(Contemporary Political Studies) Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell (Eds.) - Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1992)

ELECTORAL STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL
MARKETING
Electoral Strategies and
Political Marketing
Edited by
Shaun Bowler
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of California
and
David M. Farrell
Jean Monnet Lecturer in European Politics,
Department of Government, University of Manchester
Editorial matter and selection © Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell 1992
Text ©The Macmillan Press Ltd 1992
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Electoral strategies and political marketing I edited by Shaun Bowler
and David M. Farrell.
p. em.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-312-08396-3
I. Campaign management. 2. Electioneering. I. Bowler, Shaun,
1958- . II. Farrell, David M., 1960-
JF2112.C3E55 1992
324.7-dc20 92-9458
CIP
Contents
List of Figures and Tables vi
Notes on the Contributors vii
Preface X
The Study of Election Campaigning

Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell
2 Austria: The 1990 Campaign 24
Wolfgang C. Muller and Fritz Plasser
3 Britain: The 1987 Campaign 43
Paul Webb
4 Denmark: The 1990 Campaign 63
Lars Bille, Jorgen Elk/it and Mikael V. Jakobsen
5 Finland: The 1991 Campaign 82
Jan Sundberg and Stefan Hognabba
6 France: The 1988 Presidential Campaign 100
Kay Lawson and Colette Ysmal
7 Germany: The 1990 All-German Election Campaign 121
Bernhard Boll and Thomas Poguntke
8 The Netherlands: The 1989 Campaign 144
Philip van Praag Jr
9 New Zealand: The 1987 Campaign 163
David Denemark
10 The USA: The 1990 Congressional Campaign 183
Richard S. Katz and Robin Kolodny
11 The Informed Electorate? Voter Responsiveness to
Campaigns in Britain and Germany 204
Shaun Bowler, David Broughton, Todd Donovan and
Joseph Snipp
12 Conclusion: the Contemporary Election Campaign 223
Index 237
v
List of Figures and Tables
Figures
5.1 The key factors to successful campaigning 98

11.1 Variance in perception of Conservative party campaign
themes by campaign spending in constituency 211
Tables
2.1 Content analysis of media campaign reporting,

Austrian 1990 election 34
2.2 The Austrian 1990 election 40
3.1 The British 1987 general election 59
4.1 The Danish 1990 election 78
5.1 Party central office budgets in the Finnish
parliamentary elections of 1975 to 1991 91
5.2 The Finnish 1991 parliamentary election 97
7.1 The All-German election results, 1990 123
7.2 Party political campaign broadcasts in Germany 129
8.1 The Dutch 1989 election 161
9.1 The New Zealand 1987 election 180
10.1 US party committee contributions by party, chamber,
incumbency status, and outcome 190
10.2 US party contributions and candidate disbursements
by party, chamber, and incumbency status 193
10.3 The US 1990 congressional election 200
11.1 The impact of local campaign activity on perceptions
of the Conservative party campaign in 1983 213
11.2 The impact of campaign effort and the emphasised
campaign themes on the vote for the Conservative
party, 1983 214
11.3 Stability and change in attitudes towards the CDU-
csu 217
11.4 The Berelson paradox and the German electorate 218
11.5 Change in attitudes to the SPD by level of general
interest in politics, 1983 219
vi
Notes on the Contributors
Lars Bille is a senior lecturer at the University of Copenhagen. He has
published widely on Danish parties and elections. Currently he is
participating in a research project on 'Danish Politics in the Process of
Change'.
Bernhard Boll is a research fe11ow at the Research Unit for Societal

Developments, University of Mannheim. He is currently researching
on parliamentary incumbencies in a comparative context.
Shaun Bowler is an assistant professor of political science at the

University of California, Riverside. His main research interests are
rational choice, parties and electoral behaviour. Most recently he has
published a number of articles (with D. FarreJJ) on STY and Irish
voters.
David Broughton is a lecturer in politics at the School of European

Studies, University of Wales, Cardiff. His research interests include
public opinion po11ing and German and comparative European
politics. He has recently coedited the first yearbook of the Elections,
Public Opinion and Parties in Britain (EPOP) specialist group of the
Political Studies Association.
David Denemark has been a lecturer in the Department of Politics,

University of Western Australia since 1990. Fo11owing completion of
his PhD at Washington University in St Louis, he taught for three
years at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand.
Todd Donovan is an assistant professor of political science at Western

Washington University. His research interests include electoral beha-
viour, American state politics and local development politics. He is the
coauthor of articles appearing in Western Political Quarterly and
Urban Affairs Quarterly.
Jorgen ElkJit is a senior lecturer at the University of Aarhus. His most

recent publication (with A. B. Pade) is Election Administration in
Denmark. Recently he acted as an advisor to the Electoral Commis-
sion in Nepal.
vii
viii Notes on the Contributors
David M. Farrell is Jean Monnet lecturer in European politics at the

Department of Government, University of Manchester. His main
research interests are parties, elections and European Community
politics. He is currently engaged in research with S. Bowler on the
members of the European Parliament.
Stefan Hognabba is a student of political science at the University of

Helsinki.
Mikael V. Jacobsen is a research student in political science at the

University of Aarhus, writing a Master's thesis on Danish election
campaigning.
RichardS. Katz is a professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins

University in Baltimore, MD. He is the author of numerous books and
articles on parties and elections and currently is the codirector (with P.
Mair) of a research project on 'Party Organization and Organizational
Adaptation in the Last Third of the Twentieth Century'.
Robin Kolodny is an instructor in political science at Temple Uni-

versity, Philadelphia, PA.
Kay Lawson, professor of political science and international relations

at San Francisco State University, is the author of books and articles
on American, French, and comparative parties, and the editor of
Political Parties and Linkage (1980), When Parties Fail (1988, with
Peter Merkt), and How Political Parties Work (1992).
Wolfgang C. Miiller, reader in political science at the University of

Vienna, has published widely on Austrian politics. His current projects
include a coauthored volume to be entitled Austrian Parties and
Austrian Party System.
Fritz Plasser is an associate professor of political science at the

University of Innsbruck. His most recent book is Staatsbiirger oder
Untertanen? Politische Kultur Deutschlands, Osterreichs und der
Schweiz im Vergleich (1991).
Notes on the Contributors ix
Thomas Poguntke is a lecturer in political science at the University of

Mannheim. He has published extensively on German and comparative
European 'new politics', and is the author of Alternative Politics: The
German Green Party (forthcoming).
Joseph Snipp, a doctoral student at the University of California,

Riverside, is researching on the role of information in voter choices.
Jan Sundberg, associate professor at the department of political

science, University of Helsinki, has written extensively on Finnish
politics. Most recently, he edited (with L. Karvonen) Social Demo-
cracy in Transition (1991).
Philip van Praag Jr is a lecturer in political science at the University of

Amsterdam. His doctoral dissertation, Strategie en 1/lusie, elf jaar
intern debat in de PvdA, 1966-1977 (1991) was on the Dutch Social
Democratic party. He has published on Dutch election campaigns,
new social movements and the Dutch peace movement.
Paul Webb, senior lecturer in politics and government at the City of

London Polytechnic, is the author of Trade Unions and the British
Electorate (1992).
Colette Ysmal is a researcher at the Centre for the Study of French

Political Life (CEVIPOF) in Paris. Among her publications, she is the
author of Le comportement electoral des FranJ:ais and of Les partis
politiques sous Ia Ve Republique. She is currently working on projects
relating to voting behaviour and far-right European parties.
Preface
The idea for this book originated in a Workshop of the European
Consortium for Political Research which we organised in Bochum, in
Aprill990. What is unique about this case is that none of the Bochum
papers has been published here. Those participants who were able to
contribute to this book all agreed to write completely new chapters
according to a common framework. In addition, we commissioned
extra chapters on Austria, Germany and New Zealand; we also took
on board a number of new coauthors. Other Bochum participants who
are not included in this volume but whose contributions were of great
assistance were: Hans Anker, Peter Esaiasson, Donald Granberg,
Soren Holmberg, Peter Humphreys, Lauri Karvonen, Colin Knox,
Alberto Lopez Nunez, Ank Michels, Geoffrey Roberts, Sjaak Toonen
and Anders Widfeldt.
As always with edited volumes, the success of this venture relied
entirely on the work and diligence of the contributors who had to put
up with a loti We are grateful to them for their patience and
cooperation throughout. The case studies on Austria, Britain, Den-
mark, Finland, Germany, and the USA benefited from access to
research supported by the National Science Foundation (grant SES-
8818439), due to the involvement of some of the authors in the project
on 'Party Organization and Organizational Adaptation in the Last
Third of the Twentieth Century' directed by Richard S. Katz and Peter
Mair. We wish to record our thanks to Keith Povey and Belinda
Holdsworth for expediting this book through the production process
so efficiently.
SHAUN BOWLER
DAVID M. FARRELL
X
1 The Study of Election
Campaigning
Election campaigns attract great attention from voters, media and

academics alike. The academics, however, tend to focus their research
on the electoral result and on societal and long-term political factors
influencing that result. The election campaign - the event of great
interest, which has at least some role to play in affecting the result- is
usually passed over or at most receives minimal attention. It is
generally left to the journalists and pundits to give their insights into
the campaign; scanning every television programme and newspaper
for the latest news or gossip, scrutinising every campaign development
- whether an initiative or gaffe - for its potential effect on the result.
These are 'the boys on the bus,' the campaign journalists who,
emulating Theodore White (1961), provide fascinating accounts of
the nitty-gritty of election campaigning. 1 But such studies emphasise
the short-term and the ephemeral, rather than the underlying process
to any campaign. They necessarily stress the unique rather than the
general and as such promote the view of campaigns and campaigning
as behaviour specific to each election, indeed to each party.
There are also the prescriptive studies, the numerous handbooks by
professional campaign strategists which explain the nuts and bolts of
campaigning American-style. 2 These books tend to be long on detail
but short on analysis. They are distinguished usually by such titles as
How To Win Elections, with an appropriate quote in the Foreword
from Machiavelli and an introductory discussion on why professional
campaigning techniques are not manipulative, but rather are more
efficient means of getting across a campaign message. The text
generally entails an A-B-C guide on how to set up and run a
campaign - 'Men's shoes should be wing tipped cordovans or
conventional business shoes' (Woo, 1980, p. 11) - and some recent
examples to indicate 'the success' of the strategist's particular
methods.
2 The Study of Election Campaigning
These attempts by journalists and professionals to analyse cam-

paigning may have their shortcomings, but what of the academics and
the academic literature on campaign processes; what is their contribu-
tion to the study of campaign processes?
CAMPAIGN STUDIES TO DATE
'The study of election campaigns, as opposed to elections', write

Harrop and Miller (1987, p. 240), 'is a major gap [in the literature].'
The academic literature is rather disparate. There are examples of
sustained attempts to examine the process of campaigning and how
such processes have changed and are changing, often within one
country. Included in this category are general documentary accounts
best epitomised by the classic Nuffield series (most recently Butler and
Kavanagh, 19S8; also Crewe and Harrop (eds), 1986; 1989; Statera,
1986; Worcester and Harrop (eds), 1982). There are also examinations
of specific campaigning efforts which assess the 'turnout' and
'persuasion' effects of such things as: local party organisations, local
campaign expenditure and, most especially, constituency canvassing
(door-to-door, telephone, posted literature) (Bochel and Denver, 1971;
Crotty, 1971; Cuthright, 1963; Eldersveld, 1956; Gosnell, 1927; Katz
and Eldersveld, 1961; Kramer, 1970; Lupfer and Price, 1972; Price and
Lupfer, 1972; Weir, 1985).
To some extent it is possible to argue that these studies, despite their
thoroughness, may be seen as emphasising the specific and unique over
the general and common. Their findings tend to be restricted, perhaps
unnecessarily so, to the election at hand and so fail to present a more
general picture of campaigns and campaigning. Moreover, even within
this literature, little attention is devoted to the processes inside the
party relating to the campaign.
Some more general approaches to the study of campaigns do exist.
Among them perhaps the best known are by Nimmo (1970) and
Agranoff (1976a) and, more recently, the various efforts to apply
rational and marketing frameworks. 3
Dan Nimmo's book makes particular effort to examine 'the
techniques of modem election campaigns'. He develops a paradigm
of campaigns which focuses on campaign management, research and
communications, and which explores effects. Nimmo examines the
shift in the business of campaigning away from an amateur 'craft'
towards a 'profession'. This is indicated by changes in campaign
Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell 3
management which have seen the growing use and influence of

professional consultants; in campaign research where we see new
polling techniques, simulmatics, professional briefing and training of
principal candidates; and in campaign communications where a
greater range of media is available to campaigners which, in part,
facilitate the careful targeting of audience types.
Robert Agranofrs examination of 'the new style of campaigning' is
somewhat similar. He identifies four main areas of change in the
American context. First, the main focus of today's campaign commu-
nication is the candidate rather than the party. Second, in the new
candidate-centred campaign the party professional has been replaced
by a different type of professional, the campaign consultant. Third, the
new professionals have adapted their skills at systematic research
about products, markets, and audiences to the market of electoral
politics and have made electorates the new objects of their research.
Audience survey and opinion polls have replaced the party worker as
the primary method of gathering information. Finally, communication
through a variety of media characterises the new campaign style and
'the most popular of the media, television, has become the surrogate
party worker, the vehicle for conveying candidate style, image and
issues' (ibid., p. 6). Both frameworks share in common the fact that
they are designed specifically for the American case which is char-
acterised by apparent party 'decline', the rise of PACs and candidate-
centred campaigns. While items from both of these approaches will be
seen again in the framework outlined below, it is clear that aspects of
campaign management developed in a candidate-centred system with
multiple points of entry for politicians such as the USA will be notably
different in party-centred and unitary systems.
Other approaches to the study of campaigning have been attempted
which take as their intellectual springboard economic models of
political action. The earliest of these is Anthony Downs' (1957)
classic model of campaign rationality. His basic argument was that
a party campaigning rationally should be aiming to maximise votes, at
whatever policy costs. Richard Rose (1967) has attempted to oper-
ationalise this, examining British elections in the 1950s and 1960s.
Defining rational behaviour as 'internally consistent action based
upon empirically reliable and valid assumptions related to the
declared goal of influencing voters' (ibid., p. 31), Rose elaborates on
the main elements of his framework.
First, there is a high degree of uncertainty during a campaign which
can best be dealt with by an efficient system of obtaining feedback and
acting on it. The more efficient the system of feedback and the greater
the extent to which it is listened to by the campaigners, then the more
rationally they are acting.
Second, in a campaign the main structure of relationships is between
the 'client' (politician or party) and the 'media people' who are seeking
to sell a product to an audience (the voters). This relationship fits
somewhere between two extremes. On the one extreme, in the case of a
rationally organised campaign, the client is prepared to delegate to the
media people, listening to their advice and giving them scope to
operate independently. On the other extreme, in a campaign which
is not organised rationally, the client dominates the media people,
telling them what to do.
Third, campaign goals can also vary between two extremes. A
rationally organised campaign has the one main goal of winning the
election, virtually at any cost. Any other goal (such as policy
consistency, or attempting to change the voters' agenda) suggests less
rationality.
Rose tests the framework by examining the campaigns of the three
British parties, as well as those of some of the major interest groups
which were trying to influence the outcome in their favour. In no
single case did a campaign fit his model of rationality. Rose has similar
findings in a shorter review of election campaigning in the United
States. He concludes (ibid., pp. 246-7) that 'irrational campaign
behaviour is a persisting feature of campaign politics everywhere'.
There are some points which can be made in criticism of Rose's
argument. There are times when there could be good, rational reasons
as to why a politician might choose to ignore feedback. Not least of
these is thl\t party leaders ('clients') must pay attention to the opinions
of party activists and internal party processes. Furthermore, it is not
always clear that the kinds of feedback available during the course of a
campaign will reduce the uncertainty of party leaders. Although
campaigning may well reduce uncertainty among voters over where
the parties stand, feedback may provide conflicting messages to party
leaders. Under some circumstances, then, acting upon feedback may
well be more an act of panic than of rationality. A final criticism is the
fact that Rose is simply operationalising Downs' US-based model in
the European context with no account taken of some important
differences between the two; most notably the greater role for policy
or ideological consistency in the European party-centred context as
opposed to the US candidate-centred context (Budge and Farlie, 1983;
Robertson, 1976).
The most recent approaches to studying election campaigning have

attempted to borrow a marketing framework, focusing on the
promotional activities of the campaigners which in many ways are
identical to promotional activities in the commercial sector (Farrell,
1986; Farrell and Wortmann, 1987; Kotler, 1975; Lindon, 1976;
Mannelli and Cheli, 1986; Mauser, 1983; O'Shaughnessy, 1990;
Wangen, 1983). The political market is defined as a system of
exchange in which two or more actors each possess 'something-of-
value' which can be traded (Kotler, 1980). The 'sellers' offer repre-
sentation to their 'customers' in return for support. The exchange
occurs at election time when, to ensure maximum revenue, the sellers
market themselves through an application of directed promotional
activities. They market their particular styles of representation and
specific intentions for government as a 'product' which is designed
with close attention to market demands. Market research guides the
strategists in segmenting the market and indicates potential targets.
The sellers have four types of instruments at their disposal: product
policy, communication policy, distribution and pricing. The aim of the
marketing strategy is to apply the optimum 'mix' of these instruments.
This approach, too, has its problems from the point of view of the
academic study of campaigns. On occasions it falls into a prescriptive
mode, concerned more with providing data and advice for campai-
gners but little by way of analysis (Kotler, 1975; Mauser, 1983; Shama,
1975). Furthermore, reflecting its American emphasis, frequently this
approach focuses on the candidate as the 'product' (Kotler, 1975;
Mauser, 1983); such factors as party image and ideology, which may
be more important to party-centred systems, tend to be ignored. While
one welcome development is the fact that increasingly campaigns other
than in the USA are being examined (namely Germany, Britain,
France, Italy and Ireland), it still is the case that the point of
comparison is the USA (for a recent example see O'Shaughnessy,
1990).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the problem that in
this marketing approach the model and reality tend to get confused.
There is no doubt that marketing has relevance for contemporary
election campaigning. Nowhere is this more evident than in the
increased use of marketing agencies and consultants. The extent to
which this means that the campaign in and of itself is a marketing
exercise is, however, by no means so clear. The marketing literature
itself contains a debate over the question of whether describing an
election campaign as a marketing exercise is being true to the 'purity'
of the marketing model (Arndt, 1978; Bartels, 1974; Carman, 1973;

