MATHEMATICS IN THE

SOCIAL SCIENCE
Catherine Joy Macalos
Gilson Legaspi
Kyle Salut

TOPICS
After studying this module,
you should be able to:
Voting Systems and
the Mathematics of
Social Choice
Weighted Voting
Systems and the
Measurement of
Power
Fair Division and
Apportionment
VOTING SYSTEMS
AND THE
MATHEMATICS OF
SOCIAL CHOICE
1.1 MATHEMATICS OF VOTING

VOTING THEORY
A Social Choice Theory which
deals with the process by which
varied and conflicting choices
"e.g., elections" are consolidated
"counted" into a single choice of
the group "society" that reflects
the desires of each individual.
1.1 MATHEMATICS OF VOTING

ORDER THEORY
Studies ways in which objects
can be ordered from simple
ordering of integers from "smaller
to bigger", or ordering of a
subsets via inclusion, to more
complicated relations.
 1.1 MATHEMATICS OF VOTING

VOTING SYSTEM
A way for a group to select one
"winner" from among several
candidates.

Number of Alternatives:
1 Choice: easy but undesirable
2 Choices: 1 preferred by
"majority wins"
3 or More Choices: process of
choosing is "trickier"
1.1 MATHEMATICS OF VOTING

RANKED VOTING SYSTEM

Also known as "Preferential
Voting System"
Refers to any electoral/voting
system in which voters rank
candidates by preference on
their ballots.

NOTE: Voters will rank candidates

in order of preference, and TIES
will not be allowed.
1.1 MATHEMATICS OF VOTING

TRANSITIVITY
individual preferences are
assumed to be "transitive"
principles that involve "fairness"
of the voting method.
FAIRNESS CONDITIONS OR
PRINCIPLES

NOTE: NON-TRANSITIVITY can

CAUSE PROBLEMS
NON-TRANSITIVITY EXAMPLE
1.2 VOTING METHODS

refers to the mathematical

process, algorithm, or manner
in which individual votes are
counted and consolidated to
produce a winner

NOTE: Does not refer to voting,

machines, polling precents,
absentee voting, or the like.
1.2 VOTING METHODS TYPES OF METHODS
PLURALITY METHOD
A candidate with the most
number of votes, or most
place votes, WINS
Most popular method of
voting (PLURALITY VOTING
"pataasan")
ISN'T ALWAYS THE BEST
METHOD
PLURALITY METHOD EXAMPLE

Candidate A has the most number

(14) of 1st-place votes and is thus the
winner.
ALICE WINS!
1.2 VOTING METHODS TYPES OF METHODS
BORDA COUNT METHOD
Each place on a ballot is
assigned points.
Points are tallied for each
candidate, and the candidate
with the highest total wins.
Named after Jean-Charles de
Borda (1733-1799), a French
statesman, scholar, and
contemporary of the Marquis de
Condorcet.
BORDA COUNT METHOD EXAMPLE

A gets 56 + 10 + 8 + 4 + 1 = 79 pts
B gets 42 + 30 + 16 + 16 + 2 = 106 pts
C gets 28 + 40 +24 + 8 + 4 = 104 pts
D gets 14 + 20 + 32 + 12 + 3 = 81 pts
1.2 VOTING METHODS TYPES OF METHODS
PAIRWISE COMPARISON
ONE-TO-ONE COMPARISON
Every candidate is matched on
a ONE-TO-ONE BASIS with
every candidate.
The winner of each HEAD-TO-
HEAD match-up gets 1 point.
The winner of the election is
the candidate with most
number of points.
PAIRWISE COMPARISON EXAMPLE
 1.2 VOTING METHODS
METHODS:
NOTE: The process is repeated
round by round, until a
candidate with a majority of
first place votes emerges
TYPES OF METHODS
PLURALITY WITH
ELIMINATION METHOD
Sophisticated version of the
plurality method and is carried
out in rounds.
1st: Eliminating the candidate with
the fewest number of 1st place
votes.
2nd: Combine the identical
columns to get reduced the table.
3rd: Eliminating the candidate with
fewest number of 1st place.
PLURALITY WITH
ELIMINATION
EXAMPLE
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES

CONDORCET CRITERION
If there is a candidate who wins
in a ONE-TO-ONE COMPARISON
with any other alternative, that
candidate should be the winner
of the election.
Basic principles of fairness
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES

MAJORITY CRITERION
A candidate that is the
first choice of the
majority "50% + 1" of the
voters, then the
candidate should be the
winner.
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES

MONOTONICITY CRITERION
If a candidate X is the
winner of an election,
and in a re-election all
voters who change their
preferences do so in a
way that is favorable only
to X, then X should still be
the winner.
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES
INDEPENDENCE OF
IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
If a candidate X is the
winner of an election,
and one or more
candidates are removed
and votes are recounted,
then X should still be the
winner.
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES

UNANIMITY
If every individual prefers
a certain option to
another, then so must the
resulting societal choice.
Agreement by all people
in a given situation
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES

NON-DICTATORSHIP
The outcome should not
simply follow the
preference order of a
single individual while
ignoring all others.
No single individual can
dictate or influence the
result of a vote.
 PROBLEMS WITH DIFFERENT
1.3 OTHER FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES VOTING METHODS

Voting methods outcome may

violate one or more fairness
principles or criteria.
BORDA COUNT METHOD
Violates the majority criterion.
PLURALITY WITH ELIMINATION METHOD
Violates the monotonicity criterion.
PAIRWISE COMPARISON METHOD
Violates the independence of
Irrelevant Alternative Fairness
criterion.
There is NO IDEAL VOTING METHOD!
1.4 ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
ARROW'S THEOREM
Applies to ranked or preferential
voting system.
Uses concepts of order theory.
Proves that, "no voting method can
satisfy all reasonable fairness
criteria at the same time."
CONCEPT OF FAIR is taken in the
sense that a fairness principle or
condition is not violated.
1.4 ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
ARROW'S THEOREM
KENNETH ARROW (1921-2017)
Examined the ideas of "Social
Choice and Individual Values"
Published results in a 1952 essay "A
difficulty in the concept of Social
Welfare"
Awarded the Noble Prize in
Economics in 1972.
1.4 ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
APPROVAL VOTING
Voters can give their approval to
as many (or as few) of their
choices.
CONSIDER Strong System, but more
applicable to SMALLER voting
populations (e.g., legislatures or
organizations)
It works for those voters who
cannot or who prefer not to make
distinct rankings among the
candidates.
1.4 ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
APPROVAL VOTING
easy to understand and simple to
implement
gives voters flexible options and
increases voter turnout
helps elect the strongest
candidates
unaffected by the number of
candidates
will reduce negative campaigning
ARRROW'S "IMPOSSIBILITY
THEOREM"
Demonstrate that no voting
method will always satisfy all
fairness in all voting instances.
WEIGHTED VOTING
SYSTEMS AND THE
MEASUREMENT OF
POWER
2.0 WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS AND
THE MEASUREMENT OF POWER

WEIGHED VOTING SYSTEM

systems where voting rights are not
equally divided among all voters.

EXAMPLES:
Corporate shareholder’s meetings,
where each shareholder has as
many votes as the number of
shares owned;
Committee voting, where the chair
has tie-breaking or veto power.
2.1 WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS

MOTION
any vote involving two alternatives
(yes or no vote)
no abstentions are to be made
THREE MAIN INGREDIENTS
1. Players-Voters
2. Weight-Number of Votes
3. Quota
Minimum number of votes to pass a
motion
Majority (q > 50%, usually 50%+1)
Unanimous (100%)
 THE NOTATION INDICATES A
WEIGHTED SYSTEM WITH QUOTA Q
AND N PLAYERS. THE WEIGHTS OF THE
N PLAYERS ARE LISTED AFTER THE
QUOTA. THE WEIGHTS ARE ORDERED
FROM BIGGEST TO SMALLEST.

[q: w1, w2 , … , wN]

2.1 WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS

Weighted Voting System

A player with the most number of
votes does not necessarily hold the
most power.
At least two players are needed to
pass a motion.
EXAMPLE: [51: 48, 47, 5]

One Person-One Vote System

All players have an equal say in the
outcome of the election, instead of just
having an equal number of votes.
EXAMPLE: [20: 7, 7, 7, 7, 7]
2.1 WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS

Unanimous Vote System

All votes are needed to meet the 100%
quota.
EXAMPLE: [15: 5, 4, 3, 2, 1]

Illegal Voting System

The quota is less than half the total
number of votes.
Both groups WIN
EXAMPLE: [15: 10, 9, 8, 7]

Invalid Weight System

No motion could ever pass because
the quota is too high.
EXAMPLE: [21: 9, 8, 2, 1]
2.1 WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS

Dictator
a player whose weight is bigger than
or equal to the quota
player can pass any motion alone
EXAMPLE: [6: 7, 3, 1, 1]

Veto Power
not a dictator but he can single-
handedly prevent any group of players
from passing a motion
EXAMPLE: [8: 7, 3, 1, 1]

Dummy
a player whose vote has no outcome
in the election
EXAMPLE: [8: 10, 5, 1, 2]
2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER

BANZHAF'S IDEA
power is measured by winning
player whose vote can influence
the outcome of the election the
most is the one with the most
power
2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER

Coalition
any set of players that join forces to
vote together

Grand Coalitions
coalition consisting of all players

Winning Coalitions
those with enough votes to win

Losing Coalitions
those with not enough votes to win
2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER

Weight of Coalitions
total number of votes in a coalition

Critical Player
also known as pivotal player
a voter who can cause the measure
to fail by changing his/her vote from
yes to no "losing one"
2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER

measures a player's power or

ability to influence the outcome of
the vote
EXAMPLE: If each of the three players
is critical twice, so all have equal
power. We say each player holds 1/3
power or that each has Banzhaf
power index 1/3. The triple (1/3, 1/3,
1/3) is Banzhaf Power Distribution
for the three players.
2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF BANZHAF POWER INDEX
POWER
COMPUTATING OF THE POWER INDEX:
Step 1: Make a list of all coalitions. With
N players, one has 2N – 1 coalitions.
Step 2: Determine which are winning
coalitions.
Step 3: In each winning coalition,
determine who among the players are
critical players.
Step 4: Count the number of times
player P is critical and call this number
CP.
Step 5: Count the total number of times
all players are critical and call this
number T.
 2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE BANZHAF POWER INDEX
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF EXAMPLE: IN A COMMITTEE OF 4, CONSISTING OF A,
POWER B, C AND D, EACH MEMBER HAS ONE VOTE. A MOTION
IS CARRIED BY MAJORITY, EXCEPT THAT IN CASE OF
A 2-2 TIE, THE COALITION CONTAINING THE CHAIR
(A) WINS.
The winning coalitions are:
Any two-player coalition that includes the
chair (A)
Any three-player coalition
The grand coalition (all 4 players)
The winning coalitions with critical players in
boldface and underlined are:
Two-player coalitions that include the chair:
{A, B}, {A, C}, {A, D}
Three-player coalitions: {A, B, C}, {A, B, D}, {A, C,
D}, {B, C, D}
Grand coalition: {A, B, C, D}
NOTE: THE TIE-BREAKING RULE GIVES THE CHAIR THREE TIMES AS MUCH POWER!

2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER
BANZHAF'S POWER INDEX
Mathematicians study these systems
and have come up with results such
as the following:
In any voting system [q: w1,
w2 , … , wN], if q = w1+ w2 + …
+ wN , the Banzhaf power
index of each player is 1/N.
Two proportional systems [q:
w1, w2, … , wN] and [cq:
cw1, cw2 , … , cwN] always
have the same Banzhaf
power distribution.
In any 3-player voting
system with no veto power,
there is only one possible
power distribution.

2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER
BANZHAF'S POWER INDEX
Mathematicians study these systems
and have come up with results such
as the following:
In any voting system [q: w1,
w2 , … , wN], if q = w1+ w2 + …
+ wN , the Banzhaf power
index of each player is 1/N.
Two proportional systems [q:
w1, w2, … , wN] and [cq:
cw1, cw2 , … , cwN] always
have the same Banzhaf
power distribution.
In any 3-player voting
system with no veto power,
there is only one possible
power distribution.
2.2 BANZHAF INDEX AND THE
MATHEMATICAL MEASUREMENT OF
POWER THEOREM
any 4-player weighted voting
system with no veto power, there are
only five possible power distributions
no strictly decreasing power
distribution for a 4-player weighted
voting system
formulated by John Tolle in his
paper, "Power Distribution in Four-
Player Weighted Voting Systems”
published in Mathematics Magazine
in 2003)
2.3 POWER DISTRIBUTIONS IN
SOME INSTITUTIONS UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

