses into the

Cojuangcos, the Madrigals into the Paternos, Gonzaleses,

Vasquezes, etc. Mention has already been made of the

relationships among the landed families in the provinces
of Negros and Iloilo. In Central Luzon, it is not
uncommon to find elite relatives (cousins) being
married to each other to preserve the family properties.
There seems to be a pattern, too, in these intermarriages.
The old Spanish families and Spanish me stizos tend to
retain their exclusiveness and become self-perpetuating
minorities within the elite sub-society. Thus there
are, for instance, the Elizalde-Diaz Moreau-Von
Kauffman cluster; the Aboitiz-Moraza-Mendieta union,
the Ayala-Z obel-McMicking-Ortigas-Soriano-Roxas-De
Montemar family links, the Roces-Pardo-Prieto-Legarda
family group, and so forth. The Chinese (naturalized)
 Ill

and Chinese me stizos tend to do the same (Sycip-

Yuchengc o-Uy-Tiu-Yu-Liu; Yao Shiong Shio-Cua Guiock

Hong; Cojuangco-Chichioco, etc,), although it is now

more difficult to trace this trend as this distinction
tends to be lost through time — names are Filipinized
(or rather, Hispanized) and Chinese exclusiveness
disappears. Nevertheless, the Chinese racial origin
is still found in a marked degree among many of the

wealthy elite by their distinctive physical features

and even in the altered family names of some of them
(e.g., Lichauco, Chiongbian, Yuchengco, Tuason, Tan,

Sycip, Syquia, Dee, Gochangco, Roxas Chua, etc,). All

these intermarriages contributed to the further
concentration of wealth since kinship in the

Philippines, as shall be discussed later, has a strong

influence on social interaction and behavior.
The pattern of concentration is reflected
geographically. Metropolitan Manila 53 is the single
metropolis that dominates the entire country. It has
become the financial, commercial, manufacturing and

53
Metropolitan Manila includes Manila and the surrounding
suburbs of Quezon City, Pasay City, Caloocan City,
Makati, Mandaluyong, Paranaque and San Juan. Its total
population in i960 was 2.2 million. Vide i960 Census
of Population, vol.II, Summary, op. cit.
 112

cultural center of the archipelago. All of the m a jor

banks, insurance c o m p anies and other financial

institutions are in M e t r o p o l i t a n Manila. It is also

the m a i n center of trade and commerce. Fifty-four

p er cent of all m a n u f a c t u r i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s (having

20 or mor e workers) are in this area and more than half

(51 per cent) of all w o r k e r s emplo y e d in m a n u f a c t u r i n g

establishments in the above category are conce n t r a t e d

h e r e .^ No less than 12 private u n i v e r s i t i e s (owned by

elite f a m ilies and rel i g i o u s corporations) and one

state u n i v e r s i t y are in M e t r o p o l i t a n Manila. Finally,

it is the political c e nter of the nation.

But the ap p a r e n t growth and m o d e r n i t y of

M e t r o p o l i t a n M a n i l a and a few u r b a n centers have not

been shared by the rest of the country. M u c h of the

countryside is still ch a r a c t e r i z e d by an antiquated

k i n d of life not very different fro m the kind w h i c h

the S p a n i s h c o n q u i s t a d o r e s found when they first set

foot on these Islands. One still finds the peasant

in his world of the n i p a shack, the w o oden p l o w and the

carabao. Indeed, M a n i l a and the c ountryside seem to

depi c t the w ide c o n t rasts b e t w e e n the elite and the masses.

54
A n n u a l Survey of M a n u f a c t u r e s , vol.V, i9 6 0 , op. c i t .,
p p . 42-43»
 113

C. THE PHILIPPINE CLASS SYSTEM

The Philippine class system reflects the combined

heritage of its historical development. The marked

influence of the traditional class system, in which

society was divided into a very small but powerful

upper class aristocracy of hereditary maharlikas, a

group of timawas who owed allegiance to the aristocracy,

and a large lower class group of dependent and landless

alipins, is still noticeably evident. In this

traditional system, there was no pretense of equality

and people took it for granted that fate had placed

them in the position they occupied. 55 The Spanish

influence is found in the attitudes and behavior of the

upper class such as their disdain for manual labor,

their aloofness and aristocratic mien, and a

domineering, although sometimes paternalistic,

authoritarianism. The sociologist Hunt observed that

In the Philippines, there is a definite

effort to give members of the upper class a
common cultural viewpoint. It appears that
upper class position is associated with
a certain Spanish-European pattern which
makes for a separate sort of 'we-group'
feeling or a ’consciousness of k i n d ’. One
writer has observed that Spanish is termed
’the language of the aristocracy’ in the
Philippines.36

55
Hunt, op. cit., p.133»
56
Ibid., p. 136
 Il4

The American contribution seems to be in the tempering

of upper class attitudes and behavior. The accepted

democratic 'formulas’ have made some members of the

upper class — especially politicians — Pay at least

lip service to egalitarian principles and ’the

American stress on social mobility... has greatly

influenced the younger generation of educated

Filipinos’.57 The gap, however, between pronouncement

and reality is still very wide.

MANIFESTATION OF CLASS; ELITE AND NON-ELITE

There are many evidences which distinguishes the

elite in the Philippines from the non-elite. Class

distinctions are perpetuated by the differences in

the schools. The children of the elite attend mostly

the Catholic religious schools run by Americans,

Spaniards, and other Europeans. These are called the

’prestige1 schools in the Philippines. Many send them

later to finishing schools abroad. In this respect,

the elite receive a particular sort of training and

their distinctive type of culture is maintained. In

contrast, the lower class send their children to the

government schools which, owing to inadequate financial

57
Ibid., p.137.
 115

support, are overcrowded and ill-equipped. M a n y of

them do not finish the four grades ‘g u a r a n t e e d ’ by the

58
Const i t u t i o n . Class d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the children

going to the government schools and the r e l i g i o u s

schools are easily discernible. The well-dressed,

u n i f o r m e d c h i ldren of the elite stand in m a r k e d contrast

to the shabby, b arefooted b o y s and girls in the barrio

schools. The class p a t tern in ed u c a t i o n is also

m a i n t a i n e d by the d ifferences in tuition fees. A

comparison of tuition and o t her fees charged by five

‘p r e s t i g e ’ schools and five n o n - s e c t a r i a n schools in

Manila shows, for example, that the former exceed the

latter on the average by 173 p er cent, 153 p e r cent,

107 p e r cent and 50 per cent in Primary, Intermediate,

58
The B u r e a u of Public S c hools data on ‘d r o p o u t s ’
show that d u r i n g a 10-year p e r i o d the average
p e r c e n t a g e of those who en r o l l e d in Grade I and
reached G r a d e IV was only 66.4 per cent f rom Grade I
to G r a d e VI, 38.5 per cent and from Grade I to High
School, 15 p e r cent. See ‘School S t a t i s t i c s ’, The
M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , September 12, 1964, p.17; The
M a n i l a T i m e s , October 5» 1964, p.24-A. Government
survey d a t a also show that the l i t eracy of those
in Grade IV was only 53*8 p e r cent and in G r a d e VI,
65*1 p er cent. This means that m any of the ‘dropouts'
are i l l i t e r a t e s or soon lapse into illiteracy. This
raises d o u b t s on the common claim on the h i g h
‘l i t e r a c y ’ rate (72 per cent) w h i c h is m a i n l y based
on figures of school attendance.
 116

High School, and College, respectively* 59 These,

according to an informant from the Education Department,

do not include the ’other fees and contributions not
sanctioned by this office1 which are often collected

in religious schools.
Education is one of the hopes of those from the
lower classes to break through the class barrier. It
has become a sort of panacea, a magic passport that

enables one to escape from one’s social class. But

education costs money. There have been cases reported
of small landholders going into debt, mortgaging their
small possessions and work animals, just to give a son
the chance to escape from the life of the peasant.
Unfortunately, this ambition seldom materializes for
these persons often fall victims of the so-called
’diploma mills’. Run by profit-motivated individuals,
these ’educational’ institutions offer ’cheap’ education

59
The five private sectarian schools are Ateneo
University, La Salle College, San Beda College, Holy
Gost College (girls) and Assumption Convent (girls).
The non-sectarian schools are Far Eastern University,
National Teachers College, MLQ University, University
of Manila, and National University. Source: Bureau
of Private Schools statistical data and personal
interviews•
 117

to the masses. One writer commented, in this

connection, that
...we can’t produce an efficient educational
system that has profit as its primary
objective. In such a situation, owners of
educational institutions with an eye to
quarterly or semi-annual dividends must
hire teachers who will take any kind of
/"i
salary. Ui-
After their ’education’, they often end up among the

ranks of the unemployed or else must seek the help of

the elite to gain employment in positions not

commensurate with their educational ’attainment’.

Employers are selective and prefer those with the

same ’school tie’ or else those coming from the schools
with the ’name’.
In the matter of the residences of the elite,
there is a pattern in place and type which distinguishes

60
’An example of rapacious exploitation of gullible
boys and girls was one...which allegedly earned nearly
ten million pesos in one year for its stock holders’.
(George A. Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist,
Chapter X, serialized in Manila Times, September 23?
1957.)
61
Teodoro F. Valencia, ’Profits of educational firms
must be limited’, Manila Times, January 22, 1 9 6 3 «
See also ’Roces and business-minded educators’,
Philippines Free Press, March 9? 19^3»
62
There are lawyers without clients, for instance, who
end up as clerks in government offices, or teachers
with the income of laborers.
 118

them from the rest of the community. In M e t r o p o l i t a n

Manila, where most of the top elite have their

residences, there is a n o t a b l e c l u s t e r i n g in the

f a s h i onable suburban areas of Q u e z o n City, Makati, San

Juan, and M a n d a t uyong.

The exclusiveness of e l ite residential areas is

m a i n t a i n e d by expensive lan d w h i c h is b e yond the reach

of average citizens. Morris Joepenlatz (J u p p e n l a t z ? ),

a U.N. technical assistant, observed that

With the income levels, g o v e r n m e n t policies,

pr i v a t e ownership and l a n d tenure system
p r e v a i l i n g in M e t r o p o l i t a n Manila, not only
will a big p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n be
d e nied the chance of a d e c e n t shelter in a
decent com m u n i t y environment but at least
7 0 p er cent of the g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n over
the next 1 7 y e ars will be u n able to affo r d
a piece of u r b a n l a n d . .•c i r c u m s t a n c es will
force these people to swell the squatter
colonies already e x i s t i n g . ^3

The A y a l a lands (owned by the S p a n i s h famil i e s p r e v i o u s l y

discussed) in Makati, for instance, w h i c h covers about

1,700 h e c tares and where the exclusive ' V i l l a g e s ’ of

63
P h i l i p p i n e s Fre e P r e s s , M a y 25? 1 9 6 3 ? p.12. The A y a l a
f a m i l y group alone owns over 10 p e r cent of total land
in M e t r o p o l i t a n Manila. The area of M e t r o p o l i t a n M a n i l a
in 1946 was 7 > 3 3 0 hectares and this increased to 1 6 , 0 0 0
he c t a r e s in 1 9 6 3 but 'much of the land in p e r i p h e r y is
held by a few families or c o n t r o l l e d by land
speculators'* Thus, while m u c h of this l and remained
idle, h a l f a m i l l i o n M a n i l a n s were crowded, into an
area of 9^0 hectares. O n e - f i f t h of the M a n i l a
p o p u l a t i o n lived in slum areas; the squatter p o p u l a t i o n
was 200,000. Morris J o e p e n l a t z (J u p p e n l a t z ? ), Ibid.
 119

Bel Air, San. Lorenzo, Urdaneta, etc. are located, have

po r t i o n s w h i c h have risen in value fro m per square

m e t e r in 1959 1° ^500 per square m e t e r in 1964. In

this are a lives a small h i g h - i n c o m e g r o u p 'which

64
contribute about $ 0 per cent of M a k a t i 1s i n c o m e 1.

F o r b e s Park, called the P h i l i p p i n e ' s m i l l i o n a i r e s row,

is also in M a k a t i just a c ross the 'Villages*. Costly

m a n s i o n s and b u n g alows can be found in these areas.

The 'Villages' and Forbes P a r k m a i n t a i n their own

services and security system.

In the provinces, the local elite g e n e r a l l y live

in the p o b l a c i o n e s , most of them c l u s tered a r ound the

plaza, where the important b u i l d i n g s are c o n c e n t r a t e d —

66
the m u n i s i p y o (town hall), the church, and the school.

In Vigan, I l ocos Sur, for instance, people still refer

to the p o r t i o n of the town a r o u n d the p o b l a c i o n

(western side) as the käme s t i s u a n (from m e s t i z o ) where

64
John Y e n c h (ed.) 'We M e a n Business', Weekly G r a p h i c ,
September 9> 1964.
65
Ibid.
66
As d i s c u s s e d earlier in C h a p t e r II, this p r i n c i p a l i a
r e s i d e n t i a l p a t t e r n was e s t a b l i s h e d d u r i n g the S p a n i s h
regime. Its m o d e r n m a n i f e s t a t i o n was the subject of
an i n t e r e s t i n g s t udy by D o n n V. Hart. See his The
P h i l i p p i n e P l a z a C o m p l e x : A Focal Point in Culture
C h a n g e , op, c i t .
 120

big, Span!sh-style hous e s of stone and hardwood (narra

and y a k a l ) still stand. The n a t u r a l e s (native) side in

the eastern sector have houses m o s t l y made of bamboos

and nipa, Rafael Palma, in d e s c r i b i n g his town, wrote

that 1there was a s p r i nkling of stone hous e s around

the c h u r c h which were owned by the r i c h proprietors

and the "cabezas de b a r a n g a y " '.^

C l a s s distinctions are also e m p h a s i z e d by the

elite's p r o p e n s i t y to d i s p l a y their possessions. Hart,

for insta n c e observed in his 1 9 5 2 study:

• • .Most F i l i p i n o principalia, it w o u l d appear,

p r e f e r to display their wealth, to build
elaborate houses, dress p r e t e n tiously, and
impress visitors with their fin a n c i a l
resources. One n e e d but to dine w i t h a
w e a l t h y F i l i p i n o f a m i l y to r e a l i z e the
tendency toward c o n s picuous c o n s u m p t i o n of
weal th. 6*3

67
Rafael Palma, My A u t o b i o g r a p h y (Manila: 1953)> pp.3-4.
68
Hart, o p . c i t ., p.50. A w o m a n c o l umnist also wrote
in this connection: 'We in the P h i l i p p i n e s . ..are still
ex p e c t e d to be grateful to our l a n d l o r d s for letting
us gape through their m a g n i f i c e n t f e n c e s at their
immense houses, where the lapdogs and h o u n d s cavort
among the imported r o s e b u s h e s and the ten-course
d i n ners are the rule; for gla d d e n i n g our ignorant ears
wit h t h e i r expensive musiomakers; for a l l o w i n g us to
catch a glimpse of their y o u n g people just home from
a E u r o p e a n capital d r e s s e d and scented like duchesses
and movie stars; and p e r h a p s (if one is lucky) for
getting splashed w i t h mud off the tires of a Cadillac
(why, if it weren't for them we'd p r o b a b l y not even
get to l o o k at a limousine! (C.G. Nakpil, 'My Humble
Opinion'), M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , June 13, 1955, p.4.
 121

Some other evidences of a class system that has

endured can be found in the normative ways of behavior

among the people. In the relationship between landlord

and tenant, for example, there is a general recognition

of what is 'proper', Thus, a tenant on a visit to his

landlord's residence in the poblacion does not come as

a visitor or a guest but as a member of the household

help. He would not pass through the main door but use

the back. If he brings his family with him, say during

the town fiesta, his wife proceeds to the kitchen to

help the servants while his children perform some

household chores. The tenant makes himself useful by

preparing the 1echon (roast pig) or doing some other

odd jobs. All of these are done without any compensation

or payment as part of the 1 andlord-serf relationship.

This relationship is extended although in a modified

form, to the urban setting. Whether in the office or

factory, the j ef e or 'boss' expects his subordinates

to show not only deference but also subservience to

him. One writer calls this attitude 'conformity'.

This conformity is manifested in other phases

of the Filipino's culture. The teacher, for
example, who should be the most articulate
protester, because he is expected to have a
mind trained for analysis and criticisms, is
often a cowed creature whose main virtue is
 122

obedience to rules. Government people appear

to be no better who should be the best
equipped to judge what is happening in matters
that vitally affect the people. Religion has
often become a social organization where
people also talk the same way and think the
same way.^9

Social superiority and leadership roles are reserved

for the principalia, Whether in social, economic,

religious and, as shall be shown later, political

matters he assumes his ’proper' place. During fiestas

and other religious celebrations, for example, the

elite display their social superiority by assuming the

posts of leadership such as managing the decoration of

the church, preparing the carriages of saints (which

they usually own) for the religious procession, donating

sums of money for the bands that parade around the

town. Inside the church, they usually have special

seats reserved for them, with their names painted or

70
carved, which they own. Hart also observed this:

What is the role of the Church in making the

barriofolk aware of social class differences?
[he asks]...the vivid contrasts between the
municipal mayor, prosperous merchants, and
landlords who live in the poblacion and the
typical barrio farmer are reflected in the
activities of the church.
69
Pura Santillan-Castrence, 'Encounter with the West',
Progress, op. cit., p.95*
70
'These pews are placed by the wealthy people of the
town who have their names carved on the back'. Renato
iayag, Sinners of Angeles (i960, Author's Publication),
p.27.
 123

In some Catholic churches the more prosperous

devotees have private niches for personal
altars and reserved church benches labelled
with the family name. These benches have
been donated to the church by the family,
Barriofolk stand rather than sit in an
empty family bench. As one Filipino author
states: l...the tenants know that these
(benches) are not intended for them, and...
they keep away."^

In baptisms, weddings, and funerals, there is the same

emphasis on social class differences. The fees are

divided into ’classes’, ranging from the ’ordinario’,

reserved for the common folk, to the ’special first

class’ for the very rich. Also, some of the tombs

of the rich are virtual mansions. Thus, from birth

to the grave, class distinctions are preserved.

THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA

This chapter centered on the examination of the

general socio-economic setting. It was indicated that

there had been no remarkable change in the economic

structure and that old economic relations continue to

persist. Further, the trend of economic growth does

not suggest the creation of new social forces which

may broaden the base of power. On the other hand, the

71
Hart, op, ci t . , p.18. 'During Lenten, you will see
the tenants parading the saints owned by the cacique s ’,
said one Vigan informant. ’These tenants also render
free personal services in the caciques’ homes'.
(ilocos Sur interview, April 27, 1 9 6 3 »)
 124

pattern of concentration of wealth seems to suggest

the opposite. Finally, evidences of old social

relations show that the principalia character of the

elite is still very much in evidence.

The old and the new principalia are basically the

same in composition, i.e., they both consist of the

socio-economic dominants in the community. Also, in

view of what has been stated above, i.e., that no major

rearrangement in the social structure has taken place,

the old character and composition of the principalia

has, therefore, been preserved. Why then call it

modern principalia? The only reason is because while

the old was caste-like, entry to the new principalia

is now possible. Higher education, although limited

in effect insofar as the common people are concerned,

makes it possible for one to cross class lines. The

man with higher education, if possessing talent or

the qualifications needed, may be recruited by the

principalia either in business or politics in which

case he may continue to rise, acquiring other values

such as wealth, power, etc. He may thereby become a

bona fide member of the elite class. The man who

accumulates wealth may also join the principalia

directly. The fact, however, that there has been no

 125

major restratification, i.e., the top elite continue

to be very small in composition, indicates that social

mobility is still rather slow.
How large is the elite class? Obviously, it is
impossible to give an exact number since the term elite
itself is relative, i.e,, persons possessing the

different key values necessary for the exercise of

influence such as wealth, power, prestige, and education

can themselves fall in different gradations and it all
depends on the classifier how refined his distinctions
should be. How much influence? How much wealth?
However,, a rough estimate can be made. Since we have
defined the principalia class as consisting of the

socio-economic dominants in the community, then we can

associate them with the members of the upper strata.
The problem, therefore, revolves around an estimate of
social class composition.

The following data on income distribution, land

ownership, occupation, education and general levels of
living should be able to provide the reader with
important clues as to the general nature of the
Philippine class structure. A very rough estimate may
also be made on the various social class categories
based on the above socio-economic indicators.
 126

1, Income, Table 3*4 shows the distribution of

families, income, and real property by income class.

TABLE 3.4

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES, INCOME, AND

REAL, PROPERTY
✓
PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE
DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION OF
INCOME CLASS OF FAMILIES OF INCOME REAL PROPERTY

Below ^2,500 88.3 56.8 40.3

fz, 500-^4,999 8.0 19.6 14.6
^5 ,000-^9,999 2. 6 12.5 13.8
^10,000 and over 1.1 11.1 31.3

Source: Philippine Joint Legislative-Executive Tax

Commission, ’Percentage Distribution of
Families, Income, Expenditure, and Real
Property by Income Class for Calendar
Year i9 6 0 1.

It can be seen from the figures that the top

income class receiving ^ 10,000 and above comprise only

1.1 per cent of all families in contrast with the 88.3

per cent of all families receiving only ^2,500 ana oelow. Also

this top 1.1 per cent owns almost one-third of all real

property which is just 9 per cent less than that which

the 88,3 per cent owns.

2, Land ownership. Referring back to Table 3*2

on page 85 , it can be seen that only 0.18 per cent of

all families own lands in the 100 hectare and above

category; 1.68 per cent in the 20-99 has. category;

 127

6 p e r cent in the 5-19 bracket; and 92.1 p er cent in the

below 5 h e c t a r e s and those o w n i n g none. The a r e a owned

is not n e c e s s a r y (although T a ble 3«1 gives this information

for 50 h e c t a r e s and above) since we are m o r e i n t e rested

in the area category.

3. Occupation. Table 3*5 shows the occupational

picture in 1962 by major o c c u p a t i o n group. Note should

be made that the h igh status o c c u pations (professional,

p r oprietors, managers, etc.) include ’salaried and wage

w o r k e r s 1. C e n s u s dat a show that out of the 7*4 per cent

in these two categories, nearly 3 per cent wer e ’wage

7p
and salary w o r k e r s ’. (See T a b l e 3»5) T hey also

include small p r o p r i e t o r s and l o w - i n c o m e professionals.

4, Educational Level. In i 9 6 0 , only 1.87 per cent

of the p o p u l a t i o n were college g r a d u a t e s while 2,43

per cent had at least one y e a r of college education.

The figures for ’H i g h S c h o o l ’ and ’E l e m e n t a r y ’ are

totals for the d i f f e r e n t years. O v e r twenty-nine p e r cent

d i d not attend school, (See T a b l e 3*6).

72
Bureau of Census and Statistics, Philippine
Statistical Survey of Households, Bulletin no.11,
’Labor F o r c e ’, April, 1 9 6 2 , Table 14, p.22.
 128

TABLE 3.5
EMPLOYED PERSONS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, APRIL,
1962
Total (thousands) 9?680
Per cent 100.0
Professional, technical and related workers 2. 9 $
Proprietors, managers, administrators and officials 3*5^
Clerical, office and related workers 2,8$
Salesmen and related workers 6.1
Farmers, farm laborers, fishermen and related workers 6l.0^o
Workers in mine, quarry and related occupations 0*3^
Workers in operating transport occupations 2.1$>
Craftsmen, factory operatives and workers in related
occupations 12.4
Manual workers and laborers, n.e.c. 1.7$
Service and related workers 7»1^
Occupation not reported 0.1^

Source: Philippine Statistical Survey of H o useholds,

Bulletin n o . 11, ’Labor F o r c e 1, Bureau of the
Census and Statistics, April, 1 9 6 2 , Table l4,
p. 22.

TABLE 3,6

HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED BY PERSONS 6 YEARS OLD AND

OVER, i960

PER CENT

Total Population, I960 . • • 27,087,685

Total, 6 years old and
over •• • 21,557,572 100.00
No grade completed 29.20
Elementary (total: years 1 to 7 ) 55.50
High School(t o t a l : years 1 to 4) 11.00
College (total: years 1 to 3) 2.43
College graduate 1.87

Source: i 9 6 0 Census of the Philippine s , 1Populati

and H o u s i n g 1, v o l .II, Table l4, Page 13.
 129

5- General L e v e l s of L i v i n g , The i 960 Survey of

73
Households of the B u r e a u of Census r e p o r t e d that of

the 4.8 (m) d w e lling units in the Philippines, only

585 j OOO or 12 per cent were made of d u r able materials

while the rest (88 per cent) w ere either made of nipa,

bamboo,etc. (58 per cent), or a m i x t u r e of these n o n ­

durable m a t e r i a l s w i t h wood, G.I. roofing, etc. (30

per cent). O n l y 15*4 p e r cent used e l e c t ricity for

lighting w h i l e the rest use d k e r o s e n e lamps, candles,

wax, c o conut oil, etc. E i g h t y per cent d e p e n d e d on

open wells, forced pumps, a r t e s i a n wells, r a i n water,

spring, lakes and rivers for w a t e r supply. O n l y 7*6

per cent h a d flush toilets w h i l e the rest (92.4 per cent)

used open pits, antipolo system, c o m munal toilets or

had none at all (45 per cent had no toilets). For

cooking, 92.8 per cent used wood in what are often the

p r e - S p a n i s h kalans (earthen stoves) while only 1.3

per cent used electricity. Only 11 per cent h ad radios

while 89 p e r cent had none.

F r o m the data above, an estimate of the va r i o u s

social class categories may n o w be made. (See Table 3*7)*

73
Summary of Census of Population, vol.II. (See
Part II — ’H o u s i n g 1).
 130

TABLE 3.7

PHILIPPINE SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION: AN ESTIMATE

ESTIMATED
ANNUAL INCOME PER CENT

UPPER CLASS: Landowners with

more than 100 hectares; big
businessmen; highly successful
professionals; top government
officials, ^ 1 5 , 0 0 0 and 0.5
over
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS: Landowners
with 20-100 hectares; established
professionals; most businessmen;
executives and officials in
large businesses or government, ^5>000-^14,999 3.5

LOWER MIDDLE CLASS: Small

1and 0wne r s with t enan t s
(5 - 1 9 hectares); skilled arid
white-collar workers; owners
of small retail business; most
teachers; minor government

00
officials. ^2,500-^4,999

•
O
LOWER CLASS: Tenant farmers,
landless farm laborers,
unskilled and semi-skilled
workers; most of the handicapped;
household servants; most
government clerks; some teachers;
peddlers; most sari-sari store
owners; owners of small farms
without tenants (Below 5 hectares);
most office workers, ^2,499 and 88.0
bei ow
 131

It is to be noted that the data on income

d i s t r i b u t i o n have no d e t a i l e d f i g u r e s on income class

above ^10,000. The 0.3 per cent estimate for the

’^ 13,000 and o v e r 1 category is, therefore, the w r i t e r ’s

estimate. However, it may even be a ge n e r o u s estimate

since the U.N, figures in 1948 for the ^14,000+ show

that there were only 2,000 r e c i p i e n t s for the whole

74 .
country. Also C a r r o l l ’s estimate in 1962 for the

same c a t e g o r y was only 0.1 per cent. 73 As already stated,

the estimate given is a rough one a nd it is not intended

to convey a compr e h e n s i v e analysis since additional and

more d e t a i l e d data w o uld p r o b a b l y be n e e d e d for this

purpose. Nevertheless, since the m a i n aim was to make

an e ducated guess on the probable size of the p r i n c i p a l i a ,

it pe r h a p s serves the purpose. From the table, it can

be seen that the combi ned figure f o r the upper and upper

middle class is 4.0 per cent; giving an allowance of

1 per cent, the socio-economic dominants in the com m u n i t y

then w o u l d p r o b a b l y not exceed 3 p e r cent. In other

74
U n i t e d Nations, N a t ional Income and its D i s t r i b u t i o n ,
Technical A s s i s t a n c e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (New York: 1932).
73
Carroll, op, c i t ., p,113*
 132

words, leadership roles are reserved to about 50 in

every thousand,^

76
Compare with the estimate of Dr David Barrows,
General Superintendent of Education, in 1 9 0 2 : ’a
dozen, and generally less families who represent the
dominant elements’, in a town of ten or twelve
thousand, (1903 0 ensus, vol.I, op, clt., p,510).
 133

CHAPTER IV

1
THE MODERN PRINCIPALIA II: THE POLITICAL ELITE

In the preceding chapter, the study has discussed

how the principalia-non-principalia character of the

Philippine class system has been preserved and how

principalia leadership roles in the economic and social

spheres have survived. The question that must now be

explored is whether the principalia character of political

leadership has likewise been retained.

The present chapter presents data and analysis which

bear on the proposition that the colonial pattern of

leadership previously described has not undergone any

major change; that the new principalia class — the

social and economic dominants in the community whose

historical beginnings and later development, status, and

functions have been discussed in the two preceding

chapters — continue to remain politically dominant,

1
The study has adopted Lasswell* s definition of ‘political
elite1 as comprising ’the power holders of a body politic'
and include ’the leadership and the social formations from
which leaders typically come....' V i d e , Harold D. Lasswell
et a l ., The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1952) , p.13*
 134

c on tr i b u t i n g a ma jo ri t y of the formal p o w e r - w i e l d e r s ,

albeit under somewhat different ci rc ums ta nce s brought

about by po litical in de pendence and other ’modern*

influenc e s .

In this chapter, we shall examine the biogr ap hie s

of public leaders in the Philippines, concen tr ati ng on

those wh o have held top public p o si t i o ns from 1 9 4 6 , the

year the Ph ilippines became po li ti c a l ly independent, to

1963« The inv est ig ati on focuses on their career patterns,

their socio-economic status and background, and their

ties w ith the social structure. The objective is to

det ermine w h e t h e r there are p a tte rn s or trends in the

chara ct er ist ic s of the men who occupied and are

occupying top public office d u r i n g 17 years of p o s t ­

colonial status. How wide, or narrow, is the social

area of re cru itment? How long do they stay in power?

Ho w re p re se n ta ti v e are they of the community? What are

their occupations, ed uc ational level, income, etc,?

What are th eir economic interests and as so cia ti ona l

memberships? F r o m what re g i o ns do the top me n come from?

The gr oup includes all the Presidents, Vice-

Pr esi dents and Ca binet me mb ers (Secretaries of Exec ut ive

Dep ar tm en t s listed in the Of ficial Directories) from

 135

2
1 9 4 6 - 6 3 ; all the Senators from 1947-63; all m e m b e r s of

the H o use of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from 1946-63; and all the

Justices of the Supreme Court from 1946-63* All in all,

b i o g r a p h i c a l data bearing on the above questions were

3
g a t h e r e d on six Presidents, two Vice-Presidents, 59

C a b inet members, 55 Senators, 299 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and

25 J u s t i c e s of the Supreme Court, or a total of 446.^

2
Adequate d ata on 1946 Senators are not available.
3
T h ere were a c t u a l l y five V i c e - P r e s i d e n t s but three of
them b e came Presidents; O s m e n a h ad no Vice-President.
4
M a j o r sources are: (l) Official Directories, House of
Represe n t a t i v e s , 1946-63» and Senate O f f icial D i r e ctories
1 9 4 9 - 6 3 , h e r e i n a f t e r called as H.O.D. and S.O.D.,
respectively; (2 ) P h i l i p p i n e s ¥110*5 W h o , by D.H. Soriano
and I s idro L. R e t i z o s ( Q u e z o n City: Capitol P u b l ishing
House, Inc., 1957); (3) 'Builders* and ' B i o g r a p h i e s ’,
E n c y c l o p e d i a of the P h i l i p p i n e s , Zoilo M. G a l a n g (ed.)
(Manila: E x e q u i e l Floro, 1950-58), 20 Vols; Vols.III, IV,
XVII, a n d XVIII; (4) W r i t e r ' s q u estionnaire survey and
interviews c o n d u c t e d during fieldwork, J a n u a r y - D e e e m b e r ,
1963; (5) 'They Who M a k e Our L a w s ’, 1964 W e e k l y Graphic
series; a n d (6) some raw d a t a from the 'Survey of
B a c k g r o u n d s of Senators and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ’, conducted
by the G r a d u a t e School of P u blic Administration, Uni v e r s i t y
of the P h i l i p p i n e s in 1 9 6 3 u n d e r Prof. Jose V. Abueva.
Grateful acknowledgment is mad e to Prof. A b u e v a for m a k i n g
the same a v a i lable to the writer.
For c o m p a r a t i v e purposes, separate data on c e r t a i n
indicators was also g a t h e r e d on the 1957 P h i l i p p i n e s Who's
Who elite a f t e r removing all those who have been included
in our p o l i t i c a l elite and foreigners, l e a v i n g a list of
212 individuals. Those i n c luded in W h o 's Who according
to the compilers, are the ’n o t able living F i l i p i n o s and
residents of the P h i l ippines who are s u c c e ssfully
e s t a b lished in their various p r o f e s s i o n and c a l l i n g s ’.
(op. c i t . , p.iii). The a im is to provide a cross-reference
that can shed light on c e r t a i n cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of the
political elite and other elites.
 136

The period covers the administrations of five

5
Presidents as follows:

Roxas Administration 1946-48

Qu i r i n o " 1948-53
Magsaysay " 1953-57
G a r e ia " 1957-61 6
Macapagal 1961-63...

Also, d u r i n g this p e r i o d eight elections were held:

four n a t i o n a l and four local 7 This peri o d covered, then,

makes it p o s s i b l e for us to d i s c e r n w h e t h e r n e w types of

leaders, in p o int of social class characteristics, have

appeared or a r e appearing.

A. C A R E E R P A T T E R N A ND R E C R U I T M E N T

AGE

T he first clue to the ’c o n t i n u i t y 1 of political

l e a d e r s h i p in the P h i l i p p i n e s is the age d i s t r i b u t i o n of

5
President Osmena, who served up to April 1946, was
included among the Presidents.
6
Still in power in 1 9 6 5 .
7
The national elections were held in 1946, 1949» 1953»
and 1 9 6 1 ; the local in 1947» 1 9 5 1 » 1 9 5 5 » 1 9 5 9 » and
1963 * The President, Vice-President, one-third of the
Senators (eight) and all Representatives (l04 in 1 9 6 3 )
are elected during national elections; Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors, members of the Provincial
Board, City and town Mayors, Vice-Mayors and Councilors,
and eight Senators are elected during local elections.
 137

the power group# Almost all of them were born between

the last two decades of Spanish rule and the first three

decades of American rule (See Table 4 .l).

TABLE 4.1

YEAR OF BIRTH OF POLITICAL ELITE*

YEAR OF PRESIDENTS,
BIRTH VICE-
PRESIDENTS, JUSTICES,
CABINET REPRESENT- SUPREME
MEMBERS SENATORS ATIVES COURT TOTAL
(1946-63) (1947-63) (1946-63) (1946-63)
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
Before 1880 1.8 1.9 0.3 0.0 0.7
1880-90 17.5 20.4 2.3 26,1 7- 8
1891-1900 38.6 18.5 17.7 52.2 22.4
1901-05 14.0 16.7 19.1 17.4 18.0
1906-10 17.5 13.0 23.4 4.3 20.3
1911-15 7.0 14.8 21.8 0.0 17*8
1916-20 1.8 7*4 9.7 0.0 7.8
1921-25 1.8 7.4 4.4 0.0 4.2
1926-30 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0. 2
1931-35 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99-9
(N=5 7 ) (n =5 4 ) (n =299) (N=2 3 ) (N=433)

■¥r
The table comprises 97 per cent of total political
elite. Percentages do not all add to 1001 due to
rounding.
 The oldest among them are one President, born in

I8 7 8 , who uninterruptedly occupied top public office

from I9 O 7 to 19^6; a Senator,^ born in 187^-j who was in

the Senate from 1922 to 1953; a Representative,"^ born

in 1879? who has be e n a member of the Legislature since

1928 and who, at the age of 86, was still occupying his

seat in Congress in 1 9 6 5 * The youngest are three

Representatives^"^ all born before 1935» and are grandsons

or great grandsons of top public officials.

From the above table, we note, too, that 8 9 *^ per cent

of the Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Cabinet members,

70.5 per cent of the Senators, 6 2.8 per cent of the

Representatives and all of the Justices were born in the

last two decades of Spanish rule or the first decade of

American rule. Many in this group had still some Spanish

education,at least in their early schooling. Looking at

the total political elite, however, we find that the

8
President Osmena was appointed Governor of Cebu in 1904.
He occupied that position until 1907 when he was elected
to the First National Assembly.
9
Senator Emiliano Tria Tirona.
10
Rep. Maximino Noel of Cebu, H.O.D. 1 9 6 2 - 6 5 5 p.87*
11
The three are Rep. Jose Cojuangco, Jr (Tarlac), born
in 193^+ and elected in I 9 6 I; Rep. Cipriano Primicias, Jr
(Pangasinan) , born in 1931 and. elected in 1957 5 and Rep.
Jose Macario Laurel IV (Batangas), born in 1932 and
elected in 1 9 5 7 *
 139

majority (86.3 per cent) were born b e t w e e n 1891 and

1920. We shall d i s c u s s l a ter how the above facts also

serve as an i m p o r t a n t clue to the s o c i o - economic status

of the p o l i t i c a l elite w h e n their educational b a c k g r o u n d

is examined.

YEA R OF E N T R Y TO T O P PUBLIC POSITIONS

lT o p public p o s i t i o n s ’ refer to any of the posts

which are considered, for purposes of analysis, of elite

category, i.e., President, Vice-President, Senator,

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e and J u s t i c e of the Supreme Court. Table

4.2 shows the y e a r of entry to these top public positions.

We n o t i c e in Table 4.2 the c o n t inuity in political

leadership: 33*4 p er cent of the Presidents, Vice-

P r e s i d e n t s and C a b i n e t members, and 43*6 per cent of

the J u s t i c e s had r e a c h e d top public p o s i t i o n s on or

before 194l, i.e., d u r i n g the time when the P h i l i p p i n e s

was still u n d e r A m e r i c a n rule. It should be p o i n t e d

out that all these p r e - w a r leaders, some of w h o m had

reached the top as early as 1907 and stayed there all

these decades, were, d u r i n g the p e riod covered by this

study (1 9 4 6 - 6 3 )} the m o s t senior m e m b e r s of the p o w e r

group. Furt h e r m o r e , m a n y of those who have reached the

top of the pol i t i c a l p y r a m i d from 1946 onwards had h e l d

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i m p o rtant p o s i t i o n s such as Provincial Governors, City
«

Mayors, executive positions in the na t i o n a l government,

Jus t i c e s of the Court of Appeals or Court of First

Instance Judges, etc*, duri n g the A m e r i c a n colonial

adminis t r a t i o n . They, therefore, belong to the same

category as those who have reached the top before 1946.

The above d a t a support the p r o p o s i t i o n that there

had b e e n no major change, not only in the type of leaders,

but also, in m a n y cases, even in individual leaders. The

top p o l i t i c a l leaders who d o m i n a t e d p r e - W o r l d War II

po l i t i c s w h o were still alive w e r e the men w ho led the

n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t republic. T h o s e w ho died had their

sons, relatives, or colleagues who carried on. The

12
leaders of the government and the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a rty

in 1945-46 were the same 1old guard* who had been in

power since the e a rly decades of A m e r i c a n rule. Eve n

the f a c t i o n of the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y (the L i b e r a l Wing)

which is n o w the Liberal P a r t y was led by m e m b e r s of

these *old guard* who d e f ected to for m a 'new* party.

But there was no n e w type of l e a d e r s h i p that successfully

emerged.

12
F r o m 1907 up to the factional split in 1946, the
N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y of Osmena and Q u e z o n was the Party in
Philippine politics. This will be dis c u s s e d further in
Chapter V.
 142

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PUBLIC POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO FIRST ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT
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PRE-ELITE POSITIONS

The public positions held by the top power group

prior to their first election or appointment to elite
posts give further evidence to support the basic

proposition on the continuity of political leadership in

the Philippines. They also indicate the pattern in which

particular officials are recruited (See Table 4*3)» It
can be seen from the table that the succession process

follows a more or less hierarchical pattern. Presidents

come from the Vice-Presidency, Senate, or the Cabinet;
Vice-Presidents are recruited from the Senate and the
House; Cabinet members from Congress, the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the ’Bureaucracy*; Senators from
the House of Representatives, Cabinet and the Judiciary,
etc. This is, however, a collective picture and an
examination of individual cases of those who reached
the very top shows that they started at a relatively
higher level than the rest.
Since the Representatives are the most ’junior’
members of the political elite, their pre-elite positions
deserve a closer examination in order to discover one
of the major sources of recruitment of power-wielders.
Table 4.3-A shows the public positions held by the members

of the House of Representatives in our group prior to

their first election to Congress.

 144

TABLE 4.3-A

PUBLIC POSITIONS HELD BY REPRESENTATIVES, ^

(1946-1963), PRIOR TO FIRST ELECTION TO CONGRESS

Provincial Offices - 8 3 (28•6$) Bureaucracy (National)***

4 0 ( n . 5*)
Governor 24 (No.) Executive Positions
Vic e-Gov 4 (Govt. Office, Board,
P r o v ’1 Board 23 Corporation or Agency) 29
’Public Defender' 7 'Technical Assistants
Prov'l Fiscal 6 or Advisers' of top
Asst. Fiscal 4 public officials 11
C, Prov'l Hospital 3
Prov'l Treasurer 3 Municipal and City Officials
Prov'l Engineer 3 -35(11.8$)
Prov'l Educ. 0** 3
Secretary, P r o v ’l Mayor 15
Board 2 Councilor 11
Judge, Court of Justice of the Peace 9
First Instance 2
None or unspecified^^**
1-34(45.11o)

TOTAL 294(100.0$)

The table comprises 98*3 per cent of Representatives

during the period indicated.
-X-
Superintendent of Schools, School Supervisor.
■x- -X- .
Same explanation as in Table 4.3»
****
See explanation below.

The table reveals the same 'chain of command'

pattern manifested in Table 4.3? with the provincial

and municipal officials supplying 120 out of the l 60

Representatives who have held public office prior to their

first election to Congress, and the 'bureaucracy’

supplying the rest. The appointments in what have been

 145

categorized as the ’bu r e a u c r a c y ’ were, and still are,

under the control and allocation of the principalia

faction in power. It is a generally accepted fact in

the Philippines that these are the political ’p l u m s ’

distributed by national leaders to their relatives,

13
favorites and loyal provincial leaders. This makes

it quite difficult for ’n e w ’ men outside principalia

circles (and areas of influence) to emerge from this

group. Even the lowest ranked in the elected hierarchy --

the local officials — are drawn mostly from the members

of the local princ i p a l i a . Survey findings of the

Institute of Public Administration, University of the

Philippines, confirm this observation:

The mayor like the provincial governor, is

generally from the dominant economic or
social group in his co m m u n i t y . ..The mayors
interviewed by the survey group had
generally achieved their office by long
years of service to the party or by
demonstrating leadership in some other
phase of community life...The political
apprenticeship of the mayors was generally
_

This practice, borrowed from the American patronage and

spoils system and complicated by the Philippine kinship
system, has already been formalized in the so-called
’50-50 A g r e e m e n t ’ between the Executive Department and
the House of Representatives in 1959» This was an
agreement which ’envisaged the division of new positions
[in the government] between members of the Lower House
and M a l a c a n a n g ’ (See Gregorio A. Francisco and Raul P.
de Guzman, ’The 50-50 A g r e e m e n t ’ in Patterns in D e c i s i o n -
M a k i n g , Raul P. de Guzman (ed.) (Manila: University of
the Philippines, 1963>) p •117 ) •
 146

confined to party activities. Several of

them had served on council or in some other
municipal capacity before assuming their
present office, ^

The Governors generally come from lower local officials,

although there seems to be a two-way movement, from

Governor to Representative and vice versa.

In the sample covered by the Institute survey,

all of the governors had served in government
before their election. About half of the
governors, in addition to serving as municipal
councilors, had been congressmen from their
districts. Others had served as elected
members of the provincial board, a congressman,
and a provincial board member before his
election. Only one of the men interviewed
had not held an elective position, previous
to assuming the governorship. Prior to his
first term, however, he had been a municipal
judge for several years.15

There is of course a historical explanation for this

As pointed out in Chapter II, the trend established by

the Spaniards in setting up the principalia class as a

privileged group and as source of gobernadorcillos and

other local administrators was continued by the Americans

They, like the Spaniards, also selected men from the

principalia class in the appointments to public office.

In the elections that they introduced, they favored the

14
John H. Romani and M. Ladd Thomas, A Survey of Local
Governments in the Philippines (Manila: IPA, UP, 195
p. 22.
15
I_bid. , p •45«
 147

p r o p e r t i e d class by in tr od uc in g pro pe rty and literacy

q ua li fi c a t i o n s to the franchise. This resulted, of

course, in the l e g i t i m i z a t i o n and f u r th e r entrenchment

in p o w e r of the p r i n c i p a l i a as a class. Thus, ’p o li t i c al

d e m o c r a c y 1 in the P h i l i p p i n e s was fo unded and based, from

the beginning, on p r i n c i p a l i a superiority and dominance.

The p r o p e r t y q u a l i f i c a t i o n was r e mo ve d in 1916 (only the

l i t e r a c y q u a l i f i c a t i o n remains) but the pattern has

al r e a d y been set and it continues to this day.

There are three other features in the recruitment

and car e er pattern of the poli ti cal elite which should be

po in te d out.

The first is that those elected or appointed d i r e c t l y

to top elite p o s i t i o n s outside the immediate and f o r m al

gover nm ent h i e r a r c h y tend to come from the top or n e a r

the top of the so c i o- ec on o m i c pyramid. These appear in

Tables 4.3 and 4 .3 -A u n d e r the ’none or un sp ecified

c a t e g o r i e s ’. Of the five in the Cabinet under this

category, for example, two are m i ll i o n a i r e - b u s i n e s s m e n

(j. E l i z a l d e and B. Vale ncia), one is a top medical

pr a ct i t i o n e r ^ ^ (Paulino Garcia), one is a son-in-law of

a Pre sident (E. Valencia), and the last is a dau gh ter of

l6
W h o ’s W h o , op. c i t , , p.110
 148

a w e a l t h y bu si n es sm a n- la nd o w n er , who was h i ms el f a

Senator (Madrigal)* The same is true of the eight

17
Senators and the 134 Re pr ese ntatives. Th e y are m o s t l y

top la wy er s or other professionals, b u si n e s s m e n or big

la nd ow n e rs (or a c o m b i n a t i o n of these three). As a

fur ther i l l u s t r a t i o n of this point, of the 134

Representatives who did not hold public office prior to

their first el ec ti o n to Congress, 63 or ne a rl y half

were a c t i v e l y engaged in the practice of l a w (some as

as so cia te s of w e l l - k n o w n practitioners, Senators and

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) ; 36 or over one-fourth were m a nag in g

their lands, w ere in b u s i n e s s or were bus in ess executives;

21 were t ea c h i n g law, medicine, engineering, and other

courses, in va rious u n iv er s i t ie s (in ad d it i o n to the

active p ra c t i c e of their re sp ec t iv e professions). Four

of the eight ph y s ic ia n s p r ac t i c i n g their pr o fe s s i on had

their own (or their f a m i l i e s 1) hospitals and clinics.

The se cond f e a t u r e ,r e l at e d to the first, is the

not i ce a bl e increase in the nu mb e r of R e p r e s e nt a t i ve s who

did not hold public p os i t i o n s prior to their entry to

elite p os t s but fol low ed the direct route. Co mp ar i n g

17
Am o n g the Se nators are: A. Mabanag, G. Puyat, M.K.
Katigbak, E.T. Tirona, F. Rodrigo, G. Antonino, Some
of the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s are C.M. Fortich, M. Cuenco,
J. Laurel, Jr., G. Roxas, D. Romualdez, F. Lecaroz,
T. Durnon, T. Du pa y a and J. Duran.
 149

the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i t h the other officials in this

reg a rd (see ’none or unspecified* category in Tables

4.3 and 4 , 3 - A ) , we find the fo ll owing p er cen ta ges of

those who went d i re c tl y to elite posts. Cabinet me mbers —

10*2 per cent; Se na to r s — 17*3 pe^ cent; R e p r es e n t at i v e s —

45*1 per cent. (There were no direct entrants to the

Presidency or the V ic e- Pr es id en cy .) To what can we

at t ri b ut e this s u d de n rise in the n u m b e r of R e pr e s e n t a t i v e s

(1 3 4 ) g o i n g di re ct l y to elite posts?

It is sugg est ed that this is an i nd ica ti on of the

difference in the ca ree r and recruitment pattern of

the po litical elite d u r i n g colonial and post-colonial

periods. U nd e r the Americans, the typical career p a t t e r n

of the political elite was to start f r o m below, ’clerking*

in n a t i o n a l go ver n me nt offices or as a municipal councilor.

It must be no ted that these were alr ea dy ’high s t a t u s ’

po s it io ns then and were ge nerally re s er v e d to the few in

the h i g h e r - e d u c a t e d segment of the population. Thus,

even m e m b e r s of the u pp e r principalia entered these

posts. (This explains the ’l o w l y - o r i g i n ’ myth among

some m e m b e r s of the p o l i t i c a l elite.) With the advent

of i n d e pe n de nc e and w ith the increasing numbe r of the

educ at ed group, the elite tend to start higher in their

p o l i ti c a l careers. The evidence for this can be found

 150

FIGURE I
THE POLITICAL ELITEi
PATTERN OF RECRUITMENT

VICE-PRESIDENT
SENATOR 1« SONS, OTHER
CABINET MEMBER RELATIVES OF POLI­
SUPREME COURT TICAL ELITE.
JUSTICE 2. TOP PROFESSIONALS
2« BIG BUSINESSMEN

REPRESENTATIVE 4. LARGE LANDOWNERS

MBUREAU CRACY"
COURT OF APPEALS

PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS
"BUREAUCRACY" LOWER PRINCIPAL!At
MUNICIPAL AND CITY (LOCAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
OFFICIALS DOMINANTS)

7
Non-Principalia Recruits

1. Higher Education plus

Political Patronage
2. Economic "Suocess*!
Business, Profession, eto.

LEGENDS
■ Major source
• Minor source
 151

in Table 4.2 (Year of Entry), F ro m this table, it is

shown that of all the pol itical elite, the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

have the most nu mb er who ent er ed elite posts ’l a t e 1,

i.e., 87.6 p e r cent of t h e m entered top public posts

after i nd e p e n d e n c e in 1946, It is also this group, as

indicated above, which p r od u c e d 45*1 per cent of direct

entrants to top public positions. Fi gure I diagrams the

general p a t t e r n of r ec ru it me nt of the political elite.

The last feature that must be po in ted out from

Tables 4.3 and 4.3-A is that there is no ' o ne - b r a n c h 1

career am ong the top p ow e r group. There is a p re val en ce

of m o v i n g f r o m one g ov er nm en ta l br anch to another, e.g.,

Jus tices of the Supreme Court may come f r o m the L e g i s l a t i v e

or Ex e c u t i v e branch as well as from the Judicial branch;

members of the Ju dic ia r y do become po li t i ci a n s and

po liti cians join the Judiciary, etc. No 'separation of

powers' in career d e v el o p me n t seems to restrict the p o w e r

group in this respect.

AGE AT EN TRY TO EL ITE P O SI TI ON S

Members of the p o l i t i c a l elite entered top public

pos itions at a re la t ie ly y o u n g age. Two out of every

three ( 67*7 per cent) r e a ch e d top public office before

the age of 45 (See Table 4,4).

 152
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 153

Four of the six Presidents (66.7 per cent), one

Cabinet member and nine Senators (l6.7 per cent) reached

top public positions before the age of 30! It must be

emphasized that what are being considered in Table 4.4 are

top public positions and not the initial or even pre­

elite positions. This consideration then should add

point to the relative youthfulness of the political

elite at the time they reached top power positions. The

immediate explanation of this is that many of them

started their public careers during American rule when

there was a scarcity of educated and qualified personnel

to fill those appointive positions in the bureaucracy

open to Filipinos. But the supply of this educated group

came mostly from the principalia class. As the

’Filipinization' of the bureaucracy progressed, i.e.

as more positions at the higher levels were opened to

Filipinos, many of the political elite attained higher

ranks rapidly. Many of them shifted to elective posts

while some of those occupying elective offices got high

executive appointments.

YEARS IN ELITE POSITIONS

We have seen that, in general, the elite group enters

top public positions at a relatively young age. How long

do they stay in power? Table 4*3 furnishes this

information
 154

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 155

The d a ta re f e r to the cumulative numbe r of y ea rs in

which members of the power group actually he l d any of

the top public p os i t i o n s ca te g o ri z e d above.

The data show that me mbers of the Philippine

po l it ic al elite r e m a i n in p ow er a long time, m u c h longer

than, say, members of the A m e r i c a n political elite which

18
r e m a i n at the top on the average of three years. Even

if the story is not yet complete, for many of the

p e r s o n s in the g rou p are still in power and it is not

k n o w n how l o n g they will stay there, yet the data

alre ad y show that 32*7 per cent of the Presidents, Vice-

Presidents, and C ab in e t members, 52*7 per cent of the

Senators, 27*5 per cent of the Representatives, and

36.4 per cent of the Justices h av e been in top po si t i on s
for eleve n y ea r s or more.

While Ta b l e 4*5 gives only the actual n u m b er of

ye a r s they have h e l d top public positions, some of them

have be en in p u b l i c office all their adult lives. One

Se na to r ha d b e e n in the government service from I 9O I -63

and had be en d u b b e d the ’p o lit ic al colossus of N o r t h e r n

18
C. Wright Mills, ’The A m e r i c a n Political Elite:
A Co ll e ct i ve P o r t r a i t ’, Power, Pol it ics and P e o p l e ,
edited by I.L. H or o w i t z (New York: Ox ford U n i v e r s i t y
Press, 1963); p.206.
 156

19
Luzon*; he was 79 when he left the Senate, Two

Senators started their public careers in 1909? one

ending in 1 9 5 7 ? w h i l e the other died in office as

20
Senator at the age of 82, Still another Senator died

in office at the age of 7 6 after h a v i n g been in public

21
office for 51 years. M e n t i o n has been made of a

President who occupied public office u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y from

1904 to 1946, and a R e p r e s e n t a t i v e who occupied his seat

since 1928 and at the age of 86 was still there in 1 9 6 5 *

The above facts clearly illustrate the stability

of the political elite. There is an important consequence

of this long stay in power: fewer individuals will occupy

a given post d u r i n g a c e r tain peri o d of time. This is

clearly r e f l e c t e d a m o n g the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in the group.

T a ble 4,6 gives the number of p o s i t i o n s to be f i l l e d

d u r i n g given e l e ction years and the n u m b e r of n ew m e m b e r s

elected.

The figures in Table 4,6 are revealing in the sense

that fewer and fewer personnel are being added every

Congressional el e c t i o n year. F r o m 6 9 per cent in 1949?

19
S •0,D , , 1954-57? P.67; 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 , P.55.
20
S.O.D., 1960-61, p.10,
21
Senator M,J, Cuenco; V i d e , S,0,D, I 9 6 O - 6 I, p p # 3 3 - 34.
 157

TABLE 4.6

NUMBER OF SEATS AND NUMBER OF NEW MEMBERS IN THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES DURING GIVEN ELECTION YEARS

EL E C T I O N YEAR N U M B E R OF N U M B E R OF PER C E N T
SEATS N E W ME M B E R S

1946 97 97* 100*

1949 100 69 69
1953 102 57 56
1957 104 46 44
1961 104 30 29

T O TAL 507 299 5 8 .9

Fo r purposes of this table, the 97 R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

elected in 1946 have b e e n c o n s i d e r e d as ’new'
although quite a n u m b e r were pre-war R e p r e s entatives.

the proportion had dropped to 29 per cent in 1961. This

illustrates, too, the limited character of the personal

circulation of the power group.

B. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND BACKGROUND

Thus far evidence has been presented to show the

continuity in political leadership in the Philippines

from colonial to post-colonial periods. The next step

is to delve deeper into the socio-econoaiic status and

background of the power-wielde r s. We shall try to do

this by examining some of the standard indicators of

social class status as applied to this group.

 158

EDUCATION

The fact that the vast majority of the Philippine

political elite comes from families which could give

them distinct advantages is shown by the superior

educational level they have attained* The power-group

are almost exclusively drawn from a small college-educated

minority of the population. Data from Table 4.7 show

that 98.7 P er cent of top Executive officials, 9 8 per cent

of Senators, 92*3 per cent of Representatives, and 100

per cent of the Justices are college graduates.

Furthermore, with the exception of the Representatives,

the remainder who did not have a college degree have at

least spent a year in college. Only 12, or 4 per cent

of the Representatives did not have college education.

Putting it more explicitly, over 97 per cent of the total

political elite (427 out of 439 in the group in Table

4.7) comes from a very small college-educated group in

the population which, in 1948, comprised only 2.7 per cent

22
of the total population 25 years of age and over.

22
This may, in fact, be a generous comparison for if we
recall from Table 4.1 (Year of Birth), the vast majority
in the group (87*0 per cent) were born before 1915 and
therefore had finished their education before 1940.
This means that a more appropriate year of comparison
would be 1939 when the college-educated group is even
very much lower. The 1939 Census figures, however, did
not have detailed data to enable us to have the desired
comparison.
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 160

TABLE 4.8

COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED BY TOP PUBLIC OFFICIALS,

1946-1903*

PRESIDENTS,
COLLEGES OR VICE-PRESIDEN T S , JUSTICES,
UNIVERSITIES CABINET MEMBER^ SENATORS REPRESENTATIVES SUPREME COURT TOTAL
(1946-63) (T947-03) (1946-63) (1946-63)
PRIVATE (RELIGIOUS) 33(30.8%) 101128^6%! 17(38.6%) 186(31.4%)
Univ. of Sto. Tomas 13 17 53 9 92(,15-5%)
Ateneo de Manila 13 11 26 5 55(, 9.3%)
Letran 5 3 1 1 10(. 1-7%
San Carlos University - 1 5 1 7( 1.2%)
Four others (Catholic)** 1 4 1 6( 1.0%)
Silliman (Protestant) 2 2 12 - 16<! 2.7%)

hr*
cr
|0C
l>-

k
PRIVATE (NON-SECTARIAN) 16(1 5 .0%) 16(18.2%) 156(26.4%)

|H
6(13.7%)
Philippine Law School 7 9 41 3 601!io.i%)
University of Manila 2 1 27 - 30! 5.1%)
National University 1 1 11 - 131 2.2%)
Far Eastern University 2 2 9 - 131 2.2%)
Jose Rizal College 3 - 4 3 10| 1.7%)
19 Others 1 3 26 - 301[ 5.1%)
PUBLIC 34(31.8%) 21(23.9%) 98(27.8%) 13(29.6%)
University of the
Philippines 27 19 94 12 1521[25.7%)
Three Others*** 7 2 4 1 l4i( 2.4%)
ABROAD 24(22.4$) 16(18.2%) 36(10.2%) 8(18.2%)
United States: 2 2 (2 0 .5$) 13(14.8%) 34( 9-6%) 5(11.4%) 741(12.5%)
Harvard 3 2 7 - 121( 2.0%)
Yale 1 2 1 2 61 1.0%)
Others 18 9 26 3 561( 9-5%)
Europe and Others**** 2( 1.9%) 3( 3.4%) 2 ( 0 .6%) 3( 6 .8%) io( 1.7%)

TOTAL NUMBER OF
ATTENDANCES: 107(1 0 0 .0%) 88(100.1%) 353(100.0%) 44(100.1%) 592(1 0 0 .1%)

NUMBER OF TOP PUBLIC

OFFICIALS 52 53 244 20 369
AVE. NO. OF ATTENDANCES: 2 .0 b 1.66
1.37 2.2 1.6
Total of percentages do not all add to 100 due to rounding.