Kotler, 1972; Kotler and Levy, 1969a; 1969b; Luck, 1969; 1974). Some
authors see the marketing model being over stretched to fit into the
context of an election campaign. To some extent it is possible to
overstate such objections. A marketing approach does lend a vocabu-
lary to the study of campaigns and helps provide a typology of actions,
although sometimes it may seem that marketing language only serves
to stress that political campaigns are intent on winning votes. Perhaps
one of the biggest drawbacks to such an approach is that in general it
seems more an exercise in rationalising success or failure in hindsight
rather than being a theoretical tool. After reading many of the
marketing guides one could be forgiven for believing that every
product succeeds (or fails) to the extent that the manufacturers
listened to (or ignored) the advice of the latest marketing fad, but
this is clearly misleading. To put it simply, the best guide to a
consumer's current choice of toothpaste or spaghetti is the choice he
or she made last time. The predictive capacity of marketing models -
and hence, in part, their status as theories - is therefore somewhat
limited. As with regard to economic life, so with regard to political
campaigns: marketing models may be one way to describe certain
types of activity but it is by no means clear that they help us
understand any better the processes at work or to provide a theoreti-
cal framework from within which to assess campaigns.
HOW TO EXAMINE ELECTION CAMPAIGNING
This brief review of the available academic literature suggests con-

siderable shortcomings to date. Unlike voting or media studies which
have well-developed research questions and methodological techni-
ques, campaign studies are still in their relative infancy. Often they are
ethnocentric: apart from the tendency to draw comparisons with the
USA rarely do they even mention campaigning in other countries. Nor
do campaign studies have methodological approaches in common:
each author has his or her own particular way of analysing a
campaign. In many cases academics, rather like their journalistic
contemporaries, tend to provide little more than a description of the
campaign; no great theoretical structure is brought to bear, in part
because none seems to be available. One reason for the absence of
theory is, we suggest, an absence of basic knowledge about the process
of campaigning, especially outside the USA.
This book therefore is starting at base level: it is a conscious attempt

to build towards the first comparative study of campaigns, drawing
together a set of specialists from a range of countries. While we do not
lay claim here to making an attempt at comparative theory building
the volume does mark what might be termed a pre-theoretical
enterprise in which the authors explore the basic patterns of campaign-
ing in several different settings. The country chapters all follow a
common analytical frame of reference. This framework, much of
which builds on the studies previously noted, is an explicit attempt
to move away from an examination of campaigns grounded in the
study of only one system or, the study of one election or one party
within that system. Cross-system differences, we argue, materially
affect the ways in which campaigns are conducted. For this reason
our framework begins by expressly considering cross-system factors -
such as the impact of electoral systems or access to electronic media.
From here we move on to a consideration of factors inside the party
which will affect the course of a campaign. Finally, and here relying
more upon the marketing literature, we consider more abstract
concerns of party campaigns such as party and leader images. We
begin by considering the broadest of the factors which we presume will
affect party campaigns, those which operate at the level of the political
system itself.
THE ROLE OF SETTING AND NATIONAL CONTEXT
One principal point to consider is whether, with 'all things being

equal', campaigns are similar from context to context. There are at
least two facets to this: inter-system and intra-system comparisons.
Inter-system differences, those between different polities, may be seen
in a number of ways: here we elaborate on four of the broadest types
of differences.
First, campaigns vary across different political systems. In the
United States and France presidentialism promotes candidate-centred
campaigning. The federal nature of Canadian politics contributes to
the high degree of decentralism of Canadian party organisations and
campaigns (Bowler, 1990a; Irvine, 1987). Political systems also differ
in terms of basic socio-cultural traits. Countries characterised by a
localist, clientelistic emphasis to party competition, such as Ireland or
Italy, are more likely to have lower degrees of campaign centralism or
cohesion.
Second, electoral laws and systems can be seen to affect the degree
of centralisation of campaign strategies. Proportional representation
(PR) list systems tend to promote greater campaign centralisation than
do plurality or PR single transferable vote systems (Katz, 1980).
Electoral laws also affect campaign timing. Countries with fixed
electoral dates give the parties greater opportunity to prepare their
campaigns.
Under this category we can also group the wide variety of laws
which regulate campaign finance. The availability of campaign finance
determines how professional and/or how corrupt campaigns are
(Alexander (ed.), 1989a). German and Israeli parties, for example,
are generously subsidised by the state facilitating very expensive
campaign practices. In all some twenty-one countries operate a
system of direct public funding of political parties (Alexander,
1989b). Legal restrictions more generally determine what form
campaigning can take. In Britain restrictions on financial expenditure
at the constituency level limit the amount of local campaigning. No
such restrictions exist at the national level. In the USA campaign
financing restrictions have largely been behind the rise in importance
of PACs (Luntz, 1988; Sabato, 1985).
Third, media systems act as important communication vehicles for
the parties and candidates. In most European countries there are
restrictions on the broadcasting media with regard to 'balance' and
over access for direct advertising by the parties. The television 'spots'
beloved of American campaign strategists are for the most part not
available to European or Australasian strategists, though in Germany
and Italy the removal of the state broadcasting monopoly has
facilitated the use of television 'spots' by the parties on the private
television channels. In Japan campaigning activity, denied access to
television, centres on meetings and the extremely expensive provision
of food and gifts to voters (Curtis, 1988).
Fourth, a distinction can be drawn between types of party systems
where the focus is on the number of parties in the system. In a two-
party system it is feasible for one party to become a clear winner:
campaigns, then, can be seen very easily in terms of an attempt to 'win'
an election. By contrast in multiparty systems the parties have to make
allowances for possible coalition partners and so temper their
campaign messages. In predominant party systems one would expect
to find some mix of the previous two: that is one large party hoping for
a clear win and other smaller parties which are dependent on each
other to gain power.
Intra-system comparisons may be grouped under two main head-

ings: the level of election and the type of party. For the most part the
election level is concerned with a distinction between campaigns for
national elections and those for local or regional elections. Local
elections are, or at least were, bound to be less coordinated than those
for the national level. However, with the process of campaign
'centralisation', this distinction arguably is breaking down and in the
new democracies of southern Europe this distinction probably never
manifested itself (Elklit, 1991; Robinson, 1989).
Styles and modes of campaigning may vary across different systems,
they may also vary between the different parties within each system
according to their position within the system. Incumbent parties will,
of course, be constrained by their record, but the role of challenging
parties may be complicated by the degree to which the party space is
crowded. Challenging parties in multiparty systems may well spend as
much time campaigning against other challenging parties as against
the incumbent(s). Smaller parties in general may be much more
concerned about attracting new support than larger parties which
may wish simply to maintain vote share. Right-wing parties and
'catch-all' parties may find the abandonment of ideological baggage
and the switch to a greater reliance on leader image much easier to
achieve than left wing parties which tend to have more complex - and
potentially more restrictive - organisational forms.
Of course, campaigning and the context in which it occurs are not
static. Indeed, over the post-war period the context has been under-
going great change both in terms of inter- and intra-system factors.
Probably the most documented development has been the increase in
voter volatility (Dalton eta/., 1984; Pedersen, 1983). As Kirchheimer
(1966) predicted, the campaign arena has become more competitive:
parties have to fight harder, employing ever more professional tactics,
to maintain and/or win votes.
The parties also have to fight harder to sell their wares across the
media. The past two decades has seen the rise of 'horse race' or 'game'
coverage of elections by all media, where the focus is increasingly on
the strategies and the tactics of the parties and less on the issues which
the parties would prefer to see emphasised. Originally an American
phenomenon, there is evidence of 'game' coverage becoming more
prominent in European countries (Farrell, 1989). A third system level
change, and probably the most significant, has been the technological
revolution which has occurred in two main phases. First, there was the
entry of television into the election arena, eclipsing the radio and
competing strongly with the newspaper. Candidates were presented

with a new medium across which for the first time they could speak
face to face with the bulk of the electorate. Media consultants were
employed, candidates were sent on television training courses, special-
ist agencies were commissioned to design campaigns maximising the
potential of television. Campaigning was never the same after the
invention of television. As Anthony Smith points out: 'In the 1970s
most Western societies overcame the fundamental diffidence of
politicians towards television and accepted the new medium as an
essential element in electoral campaigning' (Smith, 1981, p. 185).
More recently there has been a telecommunications revolution
which arguably will have an even greater effect on campaign styles
than the television. Parties are working on their computer and
communication links to provide more efficient 'distribution' networks
and organisational capabilities, to improve the coordination and
cohesion of their campaigns, especially with regard to targeting their
message. The growth of cable and satellite channels means that it is
only a matter of time before party strategists make use of these
resources to beam television 'spots' across borders, thereby side-
stepping national broadcasting restrictions.
Parties and party systems, too, have undergone some considerable
change, in part related to the changes at the level of the electorate.
Prominent among such changes is the rise of new types of parties,
parties which are as different from the established parties as they are
from each other. Research on the Greens has shown how different a
party type they are from the norm in terms of organisation, policies
and support groups (Poguntke, 1989). Such differences are not only
seen in legislative behaviour but also in their approach to campaign-
ing. While the new Green parties stress factors like internal democracy
and a decentralised party organisation, the new parties on the right
(anti-tax and neo-fascist) place great emphasis on leader image, in
some cases to the point of demagoguery.
EXAMINING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The previous section has shown the importance of setting and of

national context in influencing campaign styles. The next stage is to
examine the campaign itself and for this we need a definition of what is
the campaign. The 'Westminster model' lends itself to the following
working definition of the campaign period: that period, after the
dissolution of Parliament, when the formal campaign begins and

which continues until polling day. But this definition is not applicable
to all contexts, for instance the USA where the 'final stages' of the
campaign begins with the conclusion of the parties' conventions. It
also ignores those cases of countries with fixed election dates: what
determines the 'launch' of their campaigns? Furthermore, the defini-
tion is naive in assuming that the parties themselves follow such a
short-run perspective. It passes over the steps taken by the parties to
prepare their election campaigns. The approach adopted in the
following chapters has been to take account of the period leading up
to the formal campaign - that is the preparations of the parties'
campaigns- and then to focus on the formal campaign itself as defined
either by circumstances (such as the dissolution of parliament) or by
the parties (the so-called 'hot' period in the final weeks). The campaign
can be defined as follows: it is the process by which a party or
candidate seeks to maximise electoral gains. 4 It consists of all those
efforts (promotional, financial, organisational) made by the party or
candidate to meet that goal.
The campaign occurs over two principal periods: a period of
campaign preparation and a period of campaign implementation. In
the following case studies the contributors have, so far as possible,
followed a common framework which breaks down the campaign
process into three parts: preparation and planning; organisation and
control; campaign themes and images.
Preparation and Planning
Parties which make minimal and/or last minute preparations for a

campaign are destined not to fight it terribly effectively. The fact that
in 1983 the British Labour party did not start to prepare its campaign
until a few weeks before the election was announced did not help its
attempt to unseat Mrs Thatcher. Most strategists will argue that they
begin their preparations the day after the preceding election. This is
rarely the true story. It is more likely that the campaign itself is not
actually planned for until about a year or two before. In general, the
preparations of a party consist of at least three factors: market
research; the use of consultants and specialist agencies; and distribu-
tion networks.
The case studies give accounts of the use of market research,
examining such questions as: the amount of use made of market
research in campaign preparations; the agency (or agencies) used; the
type of market research commissioned (surveys or focus groups). The

use made of market research is one hallmark of the sophistication of a
campaign and one issue to be resolved by internal party decision
processes. For example, in his work for the British Labour party
Robert Worcester developed a conceptual model of the electorate
which he used to drive a sophisticated multivariate analysis of factors
influencing voters. Market research can, of course, be utilised by a
party in a variety of ways. Such research allows parties to identify and
contact particular groups of voters, to address specific worries within
the electorate and to generate appropriate themes, slogans, 'sound
bites' and candidate ripostes. The 1988 US presidential campaign
provided examples of some of the most sophisticated usage of these
techniques yet seen. Indeed elements of the campaign - the Willie
Horton TV spot and George Bush's infamous 'read my lips' sound bite
- were specific instances of such techniques at work which have
subsequently become. important elements in any account of that
election.
Secondly, the case studies explore the use of consultants and
agencies. As Chagall (1981), Sabato (1981) and Luntz (1988) have
shown, political consultancy has become big business in the United
States. More and more use is made of specialist communication and
marketing agencies to sell the candidate. Agranoff (1976a, p. 5)
suggests that one factor behind the rise of political consultancy has
been the inherent organisational weakness of American political
parties, that 'since there was no existing body of party professionals
possessing these skills, candidates began to employ professionals from
other spheres, thus forming a new breed of political professions'. This
has occurred to a lesser extent elsewhere largely because the parties
have managed to bring professionals into the machinery as members,
as volunteer-advisors, even as full-time employees. In many respects,
the changes which have occurred in party organisations in Europe and
New Zealand might be seen to have involved a strengthening - not a
weakening - of their role and functions. Nevertheless, there are
prominent examples of the employment of outside agencies to provide
expert advice in specialist areas. In practice, the American case is not
as unique as it may appear. While the majority of American
consultants are not exactly supporters of the parties for whose
candidates they are working, they tend none the less to remain very
loyal (Napolitan, 1972; Sabato, 1981). Campaign magazine, for
example, regularly contains advertisements by both 'Republican' and
'Democrat' campaign professionals.
Following a suggestion by Sabato (1981), one could suggest a two-