composed of 5 permanent members

(US, UK, China, France, Russia), have
veto power
10 non-permanent members (voted
into the committee with fixed terms)
winning coalition must consist of the
5 permanent members plus at least
4 non-permanent members
[39: 7,7,7,7,7,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1]
The Banzhaf Power Index of a
permanent member is 16.7% while
that of a nonpermanent member is
1.65%.
2.3 POWER DISTRIBUTIONS IN
SOME INSTITUTIONS THE US ELECTORAL COLLEGE
Electoral College system was first
proposed in 1787.
Preferred system for choosing the
Chief Executive "President".
System use to choose the President of
the United States of America.
538 total number of electoral votes;
strict majority of 270 for candidate to
be elected (50 States cast a certain
votes with equal numbers of the
members of congress, and 3 electors
from District of Columbia)
Individual citizens cast their votes
(popular vote).
FAIR DIVISION
AND
APPOINTMENT
3.1 FAIR DIVISION
FAIR DIVISION
an area of mathematics that deals
with problems involves the division of
a certain set of goods among
individuals that would be considered
fair by the parties involved.
FAIR SHARE
any share that in the opinion of the
player receiving it is worth at least
1/n-th of the total value (n = number
of players)
player thinks the share is fair, based
on the player’s own personal value
system.
 Decisive – If rules are followed,

3.1 FAIR DIVISION

a fair division of the set is
guaranteed.
Internal to the Players – It
does not require intervention of
PROPERTIES OF A FAIR an outside authority such as

DIVISION SCHEME judge, arbitrator, etc.

Assumes that the players have
no knowledge about each
other’s value systems.
Assumes that the Players are
Rational — they use logic
instead of emotion. For
example, a rational player
would want more than less.
 FAIR DIVISION PROBLEMS
Continuous Goods
parcels of land or a piece of
cake
Discrete Goods
cars, houses, and jewelry
3.1 FAIR DIVISION DEFINITION OF TERMS
Apportionment
application of fair division
refers to the process of
allocating identical, indivisible
objects among participants
entitled to unequal shares
 DEFINITION OF TERMS
Standard Divisor (SD)
average number of people
per seat over the entire
population

3.1 FAIR DIVISION Standard Quota (SQ)

the (exact) fraction of the
total number of seats a state
would be entitled to if seats
were not indivisible
the quota is usually not a
whole number
 DEFINITION OF TERMS
QUOTA RULE
A state’s apportionment should
either be its upper or lower quota
QUOTA METHOD
Apportionment methods that
3.2 SOME QUOTA METHODS satisfy the quota rule.
AND PARADOXES FROM THE HAMILTON METHOD
QUOTA METHOD Calculate each state’s standard
quota.
Initially assign each state its lower
quota.
Give surplus seats, one at a time,
to states with the largest absolute
fractional parts until you run out of
surplus seats.
HAMILTON METHOD EXAMPLE

A mythical country with three states A, B, C has a total population

of 1,000,000. There are 100 seats to be apportioned to the three
states. The standard divisor is therefore SD = 1,000,000 divided by
100 = 10,000. We will use Hamilton’s method to apportion the seats.
 LAWNDES METHOD
Start out as in Hamilton’s method.
But assign surplus seats using
3.2 SOME QUOTA METHODS relative (not absolute) fractional
AND PARADOXES FROM THE parts. This means we divide the
QUOTA METHOD fractional part of the quota by the
integer part of the quota. We first
illustrate the relative fractional
part.
LOWNDES METHOD EXAMPLE
HAMILTON AND LOWNDES
METHOD
quota methods
use the standard divisor and
standard quota
satisfy the quota rule:
standard quota is rounded
up or down to nearest whole
number
 PARADOXES
a seemingly contradictory statement
that may nonetheless be true
often statements or situations contrary
to received opinion or are
counterintuitive
TYPES OF PARADOXES
3.2 SOME QUOTA METHODS POPULATION PARADOX
AND PARADOXES FROM THE An increase in the state’s population
QUOTA METHOD causes it to lose a seat
ALABAMA PARADOX
An increase in the total number of
seats to be apportioned causes a
state to lose a seat
NEW STATE PARADOX
Adding a new state with its fair share
of seats can affect the number of
seats due other states
POPULATION PARADOX EXAMPLE

Recall the allocation (using Hamilton’s

method) in our mythical country with
3 states A, B, C.
Suppose that the population grew to 1,010,000. We recompute
standard quotas and apply Hamilton’s method again.

A’s population grew, but A lost a seat!