The table comprises 82.7% of all top public officials in the above categories during the periods
indicated. 369 top public officials (out of 446) had 592 attendances in the colleges and
universities mentioned above.
San Beda College, De La Salle, Unlv. of San Agustin, St Scholastica, and Colegio de San Jose (Cebu).
Philippine Normal School, Phil. School of Commerce, Phil. Constabulary Academy.
Spain, France, England; 'Others' refer to Japan (l Senator).
 l6l

These facts become even more striking when we bear

in mind that over one-half of the general population

25 years and over (or 55*5 per cent) did not have any

schooling in 1948. One need hardly emphasize, too,

that higher education in the Philippines as elsewhere

has, in general and since colonial times, been closely

associated with those possessing economic means, for even

the so-called ’diploma mi l l s 1, which are run by profit-

motivated educational-entrepreneurs are expensive enough

to be beyond the means of the average Filipino, However,

the political elite did not just go to any college or

University, The data show that the private (and

expensive) ’prestige' schools run by foreign religious

orders are the largest source of the political elite,

claiming 31*^ per cent of the group while another 26.4

per cent attended other private schools. Moreover,

14.2 per cent of the elite studied abroad, with the U.S.

claiming 88 per cent of all those who had schooling in

foreign countries; 25»7 per cent went to the University

of the Philippines, the State University which was

established by the Americans during the early part of

their rule, presumably to counter-act the long established

influence of the Catholic religious schools (run mostly

 162

by Spanish friars)
\ on the principalia class. 23 During

the entire American administration, therefore, U.P. was

(and still is) one of the top prestige schools and it

was also one of the chief training centers of the

24
political elite, particularly in law.

Another fact that can be established from Table 4.8

is that on the average, the elite attended more than one

college or university. The data show that the 369 in the

group who have specified the colleges or university they

attended had a total of 392 ’attendances*, meaning that

most of them had attended more than one college or

university. The average number of attendances is 1,6

for the whole group; the Justices, have the highest with

an average of 2.2, followed by the Executive officials

23
Cf. Joseph R. Hayden, The Philippines, A Study in National
Development (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943 )>
pp.535-36.
24
The Americans were not, however, completely successful.
Although the public schools set up gained much prestige
initially and many sent their children to them, the elite,
particularly the upper principalia members, continued
sending their sons to Letran, San Beda, La Salle,
University of Sto. Tomas and other private religious
schools — the Philippines’ equivalent of England’s
’public schools’ -- for their eimentary, secondary and
arts education. They send them later to the University
of the Philippines, the ’Escuela de Derecho’, National Law
College (UM), etc., for their training in law in preparation
for a political career. The study’s data, however, show
only the schools attended for their college education.
 163

with an average of 2#06 ’attendances’# This is another

clear indication of the high socio-economic status of

the group# While 97*3 per cent of the population cannot
reach college, most of the political elite have attended
more than one college or university#
An interesting comparison at this stage may be made

in the college attendance among the political elite, the

25
1957 Who1s Who elite, and Carroll’s manufacturing elite#
(See Table 4,9)«

From the table we find a remarkable similarity in

the colleges attended by the three elite groups: 83*8
per cent of the political elite, 83*2 per cent of the
Who 1s Who elite, and 81,2 per cent of the business elite,

attended the same 9 colleges and universities in the

Philippines or have gone abroad. This becomes all the
more striking when the fact is considered that there
were in 1946, for example, 498 private colleges and 5
public schools offering collegiate courses#^
From the data, the trend in career differences is

also noted. More of the political elite went to U#P#,

_

See John J, Carroll, ’The Filipino Manufacturing

Entrepreneur: A Study of the Origins of Business Leadership
in a Developing Economy’, Ph.D, Thesis in Sociology,
Cornell University, 1962.
26
Handbook of Philippine Statistics, 1903-59* pp,22, 27*
 164

TABLE 4.9
COMPARATIVE DATA ON COLLEGE ATTENDANCE OF VARIOUS ELITES

COLLEGES OR POLITICAL W H O «S WHO CARROLL *S

UNIVERSITIES ELITE ELITE BUSINESS
ELITE*

PRIVATE (RELIGIOUS)
Univ, oT Sto Tomas 15.5 i 13.1 % 7.7 $
Ateneo de Manila 9.3 7.1 15. k
Letran, De La Salle,
San Beda 2.2 6.0 6.6

PRIVATE (NON-SECTARIAN)
Philippine Law and
Univ, of Manila 15.2 10.0 2.2
Jose Rizal College 1.7 1.7 7.7

PUBLIC
University of the
Philippines 25.7 24.5 20.8

ABROAD
U # vD # 3 etc» 14.2 20.8 20.8
Total 83.8$ 83.2$ 81.2$

OTHERS 1 6 .2$ 16.8$ 18.8$

Grand Total 100.0$ 100.0$ 100.0$

Number of Attendances: 592 298 91

Number of Elite : 369 212 66
Ave. No, of
Attendances : 1.6 1.4 1.4

John J. Carroll, op, cit. , Table 52, p.186

 165

P h i l i p p i n e L a w School and Un i v e rs i t y of Santo Tomas, where

they m o s t l y took up la w while more of the business elite

(7*7 pe r cent) went to Jose Rizal Co llege (which

sp e c i a l i z e s in Com mer ce and Business Administration), as

c o m p a r e d with the 1.7 per cent for both the political and

W h o ’s Who elites. D a t a on the number of attendances

in d i c a t e that on the average, the political elite have

more col le ge s ch oo lin g than the other elites w i t h an

av e rag e ’a t t e n d a n c e 1 of 1,6 as compared with 1.4 for the

other elites.

QCCUPATION

The Philippine poli ti ca l elite is extremely

unrepresentative of the citizenry in terms of occupation.

The B u r e a u of the Census, for instance, listed only 2.9

per cent of the e mp lo yed labor force as ’p r o f e s s i o n a l 1,

27
techn ica l and rel ate d workers in 1962~ w i t h the

’p r o f e s s i o n a l s ’ not e xc e e d i n g 1*5 per cent of the g a i n f u l l y

28
employed, yet 84 per cent of the p o lit ic al elite were

p r o f e s s i o n a l s and the rest were either landowners, business­

men, or b us ine ss executives (See Table 4.10). It can be

27
Ph i li p p i n e Statistical Survey of H o u s e h o l d s , B u l l e t in
n o . 11, ’La b o r F o r c e 1, April, 1 9 6 2 , Ta bl e l4, p.22,
28
C f . , for instance, 1962 Statistical H a n d b o o k, p.34.
 166

TABLE 4.10

LISTED MAIN PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION OF TOP EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS,

1946-1963*

PRESIDENTS,
VICE-PRESIDENTS,
OCCUPATION CABINET MEMBERS SENATORS REPRESENTATIVES TOTAL
(1946-63) TT947-63) ^1946 -63 )
N = 67 n =55 N =299 N=421
1. PROFESSIONAL ( 76. 2$) 46 (83.5$) 257 (86.0$) 354 (84.0%)
Lawyer
Physician
35
6
;52 .3*) 40 (72.7$) 207 (6 9 .3$) 282 (6 7 .0 $)
8 .9 1(1-8) 21 ( 7-0 j 28 C 6.6 )
Engineer** 3 b.5 — 10 j 3 .3 ) 13 ( 3-1 )
Army Officer 4 6.0 2 ( 3-6 )a 6 ( 2.0 )b 12 ( 2.8 )
Educat or*** 2 3.0 2(3-6) 5 ( 1 •7 )
Others**** 1 1.5 1 ( 1.8 ) 8 ( 2 .7 ) 10 ( 2.4 )
2. BUSINESSMAN
BUSINESS
EXECUTIVE 6 (10.9$) 15 ( 5.0$) 30 ( 7.1$)
3. FARMER-
LANDOWNER 6 ( 8.9%) 3 ( 5.5$) 27 ( 9.0$) 36 ( 8.5$)
4. UNSPECIFIED 1 ( 1.5#) — -- 1 ( 0.2$)
TOTAL: 67 (1 0 0 .0 $) 55 (99.9$) 299 (1 0 0 .0 $) 421 (99-9$)

(Percentage totals do not all add to 100 due to rounding.)

*
Many of the top public officials listed more than one occupation or profession but
for purposes of this table, the writer selected only one, with the profession having
the first priority. It should be noted, therefore, that the 'professions' are the
most accurately reflected while 'businessman' and 'farmer-landowner' are grossly
under-represented since many of the 'professionals' are businessmen or landowners
(or both) at the same time.
#*
Includes civil, mining, electrical and chemical engineers.
Includes owner-operator of an educational institution, teaching in a college or
University, teacher, etc.
****
Three dentists; two accountants, three newspapermen, one architect, one social
workerj and one leader of a 'religious organization' (also a landowner),
a
Two retired generals of the Armed Forces (graduates of Military Academy),
b
Four guerrilla officers, one reserve officer, and one pilot (graduate of Military
Academy).
 167

seen from the t a b l e t h a t there i s not a single one with

29
’low-status 1 occupation among them.

Among the p r o f e s s i o n a l s , the lawyers top the l i s t ,

67 per cent of the top executive and l e g i s l a t i v e o f f i c i a l s

are lawyers, (if we include the J u s t i c e s , who i n e v i t a b l y ,

are a l l lawyers, the figure becomes 73 per cent of a l l

the p o l i t i c a l elite). However, only a quarter of 1 per cent

30
of the g a i n f u l l y employed in the labor force are lawyers.

The same trend may be observed in the data on l o c a l

elective officials. The ’high s t a t u s ’ occupations

contributed 92.5 per cent among the Governors, 87*1

per cent of Vice-Governors, 89*3 per cent of City Mayors,

71.4 per cent of City Vice-Mayors and 77*3 per cent of

Municipal Mayors (see Table 4.10-A), with the

prof es si o n als showing thesame dominant p o s i t i o n as in

Table 4,10, Also, the lawyers provide the l a r g e s t

number of l o c a l elective officials among a l l the various

occupations (with the sole exception of the Mayors who

29
There were, however, four Representatives who l i s t e d
’l o g g e r ’ , ’miner’ and ’labor l e a d e r ’ together with t h e i r
other p r o f es si o n s or occupations. One, the son of a
landowner, l i s t e d 'businessman and labor l e a d e r ’ (H.O.D.,
1 9 6 2 - 6 5 ? p p . 1 9 , 9 5 - 9 6 ); another i s a ’lawyer, labor
leader and l o g g e r ’ (operator of a timber concession —
I b i d . , pp.20 159-6o); another one i s a ’farmer, miner,
g e o l o g i s t ’ (executive of a mining company - - I b i d , ,
Pp.170-71); and the l a s t one i s a ’lawyer and labor
l e a d e r ’ ( i b i d . , p . 1 9 ).
30
That i s , 0.26 per cent in I 9 6 I . 1962 S t a t i s t i c a l
Handbook, op, c i t . , pp.34 and 3 8 .
 168
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 169

have more ' f a n n e r s ’ in their ranks). These data also

co n f i r m the f i n d i n g s of the Institute of Public

Administration (on p r o v i n c i a l and m u n i c i p a l officials)

p r e v i o u s l y cited.

The r e a d e r must, however, be cau t i o n e d about the

uses of Tables 4,10 and 4,10-A. While they are u s e f u l

in analyzing i n d i v i d u a l professions or occupations, for

the purpose of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ’h i g h - s t a t u s ’ from ’low-

s t a t u s 1 occupations, or for general classification, they

do not give the c o m p l e t e o c cupational picture of the

political elite for they do not fully describe the

’b u s i n e s s m e n ’ and the l a n d o w n e r s ’. This has already been

suggested in T a ble 4,10 (footnote) but it needs f u r t h e r

clarification.

One of the important features of the ’o c c u p a t i o n s ’

of the P h i l ippine p o l i tical elite is their multipie

character. Owing pe r h a p s to the semi-fused nature of

social and economic institutions, and the c o n c e n t r a t i o n

of values (wealth, skill, education, power) in elite

hands, the p o w e r g r o u p tend to p e r f o r m multiple roles

and engage in v a r i o u s activities at the same time. Thus

a lawyer is often not m e rely a lawyer, but may turn out

to be a businessman, an ’e d u c a t o r ’ (either teaching or

operating his own school), a pl a n t e r (landowner) or even

 170

a labor leader. If he is in business, he does not stick

to one line but expands to other fields including the

acquisition of land. A landowner, likewise, will probably

expand into business activities. It is unlikely,

therefore, to find a member of the political elite relying

on a single occupation, much less to find one depending

exclusively on his governmental post, as his source of

inc ome •

Because this interesting aspect cannot be quantified,

it may be better to take some illustrations of these

’m u l t i p l e 1 occupations. In the following pages are brief

passages and extracts from the biographies of some of

the 1946-63 power group.

Cabinet member Salvador Araneta (Lawyer). ’Aside from

Araneta University, Salvador is president of the
^42,000,000 Republic Flour Mills, the AIA Feed
Mills, Chairman of Feati Industries, Republic Soya,
and Premier Paper, and founder of a coming yeast
factory. He was founder of the Far East Transport
Inc,, with Eugenio Lopez [brother of another Senator]
He was co-founder and first president (1946) of the
Feati Institute of Technology, . . ( 'Progress through
Family Solidarity-4' Weekly G r a p h i c , Aug. 26, 1964,
P - 35) •

Cabinet member Primitivo Lovina (Businessman, Realtor,

Banker). President and founder of Southern Investments,
Inc. Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co.; Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co,, Primitivo Lovina and Co., Inc;
Montilla Motor Co. Director of Isabela Sugar Co.,
Inc, He was also an executive of several government
corporations and agencies -- member of the National
Economic Council, Government Enterprise Council, Insular
Sugar Refining Corporation, and others. (Who 1s W h o ,
p ,l66a) •
 171

Cabinet member Jaime Hernandez (Accountant). Owns major

interest in the Bicol Electric Company, University of
Nueva Caceres, University of the East, etc*..Headed
the accounting firm Jaime Hernandez & Co., and became
the President of the Philippine Institute of Public
Accountants...He ’served as,..member, board of
directors, Philippine National Bank. Aside from being
a university official, he also taught law and
accounting at the Far Eastern University and the
graduate school, University of the East’. (W h o ’s Who ,
P.129.)

Cabinet member Joaquin M. Elizalde (Businessman). 'Member

of a distinguished family of Manila, connected with
almost every important business in the Archipelago,
Mr Elizalde was educated in Spain, England and
Switzerland, with one year of service in the Spanish
Army’. (Ency., vol.XVII, p.173*) The Elizalde family
has 18 business entities involving mining, sugar
plantations, insurance, shipping, sugar centrals, rope
factory, rum distillery, lumber business, mass-media
(TV and radio broadcasting with chains of radio
stations all over the country), etc. The family
employs 'no fewer than 20,000 people whose dependents
number around 100,000’. ( ’On the Economic Si d e ’,
Philippines Free Press. Feb 2, 1 9 6 3 , p.12.)

Cabinet member Mariano Garchitorena (Planter). Son of Don

Andres Garchitorena 'one of political bulwarks of
Bicolandia’, he took over the plantations when his
father retired from active farming and business...
'became the militant exponent and advocate of the
interests of the abaca planters’ ...'While in business
and farming, Garchitorena, though not actually in
active politics in the sense that he was a candidate
for any elective office, made his influence felt in
Bicolandia’s politics...He was consulted, and his help
was sought, in the selection and election of
candidates...’ (Ency. vol.XVII, p.207-8.)

Senator Jose C. Locsin (Listed occupation — Physician and

L a n d o w n e r ) , ' A prominent sugar planter... has son
Domingo, ’a highly successful agriculturist who owns
and manages large tracts of lands and fishponds in
Capiz’, ...he also 'manages the President Roxas Rural
Bank'. (s.O.D., 195V50-51. )
 172

Senator Gaudencio E, Antonino was President, Western

Mindanao Lumber Co., I n c . ; Mindanao Lumber Development
Co., Inc. and G.E.A., Incorporated, He was Vice-
Chairman, Bd, of Directors, Polytechnic Colleges of
the Philippines; practicing Civil Engineer-Contractor,
19^7-52; he was Director, Reinsurance Co. of the
Orient; Bataan Pulp and Paper Mill, Co. Inc.; Music
Corporation of the Philippines; Philippine Engineers
Syndicate; Rico Finance Corporation. He was also
former Presided, Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines;
Chamber of Producers and Exporters, etc. (Mimeograjjhed
'Curriculum V i t a e ' •)

Senator Fernando Lopez (Listed occupation -- Lawyer and

Businessman). 'Younger of two sons of Don Benito
Lopez, former Iloilo governor... he took direct
management of the vast Lopez [family] interests...
'The lawyer-businessman was appointed Iloilo City
Mayor in 1945 by Pres. Sergio Osmena. The vast family
interests today include extensive sugar, coconut and
rice plantations, sugar centrals, 4 TV Stations, 1
National newspaper, 23 radio stations, educational
institution, insurance, real estate, banking, etc.
(Who 1s W h o , pp.163-5»)

Senator Cipriano P. Primicias (Listed occupation —

Lawyer). 'Senator Primicias... is also a lawyer of
note, an educator and an agriculturist' . (S.O.D,,
1954/77.)
Senator Eulogio Rodriguez (Listed occupation — Businessman)
'Even while in politics, Rodriguez never abandoned his
business ventures. He founded a family business
enterprise in 1928: The Philippine Trading Company.
In 1929? he organized an insurance company, the Luzon
Surety Company, Inc., and in 1930 the Luzon Investment
Company. He was one of the organizers of the National
Life Insurance Company. Recently, he founded the
Eulogio Rodriguez & Co., to handle his real estate
holdings. In 1952, he organized the Rodriguez Rural
Bank...' (S.O.D., 1954/92.)

Senator Oscar Ledesma (Listed occupation — L a w y e r ) • 'He

practiced law but devoted most of his time to the
management of the vast family hacienda of sugarcane...'
He became President of the Philippine Sugar Planters
Association. (S.O.D., 1954/43»)
 173

Representative Reyn a l d o P. Honraclo (Listed occupation --

Lawyer), President: Crown Mines, Inc, and International
Loan and Financing Corp, He is also Vice-Chairman
Committee on Franchises, (H,0,D, 1958/183*)

Representative Sebastian C ,_M oll, J r , (Listed occupation --

Mining Engineer). After graduating from the Colorado
School of Mines, "he assisted his father in his vast
business enterprises and in managing their m i n e s , ••
He belongs to one of the wealthiest families in
Bicolandia", He is chairman, Committee on Mines,
(H.O.D., 19^6/73-74.)

Representative Manuel S, Enverga (Listed occupation —

Lawyer, Economist, Educator and Businessman). "Although
he is busy with his duties as Congressman.,.he still
finds time to attend to his varied activities as an
educator and a businessman. As an educator, he is the
founder and President of the Luzonian Coil e g e s ..•and
Professor of the Graduate School of the University of
Sto Tomas;... As a businessman, he is the President
of Quezon Development Bank, Luzon Broadcasting C o . ,
Inc., and publisher, The Star of Southern Luzon
(Newspaper)". He is a member, Committee on Banks,
Currency & Corporations (H.O.D., 1962/208-9*)

Representative Francisco M, Lecaroz (Listed occupation —

Lawyer and Businessman)• "Aside from practising the
law profession, he manages his transportation business
in Marinduque, the Lecaroz Transit and the Marinduque
Transportation Company. He is Vice-Chairman, Committee
on Transportation & Communication. (H.O.D., 1962/153-^+*)

Representative Carlos M. Fortich (Listed occupation —

Rancher and Lumberman). "Considered as the "Political
King and father of Buki d n o n *..,He is a rancher and is
also engaged in the lumber business..." He is a
member, Committee on Agriculture & Franchises),
(h .o .d ., 1962 / 57 - 38 .)

Representative Tito M. Dupaya (Listed occupation —

Businessman). "A business executive, Congressman
Dupaya manages and owns many enterprises. He owns the
Lal-lo Ice Plant, the Lal-lo Rice Mill, the Lal-lo
Transportation Company, and the Dupaya Trading. He
is also the president of the Lal-lo Rural Bank. He
is Chairman, Committee on Reparations. (H.O.D.,
1962 / 63 .)
 174

Representative Ramon M. Durano (Listed occupation --

Lawyer and Businessman). "Congressman Durano holds
the degree of B.S. in Education and Bachelor of Laws.
Well-known in business circles, he owns and operates
one of the biggest coal mines in the province of
Cebu". At one time, he was branch manager of the Cebu
National Coconut Corporation.
"Today he owns and operates an electric light and
power plant, a truck and motor car assembly factory,
a printing establishment, a real estate firm, and
an insurance company". (H.O.D., 1962/84.)

Representative Juan S. Alano "He is a lawyer by profession

and a planter by avocation". (H.O.D., 1946/31*)

Representative Pedro S. Baculio (Listed occupation —

L a w y e r ) , "His father is a cattle king, copra producer
and a farmer in Northern M i n d a n a o ... He fought against
the two wealthiest and formidable political Big Wigs
of that province, ex-Governor Pelaez and ex-Governor
Borromeo". (H.O.D., 1946/38-39*)

Representative Remedios_0. Fortich (Listed occupation —

Rancher, Businesswoman and Social Worker), "Hon,
Remedios 0, Fortich, widow of the late Congressman
Carlos A.H. Fortich is at present the President and
Manager of the Bukidnon Lumber Co. She is also a
rancher". She is a member of the Committees on
Agriculture and Cattle Industry. (H.O.D. 1946/56.)

Representative Maximino Noel (Listed occupation — Planter,

Businessman). "Congressman Noel is a planter and a
businessman", He is a member of the Committee on
Landed Estates (H.O.D,, 1946/77-78.)

Representative William L. Chiongbian (Listed occupation --

Businessman-Rancher). "Congressman Chiongbian is a
businessman and rancher by occupation. A shipping
magnate, he is the President of the William Lines,
Inc. and the Far East Fishing and Canning Corporation.
He was voted "Shipping Man of the Year" by the
Philippine Business W r i t e r ’s Association in 1951*••
member of the ß oard of Directors of the Philippine
Banking Corporation and the Philippine Coconut
P r oducers1 Federation, Inc... owner of the Pangamuran
Cattle Ranch in Zamboanga del Norte which is considered
as one of the largest and most modern in the country
today". He is a member, Committees on Banks,
Transportation & Communications. (H.O.D., 1958/243-4.)
 175

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e A p o l o n i o M a r a s i g a n (Listed o c c u pation --
Businessman), "A successful b u s i n e s s executive, his
interests are n u m e r o u s and diverse. He is in the
c o p r a trade, operates water and land transportation,
has a gasoline station, and raises rice and coconuts
in his vast landholdings", (H.O.D., 1962/47*)

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Jose B, L a u r e l , Jr, (Listed occupation --

Lawyer, L aw P r o f e s s o r and Banker), "He is m a n a g i n g
p a r t n e r L a u r e l L a w Office; C h a i r m a n of the Board,
Philippine Later i t e Corporation; Di r e c t o r of the
P h i l ippine Banking Corporation, C h a i r m a n of the Board,
Lahi, Inc,," (H.O.D., I 9 6 2 / 5 O.)

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Eugenio B a l t a o (Listed o c c u p a t i o n — L a w y e r
Farmer, and Businessman), "A lawyer by profession,
he is a b u s i n e s s m a n - f a r m e r by a v o c a t i o n , ,,he is
president of the N u e v a E c i j a Tobacco Gr o w e r s
Association. (H.O.D., 1962/182.)

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Vi c e n t e F, G u s t i l o S r . (Listed occupation
P h y s ician and Planter^. " C o n g r e s s m a n G u s t i l o dedicated
his time to sugar cane farming. He served as Vice-
President of the National F e d e r a t i o n of S u gar Planters
and was also its A c t i n g P r e s ident for some time.
P r ior to his first election as Congressman, he was
President of the V i c t o r i a s M i l l i n g D i s trict P l a n t e r s ’
Association, Inc,.." (H.O.D., 1 9 6 2 / 1 7 2 .)

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e A g u s t i n M, G a t u s l a o (Listed o c c u p a t i o n —
Lawyer). "A lawyer by p r o f e s s i o n and a sugar planter
by avocation,.." (H.O.D., I 9 6 2 / I 7 6 . )

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e M i guel Cuenco (Listed o c c u pation — Lawyer)

"Hon. M i g u e l Cuenco has been a m e m b e r of the H o u s e of
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s since 1931? w i t h a brief i n t e r r u p t i o n
in 1946-1949...
" Congressman Cuenco is also a businessman. He is the
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of the B i saya Land T r a n s p o r t a t i o n
Company, Inc,,... engaged in bus t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and
shipping in the Vi s a y a s and Mindanao. He is the
m a n ager of the shipping d e p a r t m e n t of the company.
He is also an educator", (H.O.D, 1962/91-92.)
 176

Representative Tereso Dumon (Listed occupation --

Businessman and Labor Leader), "Congressman Dumon,
who headed various business enterprises in Cebu, was
cited as "Businessman of the Year" in 195^ by the
Cebu Press Club, He was former president of Dumon
Company, Mindanao Minerals, Inc,, and Pacific Lines,
Inc, He was also former vice-president Pan-Oriental
Match Co., Inc,, former assistant manager of Cebu
Stevedoring Co., Inc, and Insular Navigation, Cebu,
At present he is the vice president of Batyak, Inc.
"Congressman Dumon was born.,,to Urbano Dumon,
landowner and farmer..." (H.O.D,, 1962/95-96.)

Representative Sergio Osmena, Jr. (Listed occupation —

Business Executive). Son of a former President, he
taught business administration at UP, FEU, and Ateneo.
"In 19^0, he was designated Attorney-in-Fact and
Administrator of the properties of his illustrious
father in Cebu (real estate and farming).., formerly
President of both the Esso Coal Company (Cebu Coal
Mining) and the Esso Agricultural Corporation
(Agriculture). He became President of the Esso and
Co. Inc. (real estate) in 19^2. In 19^+6, he was
President of the Essel Incorporated (Cebu agricultural
development) and simultaneously President of the Cebu
Heights Co., Inc. (Cebu real estate subdivision).
"In 1 9 ^-8 , Congressman Osmena, Jr. became President of
the De La Rama Steamship Co., Inc. (shipowners and
agents) and later elected member, Board of Directors,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc, in 19^9* In 1950*••he
was elected member of the Boards of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank and the National Shipyards &
Steel Corporation [Government firms.] "Congressman
Osmena was Governor of Cebu (1951-55)> Mayor of Cebu
City (1955-57 )) Congressman (l957-6l), Chairman,
League of Provincial 0 overnors and City Mayors of the
Philippines (1957) > and member of the National
Executive Committee and the Five-man "Super-Committee"
of the Nacionalista Party, (H.O.D., 1958/112-13«)
 177

Tlie above b io gr ap hic al sketches are self-explanatory.

They ill ustrate the general ch ar a c te r of the political

eli te's economic ties with the social structure. They

also p ro vid e unmist aka ble evidence that the political

elite, aside from the commanding p o w e r positions they

hold, occupy d o mi n at in g posts in the economic and social

spheres which give them great rew ar ds both in income and

the de fe r en ce n ec es s ar y in m a in t a i ni n g their elite status,

INC OM E

F r o m the data on occu pa tio n p r e s e n t e d above, it is to

be ex pe cte d that the po li tical elite should be am on g those

in the top-income bracket, The various sources of income,

generally, are: salaries and al lo wances f ro m public

office, r ent de rived f r om p r o p er t y (a gricultural lands,

urban real estate, buildings, and others), private

pra ctice of law and other profession, business, dividends

from shares of stocks, di re ct o r s hi p s in private

corporations, and others.

As of 1 9 6 3 » the f o l l o w i n g were the official salaries

received by top public officials: President — ^30*000;

Vi ce -P re s id en t — ^15*000; Senate President and Speaker

of the H ous e -- ^16,000; Senators and R e pr e s e n t a t i v e s —

^ 7 j 200; Ch i e f Justice, Supreme Court -- ^21,000;

 178

A s s o c i a t e Justice, Supreme Court — 7*2 0 ,0 0 0 ; a^cl

Dep a r t m e n t Secretaries (Cabinet members) — 7*12,000,

(These have recen t l y b e e n increased, w i t h the increases

r a n g i n g f r o m 33 to near l y 300 p er cent,) 31

The above official salaries of P h i l i p p i n e top public

officials may not be h i g h w h e n compared to what their

coun t e r p a r t s in other c o u n tries get, but in rel a t i o n to

the p er capita income of the country, they are quite

substantial. Furthermore, the lowest paid among them,

the legislators, are a c t u a l l y getting very substantial

sums in a l l o wances in what are often d u b b e d as ’secret

salaries'. One writer commented:

Ove r one-third of the 7*45*7 m i l l i o n or some

7*16 m i l l i o n goes e x c l u s i v e l y into C o n g r e s s m e n 1s
p o c kets in the f o r m of constitutional and
secret salaries. The quota in a l l o w a n c e s for
each law-maker is 7*150,000 or 7*1 5 »000, 000 in all
for the 102 House members. Their p a y according
to the rate f i xed by the c o n s t i t u t i o n is
7*7» 200 each a year,,.

31
A bill was passed by C o n g r e s s in 1963 (effective after
the tenure of the present crop of officials whose
salaries are fixed by the Constitution) i n c r e a s i n g
the above salaries as follows: President, 7*30,000 to
7*48,000; Vice-President, 7*15» 000 to 7*32,000; Senate
President and Speaker of the House, 7*16»000 to
32,000; Senators and Representatives, 7*7» 200 to
7*28,000; C h ief Justice, S u p r e m e Court, 7*20,000 to
7*28,000; A s s o c i a t e Justice, Supreme Court, 7*20,000 to
7*28,000; and Cabinet Secretary, 7*12» 000 to 7*24,000,
Cf, The P h i l ippines H e r a l d M a g a z i n e , M a y 25» 19 6 3 »
pp. 6-7 ,
 179

All told, each House solon will get ^157^200

this year, counting both the legal and the
illegal salaries# No country in the world
has been known to have rewarded its lawmakers
IP
so fabulously,

There are, of course, the additional private sources of

income that have been mentioned above. Indeed evidences

available to the study indicate that the bulk of their

income comes from sources other than their ’official1

salaries# In connection with this point, the Free

Press also noted that

In addition to their 'secret salaries' or

allowances, Representatives and Senators get
retainers if they are lawyers; others make a
lot of money as industrialists, businessmen,
franchise-holders hacenderos, bankers,

This observation is well borne-out by the findings

of the GSPA survey previously cited. Table 4.11,

derived by the writer from the raw data of this survey,

shows the sources of income other than official salary

and allowances.

32
Napoleon G. Rama, ’The Big G r a b ’, Philippines
Free Press, September l4, 1963} p,40; Cfh also
1^130,000 allowances suit heads for clash' Weekly
Graphic, December 23} 1963} p#12; Vic Barranco,
'The Most Privileged Solons in the W o r l d ’, Examiner,
January 28, 1963} p*3*
33
Editorial, Philippine Free Press, April 20, 1 9 6 3 #
 180

TABLE 4.11

OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATORS,

1963

OTHER SOURCES OF
INCOME SENATORS REPRESENTATIVES

Per cent Per cent

1. Rentals (Real Estate
and Buildings) 38.0 42.9
2, Salary of wife/other
members of family 10.3 21.0
3# Private Practice (Law) 38.0 68 •0
4. Other Profession 5.0 17.8
3* Shares or Stocks 6 3 .2 39.4
6 , Business 47.4 39.4
7. Others 42.0 32.2

TOTAL 284.1* 2 6 0 .7 *
(N=19) (N=28)
AVERAGE NO. OF ’OTHER
SOURCES OF INCOME’ 2.8 2.6

Percentages exceed 100 because of overlaps.

The facts established by the sample survey reveal

that not a single legislator depended on official income
alone, and that Senators, on the average, have nearly
three (2.8) other sources of income. The same is true
for the Representatives (2.6 average). These varied

sources of income also confirm the study’s findings on

the ‘multiple’ nature of elite economic activities.
A more concrete illustration of how much money the

members of the political elite make is shown by the annual

 181

3*4
gross income of Senatorial candidates in 1963* Of the

sixteen candidates of the two major parties (Nacionalis ta

and Liberal Parties), four had annual personal gross

incomes ranging from J^100,000 to ^ 46 5 ,000; eleven had

incomes from ^20,000 to ^ 6 5 j000; only one reported

earning about ^13?000, ^ If we refer back to Table 3*4

in Chapter III (Distribution of Income), we note that

only 1,1 per cent of all families in the Philippines

receive incomes of ^ 10,000 and above in i960, Moreover,

it must be added that the above were declared personal

incomes for purposes of taxation and anyone conversant

with the tax system in the Philippines and the major

34.
As a result of rampant charges of enrichment against
politicians while in office, candidates were required,
starting in 1963? to submit statements of annual incomes
during the two years prior to an election with their
certificates of candidacy,
35
Cf. Edward R, Kiunisala, ’Senatorial Candidates,
Their Incomes and Income T a x ’, Philippines Free Press,
September 21, 1963* p»5 * We consider these sixteen
as members of the political elite even if they were
only candidates then because not one was really a
'new' face. Seven were re-electionist Senators, five
were Cabinet members (three of whom were incumbents)
and four were incumbent Representatives, In fact, all
are included in the power group herein considered.
 182

problems that plague it would know the implication of

., • 3 6
this •

STYLE OF LIVING

The members of the principalia class, as pointed out

earlier, are noted for the luxury and conspicuousness

of their consumption. The obvious danger of exhibiting

too much of their affluence in a society that has

millions of poor and underpaid workers and unemployed

does not seem to deter them. Thus, Malcolm notes with

alarm:

Irresponsibility in more devious forms is

evidenced in extravagance in private life.
It is manifested in costly mansions, cars,
jewelry, and gowns. In my three visits to
the Philippines after World War II, I have
been increasingly astounded by the luxurious
homes and the gay night life. Sitting in
the lobby of the Manila Hotel I have observed
with awe the elaborate parties attended by
the elite.••
If any of the fashionable cocktail circuit
crowd ever viewed the Walled C i t y ’s hovels
or Tondo’s teeming squalor, they were the
exceptions. Indeed, all too few serious-

36
For instance, charges of flagrant tax evasion, tax
avoidance, etc. are made against certain people and top
public officials from time to time but apparently
’nothing happens’. See, for example, ’How much Does
He Pa y?’ Philippine Free Press, April 20, 1 9 6 3 ? p*l;
’The Diokno Question’, Ibid., June 8, I963# p»6;
’Vital Tax Reform’, Ibid,, March 23# 1 9 6 3 # P*7;
’Millions Lost in Tax Exemptions’, Weekly Graphic,
February 26, 1964, p,8-B.
 183

minded Filipinos realize that the gulf between

a rich minority and the poverty-stricken
majority is widening. In their own thoughtless
way, the expensive society people are helping
the cause of subversion,-^'

There are numerous evidences of the high style of

living among the elite, By direct observation, even

the most casual observer cannot fail to see the distinctive

kind of life and the ’different’ world they live in.

The national newspapers, too, report in great detail

in the society pages, the exclusive circles they belong

to, the kind of parties they give, the expensive clothes

and personal adornments they wear, their local and

foreign fashion designers, who just arrived and who are

leaving on a world tour, the kind of weddings their

children have, etc. More importantly, the papers also

tell us who ’th e y ’ are. A Society editor, for instance,

reports the wedding of a Senator’s daughter:

37~
George A. Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist
(Serialized in The Manila Times, Vide September 27* 1957
issue, p.2.)
One familiar with Philippine history, of course, knows
the numerous revolts and uprisings in the countrysides
since Spanish times up to the present, (The peasant-
based Huk uprising has not yet been totally crushed).
Today, one reads of the periodic ’crime waves’ in the
urban centers, the more common ’solution’ to the ’problem’
however, is to increase the police forces and arm them
with modern, high-powered weapons (such as the ricently
devised ’pistolized automatic carbine’), the employment
by the rich of more personal bodyguards and private
police, stiffer penalties for crimes against property
and persons, higher walls and stronger steel bars in the
homes of the rich, etc. (Cf,, for instance, The Manila
Times, September 7? 1963* p*l)*
 184

Amidst a setting of elegance and grandeur,

J.P., eldest child of Senator and Mrs A.P.
and E.R. Jr., were married.•, in Forbes Park,
thus uniting two of Manila’s most socially
prominent families in what is generally
described as 'a perfect m a t c h 1,..Josie’s
glittering diamond head-dress dazzled the
eye. Her gown of off-white satin had an
ovi cummerbund, its two heavily beaded
side panels and ribbon-decorated center
panel ending in a five-meter train much wider
than the carpet laid along the church1s
center aisle,•. It was a solemn wedding,
with Rufino Cardinal J, Santos officiating
over the rites, a nuptial mass following
af t e rwards•38

The ’dazzling diamond head-dress’ was specially

ordered for the wedding by the Senator’s wife ’through

, 39
her jeweller from Antwerp’ and cost her ^200,000,

The couple had a three-month honeymoon around the world.

Another politician's daughter, not to be outdone,

had another ’wedding of the year’, ’Her wedding gown,

flown in from Yves St Laurent of Paris, has floral

appliques and lace ornamentation. A diamond tiara added

4l
sparkle to Minnie’s bright countenance,.,etc. 1

38
Rosalinda L, Orosa, Society Page, The Manila Chronicle,
March 23, 1963.
39
Virginia Benitez Licuanan, 'Incidentally,' Manila
Chronicle, Society Page, March 24, 1963*
40
Manila Chronicle, March 25? 1983» p,ll.
41
W omen’s Magaz ine, May 15? 1984, p,2.
 185

The visit of the King and Queen of Thailand to the

Philippines in 1963 # for example, was a cause of great

worry among many of high society’s matrons. Their great

problem, reported a woman columnist, was ’how they could

out-dress and out-look Queen Sirikit’. There was a

Senator’s lady who in anticipation of the grand occasion,

was reported to be ’ordering a special diamond tiara

which promises to dim Queen Sirikit’s world famous

jewels’.

The affluence of Filipino politicians is shown by

the gifts some of them give to their families. A ranking

Congressional leader was reported to have given his family

a custom-built Mercury car costing $ (U.S. ) 3 0 , 0 0 0 , ^ while

another ’powerful politician’ gave as a Christmas gift

to his son ’a small lot in Quezon C i t y ’ (the ’small l o t ’

UU
costing ^60,000).

In Bacolod City, where many of Negros sugar

hacenderos reside, mansions and modern bungalows in the

’rich’ areas stand in sharp contrast to the numerous

rows of nipa huts and hovels in the ’poor’ areas. In

42
Julie Cuaderno Andaya, 'Frustrated Women and M e n ’,
Examiner, July 15; 1 9 6 3 » p.l4,
43
Eddie Martelino, ’Pointblank’, Evening News, December 26,
1963, P* 5•
44
Ibid,
 186

the streets, there is a direct contrast between wealthy

matrons and old women (and children) beggars, the former
getting off from shiny, brand-new cars to visit beauty
parlors or do their shopping, the latter squatting in
front of department stores and street corners with
outstretched hands* ’In Bacolod’, one observer writes,

’it is not surprising to see an average of three or

four-car garages’*
45

It is not generally considered unusual to see

a hacendero visiting his plantation in an
air-conditioned Land-Rover, upholstered with
airline-cushioned seats and complete with
a transistorized stereo set. Nor is it
considered fantastic anymore to find a
marble-fitted bathroom, a TV set and an
interphone in every room of the affluent
Negrenses’ house* ^

The social life of the elite is a continuous whirl

of cocktail-parties, 1asaltos', bienvenida-despedida
parties, fashion shows, ’merienda-cenas’, ’charity-drives’,
mah-jong sessions, etc. There is always an excuse for
such affairs: a welcome for a group of politicians’ wives
returning from abroad, a formal presentation of a young
daughter to ’society’, an asalto-birthday party for a
top official wife, a ’Hawaiian’ luncheon given by the

45
Noli Galang, ’The Affluent Society of Negros’, The
Sunday Times Magazine, September 15? 1965, p»24*
46
Ibid
 187

Inner Wheel Club or the Zonta, a farewell to someone’s

children going to finishing schools in America or

Europe, etc.

The residences of the political elite, like most

of the wealthy families in the Philippines, are

concentrated in the Metropolitan Manila area. Over

89 per cent of the Senators, for instance, and 82.8

per centu of the Representatives have residences in this

hi /
area. (There is, of course, a significance to this

and we shall explore this interesting aspect further when

we shall discuss the elite’s regional origins.) A

cross-check with the W h o ’s Who group (the Philippines’

national elite) reveals that over 70 per cent have also

their residences in Manila. Furthermore, the areas of

residence between the two groups are notably similar,

with the greatest concentration in the fashionable

residential areas of Quezon City, San Juan Heights,

Makati, etc.

Data also show that majority of the political elite

have more than one residence: one usually in the province

whence they come and another in Metropolitan Manila.

47
GSPA Survey, op# cit.
 188

In addition, not a few of them have vacation houses in

48
Baguio, where they stay at the most for about two or
three months a year during the hot summer months,
leaving them unoccupied under their caretakers throughout
the rest of the year. The government continues to

maintain the official vacation houses set up by the

Americans during their rule: Mansion House-built for
the American Governor-General is now the President 1s

official vacation house; Government houses at Cabinet

Hill for Cabinet members and at Justices Hill for the
Justices. All these, like the privately-owned houses
of the elite, are usually untenanted throughout the year
and are just left under the caretakers.
Car ownership is a recognized status-symbol in the
Philippines. Cars are very expensive owing to the very

48
Baguio is a city up in the mountains of Benguet,
Mountain Province. Located at a plateau about 5?000
feet above sea level, it has a dry, temperate climate
(temperatures ranging between 45 degrees and 78 degrees
throughout the year). The Americans finding the climate
very suitable, proceeded to have government vacation
houses built there where top officials could escape from
the heat in Manila during the summer months. Soon, it
came to be known as the 'summer capital’ as most top
government officials and the wealthy flocked there during
summer. To this day, the practice has continued and
the elite have built magnificent vacation homes there,
Cf. Dean Worcester, The Philippines_Past and Present
(New York: The MacMillan Company, I92TT, Chapter XVII,
'Baguio and the Benguet Road1, pp.449-T87.
 189

h igh import taxes levied on them. Consequently only few

can afford them. In 1 9 6 2 , f o r instance, there were only

about 100,000 cars in a p o p u l a t i o n of 29*2 m i l l i o n or

49
one car in 290 persons. However, the data on car

o w n e rship of the 48 l e g i s lators in the G S P A sample survey

show that they own no less than 124 cars or an average

of 2.6 cars each. (Some of them own other vehicles such

as jeeps and Land Rovers.) M a n y of the cars they own

are big and expensive A m e r i c a n cars. One S e n a t o r owning

eight cars, for example, h ad one L i n c o l n Continental,

two Cadillacs, one Chrys l e r Imperial, one Oldsmobile

Station W a g o n and three others whose make the

50
correspondent cannot c o r r e c t l y give 'since the Senator

changes his cars quite often'.

ASSQCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP^1

Membership of the p o l i t i c a l elite in va r i o u s voluntary

organizations reflects the n a ture of their occupational

activities, economic interests, cultural ties and social

status.

49
1962 Stat i s t i c a l H a n d b o o k , op. cit., Table 49? p.83»
50
The S e n a tor's private secretary.
51
The entries in the b i o g r a p h i c a l data for this item were
not sufficient to be quantified.
 190

The p r o f e ssionals are m o s t l y m e m b e r s of their

respective p r o f e ssional organizations. The lawyers belong

to the Bar A s s o c i a t i o n or the L a w y e r s ’ League, the

Physicians to the Medical A s s o c i a t i o n or the Philippine

F e d e r a t i o n of Medical Practioners, etc. Some (especially

the R e presentatives) are m e m b e r s or officers of

professional associations in the provinces.

Some of the economic i n t erest groups w h i c h claim

mem b e r s h i p among the p o l i t i c a l elite (inc l u d i n g some of

the professionals) are the N a t i o n a l F e d e r a t i o n of Sugar

Planters, l o cal planters associations, To b a c c o Growers

Association, Philippine Coconut Planters Association,

Chamber of P r o d ucers and Exporters, Chamber of Commerce,

Chamber of Industries, Philippine Lumber P r o d u c e r s ’

52
Association, etc. This is of course in line w i t h the

52
The officials of the C h a m b e r of Commerce of the
Philippines offer an i n t e r e s t i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of the close
correlation b e t w e e n l e a d e r s h i p in economic organizations
and public leadership, Of eleven p r e s idents of the CCP
from 19^5 to 19 6 3 » all have held high public office as
follows: 3 — Senators; 2 — Cabinet members; 2 -- Central
Bank Executives; 4 — E x e c u t i v e s of G o v e r n m e n t Corporations,
Bureaus, or Agencies, (The CCP pre s i d e n t s fro m 1945-63
were: Gil J, Puyat, Aurelio Periquet, Sr,, A n t o n i o de las
Alas, T e o filo D, Reyes, S r , , C e s a r M, Lorenzo, Ben R.
Medrano, Pri m i t i v o Lovina, M a r c e l o S, Balatbat, G a u d encio
E, Antonino, Alfonso Calalang, and H,R. Reyes, Cf,
Laureano Ma, Rivera, ’The CC P is Dynamic C h a m p i o n of
Filipino B u s i n e s s m e n ’, in a magazine en t i t l e d 7th National
C o n v ention of Fi l i p i n o B u s i n e s s m e n , F e b r u a r y 21-24, 1963 ?
Baguio City,)
 191

multiple character of occupations that have already been

discussed. The sugar group, particularly, is very well
represented with some of its top officers and representatives
having occupied or are occupying seats in the Cabinet,
Senate and the House of Representatives, Most
knowledgeable Filipinos are familiar with the powerful
’sugar bloc1 led by top Hacendero-politicians from
Iloilo and Negros,
Membership in Catholic religious organizations is
high, with the Knights of Columbus (headquarters in
America) having the most number of members among them.
Others which have some members from the Cabinet and
Senate are Catholic Action, the Catholic Women’s League

and the Catholic Educational Association of the

Philippines. A few Cabinet members and Justices are
also members of religious societies such as Holy Name
Society and Apostleship of Prayer, A number of Cabinet
members, Senators and Justices hold foreign decorations
like the Gran Cruz de Isabel de Catolica (Spanish),
Knight Commander of the Order of King Charles III
(Spanish), Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem
(Church), and the papal ’Pro Ecclessia et Pontifice'.
Other memberships in foreign-based organizations

include the American Bar Association, Solidaridad

 192

Filipino-Hispanico, Inc*, Academia Espanola dela Lengua,

C ole^io de Abo^ados de Madrid, and various American

universities’ alumni associations* Among the civic

organizations, the Rotary Club seems to be the most

popular, followed by the Lions Club and the Jaycees.

It is, of course, good politics to be members of

’patriotic1, ’service’ and ’public policy’ organizations

like the Veterans groups, Anti-Communist League, Free

Enterprise Society, Boy Scouts of the Philippines,

Community Chest, Red Cross, Philippine Constitutional

Association, Knights of Rizal, and others, and a number

of the legislators particularly are affiliated with

these organizations, mostly as officers or ranking

members*

The high social status of members of the Philippine

political elite is also indicated in their membership

in prestigious golf and country clubs such as Wack Wack

Golf and Country Club, Manila Golf Club, Baguio Country

Club, etc., in elite social clubs such as Casino Espanol,

Club Filipino, Philippine Columbian, Kahirup,

Mancommunidad, and similar exclusive clubs*

The total picture portrayed by these various

associational memberships of the political elite suggests

again their economic ties, their highly-westernized

 193

outlook and foreign (mainly Spanish and American)

attachment, their prestigious occupations, their superior

social status and perhaps even their conservatism*

ETHNIC ORIGIN

One distinctive feature of the principalia class is

the dominant me stizo element in its composition* In

Chapter II, the traditionally dominant role of this

mestizo group in Philippine history has been discussed*

It has been shown how Spanish personnel of the colonial

administration (and some members of the clergy, as many

historians report) and Chinese merchants mixed racially

with women belonging to the native princdpalia and which,

through time, produced a me stizo class that can be

distinguished from the bulk of the people not only by

their physical features but also by their outlook, their

socio-economic position and consequently, the dominant

political roles they played. This group first became

highly Hispanized and, later, very Americanized. They

were the minority who spoke the Spanish language for

instance, even in their homes and among themselves* The

Chinese mestizo element particularly lost its attachment

to Chinese culture, and developed instead a partly-

European, partly-indTo type of culture which has been

referred to previously as the me stizo culture

 194

Today, the m o d e r n p r i n c i p a l i a continue to manifest

this m e s t i z o character w h i c h is a feature that

disti n g u i s h e s them from the m a s s e s of F i l i p i n o s of M a l a y

stock* But while one n o t ices this distinct d i v i s i o n

between the principalia and n o n - p r i n c i p a l i a on ethno-

economic and p o l i t i c a l grounds, there seems to be w i d e ­

spread consc i o u s n e s s about it, p a r t i c u l a r l y as it concerns

the Chinese m e s t i z o element,

The data provide c o n f i r m a t i o n of this hypothesis*

C o m m o n w e a l t h President Manuel Q u e z o n was a S p a n i s h mestizo

and was often r e f e r r e d to as the ’Kastila* (The Spaniard)*

Four of six p o s t w a r P r e s idents have either C h i n e s e or

Spanish racial strain. The two V i c e - P r e s i d e n t s in the

sample are m e s t i z o s , one Ch i n e s e and the present one,

Spanish. A m ong the 1963 l e g i s l a t o r s surveyed, 68*4 per cent

of the Senators and 51*7 P © r cent of the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

reported that they have either Malay-Chinese, Malay-

Spanish, and S p a n i s h - C h i n e s e racial ancestry* (One

K O
Senator r e p orted having M a l a y - G e r m a n blood.) It should

be noted that these are self- c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s by r e s p o ndents

(or their relatives and staff) and it is p o s s i b l e that

the figures are, in fact, understated. (The w r i t e r noted

33
GSPA Survey, op* cit.

I
 195

that some classifying t h e m selves as of pure M a l a y stock

have slant eyes or fair skin not c h a r a c teristic of the

Malay r a c e ) •

They speak either S p a n i s h or English, often even

in their homes# Of the g r oup in the above survey, for

instance, 73*6 per cent of the Se n a t o r s and 50 per cent

of the R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s spoke S p a n i s h at home as a child;

all of the m now speak English# In contrast, only 2#1

per cent and 39*5 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n in i 960

54
can speak Spanish and English, respectively• Spanish

and E n g l i s h continue to be among the three official

languages (together w i t h T a g a l o g ) . 55 But Tagalog, w h ile

an official language, is seldom heard, for instance,

in the de l i b e r a t i o n s of Congress#

R E G I O N A L ORIGIN

A n o t h e r important clue to the social sources of

Philippine top p o l i t i c a l leaders is the significant

concentration of their places of b i r t h in M a n i l a and 18

provinces (out of 56 ) shown in red on the map (See

54
C f , i 960 Census of the P h i l i p p i n e s , ’P o p u lation and
H o u s i n g ’, vol.II, p,l6.
55
This policy of h a v i n g three official languages was
i n c o r porated in the P h i l i p p i n e C o n s t i t u t i o n (Art XIVr,
S e c • 3 ).
 196

map, Figure Ii). The red-shaded areas supplied the

c;6
following top leaders from 1946 to 1963:
Per cent
5 of 6 Presidents (83.6)
4 of 5 Vice-Pre sidents (80.0)*
48 of 59 Cabinet members (81,3)
44 of 59 Senators and Speakers, House
of Representatives (74.6)
21 of 24 Justices of the Supreme
C our t (87.5)

As already mentioned, three of the Vice-

Presidents later became Presidents; hence,
for purposes of tabulation, they have
been included among the six Presidents.

56
Representatives are excluded from the tabulation
on regional origin for obvious reasons, but Speakers
of the House who are selected not on regional
considerations but on other criteria have been
included.
 197
A m ore d etailed tab le fo llo w s: I
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 198

FIGURE I I

PLACE OF ORIGIN: THE P H IL IP P IN E ELITE it

MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES

LEGEND

INTERNATIONAL TREATY L I M I T S ________

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

Scarborough S h o a l

LEGEND: o

- RED-SHAD PROVINCES
s u p p l ie d !

7 9 «4# o f P o l i t i c a l E l i t e
8 3 ,S;£ o f WHO'S jWHO E l i t e
85$ + o f M a n u f a c tu rin g
E lite

|A Ö U S AN V _ °
 199

In Table 4,12 it can be seen that wi t h the ex ception

of the Senators and Sp eakers these ov e r - re p r e se n t e d areas

supplied over four-fifths of all the top leaders from

1946 to 1 9 6 3 * The pe rce n t ag e for Senators and Speakers,

while lo wer than the others, is n e ve r t h e l e s s significant

since, as a matter of practice, the exi st ing m a j o r parties

continue the old system of 1regional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 1•57

Again, if the po lit i c al elite is c o mpa re d w i t h the

other elites, we notice (as in the colleges they

attended) an extraordinary similarity in their places

of origin. Of the 212 W h o 's Who no t ab l e s that have been

considered for comparison, 177 or 83*5 per cent came

from exactly the same regions as the political elite.

Dat a on regional origin of C a r r o l l 1s top b u s i n e ss leaders

show that over 85 per cent of his 92 m a nu f a c t u r i n g

57
Duri ng the A m e r i c a n regime, Se nators were ele ct ed by
’Senatorial d i s t r i c t s ’ of wh ich there were 12 for the
whole country. The present p o lit ic al ’d i v i s i o n s ’
implicitly ac ce pt e d by both pa r t i es in the sele ct ion
of their resp ect iv e eight Se na torial candi da tes are:
Nor t he rn Luzon, Central Luzon, M e t r o p o l i t a n Manila,
Taga log region, Bicol region, East Visayas, West Visayas,
and Mindanao. In spite of this ge ographical representation,
however, Senators are elected ’at l a r g e ’. In other words,
while the political parties co ntinue to adhere to the
fi c tio n of ’geogra phi ca l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ’, the Se nators
elected continue to come mo st ly from the r ed -sh ad ed
regions. This is shown by the h i g h pe rc en t ag e of
re p res en tat io n (74.6 pe r cent) that these regions manifest.
 200

entrepreneurs came also from the same red-shaded areas

(less the provinces of Bataan, Pangasinan, Zambales and

Leyte), Sixty-eight per cent originated from Manila,

Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, In other words, the places

of origin of the business elite is even more

concentrated, (See Table 4,13)#

TABLE 4,13

COMPARATIVE PLACES OF ORIGIN OF VARIOUS ELITES

MANILA & 18 RED- POLITICAL W H O ’S WHO C A R R O L L ’S BUS.

SHADED PROVINCES ELITE ELITES ELITE*
SUPPLIED:
Per cent Per cent Per cent

19.4 83.5 85 +

*
Less the provinces of Bataan, Pangasinan, Zambales
and Leyte, Vide John J, Carroll, ‘Filipino
Entrepreneurship in M a nufacturing*, Philippine
Studies, vol,1 0 , 19 6 2 , pp , 109-1 2 ,
The present writer derived the percentage estimate
from Carr o l l ’s ’index of r e p r esentation1,

The same pattern is shown in the regional origin of

top-level bureaucrats. In a study of higher civil

servants, Francisco found that 67*5 per cent came from

Manila and the surrounding provinces of Central and

per cent came from the Visayas. 38

s r
Southern Luzon and 16,6

58
Gregorio A, Francisco, ‘Higher Civil Servants in the
Philippines’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, i9 6 0 ,
cited in Jose V, Abueva, ’Social Backgrounds and
Recruitment of Legislators and Administrators in a
Developing Country: The Philippines’, pp.6-7-
 201

In s h o r t , 84*1 pe r cent of the ’h i g h e r civil servants’

came f r o m a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same areas while only

15•9 per cent came f rom the rest of the country.

This s i n g u l a r l y unique pat te rn in the re gional

origin of m ost of those who become top le aders may be

cor r el at ed w i t h several factors.

First, these regions, ha vi ng been the areas of

earliest se ttl e me nt by the Spaniards, became the centers

59
of trade, education, c o m m u ni c a t io n and administration.

Consequently, the me mbers of the pr i n c ip a l ia who were

wit h in these ce nte rs had b e t t e r opportunities than those

in the more re mo t e areas. M e t r o p o l i t a n Manila,

particularly, became the hub of colonial a d mi n i s tr a t i on

bo th under the Sp aniards and the Americans. As m e nti on ed

earlier, it has d ev el o pe d into the single m e t r o p ol i s

that d o m i n a t e d the whole c o un tr y and has be co me toda}r,

as then, the financial, commercial, manufacturing,

educational and p ol it ica l ce nt er of the nation. Together

59
Cebu for example, was settled in 1 5 6 5 » Il oi lo in I58O,
Ma nil a in 1571? P a mp a ng a in 1572, etc. The others, prior
to their b e c o m i n g pr ovin ces m u c h later, were pa rts of
those wh i c h were settled earlier, Bataan, Ta rlac and
Nue va Ecija, for instance w e r e parts of Pampanga; Capiz
was part of Iloilo; Leyte and Bohol were parts of Cebu.
Negros O c c i d e n t a l was part of C e b u and Iloilo, etc.
(See, ’Geog rap hy , H i s t or y & C l i m a t o l o g y ’, 1918 Census
of the P h i l i p p i n e s , vol.I, Manila: Burea u of Printing,
I92Ö) .
 202

wit h the surrounding provinces, it also contributed the

majority of the business, W h o ’s W h o , and the pol i t i c a l

elite. That this is a continuing t r end has bee n

con f i r m e d by data on residences. We found that most of

those in the three groups we h a v e studied have also

their residences there,

The second factor is r e l ated to the land situation.

It is not m e rely a c oincidence that the p r o v inces that

p r o d u c e d the greatest number of le a d e r s are those that

have the highest c o n c e n t r a t i o n of land-ownership. Data

has b e e n p r e sented that shows the strong landlord-element

in the power group. The sugar barons of Iloilo and

Negros and the lan d l o r d s of Central Luzon, for example,

have always been a m o n g the leaders w i t h i n the g o v e r n i n g

class since colonial times. Conversely, it is also in

most of these pro v i n c e s where we find the h i g hest degree

of l a n d l essness and tenancy (See T a ble 3*3? C h a p t e r III).

A third factor is in line w i t h the s t u d y ’s d i s c u s s i o n

on the mestizo c h a r acter of the p r i n c i p a l i a class. The

data p r e s e n t e d in C h a p t e r II show that these o v e r ­

represented pro v i n c e s are in fact the r e g i o n s of high

mestizo concentration, wit h C o m y n ’s estimate of 90.2

per cent in 1810 for l4 of the 17 pro v i n c e s and Census

estimates of 6l per cent in 1 9 0 3 and 66.3 p e r cent in 19^8-

^ Vide Table 2.1, Ch a p t e r II, this study; 1903 C e n s u s ,

vol.II, p.210; 19^8 C e n s u s , vol.III, Part I, p.383*
 Finally, it is to be n o t e d that m a n y of these

provinces are d e n sely populated. However, their total

p o p u l a t i o n is less than one-half (49.9 per cent) of the

Philippines total* On the other hand, the 38 other

provinces, whose p o p u l a t i o n is m o r e than one-half of

the whole p o p u l a t i o n of the Philippines, supplied only

20*7 per cent of the total n u m b e r of top public officials.

Equally significant is the fact that 22 of these 38

provinces (population: 23*8 per cent) supplied none at

al 1 *

C. POLITICALLY DOMINANT FAMILIES

The study has so far tr e a t e d the p r i n c i p a l i a class

as a whole and has p r e s e n t e d d a t a to show that, like the

old p r i n c i p a l i a , it continues to be p o l i t i c a l l y dominant

and has in fact cont r i b u t e d a m a j o r po r t i o n of the

formal p o w e r - w i e l d e r s d u r i n g the p e r i o d under study.

There are, however, f a m i l i e s w i t h i n the p r i n c i p a l i a

class who are more politically active than others. These

families have been aptly called 'political d y n a s t i e s ' ^

6l
See for example, N,G. Rama, 'The "New Look" in Political
Dynasties,' P h i l i p p i n e s Free P r e s s , S e p t e m b e r 14, 1 9 6 3 #
p.4; Jose L* Guevara, 'Political Dynasties', The M a n i l a
Time s , J a n u a r y 20, 1 9 6 3 » p,4-A,
 204

for the reason that they produce successions of political

leaders, sometimes not only during two cr three decades

but, in numerous cases, even for generations.