stage process here. The first stage is where use is made of 'generalist'
consultants who lend a hand to all parts of the campaign. These are
often commercial specialists who volunteer their services to the parties
or candidates. In the second stage, greater use is made of 'specialist'
consultants who are commissioned, sometimes at great expense, to
deal with particular parts of the campaign. These specialist consultants
are a common feature in American campaigning. Arguably their role is
becoming more prominent in many other countries. Writing at the
start of the 1980s Sabato saw evidence of political consultancy
becoming accepted 'all around the world; the new campaign techno-
logy is one of the most highly prized exports of the United States'
(ibid., p. 61). Apart from the informal sharing of campaign ideas
which goes on all the time from party to party and from country to
country (the CDU's Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is particularly active
in this respect), there has also been the more formal development of an
international profession of political consultancy. In 1968, the doyen of
political consultants, Joe Napolitan, founded the International Asso-
ciation of Political Consultants (IAPC) and its sister organisation, the
American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC). Members
pool their knowledge and experience and discuss various approaches
to campaigns all around the world. They meet at annual conferences
and newsletters are distributed widely. In recent years a European
Association of Political Consultants (EAPC) has also been set up.
Another international organisation which facilitates the exchange of
campaign ideas is the World Association of Public Opinion Research
(WAPOR) which includes such prominent European figures as Robert
Worcester and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann.
The third major element in campaign preparations is what the
marketing literature call 'distribution activities,' basically the means
by which the campaign message is put across. In countries with
clientelistic tendencies an important part of the campaign's distribu-
tion activities has traditionally been the door-to-door canvass of the
candidates and local activists. In recent years great effort has gone into
improving the efficiency of the canvass. In multiseat constituencies the
canvass has been subject to closer central scrutiny in an effort to
promote elaborate vote management strategies, where the constituency
is carved up between the party's candidates to maximise the vote/seat
ratio. Central offices have taken steps to standardise the party's
campaign message: providing canvassers with campaign guides, the
printing (or provision of artwork and stencils for local printing) of
canvass leaflets (often in the form of issue leaflets) and candidate

biographies. With recent advances in telecommunications there has
been an increasing tendency to make use of direct-mail activities,
either for fund-raising or for selling campaign messages, and of
telephone canvassing. The other side of distribution activities is the
attempt to have a well-coordinated campaign from the centre to the
grassroots. To this end campaigns generally have as a minimum
telephone, and increasingly fax and computer, links with all local
offices or officers.
Organisation and Control
An examination of campaign organisation inside the party carries with

it implications for the extent to which a party is prepared for an
election. The better organised the party, the easier it is to mount a
campaign at minimal notice. At one extreme there is the party which
has a severely understaffed, underequipped and underfinanced head-
quarters, with virtually no organisational network across the country.
Nowadays most parties are well staffed and well equipped.
The degree of complexity in organisational structure has changed in
response to the need to mount more complex campaigns: it can also be
seen to differ across parties. In larger parties there is usually a coherent
organisational division into such departments as press and communi-
cations, research, strategy and campaign, and possibly also marketing.
In smaller parties the organisation may not be so hierarchically
organised; often the work is divided up between different committees
(communications, strategy, campaign) made up of full-time employ-
ees, volunteers and occasional external specialists.
Of course, using the term 'organisation' in such a general way hides,
rather than reveals, a whole host of questions concerning internal
party politics. How the organisation operates and who is in charge are,
therefore, important questions in and of themselves. In the USA the
impression is often given, not least by political consultants, that the
politicians have little influence over the design, coordination and
control of a campaign. Much like movie directors 'discover' starlets
there are now stories of consultants deciding on who they think will be
worthwhile marketing as a candidate. For the most part the tendency
appears to be that the politicians remain firmly in control of the
campaign organisation. However, there may be exceptions. It is hard
to believe that strategists as senior as Joe Napolitan (who worked on
Giscard's 1974 presidential campaign) or Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann
Shaun BoWler and David M. Farrell 15
(who has worked on Kohl's campaigns) do not have significant powers

of independent decision-making.
Finally, and where relevant, the role of support groups should also
be considered. In the American literature, as we have seen, great stress
is placed on the importance of PACs as supplements, or even
replacements, to the party machines. In the candidate-centred cam-
paign process these organisations work directly to the individual
candidates. As is shown in some of the following cases, for example
Finland, support groups are not unique to the United States.
Campaign Themes and Images
A number of different points fall under this rubric. There is the overall
approach which the party has decided to adopt. In the case of an
incumbent one might expect a defensive mode, particularly where the
government has been unpopular. However, there are instances where a
governing party has been able to turn the tables on the opponent,
adopting an aggressive mode and sometimes even forcing the oppo-
nent onto the defensive: the US Republicans in 1984; the British
Conservatives in 1983 and 1987. A related point is whether the party
adopts a positive or negative emphasis. Often the campaign period is
divided into positive and negative parts. The opposition party may
begin its campaign attacking the failures of the government and
pointing out the problems of the national economy. Then, in the
second phase, the party moves into its positive mode, stressing a bright
future and great gains to be made by it 'when in government'. This
negative-positive tactic can just as easily be adopted by the governing
party, as was shown again most effectively by the British Conserva-
tives and the American Republicans in their campaigns of the 1980s.
Crucial to a successful campaign is a well-conceived and well-
executed campaign focus, or what the marketing literature calls
'product policy'. The political product in an election consists of three
distinct elements: party image, leader image and the manifesto
proposals or favoured issues of the party.
Party image includes both the traditional image of the party (for
instance as representative of the working class, of Catholic voters, of a
specific ethnic minority) and the specific image which a party seeks to
promote in a given election. Equally the party's manifesto is designed
both to take account of the party's traditional standpoints on certain
issues and also to take on board campaign-specific issues (Budge and
Farlie, 1983). In both cases the two will not be necessarily the same,
and there is considerable scope for conflict. For example, in many

different systems parties are trying to blend in 'green' themes with
older, contradictory roles as protectors of industry or of jobs in
smokestack industries. How quickly voter perceptions keep pace with
changes in party image is, of course, open to question (Bowler, 1990b).
To help convey the images an increasing part of the packaging of a
party is the use of artfully designed logos (the British Conservatives'
Olympic torch, the European Socialists' red rose) and appropriate
party colours (in 1987 Irish Fine Gael dropped the traditional green
colour of nationalism for the more marketable and 'modem' blue).
The other component of 'product policy', leader image, is taken
increasingly seriously in today's campaigns. Qualitative surveys are
commissioned to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the party's
leading candidate and appropriate measures are taken. In the early
1980s, Margaret Thatcher is reputed to have had a change of hairstyle
and clothes, her teeth capped and to have undergone voice training to
reduce the shrill quality of her voice (Cockerell eta/., 1984). In Ireland,
Garret FitzGerald's advisors were anxious that his image was too
intellectual, so they gave him a haircut and forced him to slow down
his delivery (Farrell, 1986). Robert Graham (1984) informs us that in
the 1970s Felipe Gonzalez wore an open necked shirt, presenting a
youthful image. In the 1980s, this switched to a tie - and according to
some accounts, dyed grey temples - as Gonzalez switched emphasis to
a more mature, statesmanlike image.
In designing a campaign focus, the party strategists seek to achieve
an appropriate balance between the three elements of the political
product. Implicitly (sometimes explicitly) a decision is taken to rank
order the three. The ranking may change during the course of the
campaign, for example a decision to emphasise leader image in the
final few days. Where leader image is the predominant focus great
effort is made to design such things as an extensive, dynamic leader's
tour (Reagan's 1980 whistle-stop tour of key States, copied in 1981 by
Irish Fine Gael strategists). Detailed logistical plans are drawn up with
'advance men' preparing the way for a smooth trip. Where party
image is the key focus more effort is spent on the party's logo and
colours, greater emphasis is placed on the 'teamwork' of the party
leadership. Finally, where the emphasis is on the manifesto or
programme of the party one should expect to find proportionately
higher expenditure on advertising of policy issues, the printing of issue
leaflets or posters, the publishing of 'supplementary' policy leaflets in
phases throughout the campaign.
Quite apart from which rank order is chosen an effort is also made
to present a coherent, single focus embodying the product policy triad.
For instance, the British Conservatives in 1983 subliminally promoted
a 'Falklands factor' image with a focus in its campaign messages on
'discipline and direction' and appropriate photo opportunities of
Margaret Thatcher (such as one in front of an aircraft hanger). The
extent to which a party adopts a coherent product policy and
promotes it consistently is an important indicator of a successful
campaign (Farrell and Wortmann, 1987).
Strategists give careful consideration to questions of timing and
pacing of a campaign, trying to maximise media interest and voter
support, being careful not to overexhaust the campaign organisation
and principal candidate(s), determining at what stage the campaign
should peak, the switch between positive and negative modes, and so
on. It could be that these plans may never come to fruition due to
candidate gaffes or other campaign incidents. If that is the case, the
degree to which it can successfully adapt to unforeseen situations
becomes a measure of the campaign's professionalism. The aspect of
the campaign focused upon here, then, is the content of the campaign
message and the parties method(s) of communicating it. In their
communication activities the strategists will be seeking to set the
campaign agenda, taking the initiative and forcing both their oppo-
nents and the media into a reactive mode. This could take the form of
introducing 'themes of the day' at morning press conferences. But there
are alternative means. A distinction can be drawn between the 'indirect'
and 'direct' communication activities of a campaign. Indirect commu-
nication activities are the means by which the party seeks maximum
positive media coverage through public relations activities, personal
selling and sales promotion. These typically take the form of press
conferences, the leader's tour, special events, photo opportunities, and
so on. Direct communication activities involve efforts to bypass the
media and communicate directly with voters through the use of
advertisements, posters, election broadcasts, election literature and
campaign gimmickry. The strategists will be seeking to combine both
communication activities in an effort to sell their message effectively.
PLAN OF THE BOOK
The following chapters provide accounts of recent campaigns in

Europe (Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands), New Zealand and the United States. They are written by
country specialists who have gathered material through a series of in-
depth interviews with campaign strategists. So far as possible the
emphasis throughout is on using the framework outlined above to
describe the campaign. Each chapter begins with an outline of the
particular national context in which the election occurred. In virtually
all cases the contributors are writing about party campaigning in
parliamentary elections. The two exceptions, where the analysis
diverges somewhat from the common framework, are France and
the USA. In the first case, the chapter examines the 1988 presidential
campaign which, by its nature, was candidate-centred. In the second
case, on the 1988 US congressional elections, Katz and Kolodny are
writing in the context of a system which gives a much less significant
role to parties in the electoral process.
Chapter II involves an examination of voter responses to party
campaigns, assessing the question of how to measure the 'effects' of
campaigning. In the concluding chapter, we review the nine case
studies and explore the contrasts and similarities between them,
isolating patterns of contemporary campaign styles.
Notes
l. This phrase was used by Timothy Crouse (1972) to describe the campaign
journalists accredited to US presidential candidates. For a recent British
example of this genre see Tyler (1987).
2. It is difficult to be sure of exactly how many books have been published in
this tradition. The more prominent ones are: Agranoff (1976b); Bernays
(ed.) (1955); Chagall (1981); Chartrand (1972); Hiebert eta/. (eds) (1975);
Napolitan (1972); Shadegg (1964; 1972); Steinberg (1976a; b).
3. We should also mention the numerous studies on particular aspects of
campaigning. These include: on information technology (Boim, 1984;
Chartrand, 1972; Tobe, 1984); direct mail (Clark, 1981; Haggerty, 1979;
Harris, 1982; O'Shaughnessy and Peele, 1985; Snyder, 1982);
advertisements (Diamond and Bates, 1984; 1985; Eriksson, 1937; Hof-
stetter and Zukin, 1979; Jamieson, 1984; Shy1es, 1984a; b; Witherspoon,
1984); slogans/rhetoric (Atkinson, 1984; Kurjian, 1984; Rowland and
Payne, 1984); leaders' tours (Mintz, 1985); consultants (Kelley, 1956;
Peele, 1982; Pitchell, 1958; Ross, 1959; Sabato, 1981); market research
(Abrams, 1964; Roll, 1982; West, 1984); campaign debates (Martel, 1983).
4. We are assuming that there is a desire to maximise electoral gains, even if
this is at the expense of ideological purity (see Wright, 1971).
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2 Austria: The 1990
Campaign 1
Wolfgang C. Muller and Fritz Plasser
By Austrian standards the 1990 parliamentary election was an

electoral earthquake. Contributing to the electoral result were such
long-term trends as the decline of party identifiers, the increase in late
deciders and personality voters. One of the consequences of these
developments has been the increased importance of election cam-
paigns: unlike in previous decades it is now possible to shift the views
of relatively large proportions of the electorate and to win or lose
during the campaign. Although the subject has been relatively
neglected by Austrian academics this phase of the political process
should be one of the central features of electoral and party research.
SETTING AND NATIONAL CONTEXT
The selection of parliamentary candidates in Austria takes place

largely at the local (Bezirk) or state (Land) level (Miiller, 1992;
Stirnemann, 1989). Nevertheless, the impact of local issues on the
voting decision is low; elections to the Nationalrat, the lower house of
parliament, have a truly national character. In recent years the
national party leaders have been regarded as personally responsible
for the electoral fortunes of their parties. Reflecting this, election
campaigns are very centralised: they are directed by the national party
headquarters and the top leaders have more leeway here than in other
decision-making arenas.
The electoral system is PR with (since 1970) nine electoral districts
based on the nine Austrian Lander (states). The number of seats is
fixed at 183 and they are distributed in two rounds. In the first round
seats are distributed in the nine electoral districts, in the second round
the votes which had not yet been used are pooled for the eastern and
the western electoral districts respectively. Only those parties partici-
pate in the second round of the seat distribution which have won at
least one seat in the first round (which is easiest in the largest electoral
24
Wolfgang C. Muller and Fritz Plasser 25
district where it requires about 3 per cent of the vote). The overall
distortion of the electoral system bas been quite limited since 1971
(Miiller, 1991). The second relevant feature of the electoral system is
that it is a list system with intra-party preference voting. Since 1971
voters have been able to vote directly for one particular candidate
within the party of their choice by writing his or her name on the
ballot paper next to the party name. Even without a cross placed by
the party name these votes count as party votes. Candidates ranked
low on the party list require as many preference votes as it takes to win
a seat in order to be elected. This candidate preference system has not
proven very effective: by 1990 only one candidate had been elected by
this route (Miiller, 1983; 1990).
Since 1975 Austrian parties have received generous state funding for
their public relations. Extra funding for election campaigns was
introduced for the first time in 1990. A total of ATS 112 million
{ATS 20 for each eligible voter) was distributed among those parties
which had applied for the funding at least eight weeks before the
election, based on share of the vote in the previous election. When
state party funding was introduced in 1975 legal restrictions were laid
down for campaign expenditure and renewed for each parliamentary
election until 1986. But these never put a real limit on the parties'
expenditure. The law was not renewed for the 1990 campaign but the
two biggest parties, the Socialists (SPO) and the Peoples' Party (OVP),
worked out a 'fairness' agreement, putting a cap on campaign
expenditure during the last six weeks before the election of ATS 12
million per party, limiting the number of posters, newspaper advertise-
ments and other propaganda materials and also excluding some
particularly expensive propaganda methods (such as universal direct
mailing, or regular colour advertisements in daily newspapers).
The Austrian media are characterised by a very high degree of
concentration (Plasser, 1991). Both radio and televisi1;m are· public
monopolies, the control of which has always been a matter of political
debate between the parties. During election campaigns radio and in
particular television are so closely scrutinised by the parties that they
tend to receive a fair deal in terms of news coverage. All parliamentary
parties have access to radio and television time for election broadcasts
which is distributed according to party strength. No additional time
can be bought for political purposes. The party press, once constitu-
ting about a third of the daily distribution in Austria, has virtually
disappeared in recent years. The non-party press is strongly concen-
trated as shown particularly by the Neue Kronenzeitung whose daily
26 Austria: The 1990 Campaign
circulation of 1.5 million makes it proportionally one of the biggest