C’s population decreased, but C gained one seat!
ALABAMA PARADOX EXAMPLE

After the population grew in our mythical country, Congress

decided to allocate 101 seats. Let’s see what happens when
we re-apportion using Hamilton’s method:

When the house only had 100 seats, C was entitled to 11 seats.
But when the house increased to 101 seats (with no changes in
population), C only got 10 seats!
NEW STATE PARADOX EXAMPLE

New Fake City has two schools: Dilaw and

Pula. Mayor Moka donated 100 computers
that were apportioned using Hamilton’s
Method.
Suppose that the population grew to 1,010,000. We recompute standard quotas
and applySuppose that a new school (Bato) is created, with an initial enrolment of
525. Mayor Moka decides to add 5 computers to the pool of computers. After this is
done, a re-calculation of the allocation is made. This is the result:

The addition of a new school (state) can, by itself, affect the

apportionment of other schools (states)!
 MODIFIED DIVISOR (MD)
used (obtained by trial and
error) to obtain modified
quotas that will result in no
surplus seats

3.3 DIVISOR METHODS MODIFIED QUOTA (MQ)

obtained by dividing the state
population by the chosen
modified divisor, that is,
MQ = state population / MD

DIVISOR METHODS
apportionment methods
 JEFFERSON METHOD (1791)
1. Calculate each state’s standard
quota.
2. Initially assign each state its
lower quota.
3. If there are surplus seats, modify
3.3 DIVISOR METHODS the divisor so that when each
state’s modified quota is
rounded downward, no surplus
seats remain.
4. Apportion to each state the
integer part of its modified
quota.
 JEFFERSON METHOD (1791)
1. Assign lower quotas (based on standard
quotas), giving: (A,B,C) = (6,2,1)
2. Since this gives 9 seats, modify the divisor
(choose a smaller divisor, say 98)to get
bigger allocations.
3. Assign lower quotas using the modified
quota.
3.3 DIVISOR METHODS
 ADAMS METHOD (1832)
1. Assign upper quotas (based on standard
quotas), giving: (A,B,C) = (7,3,2)
2. Since this gives 12 seats, which is too much,
modify the divisor (choose a larger divisor
than 110, say 135) to get smaller allocations.
3. Assign upper quotas using the modified
quota.

3.3 DIVISOR METHODS

 WEBSTER METHOD (1832)
1. Round off the standard quotas in the usual
way, giving: (A,B,C) = (6,2,1).
2. Since this gives only 9 seats, modify the
divisor (choose, say 107.2) to get larger
allocations.
3. Round-off the modified quotas in the usual
way.

3.3 DIVISOR METHODS

THEOREM (BALINSKY AND
YOUNG, 1980)
Any apportionment method
that does not violate the
quota rule must produce
paradoxes.
Any apportionment method
that does not produce
paradoxes must violate the
quota rule
 COMPARISON
PROPERTIES OF METHODS
 HUNTING-HAMILTON METHOD
apportionment method used by the US
Congress to apportion congressional
seats
proposed by statistician Joseph Hill
and mathematician Edward

3.3 DIVISOR METHODS Huntington in 1911

adopted officially by the US Congress
in 1941 with a fixed House size of 435.

rounding-off is based on the

geometric mean, a geometric mean
of x and y is √xy, the square root of the
product xy
 FUN FACT:
The first US Presidential veto
was a math bill.
In 1791, President George
Washington vetoed Hamilton’s
bill on apportionment.
Jefferson’s method was
adopted instead.
 In Section 1.0, Arrow’s

CONCLUSION Impossibility Theorem shows

that there can be no perfect
system.
In Section 2.0, we are reminded
The concept of order is ubiquitous and
that in any society, no matter
important in mathematics. Order is also
how democratic, some
critical in society, especially in
individuals and groups have
decision-making. Mathematics allows
more power than others. The
us to analyze voting systems and other
notion of power as it applies to
social issues, but it does not provide all
weighted voting systems can be
answers.
studied mathematically. The
Banzhaf power index is one way
to measure power.
 Finally in Section 3.0, the

CONCLUSION
problem of how to divide certain
sets fairly was examined and
applied to the process of seat
allocations in congress. We saw
The concept of order is ubiquitous and that apportioning seats can be
important in mathematics. Order is also affected greatly by simple
critical in society, especially in decision- operations such as rounding-up
making. Mathematics allows us to or rounding down numbers.
analyze voting systems and other social
issues, but it does not provide all
In this module we presented the use
answers.
of mathematical theory to familiar
issues or questions encountered in
society. Many problems in society
and government, such as voting,
power relations, and fair division
and apportionment, can be more
clearly understood and analyzed
using mathematics.