Furthermore, this political dominance is enhanced by
intermarriage. Below are a few examples:
’Congressman Jose Cojuangco, Jr., comes
from a family of politicians. His great
grandfather [sic, actually grandfather] the
late Melencio Cojuangco, was the first
assemblyman of Tarlac, His father, Jose
Cojuangco, Sr., was also a Congressman.
Junior is the third generation legislator in
his mother's family. His maternal grandfather,
the late Juan Sumulong was a Senator; Senator
Lorenzo Sumulong and former Congressman
Francisco Sumulong are his mother's brothers'.
(H.O.D., 1962/236.)
'Congressman Primicias Jr was born on
April 17, 1931*•• His parents are Senate
Majority Floor Leader Cipriano Primicias, Sr.,
and Nieves Benito'. His grandfather was
'one of the founders of Alcala, Pangasinan1,
He was a former 'Alcalde'. (H.O.D., 1962/200
and survey.)
'Hon. Jose M. Laurel IV is the fourth
generation solon in the Laurel family. He is
the oldest son of former Speaker Jose B. Laurel
Jr., and the grandson of former Senator Jose
P. Laurel, Sr. His great grandfather, Judge
Sotero Laurel, was a member of the Mololos
Congress [1899] and Secretary of the Interior
in the Aguinaldo Cabinet' (H.O.D., 1958/71»)
'The Lawenko clan is a political institution
in this..• town of Albay, for Representative
Lawenko's father was in politics since 1907
until he died in 1932'.
 205

•••His opponent is the scion of the

w ealthiest family of the first district of
A l b a y . • • 1 (H.O.D., 1946/60)*

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Josefina B. D u r a n is the
widow of the late C o n g ressman Pio D u r a n , .,
b o r n in Z a r a g o s a ; N u e v a Ecija, the youngest
child of V i c e n t e Belmonte, ’a p o l i t i c a l
colossus of the t o w n 1, and J u l i a de los Reyes#
A n elder brother, Gabriel, h a d been
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e and later G o v e r n o r of the
province# ( G r a n d f a t h e r occupied a provincial
post under the Spaniards) (H#0#D,, 1962/37-38.)

1P o l i t i c s ... was not new to the M a g a l o n a

family. His [Senator Enrique M a g a l o n a 1s]
father, Vicente, and his uncle, Carlos, were
the dominant f i g u r e s in local p o l i t i c s d u r i n g
the Spanish t i m e ’.
’In five c o n s e c u t i v e elections, Enrique
M a g a l o n a was e l e c t e d Rep# of F i r s t District of
N e gros O c c i d e n t a l # . . ’ (S#0.D., 1954/57»)

That this is a w i d e s p r e a d p h e n o m e n o n is shown by

the fact that the s t udy has i d e n t i f i e d 169 of these

families found in every province of the P hilippines and

Manila# (The list of these p o l i t i c a l l y dominant

f a m ilies appears in the Appendix.) A m o n g these 169

families, there were 38 f u r ther affinal r elationships

(indicated by verti c a l lines and f o o t n o t e s in the list).

These families p r o d u c e d no less than 584 public officials

*
The 'wealthy o p p o n e n t 1, Lorenzo Ziga, was also a
former R e p r e s e n t a t i v e whose b r o ther V e n a n c i o was
G o v e r n o r of the p r o v i n c e while his s i s t e r - i n - l a w (wife
of the Governor) was f o r m e r Representative, Cabinet
m e m b e r and, at the time of writing, a Senator, (Cf.
H.O.D., 1957/43.)
 62
or an average of 4.5 public officials per family.

Moreover, among these public officials are 203 individuals,

or 3 ;
4 . 7 per cent, who occupied top p u b l i c positions

w h i c h we have c o n s i d e r e d as of elite category as follows:

7 P r e s i d e n t s , 2 Vice-Presidents, 15 Cabinet members,

42 Senators, 127 Representatives, and 10 Justices of

the Supreme Court. (Many of these top officials held

other posts, too, but only the highest pos i t i o n was

considered. See Appendix. The others were Provincial

Governors, Ambassadors, Ministers, G e n e r a l s and other

officers of the armed forces, other local elective and

appo i n t i v e officials, and those occ u p y i n g appointive

positions, in 'Executive A g e n c i e s 1•

The nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s in these fa m i l i e s

may be consanguinal, affinal, or a c o m b i n a t i o n of both.

There are the mal e - l i n e type w h i c h sometimes extend

from a g r e a t - g r a n d f a t h e r who was a c a b e z a de b a r a n g a y ,

a g o b e r n a d o r c i l l o , or a capitan — all m e m bers of the

caste-like p r i n c i p a l i a during S p a n i s h times — down to

62
See Appendix. As ind i c a t e d in the footnote of the list,
the number of public officials m e n t i o n e d represent only
those who have been i d e n t i f i e d f rom d a t a a v a ilable to
the study. There m a y be more,
63
I n c l u d e d is one who served d u r i n g the Japanese
occupation.
 207

the great grandson who, just fresh from school, has

already been ’prevailed upon by the masses’ to serve

them# These types, by their nature, may span through

several generations and are most apparent among the

long-estabil shed members of the traditional principalla.

Variations are the father-brother-son, father and son

(or sons), or just the brothers types# Examples of the

male-line type are the Cojuangcos of Tarlac, the

Sumulongs and Rodriguezes of Rizal, the Laurels of

Batangas, the Priniciases of Pangasinan, the Osmenas

of Cebu, the Qurinos of Ilocos Sur, the Magsaysays of

Zambales, the Montanos of Cavite, the Fuentebellas of

Camarines Sur, etc. This type is the most numerous and

may be found in practically every province.

Then there are the affinal types of relations; two

politically dominant families from the same province

’merge’ when members of their families marry. This

results sometimes in a situation where, instead of two

different families competing for political supremacy in

a province, the contest becomes an intra-family quarrel

e.g., the Paredes-Valera contest in Abra, the Abeleda

family’s feud in Mindoro Occidental, and others. Other

examples of political merges within the province through

marriage are those of Fornier-Villaverts of Antique,

 208

the Lopes-Ledesmas of Iloilo the Romualdez-Velosos of

Leyte, the Locsin-Montelibanos of Negros Occidental, the

Liboro-Abeledas of Occidental Mindoro, the Cojuangco-
Aquinos of Tarlac the Ututalum-Abubakar-Rasuls of Sulu,
etc. Unions of political families from two different
provinces also occur such as those of the Paredes-
Clarins (Abra-Bohol) Belmonte-Durans (Nueva Ecija-Albay),
Fortich-de Laras (Bukidnon-Misamis Oriental), Lecaros-

Marasigan (Marinduque-Batangas), Marcos-Romualdezes

(ilocos Norte-Leyte), Rodriguez-Magsaysays (Rizal-
Zambales) Cojuangco-Sumulongs (Tarlac-Rizal), Padilla-
delas Alas (Rizal-Batangas), etc.
An interesting development in recent years is the
husband-wife team. There are, for instance, (at the time
of writing) several of these husband-wife teams occupying
top public offices at the same time. Examples are the
Zigas of Albay (wife — Senator, husband — Representative);
the Forniers of Antique (wife — Governor, husband --
Representative); the Duranos of Cebu (wife -- City Mayor,
husband — Representative); the Crisologos of Ilocos
Sur (wife — Governor, husband — Representative); and

the Nepomucenos of Pampanga (wife — Representative,

husband — Governor), Cases of wives taking over their
husbands’ elective positions immediately after the latters’
 209

d e ath are not unusual. Finally, there are also cases

of in-law teams such as a father-in-law, son-in-law

team in the Senate ( R o d r i g u e z - M a g s a y s a y ) , and even a

mother-in-law (Governor), Son-in-law (Representative)

c o m b ination (Serra T y - P i m e n t e l )•

There is one important feature of this f a m i l y dynasty

system that n e eds to be po i n t e d out. L o o king at the

various p o s i t i o n s of the m e m b e r s of these ‘political

d y n a s t i e s ’, it will be n o ted that they can be g e n e r a l l y

categorized into two: on the h i g h e r level are the top

public p o s itions which have b e e n p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d

as of e l i t e - c a t e g o r y and, on the lower level, those that

fall mostly u n d e r the ’p r e - e l i t e ’ posts w h i c h we have

n o t e d in Tabl e s 4.3 and. 4.3-A. The impl i c a t i o n of this

is that the y o u n g e r members of the family are now in

p r e c isely the same p o sts occupied by their elders before

reaching top p u b l i c p o s itions and that under ’normal

c o n d i t i o n s ’ and, in due time, they should be able to

follow their footsteps, thereby ensuring the continuity

of the f a m i l y ’s political dominance.

D. RESUME

The p r o b l e m that was p r e s e n t e d in the b e g i n n i n g of

the chapter r e v o l v e d around the n a t u r e and c h a r a c t e r of

 210

po li tic al l ead er shi p in the Philippines. Who are the

power-holders? Are there distinct social form at ion s

f rom which they are drawn? What c o m m o n char ac ter is tic s

do the political elite have?

The empirical data and other evidence p r ese nt ed

above provide d o c u m e n t a t i o n to the m a i n pr op o s it i o n that

the p r i n c i p a l i a -type of le a d e rs h i p wh i c h d e vel op ed during

the colonial period has not m a t e r i a l l y changed; that

today's p ow er - wie ld ers c o n t in u e to be d r a w n p r ed o m in ant ly

from the socio-economic d o mi n a n ts in the community, the

group d esi gn ate d as the m o d e r n p r i n c i p a l i a .

The career pattern and recruitment of the political

elite clearly indicate that there had b e e n no new type

of le ade rsh ip that emerged since 1946. The new leaders

continue to ma nifest the same social class char ac ter is tic s

as the old p r i n c i p a l ! a .

Th ei r superior level of education, the exclusive

nature of the colleges t he y attended in the Ph il ippines

and their schooling abroad, the hi gh -s t a t us character

of their occupation, their h i g h income, style of living,

ass oci ational memberships, etc. — all suggest their

memb er shi p to the small up p e r strata minority.

The lim ite d na tur e of the social area of recruitment

has also p ro d u c e d a d y n a s t ic sort of p o lit ic al elite

 211

in the form of family political monopolies. Although

these ’family dynasties’ may be said to have been

produced by formal procedures sanctioned by the democratic

political formulas (i.e,, elections, appointments of

relatives, etc.) the hereditary nature of these

'successions’ are the telling symptoms of the existence

of an oligarchical system,

The Philippine political elite, we also noted,

are not only political decision-makers. From their ranks

are found landowners, bankers, shipping and land

transportation magnates, owners of newspapers, TV and

radio stations, owner-operators of private universities,

colleges and other educational institutions, industrialists,

directors of private corporations, importer-exporters,

timber concessionaires, owner-operators of public utilities,

government franchise-holders, lawyers and big corporations

(both Filipino and foreign), and other high-income

professionals# Socially, they belong to the most prestigious

and exclusive organizations. Membership in 'service’

and ’public policy' associations provides them with

further avenues for social leadership.

 212

The above illustrate the ties of the political

elite with the social structure. They also show that

the nature of their leadership is not merely 'political’

Power, wealth and prestige tend to merge in the same

hand s.
 213

CHAPTER V

THE ART OF KEEPING POWER: THE ELITE IN POLITICS

...the electoral contest takes place between

organized minorities controlling the
disorganized majority of voters, who may
choose between a small number of candidates
presented by those minorities.

Gaetano Mosca"^

This chapter examines the nature of Philippine

political parties, and the methods employed by the elite

in politics. How is elite dominance in the socio-economic
structure reflected in political organizations? How is

the blending of democratic ’political formulas1 with the

existing norms, as influenced by traditional practices
and the class system, manifested in elite political

techniques and behavior? Finally, how do the elite make

use of their general superiority over the masses in

politics?

1
Storia delle dottrine politiche, in James H. Meisel,
The Myth of the Ruling Class (Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press, 1958)5p .388.
 A. THE NATURE OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

THE HERITAGE OF THE PAST

In order to understand better the present nature of

Philippine political parties, it is necessary to sketch

briefly some of their important features as they

developed in the past. For this purpose, a diagram

which shows the beginnings and development of political

organizations is presented in Figure III to supplement

the discussion which follows.

On the left half of Figure III is shown the

development of Philippine political parties from 1900 to

1941. A few features in the diagram need further

explanation.

The first feature that should be noted is that the

political parties or factions that developed had one

common beginning: the principalia group which, as was

previously noted, comprised the ruling class under the

Spaniards. The first formal political party, the

Federalista Party, organized in I 9 OO under the auspices

of the American authorities, has already been discussed

in Chapter II. This party, as was pointed out, was the

only one legally recognized and allowed to exist by the

colonial authorities up to I 9 O 6 and its composition was

predominantly upper class. The elements who leaned

 215

FIGURE III

PHILIPPINE POLITICAL 0R0UP3 AND PARTIES. 1896-1963

EATIPUNAM
(Naas Revolutionary Sooioty)
SPANISH
COLONIAL ADM. 1
i 1945 I
1
NACIONALISTA PARTI
(Oanana)
I
1

CACIQUES OB P R I N C I P A L S PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

IPHIL. RJEVOLUTIOHART GOVT.

Radloale
/ v~ AMERICAN
1946 DenooraYlo|
|_ A1 llano«» 1
NACIONALISTA PARTI
(Oanana Paotlon)
NACIONALISTA PARTI
(LIBERAL NISO - Norma □
(Irreoonoll abl ee) COLONIAL ADM.
1947 NACIONALISTA PARTI LIBERAL PARTI
1900
1901
_
«molonali.it»
_ Party*
I Partldo PartIda
1949 NACIONALISTA PARTI LIBERAL PARTI
(Qulrino Faction]
j Liberal Party
(Avelino Faotian]
1902 Union Obrer««
1 Liberal« Denoorata*
[ Citize na Parly (
/
1905 Rapublloan
Party«
1906 ----- ----------[(n
\ /
a t i o n a l i s t s )
1951
4- (Taiiad
NACIONALISTA PIRTf- 1 LIBE■RAL PARTI

PARTI DO PAHTIDO PARTI DO UNION

______ ^ "\l

INDEP KNDISTA UROENTISTA »ACIOHAL 1953

PAHTIDO UNION
NACIONALISTA
V / 1955 I NACIONALISTA PARTT-i
1907 PAHTIDO PARTIDO
DP-CP-COALITION 1*^
1 NACIONALISTA PR0CRE3ISTA

i. \
1914 I MACIONALISTA PARTIll Teroerlstas PARTIDO 1957 NACIONALISTA P Nationalist- LIBERAL PARTI
(Oemena Faotlon)||(3andlko Paotlon) PR0CRESI8TA Citizens Part]

1917
\ /
PAHTIDO
DEMOCRATA
JA
If
Progressive P«rly
of the Phil.
T / _____ : r

z \ PAHTIDO
1959 NACIONALISTA PARTI-|
NCP COALITION
Grand Allianon LIBERAL PARTI
1921 NACIONALISTA MACI0NALI3TA
(Uttljeraonal lata (Coleotlvlata ) DEVUCRATA
I
1(Oemena Paotlon) 1 (Quezon Paotlon]

1924 iDP
IHACIONALISTACONSOLIDADO i
(Quezon)EA
HR
OT
CI
RD
AO
TA 1961 NACIONALISTAPARTI 1 LIBERALPARTI
^ ^ U n l t e d Opposition) 1
1----------- .
COALITION

A
1 NACIONALISTA PARTI 1
(Quaaon)
NATIONAL UUP k EHB
COUNCIL
PARTIDO
DEKOCRATA
19)0 tCcBnunlstf
1963 ILabör 11 NACIONALISTA PARTI — ■"'lLIBERj

1931 NACIONALISTA p a r t i Partldo Don 00rata| liFirJ I if (InAependente J~"[

(Quaaon) DIS30LNED

\ 4 T ~ ISunulong-Rsoto
1933 ISoolallit^ ■P (PROS) I SP (ANTIS)] Paotlon
— Direction of party or faotional change.
(Oanana) | (Quaaon) |
— Party Or faction in power.
1 Perfeoto
I SaEaTiala1
'I Paotlon • Short-lived, not aanotloned
I__ or supprasaad
(Hotel There ware other snail provincial political
1934 PAHTIDO PAHTIDO
groupings whloh appeared fron tine to tine bat they
PRO-INDEPEKDENCIA NACIONALISTA were politically lnalgnlfloant and aooa disappeared .)
DEHOCRATA DBIOCRATA
(Oanana Paotlon] (Quaaon Paotlon) SOURCESI
Pellpe Buenoanlno, "The Federal Party of tha Philippine»,"
Report of the War Department. 1901, Part IV, Exhibit B.
NACIONALISTA Florentine Torres, ^Origin and Formation of tho Federal
1935 PARTI
Party," Ibid.. Exhibit C.
(<biezon-Oemena Pualon)
Marino N. lalaw, Tho Developnent of Philippine Politloo.
(Oriental Commercial C o . , Manila, 1926).
. Philippine Government. (Manila! 1948)
Dapan Liang« The Development of Philippine Polltloal PaVtloo.
1941 NACIONALISTA
(Hongkong! South China H o m i n g Post , 1939).
PARTI
Jose H. Aruogo, Philippine O o v e m n e n t in Aotlon. (Nanllal
1942- University Publishing Co., Ino., 1956).
1949 JAPANESE OCCUPATION Reporte of the Conwleolon on Eleotlone. 1947-1963«
Official Directories, Senate of the Philippines. 1954-1961
Offlolal Dlrootorles, House of lopreoontatlroa. 1946-1965
 216

towards the masses, the radicals or irreconeilables

as they were called, who demanded complete and immediate
independence did not prosper. The parties or

organizations they formed such as the first N acionalista

Party (l90l) of Poblete, Gomez, and Alvarez, the Union

Obrera (or Workers Union, a militant labor organization

formed in 1902 by Don Isabelo de los Reyes and later

continued by Dr Dominador Gomez) and the Republican

Party (19 O 5 ) of Gregorio Aglipay, the Bishop of the

Revolutionary Government who seceded from the Roman Church,
2
were all banned. Other parties, which mildly hinted on
independence as a remote goal such as the Partido Liberal
and the Partido Democrata were also short-lived. Also,
as previously mentioned, the Federalistas had practically
a monopoly of public positions open to Filipinos up to
1906 and it was only then that the second Nacionalista
Party was allowed to be formed. Like the Federalista,
the new party was also composed of members of the
principalia. From its political victory over the

2
Cf. Hayden, op. cit., p.907j footnote 4*. Even after
the lifting of the Sedition Law (Act No. 292, Philippine
Commission) in 1902, groups desiring to organize political
parties must seek the approval of the Philippine Commission
composed of Americans and some top Federalistas.
Cf. Maximo M. Kalaw, Philippine Government (Manila:
Author1s Publication, 1948), pp .143-4,Aruego, op, cit,,
p.737.
 217

F e d e r a l i s t a s in the 19^7 election, until the grant of

pol i t i c a l i n d e p endence by the A m e r i c a n s in 1 9 ^6 , the

N a c i o n a l i s t a P a rty re i g n e d supreme. Thus, opposition

and ruling parties b e l o n g e d to the same s o cio-economic

group.

A second feature is the l o o seness of party

a f f i l i a t i o n or identity. As can be seen from the diagram,

there was a c o n tinual fac t i o n a l break-up, fusi o n or

consolidation, then d i v i s i o n again, until all these were

r e s o l v e d by the establishment of a o n e - p a r t y system in

1935 u n der C o m m o n w e a l t h President M a n u e l L. Quezon,

w h ose perso n a l d o m i n a n c e in g o v e r n m e n t a l and p a rty

affairs aptly earned h i m the title of * supreme leader*

3
or Ej S u p r e m o . This pattern demonstrates that a l t h o u g h

the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y assumed several forms d u r i n g a

g e n e r a t i o n of c o n t i n u e d p o l i t i c a l dominance, the 1parties*

that emerged were r e a l l y factions f o r m e d by ce r t a i n

d e f e c t i n g leaders w i t h their r e s p e c t i v e personal

*followers * .

A third feature, r e l a t e d to the second, is that the

break-ups or div i s i o n s were m a i n l y due to personal

rivalries for p a rty d o m i n a n c e b e t w e e n top leaders or

p e r sonal revolts against the leadership. S a n d i k o fs

3
F o r a full d i s c u s s i o n of this i n t e r e s t i n g period, see
Hayden, o p . c i t . , ch a p t e r VII, *O n e - P a r t y Government*.
 218

secession from the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y in 1914 and his

m e r g e r w i t h the Prog r e s i s t a s was a revolt against the

’o l i garchy d o m i n a t e d by S p e a k e r O s m e n a , ’ w h i c h was
4
’subservient to the A m e r i c a n s ’ . Also, as m e n t i o n e d in

C h a p t e r II, the break - u p of the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y into

two factions in 1921 was brought about by the personal

r i v alry of O s m e n a and Quezon, the former a d v o c a t i n g

leadership by a single p e r s o n (u n i p e r s o n a l i s t a ) , and the

latter (and challenger) w a n t i n g collective (colectivista)

leadership. T h e y m e r g e d again in 1924 u n d e r the

N a c i o n a l i s t a C o n s o l i d a d o , w i t h Q u e z o n e m e r g i n g as the

dominant figure, only to b r e a k up again in 1933 into two

factions of A n tis (a group led by Q u e z o n w h i c h was

against the H a r e - H a w e s - C u t t i n g Law) and the Pros (led by

O s m e n a w h i c h was in f a v o r ) . T h e electoral t r i u m p h of

Q u e z o n ’s f a c tion in 1934 f o l l o w e d by the ’coalition* of

his group w i t h O s m e n i s t a s on Jun e l6, 1 9 3 5 5 p r o d u c e d the

o n e - party system which endured until i n d e p e n d e n c e in

4
Hayden, I b i d ., p . 3 2 2 .
5
That the b r e a k - u p was due to personal r i v a l r y rather
than to d i f f e rences in p r i n c i p l e was d e m o n s t r a t e d by the
fact that the A n t i s , who triumphed in the f a c t i o n a l fight,
succeeded in h a v i n g the T y d i n g s - M c D u f f i e (independence)
A c t passed by the U.S. Congress, w h i c h was e s s e n t i a l l y
the same as the H a r e - H a w e s - C u t t i n g Ac t to w h i c h they
objected. Cf. M.M. Kalaw, o p . c i t . , p.151; Hayden, I b i d . ,
p .362.
 219

1946. T h e r e were no genuine differences of political

principles a m o n g the c o n t e n d i n g p o l i tical figures who

struggled for power. The political ‘p a r t i e s 1 were

e s s e n t i a l l y aggrupations of m e n who h e l d identical

views on basic social, economic and p o l i tical problems.

T h e y were parties of the ‘haves* who came fro m the same

social class, who h ad the same stakes in the status q u o ,

and who r e p r e s e n t e d the same interests. This condition

explains the p a u c i t y of real and basic issues in

P hilipp ine politics w h i c h p e r sists to this day. As one

Fil i p i n o pol i t i c a l scientist h a d c o r r e c t l y observed,

‘the w o r k i n g issues and conflicts in F i l i p i n o politics

are the intramural problems and d i f f e rences w h i c h arise

among men who u n d e r s t a n d one another, because they come

from the same social class and, therefore, r e g a r d the

problems of politics from the same v a n t a g e point in the

social s t r u c t u r e 1 /

A final feature that n e e d s e m p h a s i z i n g is that no

w o r k i n g class (or counter-elite) p o l i t i c a l groups or

parties were able to prosper. The p r e c edent esta b l i s h e d

by the colonial auth o r i t i e s in the s u p p r e s s i o n of the

U n i o n O b r e r a d u ring the early years of o c c u p a t i o n was

6
O.D. Corpuz, ‘F i l i p i n o P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and Politics* ,
C o m m e n t , N o . 7 } T h i r d Quarter, 1958, pp.l4-5*
 220

continued and it is manifested in various forms to this

day. 7 It seems that what Merton calls a ’self-fulfilling

p r o p h e c y 1 is true in this case. Labor, in the eyes of

the elite, was closely associated with sedition and must

be carefully watched. Because of this, labor in fact

became sedi t i o u s . Labor g r o u p s , whether composed of the

peasantry or urban workers, were always watched with

suspicion whenever they formed political associations

designed to promote their m e m b e r s ’ interests through

collective action. The standard elite defense was that

these were ’subversive* groups whose aims were inimical

to ’national interests’ . The American authorities and

the elite felt that they had valid reasons for the

violent suppression of mass organizations or parties such

as the C o l o r u m s , the T a n g u l a n s , the Communist Party, the

Socialist Party, and the Sakdalista Party, for these

groups had indeed staged uprisings or had engaged in

7
After declaring the first recorded strike in the country
against the Fabrica de Tabacos in 1902, Don Isabelo de
los Reyes was jailed for four months for ’sedition’ .
Dr Gomez, who succeeded de los Reyes as leader of the
Union Obrera was also prosecuted after the Labor Day
parade in I 9 O 3 for ’sedition’ and for ’organizing an
illicit, subversive and illegal association’ . Cf.
Department of Labor, Fact-Finding Survey of Agrarian
Problems in the Philippines (Manila: University of the
Philippines, 1937)> p .80; ’State of the U n i o n s ’ , The
Manila C h r o n i c l e , May 1, 1958.
 221

rebellious a c t i v i t i e s at v a r i o u s times. T he evidence,

however, seems to indicate that these groups m ay have

been *g o a d e d into f e r o c i t y by d e s p a i r 1 . A l t h o u g h the

authorities o f t e n attr i b u t e d these h a p p e n i n g s to

’rel i g i o u s f a n a t i c i s m ’ (e.g. the C o l o r u m and T a n g u l a n

uprisings) or to a l i e n - o r i e n t e d agitators (e.g.

Socialists, Communists, and S a k d a l i s t a s ) who w a n t e d to

subvert the ’d e m o c r a t i c 1 order, the d i s t u r b a n c e s were in

fact r e b e l l i o n against real and existing social injustices.

One A m e r i c a n observer, for instance, wrote in c o n n e c t i o n

w i t h the T a y u g uprising: ’I d o u b t . . . i f y ou could find

ten A m e r i c a n s in the I s lands who do not believe that the

poor p e a s a n t s who rose against c o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t y at

T a y u g wer e r e b e l l i n g ch i e f l y against "caciquism",

o
a g r a r i a n o p p r e s s i o h and C o n s t a b u l a r y a b u s e s . ’ Indeed,

8
F o r d i s c u s s i o n s of v a r i o u s u p r i s i n g s d u r i n g the A m e r i c a n
p e r i o d see D.R. Sturtevant, ’S a k d a l i s m and Phi l i p p i n e
R a d i c a l i s m ’ , J o u r n a l of A s i a n S t u d i e s . vol.XXI, n o .2,
February, 1 9 6 2 , p p . 199-213; H a r l a n Crippen, ’Phi l i p p i n e
A g r a r i a n Unrest: H i s t o r i c a l B a c k g r o u n d ’ , Sc i e n c e and
S o c i e t y , 1946, n o .4; B. Entenberg, ’A g r a r i a n R e f o r m and
the H u k b a l a h a p ’ , Far E a s t e r n S u r v e y , vol.XV, N o v e m b e r l 6 ,
1946, p p . 245-8; K e n n e t h K u r i h a r a , L a bor in the P h i l i p p i n e
E c o n o m y , op, c i t , ; J o s e p h R a l s t o n Hayden, The P h i l i p p i n e s :
A S t u d y in N a t i o n a l D e v e l o p m e n t , o p . c i t . , chapter XV;
and the w r i t e r ’s The S o c i a l i s t M o v e m e n t in the P h i l i p p i n e s ,
u n p u b l i s h e d M.A. thesis (Political S c i e n c e ) , U n i v e r s i t y
of the P hilippines, I9 6 I, chapter III.
9
R a l s t o n Hayden, ’C o o p e r a t i o n in the P n i l i p p i n e s F o u n d to
C a r r y Its P e n a l t i e s ’ , C h r i s t i a n S c i e n c e M o n i t o r , S e p t e m b e r
1 2 , 1 9 3 1 j q u o t e d in Hayden, I b i d .. p . 3 8 0 .
 222

there was utter neglect of their interests and welfare

by those in the government. As Hayden noted in connection

with the Sakdal uprising, 1nothing could more clearly

suggest the chasm between the classes in the Philippines,

or the danger of revolt that is faced by the minority of

1haves1 that rule the majority of have nots' ."*"^ There

were also cases of denials of basic guarantees provided

by the ’bill of rights’ involving freedom of association

and the exercise of civil rights, such as the refusal by

the authorities to grant permits for public meetings,"*""*"

12
denial of the use of insular mails, and even the use of

violence by landlords in preventing their tenants from

joining organizations of their own choosing. 13 Under

10
J.R. Hayden, I b i d ., p.391*
11
Cf. Hayden, I b i d ., p.393; also People of the Philippines
vs. Crisanto Evangelista and Abelardo R a m o s , 57 Philippine
372-5.
12
During the turbulent thirties, the authorities kept a
constant watch on known ’dissidents’ and those suspected
of receiving subversive literature from abroad were
barred from the use of insular mails. Cf. The New York
Times, March 27, 193^5 Hayden, I b i d ., p.383*
13
Kurihara, for instance, noted that there were occasions
in the 1 9 3 0 ’s when tenants who became members of the
Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra (AMT) and the Socialist
Party were found dead, ’murdered in cold blood’ by private
guards of sugar centrals or by the police. (See Kenneth
Kurihara, Labor in the Philippine Economy, o p ._ci t . , p.28.)
Luis Taruc one of the leaders of the AMT and the postwar
Huk rebellion, also complained: ’When the landlords heard
 223

these circumstances, it was ex t r e m e l y dif f i c u l t for a

pea c e f u l and legal n o n - e l i t e pol i t i c a l o p p o s i t i o n to

develop. T h ese unfo r t u n a t e d e v e l o p m e n t s led to

d i s a f f e c t i o n and dissidence w h ich c o n t i n u e d in some parts

of Ce n t r a l L u z o n up to the present time. It has also

r e s ulted in the v i r t u a l m o n o p o l y of ‘l e g a l 1 c o m p e t i t i o n

for p o l i t i c a l power by the parties of the elite.

PO S T W A R P O L I T I C A L PARTIES

C o m m o n O r i g i n and F a c t i o n a l D i v i s i o n s. T he p o s twar

deve l o p m e n t of political parties has gen e r a l l y fo l l o w e d

the prewar pattern. As can be seen on the right h a l f of

F i g u r e III, there was only one ’m o t h e r 1 p a r t y f r o m w h i c h

they emerged: the prewar N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y led by

14
President Osmena. T he same looseness and f l e x i b i l i t y

13 (C ontinued)
of their tenants joining the AMT, they tried intimidation,
t h r e atening to evict them. Some tenants b o wed to such
pressure, losing sight of their rights in their anxiety
to provide for their families. Others who were more
m i l itant r e f u s e d to be ev i c t e d and called for h e l p from
the AMT. T h e n a strike of all the l a n d l o r d ’s tenants
w o u l d protest the eviction. T he landlords c a l l e d the
Philippine C o n s t a b u l a r y to carry out the evi c t i o n or use d
their own private armies, such as the special police of
the Baluyots, one of the biggest l a n d o w n i n g families and
an old po l i t i c a l power in the province. W h e n we h ad to,
we fought the S p e c i a l Poli c e and the P C . 1 (Luis M. Taruc,
B o r n of the P e o p l e ,(New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers,
1953), p . 39 .)
14
Q u e z o n died in N e w Y o r k in 1944 w h ile h e a d of the
Philippine government i n - e x i l e , le a v i n g O s m e n a at the
h e l m of the C o m m o n w e a l t h Government.
 224

of m e m b e r s h i p and p r a c t i c a l l y the same reasons for

factional divisions were evident. The p a t t e r n was

started in the postwar p e r i o d by P r e s i d e n t M a n u e l Roxas

when, as S e n a t e President, he challenged President

O s m e n a 1s leadership, f o r m e d his own faction — the

'Liberal W i n g ’ of the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y — and ran for

the P r e s i d e n c y against the latter in the first postwar

election h e l d in A p r i l 1946. R o x a s won.

In 1949, a year a f ter V i c e - P r e s i d e n t E l p i d i o Quirino

15
took over from P r e s ident M a n u e l Roxas, the n e w L i beral

P a r t y (the former ’L i b e r a l W i n g ’ of the NP) was split

into two factions. S e n a t e President J o s e Avelino, who

was late R o x a s ’ c a m paign m a n a g e r in 1946 and who by 1949

was in control of the L i b e r a l P a r t y m a c h i n e r y w a n t e d to

challenge Qu i r i n o for the p r e s i d e n t i a l n o m i nation. But

1
President Q u i r i n o was d e c i d e d on r u n n i n g for re-election.

It seemed that it was be c a u s e of this cha l l e n g e that

Quirino o r d e r e d an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of A v e l i n o ’s conduct.

A v elino was ousted f rom the S e n a t e Presidency, was charged

with ’a n o m a l i e s ’ in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the beer and other

15
Presid ent M a n u e l R o x a s died of a heart a t t a c k on A p r i l
15, 1948, in the U.S. C l a r k A i r F o rce Base in Pampanga.
16
Cf. Jose M. Aruego, P h i l i p p i n e G o v e r n m e n t in A c t i o n
(Manila: U n i v e r s i t y P u b l i s h i n g Company, Inc., 1956), p.759*
 225

scandals 1from w h i c h it is believed, he p r o f i t e d a huge

17
sum’. A v e l i n o 1s r e a ction to this i n v e s t i g a t i o n is

interesting:

W h y did y o u have to order an investigation,

H o n o r a b l e M r President? If y o u cannot permit
abuses y o u must at least tolerate them.
W h a t are we in power for? We are not
hypocrites. W h y should we p r e t e n d to be
saints w h e n in r e a l i t y we are not? W e are
not angels. A n d besides w h e n we die, we all
go to h e l l .18

A v e lino a b a ndoned the Li b e r a l P a r t y and f o r m e d his

own Liberal P a r t y w h i c h was called the LP 'Avelino W i n g ’ .

(See F i gure III.) He ran for P r e sident but lost to

Quirino. After the elections, Qu i r i n o and A v e l i n o were

reconciled. In the so - c a l l e d 1U n i o n C l u b E n t e n t e 1 , the

two were r e p o r t e d to have p a t c h e d up their quarrel,

Quirino agr e e i n g to have A v e l i n o ’s s u s p ension from the

Senate lifted (he was found guilty of the above m e n t i o n e d

charges and suspended for one year) on c o n d i t i o n that the

’Av e l i n o W i n g ’ S e n ators (Emiliano Tri o Tirona, Pablo

A n g e l e s David, V i c e n t e J. F r a n c i s c o and Avelino) would

vot e for the p r o c l a m a t i o n of Q u i r i n o and Lopez in the

Senate. (it should be n o t e d that the N P at this time

17
Alip, P o l i t i c a l and C u l t u r a l H i s t o r y of the P h i l i p p i n e s ,
vol.I, o p . c i t . , p . 345.
18
Q u o t e d in El p i d i o Quirino, ’M e m o i r s ’ , S u n d a y Times
Magazine, J a n u a r y 27? 1 9 5 7 5 p p . 25 - 6 .
 226

was re p o r t e d to be p l a n n i n g to b l o c k Q u i r ino's

p r o c l a m a t i o n as President o w i n g to the wh o l e s a l e frauds

and ter r o r i s m p e r p e t r a t e d by the L i b e r a l P a r t y d u r i n g

the 1919 P r e s i d e n t i a l elections.) There seems to be

substance to this r e p o r t e d agreement as was shown by the

fact that A v e l i n o 1s sus p e n s i o n from the Senate was

inde e d lifted, he and the other A v e l i n i s t a s in the

Sena t e v o t e d for the p r o c l a m a t i o n of Quirino and Lopez,

and ’he and his wife left for E u r o p e and A m e r i c a on a

pleasure trip, and Pre s i d e n t Quirino made a formal

anno u n c e m e n t that A v e l i n o was t r a v e l l i n g as his ( Q u i r i n o ’s)

p e r s o n a l envoy a b r o a d ’ .^

U p to 1953» the L i b e r a l Party was in power. But the

local elections in N o v e m b e r of 1951» however, reflected

a change in the p o l i t i c a l wind. O f f i c i a l c o r r u p t i o n h ad

19
Alip, op. c i t . , p p . 3^6-7. M a n y o b s e rvers believe that
this was one of the w o rst in p o s t - w a r P h i l i p p i n e elections.
I n several provinces, the n u m b e r of r e g i s t e r e d voters
exceeded the population. V i o l e n c e and te r r o r i s m were
rampant. The C o m m i s s i o n on E l e c t i o n figures on the
n u m b e r of voters, for instance, showed that the r e g i s t e r e d
voters in 19^+9 ex c e e d e d the 1951 r e g i s t e r e d v o ters by
477,917. (1949 = 5,231,224; 1951 = 4,754,307.) In a
p e r s o n a l interview, C o m m i s s i o n on E l e c t i o n s officials
i n f o r m e d the w r i t e r that m a n y r e g i s t r a t i o n lists in the
provinces of L a n a o , N e g r o s Occidental, Cebu, Cavite, and
others ’were padded, b a llot boxes were lost, voters were
coerced, and m a n y k i l l i n g s were r e p o r t e d ’ .
20
Alip, i b i d .
 227

grown to enormous proportions. Describing this period,

Sol H. Gwekoh, biographer of Philippine Presidents

wrote:
The Liberal party had its heyday during the
terms of Roxas and Quirino from 19^6 to 1953*
But the exercise of that power was horribly
misused and terribly abused by certain party
men with the commission of wholesale and
flagrant election frauds, political terrorism,
violence, maladministration, etc. These abuses
were highlighted by the infamous Chinese
immigration quota scandal in which senators,
congressmen, Malacanang officials and other
influence peddlers exacted from ^2,000 to
jp*5 j000 from every Chinese immigrant; the
equally infamous racket concerning the
deportation of Chinese Communists in which top
suspects shelled out as high as ^200,000 each;
the racket involving 27,000 overstaying
Chinese which continued to be the source of
some powerful official’s tong money and
electoral campaign funds; the ^5,000-bed
installed in Malacanang by a Liberal
administration; the import control, and the
scandalous Tambubong real estate deal.
Quoting from a news item, Gwekoh continued:
Stories were told of big parties given by
graft-made individuals whose guests included
the so-called best people: high society,
dignitaries of the church, and prominent
public officials. The high and mighty enjoyed
their hospitality and food and wine and small
talk, and the grafters were in turn invited
and accepted as guests in the best homes.
Even the best people betrayed no sign of
condemnation; on the contrary, they showed
implied approval.21

21
Sol H. Gwekoh, Triumph Over Poverty (Manila: G. and G.
Enterxjrises , 1962), pp.7^-3 *
 228

By 1952 Q u i r i n o 1s own D e f e n s e Secretary, Ramon

M a g s a y s a y (LP R e p r e s e n t a t i v e fro m Zambales), started to

criticize the administration. On F e b r u a r y 28, 1953» he

r e s i g n e d from the L i b e r a l P a r t y and joined the

N a c i o n a l i s t a Party, w h i c h p r o m p t l y m ade h i m their

Presidential standard b e a r e r in the N o v e m b e r 1953 elections.

O t h e r defections followed. A m b a s s a d o r Carlos R o m u l o ,

r e c a l l e d from the U.N. by President Q u i r i n o to d e liver

the ke y - n o t e address at the LP convention, presented

h i m s e l f instead as a c a n d idate for the p r e s i d e n t i a l

n o m i n a t i o n d u r i n g the convention. He was, however,

22
d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the proc e e d i n g s a nd w a l k e d out.

V i c e - P r e s i d e n t F e r n a n d o Lopez, the LP r u n n i n g - m a t e of

Pre s i d e n t Quirino in the 19^+9 elections also a b a n d o n e d the

LP and w i t h Romu l o f o r m e d the Dem o c r a t i c Party. Under

this banner, R o mulo ran for President and Lopez for

Vice-President, but several months later both w i t h d r e w

and joined the N P a g a inst the Liberals. The L i b eral

P a r t y continued to be rack e d w i t h disension. In a speech

before the r u l i n g h i e r a r c h y of the LP on F e b r u a r y 25,

1953, President Q u i r i n o showed his c o n c e r n on this

development. He said:

22
R o mulo w a n t e d a secret ballot but the m o t i o n was lost.
Cf. Hartendorp, op. c i t , , p.284.
 229

. . .we lose ourselves in m u t u a l recriminations,

in in t e r n a l squabbles, in political or p a r t i s a n
or sectional diff e r e n c e s that are d i s t r a c t i n g
us and a l l o w i n g the O p p o s i t i o n to cap i t a l i z e
on them. T h e y are small d i f f e r e n c e s — not
f u n d a m e n t a l ones. In C e b u for instance,
0 smena w o u l d like to d o m i n a t e the province.
C u enco objects. I n L e y t e T o r r e s says, ’Well,
we are Quirinistas. We s h o u l d lead the p o l i c y
of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b e c a u s e we w o n in the
last e l e c t i o n ’ . Ribo, the Avel i n i s t a , says,
’No, we have a l r e a d y c o m b i n e d ourselves. Let
us get together, pull t o g e t h e r ’ . In Pampanga,
we have two rival colossi — D a v i d and
Baluyut. W h a t shall we do? Their differences
are not fundamental. P a r t y p r i n c i p l e or
questions are not involved. T h e y revolve
a r o u n d leadership. T h e y are jockeying for
influence, for power, in o r d e r to win
r e c o g n i t i o n as the leader of the province and
e v e n tually of the n a t i o n . 23

The L i b e r a l P a r t y lost the elections and the NP

r u led until 1961. Th e sudden d e a t h of M a g s a y s a y in a

plane c r a s h in C e b u in 1 9 5 7 5 however, pro d u c e d some

s ide-effects in p a r t y alignments. The y o u n g m en who

surr o u n d e d Magsaysay, became d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h the NP

and the n e w P r e s ident (Garcia) and seceded from the Party,

2k
f o r m i n g the P r o g r e s s i v e P a rty of the Philippines. By

this time, Senators R e c t o and T a n a d a h ad also b r o k e n away

f r o m the NP and f o r m e d the N a t i o n a l i s t - C i t i z e n s Party,

23
E l p i d i o Q u i r i n o , T h e Quirino W a y (Col l e c t i o n of Sp e e c h e s
and Addresses, 1 9 5 5 ) 5 p .3 ^ 1 .
2k
F o u n d e d by M a n u e l Manahan, M a g s a y s a y ’s f o rmer C u s toms
Commissioner, who ran for President in the 1957 elections.
 230

only to ’coalesce* a g ain with, the NP in 1959* The

P r o g r e s s i v e Party was joined by d i s e n c h a n t e d Liberals

and N a c i o n a l i s t a s , and they f o rmed the ’G r a n d A l l i a n c e ’

(See F i g u r e III). But the 'Alliance* failed to make

m u c h h e a d w a y in the 1959 elections and in 1961 they

25
joined the L i b e r a l Party. The electoral v i c t o r y of

the Liberals in the 1961 elections h a d i n t e r e s t i n g

results. Just a few mont h s a f ter the elections, a number

of N a c i o n a l i s t a C o n g r e s s m e n f o rmed a group called the

’A l l i e d M a j o r i t y ’ w h i c h joined the Liberals. L a t e r their

followers in the province s were d e f e c t i n g ’en m a s s e ’ to

26
the Liberals. In 1 9 6 3 , po l i t i c a l m a n o e u v e r i n g s were

already b e i n g made for the 1965 P r e s i d e n t i a l elections.

Vice-President P e l a e z , a proba b l e LP contender for the

Presidency, was i m p l i c a t e d by his own p a r t y in the

27
Sto n e h i l l scandal. He r e s i g n e d from the LP and joined

the NP in 1 9 6 3 » S e nate Pre s i d e n t M a r c o s a n o ther contender

for the presi d e n t i a l nomination, also broke w i t h President

25
Vide, Jose M. Crisol, ’A Lost T h i r d F o r c e ? ’ , E x a m i n e r ,
M a r c h 4, 1 9 6 3 ? p.7> et s e q .
26
F o r example, in Davao, 1,000 NP followers became LP men;
Batangas, 5 OO > S u r i g a o , 1,200; Zambales, 3 >000; Surigao,
1,200; Abra, 1,000. Vide, M a n i l a C h r onicle (Provincial
Department), issues of 1 9 6 2 : O c t o b e r 4, 1 0 } l 4 ; N o v e m b e r
19) 2 6 , 27; and D e c e m b e r 2.
27
This i n t e r e s t i n g event will be d i s c u s s e d in the last
section.
 231

M a c a p a g a l who s i g nified his i n t e n t i o n to get the

28
n o m i n a t i o n himself. Some of the rG r a n d A l l i a n c e 1

m e m b e r s have also b r o k e n from the LP and were

c o n t e m p l a t i n g on e s t a b l i s h i n g a n e w ‘T h i r d F o r c e 1 .

F a i l u r e of L a b o r or Mass P a r t i e s . T h e r e were two

i n s t ances in the po s t w a r period w h e n peasant and labor

groups a t t e mpted to compete d i r e c t l y f or political power

but in both instances t h e y failed.

T h e first oc c a s i o n was the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the

Democratic Alliance in 19^5. T he ci r c u m s t a n c e s l e ading

to the f o r m a t i o n of this p o l i tical group are significant

and w a r r a n t special c o n s i d e r a t i o n for they ind i c a t e d a

deviation, even only for a b r ief period, from

t r a d i t i o n a l elite p o l itical aggrupations. Its eventual

disintegration, however, d e m o n s t r a t e d the problems

e n c o u n t e r e d by the n o n - e l i t e in a t t e m p t i n g to share

p o l itical power w i t h the elite. It also showed the

strength of the t r a d i t i o n a l l y - e s t a b l i s h e d forces.

T h e r e had been two i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s o c c a sioned

by the war and the J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n of the P h i l ippines

w h i c h were d i r e c t l y l i nked w i t h the f o r m a t i o n of the

28
At the time of writing, S e nate President Marcos, L i b e r a l
Party P r e s i d e n t up to 1964, was ru n n i n g for the p r e s i d e n c y
as the official candidate of the N a c i o n a l i s t a Party.
 232

Democratic Alliance. One was the problem of

’collaboration’ with the Japanese and the other was the
'peace and order’ problem brought about by the emergence
of an armed guerrilla peasantry during the Japanese

occupation.
As is usually the case, the dominant political
elements generally collaborate with a victorious regime,

whether domestic or foreign, in order to maintain their

dominant positions and to safeguard their interests.

This has already been demonstrated in the study’s

discussion of the principalia’s role under the Spaniards,

the ’support’ that the leading members gave to the
Philippine Revolution when it showed signs of success,
their hasty abandonment of the same when it faced
imminent defeat, and the enthusiastic collaboration they
gave to the American colonial regime. The only probable
exception to this is when a new regime unmistakeably
shows its hostility to elite interests, when it threatens
to dispossess them or reduce their privileges and
influence; in which case, they resist by force or other
means in the name of ’patriotism’ or some other slogans
that appeal to, and can arouse the support of, the masses.
The Japanese military regime, while harsh, was not
basically hostile to the elite. It was no surprise,
 233

therefore, that many of the elite collaborated with the

Japanese. One Congressman, for instance, claimed that
117 of the 22 surviving senators and 60 of the 88
surviving members of the House had been collaborators
"like himself"1.^
But there were also resistance groups who fought the

Japanese throughout the occupation. Among these was a

peasant-based guerrilla army, the Hukbalahap (Hukbo_ng

Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or the People1s Army Against the

Japanese) which was led by the Commonwealth-discredited

Socialist and Communist leaders. Aside from fighting

the Japanese, the Hukbalahap also organized local

30
governments in Central and Southern Luzon.
This development, therefore, threatened to disrupt
the traditional landlord dominance in these areas.
Furthermore, the war had created the opportunity for the
discontented peasantry in Central Luzon to settle old
scores. Although they looked upon the Japanese invaders

as their immediate enemy, they probably had not forgotten

the years of exploitation and oppression they suffered

29
C i t e d in A.V.H. Hartendorp, o p . c i t . , p.210.
30
They organized the BUDC barrio councils and municipal
governments. By war1s end, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and
Laguna had Huk provincial governors. See Taruc, op. cit.,
P.152.
 234

u n d e r their landlords. This was c o m p l i c a t e d by the Tact

that m a n y oT the landlords c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h the

Jap a n e s e and 'they became in the eyes oT the tenants not

only the e xploiters oT the m a sses but also traitors to

their country'. 31 Kidnappings, c o n f i s c a t i o n of property,

32
and ki l l i n g s were reported. The rec k o n i n g came swiftly.

M a n y of the landlords sought sanctuary in M a n i l a or

elsewhere and the peasants were left m a s ters of the

countrysides.

When the Americans re t u r n e d in 1945, they found

these local governments set up by the H u k s in C e n t r a l and

S o u t h e r n Luzon. The A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y u n d e r G e n eral

M a c A r t h u r and the C o m m o n w e a l t h government of 0 smena faced

a dilemma. What was to be done w i t h the collaborators?

What about the l e f t - w i n g - l e d peasant guerrillas?

It should be n o t e d that there was a clear-cut

W a s h i n g t o n p o licy on J a p a n e s e c o l l a b o r a t o r s and it was

that 'those who have c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h the enemy must be

r e m o v e d from aut h o r i t y and influence over the political

31
C l a u d e A. Buss, ' I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 in S h i r l e y Jenkins,
A m e r i c a n E c o nomic P o l i c y T o w a r d s the P h i l i p p i n e s , op. c i t . ,
P-5 .
32
Cf. W i l l i a m Owens, 'Will the Huks R e v o l t ? ’ , A s i a and the
A m e r i c a s , February, 1946, p.55-
 235

and economic life of the country1.33 Clearly, this

official Washington policy was difficult to carry out.

There were several factors that tended to work against

it. The first was that if 1those who have collaborated
with the enemy must be removed from authority and

influence over the political and economic_life of the

country1, it would have meant a major disturbance of the

prewar status quo for, as already mentioned, many of the

elite collaborated with the Japanese. This would have

caused some considerable rearrangement in the power
structure. The second was that some of those who

collaborated were personally close to General MacArthur.

President Manuel Roxas, for example, was one of his aides
in Corregidor with the rank of Brigadier-General.
President Osmena, too, was in a similar situation. Most
of those who served under the Japanese belong to his
Nacionalista Party and some were also very close to him.
To carry out Roosevelt’s policy strictly, therefore,
would mean the destruction of his own Party. A third
factor was the de facto control by the peasant Huk
guerrillas of large areas in Central and Southern Luzon.

33
Official policy of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
the U.S. Congress on collaborators, quoted in Abaya,
op. cit., pp.67-8 .
 23 6

E v e n if they fought the J a p a n e s e and the landlords who

c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h the Japanese, still they were led by

l e f t - w i n g elements. W ere they also going to be

R e w a r d e d ’ for their res i s t a n c e activities as pr o m i s e d

34
b y M a c A r t h u r a n d O s m e n a d u r i n g the L e yte landing? Or

even tolerated? In order to u n d e r s t a n d what h a p p e n e d

next, the p o l i t i c a l var i a b l e s that i n t e r a c t e d must be

clearly identified. T h ere was the official A m e r i c a n

p o licy e m a n a t i n g from W a s h i n g t o n w h i c h d e c r e e d what was

to be done w i t h collaborators; there were the n o n - o f f i c i a l

A m e r i c a n bu s i n e s s interests in the P h i l i p p i n e s whose

stakes were in the return of a prewar status q u o ; there

were the l a n d l o r d - v e s t e d interest groups w h o s e dominant

positions in the political and economic life of the country

were t h r e atened not only by a l e f t i s t - l e d a r m e d p e a s antry

34
Cf. Abaya, i b i d . , PP-54, 219. The E d i t o r of the A m e r i c a n
C h a m b e r of Commerce J o u rnal wrote: 1T h e Huks claimed to
have fought no less than 1,200 separate engagements w i t h
the J a p a n e s e and units of the J a p a n e s e - o r g a n i z e d
C o n s t a b u l a r y w h i c h were sent against them, k i l l i n g over
30,000 J a p a n e s e and perhaps 1,000 c o n s t a b u l a r y men. To
some extent in 1942, and v e r y fully in 1943 and 1944, they
p l a y e d a large part in p r e v e n t i n g J a p a n e s e seizure of
the rice harvests in C e n t r a l Luzon. B y 1944 they
c o n t r o l l e d large areas and set up a n u m b e r of local
governments. T h e y saved the lives of a n u m b e r of A m e r i c a n
airmen f o r c e d down in t h eir territory, a m o n g them C o l o n e l
Atkinson, and the areas they c o n t r o l l e d became places of
refuge for h u n t e d m e n in M a n i l a . 1 A.V.H. Hartendorp,
o p . c i t . , p p . 137-8.
 237

but also by official U.S. policy, brought about by

their own war-time collaboration with the Japanese. 35

General M a c A r t h u r , who was the real power in the

Philippines during those times, resolved the matter.

In a precedent-setting act, he singled out Manuel Roxas

while ordering the confinement of the other top

collaborators.

At Tubao all the officials [who served the

Japanese] were taken into custody by the U.S.
Army as they arrived, were questioned, and
then sent ahead of their families to Bilibid
prison in Manila — all except Roxas who was
allowed to proceed to Mani l a with his family
on orders from M a c A r t h u r 1 s headquarters.36

Soon different 1categories' of collaborators were made.

One by one, they were set free until practically all were

cleared and were reinstated to their prewar positions. 37

35
See U.S. Secretary of Interior Ickes* implied suggestion
on this point in his ‘Introduction* to Hernando Abaya,
Betrayal in the P h i l i p p i n e s , op. c i t ., p p .10-1.
36
Hartendorp, op, c i t , , p.151. U.S. Secretary of Interior
Ickes later on wrote: ‘MacArthur promptly set free the
collaborationist Roxas and to cover his collaborationist
activities wi t h a thick coat of wh i t e w a s h . ... Without
benefit of civil investigation into Roxas* relationship
with the Japanese, he liberated him from detention with
the other members of the puppet government.1 (Harold L.
Ickes, *Introduction* Abaya, i b i d . , p.9*) Actually, as
reported above, Roxas was never detained.
37
The formal solution to the ‘collaboration* problem,
however, camein January 1948 when Roxas, as President,
issued the long-awaited Amnesty Proclamation. A few
months later, the Peoples Court was abolished.
Cf. Hartendorp, op. c i t ,, p.24-9.
 238

Meanwhile, the drive to establish peace and order

in Central Luzon included the abolition of the local

governments set up by the Huks and the replacement of
left-wing officials with landlords and other anti-Huk

elements. For most of these appointed officials, the

only solution to the peace-and-order problem was the
elimination of the peasant Huks and whatever influence

they have established in the rural areas. This attitude

could be understood in the light of what had been said
before regarding the traditional enmity of these two

groups before and during the war. The methods employed

were often violent. Also, while on the one hand the
authorities were demanding the surrender of arms of the
peasants, on the other hand they helped and encouraged
the arming of Civilian Guards, the so-called ’private
armies’ of the landlords. In this task of establishing

'peace-and-order’, the landlords and the authorities had

the backing of the U.S. Army. Würfel wrote in this
connec tion:
After the war, at the same time that most
guerrilla groups were given recognition for
services rendered to the American cause, Huk
leaders Luis Taruc and Castro Alejandrino
were imprisoned by the U.S. Army. U.S.
military police assisted the Philippine
constabulary and the private landlord's
armies, called ’civilian guards’ or ’temporary
 239

police1, in restricting left-wing political ~

activity, thus encouraging armed resistance.

This was the situation in which the Democratic

Alliance was formed. This political aggrupation drew
within its fold certain groups, including prominent

individuals, of varied political beliefs but who,

nevertheless, had a common denominator in the
anti-collaborationist issue. They were mostly composed

of resistance groups, professionals identified with the

Civil Liberties Union, journalists, and labor leaders.

Judge Jesus Barrera, former president of the Civil

Liberties Union and presently a Justice of the Supreme

Court, became its President; Osmena1s under-secretary of

Finance, Jose Hilario, was Vice-President, and Rafael

Ledesma was Secretary-Treasurer. The Directors were
Jose B.L. Reyes, presently also a Justice of the Supreme
Court, Atty. Manuel Crudo, Dr Vicente Lava, and Atty. J.
Antonio Araneta. Later, Huk leaders Luis M. Taruc,
Juan Feleo, Pedro C. Castro and Mariano Balgos became
additional officers. 39 What drew these men together?
There were those who fought and resisted the Japanese

38
David Würfel, *The Philippines1, in Kahin (ed.), op. cit,,
pp.441-2.
39
Cf. Abaya, op. ci t., pp.246-7.
 240

t h r o ughout the war, whose c o m r a d e s - i n - a r m s , friends,

and relatives fell u n d e r the guns of the Jap a n e s e and

their agents, and who wer e e m b i t t e r e d to find m a n y of

the colla b o r a t o r s b a c k in the saddle; there were the

liberals, d e eply c o n c e r n e d w i t h the trend towards the

a r b i t r a r y use of force and d e p r i v a t i o n of civil rights

o c c a s i o n e d by the ‘m a i l e d - f i s t 1 s o l u t i o n to the peace

and order problem; finally, there w e r e the socialist a nd

c o m munist leaders who pr o b a b l y saw the fu t i l i t y of

p u r s u i n g an armed struggle against the combined forces

of the government and the landlords, supported by the

might of the U n i t e d Stat e s Army. T he l e f t - w i n g group

p r o b a b l y also r e a l i z e d the v a lue of the Alliance. They

s t ated that the fight against r e a c t i o n re q u i r e d the

w i d e s t possible u n i t e d front and T . . .with its b r o a d e r

and more f a r - r e a c h i n g appeal, the D e m o cratic A l l i a n c e

was the best channel through w h i c h the people could flow

away from the parties that were d o m i n a t e d by landlords

and c o m p r a d o r e s * .^

In the first p o s t w a r e l e c t i o n in 1946, the

N a c i o n a l i s t a P a r t y ( O s mena Wing) and the Dem o c r a t i c

A l l i a n c e form e d a coalition. At that time Senate

40
T a r u c , op, c i t ., p . 2 1 5 •
 241

President Manuel Roxas had already left the NP and had

formed his own faction. His political opponents,

particularly the DA, had been bitterly denouncing his

1collaborationist1 activities and his connection with

the vested interest-landlord group. The DA put up three

candidates for Senator (Judge Jesus Barrera, Dr Emilio

Javier, and Atty. J. Antonio Araneta) and six candidates

for the House of Representatives (Dr Jesus Lava for

Bulacan, Luis M. Taruc and Amado Yuzon for Pampanga,
Jose Cando and Constancio Padilla for Nueva Ecija, and

Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac). Of the nine DA candidates,

all six candidates for Representatives from Central Luzon
were elected. However, when the new Congress, which was

dominated by the Liberals, met it refused to seat the

six DA Representatives, together with three NP
Representatives and one NP Senator, although all of them

had been duly certified as elected by the Commission on

Elections. The Liberals alleged that they had been
4l
elected through fraud and violence. But one of the
real reasons may well have been the fact that the
necessary amendment to the Constitution granting *parity*
rights to American businessmen in exchange for war damage

4l
Villareal Committee Report, Manila Daily Bulletin, May
26, 1947.
 242

payments and tariff preferences (which the vested

interest groups, particularly the sugar landlords and

other business interests, favored) might have been

placed in jeopardy as the required three-fourths majority

for a constitutional amendment would not be possible with

the ten oppositionists taking their seats and voting

42
against. The more obvious reason, of course, was the

1left-wing* tag placed on the DA which under the then

43
existing situation could not be tolerated by the elite.

Thus ended the first postwar deviation to the

traditional pattern of elite political aggrupations. The

second came in 1963 when the Lapiang Manggagawa (Labor

Party) was formed. (See Figure III.) This organization

was however, short-lived. Even while efforts were being

made to organize it in 1962, its President, Cipriano Cid,

was already complaining 1that the party organizers are

now being closely w a t c h e d 1 and told them to 'expect blows

42
See s u p r a , Chapter III; Cf. Shirley Jenkins, o p . c i t .,
Chapter VII; David Würfel, op. cit, , p.44l.
43
Cf. Villareal Committee R e p o r t , o p , c i t . Shortly after
the 'unseating1 proceedings, the Huks staged an uprising
and fought a long and costly guerrilla war. Most of
their leaders have been killed or captured and many of
their followers have surrendered but there are signs of
a growing resurgence. Cf., for example, Carlos Albert,
'The Huks Mean B u s i n e s s ' , Weekly G r a p h i c , February J ,
1965, p.3.
 243

f r o m p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s ’ , addi n g that ’p e r s e c u t i o n must

44
be a n t i c i p a t e d ’ . F o r m a l l y launched on F e b r u a r y 3 ?