sellers in western Europe. This paper is not known as a source for
detailed coverage of politics; however, it tends to provoke debate by its
selection of topics over which it tries to influence its readers. In recent
years the Neue Kronenzeitung has developed a critical attitude towards
the SPO, but not towards the leader, Franz Vranitzky, who is
presented as the positive exception and as a reasonable man. The
Freedom Party (FPO) leader, Jorg Haider, enjoys the newspaper's
unlimited support. The OVP, on the other hand, is dealt with very
critically: from the point of view of the Neue Kronenzeitung it is in the
wrong coalition and does not have a popular politician as leader. The
other newspapers all have a general non-socialist bias but are also
critical of Haider's populism. The non-socialist bias is counterba-
lanced by support for Vranitzky, for many commentators the right
man in the wrong party.
For many years the Austrian party system had been characterised
by the two-party dominance of the SPO and the OVP. Up until 1986
these two parties had managed to hold a combined vote of about 90
per cent and to monopolise government, first in a grand coalition
(until 1966), then in single-party governments (until 1983). After a
brief interlude of coalition between the Socialists and the FPO in
1983-86 the SPO and OVP returned to grand coalition government
after the 1986 election. Despite the revival of this old government
pattern the general picture has changed quite radically in the 1980s.
The Greens managed to establish themselves as a new party, winning
parliamentary representation in 1986. Another significant change
introduced at the 1986 election was the rise of the FPO which
dram~tically increased its strength in this and subsequent elections
at the subnational and interest group levels. Thus the 1990 election
revolved around questions of whether the trend against the traditional
big parties and the series of successes for the FPO would continue and
whether the Greens would prove to be a permanent addition to the
Austrian party system at the parliamentary level (Plasser et a/., 1992).
Though early elections had been discussed several times, the 1990
elections were held at the end of the government's term. The record of
the grand coalition had been ambiguous. While being excellent from
an economic perspective (high growth rate, low inflation and unem-
ployment rates, reduced budgetary deficit), its public presentation had
been marred by severe and frequent conflicts between the coalition
parties which diminished its successes and exaggerated its failures. The
government term was also overshadowed by a number of political
scandals most of which had taken place in the past but had only just
been exposed or investigated. Though some OVP politicians were
involved in the scandals it was mainly the SPO that was affected;
indeed, a whole series of high-ranking SPO politicians were forced to
resign (Meth-Cohn and Miiller, 1991). As a result the SPO started the
campaign with a severe handicap. All polls indicated that it would lose
between 3 and 5 per cent of its vote. However, the OVP was not
expected to profit from the Socialists' losses. Since assuming govern-
mental status after the 1986 election its fortunes in the polls had been
declining. Pollsters expected OVP losses of between 6 and 9 per cent of
the vote with the party suffering from its status as the junior partner
and from internal quarrels. It also suffered from being one of the
traditional big and powerful parties. This position did not allow it to
capitalise on the SPO's problems; indeed, voters did not clearly
distinguish between the SPO and OVP in this respect. The SPO's
advantage, however, was the enormous popularity of Chancellor
Vranitzky. Asked for whom they would vote if the Chancellor were
to be elected directly, more than 60 per cent answered Vranitzky. His
opponent from the OVP, Josef Riegler, was preferred by a mere 10 to
18 per cent, while Haider from the FPO appealed to between 10 and 16
per cent of the voters. Even among OVP voters a majority would have
voted for Vranitzky as Chancellor (Miiller, 1990).
It was clear from the outset that no party would be able to win a
majority and govern alone. Thus the parties' coalition preferences
were a major issue during the campaign. The SPO was very clear: it
declared its willingness to continue the coalition with the OVP. This, it
was argued, would be necessary to carry on with the pragmatic policies
of the government for the sake of the country. Alternative coalition
options with the FPO in particular but also with the Greens were
categorically rejected because of the populism of the FPO and the
environmental fundamentalism of the Greens. The OVP also indicated
its preference for a continuation of the grand coalition, but it held
open the option of a coalition with the FPO.
Modern election campaign strategies and techniques such as
professional political advertising, segmentation of the electorate into
target groups, use of TV spots, emphasis on candidate image (paid
media campaign), as well as the professional self-presentation of the
main actors in the mass media (free media campaign), were used for
the first time in 1970. Before this the campaigns consisted primarily of
appeals to the party's own supporters who were mobilised by party
slogans, attacks on political opponents and appeals to ideology and
loyalty. Since 1970 the parties have had to try reaching the political
expectations, desires and moods of a more mobile electorate. Com-
mercial advertising methods were adapted for this purpose and used to
strengthen the profile of the party or establish a candidate's image.
The planning and development of Austrian electoral campaigns has
become more professional and increasingly oriented towards interna-
tional and in particular US models.
PREPARATION AND PLANNING
SPO campaign preparations started in early 1989 with the establish-

ment of fact-finding groups. Their task was to identify the party's
perceived strengths and weaknesses. The pollsters, using both quanti-
tative and qualitative research methods, provided information about
the salience of political issues, perceptions of SPO competence to deal
with the most important issues and the popularity of the party's top
personnel. The party's campaign team was involved in the preparation
of the research and assessed its results with representatives of the
research institutes. A number of decisions were made on the basis of
convincing evidence from the polls and other sources. However, about
half of the decisions, in particular those about certain advertising
methods, were based on intuition. On the basis of these preparations a
rough plan for the SPO campaign was drawn up by December 1989.
Selected advertising agencies were invited to tender and the advertising
director for Mitterrand's presidential campaign, Jacques Seguela, was
chosen. He had been selected principally because the SPO strategists
saw a parallel between their situation and that of the Socialists in
France both in terms of electoral politics and political content. In
addition the SPO studied election campaign material from its sister
parties in France, Germany and Sweden.
The SPO as usual set up an election fund to help finance its
campaign. The party leadership laid down an ideal donation per
party member and printed the appropriate number of election fund
vouchers. The vouchers were then distributed to the Land party
organisations, according to their registered membership, for sale to
party members. What could not be sold had to be compensated for out
of Land party funds. Considerable amounts of money were also
provided by affiliated organisations such as the Socialist Unionists
and the SPO Parliamentary Club. Finally, the SPO had access to the
state election financing fund which was in operation for the first time
in 1990. This provided some ATS 45 million. State financing covered

around 40 per cent of the campaign expenses, the other two sources
about 30 per cent each.
Preparations for the OVP election campaign began in summer 1989.
A permanent campaign staff was set up at party headquarters under
the chairmanship of the general secretary. During the summer
comprehensive opinion polls were commissioned that were to provide
the empirical basis for the campaign planning. The first strategy
papers established the general outline of the campaign. In the
autumn, following extensive briefings, one German and four Austrian
advertising agencies were invited to give presentations at party head-
quarters. The German agency (von Mannstein, Political Communica-
tion) was chosen on the basis of its specialist experience in the area of
political communication gathered through working since the mid-
1970s on numerous CDU campaigns at the national and regional
level. The campaign staff also studied foreign campaigns, focusing
especially on political commercials. ln 1988 a fact-finding mission was
sent to the USA to gain experience; contacts were made at this time
with Republican and Democrat political.consultants.
The OVP campaign was financed from four different sources. The
state election financing fund provided ATS 35 million. A further ATS
20-5 million was raised by the Land party organisations and the
party's constituent interest-group Leagues. Donations from closely
connected economic and industrial associations brought in an addi-
tional ATS 15-20 million. Towards the end of the campaign the OVP
took out credits with politically sympathetic banks, the repayments for
which are likely to burden the party budget for several years.
The FPO has been remarkably successful in all national, subna-
tional and interest group elections since its change of leadership and
strategy in 1986. It transformed itself from a governing or potentially
governing party into a protest party, attracting votes from all parts of
the political spectrum, sometimes with contradicting arguments. Given
this success any change in FPO strategy in the 1990 campaign would
have been surprising. There was, however, one factor which required
some modification. Since 1989 the party's chairman and electoral
asset, Jorg Haider, had been governor of Carinthia (in a coalition
with the OVP). This was the first time in the post-war era that a
politician who did not come either from the OVP or the SPO had
managed to occupy a governor post. This executive position was
crucial to Haider's own long-term strategy since it allowed him to
add a more constructive element to his ability to mobilise protest
voters. However, running as his party's leading candidate in the

general election would have potentially undermined his position as
governor by indicating that he was not really committed to the Land.
After internal discussions Haider decided not to act as the leading
candidate; but, in order to make use of his popularity, the FPO
decided to present a team of leaders in the campaign consisting of
Haider, the party's general secretary, Heide Schmidt, and the leader of
the parliamentary party, Norbert Gugerbauer. One of the last two was
to be appointed the party's leading candidate. In March 1990, after the
party leadership had agreed on the strategy, a number of advertising
agencies were invited to present proposals as to how this strategy
could be put into practice. For financial reasons market research was
not used in the preparation of the campaign. The FPO relied entirely
on the intuition of its decision-makers in particular Haider who is said
to have been particularly adept at selecting campaign posters and
slogans. The only exception was the decision as to whether Schmidt or
Gugerbauer should be designated the leading candidate. The FPO did
not commission a poll, instead Haider discussed this question with
pollsters. These discussions led to the conclusion that a male candidate
in general and Gugerbauer in particular would be the more promising
choice. Therefore, on Haider's proposal Gugerbauer was designated
the party's leading candidate. It was planned from the beginning that
towards the end of the campaign Haider himself should be brought in
more forcefully.
In working out the style of the campaign no foreign models were
used. While the German FOP was seen to be too 'well-behaved,'
electorally successful right-wing parties and leaders such as Le Pen in
France and SchOnhuber in Germany were regarded as being too much
in the extremists' corner to constitute an acceptable model for the FPO.
The FPO rejects the idea of additional state financing for election
campaigns and so refused to accept its share. The campaign was
financed out of the party budget and, as usual in an election year,
donations were higher than normal. For the first time in the party's
history the Land party organisations were obliged to contribute a
'solidarity sum' to the campaign budget. These organisations had
enjoyed a boost since 1986 with the general growth in the party and
the participation of Haider in numerous subnational election cam-
paigns and had gained greater access to public funds. The 'solidarity
sum' was seen as an exchange for federal party support.
The Green party's campaign preparations started in autumn 1989.
The leaders of the extra-parliamentary party developed a basic concept
which was then elaborated further by the advertising agency, Trizeps.

The concept was discussed and slightly modified in the Full Party
Executive. In this process one poll was carried out in order to provide
information about expectations concerning the policies of the Greens:
this did not lead to unexpected results. The campaign concepts and
materials of the German Greens were also studied. While these were
not very influential they did provide some ideas. With the exception of
a fund-raising campaign by direct mail the Greens relied primarily on
state funding. The flow of money which resulted from the direct mail
appeal slightly exceeded its costs, thus in effect providing a free direct
mailing wave for the Greens.
ORGANISATION AND CONTROL
The SPO campaign was planned and organised by a small team

consisting of the party chairman, the two central secretaries, the
heads of the party's departments for organisation and advertising,
the chairman's press secretary, the organiser of the extra-party support
committee for Chancellor Vranitzky and representatives of the
advertising agencies. Vranitzky reserved the right of final decision
and indeed made quite a number of the major decisions. The campaign
experts were, however, very influential. Decision making in the
campaign was even less collective and less reserved to the leading
party bodies than in non-election times. The justification for this is
that the leading candidate carries the entire electoral risk and must
bear the consequences. Thus it is only fair that the party leadership has
free room for manoeuvre. This is particularly true for the question of
how the campaign is managed. To a certain extent the leading
candidate can also use the campaign to promote his own interpreta-
tion of policies, since these are accepted more easily during an election
campaign than under normal circumstances.
Reflecting the party's general character, the SPO campaign was very
centralised. Though some traditionalists in the party were not happy
with the personalised campaign strategy, it was generally accepted as
the most promising one given the circumstances. In order to coordi-
nate the campaign, the Land party secretaries were called in regularly
for conferences at national party headquarters. The 115 district party
secretaries received their orders directly from the campaign team. The
campaign was not only centralised but also very staqdardjsed: par~y
headquarters provided all the materials to be used in the campaign.
The Land party organisations could, however, select those they

thought to be most appropriate. Although the SPO campaign
concentrated on those sections of the electorate which were willing
to shift from one party to another, it also focused on its own mass
organisation which constituted not only a large segment of the party's
electorate but also of its campaign activists and election fund
contributors.
The planning group for the OVP election campaign, in which the
final decisions about strategy and advertising were made, consisted of
the party chairman, the general secretary, the heads of the politics,
research and organisation departments, the campaign manager
(appointed by the general secretary) and representatives from the
Mannstein agency. The top party organs had little role in campaign
planning or leadership. Riegler had extensive influence on the central
campaign decisions. He had the last word on questions concerning his
presentation in advertisements and the media and on the general
advertising line. The general secretary was the other major actor in
the campaign committee and external consultants also had consider-
able influence.
At the beginning of the campaign there were numerous attempts to
mobilise party supporters and campaign activists. A department was
set up in party headquarters for the motivation and training of
campaign activists (Aktion '90). Despite this the influence of the
party supporters on the campaign was negligible. The campaign and
advertising concepts elaborated by party headquarters were adopted,
with few exceptions, by the Land party organisations. The content and
organisation of the campaign was discussed in several meetings with
the Land secretaries whose organisations could order their main
advertising material from two catalogues. A central distribution body
delivered the ordered material. The party headquarters decided on the
intensity and frequency of poster campaigns. The Land party organi-
sation could decide freely on the extent and distribution of other forms
of advertising (campaign newspapers during the last three weeks
before the election, brochures and so on).
The FPO campaign team consisted of the three politicians on whom
the campaign focused, their personal staff and a few people from party
headquarters. The team was so small that decisions could be made
over the telephone. Although the advice and help of the advertising
agency was always sought, the amateur element in the FPO campaign
was certainly stronger than it was for the SPO and OVP campaigns.
The campaign was very standardised and controlled from central
headquarters which provided the campaign materials and coordina-

ted the leading candidates' tours. The FPO mass organisation is small
and was already highly motivated by the party's recent successes so it
did not constitute a special focus of the campaign.
The Greens' campaign team consisted of the party leader respons-
ible for organisational matters and one campaign manager in each of
the nine Lander. Decisions were made in telephone conferences which
were held on a regular basis. Although the Greens are characterised by
a weak link between the national and the Land levels, their election
campaign was highly centralised and uniform. The Greens did not,
however, accept the rationale of modem campaigning as proposed by
experts but stuck to their political and organisational principles even
when it was clear that the party would suffer electorally. In doing this
the party oriented itself towards the hard core of its supporters rather
than towards those parts of the electorate which could potentially have
been attracted.
All of the parties used their entire personnel resources in the
campaign; no additional staff were hired. One new phenomenon was
the 'above-party support group for the re-election of Chancellor
Vranitzky' (a somewhat misleading name since it was not the
Chancellor who was to be elected, but see below). It was the only
relevant support group in the 1990 campaign, established according to
a plan drawn up by the SPO campaign team and financed by the party.
It tried to recruit VIPs in the main but also 'ordinary' people who were
willing to give testimonials for Vranitzky. The key target group, which
had to be convinced, were those voters who were in favour of
Vranitzky but not of his party. To this end the group acted
independently of the party; it did not hesitate to articulate discomfort
with the SPO, implying that Vranitzky should be elected despite his
party. This was exactly the function the support group was supposed
to fulfil within the overall framework of the SPO campaign.
CAMPAIGN THEMES AND IMAGES
Although there had been a latent election campaign throughout 1990

the 'hot phase' of the campaign started on 1 September, lasting about
six weeks. A content analysis of the three leading Austrian newspapers
and the daily TV news programme during the campaign shows that
scandals and speculations about future government formations re-
ceived more attention than substantive issues, of which economic and

environmental issues were dominant (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Content analysis of media campaign reporting, Austrian 1990

