Chapter 9

An Introduction to Social Choice

Definition
A ballot consisting of such a rank ordering of candidates is called a preference list ballot becuase it is
a statement of the preferences of the individual who is voting.

We assume that there is an odd number of voteres, just so that ties don’t happen

Majority Rule and Condorcet’s Method

The most canonical voting system is majority rule- each person has a preference for one candidate and the
one with the majority wins. Simple.
Majority rule has three desirable properties.
1. All voters are treated equally. If two voters were to change ballots before submitting, the outcome of
the election would be the same.
2. Both candidates are treated equally. If a new election were held and every voter would reverse their
vote, the outcome of the election would be reversed.
3. It is monotone. If some candidate X is a winner of an election, and a new election is held in which
the only ballot change made is for some voter to change their ballot from not being a vote for X to a
vote for X, then X remains the winner.
Theorem (May’s Theorem)
Among all two-candidate voting systems that never result in a tie, majority rule is the only one
that treats all voters equally.

We now describe Condorcet’s method, which aims to take the concept of majority rule and expand it to a
more global setting.
Algorithm
With the voting system called Condorcet’s method, a candidate is a winner precisely when he or she
would, on basis of ballots cast, defeat every other candidate in a one-to-one contest using majority rule.

The downfall of Condorcet’s Voting system is the condorcet’s voting paradox. Just like any multi-person
voting system, it has downfalls.
Example
1. A B C
2. B C A
3. C A B
Each candidate beats exactly one other candidate in every case.

Other Voting Systems for Three or More Candidates

In plurality voting, only first place votes are considered.

Definition (CWC)
A voting system is said to satisfy the Condorcet winner Criterion provided that for every possible
sequence of preference list ballots either there is no winner, or the votin system produces exactly the
same winner for this elelction as Condorcet’s method.

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There is another shortcoming of plurality voting. It does not satisfy the monotonicity condition.
Definition
A voting system is manipulable if there are elections in which it is to a voter’s advantage to submit a
ballot that misrepresents their true preferences.
Definition
A rank method of voting assigns points in a non-increasing manner ot the ordered candidates on each
voter’s preference list ballot and sums these points to arrive at the group’s final ranking.
The special case with n candidates and a first place worth n − 1 points and decreasing by one each time
is known as the borda count.
The borda count is a reasonable way to choose a winner among several canddiates. However, this fails the
property of the Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives
Definition
A voting system is said to satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives if it is impossible for
a candidate to move from nonwinner status to winner status unless at least one voter reverses the order
in which they had X and the winning cnadidate ranked.

We now define a agenda as an ordered list of candidates. The listing is not to be confused with the preference
list ballots, as one is an order and one is a vote.
Definition
sequential pariwise voting starts with an agenda and pits the first candidate against the second in a
one-on-one contest. The winner moves on to confront the third candidate, etc. Losers are delted. This
process is continued throughout the entire agenda/

There is something troubling about SPVs, they fail to satisfy the Pareto condition.
Definition
A voting system satisfies the Pareto condition provided that in every election where everyone prefers X
to Y, the candidate Y is not among the winners.
Theorem
Sequential Pairwise voting fails to satisfy the Pareto condition.

We now describe the hare system.

Algorithm
The Hare system proceeds to arrive at a winner by repeatedly deleting candidates that are the least
preferred, in the sense of being at the top of the fewest number of ballots. If a single candidate remains,
he or she alone is the winner. If two or more candidates remain because they all have the same number
of first-place votes, they are tied for the win.

The problem with the hare system is that it is not monotonic.

There are other runoff systems which are used more commonly than the Hare system.
Algorithm
Plurality runoff is the votin system in whcih there is a runoff between two candidates recieving the
most first-place votes.

Insurmountable Difficulties: Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Theorem (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem)
With three or more candidates and any number of voters, there does not exist- and never will exist- a
voting system that always produces a winner, satisfies Prateto and IIA, and i snot a dictatorship.

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We’re not going to prove this, but this is a very very powerful theorem.
Theorem (Weak Arrow’s Impossibility)
With three or more candidates, there does not exist a voting system that satisfies CWC, IIA, and
produces a winner in ever election.

A Better Approach? Approval Voting.

There is a voting system that avoids the practical difficulties caused by the type of ballot being used that has
much else to commend it. This is called approval rating
Algorithm (Approval Voting)
Under approval voting, each voter is allowed to give one vote to as many candidates as they find
acceptable. There is no limit on the number of people that one person can vote for- a candidate that
isn’t loved can simply not be voted for.