1963? it broke up in A u g u s t of the same year. T he

L a b o r P a r t y ’s candidate for M a y o r of Manila, R o b e r t o Oca,

was r e c r u i t e d by the N a c i o n a l i s t a s and b e c a m e ’t h e i r ’

candidate while other leaders of the P a r t y ’c o a l e s c e d ’

45
w i t h the L i b eral Party.

The above h i s t o r i c a l evidence, then, d emonstrates

the c o n t i n u i t y and stability of elite control of the

e s t a b l i s h e d political organizations. Because of this

v i r t u a l monopoly, the c o m p e t i t i o n for p o l i t i c a l power

is r e d u c e d a m o n g themselves. T his in turn explains a

n u m b e r of things: the i d e n t i c a l i t y of their programs and

p o l i tical principles, the absence of class or i d e o l ogical

issues, the looseness of party a ffiliations and

i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y of personnel, and the p e r sonal n a ture

of the ’i s s u e s ’ that are p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e the electorate.

T he lack of public o p p o s i t i o n or an o p p o s i t i o n ema n a t i n g

f rom a n o ther s o cio-economic group may also e x p lain the

f r e e d o m (or license) in w h ich power is often a r b i t r a r i l y

exercised.

44
'Cid Warns L a bor of P e r s e c u t i o n ’ , M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e ,
S e p t e m b e r 16, 1962, p.l.
45
P h i l i p p i n e s Free P r e s s . N o v e m b e r 2, 1 9 6 3 j p.2.
 244

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

The organization of the two major parties, the

Nacionalista Party and the Liberal Party, are essentially

identical. The formal structure follows the American

46 provide for the establishment of
model. Their rules
conventions and committees at various levels paralleling
the governmental structure — national, provincial, city

and municipal. The national convention is supposed to

be the supreme authority in the party. The conventions

are to select the candidates of the party to be presented

to the electorate in their respective jurisdictions.

Provincial and City conventions also are to elect
delegates to the national convention and members of the
party committees shall govern the party between conventions.
Theoretically, therefore, the formal structure seems to
rest on a democratic basis.
Beneath this formal facade, however, are the
realities of power relations in the social structure. In
the provinces and municipalities, there are elite family
factions, with their respective followers, whose
rivalries are formalized by their affiliation with

political parties. For instance, in Cebu, !politics for

46
Rules of the Nacionalis ta Party, 1961; Rules of the
Liberal Party, 1963. However, the U.S. system of ’primaries*
have not been adopted.
 245

the last 50 years has been a struggle b e t w e e n the

Sottos against the Osmenas, the C u e ncos against the

Osmenas, and r e c e n t l y the D u r a n o - D u m o n - Z o s a group

47
against the C u e n c o - 0 smena f u s i o n ’ . I n Abra, a high

p r o v i n c i a l official stated that 'Abra politics revolve

a r o u n d the two family factions — the P a r e d e s e s and the

48
Valeras’. In M i s a m i s Oriental, the local p o l i t icians

are r a n g e d in c o m p e t i n g factions; ’e v e n before the war,

the fight was b e t w e e n the group led by D o n Gre g o r i o

49
Pelaez against the fa c t i o n of D o n G r e g o r i o B a r r o m e o ’ .

I n M i n d o r o Occidental, the factions even b e l o n g to the

same family. In 1962, A g p a l o n o t e d that

One i n t e r e s t i n g d i m e n s i o n of the present

l e a d e r s h i p in O c c i d e n t a l M i n d o r o is that
p o l i t i c a l power has c o n c e n t r a t e d in one
family -- the A b e l e d a s . The first a p p o i n t e d
g o v e r n o r . . .is D a m a s o A b e l e d a . .. T h e first
e l e cted C o n g r e s s m a n . . .is Jesus A b e l e d a . . .the
y o u n g e r b r o t h e r of Damaso. In the 1953
re g u l a r election Jesus ran a g a i n . . . He was
o p p o s e d by a relative, F e l i p e Abeleda...

T h e r e are other A b e l e d a s h o l d i n g top

official positions in O c c i d e n t a l Mindoro.
One of the members of the P rovincial B o a r d

47
P e r sonal interview, City, C i t y Vice-Mayor, M a y 1963*
See A p p e n d i x - Cebu.
48
P e r sonal interview, A p r i l 1963» As p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d
(see C h a p t e r I V ), these two families are r e l a t e d by
affinity.
49
Per s o n a l i n t e r v i e w w i t h a C i t y Councilor, C a g a y a n de O r o ,
M a y 1963.
 246

is Potenciano A b e l e d a . .. The governor is

Arsenio V i l l a r o z a . ..also an Abeleda [his
grandmother is Tomasa Abeleda, aunt of
former Governor Damaso Abeleda].

The present Abeleda leadership, led by

Congressman Felipe Abeleda, is affiliated
with the Liberal Party... The Nacionalista
wing of the Abeleda clan is led by former
governor Damaso Abeleda and former
Congressman Jesus Abeleda.50

In the municipal level, there is a similar pattern.

H o l l n s t e i n e r , in her study of power in H u l o , found that

*the elite...make up the core of the fact i o n s ...[a n d ]

to the voters the elite are the party. The voter identifies

and allies with the elite individuals; the party name,

itself, is merely a convenient label for this alliance.151

Rivera and McMillan in their study of rural Philippines

noted that political leadership usually is centered in,

or controlled by, small groups of large landowners, many

52
of whom live in the poblaciones*.

50
Remigio E. A g p a l o , *The Politics of Occidental M i n d o r o * ,
a Seminar Paper (mimeo.) Discipline of Political Science,
University of the Philippines, June 1 9 6 2 , pp.8-9.
51
Mary R. H o l l n s t e i n e r , The Dynamics_of Power in a
Philippine Municipality (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines, C D R C , 1963)» p.58*
52
Generoso F. Rivera and Robert T. McMillan, The Rural
Philippines (Manila: Mutual Security Agency, 1952), p.157»
 Phi l i p p i n e p o l i tical p a r ties then are loose

alliances of these elite groups w i t h their r e s p ective

followers. The active control of the party organization,

however, is in the hands of m e m b e r s of the elite who are

office-holders. U n d e r p a r t y rules, these party m e n who

are o f f i c e - h o l d e r s become a u t o m a t i c a l l y m e m b e r s of the

party hierarchy (party committees) and the p a rty

conventions, b e i n g ex-officio m e m b e r s of these bodies.

T h e party president is u s u a l l y a top elective official

suc h as the Sena t e P r e s i d e n t or the S p e a k e r of the House,

a l t h o u g h the real Party L e a d e r is the P r e s i d e n t if the

p a rty is in power. This again, as was p r e v i o u s l y noted,

is a ca r r y - o v e r from the C o m m o n w e a l t h period w h e n the

n a t i o n a l L e a d e r was also the P a r t y Leader.

54 The top

g o v e r n i n g body in the party is the N a t i o n a l E x e c u t i v e

Committee, alt h o u g h the NP h a d a m u c h smaller (nine-man)

53
LP Presidents from 1946-1963 w e r e Senate Pre s i d e n t
Avelino, S p e a k e r Perez, former S p e a k e r Jose Y u l o , then
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t Macapagal, S e n a t e P r e s ident M a r c o s and
S p e a k e r Villareal; NP Pr e s i d e n t from 1949-1963 was
S e nate Pre s i d e n t Rodriguez.
54
F or instance, in 1939} S p e a k e r Jose Yulo who wa s then
the President of the N a c i o n a l i s t a P a rty a c k n o w l e d g e d this
w h e n he stated: ’President Quezon, in his role of supreme
leader of the p a r t y in power, has been given full power
to set the date for the party c o n v e n t i o n . 1 The T r i b u n e ,
M a y 29, 1939 • Q u o t e d in Hayden, op. c i t . . p.440.
 248

55
’R u l i n g J u n t a ’ . The E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e is compo s e d

of the p a rty president, some senators, representatives,

governors and city mayors and some former top public

officials. T he n u m b e r of m e m b e r s varies. It tends to

be smaller w h e n the p a rty is in p o w e r and gets a bigger

56
’r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ’ w h e n the p a r t y is out of power. A

m u c h b i gger body is the N a t i o n a l Directorate, f rom w h i c h

the members of the E x e c u t i v e c o m m ittee are se l e c t e d and

it is compo s e d of all Senators, Represe n t a t i v e s ,

Governors, and C i t y Mayo r s who are members of the Party.

At a lower level are the p r o v i n c i a l and city committees

w h i c h again are com p o s e d l a r gely of public of f i c e - h o l d e r s

or ex-officials. Finally, at the lowest level is the

m u n i c i p a l committee w h i c h is c o m p o s e d of the local

political leaders.
57

55
T h e n i n e - m a n NP ’R u l i n g J u n t a ’ in 1964 was c o m p o s e d of
the Senate President, two Senators, two representatives,
two officers of the NP L e ague of G o v e r n o r s and C i t y Mayors,
and two from the private sector (one ex- S e n a t o r and one
b i g b u s i n e s s m a n who was also an e x - o f f i c i a l ) . V i d e
T h e M a n i l a B u l l e t i n , J u l y 22, 1964.
56 '

The E x e c u t i v e Co m m i t t e e of the r u l i n g L i b e r a l P a r t y in
1963} for example, ha d s e v enteen me m b e r s while the NP h a d
forty-three. Cf. Th e M a n i l a Times, A p r i l 7s 1963s p.l.
57
T h e r e are also party w o r kers at the barr i o and precinct
levels but they assume an insig n i f l e a n t role in the p a rty
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure.
 249

There are other interesting characteristics of

elite party organization. One of these is a

leader-follower feature which extends from the top,

where the concentration of power is greatest, down to
the local leaders. The party hierarchy resembles a

pyramidal structure where the highest leaders have their

’men1 -- actually leaders of subordinate importance who
in turn have their 1supporters' in their provincial

bailiwicks’ or strongholds. The latter, also men of

substance and prominence, have their own followings among
the local elite in the municipalities. Finally, the last
group have their sub-leaders, who also endeavor to obtain

their own 'followers’.59 No serious attempts are made to

solicit party membership from the masses.
The links in this chain are, however, loose for the
ties that bind the organization together are not based
on commitment to definite political beliefs or principles

which differ from those of other parties. Since, as

already noted, the existing political parties are
essentially alliances of leaders emanating from the same

58
Thus, in the illustration cited on page 230 there were
the ’Quirinistas’ and the ’Avelinistas’.
59
Cf. also Carl Lande, 'Politics in the Philippines’,
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1958,
p. 2.
 250

s o cio-economic groups, no class lines or i d e ology based

on class d i s t i n g u i s h one p o l i tical party from another.

T h e i r pol i t i c a l ideas are e s s e n t i a l l y the same. An

analysis of p a r t y platforms, for instance, shows the m a r k e d

sim i l a r i t y of their p r o g r a m m e . ^ U n d e r these circumstances,

it is not difficult for party shiftings and reali g n m e n t s

to take place. As an illustration, since 19^6 two

Presidents, two Vice-Presidents, five Senate Presidents,

and forty out of sixty-six S e n a t o r s have changed parties,

and some of them have shuttled b a c k and forth several

times.^ T h e s e p a r t y r e alignments among the top leaders

are r e f lected on the local level in line w i t h the

l e a d e r - f o l l o w e r dichotomy. Thus, if one top elite leader

shifts his p a rty affiliation, his h e n c h m e n f rom his

b a i l i w i c k m e r e l y f o l l o w suit. T h e r e is no l o y alty to

the party or commitment to p o l i t i c a l p r i n ciples but only

l o y a l t y to the person. The reply of the P r e s ident of the

60
C f . ’P a rty P l a t f o r m ’ , V i tal D o c u m e n t s, Manila: F a r East
E d u c a t i o n Center, O c t o b e r 1959* See also ’P a rty
P l a t f o r m s ’ , E n c y c l o p e d i a of the P h i l i p p i n e s , o p . c i t . ,
v o 1. XI, p p . 237-312.
6l
One Vice-President, for instance, has changed p a r t y
a f f i l i a t i o n five times.
62
T h i s p h e n o m e n o n was also o b s e r v e d in H u l o . See
H o l l n s t e i n e r , op, c i t . , p . 58 .
 251

Mayor’s league of a Northern Luzon province, when asked

about his party status, is revealing:

We are all ’patriots’ now. [Party defectors

have been called ’patriots’ for they usually
give ’patriotic’ reasons for changing their
party affiliation.] We follow Senator P.
Where he goes, we go. You see, we get more
benefits this way if we cooperate with the
administration.6 3

Reference had already been made of the ’Allied Majority’,

formed just after the victory of the Liberal Party in

the 1 9 6 1 elections. Composed of twenty-seven Representatives

who were elected as Nacionalistas, this group started to
make overtures with the Liberals so they could ’cooperate’

with the administration. Not long thereafter, nearly all

joined the Liberal Party. Soon their followers in the
64
provinces followed suit. There are various reasons for
party shifting. Among the top party leaders, the usual
reason is their rivalry over certain elective positions.
Aspirants for top elective posts who feel that they have
no chance of getting the nomination by their party or who
feel that the convention had been ’rigged’ in favor of
some other aspirant are offered berths or concessions by
the other party and they often accept. For instance,

63
Personal interview, April 1 9 6 3 .
64
See supra, footnote 2 6 ; also The Manila Chronicle,
January 10, 1 6 , 1 9 6 2 ; April 13» 1962.
 252

Se n a t o r Osias in the 1953 NP national c o n v e n t i o n tried

to contest M a g s a y s a y 1s n o m i nation. But the NP top

h i e r a r c h y h a d al r e a d y d e c i d e d on Magsaysay. Osias

com p l a i n e d that the c o n v e n t i o n was ’r i g g e d 1 , saying:

It w o u l d not have m a t t e r e d if I lost out to

a sensi b l e and o v e r w h e l m i n g choice of the
P a r t y as long as it was done so in a
democratic, n o n - i n s u l t i n g manner, i n s tead
of cajolery, ellicit p l e d g e s . ^5

In a d e s p e r a t e effort to appease h i m so he w o u l d not

transfe r to the Liberal Party, ’R o d r i g u e z [the NP

President] p r o p o s e d that b o t h he (Osias) and Rod r i g u e z

h ead the e i g h t - m a n s e n a t o r i a l ticket of the p a r t y ’ .

66

But Osias joined the LP w h i c h mad e h i m the Senate

President. N a c i o n a l i s t P a r t y S e n a t o r Jos e Zulueta, who

was also d e f e a t e d by G a r c i a in the n o m i n a t i o n for

Vice-President also joined the Li b e r a l Party. The practice

of enticement is not uncommon, p a r t i c u l a r l y if the

d i s c o n t e n t e d m e m b e r of the other party is a b i g m a n or it

will h e l p the ga i n i n g p a r t y in the power struggle. Thus,

in the 1961 L i b e r a l P a r t y V i c e - P r e s i d e n t i a l nomination, a

group of L i b e r a l P a rty leaders h e a d e d by R e p r e s e n t a t i v e

65
Camilo Osias, quoted in J o r g e B. Coquia, T he P hilippine
P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c tions of 1953 (Manila: U n i v e r s i t y
P u b l i s h i n g Co.), p . 67.
66
C oq u i a , i b i d .
 253

Cases and Senator Osias initiated a move to present a

resolution drafting Nacionalista Representative Sergio

67
Osmena, J r . , who was at odds with then President Garcia.

Osmena was indeed drafted. He lost to P e l a e z , however,

but claimed that the l a t t e r ’s nomination was ’clearly

railr o a d e d ’ .^ The press report announcing the selection

of the Liberal Party Senatorial ticket in the 1961

elections also illustrates this point:

The Liberal party top command last night

picked six official candidates tor the Senate,
but left the door open for the possible
inclusion of recalcitrant Nacionalista
senatorial aspirants in its eight-man ticket.

The decision not to fill the two remaining

vacant berths followed close on the heels of
reports that negotiations were underway
between representatives of the Liberal Party
and Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez,
concurrently Nacionalista Party president.

The choice of Rodrigo, Manglapus and Manahan

was a mere formality. This arrangement was
in accordance with the terms of an agreement
that brought the three Grand Alliance
leaders back into the Liberal fold.^9

67
The Manila C h r o n i c l e , January 22, 1961.
68
Ibid.
69
’Liberal Party Proclaims six Senate Bets at Top C o n f a b ’ ,
The Manila C h r o n i c l e , M ay 24, 1961.
 254

This development, however, had its reverse effects,

since old Liberal Party members who wanted the

nominations themselves threatened to defect to the

Nacionalista Party, protesting 1the "despotic" manner

in which Vice-President Macapagal had influenced the

selection of six official Liberal Party senatorial

, 70
candidates 1 .

Other causes of party disaffection, which are still

common today, have been mentioned by Aruego: 71 the

failure to get a share of ’pork b a r r e l ’ for o n e ’s

bailiwick; failure to get certain privileges known to be

within the power of the party to give; preference given

by a political superior to a personal rival; failure to

secure appointments of certain favorites for certain

positions and so forth. Membership, therefore, remains

flexible.

The illustrations already cited in connection with

party conventions suggest another important characteristic

of elite parties, namely the concentration of power at the

top of the party hierarchy. National party conventions

are held every election year to select candidates for

70
I b i d . ’Disgruntled Liberal P a r t y ’s threaten to bolt
p a r t y ’ , May 26, I 9 6 I.
71
Aruego, op. c i t . , p.774.
 255

national positions. However, in most cases the

delegates assemble to confirm choices and private

agreements previously made by the top party leaders or,

in the case of senatorial nominees, to submit names on

the convention floor. The final selection, however is

made by the top hierarchy after the convention. This

seems to be in accordance with the accepted norms

influenced by traditional practices. The top leaders

often exercise powers and prerogatives technically

reserved to the convention and the delegates acquiesce.

The 1961 LP national convention is a good example

of what the delegates in a national convention ’d e c i d e 1

and what ’c h o i c e ’ is left for them after certain

agreements have been made by top party leaders. In this

convention, the then Vice-President Macapagal and

Senator Marcos were vying for the presidential nomination.

The delegates started to arrive in Manila to make a

’c h o i c e ’ between the two but just two days preceding the

convention, Marcos withdrew. Then on the day before the

convention, the LP party hierarchy announced the ’major

decisions that will be taken up at the convention’ as a

result of M a r c o s ’ withdrawal, among which were the

following: (l) Macapagal would be proclaimed as LP

presidential candidate after which he would step down

 256

from the presidency of the party in favor of Marcos;

(2) The convention would sidestep the issue of

M a c a p a g a l 1s running-mate and the choice of the eight

senatorial candidates and instead w ould approve a

resolution leaving the decision in the hands of the LP

National Executive Committee. (Emphasis supplied.)

The press also reported that ’it w a s . ..understood that

Marcos will remain as Senate Minority leader and if the

Liberal Party gains an upper hand in the Senate, he

would become the Senate P r e s i d e n t 1 .

73 The 1963

conventions of both parties manifested the same pattern.

Before the NP convention was held

The party president, Senate President Eulogio

Rodriquez and Senator Arturo M. Tolentino,
the real power in the NP junta, have already
announced that the convention will meet only
to propose candidates. It will be the NP
national directorate that will dispose. 74

Similarly, in the L P , six of the eight senatorial

candidates were personally picked by the President two

months before the party convention, and were ’formally

endorsed’ in a caucus of the LP Executive Committee prior

72
The Manila C h r o n i c l e , January 20, 1961.
73
Ibid.
74
’The goose is c o o k e d ! ’ , The Weekly Graphic editorial,
March 2 7 , 1963? p.l.
 257

to the convention. 75 The above arrangements seem to

meet the approval of everybody in the party until
someone or a group in the hierarchy decide to contest

the informal choices made. The manipulations and the

'undemocratic1 nature of the proceedings are then
exposed by the aggrieved party member.

The 1961 NP convention, for instance, was a stormy

one. Senate (and Party) President Rodriguez wanted to
contest President Garcia* s re-election. He charged

that 'the NP national convention was rigged* to favor

the latter. Rodriguez complained that provincial

conventions were being manipulated by the henchmen of

President Garcia so that only the followers of the Chief

Executive would be selected as delegates to the national
convention. 77 Manila's Mayor Lacson, a Rodriguez
partisan, charged that 'half of Manila’s delegates were
followers of Congressmen Augusto Francisco and Joaquin
7 ft
Roces...who are all Garcia supporters'. He complained

75
The Manila Times, April 7j 1963; cf. Weekly Graphic,
ibid. During the LP convention, 'Marcos [the LP President]
was a one-man nominations committee'. See Carolina S.
Malay, 'At the Convention', The Manila Times, ibid.
76
'NP head says meet being rigged', The Manila Chronicle,
May 26, 1961.
77
Ibid., January 22, 1961.
78
Ibid., May 26, 1961.
 258

that Senator Cipriano Primicias [a Garcia man] had

unilaterally revised the list of Manila delegates to

the convention previously approved and ratified by the

_ 7Q
NP National Executive C o m m i t t e e 1 .

Mention had already been made of Senator O s i a s 1

defection to the LP in 1953 after having complained that

the NP convention was 'rigged1 by the party leaders.

Commenting on this incident, Romulo and Gray, Magsaysay's

biographers, later on wrote:

The Convention was in a sense, rigged, as

Nationalist Senator Camilo Osias charged
during its session... Nevertheless the public
wanted Magsaysay, so that there could hardly
be any resentment over the fact that its
leaders had, in this case at least, anticipated
the p e o p l e ’s desires. When Osias, the only
other candidate for nomination, accused the
Nationalist bosses of ’f i xing’ , he was
technically r i g h t .^

As regards the selection of candidates for local

posts, the procedure usually followed is for the candidates

to secure the endorsement of the party hierarchy or the

locally recognized ’political k i n g p i n ’ . Those favored

by top party leaders can be assured of becoming the

’offic i a l ’ candidates. Conventions are sometimes

79
Ibid .
80
Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray, The Magsaysay Story
(New York: The John Day Co. , 1956), p.215.
 259

dispensed with and the area declared a ’free z o n e ’ ,

especially when there are rival factions within the

party that may precipitate a break. In such event,

several aspirants may claim to be the ’o f f i c i a l ’

candidates of the party, who may be ’pro c l a i m e d ’

separately in a gathering of their respective factions

or during a public rally by members of the party

hierarchy. Top party men who have their provincial

bailiwicks to maintain are, of course, involved in local

politics. They have to be sure that their ’m e n ’ will be

in positions of power so they can be assured of effective

support. In the process, realignments often occur. The

1963 election in Cebu illustrates this point. The old

political rivals, the Osmena and Cuenco families, had

since ’f u s e d ’ to face a common threat — the Durano-Zosa-

Dumon triumvirate. However, President M a c a p a g a l e n t e r e d

the picture with the announced support for Rene Espina

as official LP candidate for Governor. Osmena, an NP

(but M a c a p a g a l ’s compadre) said he might agree if all the

rest of the slate, from Vice-Governor down to the last

Councilor were his men. On the other hand, Senator Cuenco,

an L P , was demanding three positions for his faction — a

Senate berth for his son (he got it but lost in the

elections) Vice-Governor (for Councilor Paquiao) and

 2 60

Vice-Mayor (for C o u n c i l o r Crystal). One informant

8l
said that the 'fusion' might b r eak up because of this.

B. M E T H O D S AND P R A C TICES

The elite, as has b een d e s c r i b e d in the pr e c e d i n g

chapters, are possessors of certain resources that give

them the great advantage w h i c h f a c i litates the

a c q u i s i t i o n of more of these resources. The p o s s e s s i o n

and control of money, credit and wealth; the control over

jobs, the control over information, their superior

education, the skills they possess, and the prestige and

status r e s u l t i n g from the above -- all these not only

elevate them above the m a s s e s but also give them the tools

that are effe c t i v e l y u t i l i z e d to acquire p o wer and which,

in turn, often lead to the a c q u i s i t i o n of more resources

and m o re power. The few who are r e c r u i t e d by the elite,

who possess other v a l u e s but not wealth, initially, often

acquire it after b e i n g elevated into power. We have seen

in C h a p t e r IV, for instance, that the m e m b e r s of the top

p o l i t i c a l elite are not only political decision-makers.

F r o m their ranks are f o und large landowners, bankers,

owners of newspapers, T V and radio stations,

81
Pe r s o n a l interviews, M a y 1963.
 261

owner-operators of private universities, colleges and

other educational institutions, businessmen, stockholders

or lawyers of big corporations (both Filipino and f o r e i g n ) ,

and other professionals. Moreover, as discussed in the

preceding section, those who compete for power are

directly or indirectly linked with government which gives

them control of public resources that are often utilized

in their struggle for power. The elite, as will be seen,

also make use of the established norms, as influenced by

traditional social and economic relations, in their

competition to attain official decision-making posts.

All the above elements, combined with the practices of

political democracy, produce a unique and interesting

mixture. Not infrequently, the political rivalry among

the elite become so intense that violence may be utilized.

C L A S S , CULTURAL NORMS AND POLITICS

M u c h of the e l i t e 1s political behavior in their

interaction with the masses becomes meaningful when one

considers their respective positions in the social and

economic structure and the norms that have evolved within

the system.

Various studies made by sociologists, anthropologists

and other social scientists seem to support the

proposition that social interaction among Filipinos is

 262

still generally reckoned in terms of power and wealth.

Lynch, in his study of social class in a Bikol town, for

example, found that the conception of class division

among members of the Canaman community was towards a

two-class system: an upper class and a lower class, the

former playing ’the role of "big people" (Dakulang tao)

82
in relation to "little people" (sadit na t a o ) ’ .

As landlords big people do more than own the

land that is worked by one or more tenants.
Ordinarily they are expected to give moral,
medical, and economic assistance to tenants
in any emergency or need. This entails advice
and patronage, often intercession with an
official in the town or in Naga, perhaps even
the writing or supervision of the drawing up
of some legal d o c u m e n t .83

Lynch concluded that ’the primary quality criterion of

the upper class is economic security, that of the lower

84
class, insecurity’ . Tiryakian, in his prestige

evaluation of occupations in several Philippine

municipalities, found that the frames of reference of

his respondents in their perception of the occupational

hierarchy were in terms of power (particularly among

82
Frank Lynch, ’Social Class in a Bikol T o w n * , unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation (Anthropology), University of Chicago,
1959, pp.128-9.
83
T b i d . , p.120.
84
I b i d ., p .133•
 263

rural respondents), economic security, and social

85
prestige, in that order. Similarly, a m ong u r b a n

(Manila) workers, some of the authority v a lues that

Bulatao found, for example, were as follows:

1. One looks to a u t h o r i t y figures for h e l p

in o b t a i n i n g a job and o t h e r benefits;

2. It is good to e s t a b l i s h good relations

w i t h a tycoon or manager;

3- Benefits come by w a y of patronage and

g i f t .86

The previous d i s c u s s i o n and illustrations on the

o r g a n i z a t i o n of pol i t i c a l p a rties d e m o nstrate that even

a m ong the elite p o l i t i c i a n s themselves, the l e a d e r - f o l l o w e r

d i c h o t o m y is manifested. O f course, w h e n amour propre or

p r ide is hurt or a m b ition intervenes, or w hen pat r o n a g e

is interrupted, it often leads to a s h i fting of loyalties

but the system still operates in the n e w setting.

Th e above were cited to i l l u s t r a t e the point that,

in general, the Filipino, whether elite or non-elite,

c o n s c i o u s l y or u n consciously, tends to think and behave

83
Vide, E d w a r d A. Tiryakian, ’T h e P r e s t i g e E v a l u a t i o n of
O c c u p a t i o n s in an U n d e r d e v e l o p e d Country: T he P h i l i p p i n e s ’ ,
T h e A m e r i c a n Journal of S o c i o l o g y , v o 1.63» J a n u a r y 1938,
n o . 4, p . 3 9 7 •
86
Jaime Bulatao, ’P h i l i p p i n e V a l u e s I: T h e M a n i l e n o s
M a i n s p r i n g s ’ , P h i l i p p i n e S t u d i e s , vol.10, no.I, J a n u a r y
1962, p.64.
 264

in terms of the principalia-non-principalia dichotomy:

of big and small, of superiors and inferiors, of leaders

and followers. Thus the ’b i g ’ person often becomes the

object of solicitations, of petitions. He becomes a

dispenser of favors from whom the subordinate could seek

1tulong1 (help) because the former is 1m a l a k a s ’ (powerful)

or 'mayaman' ( r ich). This, of course, gives the ’b i g ’

person a potent tool by which control over those who seek

his favor and patronage is facilitated.

The political function of interest articulation,

i.e., the formulation and expression of interests, is

coursed through the elite politician. The members of the

lower class, whose values and expectations are shaped to

a large extent by the existing social and economic

relations, are largely inarticulate and must rely on

their superiors to articulate for them. Generally lacking

effective organizations of their own, they must either

make use of their individual efforts, which are

ineffective, or must seek elite intervention. Because

they lack the education and are ignorant of the strange

ways of ’g o vernment1 , and because they are often ignored

by bureaucrats, some of whom often want to do things in

exchange for ’something1 , they often choose the latter

course. Conditioned by a built-in position of inferiority

 2 65

in the socio-economic structure, the lower class

individual does not demand for a right or a service

which may be legally due him whether from his landlord,

employer, or the government. He asks for it as a

personal favor and, if granted through the personal

intercession of the elite, he feels grateful for it. He

would have utang na loob (or a 1debt of gratitude1) which

must be repaid sometime either in terms of a 'regalo1

(gift) or votes. Through this system, government is

manipulated through connections or through personal

intervention of the elite, and pull from someone who is

'malakas1 is often necessary in seeking a job, promotion,

or transfer. This explains why the average citizen, if

he follows the formal channels, must patiently bear the

red tape and wait, while if he seeks the help of an

influential person who follows a short-cut course in an

informal behind-the-scenes manipulation, one who can go

directly to the top man, the matter is Tf i x e d 1 immediately.

This, again, further enhances the p olitician1s position.

His intercession becomes highly-valued and is sought

after. The rural peasant, particularly, has been

conditioned by the landlord-tenant relationship to think

that only through the landlord or some influential

persons can he get some attention from the government.

 266

Under this system, also, many aspirants for appointive

government posts must have kapit (pull) or seek the

tulong of an influential person. Often, even if qualified

but lacking in connections, the aspirant may not get the

job; but with the right backing, though sometimes

unqualified, he often gets the job. In promotions, the

procedure is often the same. One must have a 1p a d r i n o 1

or a 'backer1 especially when there is competition. And

this has become a general pattern. A former school

teacher, for instance, complained:

. . .how many often went ahead who had nothing

but pull and politics, and who continued to be
tyrants and contemptible Hitlers before their
subordinates, while fawning bootlickers before
their immediate superiors. How often have the
purveyors of authority often got the promotions,
those who had connections with the powerful,
those who knew how to give gifts, those who
were experts at p a s i k a t . While those who had
nothing but faith in themselves, those who
never stopped to learn, who burned the
midnight oil, who had ideas, often revolutionary
to those who had nothing but threats and deadwood
between their ears, how often were those who were
truly worthy never got the break, were forced
to be patient to compromise with fate, or else
get out of the system. F or you could not fight,
you could not change overnight the system. If
you chose, it did not care, you could go, there
were many others who would never question, and
therefore would plod along u n q uestioningly.8?

87
Amador T. D a g u i o , ’Teacher with a Lonely H e a r t ’ , The
E x a m i n e r , June 15, 19^3, p.22.
 267

A n executive of a government bureau likewise complained

that the interference with his program objectives

. . .comes from the fact that I have no real

control over a man who owes his loyalty to a
C o n g r e s s m a n ...discipline breaks down now.
The man who gets his first job through a
Congressman will also try to get a promotion
the same way. Most of those we have to
accommodate a r e n ’t even eligible.88

Yet, in spite of such complaints which are often

based on rational criteria, the cultural norms, some

feudal perhaps in their origins, others colonial, provide

some degree of stability to the system. The

superior-inferior relationship described above, though

reminiscent of cac i q u i s m , is still generally accepted.

The subordinate whether in the field, factory or office,

89
is still generally a cowed creature before his superior.

The kinship system and the Spanish contribution, the

compadre system, are other influences which lessen the

impact of informed criticisms on ’n e p o t i s m ’ and the

so-called tayo-tayo or spoils system. The American

influences of ’rugged i nd i v i d u a l i s m ’ and laissez-faire

have merged with the kinship system and have produced

what H. Otley Beyer calls an ’anarchy of f a m i l i e s ’ . The

existence of the family corporations and the political

88
Quoted in Francisco and de G u z m a n , ’The ^0-^0 A g r e e m e n t ’ ,
o p . c i t ., p . 3^9 .
89
Cf. s u p r a , chapter ITT, ’Manifestation of C l a s s ’ .
 268

family dynasties side by side with ’free enterprise1

and ’political d e m o c r a c y ’ attest to this.

The Filipino family is characterized by the

closeness of family ties. From childhood, the Filipino

is taught loyalty not only to his nuclear family but also

to his other r e l a t i v e s . He develops an obligation to

help his relatives and expects in turn to be helped by

them when he needs it. But his relatives are many.

Kinship is reckoned bilaterally, that is, both on the

paternal and maternal side. Since the Filipino family is

generally large, a person thus inherits a network of kin

from both parents. Furthermore, affinal relationships are

also recognized as part of the kinship system. Upon

marriage, a member of the family acquires also the

spouse’s k i n .

The Spanish contribution, the compadre system or

ritual co-parenthood, also provides an additional bond

that strengthens personal ties. Through Catholic baptism

(and the Philippines is 83.6 per cent C a t h o l i c ) ,^ and

confirmation of a child, one acquires ritual ’r e l a t i v e s ’ .

The child becomes the godchild (or inaanak) of the

sponsors, the latter become his godparents (ninong or

9Ö
Catholic Directoiyof_the P h i l i p p i n e s , 1963 (Manila:
Catholic Trade School, 1963)5 Statistical Index.
n i n a n g ) , while the parents of the child and the sponsors

become compadres and c o m a d r e s .91 These relationships

are also extended to marriages; the marrying couple

becomes inaanak sa k a s a l ; the sponsors would be ninong

or ninang sa k a s a l , and the parents and sponsors would

be compadres and c o m a d r e s .

The elite politician makes effective use of these

cultural tools . The superior-inferior relationship is

still exploited, though perhaps not as much as before.

92
M a n y tenants still vote for the landlord*s candidate.

Some public school teachers interviewed also intimated

that Tsometimes* superior officials would *encourage*

them to vote for particular candidates. (One landlord in

Pampanga, however, complained that since the Huks became

active, his tenants have become *hardheaded* .) The

politician, as a dispenser of favors or patronage, of

course, collects during election time the utan^ na loob

91
For a more comprehensive discussion of the compadre
system, Vide Robert B. Fox and Frank Lynch, S.J. *Ritual
Co-parenthood*, Area Handbook on the P h i l i p p i n e s , vol.2
(Chicago: University of Chicago, HRAF , 1956]» pp . 424-30.
92
C f ., for example, Lynch, ’Social Class in a Bikol T o w n * ,
o p . c i t . , p.121; i n the Hulo study, a tenant was punished
for having ’turned traitor* to a landlord who, apparently,
feeling more ’l e n i e n t * , reported that more hard-hearted
l a n d l o r d s ... forced their tenants to move off their land
because of disloyalty in politics. Hollnsteiner,
op. c i t . , p p . 98-9.
 270

debts owed to him in the form of votes. Many of the

p o l itic i a n 1s relatives, if he is in a position of power,

will most likely be in government positions, too.

Through his influence and c o n nections, he manages to

have them appointed to certain positions. 93 if he is

recognized as a 1political k i n g p i n 1 in his province or

district, a politically-inclined relative may also run

for an elective post and most probably win. (See

illustrations of these cases in s u p r a , Chapter IV.)

These relatives will of course, work for him and they,

too, have their own network of personal relations,

c o m p a d r e s , and alliances. The same is true with the

compadres. A compadre may be of superior, equal, or

inferior status. To his compadres of superior or equal

status he may expect favors or patronage if they are in

positions of power in exchange for political support.

To his ’inf e r i o r 1 c o m p a d r e s , too, he can expect support

in exchange for patronage and favors within his capacity

93
See, for example, this study*s Appendix. While from
time to time the appointment by the elite ’ins* of
relatives to government posts is sometimes condemned by
the ’o u t s ’ , they could not be too vocal about if for they
themselves do it when they are the ’i n s ’ . The general
populace do not seem to show m u c h social disapprobation
for, in the first place, the cultural norms sanction it
and, in the second place, they cannot do much about it
anyway. C f . ’RCA nepotism charges l i s t e d ’ , The Manila
T i m e s , February 19, 1964, p.l.
 271

to give. They,, too, become b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the

p o l i t i c i a n 1s largesse if they are w i t h i n the l a t t e r 1s

orbit of influence. W i t h i n this complex system of

relationships, the c u l t u r a l norms of l e a d e r - f o l l o w e r and

utanp; n a loob (or the o b l i g a t i o n to r e p a y a favor

received) operate.

Relatives and c o m p a d r e s of equal or inferior status,

w i t h their r e s p ective n e t w o r k of relationships, and

alliances, then, add to the f o l l o w i n g of the elite

p o l i t i c i a n w h i c h he has d e v e l o p e d through his subordinate

leaders. Together, they form his personal organization,

his faction, w h i c h he m ay ally wit h other elite

politicians to c onstitute the political party.

M O N E Y , GOODS A N D SERVICES

How M u c h ? The w i d e s p r e a d and o f ten extravagant use

of m o n e y and other economic resources by politicans are

of com mon k n o w l e d g e to all who are fa m i l i a r w ith

P h i l ippine elections. Pye, for instance, m ade the

c o m p a rative estimate that 1the P h i l i p p i n e s spent n e a r l y

four times as much, in p r o p o r t i o n to per capi t a income,

on its 1957 p r e s i d e n t i a l c a m paign as was spent on the

94
A m e r i c a n p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign of 1 9 5 6 t .

94
L u c i e n W. Pye, TThe Po l i t i c s of S o u t h e a s t A s i a 1 , in
A l m o n d and Coleman, o p . c i t . , p.126.
 272

The official accounting of campaign expenditures of

political parties is required by law. The Revised

Election Code, for example, provides that the treasurer

of a political party must file a statment ’of his account
of contributions and expenditures together with the names

and addresses of the contributors and persons receiving

the expenditures’.95 It likewise provides that

individual candidates must do the same, that ’no

candidate shall spend for his election campaign more than

the total amount of the emoluments for one year attached

to the office for which he is a candidate’ and that any

candidate found guilty of violating the above (and other

particular provisions of the code) ’shall be disqualified

from continuing as a candidate, or, if he has been
96
elected, from holding the office’.
The above provisions of the law are, however, largely
ignored by politicians. 97 In the 1959 senatorial and

95
Sec.42, Revised Election Code, R.A. No. 180 as amended
by R.A. Nos. 599 and 867 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1955)«
96
Sections 43, 48 and 29, respectively, ibid.
97
A Commission on Elections official stated that it is very
difficult to enforce the above provisions of the law
because it requires an action or protest by someone and
because most, if not all, of the serious contenders for
office violate the law, no one protests. He added that if
the law were enforced, probably all elective officials will
be disqualified for overspending. (Personal interview.)
 273

local elections, for example, the NP treasurer admitted

Q P)
that the party spent about £*4.3 million. A l s o i n f ormed

estimates, based on personal interviews with party

leaders, indicate that in the 1946, 1949, and 1953

presidential elections, the party in power spent between

£*2-4 m i l l i o n w h ile the o p p o s i t i o n p a rty spent b e t w e e n

JPl-1.3 million. 99 It should be noted, however, that these

were expenditures of the party headquarters. Aside from

these expenditures, each individual candidate often has

his own personal organization to maintain and, therefore,

has to raise funds for his own expenses. A rough estimate

of campaign costs of individual candidates for the

different positions would be: President £*1 to £*3 (m ) ;

Vice-President £*300,000 to £*1 (m) ; Senators £*130,000 to

£*300,000; Representatives £*80,000 to £*300,000; Governors

and City Mayors £*30,000 to £*130,000; Town Mayors £*3,000

98
T h e statement was made before the S e n a t e Blue R i b b o n
C o m m i t t e e h e a r i n g on the charge of S e n a t o r Ro d r i g o that
NP t r e a s u r e r H e r n a e z h a d r a i s e d £*4.3 m i l l i o n for the NP
coffers t h r ough the b a r t e r trade. H e r n a e z d e n i e d this
but a d m i t t e d that he r a i s e d £*400,000 for the NP c a m paign
a n d 'not t h r ough b a r t e r 1 . T h e £*4.3 m i l l i o n he said was
the e s t i m a t e d e x p e n ditures of the N P . Th e M a n i l a
C h r o n i c l e , M a r c h 11, i 9 6 0 .
99
V i d e Coquia, o p . c i t . , pp.213, 246; Lande, o p . c i t .,
p p .209 - 2 1 0 .
 274

to ^ 1 5 ,0 0 0 . The amount varies according to place

and candidate. Thus, one Representative of M a n i l a spent

about ^300,000 in the 1961 elections while his opponent

spent approximately ^ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ."^^ The affluent Osmena, Jr.,

and the industrialist Senator P u y a t , both Vice-Presidential

candidates in the 1961 elections, were reported to have

spent ’several m i l l i o n s ’ each. The Vice-Governor of a

Mindanao province stated that ’it takes over a hundred

10 2
thousand pesos to get elected governor of the p r o v i n c e ’ .

The general trend is for the incumbent (re-electionist)

to spend more than the opposition candidate. Smaller

constituencies also entail lesser expenses.

Not included in the above estimates are the public

works funds, the ’pork b a r r e l ’ , the Social Welfare

100
The above estimates are based on personal interviews
with various political leaders, some of the officials
concerned, or members of their staff; Cf. also M.V.
Concepcion, The C h a l l e n g e , pamphlet (Mimeo.) 1959? P*17;
R.V. Romero, ’Election Expenses Harm the E c o n o m y ’ , The
Manila B u l l e t i n , December 27? 19^2; and Lande, o p . c i t .
101
Personal interview with an NP leader.
10 2
Personal interview, D a v a o ._ In Cebu, where the rivalry
between the Cuenco and Osmena factions became so intense
in the 1950s, the spending in the gubernatorial race was
estimated to be between ^1 to ^2 (m) for each of the two
major candidates. (interview with a former Representative,
now living in Cebu.)
 275

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n funds, the rc o n t i n g e n t 1 funds a nd other

publ i c facilities, resources and some per s o n n e l of the

g o v e r n m e n t u t i l i z e d for p o l i t i c a l purposes by the party

in p o w e r and also by o p p o s i t i o n candidates h o l d i n g public

positions. The total e l e ction expenses of all candidates,

to i n c l u d e private and public funds, run into tens of

millions. One estimate of the total expenses of all

candidates in the 1 9 5 5 local el e c t i o n and the 1 9 5 7

p r e s i d e n t i a l elections, for example, was ^60.6 (m) and

1 f\ o
^63.2 ( m ) , respectively. A n o t h e r estimated that in

the 1 9 6 1 presidential election, w h i c h was the most c o stly

so far, *all candidates for all offices spent an

e s t i m a t e d ^80 to J£*150 million, with [President] G a r c i a

h i m s e l f resp o n s i b l e for n e a r l y h a l f the total s u m ' . 1 0 ^

It is, of course, i m p o ssible to make any accurate

estimate for the simple r e a s o n that some of these expenses

are in the form of public works jobs and services offered

to people (whose votes are needed) m o n t h s before the

elections.

103
M.V. Concepcion, o p . c i t . , p.17.
104
D a v i d Würfel, 'The P h i l i p p i n e Elections: Support for
D e m o c r a c y ’ , A s i a n S u r v e y , v o l . H , n o .3> M a y 1 9 6 2 , p.3^*
A more compr e h e n s i v e and recent study of Philippine
political finance by W ü r f e l appears in the Journal of
Polltic s , v o l . 2 5 , n o .3, A u g u s t 1 9 6 3 ? PP-757-73*
 27 6

Uses. What makes Philippine elections so expensive?

Several explanations seem valid. As previously

discussed, neither of the existing parties represent the

interests of the vast segment of the population. As

representatives of both the landed and business interests,

elite politicians cannot attract v o t e r s 1 support on the

basis of issues arising out of differences in political

principles — there are none. Consequently, one of the

major areas of competition among themselves lie in the

field of spending, that is, in the use of the economic

resources that they possess and control to win voters*

support. Patronage distribution, favor, and dole-giving,

even direct vote-buying, figure prominently in this

cont e s t .

Another factor that tends to increase the spending

is the corresponding increase in the stakes. One

politician in Ilocos S u r , for instance, explained that

not only the great spending but even the political

violence in the province are attributable to the ’high

stakes* involved. ’When one is elected to high office,

10 5
he becomes r i c h . * ’It pays to s p e n d ’ , he said.

IÖ5
Personal interview. Ma n y Filipinos are of course
familiar with these ’s t a k e s ’ for in every administration
since the war, from the Roxas to the Macapagal
administration, there were always quite a number of them.
There were the reported ’a n o m a l i e s ’ , scandals, and
rackets in the P C A U , the P R A T R A , the National Trading
 277

(He was, incidentally, referring to his opponent who

was 'i n ’ .)

The elite politician's use of money and other

economic resources to win electoral support is, of

course, complemented by the high vulnerability of the

voting masses to this political tool. Their life is

10 6
hard. Unemployment and underemployment is acute.

Composed largely of economically insecure voters whose

value-orientation is geared towards a status of

dependency vis-a-vis the elite, the bulk of the

electorate becomes easily susceptible to accept the

’help' offered by a campaigning politician, whether it

is in the form of goods, jobs, or money, in exchange for

their v o t e s .

105 (continued)
Corporation, the N A R I C , the N D C , Surplus Property
Commission, the Chinese immigration quota, Import control,
Tambubong estate deals, the Customs, Internal Revenue,
Immigration Bureau, Backpay, Central Bank, P H H C , the Army
'poncho1 case and the PX case, foreign exchange licenses,
reparations goods, the Stonehill 'web of c o r r uption', to
name but a few. Indeed, almost all government offices and
government-owned corporations seem to have been affected
by the cancerous growth of corruption. (Further discussion
on this point appears in Chapter VI.)
106
The status for unemployment and underemployment in April
1962, for example, was: Unemployed 1,012,000
Underemployed 2,190,000
Total 3,202,000 or almost
30 per cent of total labor force (10.7 m ) .
Source: Bureau of Census and Statistics, Philippine
Statistical Survey of H o u s e h o l d s , Bulletin No. 11, 'Labor
F o r c e ’ , April 1 9 6 2 , p.19*
 278

D i r e c t v o t e - b u y i n g by elite poli t i c i a n s is rampant.

It o f ten starts at the convention, where the rival

c a n d idates try to outbid each other in b u y i n g delegates*

votes. This is p a r t i c u l a r l y true whe n the party leaders

cannot agree on an i n f ormal choice and several candidates

decide to fight it out. Thus, the 1961 NP c o n v ention had

b e e n d e s c r i b e d as a ' B acchanalian orgy of w i l d spending*

for the d e l e gates were g i v e n not only t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and

IO7
free h o t e l accommodation, but also w o m e n and money.

T h e amount given to the d e l e g a t e s vary, d e p e n d i n g on the

importance of the post sought. In the 1961 NP Convention,

man y del e g a t e s were r e p o r t e d to have r e c e i v e d no less

than £*100 each and *h a p p y delegates c a r o u s i n g at the

lavish B a y s i d e n i g h t c l u b h ad their checks pick e d up by

10 8
Puyat* s genial brother...* In a M a n i l a C i t y Convention,

107
The twelve NP V i c e - P r e s i d e n t i a l aspirants for n o m i n a t i o n
were the ones who compe t e d in p r o v i d i n g the *w i n e , w o m e n
and s o n g * , plus cash to the d e l e g a t e s . The r e a s o n for
the i n t e n s i t y of the contest was the e x p e c t a t i o n that
w h o e v e r w i l l be elected to the v i c e - p r e s i d e n c y will
u l t i m a t e l y become President. President Garcia, u n d e r the
e i g h t-year const i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n on the presi d e n t i a l
tenure, w o u l d only serve three years and three months if
elected. Se n a t o r Puyat, who w o n the nomination, was
repor t e d to have spent over a m i l l i o n pesos in the
con v e n t i o n alone. Cf. also M a x i m o V. Soliven, *The
E l e c t i o n s of 1961*, P h i l i p p i n e S t u d i e s , vol.10, n o .1 ,
J a n u a r y 1962, p p . 3 - 3 1 ; Würfel, *The P h i l i p p i n e Elections*,
o p . c i t . , p .30•
108
The M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , J u n e l 4 , 1961, q u o t i n g Time M a g a z i n e ,
June l6, 1961. W ü r f e l r e p o r t e d a m u c h h i g h e r figure of
’several thousand pesos*. See his article on Philippine
political finance, op. c i t . , p.763*
 279

one candidate for mayor reportedly paid between )?100 to

t

^200 per delegate to get the nomination. The amount

paid to voters varies. In H u l o , Hollnsteiner reported

the range of ^5 to 'depending on the circumstances' .

In Manila, one Representative was buying at the rate of

^20 each while in H o c o s S u r , an informant stated that in

the 1961 election Senator P. paid ^8 although the usual

price was ^5» He added that during this election, 'the

province was flooded with m o n e y . I n Davao, the price

range in 1961 was from ^5 to J?10.

But the actual buying of votes during the few days

preceding the election is just one aspect of the use of

economic resources to influence elections. During the

entire incumbency of an elective official, he builds up

his 'popularity' not only as a 'man of the m a s s e s ' , but

also as the traditional dispenser of favors. He doles out

favors and money to his followers who flock to his office

or residence:

109
Hollnsteiner, op ._c i t . , p.100.
110
The informant, a radio political commentator, had a
brother who was fatally shot in this province notorious
for its political violence.
Ill
Personal interview, City Vice-Mayor. In Cavite, during
the 1963 elections, the price per vote was reported to be
between ^20 to ^30. (Cf. Philippines Free P r e s s . November
30, 1963, p.38.)
 280

A politician must have money. Lots of it.

He cannot win an election without money. He
must have a personal organization, his camp
followers, who will work for him. These he
must occasionally provide with money. He
must build up his public relations by donating
to beauty contests, by becoming sponsors in
baptisms, confirmations, and weddings where he
also spends. He must make donations during
town fiestas, give small amounts to those who
approach him for help. In my case, I spend
between ^80 to J?100 a day in this manner. 112

When Congress is in session, the offices of

Senators and Representatives are full of people --

relatives, c o m p a d r e s , godchildren, followers, and

provincemates — who are there to seek help, jobs, favors,

money. Because he has assumed the role of a powerful

dole-giver, because he has made many promises during the

campaign, he has made many people dependent on him.

After his election they start flocking to him. These

people must be accommodated if he has to keep his personal

organization intact, to maintain his following and thus

to keep power. The nature of his promises to his

supporters, however, indicate that it was not his

intention to fulfill his personal commitments to his

followers by utilizing his personal resources. Rather,

112
The interviewee was a Vice-Governor, the third-generation
politician in the family. Coming from an established
family, he married the daughter of a multi-millionairess.
His office on the ground floor of his house at 9-00 a.m.,
was filled wi t h people all seeking help or favors.
 281

the m a i n sources of be n e f i t s for his followers were to

be government resources, jobs in the different government

departments, bureaus, or agencies or in the public works

projects, from his share of the ’por k b a r r e l 1 (if he

were w i t h the ’i n s ’), t o g ether w i t h the other public

facilities and resources that may be available to him.

T h e s e will form part of his ’c a p i t a l ’ . He can partake

of these if he knows h ow to be a ’p r a c t i c a l ’ politician,

if he knows how to deal w i t h the bosses of the party in

power (whether it is his own or the o p p o s i t i o n ) .

The party in power has a great advantage in the use

of public funds for pol i t i c a l purposes. W h i l e C o n gress

approves the budget for public works and other government

spending, and even outlines h o w these funds are to be

spent, it is the P r e s ident who controls the release and

apportionment of the same. The ’por k barrel' funds,

divided a m ong C o n g r e s s m e n of the ruli n g party who get

b e t w e e n j?l00,000 to .£*5 0 0 ,000 each,^~*~^ are legally

designed for ’d evelopment p r o j e c t s ’ . In 1 9 6 1 , the total

’pork b a r r e l ’ fund was about £*150 (m) . The contingent

funds of the President w h i c h may amount from £*5 to £*15

113
Cf. The M a n i l a T i m e s , A p r i l 29, I960,
114
The M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , Jun e 7, 1961.
 282

million are intended for relief during natural

calamities. The Social Welfare Administration funds

also have their specific purposes. As has been said,

however, all of these may be utilized for political

purposes.

In a public rally in Pampanga during the 1963 elections,

for example, the Secretary of Public Works declared that

he was backing the promises of the LP candidate for

Governor of bountiful 'mejoras1 (improvements) with the

115
’millions in my department*. During the same meeting,
the Governor who was running for re-election, gave the

parable of the water tank. He stated that because he is

with the party in power, the water tank is always full.

In poetic language, he said that ’the President, who is

our provincemate and partymate, is the ocean which fills
the tank [public works] connected to the hose [himself]’.
’Therefore1, he concluded, ’if you elect my opponent,

you will not receive any public improvements, the roads

will not be repaired, nor will you get funds for other

services, because he has no t a n k ^

115
LP meeting, Betis, Pampanga, September 28 , 1963*
116
Ibid. In the next meeting, his opponent, an ex-Governor,
declared that ’the hose that leaks must be replaced’.
’It is true’, he said ’that the Governor had made
"improvements" during his term but they were mostly
family improvements, namely the family Coliseum, the
 283

In the above illustration, two important features

need to be stressed which characterize elite politics.

First is the tendency towards selective giving and

withholding, a sort of carrot-and-stick technique in

the disposition of public funds, jobs and services. A

second feature is the personalized aspect of the ‘g i v i n g ' .

Thus, the repair of a road or a dilapidated barrio

schoolhouse, the construction of a bridge or a

puericulture center, the distribution of relief funds

after a disastrous fire or flood — all these must bear

the brand name of the politician whose intercession made

them possible and he endeavors to make it appear that

these were personal favors ’g i v e n 1 by him to the recipient

group or community, although the funds came from the

public treasury and although they are supposed to be done

by the government as a matter of duty.

This pattern seems to be a general one. In Mindoro

Occidental, for instance, a barrio got a home economics

school-building, because its residents voted Liberal

while the p o b l a c i o n , the seat of the municipal government,

ll6 (continued)
family subdivision of fifty bungalows leased to American
servicemen near the U.S. Air Base, and the family Movie
T h e a t r e . 1 This charge was left unanswered but the
Governor got re-elected, anyway.
 284

which had more school-children and which badly needed

one did not get any. rSta. Cruz was being punished, in
117
other words, because of its Nacionalista leanings.1

In the matter of jobs, the loyal political followers of

the Liberal Party were the ones ’who got most of the

coveted limited employment opportunities at the public

w o r k s 1 , while the non-supporters were punished with

non-employment ’in order to keep the party organization

ll8
cohesive and the morale of the members h i g h ’ . In

H u l o , just before the start of the election campaign,

A rash of projects intended for the welfare

of politically sympathetic barrios or Hulo
in general breaks out...all done with notable
publicity and displaying prominent signs
informing the populace through whose pork
barrel generosity the deed is being
accomplished... Pamphlets are printed
detailing the majority p a r t y ’s contributions
to the town during its administrations. ^ 9

117
Remigio E. A g p a l o , ’The Politics of Occidental M i n d o r o ’ ,
o p . ci t . , p .10. A more recent example was the threatened
removal of the Antique National Agricultural School from
San Remigio to Hantik, Antique, because the wife of
Rep. Tobias Fornier won in all towns except San Remigio.
As one columnist remarked, ’Congressman F o r n i e r ’s promise
to punish San Remigio must be f u l filled’ . ’This is
Philippine politics...’ T. Valencia, ’Over a cup of
coffee', The Manila T i m e s , January 5? 1964.
118
I b i d ., p .11.
119
Hollnste i n e r , op. c i t ., pp.95-6.
 285

But the jobs in public works and government offices

are not enough even only for the party f o l l o w e r s . So

they are 1r o t a t e d 1. The political supporters of the

elite politician are given jobs for a few months as

temporary employees or casual laborers and then replaced

with a new batch. In this manner, the elite politician

seeks to satisfy as many followers as possible and to

keep up wit h his 'commitments'.

However, because most of the jobs and positions are

created more to satisfy the political ’commitment1 of

the politician (which help him keep power) rather than to

fill a real need, government offices become overcrowded

with me n and women doing superfluous and unnecessary

tasks. This taxes the government treasury heavily,

sometimes causing bankruptcy. Mass lay-offs occur from

time to time. Thus, in Baguio City in December 1 9 6 3 , the

City Treasurer advised the City Mayor, the Councilors,

and department heads 1to lay off all their casual employees

and laborers because the city cannot afford to pay their

120
salary a n y m o r e 1 . In Pasay City, Mayor Cuneta

announced after the 1963 elections the laying off of

120
’500 Baguio Employees Laid O f f 1 , The Evening N e w s ,
December 23, 19^3, p.l.
 286

121
' lOO p o l i c e m e n and 200 casual employees’. The

g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d M a n i l a Railroad, a favorite ’employment

a g e n c y ’ of politicians, h a d to lay off 2 , 5 0 0 employees

122
in 1 9 6 3 due to ’economic d i f f i c u l t i e s ’ . In C e b u

City, 3 OO c a sual employees were d i s m i s s e d also just after

the 1 9 6 3 e l e c t i o n s . I n i9 6 0 , the H o u s e of

Representatives a b o l i s h e d 2,400 n e w posts, and an

o p p o s i t i o n i s t R e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e n o u n c e d particularly,

’the c r e a t i o n of the n e w items and the increase by a

f i f t y - m a n p e r s o n n e l for the O f f i c e of the President, and

the c o n t i n g e n t f u n d as a "tenacious leech" and as a

dangerous tool for p o l i tical r e c r i m i n a t i o n and pol i t i c a l

, , 124
patronage 1.

A p a t t e r n of i n c r e a s e d employment before an elect i o n

and lay-offs after an e l e ction is discernible. The case

of the E m e r g e n c y E m p l o y m e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n created d u r i n g

the M a c a p a g a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , is an o t h e r good example.

121
’Is Pas ay C i t y G o v ’t. B a n k r u p t ? ’ , The E v e n i n g News ,
J a n u a r y 55 1964, p . l 6 .
122
’1,500 M R R W o r k e r s L a i d O ff M i n u s X ' m a s B o n u s ’ , The
E v e n i n g N e w s , D e c e m b e r 28, 1 9 6 3 , p.5; One thousand
tem p o r a r y and casual laborers h ad p r e v i o u s l y been
dismissed. (I b i d .)
123
’ 3 0 0 Casual employees dismissed’ , The Manila T i m e s ,
J a n u a r y 4, 1964, p.l-B.
124
'House A b o l i s h e s 2,400 N e w P o s t s ’ , T he M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e ,
A p r i l 2 2 , I9 6 0 .
 287

Congress gave the EEA an a p p r o p r i a t i o n of J?lOO m i l l i o n

for a f i v e - y e a r operation in line wit h the 1^- ye ar

socio-economic p r o g r a m 1 of the government. However,

it soon d e v e l o p e d into a m a s s i v e political i nstrument

that e n a b l e d some of the elite ’i n s 1 to employ thousands

of p o l i t i c a l proteges and w a r d leaders in the months

p r e c e d i n g the elections. This, of course, was de n o u n c e d

by the ’o u t s ’ w h i c h in c l u d e d some of the 'i n s ' who were

not ’a c c o m m o d a t e d ’ who c o m p l a i n e d that the agen c y had

spent m u c h of the entire amount a p p r o p r i a t e d in just one

126
year without any v i s ible productivity. Although the

m o t ive s of those who p r o p o s e d its a b o l i t i o n m a y be due to

their fa i l u r e to share in the bounty, still the functions

that the E E A performed, such as c l e a r i n g the esteros of

Manila, r e m o v i n g the grass fro m the moats of Intramuros,

b u i l d i n g of some feeder roads, etc., were superfluous

for they d u p l i c a t e d those of the D e p a r t m e n t of Public

Works and o t h e r e x i sting g o v e r n m e n t a l agencies.