election
Share in reports July August September

(%) (%) (%)
Negative issues
(scandals etc) 13.3 18.0 18.5
Coalition speculation,
Campaign events,
Horse race journalism 9.2 10.8 19.0
Economic issues 17.2 12.7 15.9
Environment issues . 19.1 17.7 10.8
Source: Plasser eta/. (1991), p. 119.
Given the SPO's problems in the recent past, which could not be
denied, the image the party aimed at was that of a party willing and
ready to come to grips with these difficulties. The SPO campaign did
not give much attention to the party as such; rather, it tried to hide it
behind its leading candidate. The image that the campaign strategists
wanted to assign to Vranitzky was that of a statesman rather than a
politician; the idea was to present him as the Federal Chancellor rather
than as the SPO chainnan, as a man above party. Vranitzky was the
only one who appeared in advertisements, SPO posters often displayed
only him, even without the name of the party. The aim was to turn the
parliamentary election into a referendum for the chancellorship, to
profit from Vranitzky's popularity.
Although the SPO deliberately focused on leader image, the fact
remained that this was an election to parliament not to the Chancel-
lor's office and the ballot papers contained the names of the parties
not those of their respective Chancellor candidates. In order to cope
with this problem the SPO redefined the instrument of the preference
vote. A massive campaign for preference votes for Vranitzky was
planned and implemented towards the end of the campaign. As
opposed to traditional preference votes, these were not required to
elect Vranitzky to parliament since he occupied the top place of his
party's list in all electoral districts. The argument given for this
preference vote campaign was that a large number of preference
votes would strengthen the Chancellor in particular vis-a-vis possible
attempts to remove him from his position by an OVP-FPO coalition.
A second subliminal argument was that a lot of preference votes would
also further strengthen Vranitzky within his own party. They would
help him to reform the SPO according to his proposals. The strategic
preference vote campaign had some consequences: it personalised the
election campaign still further; it opened an option for the voters to
differentiate their electoral choice by either electing Vranitzky, or the
SPO, or both.
In terms of its policy profile the SPO could rely on some well-
established strengths, in particular in the fields of social and economic
policies. While social policy is a typical Social Democratic policy
domain economic policy is a more competitive field. The SPO had
been very successful in receiving credit for its economic policy
competence during the heyday of 'Austro-Keynesianism' (until the
mid-1980s), but had suffered from the subsequent economic problems,
in particular the financial breakdown of the nationalised industries.
However, Vranitzky, a former banker, and the two SPO ministers with
economic portfolios, Rudolf Streicher and Ferdinand Lacina, had
received most of the credit for the good economic performance of
the country under the new grand coalition. Thus the SPO in 1990 was
seen as the more competent party on the economy. This image had to
be preserved or even strengthened during the campaign. The SPO
aimed at two further goals: it wanted to be seen as the party of
modernisation and the party for environmental protection. In respect
of the former it aimed at presenting itself as the party that would
modernise the economic and political structure of Austria and make
the country ready for European Community membership. In respect
of the latter it tried to put forward an image as the realistic
environmental protection party (as opposed to the 'utopian' Greens
and the merely symbolic policies of the other parties). In general the
SPO promised a continuation of the government's pragmatic policies
which it argued necessitated a further term for the grand coalition. The
SPO was highly successful in putting its plans into practice. Through-
out the campaign it stuck to the blueprint and succeeded in turning the
election into a plebiscite about who should be the Chancellor, a result
to which the strategies of the other parties also contributed. Unforseen
problems such as scandals within the party were solved quickly by
removing the people involved rather than changing the campaign.
Initially, the OVP had planned a thematic campaign. However, with

the piling up of scandals and affairs involving the SPO, the OVP in the
late summer decided on a strategy of attacking and criticising the SPO.
The FPO was also strongly attacked. At the height of the campaign
the OVP became very insecure due to the success of the SPO
preference campaign and it began to emphasise its claim to the
chancellorship, focusing on leader image. Riegler was presented as
the challenger and claimant for the chancellorship. In short, from an
issue-oriented and then offensive campaign the OVP ended up with a
personality and image campaign.
The substance of the OVP campaign was based on the concept of an
'eco-social market economy' which aimed at creating an environ-
mental policy, with market incentives through the extensive moderni-
sation of the Austrian economy. In the more limited area of economic
policy the OVP concentrated on its line, 'More private-less state' and
demanded a continuation of deregulation and liberalisation policies.
With the slogan 'Vote for growth. With us it's certain', the OVP was
pointing to its positive role in the formulation of the grand coalition's
economic policy, while trying to present itself as the only reliable
guarantor of continued economic development. In terms of social
policy the OVP promoted itself as the party of the family and appealed
to working mothers with improved maternity leave allowances.
Finally, the party emphasised its competence on the question of the
European Community, although as far as membership was concerned
the party was forced to become more and more reserved, since certain
sectors of the party (representatives of farmers, small business and
public employees) were becoming sceptical about or even opposed to
membership.
For all its efforts the OVP never succeeded in stepping out of a
defensive role in the election campaign. As a large party it was subject,
as much as the SPO, to the 'party-weariness' of large sections of the
electorate; as the junior partner in the grand coalition government it
lacked oppositional thrust. Consequently, the OVP was never able to
escape its strategic dilemma. Its attempt to define the thematic agenda
of the campaign failed in large part due to reporting in the media
which concentrated for weeks on negative issues (scandals, affairs). As
the election day drew closer the media speculated about possible
coalition variations. Even here the OVP was in a strategic dilemma
since the party was split internally on the issue. In the final phase of
the election campaign reporting concentrated on the 'chancellor
question' and on the image of the top candidates. The OVP's claim
to the chancellorship was problematic given the weak image of their

top candidate.
The FPO built its electoral campaign on its capacity to focus on
those aspects of the Austrian political and administrative system which
appeared inefficient or even corrupt, such as the abundance of social
insurance companies and extraordinarily high salaries for the pre-
sidents of the chambers of labour. These themes were to appeal to a
general public: their message was that domination of the Austrian
political-administrative system by the SPO and OVP had led to
administrative inefficiency and an unwillingness to countenance
reform. More specific issues were raised in order to appeal to certain
target groups, in particular the petty bourgeoisie and the better
qualified workers and employees. Thus the FPO focused on the
second year of paid maternity leave newly introduced by the SPO-
OVP coalition (against the will of the OVP's Business League) and, in
order to appeal to small business, the fact that joint stock companies
have a reduced tax rate vis-a-vis the individual businessman. The better
qualified workers were to be attracted by criticising the coalition's
proposals to guarantee a minimum wage of ATS 10 000 per month.
The party leaders were presented as young, modern and successful
people, against compromise with the most powerful groups in the
country (such as the big parties and interest groups) and prepared to
focus on the difficult problems ('Der Jorg, der traut sich was').
Consequently, from the beginning of the campaign the party had
virtually excluded itself from government participation in the next
parliamentary term. Since the 'old parties' were not yet ready for
reform, the FPO would rather continue with its strict opposition
politics at the national level (while simultaneously demonstrating its
capacity to govern at the Land level, in particular in Carinthia).
Towards the end of the campaign, to add some momentum, the
FPO made use of its strongest electoral asset, party chairman
Haider. It introduced an alternative scenario whereby he would
become Chancellor in a coalition with the 6VP. This again focused
the election on the question of who would be Chancellor.
Despite the existence of suitable personalities, the Greens decided
not to have a single, nationwide leading candidate. Instead they
nominated a team of no less than four people, leaving out their most
popular man in order to avoid a further personalisation of the party.
The Greens were facing a special problem. In the 1986 election they
had been an alliance of different Green groupings. Since one of these,
the United Greens (VGO), no longer supported the Greens represen-
ted in parliament but was running as an independent party, the

electoral authorities did not permit them to use the short name
'Greens' on the ballot paper. Even without such a decision the Greens
were handicapped in preparing their campaign materials; once it had
been taken, they were handicapped by having only a blank field on the
ballot papers where the other parties had their abbreviations. Of all
the parties the Greens gave most emphasis to issues in their campaign.
Their strategy was to present themselves as a fundamental opposition
to the three established parties. For that purpose they selected certain
issues which covered the whole policy space they wanted to occupy.
These were garbage disposal, traffic, food quality as an ecological
problem, the demand for a minimum wage as a social policy proposal,
the equal treatment of women, the promotion of ethnic minorities, the
proposal to abolish the army and the proposal to improve democracy
in Austria.
Austrian parties place a great deal of emphasis on efforts to
communicate directly with the voters. Before elections the streets
and the landscape are dominated by party posters: Austria has
probably one of the highest densities of political posters in western
Europe. In 1990 both SPO and OVP had 15000 large and 90000 small
posters which in the main contained portraits of the leading candi-
dates. Numerous advertisements were published in newspapers at a
maximum of A TS 15 million per party and every voter received direct
mail messages. The parties, in particular SPO and OVP, also devoted a
lot of attention and resources to their five minute television broad-
casts, transmitted in the last four weeks before the election. Based on
party strength the SPO had nine, the OVP eight, the FPO three and
the Greens one. These programmes were broadcast on prime-time TV
and reached an average audience of about 2 million people. The SPO
commercials focused on Vranitzky and were intended to make the
most of his favourable image. The OVP used a pseudo news studio
format with a young anchor woman interviewing a top politician 'live'
as if in an official news interview. The FPO placed Haider firmly in the
centre of its commercials and took the opportunity to attack the two
big parties for their involvement in scandals and for a soft approach to
the law and order issue. Although produced at great expense and to
the standard of US television advertising, the length of these broad-
casts turned out to be a handicap. Austrian television advertising
strategists agree that the American practice of using sixty-second spots
is better suited for making an emotional appeal to the viewer. Since the
Austrian broadcasting law rules out the purchase of television
advertising time for political parties there is a clear limit to the

Americanisation of the election campaign in this important area.
Consequently, restricted access to television represents the major
contrast to American campaigns and puts a stop to the otherwise
decisive victory of the 'new politics' conception of a technocratic,
television and candidate-centred campaign strategy.
For both the SPO and the FPO, a campaign method which had been
regarded as outdated and ineffective for many years, the leader's tour,
became relevant once again in 1990. Vranitzky was on tour for twenty-
seven days, Haider for fourteen (using a helicopter to get around more
quickly). Both managed to attract large audiences and they were not
only preaching to the converted as is usual in campaign rallies. To
promote open access the campaign teams tried to prevent the usual
cordon sanitaire of party functionaries around the top candidates.
Both parties evaluated the effectiveness of the leaders' tours very
highly. The tour of the OVP leader was more conventional in mainly
attracting core voters and constituting a media event. The Greens also
placed great importance on the value of the street campaign. But in
contacting people on a one-to-one basis their style was very different
from traditional party rallies.
THE RESULT
The election result was a surprise for both parties and observers. As
Table 2.2 shows, the official victor was the SPO which despite its
handicaps managed to just about hang on to its vote share and kept all
its parliamentary seats. This was first and foremost a personal triumph
for Vranitzky who received 576 315 preference votes, 28.6 per cent of
the SPO vote and more than four times as much as had been the total
of preference votes for all candidates in 1986. The real winner was the
FPO which almost doubled its vote share and seats. The clear loser
was the OVP which lost almost a quarter of its vote and seventeen
seats, leaving it twenty seats (previously three) behind the SPO. The
Greens managed to gain two seats but without increasing its vote share
and thus performed below expectations.
An exit poll showed that for 51 per cent of SPO voters Vranitzky
had been the strongest reason for their vote. This was by far the most
important reason for voting SPO in 1990, followed by the party's
traditional strength in the area of social security provision which was
mentioned by 43 per cent of the SPO voters. Similarly, Haider proved
Table 2.2 The Austrian 1990 election
Percentages Seats
1986 1990 1986 1990
SPO 43.1 42.8 80 80
OVP 41.3 32.0 77 60
FPO 9.7 16.6 18 33
Greens 4.8 4.8 8 10
Others 1.0 3.8
Source: Official returns.
to be the strongest reason for FPO voters: 42 per cent of them

mentioned him as their motive. In contrast, Riegler was important
for a mere 18 per cent of OVP voters.
Manifestly, the SPO campaign strategy was successful. By consist-
ently personalising the campaign and by focusing on Vranitzky's
image, it succeeded in neutralising the widespread mood of protest
among its supporters, in mobilising core voters and in attracting
candidate-oriented voters from other parties (Ogris, 1990). The
'presidentialisation' of the SPO campaign, through the unique use of
the preference voting system, was a further step in the direction of
'Americanising' the Austrian campaign process. By contrast the OVP
campaign lacked a consistent strategic line. Negative campaigning
based on advertisements criticising and attacking the other parties
were used alongside image-building methods designed to counteract
Riegler's weaknesses and deficits. Although from a technical point of
view extremely professional, the OVP campaign lacked a sense of
harmony and unity. The strategic dilemma facing it at the beginning of
the election campaign could not be solved even with the extensive use
of all possible campaign tools.
The FPO's winning campaign was based on three elements: (i)
Haider's personal attractiveness, dynamism and youth; (ii) the wide-
spread mood of protest in the electorate which was strengthened by
directed populist messages; and (iii) an increasing feeling of xenopho-
bia in certain parts of Austria following the opening of the borders
with eastern Europe, well-articulated in the FPO poster campaign,
'Vienna must not become Chicago'. The Greens' decision to offer a
leadership team of four regional candidates instead of one top
candidate put them at a decided disadvantage in such a personalised

campaign. Although environmental protection was by far the most
important political goal for most voters, the Greens were unsuccessful
in their effort to produce an offensive strategy on their core issues.
Controversial policy ideas, such as the proposal to raise the price of
petrol from ATS I 0 to ATS 30 per litre, provoked opposition and
involved the Greens in protracted explanations and justifications. The
modest resources available for advertising and the conflict between the
two Green groupings standing for election limited their room for
manoeuvre. They maintained their seats but did not manage by any
means to exhaust their voter potential.
It is possible to draw a few preliminary conclusions on the impact of
the 1990 campaign. Data from an exit poll and from interviews with
several focus groups indicate that the SPO preference campaign and
the presidential style of its advertising had an enormous effect. In the
end, image and mood were more important in deciding the outcome of
the election than were substantial issues. Campaigns matter - in
Austria too. This will influence future campaigns in that careful and
professional planning will push traditional campaigning even further
into the background. As elsewhere Austrian campaigns are becoming
increasingly more modern and 'Americanised' (Plasser and Sommer,
1991). This will have a major impact not only on the parties' self-
presentation in the media, but also on the electorate's political
perspective.
Note
1. Much of this chapter is based on primary sources such as interviews, party
publications, newspaper reports and campaign material.
References
Meth-Cohn, D. and Muller, W. C. (1991), 'Leaders Count: The Austrian
Election of October 1990', West European Politics, 14, pp. 183-8.
Muller, W. C. (1983), 'Direktwahl und Parteiensystem', Osterreichisches
Jahrbuchfiir Politik 1983, pp. 83-112.
- - (J 990), 'Personlichkeitswahl bei der Nationalratswahl J990', Osterrei-
chisches Jahrbuch fiir Politik 1990, pp. 261-82.
- - (1991), 'Das Parteiensystem', in H. Dachs et a/. (eds), Handbuch des

po/itischen Systems 6sterreichs (Vienna: Manz).
- - (1992), 'Austria', in R. S. Katz and P. Mair (eds), Party Organizational
Change and Adaptation in Postwar Western Democracies (London: Sage).
Ogris, G. (1990), 'Ebenbild oder Kontrastprogramm - Eine Analyse des
Wahlkampfes und des Wahlverhaltens bei der Nationalratswahl im Okto-
ber 1990', 6sterreichisches Jahrbuchfiir Politik 1990, pp. 151-70.
Plasser, F. (1985), 'Eiektronische Politik und politische Technostruktur reifer
Industriegesellschaften', in F. Plasser, P. A. Ulram and M. Welan (eds),
Demokratierituale (Vienna: Bohlau).
- - (1991), 'Massenmedien und politischer Proze.B', in H. Dachs eta/. (eds),
Handbuch des politischen Systems 6sterreichs (Vienna: Manz).
--and Sommer, F. (1991)1 'Managing the News. Redaktionelles Politikver-
stiindnis und politische Offentlichkeitsarbeit', in J. Dorer and K. Lojka
(eds), 6ffentlichkeitsarbeit (Vienna: Braumilller).
--Sommer, F. and Ulram, P.A. (1990), 'Eine Kanzler- und Protestwahl.
Wiihlerverhalten und Wahlmotive bei der Nationalratswahl 1990', 6ster-
reichisches Jahrbuchfiir Politik 1990, pp. 95-149.
- - Ulram, P. A. and Grausgruber, A. (1992), 'The Decline of "Lager
Mentality" and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria',
West European Politics, 15.
Stirnemann, A. (1989), 'Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies', in A.
Pelinka and F. Plasser (eds), The Austrian Party System (Boulder: West-
view Press).
3 Britain: The 1987
Campaign 1
Paul Webb
The June 1983 election seemed to herald the possible demise of two-
party adversarialism in British politics. For the first time since 1945, a
national political force other than Labour or the Conservatives
returned more than one quarter of the vote cast and threatened to
break into the citadel of major party supremacy. Since the 1970s the
Nationalists had managed to ensure that two-party domination was
broken in Scotland, but the emergence of the Social Democratic-
Liberal Alliance in England now held out the prospect that national
politics might move away from its traditionally confrontational style
towards the more complex pattern of coalitional competition found in
many parts of continental Europe. However, in June 1987 the
essentially trilateral election campaign (in England and Wales) was
as adversarial as any of its predecessors; in this respect the mould
remained unbroken.
The timing of the election is entirely a matter of prime ministerial
discretion, subject to a five-year maximum limit. When Margaret
Thatcher dissolved parliament in the middle of May 1987, therefore,
she still had a possible twelve months grace. However, she exploited
her tactical advantage to the full by calling an election at a moment
that was opportune in terms of the key economic and political
indicators. Since the autumn of 1986 public spending constraints
had loosened somewhat, the rate of interest had fallen, unemploy-
ment had begun to fall, real disposable income to rise and the
Conservatives to surge ahead in the opinion polls. The government
had fulfilled election pledges about which it could boast and radical
new promises to make. The major issues that emerged were largely
typical of domestic peace time election campaigns in Britain; the
management of the economy was paramount, and the theme which
was so characteristic of the Thatcher years - which might be crudely
summarised by the phrase 'private affluence versus public squalor' -
43
44 Britain: The 1987 Campaign
inevitably emerged. This theme encompassed a number of specific

areas of debate, including the funding of the National Health Service,
educational provision, deindustrialisation and regional disparity. The
question of (nuclear) defence policy reared its head again, as it had
done in 1983, though with less impact perhaps (Miller et al., 1990,
p. 261). In addition there were questions of strategic significance about
parties and leaders; following the debdcle of 1983, had Neil Kinnock
managed to fashion a Labour party that was a credible alternative to
the Conservatives? Or had the people's party had its day given the
apparent imminence of a third party breakthrough? Just how mutually
cooperative were the Alliance 'partners'? Under what circumstances
would the Alliance negotiate a coalition agreement? Was Thatcher's
headstrong brand of leadership by conviction becoming a political
liability?
If these questions provided the thematic substance of the election,
the party organisations supplied the machinery and style of the
campaign. In many ways the campaign was a vastly more impressive
affair than its predecessor. Labour provided a real contest for the
Tories in 1987 by injecting far more resources and immensely greater
sophistication and expertise into its effort than it had done four years
earlier. In terms of marketing awareness and input the 1987 campaign
represented something of a landmark. The Conservatives had made a
much trumpeted breakthrough in their collaboration with professional
advertisers in 1979, but Labour lagged behind through a mixture of
ideological scruple and lack of resources. In 1987 the party went a long
way towards overcoming its backwardness. Unfortunately for their
pretensions of mould-breaking, the same could not be said of the
Alliance.
The election was called in the aftermath of an encouraging Conserva-

tive showing at the May 1987local elections. Polling day was set for 11
June, leaving one month for the official campaign, but preparations
were already well under way for Labour, the Conservatives and the
Alliance. Being comparatively well-endowed organisationally, the
Conservatives always have personnel working on public opinion and
marketing, but the first tangible steps of election preparation were
probably taken in the summer and autumn of 1986. A manifesto
working group was established and public spending increased, especi-
Paul Webb 45
ally in areas sensitive to public concern, such as health and education.

The party conference of October was clearly intended as an election
marketing springboard, with its Next Move Forward theme. As
opinion indicators suggested rising economic optimism and govern-
ment popularity among electors, the first formal election strategy
meetings were called in January 1987 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988,
p. 38). Learning from the bitter lesson of 1983, Labour began its
election preparation early this time. Kinnock's press secretary, Patricia
Hewitt, had written a lengthy memorandum to her boss on the need
for such preparation in 1985, and the party initiated a new cycle of
intensive opinion research early the following year. The SDP founded
a General Election Unit at ~ts national headquarters in 1985, although
weekly meetings of the Alliance Campaign Planning Group did not
start until November 1986.
The most fundamental differences between the parties' approaches
to campaigning are probably financial ones. In general terms the
British state offers little aid to political parties, although they are
entitled to a certain amount of subsidy-in-kind for electoral purposes;
parties can send one batch of election literature to each elector free of
postal charge, the hire of public rooms for election meetings is gratis,
and there is a certain amount of free television and radio broadcasting
access. Apart from this, they are on their own. The precise sources of
Conservative income remain shrouded in mystery, although it is
widely assumed that the bulk is accounted for by corporate and
individual donations (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1980, p. 228). It has been
estimated that total Conservative national income rose dramatically to
£15 million in 1987, only £1 million of which was provided directly by
constituency parties (BBC, 1990). Despite the continuing value of the
party's opaque links with business, however, 1987 did see a new
emphasis on targeted appeals for donations from individual mem-
bers. For the Labour party, institutional sources of finance are, if
anything, even more important. The party relied on trade union
donations for more than 90 per cent of its general election fund
income in 1987; indeed, over 60 per cent of the fund came from just
seven major union donors (Webb, 1992). This was the case despite an
attempt to emulate the Conservatives' use of direct-mail fundraising
techniques (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1989, p. 17).
As a general rule, smaller parties in Britain are far more reliant on
income from their individual members, and this was certainly true of
the Alliance in 1987. Slightly under half of the SDP's central income of
£991 000 came from the membership, the rest deriving largely from a
number of private donors. In all, the Alliance attracted a central

income of £1 713 000. A wholly uncoordinated approach to fundrais-
ing and financial control during the campaign has been pinpointed by
the chair of the Alliance Planning Group as a reason for this
disappointing total:
There is no doubt that the Alliance campaign was an organisational

shambles and that lack of central funding was one reason for this.
. . . Liberals and SDP had their own budgets and expenditures;
neither wanted to siphon the money off to support the campaign at
the centre. We estimated we needed a minimum of £650000 to run
the central campaign; in round figures, we ended up with £150000
plus £100 000 for party election broadcasts. (Pardoe, 1989, p. 57)
One of the major uses that election funds are put to in modern
campaigning is advertising. Indeed for the Conservatives, this amoun-
ted to the single biggest item of campaign expenditure in 1987; nearly
£6.5 million was directed towards professional advertising. The
advertising company that made its name when it obtained the
Conservative party account in 1979, Saatchi and Saatchi, was once
again employed. However, the Conservatives also consulted the
American firm of Young and Rubicam from 1985 onwards. The
potentially delicate situation in which the party came to rely on rival
marketing consultants is thought to have emerged from Thatcher's
own personal annoyance with the preparatory research conducted by
Saatchi's and BJM (opinion) Research Associates more than a year
before the election; perhaps this was merely a case of the messenger
being blamed for the message (that Thatcher had 'lost her way' in the
public perception}, for it is not clear that Young and Rubicam
reported significantly different findings. Whatever, by the summer of
1986, Thatcher was looking for an alternative perspective from
marketing consultants (Tyler, 1987). The party also maintained a
link with the Harris polling organisation, and bought into a large
monthly survey conducted by Gallup in order to elaborate upon
secondary analysis. In addition Young and Rubicam conducted polls
of its own. From these sources, the Conservatives were able to rely
upon a variety of different types of poll throughout the campaign.
Labour's strategists sought to transform the party's former reluc-
tance to embrace wholeheartedly the techniques of modern marketing.
Determination to rival the Tories' approach to political marketing
probably sprang from the new Director of Campaigning and Com-
Paul Webb 47
munications appointed in 1985, Peter Mande1son. Unlike the Con-

servatives, however, Labour was more constrained to try and do the
job on the cheap. An effective way of achieving this was devised with
the formation of the Shadow Communications Agency in 1986. Based
on an idea originally credited to the Republicans in the USA, this
acted as a vehicle for coordinating the largely voluntary services of
sympathetic media and marketing professionals. The director of the
SCA in 1987 estimated that this body saved the party around £500 000
in consultancy fees (Gould et al., 1989, p. 72). Not that Labour
avoided paying entirely; the services of Gould-Mattinson Associates
were retained by the party, as were those of Market and Opinion
Research International (MORI).
MORI monitored public attitudes through quantitative and qualita-
tive research throughout the year leading up to the election, which in
itself represented a step forward in terms of Labour's professionalism
about marketing. MORI's director, Robert Worcester, insisted that his
research team be involved in Labour's strategic preparation on a
virtually. continuous, long-term basis; in 1983, MORI's involvement
had barely commenced before the campaign started (Hewitt and
Mandelson, 1989, p. 51). MORI reported regularly to a variety of
party fora, including the National Executive, the parliamentary party,
training groups, the SCA and the Campaign Strategy Committee.
Some twenty polls of Conservative marginals were conducted through-
out the campaign itself. The most experienced academic observers of
British election campaigns have been moved to comment that: 'There
is little doubt that the link between the pollster and the party was the
closest and most intelligent that has been achieved in recent British
politics, except perhaps for the Conservatives and ORC in 1970'
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1988, p. 133).
Unfortunately for the Alliance, they seemed to be making mistakes
similar to some of those made by Labour in 1983, though perhaps with
greater excuse given their financial constraints. The advertising
consultants Abbot, Mead and Vickers were only appointed late in
the day, and were not generally to distinguish themselves in the eyes of
commentators (ibid.; Wilson, 1987). The Liberals did no private
polling, but the SDP did manage to commission a dozen MARPLAN
polls of marginals during the campaign, and a few during the run-up
period.
In general, it is clear that the campaign of 1987 was characterised by
a comparatively high level of preparation and organisation by the
major parties, though the same could not be said of the Alliance. The
latter's defects were partly a question of financial constraint, and

partly a result of organisational incoherence. The parties of the
Alliance could not achieve the regular, early and relatively extensive
use of professional advertising and consultancy that Labour and the
Conservatives operated with. For Labour 1987 represented something
of a breakthrough in these terms; the party learnt lessons it is unlikely
to forget in a hurry.
The organisational nucleus of a Conservative election campaign is

traditionally located in the party's Central Office. However, 1987 was
remarkable for the degree of tension that surfaced within the head-
quarters team. This stemmed from what may, in retrospect, have been
a mistake by Thatcher. In exercising her prerogative to appoint a new
party chairman in September 1985, the prime minister may have erred
in choosing a member of her own cabinet who was too independently
minded a political heavyweight for the task of being a party manager.
Though close in terms of ideological outlook, when disagreements
over organisation and strategy did arise between Thatcher and her new
appointee, Norman Tebbit (ex-Secretary for Trade and Industry),
conflict was probably inevitable between two such strong-willed
individuals.
The key figures within Central Office during the campaign were
Tebbit and his two Deputy Chairmen (Jeffrey Archer and Peter
Morrison), his chief of staff (Michael Dobbs), the directors of
Research (Robin Harris), Campaigning (John Lacy), Presentation
and Promotions (Harvey Thomas), Special Services (Sir Christopher
Lawson) and the party Treasurer (Lord McAlpine). To these, must be
added the name of Lord Young, whose precise role was not always
crystal clear to external observers. Young was introduced to Central
Office in March 1987, apparently with the task of organising the
leader's campaign tours and the party election broadcasts. Young was
close to Thatcher and to the advertising agency Young and Rubicam.
Taken together, these developments almost created an impression of
two separate campaign loci within the party, one based around Tebbit
and Saatchi's at Central Office, the other based around Thatcher and
Young and Rubicam in Downing Street. The role of the professional
consultants in all this is pervasive, though by no means dominant. It is
known that Thatcher relied on professionals from Young and
Paul Webb 49
Rubicam (such as John Banks and Geoffrey Tucker) to help with

her speeches and TV appearances (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988, p. 35).
It is interesting also that Dobbs, whose role was important through-
out, came to the party on leave from Saatchi's, where he remained a
deputy chairman.
Nevertheless, the politicians also had a formal strategic role in the
organisation of the campaign. In June 1986, Thatcher had formed a
Strategy Group (colloquially known as 'the A-Team') of her most
trusted ministers. This included Tebbit, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Douglas
Hurd, Nigel Lawson, John Wakeham, Lord Whitelaw, plus Thatcher's
political secretary Stephen Sherbourne and Robin Harris as secretary
to the group. The Strategy Group probably had two purposes. First, it
was responsible for policy developments in the run-up to the election.
Second, it may well have had a cosmetic function; it was a way of
showing, in the aftermath of the highly damaging Westland Affair,
that Thatcher was capable of being merely primus inter pares in a
collegiate style government, rather than an isolated and headstrong
political amazon among a group of cringing yes-men (Tyler, 1987,
pp. 17-18).
The structure of Labour's campaign organisation in 1987 has been
reviewed in detail elsewhere (Webb, 1991), but can be summarised
here. The structure of the campaign was located in three main organs,
one of which we have already referred to, the SCA. The work of this
body was coordinated by Philip Gould, of Gould-Mattinson Associ-
ates, and Gould worked very closely with Mandelson in devising a
communications strategy which may well have had implications for
the party's policy development (Hughes and Wintour, 1989), though
this may be truer of the post-election policy review undertaken by
Labour. The second important body was the Campaign Strategy
Committee which was established by party leader Kinnock in 1983.
With a membership of around twenty, comprised of senior representa-
tives from the parliamentary party, the National Executive, the
shadow cabinet and affiliated trade unions, this body emerged as
effectively sovereign in campaigning affairs, though it remained
formally subservient to the National Executive. It met monthly
during the run-up to the campaign, and more frequently during it.
The third important body was the Campaign Management Commit-
tee, based around a smaller group of departmental heads from party
headquarters (the directors of Campaign and Communications,
Organisation, and Policy), the General Secretary, a shadow cabinet
representative, the leader and selected officials from the leader's office.
Alternatively known as 'the leader's committee', this was at the heart

of day-to-day campaign management.
Two features of this tripartite campaigning structure are especially
notable. In the first place, the presence of professional consultants in
the SCA, and others like Mandelson who have been recruited to the
party from the media world (he was formerly a producer with London
Weekend Television) indicates a radical shift in Labour's approach. In
1983 the party's campaign was largely in the hands of politicians and
party and union functionaries; developments in 1987 indicated the
onset of party professionalisation along lines described by Angelo
Panebianco (1988, p. 264): 'a much more important role is played by
professionals (the so-called experts, technicians with special know-
ledge), they being more useful to the organisation than the traditional
party bureaucrats, as the party's gravitational centre shifts from the
members to the electorate'.
Secondly, the developments in Labour's system of campaign
organisation have almost certainly served to enhance the control of
the leadership over the process. The leader now has at his disposal a
supply of professional expertise and assistance which is an important
resource of strategic thinking. Together with the growing importance
of the CSC, this represents some sort of a shift in control away from
the National Executive (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988, p. 50).
The main instrument of campaign organisation and control within
the Alliance was the Alliance Planning Group, which was established
on the initiative of the Joint Strategy Committee of the Liberals and
the Social Democrats in October 1986. This was a body more compact
than the Joint Strategy Committee, and had specific responsibility for
election planning and control during the period of the campaign.
Apart from the leaders of the two parties (David Steel and David
Owen at that time}, it initially comprised former Liberal MP John
Pardoe, Liberal peer Lord Harris of Greenwich, Paul Tyler (ex-MP
and former chairman of the Liberal Assembly}, Liberal party president
Des Wilson, Owen's public relations consultant Roland Freeman, and
SDP member and journalist Polly Toynbee. Later, party organisers
Andy Ellis (Liberals) and Dick Newby (SDP) were added to oversee
the implementation of campaign strategy in the locality (Wilson,
1987). This body met weekly and had overall strategic responsibility
for the campaign. It seems clear that the Alliance did not integrate
professional marketing consultants into its strategic system of plan-
ning and control in the way that the major two parties did.
Paul Webb 51
What of the resources deployed by the various campaign teams in