125
Cf. The M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , D e c e m b e r 28, 1 9 6 3 * p.5* A lso
P h i l i p p i n e s F r e e P r e s s , A u g u s t 11, 1 9 6 2 , p.4.
126
Cf. ’P e l a e z A s s a i l s LP P l a n to use EEA, Public Works
F u n d s ’ , T h e M a n i l a B u l l e t i n , S e p t e m b e r 2 6 , 1 9 6 3 5 p.l4;
’Liberal S e n a t o r s J o i n M o v e to A b o l i s h E E A ! , T h e M a n i l a
C h r o n i c l e , D e c e m b e r 28, 1 9 6 3 , p.5*
 288

A n inte r e s t i n g and f r a n k account of the combined

use of economic resources to w i n v o t e r s 1 support was

g i ven by a town mayor. A p o r t i o n of it is q u o t e d below,

not onl y b e cause it shows the typical uses of m o n e y and

goods in P hilippine elections but b e c a u s e it also

i l l u s t r a t e s m u c h of what has b e e n d i s c u s s e d in this

127
section. The m a y o r ’s n a r r a t i o n follows:

I was a candidate for m u n i c i p a l m a yor in 1959*••

M o n t h s before the election, I h ad a clear
picture of the situation. T h e fight w o u l d be a
tough one for me t h o u g h I was the incumbent,
because I b e l o n g e d to the f a c t i o n that was
opposed to that of our c o n g r e s s m a n and the
administration. It meant that I w o u l d get no
share of the hug e pork b a r r e l funds all o t t e d to
the whole d i s trict by our congressman.

A f t e r weeks of soul-searching, I came to a

decision. I n politics, one must be pra c t i c a l
if he is to s u r v i v e . .. I called on a c o n g r e s s m a n
who was v e r y close to the president and told
him that I was r e ady to support the president.
A few days later, we were w i n g i n g to Manila.

At a M a l a c a n a n g conference, they offered to

make me official candidate for mayor. T hat
was in May. In the first w e e k of June, I
recei v e d a c o m m u n i c a t i o n from M a l a c a n a n g to
the effect that the public works earmarked for
projects in my town were released. Another
letter from the h i g h w a y district engineer
informed me that work on v a r i o u s projects in
my town w o u l d commence the f o l l o w i n g week. I
was to screen the laborers.

D a y and night m y house was lit e r a l l y filled

w i t h people seeking jobs. E v e n the followers

127
For a full account, see ’Po l i t i c s Was M y U n d o i n g ’ ,
Philippines Fre e P r e s s , O c t o b e r 19, 19^3» pp.l3> 3^+•
 289

of m y opponent came to me and asked for jobs

and o t her f a v o r s . ..

T h a t September, w h e n I got w o r d that our

g u b e r n a t o r i a l candidate w o u l d v i sit m y town,
I o r g a n i z e d a huge r a lly on the m a i n p l a z a to
c o i n c i d e w i t h his a r r i v a l . . .hundreds of people,
m o s t l y public works laborers, their wives, and
c h i l d r e n w ere in m y house to welcome our
candidate. To feed them, I h a d five cavans of
c o r n grits cooked plus a sack of mongo,
s a r dines and dried fish.

I w a l k e d beside our c a n d idate oh the way to the

p l a t f o r m while he was b u s y d i s t r i b u t i n g
e n v e l o p e s . .. One glance and I k n e w the
env e l o p e s c o n t a i n e d ^5 and ^10 bills. My
p o l i t i c a l stock...was gr e a t l y boosted. I was
g r e e t e d w i t h tremendous a p p lause when I
d e l i v e r e d m y speech. E v e n while our candidate
was speaking, truckloads of supplies were b e i n g
u n l o a d e d in my house. T h e y con s i s t e d of
clothes — T-shirts, undershirts, shawls,
handke r c h i e f s , etc., all m a r k e d w i t h the name
of our candidate for governor, as well as mine.
T h e next day other truckloads of supplies
a r r i v e d in m y house. This time, they con s i s t e d
of sacks of rice, boxes of SWA (Social W e l f a r e
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) sardines, and other items like
pencils.

F o l l o w i n g our strategy, I b e gan d i s t r i b u t i n g the

goods four days before e l e c t i o n d ay or on
Nov. 7* M y leaders in teams of two or three
went to their as s i g n e d barrios to dist r i b u t e the
T - s h i r t s and u n d e r s h i r t s to the m e n and the
shawls to the w o men in a d d i t i o n to a g a nta or
two of rice and sardines. I f o l l o w e d the next
d ay to d i s t r i b u t e ^3 per voter. On the 8 th and
9th, 1 u n l e a s h e d our u l t i m a t e weapon. Armed
w i t h b l a n k pay rolls, my leaders went from one
h o u s e to another. Ta r g e t s w ere the followers of
m y opponent. Once the v o t e r p r o m i s e d to vote
for me, he or she w o u l d s i g n in the proper space
 290

and. . .receive )?20, the equivalent to one g

w e e k 1s w o r k on the road c o n s t r u c t i o n project.

In the rest of the above account, the m a y o r

complained that in spite of the fact that he spent

^15,000 of his own personal m o n e y (aside fro m the goods

that came fro m the p r o v i n c i a l and n a t ional governments),

he w on o n l y by a small m a j o r i t y and not by the landslide

129
that he expected. He c l a imed he was 'double-crossed1 . y

The flow of official funds and p a t r o n a g e is not

always done through ’channels' as i n d i c a t e d in the above

illustration. Sometimes, it is done direct such as in

the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e ction of 1961. While other

pre s i d e n t s were more subtle in the u t i l i z a t i o n of public

funds and resources, for p o l i t i c a l purposes, ’former

P r e s ident G a r c i a had no qualms about u t i l i z i n g some of

1
his m ore salient p r e r o g a t i v e s d u r i n g the [1961] campaign’.

128
I b i d . O t h e r goods and services ’g i v e n ’ to v o t e r s d u r i n g
elections are soft drinks, calendars, ball pens, combs,
cigarette lighters, some religious items and other
consumer goods; d u r i n g r e g i s t r a t i o n and el e c t i o n days,
m a n y p o l i t i c i a n s also provide free t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to
voters, sometimes food. Some b i g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n companies
s u p p o r t i n g par t i c u l a r c andidates o f ten give free tickets
to v o t e r s l i v i n g outside their v o t i n g districts. (For
more r e cent examples, vide P h i l i p p i n e s F r e e P r e s s ,
N o v e m b e r 3 O , 19^3? PP*33j 38.)
129
I b i d . , p . 3 4 . The m o s t p r o b a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n is that his
opponent was also u s i n g the same techniques or was able
to raise the ’i s s u e ’ of graft and c o r r u p t i o n ’ effectively.
130
Soliven, ’T h e E l e c t i o n s of 1 9 6 1 ’ , op, c i t . , p . 22 .
 291

He travelled around the country either on

government plane (such as the Fokker-Friendship),
by government-owned railroad or aboard the
*3>2.5 million presidential yacht obtained from
Japanese Reparations, the 'Lapu-Lapu1. At
each whistle stop or campaign platform, Garcia
openly read detailed lists of ’pork-barrel1 or
public works allocations granted that specific
locality (reminding residents of the area that
they had partaken of his official largesse),
handed out backpay checks and treasury warrants,
or delivered previously unpaid monetary
’bonuses1 to Juan de la Cruz. His campaigners
had at their command all the combined facilities
of government and of government-controlled
corporations.131

There was, of course, nothing that President Garcia

did in the 1961 election campaign which his predecessors,

or his successor, did not do. The only difference

perhaps was in degree and in the ’openness’ in which he

utilized official funds and facilities to promote his

candidacy. All the others have also used government
facilities during election campaigns. Even Magsaysay’s
candidacy was in a way promoted by utilizing the
facilities of the propaganda office of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines under then Major Jose M. Crisol, while
the former was the Secretary of National Defense of
Quirino. And all have used the ’pork barrel’ and public
works funds for political purposes. For these are not

purely postwar occurrences. It has been the perennial

131
Ibid.
 292

complaint of the ’o u t s 1 even b e f o r e the war, for

instance that ’the present s y s t e m of government has

g i v e n the p a r t y in power m a n y p r i v i l e g e s like p o r k - b a r r e l

l e g i s l a t i o n and patronage w h i c h give v e r y little chance

132
for the m i n o r i t y to get into p o w e r ’ . In short, they

f o r m part of the A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l legacy to F i l i p i n o

politicians and they have f l o u r i s h e d u n d e r local

conditions.

There are other occasions w h e n goods an d services

are d o l e d out by p o l i ticians or t h eir families. After a

flood, typhoon, or a fire, for instance, the p o l i t i c i a n

or his w i f e goes to the scene to comfort the victims,

b r i n g i n g some relief goods to the unfortunates. But the

group of p h o t o g r a p h e r s and public relations men

a c c o m p a n y i n g h i m or his wife see to it that the act of

’charity* is p r o p e r l y ann o u n c e d in the m e t r o p o l i t a n

d a i lies w i t h the picture of the p o l i t i c i a n d o l e - g i v e r

p r o m i n e n t l y d i s p l a y e d h a n d i n g the doles. Sometimes, too,

the r e l i e f goods themselves are l a b e l l e d or m a r k e d in

133
bol d letters w i t h the name of the dole-giver.

132
S t a t e m e n t s of Benigno Aquino, Rafael P a l m a and M a x i m o M.
Kalaw, P h i l i p p i n e H e r a l d , June 5j 1 9 3 3 5 p.4. C i t e d in
Liang, o p . c i t ,, p.262.
133
One e x ample is ’O p e r a t i o n P u s o * , l a u nched by the First
Lad y a f t e r the Central L u z o n floods in i 9 6 0 . See also
 293

During the Chris turns s e cis o n , Mgnila.' s *poor people'

are gathered, in front of Malacanang Palace to receive

their 'gifts' from the First Lady of the Land. Months

before this occasion, newspapers keep a running account

of the organization and activities of the group of

wealthy matrons -- wives of politicians, landlords,

industrialists, and businessmen -- led by the First Lady.

When the day comes for the distribution of 'gifts', the

poor people' from Tondo and the numerous squatter

colonies of Manila and suburbs congregate in front of the

Presidential Palace to receive a 'bayong' (paper bag) of

rice, a few canned goods, and other items. Thus, in this

manner, the politician's stock is further raised.

Poverty, too, not only becomes institutionalized but, as

shall be shown later, it also becomes good politics.

Sources. There are a variety of sources of financial

support for political spending. The utilization of

government funds and other resources for political purposes

by those holding power has already been discussed. The

133 (continued)
Hi?_M_anila Times, January 15 , 1964. It is significant to
mention, in this connection, that two women administrators
of Social Welfare (in charge of providing government
relief goods to the 'poor') have been elected to the
Senate. Like the distribution of government jobs, the
giving and withholding of scarce government-owned goods
becomes a potent political weapon.
 294

1i n s ’ particularly have a decided advantage in this

regard. In the 1946, 1949 and 1953 presidential

elections, for instance, Coquia estimated that between

40 to 65 per cent of party campaign funds came from

public sources (public works, provincial and municipal

funds) .13Z+

As previously noted, the legal provision requiring

parties and candidates to submit names and amounts

contributed is not followed and no official sources are,

therefore, available on private donations. However, by

the nature of the parties and the economic ties of the

candidates, it is logical to expect that the major bulk

of the financing would come from the landlord-business

groups.

As shown in Chapter IV, many of the political elite

belong to these vested interest groups — as landlords,

big businessmen, directors or stockholders of big

134
Coquia* s estimates of sources of party finances (of the
party in power) in three presidential elections are as
follows:
1946 (NP) 1949 (l p ) 1953 (LP)
Party Fund pl.O (m) pi. 5 (m) ?1.0 (m)
C andidates 0.7 2.5 2.5
Public Works 2.0 3.0 2.0
UNRRA (Govt.) 1.5 - -
Pro v 11. and Municipal Funds - 0 .7 0.7
Vide Coquia, o p . c i t ., pp.215, 246.
 295

corporations, or as corporation lawyers of big firms,

both. Filipino and alien. These give them, therefore,

a direct line of contact. The ’national1 politicians

which include the President, Vice-President, the

Senators and, in some respects, the Representatives,

get much of their campaign funds from the top economic
groups — the big exporters-importers, the manufacturers,

the landowning groups -- (e.g. the ’sugar bloc’, the

’tobacco bloc*, abaca growers, rice producers, etc.) and

other businessmen. Favorable or protective legislation,

liberal loans from government banks and other financing

institutions (e.g., Philippine National Bank, Development

Bank of the Philippines, Social Security System,
Government Service Insurance System) the awarding of fat

government contracts, appointment to key public offices

and corporations -- all these, among others, form part
of the considerations given in exchange for liberal
donations to party funds. An examination of those
appointed to key government agencies, for example, shows
the close correlation between the economic interest of
many of those appointed and the post or office which
they held. Thus, one finds big sugar men usually
appointed to the Philippine Sugar Institute, coconut men

to the Philippine Coconut Administration, some bankers

 296

and financiers (or those connected with them) to the

Philippine National Bank and Central Bank, and so
forth. 135 Since there are no basic differences between

the parties, party considerations do not seem to enter

the picture in these donations. As one Negros landowner
stated,

The province [hacenderos?] generally goes with

the Administration. You see we need loans and
subsidies. That is why we don't bother too
much with local politics. We are more concerned
with national policies, the passage of laws.
We need the cooperation of top government
people.136

Another example was the financial support given to

Magsaysay during his bid for nomination in the 1953

Nacionalista Party convention. His biographers report:
Aguinaldo [a wealthy landowner-businessman-
industrialist] was able to produce one
hundred and twenty thousand pesos, which
financed the nomination bid, and ultimately
the convention was underwritten by a
prominent Liberal who preferred to remain
anonymous. (Emphasis supplied.)137
Among the oft-mentioned large financiers of political

parties and politicians are the wealthy Spanish and

Chinese mestizo families whose members have been in

135
Cf . Official Directories,_Republic of the Philippines,
19^6-1963} op. cit.
136
Personal interview.
137
Romulo and Gray, The Magsaysay Story, op. cit. , p.198.
 297

politics themselves. Roxas in 19^6, for example, was

reported to have been backed by Soriano, Elizalde,

1 QQ
Amado Araneta, Lopez, Fernandez and other big businessmen.

Other big names often mentioned are the Yulos, Mo n t e l i b a n o s ,

Roceses, Aranetas (another family), Madrigals, Cojuangcos,

Rufinos, Menzi, Ledesmas, Henareses, Delgados, Sycips,

Jacintos, Y u Khe Thais, Zobels, Del Rosarios, Puyats, and

others. 139 Members of these families have occupied top

elective and appointive positions. Andres Soriano was a

Secretary of Finance of Quezon in the Commonwealth

government-in-exile. A Spaniard, he became a Filipino

citizen in 19^1 to avoid having his vast assets being

140
frozen in the Philippines and in the United States.

Just after the war, he became an American citizen but

continued to reside in the Philippines. Except for

Yu Khe Thai, all the others have members of their families

who have served as Cabinet members, Senators,

Representatives, members of the boards of directors of

government banks and other financing agencies,

138
Abaya, op . ci t . , PP •5 > 71 > 17^-*
139
Personal interviews with informed sources close to
political leaders.
140
Abaya, op. c i t . , p.167.
 298

government-owned or controlled corporations and

l4l
agencies. Together with Americans, Chinese and

other foreign firms, these families own or control a

vast segment of the economic resources of the country.

Illustrations of their immense economic holdings (which

include banking, insurance, landed estates, manufacturing,

mining, shipping, educational institutions, mass media,

land transportation, and others) have been given in the

previous chapters. Also, their intermarriage and other

social and economic ties have likewise been pointed out.

Alien business groups, particularly Chinese and

Americans, though specifically prohibited by law, also

figure prominently in these donations. American

businessmen, however, seem to be more concerned with

’national* politicians while the Chinese are involved in

both national and local politics. In the 1953 elections,

for instance, American business interests, were reported

to have contributed $>250,000 to Magsaysay*s campaign

142
funds. The large contributions to the campaign chests

of both the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties and the

personal favors, 'donations* , and payments (for ’services*)

141
Some of these families have been mentioned in s u p r a ,
Chapters III, IV, and the Appendix.
142
Time Magazine (U.S.), November 2 3 } 1953} P»37»
 299

to individual top politicians by the American

businessman, Harry S. Stonehill, may be cited as another

example. The public disclosure in I962-I963 of the

details of Stonehill's links with top politicians and

government people opened the lid on the usually

concealed intervention in Philippine politics of alien

businessmen. The case warrants special consideration

for it illustrates what may be the established pattern

of relationships between some foreign (and Filipino)

businessmen and politicians. The case also illustrates

some of the important considerations given to businessmen

in exchange for financial support to politicians, as well

as some aspects of Philippine politics.

Stonehill was an American ex-soldier who had been

stationed in the Philippines in 1945. While still in

the army, he engaged in business, dealing in Army surplus

equipment and other i t e m s . In less than a year, he had

made about $>150,000 in profits. Discharged in 1946, he

returned to the U . S . , divorced his wife who refused to

return with him to the Ph i l i p p i n e s , and came back to the

Philippines where he engaged in various business

l4l
enterprises. In a period of less than fifteen years,

143
Juan S. S a b a d o , 'From Rags to Riches', Weekly G r a p h i c ,
August 29, 1 9 6 2 , pp.6-7.
 300

he was able to b u i l d what has b e e n c a l l e d the 'Stonehill

e m p i r e ’ , w h i c h comprised, among others, the U.S. T o b a c c o

Corporation, P h i l i p p i n e T o b a c c o F l u e - C u r i n g and R e d r y i n g

Corp o r a t i o n , the S t o n e h i l l Steel Corporation, the

R e p u b l i c G l ass Corporation, the P h i l i p p i n e C o t t o n

Development Corporation (now the G e n e r a l A g r i c u l t u r a l

Co r p o r a t i o n ) , the A t l a s Cement C orporation, the Rep u b l i c

R e a l E s t a t e C o r p o ration, the U n i t e d H o u s i n g Corporation,

the I n d u s t r i a l B u s i n e s s and M a n a g e m e n t Corporation, and

the F a r E a s t P u b l i s h i n g Company.

Abroad, S t o n e h i l l owns the Julius Baer B a n k

in S w i t z e r l a n d (that b a n k has d e nied t h i s ) ,
a c i garet plant in Mexico, a cement plant in
Nigeria, a b o t t l e and jar plant in Hawaii,
and a c o u n t r y club in Oregon.

The assets of these various companies run

into h u n d r e d s of millions. Sto n e h i l l h i m s e l f
is said to be w o r t h more than a h u n d r e d
m i l l i o n pesos.

D u r i n g all those years, S t o n e h i l l became a b o n a fide

m e m b e r of M a n i l a ’s ’4 0 0 ’. H e was a m o n g the top ten

taxpayers in the country. He m o v e d around in the highest

social circles, r u b b i n g elbows w i t h top political, social

and economic leaders. He c o n t r i b u t e d to charity. He

lived in m i l l i o n a i r e s ’ row -- in Forbes Park.

144
I b i d , , p . 7.
 301

H o w did Stonehill accu m u l a t e this huge fortune in

just a brief p e riod of f i f t e e n years? The details were

re v e a l e d when one of his bu s i n e s s associates,

M e i n h a r t Spielman, went to the N a t i o n a l B u r e a u of

I n v e s t i g a t i o n and c o m p lained that he was b e a t e n up by

Stonehill and Robert Brooks, a n o ther S t o n e h i l l associate.

S p i e l m a n also disclosed to the N BI all of S t o n e h i l l ’s

activities and methods of operations. O n M a r c h 3» 1962,

Stonehill and Brooks were arrested, and their offices

and residences were searched. F o u n d and c o n f iscated

were electronic devices w h i c h i n c l u d e d t e l e p h o n e - t a p p i n g

and ja m m i n g instruments, t a p e - r e c o r d i n g machines, and a

145
‘w a l k i e - t a l k i e ’ . Also, among the m a t erials seized were

two-way mirrors, m o v i n g pictures of h i g h officials

filmed i n d i v idually w i t h actresses and high society

146
matrons in a secret a s s i g n a t i o n roo m of S t o n e h i l l ’s ...

V o l u m i n o u s documents, s h o w i n g S t o n e h i l l ’s modus operandi

in business were also seized. These in c l u d e d a small

book, w h i c h came to be k n o w n as the ‘Blue B o o k ’ ,

c o n t a i n i n g a record, in S t o n e h i l l ’s own handwriting, of

names of top politicians and other h igh government

145
F i l e m o n V. Tutay, ’T h e S t o n e h i l l Case: The B a c k g r o u n d
of "N e t w o r k of C o r r u p t i o n " ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s Free P r e s s ,
J u l y 20, 1 9 6 3 5 p.4; cf. also 'Twelve O f f i c i a l s in Bribe
R a p s ’ , The M a n i l a T i m e s , M a r c h 7 5 1962, p.l.
146
'This is W h e r e it B e g a n ’ , W e e k l y G r a p h i c , J u l y 3 1 5 1963»
P •7 •
 302

officials, w i t h amounts of m o n e y entered opposite their

names. S e c r e t a r y L i w a g d e c l a r e d that !some 100

g o v e r n m e n t m e n were shown to have r e c e i v e d m o n e y and other

considerations from the A m e r i c a n m i l l i o n a i r e i n d u s t rialist

147
and f i n a n c i e r ’ . It seems that the evidence Tp o i nted

to a plot for economic d o m i n a t i o n by S t o n e h i l l and his

crew, with extensive use of b r i b e r y and b l a c k m a i l in all

br a n c h e s of the g o v e r n m e n t ’ .

The full contents of the ’Blue B o o k * , however, were

not r e l e a s e d for over a y ear for some top officials,

i n c l u d i n g Senators, C a b i n e t members, and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s

b e l o n g i n g to the p a rty in power were also m e n t i o n e d in the

list. Furthermore, libel suits wer e t h r e a t e n e d against

anyone who w o u l d reveal its contents.

Mea n w h i l e , S t o n e h i l l and his a ssociates were c h a rged

w i t h a t t e m p t e d murder, v i o l a t i o n of internal revenue

and c u s toms laws and C e n t r a l B a n k regulations, corruption

of public officials, i n f l u e n c e peddling, smuggling, tax

evasion, espionage and other criminal charges. The

charges were later ch a n g e d to ’economic sabotage, tax

evasion, political interference, m i s d e c l a r a t i o n of

147
The M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , J u l y 13> 19^2, p.15«
148
’This is W h e r e it B e g a n ’ , op. c i t . , p.7*
i m p o r t s , schemes and i n s i d i o u s m a c h i n a t i o n s inimical to

the i n t e r e s t of the state e f f e c t e d t h r o u g h influence

l4o
p e d d l i n g and or c o r r uption of public officials*.

S p i e l m a n was the principal state witness but in the

course of the d e p o r t a t i o n proceedings, he disappeared.

S t o n e h i l l and his associates were g r a n t e d bail. On

I5O
April 22, 1 9 6 2 , S p i e l m a n was r e p o r t e d murdered.

An interesting development occured d u r i n g the trial

of Stonehill. S t o n e h i l l 1s lawyers perhaps f i n d i n g it

difficult to offset the e v i dence against their client,

decided on a d i f f erent m ode of defense. They disclosed

the contents of a docum e n t a l l e g e d l y w r i t t e n by Jose W.

Diokno (who was M a c a p a g a l ’s S e c r e t a r y of J u s t i c e and

under w h o s e d i r e c t i o n the S t o n e h i l l raids were conducted)

to M a n i l a ' s M a y o r A r s e n i o Lacson, a p o r t i o n of which

reads:

Ou r o wn trusted m e n are e v a l u a t i n g the

d o c u m e n t s seized and I've given specific
i n s t r u c t i o n s that all do c u m e n t s i n c r i m i n a t i n g
D a d o n g [President M a c a p a g a l ] be i m m e d i a t e l y
t u rned over to you. Y o u wil l n o w h ave him
captive. In this way, y o u will be e x e r c i s i n g
the p o wers of a President long b e fore 1965-151

149
Q u o t e d in F.V. Tutay, 'Stonehill C a s e ' , o p . c i t . , p.4.
150
W e e k l y G r a p h i c , J uly 31» 1963» P-7-
151
Quoted in i b i d . , p.97-
 304

It siiould be noted that Lacson was an NP man who

rebelled against his party in the 1961 presidential
elections and became the campaign manager of LP

candidate Macapagal who won. Diokno, a Lacson man and

also an N P , became a Cabinet member in an LP
administration as a fulfilment of one of the 1commitments'
of President Macapagal to Lacson in exchange for the

political support of the latter during the 1961 elections.

If the letter were genuine, it would seem that Lacson and

Diokno had an ‘insidious scheme to exploit the position

of the justice secretary to further the presidential bid

of Lacson in I9651.
Diokno, of course, denied that he ever wrote the
letter and branded it ‘a big forgery*. The NBI claimed
that the signature was genuine, but that it had been
written on a blank paper in 1 9 5 8 . But Diokno was
relieved as Justice Secretary by President Macapagal.
Because Senators and Representatives had been
mentioned as included in Stonehill’s ‘secret payroll’,
Congressional investigations were conducted. Diokno,
the new Justice Secretary Liwag, and NBI Director Lukban

were asked to testify. During the testimony three

152
Ibid.
 305

members of Macapagal's cabinet were mentioned as linked

with Stonehill.^ ^ On July 31} 1962, Finance Secretary

F.E.V. Sison and Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc
resigned from the Cabinet. (The President accepted the

resignations but the latter was appointed as Ambassador

to the U.S.j\ 15 4 A few days after the resignation of the
two cabinet members, Stonehill who was at the time placed

under custody of a congressional committee for contempt

(he had refused to answer any question) was taken from
congressional custody by presidential order and

deported.155
With Spielman dead and Stonehill out of the country,
the political storm over the case really began. Diokno,

who became an NP senatorial candidate in 1963» started

the fireworks. In a political rally of the NP in Manila,
he showed photostatic copies of the Stonehill documents
and made insinuations on the identity of one Senator
involved. Reading 'Red' and !De la Rosa1 and various
amounts entered opposite the names on different dates

(total: ^*90 ) 500) , he told the crowd that he was not saying

153
The Manila Chronicle, July 31> 1962, p.l.
154
Ibid.
155
The Manila Chronicle, August 6 , 1962, p.l.
 306

that the amounts entered opposite these names were sums

of money given by Stonehill to re-electionist LP

Senator Rogelio de la Rosa. 'You be the judge on this*,

■j ^ /

he told the crowd. The following week (on July 13?

1963) j during a TV-press conference, Dlokno came out with

more documents from the Stonehill files. One was
allegedly a draft of a letter of Stonehill to President

Macapagal reminding him of promises that the latter

supposedly made just after the 1961 elections regarding

the appointment of F.E.V. Sison as Under-secretary of

Finance, (with Macapagal himself holding the Finance

portfolio) but giving Sison all the responsibilities of

Secretary, including chairmanship of the Monetary Board
of the Central Bank; the appointment of former Ambassador
Manuel V. Gallego as Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources; the retention of certain officials of
the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration with
which Stonehill had business dealings; and the appointment
of a recommendee of Stonehill to the Monetary Board. Two

of these 1promises’ (Sison1s appointment and retention

of PVTA officials), Diokno said were fulfilled. Diokno
produced other documents. One was a letter addressed to

136
F.V. Tutay, ’Political Explosion’, Philippines Free
Press, July 20, 1963? p*3 *
 307

Sison commending him on his future appointment as

Under-secretary of Finance and instructing him to resign

from all business and civic positions upon his

appointment. Others purported to show that Stonehill

sent ^100,000 to ‘Mr Lex' (later identified as Executive

Secretary Amelito Mutuc) during the height of the 1961

presidential campaign and asked ‘Mr Lex* to work for the

appointment in the Macapagal Administration of persons

identified with the Stonehill group.

This infuriated the LP top men. The following

evening,Justice Secretary Salvador Marino in a TV-radio

appearance, implicated seventeen persons as being linked

with Stonehill. Not surprisingly, they were all members

of the N P . He charged Diokno of protecting from public

disclosure his NP friends. He further charged Diokno of

receiving ^20,500 from Peter Lim (a Stonehill associate)

and the Federation of Chinese Chambers of Commerce of

158
which Lim was the leader. He further charged that

Mr Diokno*s involvement with the web of

corruption of Stonehill and Peter Lim is
accentuated by the fact that the Chinese

157
Ibid.
158
For a full text of the charges, see The Manila T i m e s ,
July_15, 1 9 6 3 , p.20-A; Vide, also ‘Justice Secretary
Marino on Diokno and on Stonehill Blue Book L i s t 1,
Philippines Free P r e s s , July 20, 1 9 6 3 , pp.6-7, e t . s e q .
 308

Khing Guan K h o , who owns the 'batel' [boat]

in which Spielman was murdered, is now the
head of the 1Diokno-for-Senator-Movement in
Sulu.159

He added that Diokno's outstanding activity 'has been

to be the lawyer and defender of Chinese clients and

interests' and this is the reason, he said, why Peter

Lim was not arrested and deported with Stonehill. He

then proceeded to name twenty-five of Diokno's Chinese

clients.

But that was not all, Marino said that former

President Garcia 'was financially assisted by the

Stonehill and Peter Lim group both in the 1959 and 1 9 ol

elections' and that the former President 'had a long

history of unethical tie-up with the Stonehill and Peter

Lim G r o u p ' . To prove his point on the financial

159
I b i d ., p .6.
160
I b i d . Diokno later on replied that Marino's charges
were 'foul lies and half-t r u t h s ' ; that his name was not
in the 'Blue B o o k 1 ; that he was retained as a lawyer, not
by Peter Lim, but by the Federation of Chinese Chambers
of Commerce; that, of the twenty-five clients mentioned,
fifteen are naturalized Filipino citizens; and that K i n g
Guan Kho (a naturalized Filipino and not Chinese) who
owns the Kumpit in which Spielman disappeared, is his
client and not campaign manager in Sulu. He said that
there is nothing wrong with having some alien clients.
Cf. F.V. Tutay, 'The Stonehill B o m b ' , Philippines Free
P r e s s , July 27, 1 9 6 3 *
161
'Marino Releases Version of Stonehill C a s e ' , M a n i l a
B u l l e t i n , July 15, 19^3, p.ll.
 309

backing given to President Garcia and the N P , he cited

from ’confidential1 memorandum and a ‘very confidential

letter1 from the Stonehill documents showing that 1the

financing consisted of ^3 million undertaken by the

financial backers at a quota of ]?500,000 each to start
l62
from August, 19581. This was corroborated, he said,

by a letter, dated July 23, 1959, sent by Stonehill to

Nino Ramirez (brother-in-law of Mrs Garcia) which reads

in part as follows:
In accordance with our previous plan that the
President should not permit a number of people
to be soliciting funds from various sources,
let us make certain that only four or five
large groups are contacted such as a sugar
group, Stonehill group, Soriano group, and
perhaps, the Elizalde group, who would
finance the entire campaign and secure the
approval of the projects which they would
need.1^3
Marino further charged that from the documents and
records on the Stonehill files, the following also appeared
to have received from the Stonehill group the amounts
indicated: Mrs Leonila Garcia (First Lady) - ^ 200, 000;

Linda Garcia-Campos (daughter of President Garcia) and

her husband, Atty. Fernando Campos - $500 a month 1during
their stay in the United States1; Senator Roseller Lim -

162
Ibid.
163
Ibid.
 310

Tat least1 £*8 8 ,9 0 0 , and he 1performed unethical

services for S t o n e h i l l 1 ; Representative Natalio

Castillo - £*23,000; former Executive Secretary Juan

Pajo - £*73 ,000 . Mayor Lacson - £*15,820; Mrs Luchi

Lacson - £*2,000; Ambassador Melchor Aquino - £*12,000;

Representative Joaquin Roces - £*12,375* Marino likewise

declared that Senator Gil Puyat ‘served as an implement

of the Stonehill group in the S e n a t e 1 ; that Senator

Cipriano Primicias ‘assisted Stonehill in P V T A ‘ ; that

Representative Bartolome Cabangbang ‘appears to have

rendered unethical services for Stone h i l l 1 ; and that

Cosme Garcia (brother of President Garcia) ‘had unethical

164
and business relations with S t o n e h i l l 1 .

What did Stonehill get in return for all these

payments? Marino asserted that from the Stonehill

documents, ‘it appears* that Stonehill was assisted by

President Garcia and some members of his family in various

ways such as securing a huge loan from the government

owned Philippine National Bank; approving a ‘transaction

to export 14 million lbs. of low-grade tobacco in

exchange for importing 10 million lbs. of American

Virginia tobacco; agreeing ‘to split profits on a barter

164
Ibid. Cf. also The Manila T i m e s , July 13 , 19^3 , p.20-A.
 311

transaction1 ; favorable consideration of barter

licenses of Stonehill; assistance on various business

projects such as the plan to release 10,000 hectares

of Isabela land for a rice project, import of 10,000

tons of rice, export of 3 million lbs. of scrap and

cigar fillers and the import of 3 million lbs. of

Virginia tobacco; intercession with Central Bank Governor

Cuaderno for Stonehill1s sheet glass enterprise;

assistance in stopping the inflow of sheet glass from

other countries; prevention of approval of importation

of $8 million worth of cotton (Stonehill had a cotton

plantation in Cotabato); certifying of bills which

Stonehill himself prepared for Senator Puyat and

Representative Teves; approval of Stonehill’s Republic

Glass Corporation; protection ’from harassers’ ; and

many others. Marino averred that Mrs Leonila Garcia

’had agreed to accept £*200,000 after award of a Stonehill

coke project with her full support’, and that a relative

of Mrs Garcia ’followed up "an illegal pending deal" with

the GSIS for £*1,600,000’ . He further stated that ’it

appears that Mrs Garcia intervened in the matter of the

veto of Senate Bill 588 for Stonehill with Atty. Dimataga

[Mrs Garcia’s relativeJ as intermediary’.

165
Ibid.
 312

The other officials mentioned, charged Marino,

performed, more or less, similar ’assistance1 to

Stonehill. Rep. Natalio Castillo, he said, appeared

to have ’received from Stonehill ^10,000 as additional

campaign help for signing PTFC [Philippine Tobacco and

Flue-Curing] contract exclusion’ Senator Lim,

Marino stated, helped Stonehill in legislation, one
letter ’asking him [Lim] to pass a bill to protect local

cotton producers’. Marino charged that Lim appeared to

be ’under orders from Stonehill’. In a Stonehill letter,
the former American Cl, wrote:

I should like to have you [the Senator] follow

up for me with [name of a Central Bank
official] in order to get the Monetary Board
to transfer our [dollar] allocation to the
Far East Publishing Corporation [a Stonehill
corporation].1^7
The above disclosures created a furor among the
NPs. Denials, libel threats, and counter-denunciations
followed. Former President Garcia called the charges a
l68
’tissue of lies’. How could he be connected with
Peter Lim, he asked,

166
Ibid.
167
Cited in Filemon V. Tutay, ’What They Got from Stonehill’ ,
Philippines Free Press, March 23, 1 9 6 3 , p.83; Cf. also ibid.
168
’NPs Reply to Marino Raps’, Philippines Free Press, July
20, 1 9 6 3 , P •68.
 313

E v e r y b o d y in M a n i l a knows that he [Peter Lim]

was the political confidant of the late M a y o r
Lacson. W h e n the late M a y o r L a c s o n
t r e a c h e r o u s l y c a m p a i g n e d against his Party
and joined M r Macapagal, he d r a g g e d along
w i t h him M r P e t e r L i m and p r e s u m a b l y all the
Chinese elements of his f o l l o w i n g w i t h the
f i n ancial resources u n d e r their c o m m a n d . 1 ^ 9

If there were millions spent in the 1961 elections, he

stated, 1 such millions must have been spent against me

170
and f o r someone e l s e * . As regards the favors or

assistance that he gave to Stonehill, former P r e s i d e n t

G a r c i a de c l a r e d that

A President of a country, w h o e v e r he may be,

r e c e i v e petitions, requests, p ropositions and
w hat not from b u s iness executives, fanners,
industrialists, p o l i t i c i a n s and p l a i n citizens.
If the President ap p r o v e d any or some of these
requests, proposals, etc., in f a v o r of
bu s i n e s s executives like M r Stonehill, it does
n ot entirely f o l l o w that the P r e s i d e n t ' s
approval is c o r r u p t . .. S i m i l a r requests or
petitions were s u b m i t t e d by other industrial
executives like the Sorianos, Zobels, Elizaldes,
C a b a r r u s e s and an endless list of others.
Similarly, some w e r e approved, others were
r e j e c t e d and still others r e - s t u d i e d
a c c o r d i n g to their resp e c t i v e merits.

Representative Joaquin Roces of M a n i l a said he

could not remember h a v i n g r e c e i v e d any m o n e y from

Stonehill as a gov e r n m e n t official, 'not even a

169
Ibid.
170
Ibid .
171
Ibid.
 314

c o n t r i b u t i o n for campaign funds in the 1 9 5 7 > 1 9 5 9 and

1961 elections'. O nly Stonehill, he said, could explain

the ^ 1 , 0 0 0 and the ^2,375 alleged to have b e e n g i ven to

h i m (Roces). He, however, r e m e m b e r e d h a v i n g sold a lot

to a n e w s p a p e r m a n w o r k i n g as S t o n e h i l l 1s public

r e l a t i o n s m an and 'I l e a rned later f rom Jurado (the

newspaperman) h i m s e l f ... that S t o n e h i l l h e l p e d h i m b uy

this l o t 1 .^ ^

D i o k n o de f e n d e d his friend, the late M a y o r Lacson,

and said that 'I k n e w M a y o r L a c s o n v e r y well and I know

173
he c o u l d not have sold h i m s e l f to anyone for any sum* .

Senator Puyat said that he h ad 1a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g to do

with Stonehill -- o f f i c i a l l y or o t h e r w i s e 1 .

W h e n X was o r g a n i z i n g a commercial b a n k for

m y f a m i l y three y e ars ago, a b r o k e r a p p r oached
me w i t h the request that he be al l o w e d to
i n vest ^600,000 in this ban k for Stonehill.
I t u rned d o w n the r e q u e s t . 174

He c a l l e d Ma r i n o ' s charge a 'smear ca m p a i g n to injure

my good name, my honesty, my i n t e g r i t y ’ . C a b a n g b a n g said

he w o uld file a libel suit against J u s t i c e S e c r e t a r y

Marino.

172
I b i d . , p .6 9 •
173
I b i d . , p .68.
174
I b i d . , p .6 9 •
 315

The Stonehill affair, however, did not end there.

The NPs counter-attacked with Diokno spearheading the

move. In a TV-press conference on July 20, 1 9 6 3 , he

came up with a list of eight top Liberal Party men

including President Macapagal, Senate President Marcos,

Speaker Villareal, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Senator

Estanislao Fernandez, Representative Manuel Cases,

Representative Antonio Raquiza, and Ambassador Amelito

V. M u t u c . (it seemed that he got photostatic copies of

documents seized from Stonehill before his dismissal as

Secretary of Justice.) Citing a document, he claimed

that the above top LPs (excluding Rep. Raquiza) received

•hand-outs1 in New York from a Stonehill man in November

17 5
i960 in the total amount of $>5,800. On the same day,

Secretary Marino also came out with twenty new names,

explaining that since the Nacionalistas were clamoring

for the •whole t r u t h * , he would oblige. *The Stonehill

documents, papers and files* , he said, 1show the link

of the following with Stonehill and his associates ’ ;

ex-Speaker Daniel R o m u a l d e z , ex-Senate President Eulogio

Rodriguez, Sr., Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr., Governor Isidre

R o d r i g u e z , ex-Senator Edmundo Cea, ex-Senator Decoroso

Rosales, ex-Senator Pedro Sabido, Senator Tolentino,

175
The Philippines H e r a l d , July 21, 1 9 6 3 ? p.l
 316

Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, Senate President Ferdinand

Marcos, Emilio Abello, Carlos Romulo, Central Bank

Governor Mignel C u a d e m o , former Commerce Secretary

Manuel Lim, Vice-Mayor Jesus Marcos Roces, Antonio

Araneta, Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez, Mila Magsaysay,

and Representative Aguedo U. Agbayani . These are

still mostly N acionalistas. But there are two big

exceptions, namely Vice-President Pelaez and Senate
President Marcos. Some observers attach significance to
this. The two are the most probable LP contenders for

the Presidential nomination in 1965 • Since President

Macapagal had already been dragged by Diokno into the
mess, the 'whole truth1 might as well be known. The
1unexpurgated contents' of the controversial 'Blue Book'

of Stonehill finally came out and the ninety-seven names

included Nacionalistas and Liberals alike with the
former out-numbering the latter. Amounts appearing
opposite the ninety-seven names totalled y 2 , , 2 1 0 . 6 3 • 177
Aside from those already released by the warring parties,

it included among others top-level and second-level

176
Ibid.
177
Cf. Philippines Free Press, July 2 7 , 1963, p.8 8 ; also
F.V. Tutay, 'What they got from Stonehill* , op. cit .
 317

bureaucrats, ‘newspaper boys’ (there were fourteen

listed), some police agencies and one ’Major General’.
The public exposure of the Stonehill ’web of

corruption’ was perhaps unfortunate for both NPs and LPs.

Both used the scandal as a political weapon, with the
NPs exposing the LPs while the LPs attacked the NPs found

linked with Stonehill. But both got hurt in the process,

it is probable that some were just mentioned without

actually having any relations with Stonehill whatsoever.

It is also possible that a few received some ‘favors’

without doing anything for Stonehill in return. In

fact, most of those mentioned denied having anything to

do with Stonehill, some claiming that the documents may

be ’forgeries’, and that the charges and counter-charges
were ‘lies’ or fabrications.
These are, no doubt, possibilities that may occur,
particularly, in the heat of internecine quarrels and
struggle for power. But there are certain facts which
stand out and cannot just be brushed aside: that Stonehill
started from scratch and became a multi-millionaire in a
short period of fifteen years; that he got certain

178
Ibid.
 318

favorable legislation and concessions for his many

c o r p orations; that several senators admitted having

received the amount listed but that these were either

- . _ 179 loans,
, 180 ^ , 181
lawyer1s fees, or were returned. Also

some of the newspapermen admitted having received the

amounts listed but these were loans or for ’professional

services* rendered.'*'^ In other words, the evidence

seems to suggest that many, if not all, of the documents

disclosed may not be ’fabrications* at all.

179
In the ’miting de avance’ of senatorial candidates of
both parties at the Manila Overseas Press Club held on
September J O , 1963} Senator Lim admitted that he had
received lawyer*s fees from Stonehill *which was more
than some others present had d o n e ’ . What was wrong with
getting fees as a lawyer?, he asked. Cf. The Philippines
Free P r e s s , October 5* 1963} P*75*
180
Senator B a l a o , according to Senator Tolentino, admitted
having received the $1,000 recorded in a Stonehill
document but that it was a loan which he claimed was paid
later. (Senator Tolentino, cited in ’The Big Crack* ,
Philippines Free P r e s s , August 3} 1963} p.4.
181
Senate President Marcos claimed that the $2,000 was
offered to him but it was returned. (The Manila B u l l e t i n ,
July 22, 1963, P.15.)
182
Willy Jurado (who was given a lot by Stonehill) said
that he worked for Stonehill as a public relations
consultant and that the job ’involved no attempts to
corrupt public officials’ . Zacarias Nuguid and Jose Nable
rendered service on a professional basis, while Ernesto
Ilustre admitted having borrowed $230 from Ira Blaustein
in New Y o r k but ’Stonehill refused to accept it [the
repayment] and it remains unpaid to this d a y ’ . ( C f .
Philippines Free P r e s s , July 27, 1963 , pp. 88 - 9 .
 319

The above case study, as earlier mentioned, may

illustrate a pattern in the relationships between

businessmen, alien or Filipino, and politicians.

Perhaps Stonehill*s methods were more unorthodox, or a

little too vulgar, to be 1acceptable* by those who

profited from him and yet denounced him later. But that

was only after he was exposed. As previously noted, he

was one of Forbes P a r k 1s high society before he committed

the costly mistake of mauling an associate, rubbing elbows

with Presidents, Senators, Cabinetmen, church dignitaries,

economic czars. Could he be too different? Was Stonehill

the only one? One writer offered an answer. There are,

he said,

thousands of other Stonehills, alien and

Filipino alike, whose pockets are lined with
income from smuggling, ‘fixed* government
contracts, overshipments of logs, sugar,
minerals or copra, influence peddling,
customs graft...

We have deported one Stonehill. The others

are still with us, riding around in
air-conditioned cars, mixing with the best,
promoting civic and charitable projects,
helping the people with one hand and robbing
them with the other.

These men have no secrets to their neighbors.

Just the same they are much admired, they are
held in high esteem.183

183
Juan S. Sabado, 'Curtains for a 'Big-Shot1*, Weekly
G r a p h i c , August 29, 1 9 6 2 , p.6.
 320

The Stonehill pattern of financing elite political

activities, it is suggested, is not an isolated one.

There may be differences in degree, others may be more

‘refined1, but they are still essentially similar. The

Chinese in the provinces, for instance, have to buy

‘protection1 and have to contribute, often to politicians

of both parties. They are not exactly ‘victimized1, or
if they are, they are often ‘willing1 victims. For both

politician and donor profit from the transaction. There

is always the give and take part of it and there are many

cases where the alien contributors (like in the Stonehill

case) take more than what they give. And, often, they
take what is not due them under the law. In this
respect, vice operators may be included as willing

sources of campaign finances. Gambling syndicates,

brothel operators, ‘massage clinics*, and motel owners
are among the sources of political financing, particularly
in the urban centers like Manila, Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo,
and Davao. Other usual sources on the city and
provincial levels are public works contractors and
suppliers, public utility operators, real estate owners
or landowners, and other businessmen. Finally, the local
politician in the municipal level sometimes has to rely
on financial help from the party leaders above, or has to
 321

raise his own funds, again, usually from local

businessmen (including Chinese wanting 'protection1)

vice operators, landowners, and other moneyed persons.

S Y M B O L S , SLOGANS AND PRACTICES

Id e ology and Political F o r m u l a s . An examination of

elite public pronouncements and writings would suggest a

deep commitment to libertarian — even egalitarian --

principles. There is also an apparent deep sense of

social consciousness and responsibility, of solicitous

regard for the toiling, 'downtrodden1 masses. The pattern

had been set by Quezon. In a speech he delivered before

the war, he declared:

We will see to it that the man who works in

the field or factory gets the proper return
for his work and we will not let anybody
exploit him like a beast.

The time has arrived when the poor workers

in the fields and factories in the Philippines
must be given their due, for if they are not,
we will see repeated in the Philippines what
we see in so many of the countries of the
world today.184

President Osmena, during the swearing in of the

members of his Cabinet just after the Second World War,

likewise expressed his beliefs in freedom and egalitarian

ide a l s :

184
Speech of President Manuel L. Quezon, T u g u e g a r a o , Cagayan,
February 28, 1936, quoted in Hartendorp, op. c i t ., p.491.
 322

We hereby affirm our faith in, and adherence

to, the principles of freedom and d e m o c r a c y . . .
We shall re-establish in our country a
social and political system...in which
government officials and employees are not
masters of the people, but their servants...
We stand for the individual liberties,
guaranteed by our Constitution, for the
right of every man and woman to enjoy life,
liberty and the pursuit of ha p p i n e s s . .. We
stand for a new world, free from want and
fear .

O s m e n a 1s successor, R o x a s , in turn promised that !labor,

including farm tenants, will find a champion in my

administration — their just and reasonable claims will

186
be upheld; justice will be done th e m 1 . A little later

he stated that 1the sweat of the toiler1s brow must be

fairly and fully rewarded... There must be neither

masters nor serfs in our economic system1 .

Other Presidents and Filipino politicians have more

or less followed this style of speech-making. President

Q u i r i n o , in his Inaugural Address, declared that 'ours is

a free country and the civil liberties guaranteed by our

Constitution are in full force. There shall be no undue

impairment of these freedoms so long as I am President.'^

185
Quoted in i b i d .
186
Radio address after his election in April 1946, quoted
in i b i d .
187
Inaugural Address, July 4, 1946, quoted in Marcial P.
Lichauco, Roxas (Manila: Kiko Printing Press, 1952) p.249.
188
President Quirino* s Inaugural Address, December 30? 19^-9»
in Elipidio Quirino, The Quirino W a y , op. c i t ., p.208.
 323

President Magsaysay had a more unorthodox and simple

solution to the problems of the workingman. Referring

to the Huks at the height of their rebellion, he said:

They are fighting the government because they

want a house and land of their own. All right,
they can stop fighting, because I will give it
to them. I am going to make the Huk a
capitalist. I am going to set up a carpentry
shop and let the Huks run it.1^9

On another occasion, he declared that

Heretofore, social justice has raised fervent

but frustrated hopes in the hearts of our less
fortunate citizens. We must not permit social
justice to be an empty phrase in our
Constitution. We must bring it to life -- for
all.

In consonance with this purpose, my administration

shall take positive, energetic measures to improve
the living conditions of our fellow citizens in
the barrios and neglected rural areas and of
laborers in our urban and industrial centers

The land tenure system of our country shall be

re-examined, to purge it of injustice and
oppression.

l a n d for the l andless1 shall be more than just a

catch-phrase We will translate it into
actuality. We will clear and open for settlement
our vast and fertile public lands which, under
the coaxing of willing hearts and industrious
hands, are waiting to yield sustenance to
millions of our countrymen.

Democracy becomes meaningless if it fails to

satisfy the primary needs of the common man, if
it cannot give him freedom from fear and freedom
from want. His happiness and security shall

189
(U.S.) Time magazine, November 26, 1931» p .23•
 324

be foremost among the goals of my

administration.190

President M a c a p a g a l , during his campaign for the

presidency went farther by making explicit commitments.

*Under our social program* , he said,

we will provide low-cost housing for the

average citizen, housing for the poor at
nominal rental, and free housing for the
aged and infirm. We shall set a program for
unemployment insurance, hygienic facilities
in the slums and rural areas, land for the
landless, and most important of all,
additional opportunities for gainful occupation
to all citizens willing and able to work who
shall thereby contribute to raising the
standard of living under conditions of self-help
and human dignity.191

Much of the above pronouncements were also reflected

in the party platforms of the two major parties. The

‘Bill of Economic Rights' incorporated into the 1953

platform of the Nacionalista party, for instance,

proclaimed 1 the right of every Filipino laborer who so

desires to own as much land as he can till; and to count

upon government assistance in securing implements, tools,

192
animals seeds and scientific advice which he may n e e d * .

190
Ramon Magsaysay, Inaugural Address (A pamphlet), December
30, 1953, p p -4-5.
191
Address before the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines,
September 9 5 I960, V i d e , Mani l a Chronicle, September 21,
1961, p . 6 .
192
Platform of the NP for the General Elections of 1953*
 325

Not to be outdone, the LP (in the same elections)

promised *to hel p [the comm o n man] fulfill his d r e a m of

p o s s e s s i n g a home for his dear ones and a farm for

19 3
h i m s e l f to till* . E v e n the Demo c r a t i c Party, a

coa l i t i o n of b ig hacenderos c o m i n g m a i n l y from the

'sugar b l o c ' , stated in its platform that 'no society can

thrive, no people can be h a p p y or even m o d e r a t e l y secure,

unless there is an equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of the

n a t i o n a l p a t r i m o n y of the land from w h i c h our people

194
have sprung’. It went on to state that ’h u m a n rights

are above pro p e r t y rights and must be so p r e s e r v e d ’ .

It, however, made the important q u a l i f i c a t i o n that ’the

right to acquire and possess property is inherent in the

i n a l ienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of

happiness, and that such right must be given the same

195
p r o t e c t i o n as others p e r t a i n i n g to f r e e d o m ’ .

This last statement in the D e m o cratic P a rty p l a t f o r m

is perhaps indicative of the general a m b i valence in

elite pronouncements. T h i s was, of course, a mere

r e p e t i t i o n of Q u e z o n ’s ’w h e n e v e r p r o perty rights come in

193
P l a t f o r m of the LP for the N a t ional E l e c t i o n s of 1953-
194
P l a t f o r m of the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y 1953*
195
Ibid.
 326

conflict with human rights, the former should yield to

196
the latt e r 1 . Yet, it was also Quezon who, speaking

of business and industrial organizations, said that 'we

shall support the organization of the producers of abaca,

coconut, tobacco, rice, and other articles for the

defense and promotion of their interest1 and 1shall help

industries and continue to work for the welfare of the

197
nation1 . Indeed, it would be a mistake to attach too

much weight on elite pronouncements and consider these

as expressions of their true p o l i c i e s , or as what 1they

believe* — as their ‘i d eology*.

Ideology, in general, may be said to consist of a

complex of ideas, theories, principles, goals, and

198
*values* . The assumption, of course, is that all these

components which make up an *ideology* are embodied in a

logically consistent system. Elite *values*, however, as

196
See *Biography* , Encyclopedia of_the Phili p p i n e s , o p . c i t . ,
v o l .I V , p .6 l .
197
I b i d . , pp.6l-2.
198
The term ‘value* here has a different connotation than
was used in chapter III. As used here, it refers to *a
conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an
individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable
which influences the selection of available modes, means
and ends of action*. (Clyde Kluckhohn in Talcott Parsons
and Edward A. Shils (e d s .), Toward a General Theory of
Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 195l) p . 395.
 327

reflected empirically in elite actions and attitudes

and identified in the manner in which they 1experience,
perceive and interpret the concrete situations which
199
they confront in life*, may not necessarily correspond
with their publicly proclaimed goals and ideas. For, as
already discussed in the first part of this section

(Class, Cultural Norms and Politics), much of the

political behavior and attitude of the elite and the
masses are shaped by the respective places they occupy in

the socio-economic structure.

Thus, the landlord rules while proclaiming the

rights of man. He might promise land reform, and even
200
pass laws to this affect, but would do everything to
prevent full and effective implementation of the same.
The reason, of course, is obvious. His economic interests
and his ties with the social structure demand that he must
work for the preservation of the status quo. The
democratic political formula, however, necessitates that,

199
Philip E. Jacob, James J. Flink, and Hedvah L. Shuchman,
’Values and their Function in Decision-making*, The
American Behavioral Scientist, vol.V, n o .9> Hay 1962
(Supplement), p.9*
200
The ’passing* of land reform laws was initially strongly
resisted but when they were found to be harmless (that
is to say, unimplemented due to ’lack of funds’, exceptions,
amendments, unconstitutionality, etc.), many landlord-
legislators became ’land reformers’.
 328

aside from buying the support of the people through the

use of money and other economic resources, the elite

politician must seek the support of the ’sovereign1

people.
The political formulas are the rituals, symbols
and slogans that he creates to elicit support from the
masses. They need not be consistent for they are
usually eclectic, that is to say, superficial borrowings

from the vocabulary of diverse ideologies. Hence, they

may all at the same time be ’paternalistic’, ’democratic’,
’socialistic’, or even ’revolutionary’. By their very
nature, also, they have to be general and vague. Thus
Quezon became the advocate of ’Social Justice’,
Magsaysay of the ’Bloodless Revolution’, and Macapagal
will finish the ’Unfinished Revolution*. In spite of so
much talk about ’revolutions’, however, most of the
peasants are still, in 1963» committed to a life of
poverty and tied to their landlords.
Other Symbols and Slogans. President Ramon Magsaysay
started, in 1953» the so-called ’grass-roots’ technique
of campaigning. Heretofore, his predecessors relied
mainly on the provincial and local leaders to deliver the
votes. Quezon during prewar days just made a few campaign

speeches over the radio and visited a few provincial

 329

capitals. The p r e w a r politico u s e d to campaign in

hi s A m e r i c a n a (western suit) in k e e p i n g w i t h his status.

M a g s a y s a y c h a nged all these. He wore simple

clothes, sometimes the b a k y a (wooden clogs), d o n n e d the

b u r i hat of the peasant, and wen t to the barrios to

shake the hands of rural folks. In fact, Quirino

c o m p l a i n e d about this tactic of Magsaysay. He said

that

tactics of r i d i n g in caretelas, eating w i t h

the people in the m a r k e t in the barrios or
jumping fences and ditches were mere stunts
to w i n votes and may prove that one is able
p h y s i c a l l y but do not n e c e s s a r i l y show that
one is fit m e n t a l l y for h i g h political
p o s i t i o n s .201

But M a g s a y s a y h ad an effective reply. TIt is s w e eter

for m e 1 , he said, 1 to shake the hands of me n who earn

their bread in honest toil than h o l d w e l l - s o a p e d hands

of men who have enriched themselves through graft and

20 2
corruption1. The people applauded. They f o und a

champion, one who did not only say he was !for t h e m 1 ,

but by his attire and manners, he seemed to be 1of t h e m 1

M a g s a y s a y was o v e r w h e l m i n g l y elected.

201
M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , O c t o b e r 19, 1953-
20^
M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , O c t o b e r 23, 1953-
 330

Thereafter, it was the era of the ’common man1.

Practically every politician -- whether landlord, banker,
rich businessman or industrialist — became the ’champion

of the downtrodden’. Their campaign posters are filled

with phrases like ’man of the masses’, ’friend of the
poor’, ’defender of the oppressed’, ’man of the common

tao’ and similar slogans.

Poverty has become good politics. Because most of

the voting masses are poor, the well-heeled politician has

glamorized poverty. If the poor cannot become like him,

then he will try to be like them, at least, even only

during election campaigns. The idea is to create a
’common man’ image to show that he is ’one of them’ and,
if he succeeds in this, then the implication seems to be
that he is, therefore, ’for them’. Some of the techniques
of the politician include being photographed (and the
pictures are published in the newspapers) while eating
with his hands (like the common people), drinking in
artesian wells, having a haircut by the barrio barber.
A Davao politician, for instance, complained of the
palabas (showmanship) of his political opponent, now a

Senator who, he said, goes out in the barrios in maong

(blue denim) pants, rubber shoes and buri hat and drinks
tuba (the barrio folk’s drink made from fermented
coconut) in sari-sari stores. ’Back in Manila’, he said,
 331

1he is r i d i n g in a l i m o u s i n e 1 , and lives in a mansion.

lT h e people do no t k n o w that he is only f o o ling t h e m 1 ,

he added.

The m y t h of the poor boy who became president h ad

b e e n so s u c c e s s f u l l y a d v e r t i s e d that m a n y p o l i t icians

hav e i m i t a t e d it. H i g h l y paid image-makers and public

rel a t i o n s m en are e m p loyed to create a 1common m a n 1

image, of a poor but brilliant boy who, despite

o v e r w h e l m i n g o d d s , has r e a c h e d the top t h r ough sheer

204
talent and hard work. 1I was born poor and n o w I have

a little p r o p e r t y made by my brains and m y i n d u s t r y 1 ,

20 5
said President Quezon. President Q u i rino often m ade

references to his 'h u m b l e 1 beginnings. 1Please remember,

m y f r i e n d s 1 , he said in a campaign speech, 'my name is

easy to re m e m b e r — ELIPIDIO Q U I R I N O . I have no m i ddle

20 (S
initial. I am a poor m an — and have always b e e n . 1

Again, on an o t h e r occasion, he said, 'Poor as I am and

20 3
P e r s o n a l interview. Th e informant was hi m s e l f l i v i n g in
a large, u l t r a - m o d e r n house.
204
C f . 'Who are the I m a g e - m a k e r s ? 1 , W e e k l y G r a p h i c ,
F e b r u a r y 26, 1964, pp.2-3*
205
' B i o g r a p h y 1 , E n c y c l o p e d i a of the P h i l i p p i n e s , o p ._c i t . ,
v o l .I V , p .58 •
206
S p e e c h at M a n i l a Hotel, S e p t e m b e r 23, 19^9, in E l i p i d i o
Quirino, The Q u i r i n o W a y , o p . c i t . , p.182.
 332

having come from the bottom, I have so conducted myself

in public as well as in private life that I can always

look straight into any man's eye and tell him to go to

207
hell*. Many Filipinos are, of course, familiar

with the story of the 1zacatero1 (one who cuts and sells

zacate -- or grass for horse feed -- for a living) who

became Senate President, and Ramon Magsaysay, the humble

'mechanic* who rose to the Presidency. The biography of

a Speaker of the House, for instance, also refers to his

boyhood days when *he learned his farm chores including

taking carabaos to past u r e * . 'Himself a poor m a n 1 , his

biographer continued, *he soon became the pride and joy

P0 O
of the people of Capiz.*

It is, of course, easy to romanticize the 'humble*

origins of one who has reached the top, especially in an

age where well-trained image-makers abound. Yet even

the many Horatio Alger 'success* stories found in elite

biographies and other records are not always consistent.