1987? Financially, there is a notable constraint on local campaigning-
a legal maximum that may be spent by any candidate in his or her
constituency. In 1987 this stood at £3370 plus 3.8 pence per elector in
county constituencies, or 2.9 pence per elector in borough constituen-
cies. On average Conservative candidates actually spent only £4400
each in their constituencies, compared to £3900 spent by Labour
candidates and £3400 by Alliance candidates. Perforce, therefore, the
bulk of each party's campaign funds was spent at the centre; it is also
inevitable that the central campaigns waged by the parties became the
real focus of attention. These campaigns are fought largely through
the mass media, of course. The Conservatives spent £9 028 000 on the
national campaign, of which just 2 per cent went to local constituency
associations and over 70 per cent went on advertising! Labour spent
£4 564 000, and only paid one-third of what the Conservatives did for
advertising, though it did have the benefit of the SCA on a largely
voluntary basis. Like the Conservatives, however, this expenditure
represented a considerable increase on 1983 in real terms.
The same could not be said of the Alliance. Total spending is not
thought to have exceeded £2 million in their case, and total advertising
and broadcasting production costs seem to have been well under £1
million. One other point of contrast between the Alliance and the
major parties concerns the amount of money spent in the locality. The
SDP alone directed £617 000 of its central money to local constituen-
cies (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1989). In part this may have reflected the
strategic need for the Alliance to concentrate its efforts on marginal
constituencies if it was to make even a modest advance under the first-
past-the-post electoral system. In these terms the Alliance represented
something of a paradox, if not to say an anachronism, in modern
campaigning. Its support was known to be well spread geographically
and socially; its problem lay in having too few local concentrations of
support to do well given the electoral system, and it was therefore
necessary to focus resources on key localities. Unlike the major
parties, the Alliance could not additionally afford to spend heavily
at the centre. The Conservatives could call on the services of a Central
Office staff of more than 120 during the election, though at any one
time only a part of this number would actually be involved in
campaign work. Labour's national headquarters staff numbered
somewhat less than a hundred, but the party benefited from a certain
trade union input at election time. For a start, a new trade union
campaign unit was established at Walworth Road, headed by a

permanent Trade Union Liaison Officer (TULO) and a staff of
seven. Its function was typical of the traditional work of trade unions
in British campaigns; providing speakers and campaign workers,
organising meetings, briefing local volunteers, and so on. However,
this new campaign unit constituted part of a broader innovation by
Labour- the formation in 1986 of Trade Unions for Labour (TUFL).
TUFL had a brief to build on the mid-1980s' momentum of the
political fund campaigns in order to recruit Labour supporters among
union members. It was, in the words of one observer, 'regarded as an
organisation which will campaign amongst union rank and file
members before, during and after the next general election' (Pat-
chett, 1987, p. 97). In the country, TUFL concentrated on providing
personnel in special target constituencies; over half of all constituency
parties had a local TULO working for them (Labour Party, 1988).
The Alliance was able to call upon the services of two central
campaign administrative teams based at the SOP's national head-
quarters; one, led by Wilson, comprised about half a dozen staff from
the two parties, and worked overnight to monitor media coverage and
prepare the following morning's press conference. A separate 'day
team' numbering around ten, coordinated the leaders' tours, rallies
and publicity from breakfast time onwards each day (Wilson, 1987,
pp. 188-9).
In terms of equipment used by the parties, the feature of the 1987
campaign that has most frequently drawn comment is the introduction
of computers by the parties. Notwithstanding the fact that 'some press
accounts during the election greatly exaggerated the role and signif-
icance of computers', one academic observer has claimed that 'the
introduction of computer technology to the constituency campaign is
one of the first really positive developments (in local electioneering)
for the best part of a century' (Swaddle, 1989, p. 30). Nevertheless,
only around one-third of constituency parties employed computers in
some manner or another. The main uses seem to have been for internal
communications between the centre and the locality, and for helping in
the targeting of election literature. With respect to the former mode of
operation, both the Conservatives and Labour plugged into British
Telecom's Gold Mail-Box system via modem links. This enabled
headquarters teams to provide regular daily bulletins, and to receive
nightly summary reports from regions and areas. One implication of
this is the growing standardisation of campaigning throughout the
country. For Labour this is particularly true, perhaps, though staff at
Paul Webb 53
Walworth Road are keen to emphasise that there is no question of

imposing a uniform campaign on constituency parties; if local parties
now have rapid access to high quality briefing material from London,
they are bound to avail themselves of it.
Conservative strategy was originally to raise their weakest issues

first and then to switch later in the final campaign to their
traditional strengths. Thatcher herself seems always to have wished
for a positive, forward-looking referendum on the next stage of
Thatcherism. Labour's plan was to build up the credibility of their
leader, see off the Alliance, and then hammer away on health,
education and social services. In the event, the Conservatives
panicked and switched to their traditional strengths (especially
defence) early in the campaign. (Miller et al., 1990, p. 166)
This is how one group of campaign analysts summarised the 1987

election, and in many ways it conveys the essential story. All the
parties employed a balance of negative and positive, defensive and
aggressive tactics, and all sought to portray an effective blend of
policy, party and leadership images. For many observers, Labour won
the campaign in presentational terms, but the Conservatives appeared
to convince the electorate that theirs was still the superior product.
This product consisted partly of the uncharacteristically lengthy and
detailed policy documentation paraded before the electorate. In fact,
the Conservative manifesto comprised two documents, The First Eight
Years being a retrospective ofThatcherite achievement in office, whilst
the seventy-seven-page The Next Move Forward was widely recognised
to be a radical menu of future reform. This incorporated proposed
changes in education, housing and local government, plus further
rounds of privatisation, tax cuts and trade union legislation.
Labour, by contrast, adopted the contrary strategy of slimming
down its manifesto considerably. In 1983 it had been accused of
producing 'the longest suicide note in history', but this could hardly
have been said in 1987. Britain Will Win was a skimpy- some said
vague - sixteen pages (only thirteen pages of which were actually
devoted to policy detail). This placed much emphasis on job creation
and industrial policy, higher welfare benefits and a minimum wage;
there was little or nothing on controlling inflation, the role to be
played by trade unions, (re)nationalisation, or Europe. This was an

unexciting and modest volume, but Labour did manage to create a rod
for its own back on the issue of Cruise missiles. While supporting
multilateral disarmament talks then in progress between the USSR
and the USA, the party declared its intention to 'inform the Americans
that we wish them to remove their Cruise missiles and other nuclear
weapons from Britain' should these negotiations falter (Labour, 1987,
p. 16). Labour's opponents were quick to point out that it was iiJogical
to go into disarmament negotiations stating that, in the event of a
breakdown, unilateral disarmament would take place anyway. It was
continually alleged that this undermined any incentive the Eastern
bloc might have had to bargain seriously.
The Alliance produced - after a lengthy and not always harmonious
process of consultation and bargaining - a joint manifesto called
Britain United. This was headed by the theme that they wanted to
establish as their own, that of constitutional reform, which incorpora-
ted a series of radical commitments to introduce a proportional
electoral system, a freedom of information act, abolish the Official
Secrets Act, modify the Bill of Rights, devolve power to a Scottish
assembly and establish fixed parliamentary terms. In addition there
was a commitment to create one million jobs within three years, and
there were notable new emphases on education and the environment.
The major policy problem the Alliance had faced in the run up to the
campaign was over defence; on nuclear weapons, a compromise was
eventually reached between the multilateralist SDP and the unilateral-
ist Liberals. It was agreed that the new Trident submarine system
would be eschewed, but existing nuclear weapons would only be
removed as the outcome of multilateral negotiations.
On party image both Labour and the Alliance faced the knotty
problem of convincing electors that they were united and ready for the
rigours of government. Ultimately this was a problem over which
Labour made progress, while the Alliance struggled. Kinnock seems to
have convinced voters that the Trotskyite Militant menace that had
threatened the party during the early 1980s was largely quelled.
Notorious left-wing 'bogey' men (and women) kept a low profile
during the campaign, and the party was able to project the image of
an apparently united, disciplined and well-organised modern social
democratic party. Prior to the election survey information indicated
that the Labour party was some twenty-two percentage points behind
the Conservatives and thirteen points behind the Alliance in terms of
the impression of unity it conveyed. By the end of the campaign,
Paul Webb 55
however, some 25 per cent more respondents regarded the party as

united; by contrast, the 'unity rankings' of the other parties changed
little, which meant that Labour surpassed the Alliance in this respect
(Miller eta/., 1990, p. 157). The Conservatives had little difficulty in
maintaining the image of a reliable and united party which was
experienced in government and competent at the crucial task of
economic management. By contrast observers detected signs of
tension in the relationship between the SOP and the Liberals. As we
have indicated, the Alliance had a trying time during the run-up to the
campaign over the issue of nuclear defence policy, and this did nothing
to enhance the formation's image as a united bloc. Moreover, during
the campaign itself, it was not always easy to present the joint
leadership as a united and harmonious arrangement.
David Owen had consistently resisted the idea of a merger of the two
parties - a stand that was ultimately to leave him completely isolated in
the aftermath of the election - and he had also denied the necessity of
electing a single leader or spokesman. His feeling was that an Alliance
of two distinct parties would reap an electoral harvest that a single
party could not hope to gather (surveys suggested that Conservative
'waverers' were far more drawn to the SOP than to the Liberals). There
was always a certain tension between Owen and the Liberals, at both
leadership and rank and file level. One influential Alliance campaign
organiser (a Liberal) has described how Owen 'at times barely
concealed his view of many Liberals as naive, woolly, lacking in
appetite for power and responsibility' (Wilson, 1987, p. 194).
It was agreed that, if in a position to form a government, the leader of
the larger of the two parties in the Commons would become prime
minister. It was decided that the two leaders would do much of their
public campaigning together, but Steel committed something of a gaffe
by self-deprecatingly suggesting in mid-campaign that it might be
necessary to minimise the number of joint appearances which left the
two leaders looking like 'Tweedledum and Tweedledee'. The satirists
had great fun making the most of the comic imagery of this statement.
Whatever, it was clear that the two leaders felt some frustration sharing
the platform so often and their campaign managers were often worried
about the difficulty of coordinating the two men's public utterances.
Surveys suggested that public evaluations of Steel and Owen as 'good
leaders' diminished slightly over the course of the campaign and by the
end Kinnock enjoyed a higher rating (Miller et a/., 1990, p. 152).
Much has been made of the 'presidential' campaign that Labour ran
in 1987. Particularly notable in this respect was the party election
broadcast produced by film professionals Colin Weiland and Hugh

Hudson (the Chariots of Fire team) which was simply entitled Kinnock.
This concentrated exclusively on the personality and qualities of
Labour's leader, and was even rerun later in the campaign. Polls
indicated an immediate positive reaction on the part of electors;
however, Miller and his colleagues (1990, p. 151) argue that
'Kinnock's image improved most in unimportant areas like seeming
energetic or in areas where he already had a large lead, like being
caring or willing to listen'. Labour's strategists have contended that
the Kinnock broadcast was 'not simply a biographical tract ... it was
using him as a vehicle - in fact, as the device - for saying something
about the Labour Party' (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989, p. 53).
However, taken together with the de-emphasis of policy detail since
1983, it was clearly decided that leadership image would be central to
the party's chances in 1987.
Arguably Thatcher played less prominent a role in the Conservative
campaign than Kinnock did in Labour's, but she continued to be of
huge importance none the less. She too had the best part of an entire
election broadcast devoted to her as leader, and while it was initially
hoped for a gradual escalation of media attention upon her over the
course of the campaign, she still tended to dominate daily press
conferences and TV appearances from an early stage. Her positive
personal rating held up throughout, and although her lead over
Kinnock was eroded somewhat, she maintained a superiority in
crucial respects like appearing to be well informed and decisive. This
remained so despite an unprecedented degree of attention on her style
of government; she was closely questioned on TV about her capacity
for admitting mistakes and suppressing conventions of cabinet
government, while Labour tried to make the most out of the
personality and values which 'cut her off from ordinary people'. This
did little to undermine the strength of the Conservatives' position in
1987, though in retrospect one wonders if it might not have helped
weaken Thatcher herself in the long run. The question of her style of
leadership had been thrown into sharp relief during the Westland
crisis, and became the focus of some attention again in the election.
When the government's fortunes were to slump in 1990, the question
was to be raised for a third time; this time Thatcher was not to survive.
What about the implementation of the campaign plans? How
smoothly were the plans put into action by the parties, and how far
did they succeed in forcing the campaign's focus onto their own
preferred agendas? On the face of it, Labour ran by far the most
Paul Webb 57
effective campaign. It was the only party to stick closely to its original
plan throughout. It had planned to concentrate on a specific issue each
day of the campaign, and by and large it appeared to do this. In
reality, however, the party and the leader were too far behind in the
polls, and had been so for too long at the moment of dissolution.
Though it could not be admitted publicly at the time, the real objective
of Labour's campaign therefore became victory in the 'battle for the
opposition'. At the outset of the campaign Labour was seriously
threatened by the Alliance, according to the opinion polls. It therefore
became imperative for the party to demonstrate that it was a more
credible alternative government than the Alliance was either a
coalition partner or a main bloc of opposition. This it did by
effectively combating the internal 'threat' from the far left, producing
a largely unspectacular but 'safe' manifesto, polishing up its leaders'
images and showing that it could at least be relied upon to manage an
impressive and professional campaign effort. By contrast the Alliance
fumbled its chance. The SCA coordinators have summarised Labour's
achievement thus: 'We lost this election but we laid the groundwork
for winning the next' (Gould eta/., 1989, p. 86).
Labour recognised that it had to concentrate on attacking the
Alliance during the early part of the campaign, and hoped that,
having 'seen them orr, it might then be able to chip away at the
strong Conservative base. This was broadly what happened. Evidence
suggests that fully two-thirds of all the electors who were initially torn
between the Alliance and Labour finally opted for the latter, whereas
only one-fifth of those wavering between the Conservatives and
Labour did (Miller eta/., 1989, p. 114). It was only really during the
third week of the campaign that things began to move away from
Labour, with a double-sided attack from the Conservatives and the
Alliance on the defence issue, clearly an area where Labour did not
have the confidence of the electorate. The other significant flaw in
Labour's campaign probably related to timing; though they started
well, the party's campaign managers have admitted to 'feeling the
pressure' during the final week of the campaign, and consequently to
'not fully maintaining momentum' (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989,
p. 54).
By contrast things went far less smoothly for the Conservatives, but
they probably paced their effort a little better. We know that there
were tensions between Central Office and Downing Street, tensions
which were reinforced by a number of professional and personal
rivalries. The general slickness of Labour's effort had started to
worry many Conservative strategists, moreover. The culmination of

this strain came with the news of a poll of marginal constituencies
conducted for the BBC little more than a week before the election; this
poll forecast a hung parliament. Some egos were bruised as a final
advertising blitz which appealed to Thatcher's sense of political
combat was planned; the party treasurer, Lord McAlpine, had to
find an extra £3 million to cover the cost of this 'panic' step (though it
was subsequently claimed by Saatchi's that this late onslaught had
long been planned (Tyler, 1987)).
With the benefit of hindsight, however, we might argue that the
impression of a 'poor' Conservative campaign which so many
commentators referred to is somewhat exaggerated. Having been in
office for eight years, having faced such weak opposition in 1983, and
entering the campaign with a comfortable lead in the polls, the
Conservatives had everything to lose. It was known that they were
well capable of organising and financing an impressive modern,
professional campaign (in British terms), and such a performance
was widely and routinely expected of them once again. Labour's
revival was a revelation, however, and captured much media and
academic attention. Yet on its own admission, Labour seemed to run
out of steam; moreover, the evidence of what happened to the political
agenda during the campaign is not wholly flattering for Labour's
strategists and politicians. They have explained their election commu-
nication strategy as being threefold in 1987:
1. Since political advertising was considered to be too weak to change

people's minds, they had to concentrate on changing what was on
people's minds - that is, on changing the issue agenda.
2. Advertising was to concentrate single-mindedly on the 'social/
emotional' area of the agenda - Labour's strong points.
3. Advertising was considered to be at its strongest when attacking
the record of the government on these areas (Gould eta/., 1989, p.
73). (Negative criticism is in any case an almost inevitable strategy
of parties in opposition, whereas governmental parties will equally
inevitably expend effort focusing on their positive achievements.)
Disappointingly for Labour, the best available evidence does not

indicate that the party was very successful in 'changing what was on
people's minds'. William Miller and his colleagues have argued that
the issues that the public as a whole would have liked to have focused
on in 1987 were primarily unemployment, health, welfare and
Paul Webb 59
education - precisely the sort of 'social/emotional' issues that

Labour's strategists were keen to promote. However, compared to
this agenda, that of the parties and the media was biased towards
defence which, along with taxation, was Labour's most vulnerable
issue. And not only did the Conservatives have some success in
making the media and Labour talk about defence more than the
latter (and the electorate) would have liked, but it very probably won
some votes through the strategy. Over the course of the campaign the
percentage of voters regarding defence as the most important issue
increased from 3 per cent to 11 per cent, and the proportion
considering it to be 'extremely important' for their voting choice
increased from 42 per cent to 49 per cent (Miller et al., 1990, pp.
204-14). In short, notwithstanding the fact that the electorate was
predisposed to favour Labour's agenda, the Conservatives were still
effective in making the most of their main opponent's weak points.
Clearly the Conservatives suffered from an organisational muddle
between Central Office and Downing Street which they will not want
to allow again, but their campaign was far from ineffective; neither
was Labour's the unmitigated marketing success that some would have
us believe. The election results are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 The British 1987 General Election
Votes Change Seats