20 Q
Quezon's parents belonged to the principalia class.'

The Quirinos of Ilocos Sur were not poor but

2Ö7
Speech before the Manila Lions Club, August 1 9 » 1 9 5 0 » in
i b i d . , p.213.
208
H.O.D. , op ._ci t . , 1963/76.
209
A.V.H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of the
Philippines (The Magsaysay Administration) (Manila:
Philippine Education Company, 1 9 6 1 ) p.4 .
 333

they were a rich family owning several

sailing vessels, called p o n t i n g s , and
possessing a substantial sum in silver money
which according to the town's legend, Don
Manuel [President Q u i r i n o 1s grandfather and
former Governadorcillo of Caoayan, Ilocos Sur]
used to measure by the g a n t a . .. When baby
Elpidio was baptized in the Roman Catholic
church of the town the family held a grand
celebration that lasted all day... Climax of
the activities.. .was the tossing away of
silver coins.210

Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez, referred to as the

zacatero, was the son of Petronilo Rodriguez, !a cabeza

de b a r a n g a y , while his wife was a merch a n t 1 , and he was

21
educated at the exclusive San Juan de Letran College.

President M a g s a y s a y , portrayed as the 'poor m e c h a n i c 1

212
comes from a landed family of Zambales. Osmena and

Roxas came from wealthy families with the latter having

1aristocratic lineage, native and S p a n i s h 1 .

210
Sol H. Gwekoh, Elpidio Quirino (a Biography) (Manila:
Fortune Publications^ 1950) p p .18-21.
211
S . O . D . , 1960-61/9-10.
212
The 1955 list of landowners (in the Sorongon study of
landed estates) shows that the Magsaysays and the Del
Fierros own nearly 7 OO hectares of land. Hartendorp,
however, wrote that * the family. . .owned over a thousand
hectares of lan d 1 and that ’they lived, not in a nipa hut,
but in a roomy, well-built, strong-material h o u s e 1 .
(Hartendorp, o p . c i t . , p.<4) An uncle, Don Ambrosio, was
one of the founders of a large shipping firm.
213
Hartendorp, i b i d .
 334

Among the Presidents, only Macapagal can truly

claim to be of 'humble origin*. But, as he himself has

acknowledged, he rose through the sponsorship of the

214
principal!a. He became a 'protege* of the Pampanga

landlord-millionaire, Don Honorio Ventura (former

Secretary of Interior), who financed his law studies and

who launched him in his law career by recommending him

to the American law firm of Ross, Lawrence and Selph

215
with whom he became a corporation lawyer. He got a

job as legal assistant at Malacanang Palace through the

help of the late Chief Justice, Jose Abad Santos, another

Pampanga landowner. Finally, it was President Q u i r i n o ,

whom he acknowledged as *my political benefactor* , who

2 1_6
launched him in his political career, by which time

he was a bona fide member of the principalia class.

But while there may not be sufficient basis to the

numerous 1success* stories, the *common m a n ’ myth still

persists for, as previously noted, it is good politics.

To the elite politician, it is one effective way of

214
V i d e , Jesus V. Merritt, *3 men and D M 1 , Weekly G r a p h i c ,
September 25, 19^3, P»3*
215
Sol H. Gwekoh, Diosdado Macapagal: Triumph Over P o v e r t y .
o p . c i t .. pp.21-2, 2 5 .
216
J.V. Merritt, op. c i t .
 335

winning votes. To the masses, it gives them hope since,

as one biographer of Philippine Presidents wrote, 1in a

democracy like the Philippines any person possessing the

necessary qualifications can be a candidate for the

217
presidency'.

In these presidential elections, the really

brilliant and the not brilliant individuals
as well as the really rich and the truly poor
vie with each other for this most coveted
position.218

There is, therefore, hope that someday the son of a

kasama may become President. Even to the more discerning,

who know that the politicians who come to them are

'different* and can perhaps see through the affectations

of his 'gimmicks*, there is still the feeling of

self-importance. Used to being ignored and neglected,

they are suddenly showered with attention by 'these rich

people', who embrace them, shake their hands, and promise

to champion their causes.

OTHER PRACTICES

However, it is not always sweetness and light that

prevails in elite politics. Too often, the competition

217
Gwekoh, o p ._cit. , p.viii.
218
Ibid.
 33 6

for power is accompanied by coercion, terrorism and the

use of force.

Violence in Philippine politics is not one which

is specifically directed by the elite politician against

the masses but one which arises out of the bitter

struggle for power among the elite themselves. There

was, of course, one exception. As recounted in the first

section of this chapter, the 'peace-and-order’ drive in

Central Luzon, carried out in 1945-46 to restrict

left-wing political activities, often erupted into

violent outbreaks between the landlord’s private armies,

government troops and the U.S. army on the one hand and

an armed peasantry on the other. These encounters

assumed the form of an elite-counter elite ’confrontation’ .

Except for this single instance, however, postwar

political fraud and violence before, during, and after

elections were often the result of the intense rivalry

among elite politicians themselves. But, as an old

African proverb states, when bull elephants fight the

grass beneath is trampled down.

The 1947 election was described at the time as the

219
’bloodiest in Philippine h i s t o r y ’ . y There was

219
C f . Filemon V. Tutay, ’Preview of 1 9 6 3 *, Philippines
Free P r e s s , November 3O , 1963; A.V.H. Hartendorp, op. c i t . ,
(1958 volume) p.280.
 337

w i d e s p r e a d p r e - e l e c t i o n v i o l e n c e and elect i o n returns

from a n u m b e r of p r o v inces in the V i s ayas and M i n d a n a o

‘were d e l a y e d for m a n y days and impossible counts were

220
r e p o r t e d a nd a c c e p t e d 1 . M u c h worse was to follow.

The 19^9 e l e c t i o n was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by even greater

v i o l e n c e a nd fraud. Thi s was the e l e ction that p r o d u c e d

a pocket r e b e l l i o n in Batangas, home province of d e f e a t e d

N P P r e s i d e n t i a l c a n d idate J ose P. Laurel.

T h i s [19^9] el e c t i o n was to become infamous as

the 1d i r t y election* . It w o uld be said in
19^+9 that the Q u i r i n o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p e r m i t t e d
'even the birds and the bees to vote* to
p e r p e t u a t e itself in power. A r m e d *goons*
g u a r d e d the v o t i n g places, stuffed the ballot
boxes, and by c o n stant gunfire kept the cowed
c i t izens from c a s t i n g their b a l l o t s . 221

The 1951 e l e ction was r e f e r r e d to as a 'clean*

222
election, but that is perhaps by 19^9 standards.

Actually, the old p a t t e r n of terrorism continued. In

Negros province, G o v e r n o r R a f a e l L a c s o n ran what was

called 'the N e g r o s R e p u b l i c ’ . He had a private army

numbering more than 1,000 m en w h ich ter r o r i z e d people.

It was said that 'Lacson a nd his h e n c h m e n c o uld get away

wit h anything, i n c l u d i n g rape and m u r d e r . . . Should

220
Hartendorp, ibid.
221
Romulo and Gray, T he M a g s a y s a y Story, op. c i t ., p.97*
222
V i d e , Coquia, op. c i t . , p . 3 2 .
 338

anyone challenge Lac s o n 1s power, he was courting d e a t h . ..

Lacson and his men had no need to fear the law. They

were the l a w 1 . Moises Padilla, an NP candidate for

Mayor in Magallon, Negros Occidental, dared oppose the

rule of Lacson and he was publicly tortured and brutally

224
killed. In Cebu, there were the dreaded 'bongotons',

the bearded armed thugs of the Cuencos. These men were

killers, mostly with previous criminal records, who

terrorized the people.

Army planes filled with stuffed ballot boxes

were ordered to take off to strategic voting
places. Magsaysay learned that one was
leaving the Manila airfield for the South.
Infuriated, he began telephoning all parties
concerned to stop the flight. Unable to pin
anyone down, he summoned a car and rushed,
to the Manila airport. He was too late; the
plane was already on its w a y .^26

Even Magsaysay admitted that rhigh authorities ordered him

to commit frauds in the 1951 elections [when he was

223
Romulo and Gray, o p . c i t . , p.154.
224
Philippines Free P r e s s , September 2, 1954. Governor
Lacson was later on charged for this murder, but as is
usually the case, his followers (who were just doing his
bidding) got the death penalty while Lacson got a less
severe punishment (life). At the time of writing, there
were already moves for the granting of presidential
pardon to Lacson. Cf. The Philippines Free P r e s s ,
January 2 6 , 1 9 6 3 .
225
Personal interviews with the Cebu Constabulary.
226
Romulo and Gray, o p . c i t .
 339

Defense Secretary] but that he refused to destroy the

p e o p l e ’s w i l l ’. ^ ^

The Presidential election of 1953 threatened to be

more violent than the preceding ones for pitted against

each other in this election were President Quirino who

was running for re-election and his former Defense

Secretary Ramon Magsaysay who, as previously mentioned,

h a d gone over to the N P s . Plans for a coup d 1etat were

made, and some reports indicated that it may be carried

out with possible American assistance.

When Quirino accused the U.S. of keeping

warships in the harbor to land m a r i n e s , force
him out of Malacanang, and put Magsaysay into
the palace, he may have had some inkling of
the actual p l a n s . ..

A skele t o n command h e a d q u a r t e r s was set up in

Zambales. T h r o u g h o u t Z a m b a l e s and the other
provinces thousands of we a p o n s were cached at
top secret dumps. A r m o r e d vehicles, i n c l u d i n g
t a n k s , were so plac e d that they could be
brought into immediate action.

M a g s a y s a y planned, if n e e d came, to go
i m m e d i a t e l y to the Z a m b a l e s headquarters,
direct operations f rom there, and announce to
the n a t i o n that he h ad set up a p r o v i sional

227
Pi o n e e r H e r a l d , June 1 , 1953*
 340

g o v e r n m e n t and intended to advance on 228

M a l a c a n a n g to depose and i m p rison Q u i r i n o .

It should be added that M a g s a y s a y ' s can d i d a c y h a d the

full b a c k i n g of the A m e r i c a n s . American businessmen

contributed $ 230,000 to M a g s a y s a y * s c a m paign expenses.

But M a g s a y s a y r e p u t e d l y r e c e i v e d a further h alf m i l l i o n

dollars f r o m the Pentagon. The amount was r e p o r t e d l y

o f f e r e d for use in c o n n e c t i o n w ith the a n t i - H u k c a m p a i g n

but 'the h a l f m i l l i o n was q u i e t l y t r a n sferred to J U S M A G ,

in Manila, w h ere it would not be n e c e s s a r y for M a g s a y s a y

229
to account for i t 1 . Time mag a z i n e reported:

It was no secret that R M [Ramon M a g s a y s a y ]

was A m e r i c a ' s boy. F o r a time, U.S. Col.
E d w a r d L a n d s d a l e [who e a rned the title of
'General Landslide' a m o n g Filipinos for his
role in M a g s a y s a y * s e l e c t i o n victory] of the
U.S. A i r F o rces took a des k in M a g s a y s a y ' s
D e f e n s e Office, and b e c a m e v i r t u a l l y his
m e n t o r and pu b l i c i t y man. Polished, precise
W i l l i a m Lacy, C o u n c i l l o r of the U.S. E m b a s s y
[ a c t ually Lac y was the d e p u t y of A m b a s s a d o r
R a y m o n d A. Spruance] became the m a n to w h o m
M a g s a y s a y turned daily for c o u n s e l . ^30

T h e r e p o r t e d U.S. assistance to M a g s a y s a y in the event

of a c o u p , therefore, seemed to be h i g h l y pla u s i b l e

228
Romu l o and Gray, The M a g s a y s a y S t o r y , op. c i t , , pp.31-2;
Cf. also C a r l o s Quirino, M a g s a y s a y of_the P h i l i p p i n e s
(Manila: A l e m a r ' s 1938) and Hartendorp, The M a g s a y s a y
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , o p . c i t . , p p .2 - 3 •
229
Romulo and Gray, i b i d . , p.l67.
230
Time, N o v e m b e r 23, 1953, P*37*
 341

although the direct use of U.S. Marines to force Quirino

out of Malacanangj as noted by Magsaysay's biographers,

may not have been part of the actual plans. Fortunately,

the planned coup d ’etat did not come about for, as

earlier mentioned, Magsaysay won overwhelmingly over

Quirino at the polls.

Subsequent elections have followed a more or less

similar pattern as regards the use of fraud and force.

In 1957} the election toll was reported as forty-three

dead and wounded, while the 1959 figure rose to

211
ninety-four. In the I96I Presidential elections,

’g o o n s 1 were reported to have been ’imported’ into Romblon

where they ’were displaying and cocking their high-powered

guns in p u b l i c ’ . Ilocos Sur, as always, topped the

other provinces in political violence. Government troops

were sent to augment the local police forces but the

233
killings and political terrorism continued. Disruption

of political rallies, beatings, stabbings and shootings

231
Cf. Far Eastern Economic R e v i e w , November 1 6 , 1 9 6 1 .
232
Manila C h r o n i c l e , October 31} 1961.
233
Cf. ’More troops readied for I l o c o s ’ , Manila C h r o n i c l e ,
November 7} 19^1; ’Campaign days getting bloo d i e r ’ ,
i b i d ., November 8 , I96I; ’Roundup of Ilocos Sur Goons
O r d e r e d ’ , i b i d . , November 1 1 , 1 9 6 1 ; ’PC alerts 16,000
men for elections*, i b i d ., November 1 3 } 1961.
 342

while rallies were going on, and ambuscades were

234
reported. In the 1963 off-year elections, there

were *31 provinces [out of 56] which reported a record

number of dead and wounded1 as a result of political
235
violenc e .

The important question is why elite politics sometimes

becomes violent. In answer, several factors must be
considered. The first is the police-bodyguard system.

Since before the war, local police forces have mostly

been the personal followers of incumbent politicians.
Thus Hayden observed:
During the American period, the municipal
police were a joke and a scandal. In a
large majority of cases, they were the
political henchmen, and in too many instances
the personal muchachos of the presidentes and
local bosses. Underpaid, only partially
trained, and poorly equipped, in some places
changed every few months in order that more
of the faithful may be rewarded, they often

234
Cf. Manila Chronicle, November 1 0 , I96I; 1Pre-poll
violence toll rises1, ibid., November 1 2 , 1961.
233
Filemon V . Tutay, ’Terrorism at the Polls1 , Philippines
Free Press, November 3 0 } 1963> p.2 ; Cf. also ’Ilocos Sur
Bloodbath1, ibid., August 1 7 , 1 9 6 3 , p.3 ; ’Comelec
deputizes entire PC1, Manila Times, October 2 , 1963;
’Negros LP mayor killed at rally!1, The Daily Mirror,
November 8, 1963? p.l; 1LP Solon’s son ambushed!1, The
Daily Mirror, November 7 5 1 9 6 3 ; ’Assassins gun down LP
bet1, Manila Chronicle, November 1 0 , 1963* The reported
political casualties during the 1963 elections were
ninety-eight killed and wounded. Cf. Filemon V . Tutay,
’Preview of 1963*, Philippines Press, November 30, 1 9 6 3 j
p.k.
 3^+3

served the reigning local cacique rather

than the p u b l i c . In numerous instances they
were instruments of oppression rather than
agents of the law.^36

On the national level, the national police agency

entrusted with peace and order, the Philippine

Constabulary, had traditionally been under the control

of politicians. Before the war, and until 1 9 5 1 5 it was

under the Secretary of Interior who was a politician.

While placed under the unified command of General

Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from

1951 to help cope with the Huk rebellion, it has recently

been concerned again with the policing of elections.

The personal nature of elite political organizations

has already been pointed out. Adherents of a party tend

to be personal followers of particular politicians.

This includes, in many cases, the police agencies.

H a y d e n 1s observations are still relevant in the

contemporary setting as illustrated by the following

example in the town of M a b i n i , Pangasinan:

Violence may possibly erupt any time in this

usually peaceful town since the emergence
last week of two chiefs of police with
separate f o r c e s . Despite the refusal of the
incumbent chief of police, Gil M. Bustamante,
to resign from his position, newly elected
LP mayor Demetrio Braganza had appointed his

236
J.R. Hayden, o p . c i t ., P.291.
 344

own nephew Orlando Catalan, a lawyer, police

chief.

Bustamante, an NP appointee and the chief of

police for the past 10 years, continued to
defy Mayor B r a n g a n z a 1s order dismissing him
from the ser v i c e .237

The pattern of personal domination of police forces

by the local incumbent politician seems to be a general

one. Thus, one observer noted that *a cursory look into

the police system discloses the fact that many of the

members of the c o u n t r y ’s local police forces have no

O O Q
qualifications but their political connections*.

Indeed, the security of tenure of the local policeman

seems to depend very much on the capacity of his political

boss to remain in office. Because of this, he becomes a

rabid partisan, personally loyal to his political

godfather for, if the latter loses in an election, he

would most probably lose his job, too. The same perhaps

may not be said of the Constabulary in general, but there

are many instances where political partisanship is shown.

While there is more security of tenure, particularly

among members of the regular force, political influence

and connection oftentimes become a strong determining

237
Manila T i m e s, January 13, 1964, p.l-B.
238
Oscar Rojo, ’Policemen in P o l i t i c s * , The Philippine
Herald M a g a z i n e , November 2, 1 9 6 3 , p.5»
 345

factor in matters of promotions and assignments. This

is especially the case at the top echelon of command.

Thus, politics intrude in military affairs. Because of

this, the Philippine military may not be said to be exactly

apolitical.

The reshuffles and transfers of some constabulary

and army officers before an election are often noted by

239
the press. As in the use of public funds and facilities,

the party in power has a decided advantage with regard to

the *p olicing1 of the elections. In 1 9 6 1 , for instance,

then Vice-President Macapagal strongly opposed the use of

the Constabulary in policing the elections as he claimed

that ‘mounting evidence shows that the PC high command was

240
a political tool of President G a r c i a 1 . He cited the

following to support his charge: ‘the recent shifting of

PC provincial commanders as shown in the sending of PC

partisans to Liberal [party] areas considered critical by

N a c i o n a l i s t a s ; the unjustified actions in placing areas

under constabulary c o n t r o l . ..; the retention of

Brigadier General Isagani V. Campo as PC Chief [said to

239
Cf., for example, The Manila T i m e s , October 2, and 5»
1953; Philippines Free Press, October 3> 1953? and
December T9, 1953*
240
‘Macapagal bucks use of PC in policing November p o l l s 1 ,
Manila C h r o n i c l e , October 3? 19 6 1.
 346

be 'very c l o s e 1 to President Garcia] despite his having

241
reached retirement age two years a g o 1 . In Ilocos Sur,

one politician belonging to the 'outs' complained that

one PC officer, close to a congressman, was very partial.

'He was protecting the "goons" of C o n g ressman...1 , he

charged. He added that 1he even gives them CIS

p[i p
(Criminal Investigation Service of the P C ) ID cards1 .

Likewise, a PC provincial commander interviewed stated

that 1the position of a PC commander is difficult. If

he does his job well [i.e., impartially] he gets

relieved. There are powerful political forces exerted

a b o v e 1 , he said.

Another PC officer assigned in Cebu complained:

Why should I sacrifice my military career for

those ... politicians? [Politician] A clamors
for the arrest of [Politician] B for gambling.
If I do i t , it will not only be the personal
triumph of A but it will also prejudice my
career. You see, B is so powerful he can
concoct charges, get witnesses, bribe fiscals
and j u d g e s , and buy newpapermen to yank out a
small fry like me from his job. He can even
have somebody killed.244

241
I b i d . Cf. also 'AFP Vice-Chief asks PC to keep off
p o l i t i c s 1 , Manila C h r o n i c l e , June 2 9 , 1961.
242
Personal interview.
243
Personal interview.
244
Personal interview.
 3^7

The above illustrations point to an advantage of

the 'ins1 . What about the 1o u t s ? ' Claiming, that their

lives are threatened with danger, they employ their own

personal bodyguards. In many cases, known killers and

criminals are hired. One Ilocos Sur politician, for

instance, said in a matter-of-fact way: *We all employ

"goons". It is because they [his political opponents]

employ "goons". The "goons" here are killers. The

more they have killed the better they are as b o d y g u a r d s .

245
Y o u see, murderers are feared.* One politician, a

provincial official, described political life in Ilocos

Sur as the *survival of the toughest1 . Another politician

in the same politically violent province justified the use

of bodyguards:

The employment of *goons* is necessary [he

said]. Here, if you have no *goons* your life
is endangered. You cannot campaign because
you will be trailed wherever you go by the
*goons* of your opponent. If you attack
[criticize] h i m . .. BANG. So you must employ
*counter-goons * .246

Politicians giving protection to criminal elements

are not uncommon. One provincial commander mentioned

that some killings and other form of violence in his

243
Personal interview.
246
Personal interview.
 348

province are actually due to personal grudges or

drunkenness of the b o d y g u a r d s of politicians. The

perpetrators, however, s eek p r o t e c t i o n and help from

their p o l i t i c a l bosses and they u s u a l l y get it. In

Cavite, one PC officer r e p o r t e d that his men were

e n c o u n t e r i n g d i f f i c u l t y in arr e s t i n g a gan g leader w a n t e d

for murder, holdups, and r o b b e r y in band ‘because of the

24-7
i n t e r f e r e n c e of a p o l i t i c i a n * . T h e r e were also

r e p o r t e d cases of d e t a i n e d convicts a l l e g e d l y 1r e l e a s e d

for e l e c t i o n duty* in the 1 963 elections.

T h e employment of b o d y g u a r d s is a c o m m o n practice

among politicians. I n the provinces n o t e d for their

p o l i t i c a l violence, it is not surprising to find

p o l i t i c i a n s m o v i n g about d u r i n g election campaigns

a c c o m p a n i e d by m e n a r med w i t h pistols, carbines,

s u b - m a c h i n e g u n s and o t h e r d e adly weapons. W h e n these

bodyguards of o p p osing camps meet, w h e t h e r in bars,

n i g h tclubs, liquor stores or political rallies, an a r med

c l a s h is sometimes the result. Even the popular M a g s a y s a y

employed *h i r e d guns* .

T h e s e m en [Magsaysay*s bodyguards] labored w ith

such impersonal e f f i c i e n c y that in a crowd even

24?
T h e M a n i l a T i m e s , M a y 27, 19^3*
248
F.V, Tutay, ‘P r e v i e w of 1 9 6 5 *, o p . c i t . , p.4.
 349

members of the campaign party could not tell

who they were. They mingled with the people,
prepared for any emergency. They were tough
and their guns were always on the ready.

One example of the type drafted for this work

was a muscleman known only as *Big B o y 1 .
While riding in a truck one day, he had
recognized two Huks as his fellow passengers.
He started a fight with them, knocked one out,
and shot the other to death. It was shortly
thereafter that *Big Boy* was recruited for
the Magsaysay contingent.

Another factor that contributes to political

violence is the large number of firearms circulating.

As of December 1963 , there were 331>123 registered

firearms. These were mostly issued to property owners,

250
businessmen, and public officials or their agents.

But there are scores of thousands of other loose firearms

coming from various sources. Many were the remains of

the last war, others were sold by American soldiers from

the U.S. bases, and still others were 1home-made1 . In

Cebu, Ilocos Sur and possibly other provinces there are

secret *paltikl (locally made firearms) factories.

Political killings are usually perpetrated with these

unlicensed firearms so that ballistic examination cannot

249
Romulo and Gray, op. c i t ,, p.225*
230
The Manila T i m e s , December 27, 1963? p.l6-A; V i d e ,
Article IV, Chapter 35 of the Revised Administrative Code
for qualifications for firearms license.
 350

trace the killer. Many politicians’ bodyguards are

armed with these unlicensed firearms. In 1961, for

instance, the PC chief, ordered ’all units of his command
to confiscate the unlicensed firearms of the so-called

agents of provincial governors1. One provincial governor

(Cavite), however, complained of discrimination, alleging
that ’the PC command in Cavite is a political tool of
Fernando Campos, son-in-law of President Garcia who was

a candidate for the lone congressional district of

Cavite’.
The often virulent and personal attacks hurled by
elite politicians against each other also contribute
towards the use of force. The familiar cry of ’bomba’,

meaning, the unrestrained and personal innuendos

bordering on the libelous and the exposure of private
and public immoralities, increase the animosities and
tension that often end up in gunplay, but the casualties
are usually the ’loyal’ mercenaries and henchmen. For
the elite politician is not for something when he campaigns.

In most cases he is just against somebody. Too often,

the central theme involves personalities, not concrete

programs or principles.

251
Manila Chronicle, September 2 2 , 1961, p.l.
 351

Finally, the use of fraud itself may be mentioned

as another cause of violence. Uses of ’flying voters*,
(i.e., paid men who register and vote in more than one

precinct), preventing electors suspected of supporting

the other candidate from voting, vote-buying, snatching

of ballot boxes, and other similar practices may invite

252
reprisals from the other side.
One of the standard elite arguments to demonstrate

the ‘vitality* of democracy in the Philippines is the

fact that ’never in its history...has [it] seen a

military coup d* etat, a change of government except by

252
It is difficult to estimate the number of ’flying
voters’. In Manila, one informed source estimated that
about ten per cent of voters are ’flying voters’. In
the 1963 election, the Commission on Elections
distributed a special kind of ink to all precincts to
combat ‘flying voters*. Electoral officials used this
ink to ’brand* every voter that had voted between the
thumb and the forefinger. There were reports from
various precincts, however, to the effect that the ink
was ’accidentally’ spilled, had mysteriously disappeared,
or was not used at all. (Vide, ’Terrorism at the Polls’,
op, cit., p.38.) One defeated NP gubernatorial
candidate in Cotabato in the 1963 election complained
that ’the flying voters of the Liberals had a field day’.
(ibid.) One Davao politician narrated that in one
election, his opponent was buying votes. Then they met
in one locality. ’If he offered ^3 j I was ready to
offer j^lO. If he made a false move then* , he said, ’it
would probably have meant the death of the two of u s .
If I was the target of his bodyguards, he was also the
target of mine.’ (Personal interview.)
 352

ballot, a dictatorship, forcible expropriation of

25 3
property, riots, snake dances or bloody p u r g e s 1 .

Through the ballot, the people overthrew the

messy and scandalous Liberal administration
during the Quirino regime; the people used
it again during the dark and wicked days of
the Garcia administration. The ballot is the
foundation of the government of the people
which we enjoy today. It is the common man's
possession which makes him equal to anyone,
rich or powerful. It is the citizen's own
weapon in the new revolution.254

In view of the limitations to the election process

that have been discussed, however, the above views may

be a little too optimistic. Another view, expressed by

Sorokin, seems to be more relevant to the Philippine

setting during the period under review. Thus, Sorokin

wrote:

When the whole electoral machinery became

monopolized by small cliques of politicians;
when these politicians began to decide who
in each party was to be nominated for what
position; when direct, personal knowledge of
the candidates became impossible for 99 per
cent of the voters; when political propaganda
through press, radio, television and other
means of communication became monopolized by
small caucuses of professional politicians
and power groups; finally when bribery,

253
Hilarion M. Henares, J r . , (NEC chairman) quoted in
Daniel Wolfstone, Far Eastern Economic Review, vol.XLV,
n o . 12, September 17, 1964, p.511.
254
Weekly Graphic editorial, November 6, 1 9 6 3 , p.l.
 353

fraud, threats, punishments and murder began

to be used as the instrumentalities of
elective campaigns — then the value of the
elective principle had largely e v a p o r a t e d .^55

235
Pitirim Sorokin, Power and Morality (Boston: Porter
Sargent Publisher, 19591 p p .l4 l - 2 .
 35^

CHAPTER VI

THE ART OF WIELDING POWER: THE ELITE IN GOVERNMENT

In the last two chapters, the study has described

and analyzed the character, composition and economic
interests of the power-wielders and the manner in which
they compete to attain political decision-making posts*
It has been shown that the 1social circulation1 of the
political elite has been essentially confined within
the limits of the existing dominant socio-economic groups
whose basic interests are tied to land, business,
industry or the professions. It has likewise been
indicated that Philippine political organizations and
political activities are organized, financed and led by
the socio-economic elite, and that in striving to assume
decision-making positions large amounts of money, time
and energy are spent. Even lives are lost in the quest

for power.

This chapter attempts to describe and analyze the

manner in which the elite exercise power. It investigates

the ways in which benefits and resources are allocated

and how elite positions and interests are maintained or
enhanced in the process. Attention is focused on the
 355

stakes and prizes involved in the political contest and

how the participants go about getting what the system
has to offer. What are the privileges of power? How
do the elite deal with the problems of Philippine
society in general?

A. THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF POWER

Before going into the discussion of the main

problem, it is necessary to touch briefly on the formal
structure in which the participants operate.
One of the chief features of Philippine governmental
organization is its high degree of centralization. Not
surprisingly perhaps, this organization follows the
hierarchical pattern in the social and economic structures.
The system of government is unitary with vast
powers concentrated in the national government. Primarily
a legacy of the colonial era, when almost everything was
decided in Manila, this high concentration of power
gives the top national officials a strong control of the
whole machinery of government.

The Constitution of the Philippines broadly outlines

the major divisions of the government, namely the
Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary (see
Figure TV). It establishes the centers of political

LEGISLATIVE
C ONGRESS
T CABI N E T
1_____ _
aULWATE HOUSE OF
(2 4 ) REPRESENTATIVES
(104)
r 0 of
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
E x e c u t i v e 0 of the P r e s i d e n t * !
Local Gov t s and Civil A f f a i r s 0
Gaines an d A m u s e m e n t s B d
P hil B r o a d c a s t i n g S e r v i o e
B d o f R e v i e w f o r H o v i n g # Pio' u res
0 of the Press S e c r e t a r y
Pr e s ' l C o m m i t t e e on Ad m P e r ­
form a n c e 4 E f f i c i e n o y * *
B u d g e t Commiss'ion**
S o oial W e l f a r e A d m * *
Nat'l E o o n o m i c C o u n c i l * *
C o m on Nat'l Int e g r a t i o n * *
Emergency Employment Adm
Civil S e r v i o e C o m m i s s i o n
Civil S e r v i c e Bd of Ap p e a l s
Nat'l P l a n n i n g C o m m i s s i o n
Phil C h a r i t y S w e e pstakes
UNESCO National Commission
A s i a n G o o d N e i g h b o r Rel. Cora
Agrio'l C redit 4 C o o p e r a t i v e
Financing Administration
Land Tenure Administration
N a t'l Civil D e f e n s e A d m
Nat'l Inte l l i g e n c e Coord. A g e r .
Tariff Commission
P hil V e t e r a n s Ad m
S o oial S e c u r i t y S y s t e m
Home Financing Commission
Ex p o r t Control Co m m i t t e e
Q u e z o n Memo r i a l C o m m i t t e e
Phil H e r a l d r y C o m mittee
C o m on S o h o o l h o u s e P r o g r a m
B d of L i q u i d a t o r s
P r e e ' l A s s i s t a n c e on C o m m u n -
ity D e v e l o p m e n t ______
CENTRAL BANK OF T H E PHIL***
P H I L N A T I O N A L B A N K***
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF T HE PHIL***
REPARATIONS COMMISSION***
NATIONAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT BD***
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES***
UNIVERSITY O F MINDANAO***
PHILIPPINE NORMAL COLLEGE***
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE***
CENTRAL LUZON AGRIC'L COLLEGE***
MINDANAO AGRIC'L COLLEGE***
MINDANAO INSTITUTE OF TECH.*
SAMAR INSTITUTE OF TECH.***
PHI L COLLEGE OF ARTS AND TRADES***
IT 4 W E 3 A G R I C ' L CO L L E G E * * *
MUSIC PROMOTION FOUNDATION OF
TH E PHILIPPINES***
amess.
■iw .f
A65-189
G O V E R N M E N T OF T H E R EPUBLIC O F T H E P H I L I P P I NES
_______ I
PRE S I D E N T O F T H E
D EPT O F FOR. AFFAIRS
Ö of P o l i tioal 4 C u l tur-
al A f f a i r s
E c o n o m i c Affairs
I 0 of Legal Affairs
0 of C o n s u l a r Affairs
Phil Forei l^n
g n Service
DEPT OF JUSTICE
0 of t h e S o l i c i t o r Gen.
Prov'l 4 C i t y F i s oale
Pub S e r vioe C o m m i s s i o n
Bu of Immig r a t i o n
Nat'l B u of Investig.
Bu of P r i sons
Land R e g i s ' n Co m m i s s i o n
Prov'l 4 C i t y R e g i s t e r
of Deeds
Code C o m m i s s i o n
0 of the Govt C o r p o r a t e 1
Court of T a x A p p e a l o o u n ® eJ
Court of Indus'i Rel.
Court of A g - B j i a n Rel. (
J u v e n i l e anu D o mestic
R e l a t i o n s Court
Courts of Fir s t I n stance
J u s t i c e of the P e a c e Cte
Bd of P a r d o n s 4 P a r o l e i
A n t i - D u m m y Bd
Deportation Bd
DEPT OF EDUCATION*»
B u of P u b l i o Schools
Bu of P r i v a t e Soho o l s
Instit. of Nat ' l L a n g u a g e
B u of P u b l i o Lib r a r i e s |
National Museum
Phil Hi s t o r i c a l Com m i t t e e
~~~ I -- '
D E P T O F LABOR»«
B u of L a b o r S t a ndards
B u of L a b o r Rel a t i o n s
Bu of W o r kmen's C o m p e n ­
sat i o n
B u o f W o m e n and Mi n o r s
Fie l d O p e r a t i o n s S t a f f
I V. L u n a General Hosp i t a l
D E P T O F HEALTH«*"
B u of H e a l t h S e rvices
B u of M e d ical S ervices
Prov'l 4 C i t y Hos p i t a l s
N o r t h General Hos p i t a l
B u of D i s e a s e Control
Bu of Quarantine
1
Bu of Res. 4 L a b o r a t o r i e s
DXiPT U F Ü E a r n AI, ä K K V T C K M » »
B u of B l d g 4 Real P r o p e r t y
Management
B u of R e o o r d s M a n a g e m e n t
B u of S u p p l y C o o r d i n a t i o n
Bu of Printing
Nat'l M e d i a Prod. Center
356
FIGURE IV
sgr
CONSTITUTION
EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL
PHILIPPINEsl
COUNCIL OF STATE
SUPRFUE COURT
(1 C h i e f Justioe,
10 Assoc. Juatloes)
D EPT O F F I N A N C E C O U R T O F AFPE AT5"
Prov'l. 4 C i t y T r e a s u r e r s 4
(l P r e s i d i n g J u s t i c e (
Ass e s s o r s
Bu of T r e a s u r y
15 As8oo. Justloes)
B u of Internal Reve n u e
B u of Customs
0 of Ina u r C o m m i s s i o n e r
GENERAL AUDITING OFFICE
D EPT O F A O R I C 4 NA T R E S O U R C E S
B u of L a nds ~~"
Bu of Plant I n d u s t r y
C O M M I S S I O N ON E L E C TIONS
Bu of An i m a l I n d u s t r y
Bu of F o r e s t r y
Bu of Mines
B u of F i s h eries
B u of Soils
1
O F E C O N O M I C C O O R D I NATION**
B u of Agri c u l t u r a l E x t e n s i o n Nat'l D e v e lopment Co
Parks and Wild l i f e 0 Nat'l P o w e r C orp
A b a o a C orp of tho P h i l i p p i n e s N a t ’l S h i p y a r d 4 Steel C orp
Phil C o c onut Adm M a n i l a R a i l r o a d Go
Phil S u g a r I n s t itute C ebu P o r t l a n d C- m°nt Co
I Phil T o b a c c o Ad m Rio« and C o r n Adm
Nat'l R e s e t t l e m e n t 4 R e h a b ­ Peop l e ' s H o m e s i t e 4 H s g C orp
j ilitation Adm
Govt S e r v i o e Insur. System im
Agrl o ' l T e n a n c y Co m m i s s i o n
M a n i l a Gas C orp
I
M a n i l a Hotel Co
D E P T O F P U B WOR K S 4 COMMU N I C . » « Phil A i r Lines
B u of Pu b Works
B u of Pub H i g h w a y s
B u of Posts
B u of T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s NOTE» The Oounoll of 8tate is
Motor Vehioles 0 an advisory body oreated by
Civil A e r o n a u t i o s Adm Ereoutive Order No. 5, dated
Nat'l W a t e r w o r k s a n d S e w e r a g e July 12, 1946, by President
Authority Manuel A. Rozas. It inoludee
Radio Control 0 the Vice-President, Senate Pres­
I r r i g a t i o n Cotlnoil ident, Speaker of the House,
Civil A e r o n a u t i c s B d Heads of the Exooutive Depts.,
Executive Secretary, President
Pro TempÖre and Majority Floor
dJ
D E P T O F N A T ' L PI tiise*« Leader of the Senate, Speaker
A r m e d Fo r c e s of the Phil
Pro Tempore and Majority Floor
Phil A r m y
Leader of the House, Chairman
Phil N a v y
of the National Eoonomlo Coun­
Phil A i r F o r c e
cil > President of the Governors
Phil C o n s t a b u l a r y and City Mayors League, and the
Phil M i l i t a r y A c a d e m y Commissioner of the Budget.
Sometimes it includes private
B u of Coast 4 C e o d e t l o S u r v e y persons. There is also a Na­
Vete r a n s M e m o r i a l H ospital tional Security Council.00m-
posed of the leaders of the
D EPT O F C O M M E R C E 4 IN D U S T R Y » » Ereoutive 4 Legislative branohea
Bu of Commerce
Secur i t i e s 4 Exc h a n g e Coomissio:
Sugar Quota Administration
i and all past Presidents, whioh
is convened during times of ne-
tional crisis or emergency.
Phil P atent Office
Bu of C ensus 4 Statis t i c s
Weather Bureau
Coop e r a t i v e s A d m O ffice
**The heads of these departments
and offices are members of the
Cabinet.
Bu of Fiber Inspection Servioe **»These are unassigned offloss,
Pro d u c e r s In c e n t i v e s B d agencies, eto., whioh under 8eo.
Nat'l M a r k e t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n 74 of the Revised Administra­
tive Code are placed under the
administrative supervision of
the President. (Seo. 74, R.A.O.,
as amended by Exec. 0 94, Oot 4 ,
1947 and Exeo. 0 392, Jan 1, 1951.)
i«,, bu„. u 1963,
*• "" Phlu^ “ “«vll
 357

decision-making and also grants powers to those who will

m an these posts.

The legal and constitutional position of the

Philippine President makes him a very powerful person.

He is the head of state, and chief of the administrative

branch; and ’the executive departments, bureaus and

other offices are extensions of his personality’.^

Immediate powers of supervision are given to Cabinet

secretaries over their respective departments but general

2
supervision and control is vested in the President.

In addition to his role as chief of the administrative

branch, the President has under him the Office of the

President which exercises direct administrative

supervision over all unassigned offices, bureaus, and

agencies that are created by Congress from time to time.

The President has also under him, through the Cabinet

1
John H. Romani, citing Villena v. Secretary of Interior,
38 O.G. 5 2 7 j in The Office of the Philippine President
(Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University
of the Philippines, 195^)? p.l.
2
I b i d . There were in 1963 eleven Executive Departments
whose heads composed the Cabinet. The heads of the
Office of Economic Co-ordination, Office of the President,
Office of Press Secretary, and five other agencies have
also been given the status of Cabinet members. (See
Figure IV, Note **.)
 358

members concerned, various government corporations such

as the National Development Company (NDC), the National

Power Corporation (NPC), the National Shipyards and

Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Manila Railroad Company
(HRP), the Rice and Corn Administration (RCA), the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Manila
Gas Corporation, the Philippine Tobacco Administration,
Abaca Corporation of the Philippines, the Philippine
Sugar Institute, the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), the National
Marketing Corporation (NAMARCO), and others# (See
Q
Figure IV#) He has administrative supervision over the
government banks and other financing institutions such
as the Central Bank, the Development Bank of the
Philippines, and the Philippine National Bank#
The Constitution likewise provides that the President
’shall exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law1: he
4

has the power to suspend or remove provincial

officials for disloyalty to the government,

3
For a discussion of Philippine government corporations,
vide R.S. Milne, ’The Role of Government Corporations in
the Philippines’, Pacific Affairs, vol.XXXIV, no.3» Fall
1961, pp.257-70#
4
Section 10(l), Article VII.
 359

dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office.

He has also the power to remove municipal
officials for neglect of duty; oppression;
corruption; any other form of maladministration
in office; and final conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. He also has the
power to remove for cause, justices of the
peace,,,,By statutory law, department
secretaries in the national government have
also been given control over the acts of the
local governments. Thus, provincial and
municipal budgets may be passed upon by the
Secretary of Finance; the validity of
ordinances and resolutions may be decided
finally, at least administratively, by the
department head in the national government -
formerly the Secretary of the Interior, and now
with the abolition of the latter, by the
Executive Office,.,5

Another important power of the Chief Executive is

the power of appointment and removal. The Constitution
provides that the President appoints the heads of
executive departments and bureaus; officers of the Army
from the rank of colonel and of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander; ambassadors,
ministers, and consuls; members of the Supreme Court and
all judges of inferior courts; members of the Commission
on Elections; the Auditor-General; other officers of the
government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for in the constitution; and those whom he may be
authorized by subsequent laws to appoint.

5
Aruego, op, cit., p,606 .
6
Section 10(3)j Article VII; Section 5» Article VIII;
Section 1, Article X; Section 1, Article XI,
 360

The President has other powers. He can influence

the passage of certain legislation through his power to
control the sessions of Congress, to certify to the
necessity of immediate enactment of particular bills,
and to approve or veto measures that have been passed by
Congress, 7 These are in addition to his direct, though
informal, influence as titular head of his party, as well
as his personal skill as a politician in dealing with
members of the opposing political group.

The Philippine Congress is also an important locus

of formal power. Aside from its primary function of
lawmaking, it shares in the executive prerogatives by
its power to create or abolish executive departments,
bureaus and other offices; to define their powers; and
to appropriate funds for their operations. It confirms
the appointments (of specified officials) made by the
President through its Commission on Appointments,
Congress, also,
has exclusive power to determine the organization,
powers, and functions of local governments. It
may determine that the number of provinces or
municipalities or cities be increased or
decreased; that their officials be appointive,
not elective; that their term of office be short
or long; that their powers be great or little,

7
The Presidential veto power can, however, be overridden
by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress.
 361

m a k i n g them more or less a utonomous or mere

agencies of the national government; that
their a c t i o n on ce r t a i n m a t t e r s or e ven on
all m a t t e r s — finance, h e a l t h education,
public works, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of justice, —
be subject to national control.®

Local governments, then, are prac t i c a l l y at the

m e rcy of the P r e s i d e n c y and Congress. Although certain

r e f o r m me a s u r e s l e a d i n g towards more local a u t o n o m y have

recently been passed, the fact is that this dual

L e g i s l a t i v e - E x e c u t i v e p o w e r over local g o v e r n m e n t s is

still strong. The m e a s u r e s that have been en a c t e d are

actually m i n o r conc e s s i o n s g i v e n by the central

Q
government in the exercise of this power. Congress

still enacts laws creating b a rrios or municipalities,

cr e a t i n g or a b o l i s h i n g cities, even the c h a n g i n g of

n a m e s of gove r n m e n t schools in f a r - f l u n g p r o v i n c e s

require approval by the national government in Manila.

Whether or not this u n i t a r y and high l y c e n t r a l i z e d system

is desirable in a c o u n t r y such as the P h i l i p p i n e s is a

quest i o n the a n s w e r to w h i c h wil l p r o bably depe n d on

man y factors. What is certain, however, is that this

8
Aruego, op. c i t . , p.606.
9
Two m e a sures i n c r e a s i n g local au t o n o m y are R.A. 2264,
k n o w n as the Local A u t o n o m y Act, p a s s e d on June 19?
1959; and R.A. 2370? k n o w n as the 'Barrio C h a r t e r 1 ,
p a s s e d on June 20, 1959*
 362

relationship of national and local governments in the

Philippines has contributed immensely to the powers

that the top national officials exercise over the rest

of the country.

Formal political decision-making in the Philippines

is largely centered on this Executive-Legislative axis.^

The persons who man the top posts in these two branches

of the government are the official policy-makers. They

are the ones who formally decide ’who gets what and how

much*•

B. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF POWER

It is not to be inferred from the above statement,

however, that the formal power-wielders are the only

participants in the decision-making process. There are

other non-governmental groups composed of citizens or

non-citizens, who may be able to influence public policies.

Questions such as whom to appoint in a governmental post,

what legislation will be enacted that favors or protects

10
Constitutionally, the Judicial branch is a co-equal of,
and as important as, the Executive and Legislative
branches, but its decision-making functions (aside from
the usual functions of administering justice) are
mainly limited to making interpretations of the
legality or constitutionality of certain Executive
and Legislative acts.
 363

a particular individual or group, who will get

government contracts, who will get monopolies or

semi-monopolies through government franchises and
licenses, who will get what public services and how

much, what group or individuals will get generous loans

from government banks and other financial institutions,
whose tax payments will be condoned or reduced, and so
forth - all these, though formally decided by official
decision-makers, involve personal arrangements,
bargaining, pressures, or compromises among the
influentials•
The influentials, as has been indicated in the
previous chapters, come from the small upper strata
minority. They consist of the educated, wealthy or
well-to-do groups who command prestige and deference,
mainly because of the superordinate socio-economic status
they occupy.
There are the affluent party leaders who may not be
holding public office at the moment; the landowning groups
such as the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters,
the Philippine Sugar Association, the Federation of Rice
and Corn Planters, the Philippine Coconut Producers
Association; the industrialist groups represented by the
Chamber of Industries of the Philippines; the bankers
 364

and financiers; the exporters and importers and other

individuals or groups who have financially supported

the power-holders during the political campaign.
Mention may also be made of the Catholic Church which
has consistently considered the field of education as
its traditional sphere of interest; the mass media which,
as previously noted, are largely controlled or owned by

a few families (the Roceses, Lopezes, Sorianes, Elizaldes,

Stewarts, Menzio, Ceas);~*~^ and the civic groups that
seek to promote certain projects.
There are the alien businessmen, landowners, or
industrialists who, although prohibited by law from
intervening in domestic politics, manage to secure what
they want in terms of favorable or protective laws,
franchises or licenses, contracts, and other privileges,
mainly through substantial contributions to party
campaign chests or to individual politicians, or through
’favors’ and other payments made to public officials.
The Stonehill case, discussed in Chapter V, provides a
good illustration of this point. (it was noted in this
example that Stonehill seemed to have influenced even
the appointment of certain top public officials.) The

See Footnote 51* p.109*

 365

study considers this group as important because it is

able to influence important public decisions. They

exercise influence directly or indirectly, through the

'front door' or the 'back door', legally or illegally.

This fact is important from the political standpoint since
the members of this group, although possessing political

disqualifications -- they cannot vote nor run for public

office — manage to get what they want from the system,
much more successfully than thousands of the voting

citizens.
Two points must be emphasized in this connection.
As has been said, these influentials belong to, or
generally represent the interests of, the upper-strata
urban minority. Because of this factor, the concessions,
benefits, or advantages they get are usually of limited
application insofar as the total society is concerned.
A second point is that there is a considerable
overlapping or interlocking of interests among them.
Illustrations have been given of the pattern of
multiplicity of interests, not only of the members of
the socio-economic elite in general, but also of the
12
political power-wielders as well. Thus, there are

12
For illustrations, vide Chapter III, pp.107-9 and
Chapter IV, pp.170-6.
 366

sugar p l a n t e r s who are also ' m i l l e r s 1 (sugar mill

operators), rice h a c e n d e r o s , industrialists, bankers,

mass m e dia owners, or are engaged in other business

activities. There are civic leaders who are also

l a n d o w n e r s and businessmen. The C h u r c h has interests

in e d u c a t i o n as well as in banks, i n s u rance company and

13
landed estates. M a n y p o l i ticians are landowners,

businessmen, or lawyers of big corporations. Aside

from this i n t e r locking of interests a m o n g the elite,

there a re the family and other social links. These have

13
The C h u r c h owns about 87 per cent of the stocks of the
P h i l i p p i n e Trust Company, owns the M o n t e de Piedad
S a v i n g s Bank, and is a major s t o c k h o l d e r of the B a n k of
the P h i l ippine Islands, the latt e r b e i n g owned j o i n t l y
w i t h the Spanish A y a l a group and some other l a n d o w n e r s
and businessmen. The BPI was the f o rmer ’Banco EspaTTol’
e s t a b l i s h e d by the Spaniards in 1831 by Royal Decree.
It was ’the oldest b a n k in the i s l a n d s ,... founded by
an order of the S p a n i s h G o v e r n m e n t u n i t i n g the obras pias
funds of the four orders of f r i a r s in the Philippines.
T h e s e funds were k n o w n as the Santo Domingo, San Francisco,
Isabel, and Recoletos, and were d e r i v e d from l e g a c i e s of
p i o u s Catholics, the incomes f r o m w h i c h were d e v o t e d to
the p u r p o s e s m e n t i o n e d in the w i lls — such as m a s s e s
for the repose of the souls of the deceased, or f o r some
char i t a b l e object, or for the b e n efit of the r e l i g i o u s
o r der to w h ich the b e q uests p e r t a i n e d ’. (1903 C e n s u s of
the P h i l i p p i n e I s l a n d s , op. c i t . , vol.IV, p. 34l • ) The
C h u r c h also owns the F i d e l i t y and Surety Company, o w ning
4,993 shares out of 5 j000. (A r t i c l e s of I n c o r p o r a t i o n .)
The C h u r c h and some of the r e l i g i o u s corporations also own
h a c i e n d a s . The Catholic educational inst i t u t i o n s in
1962 c o n s i s t e d of 6 U n iversities, 113 Colleges, 399 H i g h
Schools, 328 E l e m e n t a r y S c h ools and 210 K i n d e r g a r t e n
Classes. (Catholic D i r e c t o r y of the P h i l i p p i n e s , 1 9 6 3 »
op._c i t ., S tatistical A ppendix.)
 367

also been discussed in Chapters III and IV. All these

are important considerations in the analysis ol elite

political behavior.

THE REWARDS OF OFFICE

Appointments. One of the most important prizes of
the political contest among top public officials is the
opportunity to allocate government positions. The chief
official participants in this process are the President
and other executive officials, and members of Congress.
The top offices, namely, the Cabinet posts and the
principal positions in the various government-owned or
-controlled corporations and other national agencies are
usually filled by the President to fulfill his
’commitments’ and to increase the strength and
effectiveness of his political machine. These go to top
party cronies and other influential individuals (or
their recommendees) who have made substantial
contributions to the party. Some go to persons who are
close to the President. These may be relatives,
personal friends, ’provincemates* or 'townmates', top

industrialists, bankers, business magnates, or prominent

men of the professions. The loyal political leaders who
had worked hard for the victory of the President but
 368

who had lost in their candidacies, the so-called 'lame-

ducks’, are also among the contenders for the top posts.
Thus, President Roxas appointed Miguel Cuaderno,
who was the organizer and first President of the

Philippine Bank of Commerce in 1939 (now owned by the

\
Cojuangcos), as his Secretary of Finance in 1946. l 4
He was economic adviser to President Sergio
Osrnena until the latter had reorganized the
Commonwealth government....He...worked for
the election of President Manual A. Roxas;
and was named chairman of the board of
directors, National Development Company,
and seven government corporations. He was
appointed secretary of finance later.
Prominent landowners are often appointed to the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.^ Reference has
already been made in another connection on this pattern
of appointing persons whose dominant economic interests
are closely related to the public posts they are to
occupy. Further illustrations on this point are the
government banks and other financial institutions.
Prominent bankers and financiers or persons closely

14
Who’s Who, op. cit., p.806.
15
Ibid. Cuaderno was also the Governor of the Central
Bank of the Philippines from 1948 until his replacement
during the Macapagal administration.
16
Those who have occupied these posts were: Mariano
Garchitorena - 1946; Placido Mapa - 1949; Fernando Lopez -
1951; Salvador Araneta - 1955; Juan de G. Rodriguez - 1959;
Benjamin Gozon - 1 9 6 3 ; and Jose Y. Feliciano - 1964.
 369

connected with private banks such as A, de las Alas

(Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company), Nicanor Jacinto

(Security Bank and Trust Company), Primitivo Lovina

(Manila Surety and Fidelity C o m p a n y ) , Alfonso Calalang

(Security Bank and Trust Company), Arsenio Jison (Manila

Banking Corporation) Silvestre Punzalan (Bank of the

Orient), Rufino Manotok (Metropolitan Bank), Rodolfo

Andal (Manufacturers’ Bank and Trust Company), and

Leonides S. Virata (Far East Bank and Trust C o m p a n y ) ,

have held top positions as Presidents, Vice-Presidents or

members of the board in government banks and financial

institutions (Philippine National Bank, Central Bank,

Development Bank of the Philippines, and Government

Service Insurance System). The study’s data on banks

and insurance companies also show that of 33 private

commercial banks in 1 9 6 3 » 29 (or 88 per cent) had 4l

public officials or close relatives in these b a n k s ’

boards of directors. Top public officials who have held

or are holding public office who have been identified

are as follows: 8 - Cabinet members; 5 - Senators;

1 - Speaker of the House; 4 - Representatives; 2 - Justices;

17
List of Board of Directors of Private Commercial Banks,
1 9 6 3 ? Central Bank of the Philippines;
Official Directories,
Republic of the Philippines, 1946-1963-
 370

1 - Ambassador; 1 - General; and 1 - Colonel* Of 69

insurance companies whose records were available to the

study, 27 had 5 0 public officials or close relatives in

their boards of directors. Top public officials who

have held or are holding public office who have been

identified are: 11 - Cabinet Members; 1 - Senate

President; 1 - Speaker of the House; 5 - Senators;

4 - Representatives; 2 - Provincial Governors; 3 -

Ambassadors; and 2 - Generals,

Appointments (from 1946-1963) to key government

corporations or agencies, such as the National Development

Company include prominent businessmen, shipping magnates,

industrialists and landowners like Manuel Elizalde, Jose

P. Fernandez, and Rafael Roc es, Roberto Villanueva, and

Eugenio Puyat; and in the National Economic Council,

Aurelio Montinola, Joaquin Elizalde, Sergio Osmena, Jr.,

Salvador Araneta, Jose Cojuangco, and Juan L. Ledesma

(l953); Jaime Hernandez, Alfredo Montelibano, Alfonzo

Calalang, and Oscar Ledesma (1955); and Eduardo

18
Z. Romualdez and Hermenegildo B. Reyes (1959)* All

these men are nationally known for their wealth and the

extent and diversity of their economic interests. The

18
Official Directories, ibid.
 371

data that have been presented in Chapter IV illustrating

the occupations of top public officials would further

illuminate this point.

Most knowledgeable Filipinos are, of course, aware

of the pattern of appointing relatives or prominent

*p r o v incemates' or ’townmates1 to important government

posts. Appendix A of this study, for instance, shows

that many of the members or close relatives of the

politically dominant families (in the various provinces

and Manila) occupy appointive positions, (See last

column, Appendix A,) The pattern is a general one and

was observed for all the Administrations covered by this

study.

The practice is sometimes denounced. Representative

Teodulo Natividad, for instance, charged Agriculture

Secretary Jose Y. Feliciano of 'corruption and n e p o t i s m 1,

accusing him of 'packing the Rice and Corn Administration,

which Feliciano also heads, with relatives and political

leaders as casual laborers, drawing salaries as high as

p i , 243,50 per m o n t h 1, In a privileged speech in

Congress, Natividad presented documents containing the

names and salaries of the persons involved, 'In a gesture

19
IRCA nepotism charges listed', The Manila T i m e s ,
February 19» 1964, p.l.
 372

of unprecedented partisanship, abuse of power and wanton

disregard of WAPCO and civil service regulations,

[Natividad charged], Feliciano hired whole families of

his political leaders*120
There is of course, nothing novel in the above
illustration. As has been said, this is a general
practice in the government service or even in private
21
enterprises. Even during the Commonwealth period, the
practice had been recognized as a widespread phenomenon,
making it necessary for President Quezon to issue an
executive order prohibiting and Restricting the Practice
22
of Nepotism1* Hayden1s explanation was that
Society in the Philippines is still
quasi-feudal in organization* An astonishing
number of people are the followers of this
leader or that family. Many young men are
commonly recognized as being under the
patronage of powerful figures in the business,
social or political world. There may or may
not be direct pressure to assure the rapid
advancement of such persons, but it is an
observable fact that not infrequently they
do rise with surprising rapidity even in the
civil service. Other things being at all

20
Ibid♦ In the list that Natividad presented, one
family had ten members employed in the RCA and four
others had six each.
21
Reference is made to the 'closed family corporations',
discussed in Chapter III, pp.105-9*
22
Executive Order No. Ill, August 30» 1937» cited by
Hayden, op * cit,, p.121*
 373

equal 3 no one who knows the Philippines can

doubt that ’townmates* or ’provincemates'
get the better of it in the government
offices, as elsewhere,^3

Although the practice is denounced from time to

time, it is carried on, for even those who denounce it
are most probably practitioners of the system. It is,
of course, prohibited by law. In fact, the Constitution
itself provides that

appointments in the Civil Service, except

as to those which are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical
in nature shall be made only according to
merit and fitness, to be determined as ^4
practicable by competitive examination.
The above provision on appointments to the Civil
Service was extended by executive order in 1950 and
I9 5 J- to include officials and employees of government-
25
owned and -controlled corporations. It also embraces
all national and local officials and employees.
The Civil Service Law on nepotism is also quite
specific as regards the prohibition on the employment of
relative s:

23
Ibid.
2h
Article XII, Section 1.
25
Cf. Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr,, and Raul P. de Guzman,
’The ’50-50’ Agreement’, in Raul P, de Guzman (ed,),
Patterns in Decision-Making, op, cit,, p.9^*
 374

All appointments in the national, provincial,

city, and municipal governments or in any
branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations,
whether in the competitive or non-competitive
service, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of
the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited.26

The intervention of top politicians and other

public officials in matters of appointment to the public

service, however, cannot seem to be stopped by laws.

The political and cultural systems sanction it.

Loopholes on the rules are sought (and usually found),

the laws are twisted, and even the Constitution is openly

disregarded. This is effective power.

Because the practice cannot be stopped, the

Executive and Legislative departments have formalized

it in 1959 in what has been previously cited as the

’50-50 Agreement ’• This plan, it should be recalled,

’envisaged the division of new positions between the

— 27
Lower House and Malacanang1. Francisco and de Guzman

quoted a Congressman-dissenter as having said in

connection with the agreement:

26
Section 30(a), ’Nepotism1, Republic Act 2260.
27
Francisco and de Guzman, op. cit,, p.117«
 375

I don’t see why they [the President and the

House leadership] had to make it a formal
arrangement» They could have done it
informally; the formal arrangement is immoral.
The number of positions created is
predetermined not according to actual needs,
but according to the number of political
proteges to be accommodated. There have to
be many new positions as there are Congressmen
to carry out the agreement,^

Office as a Means to More Power, The allocation of

government posts and other jobs by the power—holders is

not, of course, designed merely to accommodate relatives,
friends, and political supporters. Public office, as
shall be shown later, is a very profitable activity and
there is therefore a tendency — in fact, a strongly
established pattern -- towards the consolidation of
position aimed at climbing to still higher positions
of power. Undoubtedly, this characteristic is not unique
to the Philippines. It can appear anywhere. Wealth,
prestige, and power are like opium that intoxicates the

possessors, making them crave for more.

Reference has been made in Chapter V to the nature
of elite political organizations, It has been argued

that individual political leaders tend to create

personal organizations of their own and that in the

process they utilize not only the cultural tools but

28
Congressman Joaquin R, Roc es, quoted in i b i d p.lll
 376

also the r e s o u r c e s of the government, d i s p e n s i n g favors

29
and pat r o n a g e whenever they are in power. The aim

of the p o w e r - h o l d e r is to strengthen his pol i t i c a l

position. L o o k i n g after the i n t erest of m o n e y e d

groups and g i v i n g them key p o s i t i o n s in the government

assures him of continued fin a n c i a l b a c king in his

political activities. A l t h o u g h he may be e c o n o m i c a l l y

very well off himself, he still needs a lot of m o ney

d u r i n g an e l e c t i o n campaign, since P h i l ippine

elections, as has been seen in the p r e c e d i n g chapter,

are very expensive. But, obviously, this is not a

one-sided arrangement. The ’i n t e r e s t s 1 p r o v i d e h im

with the f i n a n c i a l backing that he needs so he can

r e m a i n in office or seek h i g h e r positions, but he must

in t u r n fulfill those e x p e c tations or understandings,

expressed or implied, which p r o m p t e d the f i n a n c i a l

b a ckers to select him as ’t h e i r ’ candidate.

The a p p o intment of his r e l a t i v e s is not only in

acco r d with the k i n ship system but is also an o t h e r

means of e n h a n c i n g the f a m i l y ’s economic position.

Patronage of his p r o v i n c e m a t e s assures h i m of a

strong pro v i n c i a l bai l i w i c k w h i c h he can count on, for

29
See C h a p t e r V, p.269-71
 377

these are most often his own political leaders or their

30
relatives and other recommendees.
Public office, then, is a stepping stone to higher

posts. The Municipal or City Councilor aspires for the

mayorship, the Provincial Board member wants to be
Governor some day, the Representative would like to be
Senator, and so on. This hierarchical pa tie rn of ascent
has been illustrated in the analysis of the career
31
patterns of the power group in Chapter IV, There are,
32
of course, exceptions as has been earlier pointed out,
and these exceptions are those individuals who come from
the top or near the top of the socio-economic pyramid
and who follow the direct route to the House, the Senate
or to a Cabinet post. None so far has, however, gone
directly to the Presidency or the Vice-Presidency, 33
The power-holder does not rely on the strategic
appointments of allies and supporters alone to strengthen
his position. He forms other alliances with other
politicians who, like him, are also earnestly trying to

3Ö
Cf, Rodolfo Danzon, ’Regional Favoritism’, The Manila
Chronic!e, February 25j 19^3» p,2.
31
See Tables 4,3 and 4.3-A, pp#l43 and 144, respectively,
32
Cf. p , 147,
33
Cf, Figure I, p.150.
 378

increase their own personal political strength. He

makes bargains or secret deals with party cronies or

even with leaders of the other party. The overriding
aim is to consolidate one's position. This becomes

possible for, as has been discussed elsewhere, there is

a fluidity in party membership because the major political
parties in existence are indistinguishable from each
other in point of basic interests, political principles,
and composition. There is a free movement of political
personnel from one party to the other.
In the November 1961 elections, for instance, the
Liberal Party candidates for President and Vice-President
were elected; but the Nacionalista Party retained control
of Congress. The NP had 75 members in the House as
against 29 Liberals; in the Senate, there were 13
3 1\
Nacionalistas as against 11 LP Senators. This
situation, however, was not to last long. By January 9»
1 9 6 2 , or just over a week after the newly-elected

officials had been, installed, three NP Representatives

(Cebu’s Zosa, Durano, and Dumon) joined President

Macapagal's LP House bloc. 35 A week later, these were

followed by NP Representative Montano of Cavite. The

34
The Manila Chronicle, Januarv 10, 19 6 2 .
35
Ibid,
 379

latter had a 'patriotic’ justification for his defection.

He changed party, he said, because he believed that

in order to meet the universal clamor for the

immediate solution of the country's most
pressing problems the most logical step for
the members of Congress to take is to have
proper co-ordination and co-operation
between the Executive and the Legislative
branches of government,^0

Montano led a group of 26 other NP congressmen

(including the first three mentioned above) and formed

the so-called 'Allied M a j o r i t y ’. Conferences and secret

huddles with the President and other LP leaders followed.

On January 23, 1962, the initial voting for the House

leadership showed the trend. The NP which was supposed

to have 73 members in the House got only 6l votes while

the LP with only 29 members garnered 40 votes.

Nevertheless, NP House leader Daniel Romualdez was still

elected as Speaker. 37 As more of the ’Allied M a j o r i t y ’

got the concessions they wanted from the President and

the Liberal Party, the LP capture of the House

leadership, despite the party's limited numbers, seemed

inevitable. By March, I 9 6 2 , the NP control of the

House of Representatives passed to the Liberals. LP

36
The Manila C h ronicle, January 16, 1 9 6 2 .
37
The Manila Chronicle, January 23, 1962.
 380

Representative Cornelio Villareal won the Speakership,

The NP defectors were given posts as House Committee

chairmen and Representative Montano, the leader of the

O Q
A l l i e d Majority*, became House Majority Leader,

In the Senate, where the situation was also

precarious for the NP which had only a majority of 2

(l3 NP Senators against 11 Liberal), a change also

occurred, NP Senator Eulogio Balao, engaged in a

political feud with NP President and Senate President

Eulogio Rodriguez, defected to the Liberal Party on

January 24, 1 9 6 2 , making a 12-12 count in the party

alignments, Balao*s defection was so sudden that it

caught his former partymates by surprise. Shortly

before the opening of the Senate session, he had

informed a committee of Congressmen that he was abiding

by the NP agreement in a caucus to retain the leadership

of the Senate, When his name was called during the

voting for the Senate presidency, however, he stood up

and announced that he had affiliated with the Liberal

Party and was voting for that party’s candidate, Senator

38
Cf, 'Coalition Revamps House Committees, NP
Defectors Given Posts as Chairmen’ The Manila Chronicle,
March 20, 1 9 6 2 , p.l.
 381

Ferdinand Marcos. 39 Charges of 'opportunism* were

hurled. NP Senator Primicias recalled that ’patriotism

[which was the excuse given for the defection] is the

last refuge of scoundrels’. NP Senators Lim, Tolentino

and Ledesma denounced the practice of 'switching parties

40 /
for personal convenience’. LP Senator Osias (who, as

recounted earlier in Chapter V, had himself defected

from the NP in 1953) defended Balao and said that

'patriotism is a virtue that should be presumed as

4l
existent in the Senate’. Because of the deadlock,

no change can be made in the leadership. Under the

’h o l d o v e r ’ theory, the NP's retained the Senate

leadership•

But the struggle went on for over a year. In

Januar/, 1 9 6 3 ? NP Senator Alejandro Almendras, who was

facing charges of unexplained wealth made by the LP

administration, left the country a week before the

42
opening of the Senate session. He had given an

39
Vide 'Senate Power Struggle Still on; Voting on
Presidency D e a d l o c k e d ’, The Manila C h ronicle, January 25»
1962.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Further discussion on this subject appears in the
next section.
 382

assurance to his NP colleagues that he was just going

on a short business trip to Japan and would be back

43
before the session opened, Almendras, however,

proceeded to New York where he had an *ingrowing g o i t e r ’

removed. The Nacionalistas panicked. The LP, knowing

that Almendras was in New York, gave notice of a vote

on the Senate reorganization, Almendras sent telegrams

stating that he would be back in a few days and asked

that the voting be delayed. The Liberals refused and

the NP decided on a filibuster, which NP Senator

Roseller Lim effectively utilized, discoursing on goiter

and its hazards and other matters for nearly 20 hours,

Almendras returned and the NP fort was saved. However,

in April 1 9 6 3 ^ or less than three months later, Almendras

surprised his NP colleagues by crossing party lines, and

voted for LP Senator Ferdinand Marcos as Senate

44
President, NP Senator Oscar Ledesma denounced the

act as a ’betrayal of the p e o p l e ’s w i l l ’ while NP Senate-

majority floor-leader Cipriano Primicias called it 'the

subversion of the sovereign will of the p e o p l e ’,

45

53
N.G, Rama, ’Crazy Man C r a z y ’, The Philippines Free
Press, February 2, 1 9 6 3 *
44
Cf, Filemon V, Tutay, ’A Hero or a H e e l ? ’, Philippines
Free P r e s s , April 13, 19^3} p#^-*
45
Ibid •
 383

The above account illustrates one of the main

preoccupations of the politicians. These continuous
political maneuvers to gain personal or factional
advantage, coupled with another time-consuming activity,

that of finding government jobs for their respective

political leaders, friends, and relatives, leaves very
little time for the major tasks for which they were
46
elected. This has led to the common comment among
observers of Philippine political goings-on that there
47
is 1too much politics’ in the Philippines. What is
probably meant is that the struggle for political
predominance is very intense and sustained. It does not
end with spirited political campaigns which are
48
themselves long. The act of governing itself appears
to have become a continuous process of political haggling
and intense struggle for political supremacy.
T6~
For press reports on this point, Cf. ’Inside Congress’,
Philippines Free Press, May 18, 1963» p.3« et seq.; and
Amante F, Pardes, ’Partisan Affairs Permeate 4th
Congressional Session’, The Chronicle Magazine, January 23»
1964, p.10. et seq.
47
Cf, for instance, Socrates de la Victoria, ’The Curse
of the Nation; Too Much Poltics’, Weekly Graphic,
November 18, 1964, p.6 et seq.
48
For example, the Nacionalista Party held its convention
in November 1964 for the presidential elections in
November, 1963* The Liberal Party held its own convention
in January, 1963 or 10 months before the election. The
major contenders had been campaigning around the country
for months before the convention.
 384

From the point of view of the power-wielders,

however, the time and effort spent in maintaining and

enhancing their power positions are worthwhile for there

are other rewards that are fused with power. The

greater the power that one exercises, the higher are the

possible rewards,

THE ECONOMIC REWARDS

Salaries, Allowances and Public Funds, The

emoluments of top public officials which include the

official salaries and allowances that pertains to their

49
office have been discussed in Chapter IV, It has been

indicated that their salaries and allowances are substantial

enough to place them among the top income earners. The

legislators, particularly, although the lowest paid

among the top power group considered, are nevertheless

getting huge allowances in what some observers have

dubbed as their 'secret salaries'.

But there are other economic gains derived from the

public treasury other than the official and 'secret

salaries'. The legislators have oftentimes used their

lawmaking power to secure economic benefits for

k9
Cf. Section on 'Income', pp. 177 9
- *
 385

themselves and their families. One example of this was

reported by the press:

Last year [1962] the first year of the new

Congress under the Macapagal administration,
the solons forced a rider in the General
Appropriations Act setting aside ^6,000 for
a world trip for each of them. And when on
a world tour, each gets $25 per diems, plus
expenses for secretarial assistance (meaning
wife or child), in addition, the solons
specified that while on such trips abroad,
each shall carry a 'diplomatic p a s s p o r t 1,
regardless of whether he is going on an
official mission or merely on a pleasure-
and-shopping spree, 30

Other legal methods of securing money from the public

treasury is through the yearly budget appropriation.

Comparative figures of the annual appropriations of both

houses of Congress indicate a sharp increase of from

^12 million in 1961 to J*33*6 million in 1963 for the

House of Representatives; and from ^3*4 million to

51
^5,2 million during the same period for the Senate,

The 'library' funds of Congress, for instance,

amounted to J?6,5(ni), while the Bureau of Public Libraries

which looks after the library needs of the entire country

Cfp
had only ^l,4(m), Knowledgeable persons among

50
Vic Barranco, 'The Most Privileged Solons in the World',
The E x a m i n e r , January 28, 1 9 6 3 » p,5*
51
The figures for 1964 were even higher and were as
follows: House - ^45»7(m ); Senate - ^8,2(m). Cf, Weekly
Gra p h i c , July 15? 1964, p,4,
52
Ibid,
 386

Filipinos, of course, know that much of these ‘library1

funds do not all go to the purchase of books and other

reading materials but are diverted for other purposes.

Other funds in the Congressional budget include the

‘consultants f u n d ’ and the ’contingent fund’. The former

is ’for specialists in their particular lines who need

not hold public office in Congress’.53 It should be

pointed out that the ’consultants fu n d ’ is different

from the funds appropriated in the budget which

allocates another substantial amount for technical

assistants, special attorneys, law clerks and other

researchers specializing in the drafting of bills and in

legal research. Furthermore, each

senator or congressman is entitled to a big

high-ceilinged, well furnished room in the
Capitol building, plus an assorted suite
of sinecures. By his own decree, he has
entitled himself to enormous fiscal
allowances for secretaries, clerks,
receptionists, and messengers. He can also
have a military officer detailed as his
technical assistant or aide. He appoints
one-peso a-year-agents equipped with badge
and gun. In his capacity as a member of
a committee (and he has several committees),
he can also name personal ’liaison m e n ’ or
special investigators.^

53
Ibid.
5b
Vic Barranco, ’The Most Privileged Solons in the
World*, op. cit., p.5*
 387

It need not be repeated that most of the members of his

staff are his relatives (wife, daughter, son, nephew,

etc#), political leaders, or other favorites.

From time to time the lid is lifted for a public

view of 'what really h a p p e n s ’ to these funds# While the

information is publicly disclosed at the height of

internal quarrels among the political leaders themselves

(and, therefore, subject to some degree of bias), yet

these disclosures are often undisputed. LP Senator

Gaudencio Antonino, for instance, during his personal

feud with the top LP leaders disclosed that in 1964, the

amount of ^ 2 .2 5 (m) was appropriated for ’printing or

reprinting and binding of records, journals, and other

documents for prior y e a r ’ (Emphasis supplied). 35 Yet,

he argued, in 1962 and 1 9 6 3 , the amounts of ^2.5(m) and

^ 2 .0 5 (ni), respectively, had been appropriated for the

same purpose.

Incidentally, it was revealed in Congress that

a Visayan solon was able to obtain a fat
printing contract from the Office of the Speaker.
The contract covers the printing of the journal
of Congress. This may not be objectionable,
except for the fact that the printing shop
happens to be in the Visayas that the proofs
have to shuttle back and forth between the
Visayan shop and the publications division in
Congress.66

33
Cited in Weekly Grap h i c , July 15? 1964, p.4.
56
Ibid. Weekly G raphic, p.86.
 388

The ‘contingent f u n d s 1 amounting to ^5»95(ni) in 1964,

are under the control of the Speaker.

With about ^ 6 ( m ) , the Speaker becomes a very

powerful public official. This is especially
so during an election year, when the Speaker,
as a high party official, has a hand in the
choice of candidates or whom to support
financially•67

Senator Antonino stated that the Speaker is ‘authorized

to transfer items of appropriations*. He concluded that

‘a pattern has been set that would make our people

believe that members of Congress have an insatiable

desire to have more and more funds for themselves to

the extent of having become callous to the essential

needs of the n a t i o n * •
58

Regarding the furnishings of the offices of Senators

and Representatives, for which another sizeable amount

is likewise appropriated, an informant disclosed that

some of the senators and representatives take home some

of these (chairs, tables, etc.) at the end of their

t erm s .59 Also,

certain lawmakers send their printing jobs,

such as letterheads, calling cards,

57
Ibid.
58
Quoted in ibid.
59
Personal interview with a Congressman's private
Secre ta r y •
 389

Christmas cards, invitation cards, condolence

cards and thank-you cards to the bureau of
printing, all costs charged to special
funds in Congress. At Christmastime and
during the election campaign months, the
average solon stuffs loads of mail into
the postal offices free of charge, because
he has given himself a franking privilege.
He travels free within the country, by land,
sea or air facilities. He has car, gasoline
and driver’s allowances.^

The utilization for electioneering purposes, of

public works funds, including the ’community development

funds’ more popularly known as the ’pork barrel’, has

already been discussed in Chapter V. As previously

mentioned, it is Congress which approves the budget for

public works funds but it is the President who controls

their release and apportionment.

Bureaucratic Capitalism. F r e d R i g g s has defined

’bureaucratic capitalists’ as ’elite capitalists who

62
are actually officials in the government’.

They exploit their power position to obtain

income from pariah capitalists. Bureaucratic
capitalists may also go into business on
their own account, using pariah partners to
do the work, and they may also obtain quotas
and permits for re-sale to pariah collaborators.

60
Vic Barranco, op. cit.
61
Vide p.281•
62
Fred ¥. Riggs, ’The Bazaar-Canteen M o d e l ’, Philippine
Sociologic al_R eview, vol.VI, July-October, 1958, Nos, 3
and k , p .2 8 .
 390

A bureaucratic capitalist may exploit his

control over a government agency to make
contracts with a firm in which he holds an
interest, or utilize his influence over a
public corporation attached to his
department to name his relatives and friends
to lucrative posts in the corporation.
Obviously there are many ways for a
bureaucratic capitalist to allow his personal
interests to modify decisions nominally
made for the public interest.

In other words, funds and resources allocated

to government agencies for investment or
developmental purposes in a prismatic society
are used in part to serve the private interests
of officials handling these resources. ^

There is probably a certain amount of bureaucratic

capitalism in any society that has private profit as

a chief motivating factor in its economic system.

Businessmen and other economically dominant groups, or

those whom they support, are very likely to be elected

or appointed to important public positions. When they

are in positions of power, the capitalist spirit of

private gain is not likely to fade away. It may merge

with announced motives of ’public service* or the intent

to ’help the masses’, but it does not disappear. If

there are no checks or other restraining influences, this

drive for personal gain often becomes a dominant factor

in the power-wielders* political behavior.

63
Ibid
 391

The fact that, in the Philippines, political and

economic power is concentrated in the hands of a few tends

to increase the probability of bureaucratic capitalism#

The power-wielders, as has been pointed out, are clothed

with highly-centralized formal authority. The social

and cultural norms recognize a built-in superordinate --

subordinate relations between the elite and the masses.

The ’sovereign people’ are mostly ignorant and

inarticulate while the power-holders are skilful

individuals# Under these circumstances, the power-holders

who are not subjected to an effective restraint from the

people tend to become arbitrary in the exercise of

official power. And the direction is towards the

building of private fortunes.

The Philippine Constitution specifically prohibits

top government officials from engaging in economic

activities affected by the functions of their office:

The heads of departments and chiefs of

bureaus or offices and their assistants
shall not, during continuance in office,
engage in the practice of any profession,
or intervene, directly or indirectly, in
the management or control of any private
enterprise which in any way may be
affected by the functions of their office;
nor shall they, directly or indirectly, be
financially interested in any contract
with the Government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.

64
Section 11 (2), Article VII
 392

The mem bers of Congress are also un der similar

Con st it ut io n al prohibition:

No Sen ato r or me mber of the House of

R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s shall d i r e ct l y or i n dir ec tly
be f in an c i a l l y in te rested in any contract
with the government or any subdivision or
in st r um en tal it y thereof, or any fr an chise
or special privilege g r a n t e d^ b y the Co n gr e s s
durin g his term of Office..# ^

It is, of course, d i f f i c u l t y for these Con st itu ti ona l

provisions to be enforced for, as has b e e n p o i n t e d out

earlier, economic po w e r in the Philippines is me rg ed with

political power. This has be co me common k n o w l e d g e in

the country. It was somewhat surprising, therefore, when

opposition S en ato r Taiiada ’e x p o s e d 1, in a pr iv il e ge d

speech in 1963s the economic a c ti vi ti es of two Cabinet

me m be rs of the r u l i n g L P administration. He charged

that S ecre ta ry of C o mm e r ce and Ind us try Rufino H e c ha n o v a

was a di rector of five commercial or industrial firms

and that such firms are 'in some w a y surely aff ec ted by

the fu nctions of [H e c h a n o v a 1s ] d e p a r t me n t of commerce

65
Sect io n 17s A r t i c l e VI.
 393

and i n d u s t r y * • He likewise a v e r r e d that Justice

S e c r e t a r y Liwag, whose office s u p e rvises the solicitor

g e n e r a l ’s office w h i c h is ch a r g e d w i t h the d u t y of

p r o s e c u t i n g v i o l a t i o n s of the c o r p o r a t i o n law by a

corporation, is also a di r e c t o r of several p r i v a t e

c orporations. A f t e r p o i n t i n g out the obvious

C o n s t i t u t i o n a l violations, he asked:

H o w indeed do y o u refuse a p o s i t i o n for which

in the space of only four m o n t h s y o u receive
p er diems and bonuses t o t a l l i n g ^ 1 2 , 0 0 0 as in
fact Secretary L i w a g did from the B inalbagan-
I s a b e l a Sugar Co., Inc., or in five months,
r e c e i v e ^3?000 as he did from P a m p a n g a sugar
M i l l s ? 67

TaTTada c o n c l u d e d by asking: ’W h e n a government official

r e c e i v e s more from p r i v a t e sources than from the

government itself in per diems and bonuses, whose i n t e r e s t s

66
Cf. Gene de Gracia, ’The B ig Shots and their E x t r a
J o b s ’, The Weekly G r a p h i c , April 3? 1963? p.6. Hechanova,
at the time of T a n a d a ’s blast, was di r e c t o r of not just
five but eight private corporations, as follows: Biscom,
Bo l i n a o E l e c t r o n i c s Corp., I n d u s t r i a l Co., Inc., Philippine
P r e s i d e n t Lines, MuTToz Press, Inc., Phi l i p p i n e F i b e r
P r o c e s s i n g Corp., M a g d a l e n a Estate, Inc., P h i l i p p i n e
P o r t l a n d Cement Co., and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Steel and Smelt i n g
R e f i n i n g C o . ; the other Cabinet m e m b e r c r i t i c i z e d by
Tanada, J u s t i c e Secretary J u a n Liwag, was director of the
M a r c e l o Steel Corp., Biscom, F i n d l a y M i l l a r T i m b e r Co.,
I n d u s t r i a l Co., Inc., P a m p a n g a Sugar Mills, P h i l ippine
Investment C o . , P hilippine P o r t l a n d Cement C o . , and the
T r a n s - P a c i f i c Investment Corporation. (I b i d . )
67
S e n a t o r L o r e n z o Tanada, q u o t e d in i b i d .
 394

will be really looked after, the government’s or the

private corporation's?^

Hechanova’s and Liwag's replies were similar. Both

claimed that they each received only ^1,000 monthly for

all their directorships and that they were representing

the various government banks or financial institutions of

which they were members. 69 The latter wrote in a letter

to the Development Bank of the Philippines, informing the

government bank of his desire to resign from the board

of the Marcelo Steel Corporation, that

I accepted this position only after I made

certain that such membership is not only in
accord with sound banking practice, but in
line with well-established precedents
followed by all past administrations since
the inauguration of the Commonwealth•
(Emphasissupplied.)70

The argument that Cabinet members may, by representing

government lending institutions, become director of

private corporation is, however, tenuous. As Senator

Tanada had correctly said,

It is no defense that Hechanova [or Liwag]

may have accepted those directorships to

68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Quoted in Ibid
 395

represent the Development Bank of the

Philippines from whom these corporations
may have obtained loans. A law does not
amend the Constitution. Much less a
government bank policy or regulation.

While Tanada was on solid ground on this score, he

however, picked only two, and these were both political

opponents. He failed to mention the numerous others,

72
including those belonging to his political camp. There

were LP stalwarts linked with private business or industry

whom he failed to mention such as Finance Secretary

Rodrigo Perez, Jr., Education Secretary Alejandro Roces,

Labor Secretary Bernanrdino Abes, Foreign Undersecretary

Salvador P. Lopez, Justice Undersecretary Magno Gatmaitan,

former Customs Commissioner Cesar Climaco, Public Works

Undersecretary Jose Lachica, General Marcos Soliman,

Immigration Commissioner Martiniano Vivo, and Commerce

Undersecretary Benjamin Tobias. There were also

Nacionalistas who held directorships in private

corporations during the NP administration, v i z ., former

Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro, former Justice

Secretary Pedro Tuazon, former Executive Secretary Juan

71
Ibid.
72
TalTada, who heads the Nationalist Citizens Party has,
since 19^9? been in coalition with the Nacionalistas
and for all practical purposes has been considered as a
member of the latter group.
 396

Pajo, former Finance Secretary Dominador Aytona, former

Executive Secretary Fortuanto de Leon, former Foreign

Secretary Felixberto Serrano, National Treasurer Vicente

Gella, former GSIS General Manager Rodolfo A n d a l , former

GSIS and DBP Chairman Gregorio S. Licaros, and many others. 73

This study’s data on government franchise or license

holders show many public officials, former officials or

their families who hold pasture leases, lumber concessions,

land transportation and shipping franchises, telephone

lh
and power plant franchises.

73
For a list of the private corporations in which the
abovewere officials, cf. ibid., p p .7 and 90.
74
Some examples are:
(Pasture Land lessees) - Abra-Baleras; Albay-Imperials;
A n t i q u e - C a d i a o s B o h o l - B o r j a s , and Toribios; Bukidnon-
Kintanars, Osmenas, Fortiches, Lluchs, Quisumbings,
Pelaezes; Buiacan-Manahans (sold to Santoses); Ledesmas,
Fernandezes; Davao-Almendras-Bendigo; Ilocos Sur-Gaculas;
Occidental Mindoro-Abeledas, Balmacedas, Levistes, Recto
(Rafael); Mindoro Oriental-Abeses; Nueva Ecija-Abeses,
Aletas, Liwags; Nueva Viscaya-Madarangs; Misamis Oriental-
Cuencos; Mountain Provinee-Dangwas, A r r a n z , Duyans; Negros
Occidental-Lacsons, Gatuslao-Montinolas; P amp anga-Enrique ze s,
Alvendias, Baluyots; Masbate-Gimenezes; Pecsons; Avelinos
(Jose), Cojuangcos, Zambales-Barrettos; Zamboanga del
Norte-Chiongbians. (Source: Record of Pasture Leases
^1963)5 Bureau of Forestry.)
(Timber Licensees, Officials, or Stockholders of Logging
Companies) - Tibles of Albay, Baluyots of Pampanga, Lacson
de Leons of Bataan, Magsaysays-Labradors-del Fierros of
Zambales, Antoninos of Davao-Nueva E cija, Toribios of
Bohol, Puyats of Manila-Pampanga, Manuel Lim, Manuel Nieto,
Cojuangcos of Tarlac, Lluchs, Duranos and Dumons of Cebu,
Quisumbings, Ozaetas, Roceses, Mutucs, Moratos, (cont'd.)
 397

The use of official influence in the acquisition of

private property, franchises, licenses, and other

concessions from the government has sometimes been the

subject of heated political disputes among the power-

wielders.

One illustration was the Almendras case referred to

earlier. The public exposure of A l m e n d r a s 1 acquisition

of properties and other assets was made by a fellow

Nacionalista, Representative Ismael Veloso, or Davao.

In a privileged speech delivered in the House of

Representatives, Veloso charged that Senator Almendras,

while Provincial Governor of Davao (1952-1953), acquired

a fishpond, residential lands, agricultural lands, pasture

lands, forest concessions - all worth ^1,710,400. 75

While Secretary of the Department of General Services

y4 (c o n t .y
and Elizaldes. (Source: List of License Agreements as of
June 30, 1 9 6 3 ? Bureau of Forestry.)
(Land Transportation)- Paredeses (Yujuico), Halilis,
Enriquezes (La Mallorca), Dangwas, Osmenas (Cebu Autobus),
Cuencos (Bisayas Land Transportation). (Source: Public
Service Commission.)
(S hipping) - De la Ramas, Cojuangcos, Chiongbians,
Elizaldes, Magsaysays, Cuencos, Madrigals, Montelibanos
and Lopezes. (Source: Public Service Commission.)
75
Vide ’Properties and Assets Acquired by Senator
Alejandro Almendras while in Public Office', Philippines
Free P r e s s , February 16, 1 9 6 3 , pp*31 and 43» Cf. also
The Manila B u l l e t i n , February 6, 1 9 6 3 *
 398

(1 9 5 8 - 1 9 5 9 ) 5 Almendras acquired, according to Veloso,

additional property valued at ^1,894,000 which included

commercial land, residential land, a 'palatial mansion

and residence at 54 Gilmore Avenue, Quezon C i t y 1 , and

agricultural land. Finally, while a Senator of the

Philippines, Almendras acquired Hacienda Tagulaya in

Davao and more lands worth ^ 3 5 850,500, claimed Veloso.

These acquisitions total 5 454 5 900 and, Veloso said,

they exceeded the net legitimate income of Senator and

Mrs Almendras (from salaries, farming and logging

business) of ^248,083) by ^ 7 , 1 0 6 ,817.7°

This bitter denunciation promoted Senator Almendras

to lash back at his attacker. Usi n g the Senate floor as

his forum, he declared that Veloso was once his political

ally. They had parted company in 1 9 5 7 5 he said, when

he (Almendras) helped bring about the first political

defeat of Veloso. 77 Calling Veloso*s charges ’evil l i e s ’ ,

he described Veloso as a ’man who, despite his own

personal record shamefacedly professes now to be a

H8
champion of m o r a l i t y ’ . He added that he (Almendras)

7^
Ibid., p.4 3 .
77
Senator A l m e n d r a s ’ statement and excerpts from his
Senate privileged speech appear in Philippines Free P r e s s ,
February 16, 1 9 6 3 5 p.3*
78
Ibid.
 399

had been elected and re-elected by the people of Davao

and wondered ’if I committed all the acts ascribed to

me by Congressman Veloso as a public official, would

the 200,000 voters of the province of Davao have given

me such an overwhelming endorsement? ’79 He has always

been against graft and corruption in the government

servic e .

Representative Veloso followed up his attack with a

bill, which he filed in the lower House, seeking the

expropriation of Hacienda Tagulaya, Davao, owned by

80
Senator Almendras. Veloso earlier stated that the

hacienda was acquired by Mrs Caridad Almendras (the

Senator’s wife) from the heirs of a rich landowner, after

it has been the object of possible government purchase:

[The] area was the subject of a petition filed

in 1 9 5 6 for the requisition thereof for
distribution among its 200 tenant families and
occupants, who had solicited the help of Sec.
of General Services Almendras for the
prosecution of said petition; in violation of
the provisions of Sec. 20, Rep. Act No. l400
and in immoral and inequitable violation of
the trust and confidence reposed in the senator
by the petitioning tenants of said h a cienda,...
Sen. Almendras acquired the said land for
himself, in his w i f e ’s name, under a questionable
and dubious ’high f i n a n c e ’ arrangement allowed

79
Ibid.
80
Manila B u l l e t i n , February 22, 1 9 6 3 } p.12.
 400

and abetted by the Philippine National

Bank.

Almandras charged Veloso with continuing his 'campaign

of v i l i f i c a t i o n ’. He said he had bought the land in good

faith ’on request of the tenants themselves’ claiming

that the land had originally been offered for sale by

the original owner to the Land Tenure Administration but

the L.T.A. could not buy it for lack of funds. There

was no unrest or discontent among the tenants since he

82
took over, Almendras said. Veloso was already a

congressman in 1956. ’Why did he not file a similar bill

then? Is it because he is related by affinity to the

person who wanted to buy it [the h a c i e n d a ] but who was

not acceptable to the tenants?', he queried. The Davao

congressman, he said, is desperate

because he is now facing charges for murder in

Davao, an election protest where he is losing
and he is about to be investigated for culpable
violation of the Constitution by authorising a
law which granted an electric franchise to his
wife, Rosita Mullet.

81
’Properties and Assets Acquired by Senator Alejandro
Almendras while in Public O f f i c e ’ , o p . c i t .
82
The Manila Bulletin, February 22, 1963} p.12.
83
Ibid.
 4oi

Almendras concluded that 1these acts [forVeloso, an N P ],

84
are inspired by the L i b e r a l s ’.

It might be added tht in November 1962, Almendras

was charged by the ruling LP administration with the

violation of Section 2, Republic Act 1379> otherwise

85
known as the Anti-Graft Law. This provision of the law

states that any public servant who shall acquire properties

out of proportion to their legitimate income while in

office shall have the same forfeited to the State.

Almendras claimed then thct he was being ’harassed*

by the LP Administration. He said that his refusal to

join the LP so it could win the Senate Presidency prompted

86
this act of ’political v e n g e a n c e ’. He revealed later

that ’highly placed L i b e r a l s ,including Antonino [LP

Senator Gaudencio Antonino], had approached him with an

undated blank form of affiliation to the Liberal party,

and that if Almendras would sign, the graft charges

against him for alleged enrichment in office would not

be f i l e d , and that the same nature of charges against the

Lopez brothers (Senator Fernando and Businessman Eugenio)

O
would be f o r g o t t e n ’. (Emphasis supplied.)

84
Ibid.
85
The Man i l a Chronicle, November 11, 1962.
86
Ibid.
8?
The E x a m i n e r , February 18, 1 9 6 3 , p.13»
 402

As has been previously mentioned, however, Senator

Almendras finally voted for LP candidate Marcos for the

Senate presidency although he did not join that party.

And the LP administration seemed to have lost interest

in pursuing the grave charges originally filed against

him.

The Almendras case has not been an isolated one.

Since the war many old fortunes have been augmented and

new ones have been built through the skillful combination

of official influence and the profit-motive. The

details may sometimes vary but the general principle is

the same: that of making private capital out of public

funds and the public domain.

The years immediately following ’liberation* were

particularly fruitful ones because the opportunities

were many and the absence of effective restraints gave

license to the almost uninhibited exercise of money­

making activities among public officials.

Reference has been made earlier in another

connection to the rampant inregularities that characterized

the Osmena, Roxas, and Quirino administrations. There

were the reported ’anomalies’ in the distribution of

PCAU (Philippine Civil Affairs Unit) and UNRRA (United

Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) relief

 403

goods; the PRATRA (Philippine Relief and Trade

Rehabilitation Administration) and NARIC (National Rice

and Corn) mess; the NDC (National Development Company)

and the Surplus Property Commission scan d a l s ; the Chinese

immigration quota racket; the graft money that augmented

the income of some public officials from import controls;

the backpay, customs, and internal revenue rackets; etc.

The surplus property scandal arose out of the

acquisition of U.S. Army surplus property by the Philippine

government in September, 1946. The value of the goods

that were turned over to the Roxas administration had a

procurement value of $1,121,400,000. These were,

O O
however, given a ’fair v a l u a t i o n 1 of ^274,000,000.

President Roxas appointed Placido L. Mapa, Arsenio N. L u z ,

and Gabriel K. Hernandez to compose the Surplus Property

89
Commission. Soon, government officials, their relatives

and friends were in ’busi n e s s ’ . They disposed of these

public property, amassing huge profits for themselves

but at great loss to the government. There were reports

88
A.V.H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of
the Philippines (1958), o p . c i t . , p.252. The figures appear
as indicated. Official rate of exchange was $1 = ^2.
89
The latter is President R o x a s ’ relative. (Personal
Interview with a former SPC provincial official.)
 4o4

that surplus steel rails were sold to the government-

owned Manila Railroad Company at about five times their

90
procurement cost and these changed hands several times.

A n informant narrated how trucks were 1cannibalized1

( i . e . , tires and other spare parts were removed) before

selling them to the public. 91 Several of the top

officials were reportedly involved, but they were merely

replaced. The loss, however, to the government was

tremendous. Out of the ^274,000,000 worth of goods turned

over to the government, only j^73 >460 ,208.08 were

92
realiz e d .

The Catholic Church, through the Philippine Trust

C o . , and the San Juan de Dios Hospital (operated by a

religious corporation), sold to the government the

Tambubong and Buenavista estates in Bulacan in 1949-

Although the Philippine government had already paid ^3(m)

for the latter estate during the Japanese occupation, the

government had to pay again ^4. 5(m) in 1949» Jean

Arnault, a Frenchman who became a naturalized citizen,

was the Middl e m a n * in the transaction and when summoned

9Ö
Cf. Coquia, op. cit , , p .100 .
91
Personal Interview.
92
Hartendorp, o p . cit.
 405

by an Investigating committee of the Senate, he admitted

having given about ^400,000 to 1someone* who negotiated

the sale, but he refused to reveal the identity of the

person. For this, he was sent to prison for contempt.

The Nacionalistas charged during the 1951 elections that

the person involved was Judge Antonio Q u i r i n o , younger

brother of President Quirino.

The import control racket involved the procurement

of import licenses for businessmen, particularly aliens,

by highly placed influentials who gave their 1 services*

on a fee of 10 per cent commission. 93 Mention has

already been made of the immigration quota racket where

ranking Malacanang officials, Senators and Congressmen

were able to * earn* from ^2,000 to ,000 from every

Chinese immigrant by certifying to the good character

94
of these aliens.

The NDC scandal, otherwise known as the 'Caledonia

Pile M y s t e r y * , involved the 'swindling* of the government

of the amount of ^244,068,000. The NDC Manager, Amado

Bautista, and Judge Antonio Quirino were reportedly linked

93
Cf. Philippine Free P r e s s , February 26, 1953? p.2.
94
Vide p.227* Of. also Coquia, o p , c i t ., p.102, Speaker
Eugenio Perez was allegedly allocating the 'quotas* to
favored House members.
 406

to this irregularity. 95 Judge Antonio Quirino was also

reported to have been involved in the purchase of a TV

tower owned by the CAA at a price of ^10,000. The

original cost of the tower was ^ 200,000 ($1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ) . In

the installation of the tower at the Bolinao Electronics

Corporation’s property (owned by A . Quirino), army trucks,

equipment, and personnel were reportedly u s e d . ^

The Garcia administration has also been linked with

numerous ’a nomalies’. The reported ’unethical' relations

of top officials with alien businessmen and with

Stonehill’s ’web of corruption’ has been discussed in

Chapter V.

In 1961, M a n i l a ’s Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, himself

a top member of the then ruling N P , disclosed that ’the

p e o p l e ’s own money would be employed [by the NP

Administration] to corrupt t h e m ’ in the 1961 presidential

elections. He revealed that:

(1) There is a ’kickback' from every import

license for party funds. The license is
not released unless the kickback is
assured;

(2) Licenses are granted to those who are not

entitled to them but who have sworn to
support President Garcia;

95
Cf. Philippines Free P r e s s , July 3» 1954, p.3*
96
Cf. The Manila B u l l e t i n . October 2, 1953*
 407

(3) In the case of sugar planters, no crop

loans w i l l be g r a n t e d w i thout kickbacks;

(4) M i l l i o n s will be made for so-called

d e v e l o p m e n t a l loans: ^ 1 5 0 (ni) from the
m a r g i n levy: ^60(m) from the G-SIS, and
a n o t h e r ^100(m) m a y be tapped from the
S S S .97

T he goods f rom Japan e s e war r eparations hav e b e e n

the object of stor m y quarrels. In 1 9 6 1 , the then V i c e -

President, M a c a pagal, a c c u s e d P r e s i d e n t G a r c i a of

’s q u a n d e r i n g the J a p a n e s e w ar r e p a r a t i o n s by a l l o c a t i n g
— 98
them to m e n a r o u n d M a l a c a n a n g and to a f a v o r e d f e w ’ .

He also c h a r g e d President G a r c i a of ’p u b l i c l y justifying

t h e ... m o n e y - m a k i n g a c t i vities [of public officials by]

his statement that n it is no t w r o n g for a C a b i n e t official

to p r o vide for the security of his f a m i l y " ’ .99

T he w a r reparations, it should be noted, were inten d e d

to b e n e f i t the millions of F i l i p i n o s who suffered under

the J a p a n e s e d u r i n g the war. The ’R e p a r a t i o n s L a w ’ , for

instance, p r o vides that

It shall be the p o l i c y of the G o v e r n m e n t of the

P h i l i p p i n e s to u t i l i z e all r e p a r ations payments...

97
W e e k l y R a d i o Broadcast, cited in T he M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e ,
M a r c h 13, 1961.
98
The M a n i l a C h r o n i c l e , September 2 0 , 1961.
99
I b i d . T h e latter statement has been l i kened w i t h form e r
Senate P r e s i d e n t A v e l i n o ’s c a ndid ’W h a t are we in p o wer
f o r ? ’ statement. Cf. Chap.V, p.225*
 408

in such m a n n e r as shall ensure the m a x i m u m

possible economic benefit to the Fi l i p i n o
people and in as equitable and w i d e s p r e a d
a m a n n e r as p o s s i b l e .100

Th e actual allocation, however, as c o r r e c t l y stated by

Macapagal, was c h a n n e l l e d to a f a v ored few. B y 1961,

for instance, out of a total of $ 1 0 5 * 2(m) paid in capital

goods, $71.76(m) went to the private sector w h ile only

$33 •4 4 (m) went to the government,^'*' The 1private sector*

seems to refer to the few who were c l o s e l y connected,

by family, business, or other ties, w i t h the power-holders.

T h e award of a $ 2 .2 5 (m) ship r e c e i v e d in r e p a r a t i o n to

the S u l t a n S h i p p i n g Lines, a c o r p o r a t i o n h e a d e d by

F e r n a n d o Acuna, first c o usin of the late President R o x a s ,

for example, r e c e n t l y became a subject of controversy.

V i c e - P r e s i d e n t Pela e z who, as earlier mentioned, h ad

a b a n doned the LP and had joined the N P , c h a rged P r e s i d e n t

M a c a p a g a l w i t h *r a n k discrimination* against established

s h i pping companies in favor of a ’p o w e r f u l L i b e r a l P a r t y

10 2
leader*. Pala e z averred that the LP a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ’s

100
Se c t i o n 1 , R e p a r a t i o n s Act, June 2 1 , 1957»
101
Ce n t r a l B a n k of the Philippines, T h i r t e e n t h A n n u a l
Report, 1961 ( Q u e z o n City: JMC Press'^ I n c . , 1962) , pTlOO.
10 2
C f . E d w a r d K i u n isala, ’R e p a r a t i o n s C o n t r o v e r s y * ,
P h i l ippines F r e e P r e s s , F e b r u a r y 1 , 1 9 6 4 , p.67.
award of a ship w o r t h $2.25 m i l l i o n to the S u l t a n S h i p p i n g

C o m p a n y over the objections of the N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c

1A O
C o u n c i l was made 1 to please his [the P r e s i d e n t ’s] c r o n y 1 .

The U n i t e d P h i l i p p i n e Lines, one of w h o s e founders was

D o n A m b r o s i o M a g s aysay, a r e l ative of President M a g s aysay,

also acquired 12 vessels from the government — 7 cargo-

liners from the NDC and 5 o t h e r v e s s e l s from J a p a n e s e

.. 104
war reparations.

T h e pu r c h a s e of three o c e a n - g o i n g vessels in 1949

by the NDC (National D e v e l o p m e n t Company) is a n o t h e r

i l l u s t r a t i o n of the role of the government as a p r o v i d e r

of benefits to the favored few. T he three ’Dona* vessels,

as the g o v e r n m e n t - o w n e d ships were called, wer e o p e r a t e d

by the De la R a m a S t e a m s h i p Co. I n c . , a private c o m p a n y

u n d e r the m a n a g e m e n t of Serg i o Osmena, Jr. (son-in-law

of De la Rama, a shipp i n g magnate) J who secured the

contract f rom the government on a c o m m i s s i o n basis.

While the v e s s e l s were m a k i n g an average gross income of

103
Ibid.
104
Cf. T h e n and N o w , C h r o n i c l e Publications, vol.II,
1 9 6 1 , p . 1 9 . F o r other r e p a r a t i o n s awards, vid e ’W h y the
r eparations h u s h - h u s h ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s F r e e P r e s s , M a r c h 22,
1958; and ’W h o got the r e p a r a t i o n s ? ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s Fre e
P r e s s , S e p t e m b e r 12, 1959*
105
Cf. C h a p t e r IV, p.176.
^5*5(m) sc year, the De la R a m a Steamship Company had
10 6
been declaring losses from their operation.

Substantial government loans and huge subsidies

are other major benefits provided by the government to

the elite. The sugar hacenderos are among the

traditional beneficiaries of loans from government banks

and other financing institutions.

The ’loans, credits, and accommodations’ which the

Lopez brothers (Senator Fernando and brother Eugenio)

were able to secure from three government financing

institutions ’to build their economic e m p i r e ’ were

disclosed by Press Secretary Leoncio Parungao, Jr. in

1963 as totalling ^ 8 8 , 3 7 3 , 0 0 0 . x p e disclosures were

106
Cf. L e a n d r o A. V i l o r i a , ’T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S e r v i c e s ’ ,
in H.B. J a c o b i n i and A s s o c i a t e s , G o v e r n m e n t a l S e r v i c e s
i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ( M a n i l a : I P A , U n i v e r s i t y o f the
P h i l i p p i n e s , 1 9 5 7 T » p.54l.
107
’P a l a c e v e r s u s L o p e z e s ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s F r e e P r e s s ,
J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 6 3 » p .60. T h e amounts are b r o k e n down
as f o l l o w s :

1. Development Bank of the Philippines:

a. Binalbagan Central 32,490,000

b. Pampanga Central 4.788.000
c. Philippine Portland Cement 2.355.000
d. Industrial Company 1.450.000
e . B o l i n a o E l e c t r o n i c s (Alto B r o a d c a s t i n g ) 600,000
f . CBN Broadcasting 2 . 2 75.000
g» S o u t h e r n L i n e s ( s h i p p i n g c o m p a n y ) 1 . 7 30.000

T o tal ^45 ,688,000

 4ll

made, as is u s u a l l y the case, during the h e i g h t of a

bitter political war. The Lopez brothers denied that

t hey h a d u s e d political power to b u i l d u p their business

empire and countercharged that Presi d e n t M a c a p a g a l had

been abusing his political powers to satisfy his (the

P r e s i d e n t 's) desire f or v e n g e a n c e against his political

108
enemies.

It is w o r t h w h i l e m e n t i o n i n g t h a t the P r e s i d e n t had,

indeed, been centering his a t t a c k on the L o p e z e s , Yulos

and Aranetas, all p o w e r f u l figures of the s u g a r group.

The latter two w e r e top L P stalwarts. Jose Y u l o was LP

candidate f or P r e s i d e n t in 1957» the r u n n i n g m a t e of

107 (cont.)
Total (carried over) ^45?688,000
2. Philippine National Bank

a . Meralco 3 5 ,000,000
b. C h r o n i c l e 2,000,000
c . Binalbagan Sugar Central 3 .500.000
d. P a m p a n g a S u g a r M i l l .
1 200.000
e . B o l i n a o E l e c t r o n i c s ( Alto Broadcasting) 4 8 5 }0 0 0

T o tal ^ 4 2 , 1 8 5 ,000

3. Government Service Insurance System

a. A l t o - C B N (building construction) 500,000

Grand Total ^ 8 8 , 373,000

108
Ibid.
 412

Macapagal. J. Amado Araneta, brother-in-law of Yulo,

was also a top official of the L P . But both, like most

of the rest of the sugar bloc, supported the then

President, Garcia, during the 1961 presidential elections.

It could then be true that the pressure emanating from

the President might be political vengeance but, whatever

the motivation, the important thing, insofar as this study

is concerned, is that large amounts of government funds

were made available to these groups. It has been

subsequently reported that the vast Yulo Canlubang sugar

estate had been financed with government f u n d s .

The shipping companies are among the other major

beneficiaries of large government loans. With top public

officials or former officials as stockholders or directors,

they easily secure government funds for expansion of

their business.

The enactment of the Philippine Overseas Shipping

Act of 1955 (R.A. 1407 , September 9 j 1955)5 signed into

109
Cf. 1Sugar groups back G a r c i a 1 , The Manila C h r o n i c l e ,
May 5, I96I; *CG bares Yulo d e f ection*, The Manila
C h r o n i c l e . June 14, 1 9 6 1 .
110
As early as 1953} Yulo had already been exposed by
J. Antonio Araneta, an N P , as having been able to secure
huge loans from the government-owned PNB while a member
of the Board of Directors of the government bank. Cf.
The Manila T i m e s , October 7} 1953*
 413

law by President M a g s a y s a y , made available an annual

amount of ^20(m) for a period of five years ’for loan or

for the construction or acquisition of ocean-going vessels

for resale or lease to Filipino citizens’ . The Shipping

Act likewise provided certain tax exemptions.

There are other examples of legislation and

administrative policies providing government financial

help which promote elite interests such as the Gold

Subsidy Law, Tobacco Subsidy Law, and so forth, but the

above should suffice to illustrate the point.

Private banks are also beneficiaries of public funds.

Over the last several years they have noticeably increased

in number, so that by 1963 there were no fewer than 33

commercial banks. Landlords, businessmen, politicians

and other public officials have turned to banking, the

reason being their discovery of the profitable technique

of diverting government funds into the vaults of private

, i 112
banks.

111
Cf. L. Viloria, o p . c i t , , p.542.
112
For interesting accounts of this point, vide F.V. Tutay,
’Biggest bank f r a u d s ? ’ Philippines Free P r e s s , March 2,
1 9 6 3 , p.10, et s e q . ; Gene de Gracia, ’Money T a l k s ’ ,
Weekly G r a p h i c , February 26, 1964, p . 5 } et s e q .; Gene de
Gracia, ’Graft in the Central B a n k ’ , Weekly G r a p h i c ,
February 19, 1964, p.2, et s e q . ; Villegas-Padilla
controversy in The Manila T i m e s , January 18, 19 and 20,
1964; and the Villegas-Tolentino controversy in The
Manila T i m e s , August 1 3 } 1964.
 klk

C. RECAPITULATION

The small upper strata minority which dominates

Philippine political and governmental processes utilizes

political power to promote its economic interests and to

maintain its superior position in the social structure.

Power circulates within this group.

The formal governmental structure, which is
characterized by a high degree of centralization and of

concentration of power at the top, provides an effective

means of political control. It also complements the
hierarchical pattern in the social and economic structures.

The President is a dominant figure in the governmental

hierarchy, but Congress has sufficient power to allow it
to bargain with the Executive. However, the legislature,

the executive and the judiciary are not exactly

autonomous, self-contained loci of authority with strictly
differentiated functions for there exists a certain
amount of overlapping of powers. Furthermore, the

manipulation that takes place within the political system

e.g. the destruction of a Congressional majority described

above renders the constitutional principle of separation

of powers largely ineffective.

 415

The elite system impinges on the formal structure

in such a way that informal power-wielders are able to

exercise a relatively great amount of influence in

political decision-making. This is accentuated by the

interlocking of interests, the kinship system and other

social links among the elite.

Mass organizations which can act as a restraining

influence oil elite excesses in the exercise of power are

absent. On the other hand, the masses are integrated

within the elite system, divided among themselves and

playing the role of inarticulate supporters of the elite

in a leader-follower relationship. The contest for

power, then, is limited to the elite.

Public office is a prized stake in the political
contest for it not only confers formal power but provides

other rewards as well. Public office is an avenue to more

power, prestige and wealth.
Generally speaking, and within the context of the

total society, benefits tend to be allocated according

to rankings in the social hierarchy. The top elite, the
upper principal!a, get the most out of the system.

(See Figure V.) The benefits are in the form of high

governmental positions, favorable and protective

legislation, loans from government banks and financing
 416

figure V
THE ELITE IN GOVERNMENT —
PATRONAGE AND FAVOR DISTRIBUTION

UPPER PRINCIPALIA ----

TAX ASSESSMENTS, OTHER PRIVILEGES

LOWER PRINCIPALIA ---- LOWER GOVERNMENT POSTS, PATRONAGE AND

FAVORS ON A SMALLER SCALE, 0THF31 PRIV­
ILEGES

- PETTY FAVORS TO SOME SUPPORTERS

 417

institutions, franchises and licenses, profitable contracts

with the government, low tax assessments, and other

privileges. The lower principalia get similar benefits

but on a smaller scale. The masses, with no effective

organization of their own, get petty favors, but only

through elite intermediaries. Also, as pointed out in

Chapter V, they have to ally themselves -- as followers --

with an elite leader in order to get a share of the

residue of scarce public resources.

 418

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Philippine elite has a long history that is

marked by a remarkable continuity. The ruling datus ,

together with the members of the nobility (maharlikas) ,

comprised the ruling class in the pre-Spanish Philippines.

With the conquest of the Philippines by Spain, the absolute

dominion of the datus was terminated, but they did not

lose their leading roles insofar as their relations with

the people were concerned. They were treated as a

privileged class by the Spaniards and became willing

agents of Spanish rule. They alone had limited voting

rights and they alone received the benefits of education

and economic opportunity to become the privileged class

under the colonial administration. This group were

called the principalia or principal citizens of the

community.

Through the years, the principalia underwent some

changes. Slowly but surely, they became more and more

'different* and isolated from their countrymen. They

acquired Spanish education, learned the Castilian language,

 419

and started to live ’under the bells’. Also, the

mestizo (both Chinese and Spanish) element began to
appear among the ranks of the principalla . This infusion

of new elements, however, did not substantially affect

the character of the elite. There was limited

’circulation’ but no transformation. The new entrants

were absorbed into the elite system without changing it.
By the beginning of the nineteenth century with the

expansion of commerce and trade, land accumulation began

to increase, paving the way for the haciendas to grow in
numb er.

The coming of the Americans, who replaced the

Spaniards, saw the introduction of novel political

techniques. Elections were held but only the elite,

although defined more broadly than under the Spaniards,
could vote or stand for local office under the property
and literacy qualifications that were imposed. Political
parties were organized but they were elite parties.
The modern principalia is not unlike the ’old’
principalia since they are both composed of the
socio-economic dominants in the community. Innovations
such as ’free enterprise', public education, representative

government, and popular elections were introduced in the

American period, but since the basic economic structure
 420

remained essentially intact, change became

circumscribed. Traditional patterns of economic and

social relations persisted and the prosperity associated

with progress was confined to a limited group in society.

There is, however, one difference between the old

and the new principalia. While the old was caste-like,

entry to the new became somewhat easier. Higher education,

although of limited application, and accumulation of

wealth may provide passports to principalia status. This

is, however, of little significance as shown by the fact

that there has been no major restratification, implying

that the rate of social mobility is slow.

The political power-wielders are largely drawn from

the socio-economic dominants of the community. Analysis

of 446 top public officials from 1946-1963 shows that

most of them come from the small upper strata minority.

Data on college education, for instance, show that

96.7 per cent of top executive officials, 96 per cent of

Senators, 92.3 per cent of Representatives, and 100 per

cent of Justices of the Supreme Court are college

graduates. The comparative figure for the Philippine

population, twenty-five years and over in 1948 was only

0.7 per cent. In occupation, income, style of living,

memberships in prestige associations, the data show that

 421

the top public officials belong to the very tiny minority

and are not representative of the population. Furthermore,

within the limited social area of recruitment, a group

of politically dominant families has emerged. These are

the ffamily dynasties' which may be found in practically

all provinces of the country.

The political power-wielders were also found to have

multiple occupations. In their ranks were found lawyers -

businessmen - landowners - bankers and similar combinations

of occupations. Among the group studied, there were

also TV and radio station owners, owner-operators of

private universities, colleges and other educational

institutions, owner-operators of public utilities, lawyers

of large corporations, government franchise and license

holders, etc. Thus the nature of the leadership of the

political elite is not merely 'political' but extends to

business, banking, education, the mass-media and the

prof essions.

Philippine political parties are elite parties. A

review of their early history shows their common origins.

The pre-war parties sprang from the principalia group.

The Federalista Party, the only party which the Americans

permitted until 1906, was a party of the Filipino

aristocracy. The post-war parties had also a common

 422

origin in the pre-war Nacionalista Party of Osmena

and Quezon. Because opposition and ruling parties are

composed of individuals belonging to the same

socio-economic group, party identification is rather

loose. No differences based on principles, class or

ideology distinguish one party from another. Factional

break-up, fusion, and consolidation are regular

occurrences. Individual or group defections are common.

Personal rivalries among top leaders are among the causes

of party break-up.
Labor or mass parties have so far failed to prosper.
The setting does not seem to be favorable for non-elite

parties to develop. Two outcomes are usually the fate

of such parties: they are absorbed by either of the two
major parties (or by both, as in the case of the Labor
Party in 1963) or they turn to more militant activites
(as in the case of the Sakdalista Party before the war) .
The organization of the two major parties are
essentially the same. Formally, they have established

rules, after the American model, on party organizations.

Informally, the power relations in the social structure

impinge on the formal organization. The elite family

factions in the provinces become the nuclei of party

 423

organization and politics in the provinces revolve

around the interests these elite family groupings.

National Party conventions are held regularly, but

often are only for the purpose of selecting choices

already made by the top party hierarchy. Personal

arrangements by the top party leaders are often made

behind-the -scene, and the informal choices of the party

leaders are then presented for confirmation by the

delegates.

Elite politicians employ various methods and

techniques in their political campaigns. Effective use

is made of the cultural norms and of money, goods, and

at times, even violence to win an election. The use of

money and goods, in particular, to win electoral support

is rampant. Money is used for buying delegates votes at

the convention and elector’s votes at the polls, and for

personal donations and gifts between elections. Candidates

may spend from three to thirty times their prospective

salaries to secure election and public funds are commonly

employed to this end by the party in power. Sources of

campaign funds are the public works funds, the ’pork

barrel’, and the landowning and business interests and

others who may want something from the government in return

when the candidate supported is in office.

 424

The elite politician also utilizes symbols and

slogans to win voter's support. He promises to give land

to the landless, to emancipate the serf-like tenant, and

not to ’let anybody exploit him like a beast'. During

election time, he goes to the barrios, dresses like the

peasants and shakes the hands of the rural masses. Thus,

the elite politician, every now and then,becomes a 'common

man ’ .

In public office, the elite politician often utilizes

political power to promote his economic interests. The

highly centralized system of government and the too-much

concentration of power at the top provides him with an

effective means of political control. The Executive, in

the person of the President, and Congress are the centers

of control, but between them the President is the dominant

force. The interaction of the elite system and the

formal structure allows informal power-wielders to

exercise relatively great influence in political

decision-making. And, inevitably, this influence is

utilised for the maintenance of the system under which

they have achieved such substantial rewards.

 423

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cd 0 0 0 Cfi Cfi d
•H cd ft ft H •H cd ft
ft S cd d 3 > U 0
cd cd ft to cd 0 cd •H
ft ft <d <1 ft ft S ft

ft
ft <1
PROVINCE

ft ft ft ft
ft <3 ft ft
R e la te d

<y <1 <3

H
<J <1 <1
(ft ft ft
§
• • •
VO 00
 429

(CONS.ANGUTNAL OR AFFINAL)~IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES
CD
bjD
Oh
ft ft
I I
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

by affinity to Paredeses of Abra, (Data here not previously included)

>
o
LEGISLATIVE

ft

ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft
<D CD 0 0 0 0 0 0
ft
1
ft
1
ft
1 ft
1 ft
1 ft ft
I ! ft
1
1 I
CM CM CM CM r - CM
Sh 'S
ft Ö 0 0 0 0 £
CD 0 fP ft ft ft ft ft Ti 0
EXECUTIVE

f t V! cti 0 PQ PQ ko
S CÖ =0 0 •H
°8 _x — ' u o P ft ft
CO O 0 O ft P > > o
o > !> . O ft > ft > i—1 0 i> O 0
0 cti ft Cti o cti 0 o Cti o u O Sh *
ft ft S > O ft ft P ft S ft ft p ft ft
l I i 1 1 1 1
I I i i i 1 ! 1 1
CM
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-
SION

* *
FAMILY'S

LANU NESS

* «

cti
p S ft
cti CO 0
FAMILY

p cti
Cti Ö o Sh cti Ö ft
•H ft ft cti -p o Ö
O U -p 1
—1 cti o N 0
U cti u 1
—1 ft ft Ö s
cti ft o •H •H •H ft
P o ft > Q ft t> ft

CTj
x ft?* ft
o
<i H
PROVINCE

Jz ; %
ft Q O
o H § ft ft
x
o $ p 5 -p
CD CD
+3
X 2Q o O cti Cti
I
—! ip
CD CD
CP Ph X
 430

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

H
ft
0
1
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

<=0
LEGISLATIVE

u
f t TO
0 TO ft ft
ft cd CO f t
'N_X 1
^ rO
e TO
d <1 f t d ft d ft ft ft 0 ft
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 u 0
CO
1 I
ft CO f t
1 1
CO
1
ft
1
ft
1
ft ft
1
ft
1 1
t—1 C\i C\i r- r—

u ft
0 ti d 0
0 ^---s 0 . 0 ft > O 0 0 ft
EXECUTIVE

ft d CO f t to cd 0 0 to to
w 0 \ f t <u S O x < < =6 >
CO f t w ft U ✓ CO
TO O ft 0 d 0 0
> 0 - f t [> 0 -p > 0 •v
3 ft 0 > d
0 d ft 0 0 X! •H 0•H 0 ft cd X 0 0
0 ft cti O O ft O O > 0 ft S ft O ft
1 I O I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ft T— T— T -- r- T— T— r - Cft c\i r— r—
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
T AATT^ BUSI- PROFES-
SION
FAMILY'S

X X X X X X

Another member Is a Catholic Archbishop.

LAND n e s s

X W X X
X!

X! X X X X

cd
ft 1
ft d ft cd
0 cd to cd 0
ft
FAMILY

to d 0 -p
0 cd f t u d
-p TO 1— 1 TO cd 0

d cd to d ft ft
0 cd X d 0 ft 1— 1

d 0 0 •h 0 •H < 1

ft O ft ft >
CO
ft
CO ft
ft <i
ft ft ft
H ft ft
PROVINCE

f t CO N ft
<E H <J
Jg ft H
<j < 1
O O 0

-d" vo
 431

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
-P
OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES
0 O
tiD
ft ft
ft 3
ft ft
1 1
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

ft ft
0
LEGISLATIVE

- 0 - f t
ft > ft f t cd
0 cd 0O
°8 Ö S ft
's_ S
ft >
d ft d d f t -P s o f t d ft
0 CD 0 0 0 *H 00 0 0 0
ft1 ft1 ft1 CO
1
ft O
1
ft
1
ft
1
ft
1 1
ft

d r— r—
0
fclD /«—s X—N.
** — > ft
ft > CO 0 0
0 0 - 0 0 ft ft
EXECUTIVE

fclD 0 d P CD
r j CO < J S_ o' 0 ft X! °8
Cti f t p 0 ft 1 ft S_ _ / n_ ^
O O O 0 CO 0 d
NT MB FF?

> !D ^ H > t^ ft 0 - 0 f t ft - ft >

0 •H cd X O cd ft p f t -H a 0 t cd 0
0 ft S ft O JSJ <! ft 0 > 0 0 s ft ft
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 or!
HH i
1 l1 l 1 1 1
<ft r- C M r- r— T- T— T- T—
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
T A,TT^ BUSI- PROFES-
SION

x *

alfinity to Chiongbian of Cebu.

FAMILY *S

ft
o
ft
X to
NESS

•H
ft
ft
Ü
p
X X <sj
O
L

•H
1— I
I O
cd ft
H -P
(1 ) a
O cd CO o
FAMILY

ft 0
p ft cd 0 0
1 0 0 c3 id 0 ft cd
cd S co -p 0 d 0
P H ft) d £ 0 •H CO
0 <tj 0 to ft P •H
> s O ft ft
P
0)
ft
£
ft 0)
ft ft £ ft
H
PROVINCE

H ft P ft
ft > ft 0 CD
ft C ft ft -P
ft ft -P cd
3 O H
H • . ft CD
C 00 ft
ft i—1 cd ft
 432

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

H
ft
O
I
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

ft

> °8
LEGISLATIVE

0
ft ft
CD
°8 ft ^
v_/ >
0
d ft ft d ft a
0) CD CD O) 0 •
ft ft ft ft ft -ft
1 1 1 1 1 co
T- T- CO 1
—1 T— On
<— 1
^^
d d > d 0
— .O O d ft 0 0 O
►> ft r>> ft O 0) ft ft ft ft d
EXECUTIVE

O f t CÖ 03 ft o f t 0 f t d •H
0 s g g cß !*! <J ft 0 Cß
H d ft P w d
CD ft
ft CD d > 0 d o ft 0 ft
O ft
ft O d >> 0 ft ~ d d cß f t f t Jo O
•H ft ft 0 0 u d ft 0 ft d d ft d d
> =0 O > O ft ft s ft ft ft ft ft ft S 0
1^ 1 I I 1 1 1 1 i i i 1 1 1 d
T- CM r - T- t— r- 0 0 t— t— r- t— r- t— t— -p
•H
-P
Cß
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE

d
T T BUSI- PROFES-

0
SION

0 Cß
ft
FAMILY1S

X * X X 0
d ft
•H ft
>
0 ft
LAND NEgs

u 0
X X X X! ft ft
d
0 0
d Cß
> 0
d u
X X X X Q ft
0
d u
•H
ft
d ft ft
Cß ft Cß
d ft 1 •H d
s
FAMILY

d u d 1 d 0
1 ft d d s 0 -p d d
0 d d -p d ft d ft •H
§ 0 (3 d 1— 10 d ft
d B -p ft d ft Cß Cß d
Pi H d d ft d d d 0
d <J •H 0 d d •H d 0
ft ft ft S S ft ft
rj
pH CO
0 ctf
B ft
O ft
H d
< d
jH
PROVINCE

ft 0
<5 Cß d
ft -p
O d d
ft •H
ft 0 ft
ft • 0
ft ON ft
O H d ft
 433

Data here are in addition to those given under

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL! IN ELECTIVE
JUDICIARY
-p
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES
o
ft H H ft
ft d ft ft 0
ft| ft
|
U
1
O
1
ft|
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

ft
LEGISLATIVE

ft
0
ft

Ö ft ft ft
0 0 0 0
ft
1
ft
I
ft
I
ft|
1 1 1
r- CM rH H

,,— ^ ft "7?
> ~ ft ft
ti 0 ft p d
0 ft ft O 0
ft
EXECUTIVE

SD ft h d 0) Ö tUD
< =6 w cd ft 1x1 0 <1
u rH U O'— x u d ft ElD
O 0 > 0 CO O o <; O
> 0 ft ft > O ft 0 - > ft > ft - 0
O 1x1 d d o u d U d 0 d 0 d ft X
ft ft S O ft ft 2 ft cd ft S ft S ft ft
1 i I l i i 1 i ft I i i i i 1
T— T— r— <— 1 H -3- Cft ft r— r- r— t— r— C\!
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
T AATT^ BUSI- PRO FES-
SION
FAMILYxS

X! XI X X X X

Cebu (Durano-Almendras family).

LAND NESS

XI X X X

XI XI X X X X

ft
N
d 1 0
co CO f t 0
d O ft e»o
ft
FAMILY

U o d d o o
ft d 3 N Ö i—i d
ä d £ •H •H 0 ft
0 S o d d CO •H
s ft ft •H •rl d
ft d d d d
ft ft O’ o ft
ft
ft ft
o P
ft ft
ft ft
PROVINCE

o o o
<1 o o
> o o
<3 ft ft
P H H

O r_ CM
CM C\i Oi
 434

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

H
ft
O
I
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

ft „— s
> ft ft
•* P 0
LEGISLATIVE

Ö
> «8 > 0 0 ft
0 0 £UD
O Pi ft •* °8
CO
£ co O
ft Ö cti ft 0 ti ft
0 ft 0 0 ft 0 X 0 0
m p ft ft B ft ft ft ft
10 1 J_ <* 1 1 1 1
r— T- T—

°8
Ö Pi ■Ö Ö Ö
3 -H > ft 0 0 P+-— n 0
0 P 6UD fcUD 0 -P to
EXECUTIVE

0 O ft
0 O CO ft > CO O <1 ft O
m ft CO Pi ft CO s_-
P 0 0 P -0 0 Ü ft 0
ft > ■P ft ft O ^ P< O ft ft 0 0 P > ft P 0
P 0 •H B •H P O 0 S CD X X 0 0 p m x
O O O =0 <; > £ ft ft < ft ft ft O O 0 ft
1 1 1— * 1 1 1 1 1 1w 1 1 1 1 1 1
T— T— T— T— r- r- CM C\i r— T— CM r- T— T— T—
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-
SION

Related by affinity to Aranetas (See Manila)

FAMILY *S

X! X X X X X X X
LAND NESS

X! X X X X X

X! X X X X X X X

SI
FAMILY

0
p ft 0
P s O si Ö 0
SI CO Ö Ö 0 p 0
0 0 p P -p Ö ft 0
ft ft ft Pi 0 Ph •H H
0 0 H Jh •H 0 ft p
ft ft <1 < £ ft ft >*

<*
0 ft <1
PROVINCE

ft ft £
H cp ft
O <! ft
ft ft <4
H H ft

cn -ft in
C\f CM CM
 435

ft >-<
CO > ft
ft H «3
> H H
H O O
H ft H ft
<3 ft Q H
ft ft CO ft i
ft ft H T“
ft ft o

Data here are in addition to those

H H ^—N
ft H ft ft >
CO Y— - H ft ft 0 o
o ft CO > o ft O
ft <3 o H
o ft ft H °8 °8 <=0
H <3 ^ ft -— ✓ 'S-/
ft ft ft ft ft
o ft > CO ft ö a ft ft ft ft ft ft
<3 H H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CO H O ft CO CO ft ft ft ft CO
ft ft ft ft 1 1 1 i 1 1 i 1
ft O H ft t— T- CM T— T— T—
ft O
a ft ft --—
a <3 ft ft ft ft
a ft <J 0 0 O
H ft X> X, ft o ft o
ft ft ft ft ft 0 ft ft 0 pj ft 0 pj
o O o > a a ft X 0 < X 0
ft H »-1 ft to ft to
ft <1 H a a > > C — . <1
ft CO ft > -p -p > o > •H > ft ft ~
ft ft O 0 •H •H o ft 0 ft 0 T) 0 0 xi
g o ft O O O O ft O ft O a o O ft
ft O ft i 1 1 i 1 i 1 i i 1 i i
ft ft H r_ r_ r— r— T- T“ C\i

co
Witz:
wo XX! X X
OH X X X

Norte (Marcos-Romualdez).
ft CO
Oh

X X

X X! X X X X X X X

0j
N
H 0 0 ft 0
ft 0 ft -P ft
H i— 1 •H o ft 0 ft ft H
ft H i— 1 -p ft ft ft to CO 0 ft
5 O — -H — •H ft £ ft ft 0 0 ft ft
ft ft ft ft o o S £ -p 0 •H £
H ft ft H ft •H •H ft ft CO 0
ft ft O <3 ft ft Q O o O ft ® Ö
CD O
O >
ft ft O -H

ft ft a H tcö
Q ft ft o H
H H
ft O ft o ft a ft O H
o <3 O «3 ft ft H CO CO
ft ft ft CO H ft
< <5 <3 ft ft O
> ft ft ft ft
0 >
•H

o 0 0
PS VO
•
00 On CO ft
Oh {>
cm CM CM CM ft ft
 436

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

>
o
LEGISLATIVE

ft
=6

d a d ft ft ft Ph ft ft
P P CD CD 0 CD 0) 0 <D
ft ft w1 ft1 ft ft ft1 ft1 ft1
1 1
c^i cry
1 !
1 1 1
CM CM

d -p „— s
> ft CD > ft > - d >
EXECUTIVE

0 ft 0 <D 0 ftp 0
0 ft ft ft p ft ft
H p ft
P > 0 0 d CD d 0 CD ^ og p
0 0 CD 3 O 3 > d > O > 0
•H p cti H 0 •H 0 0 ft 0 •H f t f t 0 -H
> ft S ft O > 0 ft ft ft > > Cti f t >
1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
r - CM
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-
SION
FAMILY«S

affinity to Brioneses of Cebu.

- — - NESS
FAMILY
,
PROVINCE
 437

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

TT Pi
CD o o X—S
O x—n ft
LEGISLATIVE

•H °8 cti ctf d
> o s £ o
> ft O
og 0 *"0
O
ft ft ft ft d
0 o 0 0 0
ft ft ft ft ft
1 1 i 1 i
T—
N
u Pi Pi •H
o d 0 3 d o O 0 ft
ft ft d ft 3 0 ft 0 d Cti
EXECUTIVE

ctf pq o cti o Eft d X! 0 - —s O

» S o 1—1 S o <J S f t Ph f t
0 H d EH f t 0
d ft > ft o ft ft O ft 0
ft ft 0 ft CO -P ft 0 > -p ft Pi 0
£ f t Ph ft •H •H ft X! o •H cti •h d s__ /
<j o f t o ft O O ft ft O o Q 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I i 1 1 1 £0 0
T“H T“* T““ T— T— T— r— r— T— T— - < cti
X!
0
ft
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-

ft
• d
SION

d CO
o
X X X! X! X! X! X X! d r»
FAMILY*S

ft
•H (Ö
ft d
3 3
LA^D NESS

cq to
X X! X X X! d
ft ft
o
0
0 0
0 0
XI X X! X! XI XI X X! ft
o
ft 0
ft ft 0
--- s Ph ft
o 0 0 d
d d ft ft
CO X
FAMILY

Cti 0 ft o 0 0
cO Cti d •H d ft ft -p
-p Pi ft d ft ft i
d cti d 0 •H 0 0 0 ft ft
•o 0 ft U d 0 ----- f t d ft ft -p
E -p p> 0 d cti d •H •H
o cti 0 •H cti o o Ph f t d d
ft > Q s ft ft S «J — •H •H
ft ft
ft ft
ft d d
ft o
H ft ft ft
PROVINCE

< H 0] • ft ft
ft > o Ü
• ft O ft ft ft ft
ft ft ft ft o 0 0
o O ft ft -p ft
S ft d d
• ft ft
cn • • 0 0
H -ft If t ft ft
s Cft d ft
 438

ft ft
CO > pd —s
X

w H <3 >
> ft H 0
H O O H O
f t PQ H Ph
ft Q O =6
HI W CO P 1 "—•
pq 15 ft T
—
Pd 521 O / --•>
H H
ft ft >
CO x—' H pq 0
o f t CO > O
HI <3 O H
o 12? Ph f t °6
H <d
cd f t f t HI
o f t > CO ft ft ft ft
<d H H o 0 0 0
CO EH O Pd Pd Pd Pd
Pd od 5 Pq i i i i
f t o H HI T— r- cm r—
PQ O
2 f t Ph -----s ----s -p
f t <! Ph H ft -p H > ft
2 55 <1 o d 0 0 0 =6 o 0
H X d Pd ft O X ft o O ft Q
f t f t Pd Pq cd o CQ ft cd 0 0 PQ
o O o > 2 ü °8 2 0 Pd X! 08 ft

fam i l y )
15 H -—/i—1 H H ft 0 pq w H -P
<1 EH > o 0 5 > 2 Cd > H
f t CO P > -P -p > o > x 3 0 -p ft ft > - d > 0 cd
PQ 15 o o •H •H 0 H CÖ O Cd o u •H cd S 0 ft 0 0 H 0
2 O pq O O O Ph 2 0 2 0 Ph O O <1 O K o O P h ft
ft O X i 1 1 1 1 1 i i i 1 1 l l i i <d i 1 1
5 Pq r_ CM T- T— cm <" CM f H
“ T- T— CM r_ t— r—

Duran
pq
co I
CO
pq w 12?

(see A l bay,
ft o
co o O H XI XI X! XI K
H CO
ft 2
HI O
H 5 I
o H CO
5 o CO CO X! XI X! X!
P h w ft
I pq
o Duran
H
o
o
g
<1 XI X *
CO ft
J o s e f i n a B.

cd
1> cd
ft 0 0 1 0
HI d -p o o d cd
H d d o o d ft ft
2 0 cd d o ft 0 cd ft 0
<! 0 i—I 0 6 2 ft N 0 ft
Ph > H 0 ft cd 1—1 d Pq ft
0 •H o 0 o cd cd cd
ft > ft PP o O 2 2
is R e p .

<1
ft <1
H ft
pq CO O <1
o O Pq o
5 Pd • N
o Pd
Sister

H <1 <1 H
> pq o > > >
o 5 5 15
pd
Ph * « *
\o ft- oo
C ft Cft
 439

(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

>
o
LEGISLATIVE

>
o 0
0
°8
ft ft ft
2-Rep

0 0 0
ft ft ft
1 i 1

affinity to Aranetas (Gregorio Araneta family - Manila)

d d d d d
0
ft 0 0 0 0
ft ft ft
EXECUTIVE

hD d ft
<l < <1 0 d <l
u 1—1 u co d f t O
0 > 0 O d 0 0 0 d o 0
ft > 0 0 0 ft 0 0
1-Gov

> 3 > > ft ft - 0 ft

d 0 uX! X 0 0 0 aj XI 0 XI S d f t XI ft
ft 0 ft ft ft 0 0 ft ft ft ft ft <! f t f t f t <
I
1 1 11 I 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
cn CM cm CM T - CM r- T- r - CM r—
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-
SION
FAMILY *S

X!
x

X K X! X X!
^gg

X X * *
x

X
x

XI X XI
T

ft
0 N
ft 0
FAMILY

0 aj ft
Abeleda

0 d -p -p d
d 0 d d d aj
0 ft 0 0 aj d
ft •H CO d ft d
•H 0 0 O d 0
ft ft ft ft H ft

0
O ft ft ft
ft ft
PROVINCE

ft 0 <
--------

O Q ft
Q ft <1 ft P
ft ft 0 0
39. OCC

• H
H ft ft <3 -P -P
2 O ft aj aj
1— l ft
• • 0 0
O *— ft ft
- ft - ft aj -Q
 440

ft ft
CO > ft -p
Hl H <3 o
> EH H
H CD o ft
ft ft H
<! f t Q
ft hi CO 02 1
Hl g ft) <—
er; g O
H H ^--s ^—%
w 6-i > >
co x--- - H ft o o
o ft CO > cp cP
f t <; o H
o g f t EH °8 =0
H <3 V—X >-- X
ft ft w Hl
o ft > CO f t ft Ö ft Ö ft ft ft
< H H 0 0) CD 0 0 0 0 0
CO f t CP f t ft CO ft CO g ft ft
f t er; g ft 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 l
h o H Hl T---- T---- T— r— T— T— T— C\i
CQ O
S3 f t ft
H «3 ft n 0
2 g <1 ft 0 -- S
- +3
H 0 l> ><j X s ft > 0 ö ft
H f t oe CQ ft 0 Hl Ö PQ O 0 0 0
o Cp o > co CP ® cP X MQ
g H H •» JjD i—1 ?H H Hl <!
er; < EH 0 CO > 0 f t <! > W) o o 0
f t CO ft > > X 0 0 K > o -p ft X > r* 3
S g CD o o ft H •H o H O cP cP 0 ft ft
o Hl CP cP 2 ft > 08 cP f t <3 2 2 cp tn Hl
ft o X 1 i i 1 1 >—' 1 1w I i i i 1
g ft r - Cft

ft
CO 1
<u CO
ft X
CQ
ft o
CO o O H X! X! X! X! X! X! X!
»X H f t CO
f t s Oh
ft o
H g 1
2 o H CO
o CO CO X X X
ft hi f t f t
1 eq g
o
H =1
CD
O <! X X! X! X! X! X!
CO H

0
i—i Ql 0
X cP cP 0 cP cP
Hl i—1 fciD £uD o •H o3 1—1
H O 0 o cP 3 0 0 ft
2 Ö 3 ft ft S •H CO N 0
<3 c3 f t H cP 0 s EüD 0 u
H f t <1 o o ft •H Ql u ft
co ft cP 0 u 0 0 CO

Hl <3 2 g ft eq ft Hl
g
<1
<3 g
cP H
Hl g CO
O < <1
g g ft cP
H <3 2 g
> Cs <
O <3 ft ft
ft Hl
ft <3 • •
ft cv eft
Pf Pf
 441

pp ft
co > ft ft
hi H <5 O
> EH H
H O O ft
EH PP H d
<3 HI n CO
HI PP CO ft 1
PP ft ft 1—
pci 2 O
H H °8 -
PP EH ft
CO^—>H HI r> (\j
o f t CO > ^—s ft o
hi <1 O H > 0
o 2 Ph ft °8 o ft
H ^ ft "—-*
Ph Ph PP HI i
O Ph P> CO ft ft 0 d d ft d ft d
<$ H H 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0
CO ft ft Ph ft -H CO CO ft CO ft co
Ph ft ft PP 1 i > i 1 1 i i i
pp O H HI r- r— t— 1— r— c\i CV C\i
CP o
2 HI P h Cfi -P
PP <U Ph H ft
2 2 <J •H 0 ft d
H d f t ft 0
Ph ft Pi PP H ft 0 -P ft
O ft O > d ft ft Q > ft Cfi >
H H PP < f t H o ft H d o u CO
Ph EH 0 rH o d o ft U o Cfi 0 o
PP CO P Hi cfi H d d d > Hi > o ft d Ph 0 f t u
CP f t O d d O 0 d o 0 d o d o d O f t i*j d o
s O HI 2 ft H ft PP O ft ft ft ft ft O PP ft H
ft o X l 1 1 1 i i i i i i i 1 1 i I 1
ft PP C\! T— 1— r— t— r— r_ r~m r_ r~ —
t r - 1- c\* r~

Z a m b a le s
of
M agsaysays

d 0 Cfi
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0 0 ft '—1
to

d d d d <J
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a ffin ity

d d d u d •H d
u •H Id d s d h
0 d d o 3 d
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ft
by

pp < ft
o ft o HI
ft H N <1 d d
H co hi N 0 CD
> ft H 4 -> -P
O s O’ ft d d
Ph ft rH
Ph 5 0) 0
ft - ft m ft ft
- ft ft-
 442

( CONSANGUINAL OR A F F I N A L ) I N E L E C T I V E

JUDICIARY
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE R E L A T I V E S

ft

under L ey te
I
OR A P P O I N T I V E P O S I T I O N S

(& C a b )

> CÖ
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LEGISLATIVE

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>

given
ft ft ft Ö o ft
1-Sen

ft
0 0 0 0 0 ft 0 0
ft ft ft ft ft ft ft
I I I 1 1 1 I
T— T—
T— r—
r~
ft

those
^ —\ 0
(& R e p )

ft U •H
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ft ft o ft O > u 0
ft 0 cd o o
EXECUTIVE

ft ft
X Ö s 0 ft ft <1

to
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ft O n C 3 > -p ft O H 3 > > o 0
1- G o v

a d d itio n
aj u ft o 0 •H aj U 0 0 o o f t °8 X
o
1
ft ft
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1
ft
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1
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1
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1 1
ft
1
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1 1
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r— C\i r- T- r- T- T— T—
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
B U S I- PROFES-

in
SION

are
FAMILY* S

X XI X! lx! X X
x

D ata h e re
LA ■- NESS

X X! X X! X!
x

XX! X X X X X
x

o f L eyte,

CO ft
FAMILY

2 i ft 0
S ev illa-

ft aj CO 0 0 ft CO
aj 0 Ö o 0 i— i Ö 0 aj
ft ä ft CO __ i—l i—i ft ft ft
ft 0 ■p 0 aj aj 1—1 p ft
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ä Sh CO i—I CO > 0 a o
aj o 0 0 o > CO ft
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ft
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to

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PROVINCE

o
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ft <5 m
R elated

2 ft
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ft i 1 1 1
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ft ft 0 ft 0 ft 0 ft ft 0 0
> H <] f t <1 Q C fl > <J ft <1 f t <! ft ft
H aj C fl CO u -p u
ft c o o O 0 aj o 0 0 O ft 0 o 0 0
ft Cß 0 £ > 0 0 ft > U 0 ft 3 0 aj 0 £ > ft 3 >
ft •rl ^ Tj O * X a o O * aj ft !«j 0 X ft 0 aj f t 0
ft ft ft ft ft
1
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1 1 I 1
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ft r- CM Cft r- C\i CM T- CM CM CM Cft

ft
CO 1
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ft ft ft
ft O
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ft 1 ft u Ö
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s 2 -H s ft aj '—1 aj £ u
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ft •H cfl s •H p C fl 3 H >
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ft ft <3 <! ft ft ft ft

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 444

ft 2
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> ft H qj
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ft p ft l ft
ft C/3 f t T—
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H O X--N 0
p H > O
m —- f t ft O ft
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ft A C/3 H
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H PH <j -p
p Pm ft
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Pm C/3 ft ft ft qj
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ft O 2 P T— ca r- •H
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2 ft O P ^ U ft
f t <1 ft ft ft o ü a aj
2 ft Oh 0 0 2 Ö Ö 0 0
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ft P P 2 0 bo ^ ft P \ •H
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0
ft O H P H ft qj H 0 aj
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ft ft ft O -P H
w C/3 P > 0 2 ft > t\ f t 0 2 ft > 2 0 aj <J 2 ft aj
oq f t O O 0 aj aj o f t <j X aj S °8 o aj X 0 aj 0
2 O P ft ft 2 O ft ft P 2 ^ ^ f t 2 P ft 2 ft 0
p o i*! I i i i I i i i i i l l i i 1 H
!z; P r- C\J r- T— T-- T- C A T— T- T— T— CM T— T-- T
-- 0
ft
aj
ft p
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C/3 H ft C/3 P
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2 o C/3 C/3 X! X X! X X
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ft i CP f t O
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ft 0 b0 0 cu P •
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P O <1 ft P P P ft
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ft P ft 0 C/3
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ft • • 0 ft
CM CA
1T\ iA aj 3
 445

Data here are in addition to those already

JUDICIARY
(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES

1-Sup Ct
-p
o
ft
ft 3
n> ft
I i
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS
LEGISLATIVE

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cd X ft cd o X O u •H ft Cti cd q
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i i i i i i i i 1 1 1 1
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-
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Related by affinity to Rodriguezes of Rizal.

FAMILY*S

X X X X! X X!
NESS

X! X X
x

ft
q
x

X X X X X X
L
Magsaysaya

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I
FAMILY

-p
p 0 i o P
0) i— 1 cd Ö •H u
u ft N ft 5 S 5h 0
u cd cd cd ft "H 0 ft
cd ft ft ft cd f t Ö t—1
ft <1 < ft ft ft

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ft ft ft ft
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o ft O ft
ft ft ft H
i ft £ ft A
< w < ft 3
N ft N £
• • •
in VO o
in m m
 446

JUDICIARY
(CONSANGUINAL OR AFFINAL) IN ELECTIVE
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OR CLOSE RELATIVES
-p
o

Data here are in

a
3
co
I
OR APPOINTIVE POSITIONS

C\!

"ft
LEGISLATIVE

0
ft

a d ft d
0 0) 0 0
ft CO ft CO

Related by alfinity to Lopezes of Iloilo and Leidos of Or. Mindoro.

I 1 1
1 1
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U d a
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EXECUTIVE

0 ft 0 O X
X Cd o 0 ft d
ft d S CO 0
0 ft *» fcUD
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ft
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASE
BUSI- PROFES-
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I X X X! X X
FAMILY*S

ft ft
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addition to those previously given.
ft
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d cd H N cd d cd
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CO i—1 fciD f t i Sh u ft ft
ft •H •H cd co cd 0 d 0
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 447

ft
p
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ft 0
P P ft ft
P 0 0
co PQ ft ft 0 p
0 0 S P 0 p

W r i t e r ’s Questionnaire Survey, 1 9 6 3 ; GSPA Survey, 19^3 5 Provincial Interviews;

0 P O • rH 0 ft •H ft
P 0 P ft 0 P s 0 -p 0
0 P 0 P 0 P P f t CO CO p
ft P ft 0 0 ft ft 0 0 p 0 i— I
0 E ft ft p > > ft 0 P
ft > 0 ft ft P p 0 0 0 ft CO ft •~ o
0 0 ft P ^ 0P 0 p > CO f t f t p p p
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ft; PQ f t f t p p p 0 0 0 VO
P f t P rH -p 0 ft p ft p ft ON
< ft f t 0 P •H
0) 1—1 •* p ft P 0 p p •H ft
P O P ft p
p ft P f t -p 0 0 ft 0 CO o
•H ft ft P •H p p - CO > 0 1— 1
rH O 0 0 ft a 0 O p 0 P p 0 0 ft 0 p ON •H
cti P O 0 P p f t f t P f t CO 0 0 P s 0 ft ft in O
P •H •H •H P 1—1 f t ft ft 0 0 ft ft ft 0 p ON N
0 > ft ft 0 ft ft CO > P P P P 0 P •H 0 0 ft •«*
P 0 CO CO f t P f t 0 O 0 ft P 0 ft ft ft 0 0 cn
0 P P p ft P ft P P 0 0 0 ft p p •H •H *> NO >
ft ft ft ft ft ft
ft ft ft f t f t 2 f t ft ft > > m 1 H
in NO

’They Who Make Our L a w s ’ , Weekly Graphic S e r i e s , 1964.

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ON -ft
1—1 On
1—1 H
0 •* rH •- H
ft ft 0 > c n no i n •* H
ft ft ft 0 in 1 NO CO
TO ABBREVIATIONS

0 ft ft ON-ft 1 ft
Q 1—1rH 0 0 rH i n no 1 —1 0
co > > p 0 0 ON-ft p 1— I
> co PQ Ph ft P h CO O 1—1 ON O
o Ph ft 0 Ph P\ ft CO
**
i—1 >
O 4 b hi Ph ft 05 M P > 0
P CO
f t 0 CO CO
ft p 0 0
ft f t > p

’B u i l d e r s * , i b i d . Vols. XVII, XVIII, 1958;

ft a ft •H
0 r. 0 i—1 o. f t ft
O 0 0 P ft f t •H P ft
p •rl O ft 0 P f t i—1 f t *• f t
0 ft P ft ft P ft Ph f t P tH
0 CO P ft 0 ü ft 0 •H
ft 0 •H P ft ft P P P 0 P h CO
W ft f t ft) P CO O 0 O H £ 0
ft ft ft O p P ft •—✓ ft 0 p
O CO H ft ft CO ft ft p
ft ft ft P ft CO 0 0 ft ft 0
0 p P ft ft P ft
P 0 O ft
CO 0 0 ft co ft CO ft 0 ft 0
E ft
(Manila: E^ F l o r o , 1 9 5 0 ) 5

CO 0 Ph ft O P 0 O eio > 0
E 0 O ft •* f t
0 p Ph E ft ft ft p 0 < j P •H ft 0 O O
0 •rl P 0 - P fp P ft ft O 0 ft ft 0 m
p Ph O 2 P Ph 0 Ph P 0 f t ft ft ft 0 o\ P
O ft ft 0 P P CO H *H
Ph 0 Phf t E P P P p Ti
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ft ft H p •H S f t CO f t o
0 CD f t p 0 p 0 o
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P P P 0 0 H o ft r*
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0 0 0
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0 CO f t 0 0 0 •H hi
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ft ft P ft P H ft ft ft ft •H •H
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 A PPEN D IX B 448

1
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IS 5 Ö 1 3 1 1 13 l i 33
I 8 as 8 a 8 8 g a
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QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

s Soi
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 449

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

Buencamino, Felipe. ’The Federal Party of the

Philippines’, Report of the War Department,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1901,
Part IV, Exhibits B and C.

Bureau of the Census and Statistics. Annual Survey of

Manufactures, i960. Vol. V, pp. 42-3»
_______. Census of Agriculture, i960. Manila: Bureau
of Printing, 1 9 3 •
______ . Census of the Philippines, 1903» Vols. I-IV.
Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1905»
______ . Census of Population, i960. Vol. II (Summary).
_______. Philippine Statistical Survey of Households
Bulletin, Series Nos. 1-13*
______ . Statistical Bulletin. Vol. XIV, No. 4,
December, 19o2.
______ . Statistical Handbook of the Philippines, 1959}
1962. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 19^3•
_______. Statistical Reporter, Manila. Vol. VI, No. 2,
April" 19^2 .
Bureau of Private Schools. List of Authorized Private
Schools and Courses, School Year 19^2-19^3.
Manila: Bureau of Printing,1 19^2.
Catholic Directory of the Philippines. Manila: Catholic
Trade School, 1963 •
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
 450

Department of Finance. Arturo P. Sorongon. ’A Study

of Landed Estates in the P h i l i p p i n e s ’. Manila:
ICA, 1955.

’Five-Year Integrated Socio-Economic Program for the

Philippines'. Supplement of the Department of
Foreign Affairs R e v i e w , Vol. IV, No. 1, January,
1962.

Land Tenure Administration. Annual_R eport, FY I 96I-I9 6 2 .

(Manila) .

Official Directories, House of Representatives, 1946-1965-

Official Directories, Senate of the P h i lippines, 1954-1961.

Official Directories, Republic of the P h i l i p p i n e s , 1946-1963*

Reports of the Commission on E l e c t i o n , 1947-1963*

Report of the Philippine Commission to the P r e s i d e n t , 1900.

Vol. I. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Republic Act No. 1180, 1954.

Republic Act No. l400, 1955*

Revised Administrative C o d e .

Revised Election C o d e. Republic Act No. 180 as amended

by Republic Acts No. 599 and 8 6 7 * Manila: Bureau
of Printing, 1955*

Senate Document No. 331* 5th Congress, 1st Session, p.67*

Summary of the Report, Technical Committee to the

President of the Philippines, American Philippine
Trade Relations. Washington: 1944.

The Land Reform Code of 1 9 6 3 *

United Nations. National Income and its Distribution,

Technical Assistance Administration. New York:
1952.

_. Report on th e Progress in Land R e f o r m . New

York: Department of Economic Affairs, 1954.
 451

B. BOOKS

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New York: A.A. Wyn, I n c . , 1946.

A g o n c i l l o , Teodoro A. Revolt of the Masses: The Story

of Bonifacio and the K a t i p u n a n . Quezon City:
University of the Philippines, 1956.

Alip, Eufronio M. Politi c al and Cultural History of the

Philippines. Manila: Alip and Sons, 1945•

Aruego, Jose M. Philippine Government In A c t i o n .

Manila: University Publishing Co. , 1956 •

Beard, Charles A. The Economic Basis of P o l i t i c s .

Compiled and annotated by William Beard. New York:
Vintage Books, 1957*

Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islands: 1493-1898»

Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur Clark Co., 1907*

Blount, James Henderson. The A m e rican Occupation of the

Philippines, 1898- 1912 . New York: G.P. P u t n a m ’s
Sons, 1913*

Bottomore, T.B. and Rubel, M. Karl Marx: Selected

Writings in Sociology and Social P h i l o s o p h y .
L o n d o n ! W a t t s a n d C o .,1956.

Burnham, James. The Managerial R e v o l u t i o n . London:

Putnam and C o . , 1943*

Centers, Richard. The Psychology of Social C l a s s e s .

Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1949.

Chung-li, Chang. The Chinese G e n t r y . Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 1955*

Co quia, Jorge. The Philippine Presidential Elections

of 1 9 5 3 « Manila: University Publishing Co., 1955*

C o r p u s , 0.D . The Bureaucracy in the P h ilippines .

Manila: I P A , University of the Philippines, 1957*
 452

Dahl, Robert A. Who Governs?. New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1961 .
Emerson, Rupert. Representative Government in Southeast
Asia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1955*
Engels, Frederick. ’Socialism, Utopian and Scientific’,
Karl Marx, Selected Works. Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, Vol. I, 1946.

Forbes, William Cameron. The Philippine Islands.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945•
Foreman, John. The Philippine Islands:_A Political,
Geographical ,_Ethnographical, Social and Commercial
History of the Philippine Archipelago and its
Political Dependencies, embracing the whole Period
of Spanish Rule 1899« London: Kelly and Walsh,
Ltd., 1906.

Francisco, Gregorio A. and Guzman, Raul P. de. 'The 50-50

Agreement’. Raul P. de Guzman (ed.) Patterns in
Decision-Making. Manila: GSPA, University of the
Philippines, 1963*
Galang, Zoilo M. Encyclopedia_of the Philippines.
Manila: Exequiel Floro, 1950-1958 ^20 Vols."]”,
Vols. Ill, IV, XVII, and XVIII.
Ganshof, F.L. Feudalism. London: Longmans, Green and
Co., 1952.
Golay, Frank H. The Philippines: Public Policy and
Economic Development. New York: Cornell University
Press, 19^1•
Gwekoh, Sol H. Elipidio Quirino. Manila: Fortune
Publications, 1950.
Hartendorp, A.V.H. History of Industry and Trade of the
Philippines. Manila: American Chamber of Commerce
of the Philippines, Inc., 1958 (ed.); and I96I (ed.)
Manila: Philippine Education Co.

Hayden, Joseph Ralston. The Philippines: A Study in

National Development. New York: The MacMillan
Company, 19^+5 •
 453

Hollns teiner, Mary R. The Dynamics of Power in a

Philippine Municipality. Quezon City: CDRC ,
University of the Philippines, 1963*
Hunt, Chester L. et al. Sociology in the Philippine
Setting. Manila: Alemar’s, 195^»
Hyman, Herbert. Survey Design and Analysis. Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1955*
Jenkins, Shirley. American Economic Policy Toward the
Philippines. California: Stanford University
Press, 195^•
Josephson, Matthew. The Robber Barons. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934*
Kalaw, Maximo M. Philippine Go v e r n m e n t . Manila:
( A u t h o r 1s Publicationy7 19^+8.

Knight, Maxwell E. The German Executive. Stanford,

California: Stanford University Press, 1952.
Kurihara, Kenneth K. Labor in the Philippine Economy.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1945 .
Las swell, Harold D. The Comparative Study of Elites.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1952.
_______. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York:
Peter Smith, 1950.
_______ and Kaplan, Abraham. Power and Society.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
Leroy, James Alfred. The Americans in the Philippines,
191^» 2 Vols. Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1914 .

Liang, Dapen. The Development of Philippine Political

Parties. Hongkong: South China Morning Post, 1939*
Lichauco, Marcial P. Roxas. Manila: Kiko Printing
Press, 1952.
Lundberg, Ferdinand. America1s 60 Families. New York:
The Citadel Press, 19^+6 •
Lynd, Robert S. and Lynd, Helen M. Middletown.
New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace and C o . , 1929*

Mabini, Apolinario. La Revolucion F i l i p i n a . Manila:

Bureau of Printing, 1931 5 2 Vols.

Majul, Cesar A. The Political and Constitutional Ideas

of the Philippine R e v o l u t i o n . Quezon City:
University of the Philippines, 1957*

Malcolm, George A. First Malayan R e p u b l i c . Boston: The

Cristopher Publishing House, 1951*

Mannheim, Karl. Man and S o c i e t y . London: Kegan Paul,

Trench, Trubner and C o . , 19^6.

Marshall, T.H. Citizenship and Social C l a s s . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1950.

Marvick, Dwaine (ed.). Political D e c i s i on-Makers.

The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.

McDonald, Austin F. Latin American Politics and

Government . New York: Thomas Y. Orwell C o . , 19^9*

Meisel, James H. The Myth of the Ruling C l a s s .

Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1959*

Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study

of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern D e m o c r a c y .
Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19^9•

Mills, C. Wright. 'The American Political Elite: A

Collective P o r t r a i t ' . Power, Politics and P e o p l e ,
I.L. Horowitz (ed.). New York: Oxford University
Press, 19 6 3 •

________. The Power E l i t e . New York: Oxford University

Press, 1959*

and Mills, Ruth. 'What Helps Most in P o l i t i c s ' .

P a g e a n t , November, 1952.

Misra, B.B. The Indian Middle C l a s s . London: Oxford

University Press, 1961.

Morga, Antonio de (Jose P. Rizal's ed.). Sucesos de las

Islas F i l i p i n a s, l609* Blair and Robertson, The
Philippine Islands Vol. XVI.
 455

Mo sea, Gaetano. The Ruling C l a s s . Arthur Livingston,

(ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939*

Nelson, Lowry. Rural C u b a. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1950.

Palma, Rafael. My A u t o b i o g r a p h y . (Manila), 1964.

Pareto Yilfredo. Mind and Soci e t y . (Trattato d i

sociologia general). 3 Vols. Arthur Livingston,
(ed.)7 London: Jonathan Cape, 1935*

Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward, (ed.). Toward a

General Theory of A c t i o n . Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1951*

Quezon, Manuel L. The Good F i g h t . New York:

Apple t on-C e n t u r y , 1946.

Quirino, Carlos. Magsaysay of the Philippines. Manila:

Alemar's, 1958.

Retizos, Isidro L. and Soriano, D.H. The Philippines

Who *s W h o . Quezon City: Capitol Publishing House,
1957-

Riggs, Fred W. The Ecology of Public A d m i n istration.

New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1961.

________. Administration in Developing Countries, The

Theory of Prismatic S o c i e t y . Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, I 9 6 4 •

Rivera, Generoso F. and McMillan, Robert T. The Rural

Philippines. Manila: Mutual Security Agency, 1952.

Romani, John H. The Philippine P r e s i d e n c y . Manila:

I P A , University of the Philippines, 1956.

________. The Office_of_the Philippine* President .

Manila: IPA, University of the Philippines, 1954.

________ and Thomas, M. Ladd. A Survey of Local

Governments in the Philippines. Manila: IPA,
University of the Philippines, 1954.

Romulo, Carlos and Gray, Marvin M. The Magsaysay S t o r y .

New York: The John Day C o . , 195^"*
Roy, James Le. Philippine Life in Town and Country.
Ne w York: G.P. P u t n a m ’s Sons, 1905-

Scalapino, Robert A. Democracy and the Party Movement

in J a p a n . Berkeley: University of California Press,
1953.

Schurz, William L. The Manila G a l l e o n . New York:

E.P. Dutton, 1939*

Skinner, William G. Leadership and Power in the Chinese

Community of Thailand. New York: Cornell University
Press, 1958.

Smith, R.A. Philippine F r e e d o m , 19^-6-1958. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1958.

Smythe, Hugh H. and Smythe, Mabel M. The New Nigerian

E l i t e . Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, i 9 6 0 .

Sorokin, Pitirim. Power and M o r a l i t y . Boston: Porter

Sargent Publisher, 195 9*

________. Social and Cultural M o r a l i t y . The Free Press

of Glencoe, Illinois, 1959*

Starner, Francis L. Magsaysay and the Filipino Peasantry:

The Agrarian Impact on Philippine P o l i t i c s , 1953-56.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.

Sumner, William Graham. What Social Classes Owe to Each

0 ther. New York: Harper and Brothers, Franklin
Square, I883.

T a r u c , Luis M. Born of the P e o p l e . New York:

International Publishers, 1953*

Tayag, R e n a t o . Sinners of A n g e l e s . (No date: Private

PublicationT)

Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure C l a s s .

London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922.

Viloria, Leandro A. ’Transportation Servi c e s ’ in H.B.

Jacobini and Associates, Governmental Services in
the Philippines . Manila: I P A , University of the
Philippines, 1957*
 457

Warner, William Lloyd et al. Democracy in Jonesville.

New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949*
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization. New York: Oxford University Press,
1947 •
Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines, Past and Present.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921.
Würfel, David. ’The Philippines’. George McTurnan
Kahin, (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast
Asia. New York: Cornell University Press, I96I.

Zuniga, Martinez de. Estadismo de las islas Filipinas.

W.E. Retana, (ed."jTj 2 Vols. Madrid: 18935 Vol. I.

C. ARTICLES

’A Landlord Speaks up', Philippines Free Press, April 6,

1963 .
Andaya, Julie Cuaderno. ’Frustrated Women and Men’,
Examiner , July 15, 1963*
Aron, Raymond. ’Social Structure and Ruling Class’,
British Journal of_So ciology , Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2,
1950.
Barranco, Vic. ’The Most Privileged Solons in the World’
Examiner, January 28, 1963»
Bendix, Reinhard. ’Social Stratification and Political
Power’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 46,
1952.
Booth, David A. and Adrian, Charles R. ’Simplifying the
Discovery of Elites’, The American Behavioral
Scientist, Vol. V, No. 2, October, I96I.
Bulatao, Jaime. ’Philippine Values I: The Manilenos
Mainsprings’, Philippine Studies, Vol. 10, January,
1962 .
 458

Castrence, Pura S a n t i l l a n . ’Encounter with the West’ ,

Pro g r e s s , Manila Times Publishing Co., 1959*

Charlesworth, H.D. and Hooley, R.W. ’Financing Economic

Development in the Phil ippines: The Role of a
Pr ivat e Development Bank’ , P h il ip p in e Economic
J o u r n a l , Vol. I I , No. 3 , November 1, 1963•

Corpus, O.D. ’F i l i p i n o P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c s ’ ,

Comment, No. 7> 3rd Quarter, 1958.

Cressey, Paul F. ’Urbanization in the P h i l i p p i n e s ’ ,

Sociology and Research, Vol. 44, No. 6, July-August,
I960.

Daguio, Amador T. ’Teacher with a H ear t’ , The Examiner,

June 15 , 1 9 6 3 *

Dahl, Robert A. ’A Crit iq u e of the Ruling E l i t e ’ , The

American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. 52, 1958.

__________. ’The Behavioral Approach in P o l i t i c a l Science:

Epitaph f o r a Monument to a Successful P r o t e s t ’ ,
The American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. 55j 196 1.

Entenberg, B. ’Agrarian Reform and the Hukbalahap’ , Far

Eastern Survey, Vol. XV, No. 16, 1946.

Foreign Information Service, F i r s t National City Bank of

New York. ’P h il ip p in es : Return to a Free Market
Economy', (Pamphlet), January, 1 9 6 3 .

Galang, Noli. 'The Affluent Society of Negros', The

Sunday Times Magazine, September 15} 1 9 6 3 *

Galvan, G.L. ’Progress through Family S o l i d a r i t y ’ ,

Weekly Graphic, 1964 s e r i e s .

Gracia, Gene de. ' G r a f t in the Central Bank’ , Weekly

Graphic, February 19, 1964.

__________. ’The Big Shots and Their Extra J obs ’ , Weekly

Graphic, April 3 , 1963*

Hart, Donn V. ’The Philippine Plaza Complex: A Focal

Point i n Culture Change’ . Yale University:
Southeast Asia Studies, Cultural Report Ser ies , 1955*
 459

’How Much Does He P a y ? ’ , Philippines Free P r e s s , April

2 0 , 1963.

Jacob, Philip E. e t a l . ’Values and their Function in

Decisio n - M a k i n g ’, The American Behavioral S c i e n t i s t ,
V o l . V, No. 9, May, 19 6 2 .

’Justice Marino on Ston e h i l l ’s "Blue Book L i s t " ’ ,

Philippines Free Press, July 20, 1 9 6 3 *

Kiunisala, Edward R. ’Senatorial Candidates, Their

Incomes and Income T a x ’, Philippines Free P r e s s ,
September 21, 1 9 6 3 *

Legarda, Benito Jr. ’Our Growing Entrepreneurial C l a s s ’,

P r o g r e s s , Manila T i m e s Publishing C o . , 1939«

Majul, Cesar A. ’The Life and Mind of M a b i n i ’ , This W e e k ,

June 1, 1938.

Merritt, Jesus V. ’3 M en and D M ’ , Weekly G r a p h i c ,

September 23, 1963«

Miller, Delfert C. ’Industry and Community Power

Structure: Comparative Study of an American and
an English C i t y ’ , American Sociological R e v i e w ,
Vol. 3, No. 1, February, 1938.

’Millions Lost in Tax E x e m p t i o n s ’ , Weekly G r a p h i c ,

February 26, 1964.

Milne, R.S. ’From Magsaysay to Macapagal in the

Phili p p i n e s ’, Parliamentary A f f a i r s , Vol. 13,
19 6 1 - 6 2 .

________. ’The Role of Government Corporations in the

Phili p p i n e s ’ , Pacific A f f a i r s , Vol. XXXIV, No. 3?
Fall, 1961.

Nadel, S.F. ’The Concept of Social E l i t e s ’, International

Social Science B u l l e t i n , Paris: UNESCO, Vol. 8 , 1936.

'N P ’s Reply to Marino R a p s ’, Philippines Free P r e s s ,

July 20, 1963.

’On the Economic S i d e ’, Philippines Free P r e s s , February 2,

1963.
 460

Owens, William. 'Will the Huks R e v o l t ? ’ , Asia and the

A m e r i c a s , February 1946.

'Palace Versus L o p e z e s ' , Philippines Free P r e s s , January

19, 1963.

Paredes, Amante F. 'Partisan Affairs Permeate 4th

Congressional S ession', The Chronicle M a g a z i n e ,
January 23, 1964.

Parker, Luther. 'The Cats and the L a k a n s ’ , Philippine

M a g a z i n e , Vol. XXVII, January, 1931*

'Politics was my Undoing', Philippines Free P r e s s , October

19, 1963.

Rama, N a poleon G. 'The Big Grab', Philippines Free P r e s s ,

September l4, 1963»

________. 'Crazy, Man, C r a z y ' , The Philippines Free P r e s s ,

February 2, 1 9 6 3 »

Ravenholt, A. 'The Peso Price of Politics', American

Universities Field Staff Reports S e r v i c e , M a y , 1958.

________. 'Politics and B u s i n e s s ’ , American Universities

Field Staff Reports S e r v i c e . New York: Southeast
Asia Series, Vol. IX, No. 2 (Philippines).

Riggs, Fred W. 'A Model for the Study of Philippine

Social Structure', Philippine Sociological R e v i e w ,
July, 1959, Vol. VII, No. 3-

________. 'The Bazaar Canteen M o d e l ' , P h ilippine

Sociological R e v i e w , Vol. VI, July-Octo b e r , 1958,
Nos. 3 and 4.

Rivera, J.L. 'The Sacadas — Victims of Government

N e g l e c t ' , Philippines Free P r e s s , July 20, 1 9 6 3 «

Robertson, J.A. 'The Extraordinary Session of the

Philippine Legislature and the Work of the Philippines
A s s e m b l y ’ , American Political Science R e v i e w ,
November, 1910.

'Roces and Business-Minded Educators', Philippines F r e e

Pre s s , March 9 > 1963*
 461

Rojo, Oscar. »Policeman in P o l i t i c s ’, The Philippine

Herald M a gazine, November 2, 1 9 6 3 *

Sabado, Juan S. ’From Rags to R i c h e s ’, Weekly G r a p h i c ,

August 29, 1962.

________. ’Curtains Tor a "Big-Shot"’ , Weekly G r a p h i c ,

August 29j 1962.

Schulze, Robert. ’The Role oT Economic Dominants in

Community Power S t r u c t u r e ’ , American Sociological
Review, Vol. 2 3 5 No. 1, February, 1958.

Singson, Ernie. ’All Tenants Live in P o v e r t y ’, The

Manila B u l l e t i n , February 6, 1 9 6 3 *

S t u r t e v a n t , D.R. ’Sakdalism and Philippine Radic a l i s m ’,

Journal oT Asian S t u d i e s , Yol. XXI, No. 2, February,
19^2 .

Tardits, C. ’The Notion oT the Elite and the Urban

Social Survey in A f r i c a ’ , The International Social
Science Bull e t i n , Paris: UNESCO, Vol. 8, 1956.

’The Diokno Q u e s t i o n ’, Philippines Free P r e s s , April 20,

1963.

’The Goose is C o o k e d ! ’, Weekly Graphic (ed.), March 27,

1963.

’They Who Make Our L a w s ’ , 1964 Weekly Graphic series.

Tiryakian, Edward A. ’The Prestige Evaluation of

Occupations in an Underdeveloped Country, The
P h i l i p p i n e s ’, The American Journal_of S o c i o l o g y ,
Vol. 63} January, 1958, No. 4.

Tutay, F.V. ’Biggest bank f r a u d s ? ’, Philippines Free

P r e s s , March 2, 1 9 6 3 »

________. ’The Stonehill B o m b ’, Philippines Free P r e s s ,

July 27, 1963-

________. ’Political E x p l o s i o n ’ , Philippines Free P r e s s ,

July 20, 1963-

________. ’Preview of 1 9 6 5 *, Philippines Free P r e s s ,

November 30, 1 9 6 3 *
 46 2

___________. ’T e r r o r i s m a t the P o l l s ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s Fr e e
P r e s s , November 30, 1 9 6 3 *

___________. ’I l o c o s Sur B l o o d b a t h ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s Fr e e Press,

August 17? 1 9 6 3 *

___________. ’A Hero or a H e e l ? ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s Fr e e Press,

A p r i l 13} 1963*

V i c t o r i a , S o c r a t e s de l a . ’The Curse of t h e N a t i o n :
Too Much P o l i t i c s ’ , Weekly G r a p h i c , November 18,
1964.

’V i t a l Tax Reform’ , P h i l i p p i n e s F r e e P r e s s, March 2 3 }

1963.

'Who Are t h e Image Makers?' , Weekly G r a p h i c , F e b r u a r y 26,

1964.

’Who got the r e p a r a t i o n a w a r d s ’ , P h i l i p p i n e s F r e e P r e s s ,

September 12, 1959*

’Why t h e r e p a r a t i o n s hush-hush’ , P h ilip p in e s Fr e e Press,

March 22, 1958.

Wickberg, E. ’The Ch i n e se Mestizo i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ’ ,

J o u r n a l of So u t h e a s t Asian H i s t o r y , Vol. 5} No. 1,
March, 1964.

W ü r f e l , David. ’The P h i l i p p i n e E l e c t i o n s : Suppor t for

Democracy’ , Asia n Survey , Vol. I I , May, 1962.

Yench, John ( e d . ) . ’We Mean B u s i n e s s ’ , Weekly Graphic

s er i e s .

’^150,000 Allowances S u i t Heads f o r C l a s h ’ , Weekly

G r a p h i c , December 25} 1963*

D. NEWSPAPERS

The D a i l y M i r r o r [Manila], 1963*

The Evening News [ M a n i l a ] , 1963.

 46 3

The Manila C h r o n i c l e , 1953-1964.

The Manila Daily B u l l e t i n , 1947-1964.

The Manila T i m e s , 1946-1964.

The New Y o r k T i m e s, March 27 5 1930; November 14, 1953*

The Philippines H e r a l d , 1962-1963»

Araneta, Salvador. ’U.S. Privileges in our L a n d 1 ,

The Manila T i m e s , September 17, 1964.

Malay, Carolina S. TAt the Convention’ , The Manila T i m e s ,

April 7, 1963.

Malcolm, George A. American Colonial C a r e e r e s t , Chapter X,

serialized in The Mani l a T i m e s , September 2 3 } 1957*

Recto, Claro M. ’The Role of Political P a r t i e s ’ , i 9 6 0

Commencement Address, University of the Philippines,
The Mani l a C h r o n i c l e , September 12, i 9 6 0 . The
Sunday T i m e s , September 20, i 9 6 0 .

E. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Agpalo, Remigio E. ’The Politics of Occidental M i n d o r o ’ .

A seminar paper (mimeo.), Discipline of Political
Science, University of the Philippines, June, 1 9 6 2 .

Baterina, Virginia F. ’A Study of Money in Elections

in the Philippines with Emphasis on Financing of
Political P a r t i e s ’. MA thesis, University of the
Philippines, 1953*

Carroll, John J. ’The Filipino Manufacturing

Entrepreneur: A Study of the Origin of Business
Leadership in a Developing E c o n o m y ’. Ph.D. thesis
(Sociology), Cornell University, 1 9 6 2 .

Castro, Amado A. ’The Philippines: A Study in Economic

D e p e n d e n c e ’ . Ph.D. dissertation (Economics),
Harvard University, 1954.
 464

Grossholtz, Thelma J. 'Bargaining Process and

Democratic Development: A Study of Philippine
Politics'. Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1961.

GSPA Survey.

Lande, Carl H. 'Politics in the Philippines'. Ph.D.

dissertation (Political Science), Harvard University,
1958.

Lynch, Frank. 'Social Class in a Bikol T o w n ’. Ph.D.

dissertation (Anthropology), University of Chicago,
1959. *

Simbulan, Dante. 'The Socialist Movement in the

Philippines'. MA thesis (Political Science),
University of the Philippines, i 9 6 0 .
 68

ERRATUM

Lines 11-12: Omit "first" before "municipal elections"

to read: ,*
un
"A direct consequence of this policy was

that in the municipal elections held in

1901, only 49,523 persons..."

 ERRATUM

Lines 1-2 after quotation: The sentence, "The above are

more or less unanimous comments of both local and

foreign observers" should read:

"The above are the more or less similar comments

of both local and foreign observers."

 ERRATUM

Footnote 66 should readi

"Reports of the Philippine Commission« 1900-1903.

(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), Vol,

p. 131.
p ERRATUM

Line 16-17 • The dash (— ) after pacto de retro should he

replaced by three dots (...) to read:

’’...'as early as 1768 there were laws

against the use of the pacto de retro...”

1
 ERRATUM

Footnote 5 "Ibid., p. 142..o" should read:

"Alip, op. cit.. p. 142..."
 LI
Page 22 - Historians need not live during the period which
they a re writing a hout. Most historians write
about eras or periods before their own time. That
Morga was "one of the recognized chroniclers of
pre-Spanish Philippines" is borne out by the fact
that writers and scholars have quoted from him.
The Philippines' national hero, Dr. Jose P. Rizal,
drew heavily from Morga when he wrote about pre-
Spanish Philippines. He also edited Morga's work,
Sucesos de las Islas Pilipinas, 1609 (C f . Blair
and Robertson, The Philip ine Isl a n d s : 1493-1898,
Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur Cla rk Co., 1907, pt>.
119-121).
Professor Maximo M. Kalaw (A.B., LL.B., Ph.D.),
former Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and
Professor of Political Science, University of the
Philippines, writes that
"Antonio de Morga, a high royal official in
the government who came to the Philippines
about the year 1600, is admittedly the most
relia ble chronicl er of the conditions exist­
ing in those early ^pre-Spanish7 days." (Max-
imo M. Kalaw, Philippine Government, Its Dev­
elopment, Organization, and Activitie s , Mani 1a :
Author's Publication, 1948, p. 12.*)

Page 24 - CORRECTED. Professor Eufronio LI. Alip, Ph. Litt. D. ,

Professor of History and Political Science, Univer­
sity of Santo Tomas, whom Prof. Corpuz thinks is
"extremely unrelia ble for this period," is the
author of many Philippine textbooks, including:
(a) Philippine History (Manila: Alip & Brion Pub­
lications, Inc.~, 1948); (b) Philip; ine Government
(College textbook); (c) Political and Cultural His­
tory of the Philippines {College textbook,); (dj Phil­
ippine Government (High School textbook); (e) Phil­
ippine Civiliza lion (College textbook); etc. He"
is also a member of 'the Philippine Historical Com­
mittee and former Executive Secretary of the Phil­
ippine Historical Society. It could be possible
tha t Professor Alip, a historian, might have his­
torical materials which Professor Corpuz, a political
scientist, ma y not have.

Page 44 - CORRECTED.

’age 47 The writer's statement on "hispanization" refers

to the principalia elite, that is to say, the native
a ristocracy, the Spanish m estizos and the Chinese
mestizos. Phelan's argument refers to the need of
qualifying the view that the whole of Philippine
society was culturally "Hispanized." Phelan's view
and mine, therefore, are not necessarily c o n t r a d i c t ^ ’
Page 56 - CORRECTED.

Pa ge 67 - CORRECTED.

Page 68 - CORRECTED.
Page 72 - The complete statement (Thesis, Lines 16-19) is:

"This ceaseless persona 1 fight went on until 1955

when there was a 'fusion’ between the warrigg groups
and Quezon's paramount dominance remained unquestioned
until his death in America in 1944."
'That is meant here is that the personal struggle for
political dominance between Osmena and Quezon continued
even after they temporarily merged their factions in
1924. The proof of this is the fact that in 1933, they
again broke up into two political groups— the Pros led
by Osmena and the Antis led by Quezon. Prom 1935- until
Quezon's death in 1944, however, Osmena seemed to have
accepted Quezon's personal dominance.
Pages 86-88 - The comments here were satisfactorily explained
during the oral examination. Professor Corpuz did not
quote the thesis accurately in his question. He was
commenting on the " 'direct connection' between the per­
centages of landless families and tenancy" whereas the
complete statement in the thesis is as follows:
"That there is a direct connection between landlessness
and tenancy on the one hand and concentration of land
ownership among a few families on the other is illus­
trated in Table 3.3. (See pp. 86-87).
In effect, he thought tha t the direct connection
being esta blished by the study was between landlessness
and tenancy. The above quotation, however, is believed
to be clear enough and perhaps needs no further elabora­
tion.