(%) (%)
Conservatives 42.3 ~.I 376

Labour 30.8 +3.2 229
Alliance 22.6 -2.8 22
Other 4.3 ~.2 23
THE FUTURE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNING IN BRITAIN
In the 1992 election there is little doubt that Labour will maintain a
similar campaign management structure; moreover, although Kin-
nock's leadership is bound to figure prominently once more, the
party is now buoyed by a new policy profile designed to make it
more 'electable'. This is the result of a very detailed post-1987 review

of the party programme which has broadly swung the party back
towards a social market perspective in the economic and industrial
sphere. It has been further helped by the thaw in East-West relations
and the substantial arms reduction deals signed by the superpowers;
the vexed question of Labour's unilateralism has become virtually
redundant, and certainly defence is likely to be less salient an electoral
issue in the foreseeable future. For Labour this should result in a
better balance between the three sides of the electoral triangle
important to the party's strategists- party, leadership and policy.
The Conservatives can also be expected to stick to the tried and
trusted patterns of modern campaigning that have served them well
during the past three national parliamentary elections. However, they
face the need to adapt more than Labour in some respects. First, they
will certainly want to do everything possible to avoid the tangle of
personalities, conflicting authorities and marketing approaches that
afflicted the 1987 campaign. Second, they face the need to change
leadership and policy images; with the advent of the John Major
premiership the party has certainly found a new style of leadership,
but a way of promoting this style effectively in the context of an
election campaign will have to be found. Just as important is the
political image of the party; will they be able to convince electors that
'Majorism' constitutes a coherent way forward for the nation, or is the
Conservative party without Thatcherism a movement bereft of vision?
The Alliance has merged formally since 1987 to form the Liberal
Democratic Party, and this constitutes an important step forward in
one respect. The old problems of tension between Liberals and Social
Democrats should now be overcome, and certainly campaign strate-
gists will be able to concentrate on promoting a single leader in the
shape of the personable- even charismatic- Paddy Ashdown. But the
major obstacle that remains to be overcome is a basic one - lack of
resources and finance. Both of the major parties are now able to
concentrate on a strategy of communicating with electors primarily on
a nationwide basis (through both television coverage and press
advertising) because they can concentrate resources centrally and
then coordinate the way these resources are used. It is not yet clear
whether the Liberal Democrats will be able to do this. In 1987 the
Alliance parties were obliged to rely disproportionately on traditional
forms of electoral communication - public meetings and canvassing -
partly because of the decentralised nature of their organisational
structures (especially true of the Liberals). The Liberal Democrats,
Paul Webb 61
therefore, have two interlinked problems; the raising of more financial

support and its central concentration so that it can be used in a
coordinated way. In addition they face a potentially awkward policy
problem; Labour is showing every sign of assimilating its cherished
role as the party of radical constitutional reform. Indeed the problem
of vague policy image which so blighted the old Alliance is likely to be
exacerbated at a time of policy convergence between Labour and the
Conservatives.
Notes
In researching for this chapter I am grateful for the assistance of the staff in
Labour's campaign and communication department, Conservative Central
Office and the SDP Chief Whip's office.
References
BBC (1990), 'Paying for the Party', Panorama (October).

Patchett, D. (1987), Trade Unions and Politics in the 1980s (New York: Croom
Helm).
Gould, P., Herd, P. and Powell, C. (1989), 'The Labour Party's Campaign
Communications', in I. Crewe and M. Harrop (eds), Political Communica-
tions: The General Election Campaign of 1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Hewitt, P. and Mandelson, P. (1989), 'The Labour Campaign', in I. Crewe and
M. Harrop (eds), Political Communications: The General Election Campaign
of 1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Hughes, C. and Wintour, P. (1989), Labour Rebuilt: The New Model Party
(London: Fourth Estate).
Labour Party, (1987), Britain Will Win (London: Labour Party).
- - (1988), NEC Annual Report (London: Labour Party).
Miller, W. L., Broughton, D., Sonntag N. and McLean, D. (1989), 'Political
Change in Britain During the 1987 Campaign', in I. Crewe and M. Harrop
(eds), Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 1987
--Clarke, H. D.,Harrop, M., LeDuc L. and Whiteley, P. F. (1990), How
Voters Change: The 1987 British Election Campaign in Perspective (Oxford:
Clarendon Press).
Panebianco, A. (1988), Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge:
Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1980), British Political Finance 1830-1980 (Wash-

ington, DC: American Enterprise Institute).
- - (1989), 'Financing the British General Election of 1987', in I. Crewe and
M. Harrop (eds), Political Communications: The General Election Campaign
of 1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Swaddle, K. (1989), 'Ancient and Modern: Innovations in Electioneering at
the Constituency Level', in I. Crewe and M. Harrop (eds), Political
Communications: The General Election Campaign of 1987 (Cambridge:
Tyler, R. (1987), Campaign! The Selling of the Prime Minister (London:
Grafton).
Webb, P. D. (1991), 'Election Campaigning, Organisational Transformation
and the Professionalisation of the British Labour Party', European Journal
of Political Research, 20.
- - (1992), Trade Unions and the British Electorate (Aldershot: Dartmouth).
Wilson, D. (1987), Battle for Power: The Inside Story of the Alliance and the
1987 General Election (London: Sphere Books).
4 Denmark: The 1990
Campaign
Lars Bille, J ergen Elklit and

Mikael V. Jakobsen
In November 1990 Prime Minister Pout Schluter (Conservative), head

of a minority coalition government of Conservatives, Social Liberals,
and Liberals, called a general election to the Folketing, the Danish
unicameral parliament. The Danes could thus look forward to their
tenth general election in less than two decades! The election took place
on 12 December resulting in the formation of yet another non-socialist
minority coalition government. This was the third election in a row
(1987, 1988 and 1990) where despite a drop in voter support (and
seats) the government remained in office.
The frequency of general elections has accustomed Danish voters,
politicians and party activists to election campaigning. The 1970s and
1980s also saw six local and regional elections, three referendums
(one simultaneous with a general election), and three European
Parliament elections; in all twenty-one polling days in as many
years. During this period and particularly in the early 1970s the
number of political parties competing and gaining representation has
been on the increase (Bille, 1989; Pedersen, 1987). In December 1990
thirteen parties ran for election, eight of which were already
represented in parliament. One of the five not in parliament, a
coalition of Communists and Left Socialists, was presenting itself
under a label of unity, hoping to redress the poor prospects of its
constituent parts.
Instead of covering the campaigns of all parties we shall concentrate
on five: the four 'old parties' (the Social Democratic party, the Social
Liberals, the Conservatives, and the Liberals, each dating from the
nineteenth century) and the Christian People's party (a newcomer,
63
64 Denmark: The 1990 Campaign
founded in 1970). Together these parties account for a considerable

share of votes as well as seats. They include all three parties of
Schluter's 1988-90 minority coalition, as well as the main opposition
party which was very keen to return to office. 1
The Danish electoral system is a list system (with provisions for
effective preferential voting) of strict proportional representation for
parti~s passing any one of three legal thresholds. The most important
threshold requires the party to obtain 2 per cent of the valid national
vote (Eiklit and Pade, 1991). This kind of electoral system means that
all votes count and consequently that election campaigns acquire a
nationwide character. The strict proportionality of the electoral system
combined with the parties' actual shares of the vote, make it common
knowledge, at least among leading politicians, that the formation of
coalitions will be a necessity. This calls for ambiguous campaign
messages: parties have to promote themselves while at the same time
conveying cooperative messages both to the voters and to possible
future coalition partners.
The advent of television and the gradual replacement of local
newspapers by regional and national newspapers has obviously
furthered this development. From the 1960s onwards Danish election
campaigns have gradually become more 'modern'. It should be
remembered, however, that political parties are by law restricted from
advertising on any of the television channels and the regulations of the
first national channel - a public service channel - allow all registered
political parties equal access to election programmes. The 1990 election
was the first election covered by two national and a number of regional
television channels. Some politicians saw this expansion of television
access as the most interesting innovation to election campaigning for a
number of years.
In Denmark MPs are elected for a fixed period of four years. The
prime minister can, however, call a general election at any time,
thereby starting a new period of four years. The next general election
was due on 10 May 1992. However, in the autumn of 1990, difficult
and lengthy negotiations between the government and the main
opposition parties on the 1991 budget, as well as on related economic
and fiscal proposals, were unsuccessful, leaving a number of problems
unresolved. On 22 November Schluter used the breakdown in the
negotiations as an excuse to call an election (Bille, 199la). One cannot
say that the election was sudden and unexpected as the parliamentary
situation had been tense for a while.
Lars Bille, Jergen Elk/it and Mikael V. Jakobsen 65
The Social Democratic party's preparations started in the autumn of

1989.2 Candidate posters were printed and leaflets prepared (costing
DKr 500 000) in the full knowledge that they would become obsolete if
an election was not called within two years. The party had been
allocated the letter 'A' on the ballot papers, so a new 'A' was designed
for use on posters and other election material. The party expected that
a general election would be increasingly likely after the summer of
1990, since by then the government would have been in office for more
than half of the electoral period. From June onwards the general level
of preparation was increased. On 7 June an ordinary meeting of the
party leadership (of both the parliamentary party and party organisa-
tion) was used as a pretext to discuss possible election dates, as well as
political strategies to pursue before the election. 3 Three possible dates
were considered: (i) December 1990/January 1991 (coinciding with
negotiations on the 1991 budget), (ii) March/April 1991 (the finalising
of labour market collective bargaining), and (iii) the early autumn of
1991 (before the start of the 1992 budget negotiations). The third
possibility was considered most likely, with the first possibility next.
The leadership viewed the party's position as favourable: the opinion
polls showed an upward trend. The meeting decided to pursue an
offensive strategy in the months to come. Keywords agreed on were
'credibility', 'accountability', and 'justice': it was decided that the party
should present itself as in good strength and unified behind its
chairman, Svend Auken. Various policy areas were discussed and an
order of priority agreed on. As regards target groups the meeting
decided it was essential to address the entire electorate, though not
forgetting the party's traditional core groups: the poor, the pensioners,
the manual workers. The overall strategy should be to present the
party as a winner.
This meeting was the beginning of a period of election readiness
where the organisation intensified its preparations. Advertising plans
were fine tuned, material prepared and activists informed that they
should be ready for action. Overall the level of preparation in the party
was high. These preparations were made without the assistance of
professional consultants or market research agencies, one reason being
that the use of such assistance for the design of the party's 1987
campaign was afterwards considered too expensive and of little use.
The Social Democratic strategists consider themselves as experts on
election campaigning drawing on their experience, on feedback from

the party network, on opinion polls in the newspapers and on studies
produced by university researchers for general academic purposes. To
a considerable degree all Danish parties share the same attitude. The
Social Democrats can also draw on a network of skilled lithographic
artists, layout specialists and communication experts, all working on a
voluntary basis.
It was only two weeks before the calling of the election that the
Social Liberal leadership realised that a breakdown in the parliamen-
tary economic and fiscal negotiations might have such a result. 4 The
party had entered the bourgeois government coalition in May 1988
and the ensuing decline in opinion poll ratings had made it a matter of
high priority to avoid an early election. The strategy was to let the
three-party coalition end its normal term in 1992, thereby giving the
Social Liberal cabinet members time to produce political results. The
party's central office started its preparations just one week prior to the
calling of the election. Furthermore, the key personnel in the central
office, that is the general secretary and the press officer, were both
recent appointments. They had limited political experience and, of
course, no electoral experience. There had been some preliminary
meetings with the party's advertising agency to start drafting a future
general campaign, but they had no idea that an election campaign was
due only one month later.
The Social Liberals have never commissioned market research
primarily because the leadership is unenthusiastic about the use of
quantitative analysis and the idea of targeting voters: such endeavour
is considered populist. However, the party did use an advertising
agency, Nergaard Mikkelsen, one of the largest agencies outside
Copenhagen, which was also used in 1988. The agency proposed
some ideas for campaign themes and a systematic media plan
targeting potential voters. It advised that the party should concen-
trate only on two themes, one of them being environmental issues, as
such issues were part of the party's image and also because the
minister of the Environment was a prominent Social Liberal. How-
ever, the party's election committee rejected both this proposal and
another, that the party's sparse economic means should be concen-
trated on advertising in a few national newspapers instead of trying to
cover all minor and regional newspapers (with only one advertisement
during the entire campaign).
The television election broadcast was produced by Crone Film. 5 The
producer suggested that only two senior cabinet members should
appear, but again the election committee rejected the advice, arguing
that the party had five cabinet members and all five should appear.
The election committee had the final say: the producer even had to re-
edit the programme because one minister's name was not mentioned in
sync with a picture of the person's head!
The Conservatives' preparations started in the spring of 1990.6 The
early start was provoked by fear that the annual budget negotiations
might end in an election. However, as the prime minister's party it
wished to signal confidence in the eventual success of the negotiations,
so the election preparations were disguised as a membership drive. The
fact that membership has been on the decline made this camouflage a
perfect cover (Eiklit, 199la). During the autumn the party's general
~ampaign plan was adjusted to the actual situation and when the
parliamentary position became tense, a prearranged meeting of branch
chairpersons was used for stepping up preparations in case of an
election. This meeting took place only two days before the election was
called and the very next day the organisation was put on a campaign
footing. So by the time the party's national council met, three days
after the calling of the election, all the campaign posters were ready to
be presented to the council members and to the press.
It was agreed that the advertising campaign should not be too
extravagant: extensive advertising might have given the impression
that the party had considerable means, an impression the party
leadership did not want to convey. Therefore the advertisements,
which were produced by Saatchi and Saatchi, were more scattered
and less visible than at previous elections. In contrast more stress was
placed on the television election broadcast which received the highest
rating of all the election broadcasts according to one opinion poll. Like
the Social Liberals the Conservatives also relied on publicly available
information, primarily the newspaper opinion polls, rather than
commissioning their own private research. The party's voters are
scattered socially and geographically so it is difficult to make much
use of opinion polls. However, information from the public polls on the
voters' evaluation of various issues was used to decide on the
advertising themes. Even though the election was called after unsuc-
cessful negotiations on budget and taxation issues (where the Con-
servatives had advocated tax cuts), it was obvious from the opinion
polls that the voters were not really interested in that issue, but rather in
the subject of unemployment. Consequently, there were no advertise-
ments on the 6 per cent tax on middle and higher incomes, while
unemployment was given higher priority than originally envisaged.
The standing election committee of the Christian People's party is

appointed by the party's national committee during a national
conference. 7 After each general election this committee prepares an
'election contingency plan' to be implemented in the event of a sudden
general election. The committee also decides on the campaign strategy
and the radio and television election broadcasts. During the summer
of 1990 the election committee initiated a programme of detailed
preparations of party policies on the reduction of VAT, embryo ethics,
family and environment/energy. A series of committees were appoin-
ted to prepare the party's positions on these central campaign themes.
In response to the frequency of Danish elections the party put a fifth
issue on the agenda: the need for fixed four-year election periods, as in
Norway. By late October the general expectation was that an election
was approaching. The work of the various committees was accelera-
ted, fund-raising began and preparations for the production of
campaign material were initiated. Political consultancy played a
bigger role for the Christian People's party than in previous cam-
paigns. For instance, a consultant was used for advice on the
production of the television broadcast, preparations for television
appearances and the design of the party's campaign material.
The Liberal party wanted an early election. 8 In government it was
pressing for an election instead of prolonged negotiations which, it
argued, would only result in unsatisfactory solutions. The party began
its preparations months before the election was called and its head
office was on constant alert throughout November. The party has used
the same advertising agency, FCB/Hiort, Stenius & Walter, since the
mid-1980s. This agency has been quite influential in determining
campaign style and appearance; its managing director, Peter Hiort,
functions as a creative sparring partner. Unusually for Danish election
campaigns the agency played an important role in this one, especially
in the episode where Hiort introduced one of the main campaign
themes by his personal attacks on the Social Democratic leader. In a
newspaper interview he stated that Svend Auken used tranquillizers to
blur his true aggressive personality. 9 Nordisk Film, with whom the
Liberals have cooperated for the past ten years, produced the
television election broadcast.

In the first weekend of the campaign a meeting was held between the
parliamentary group of the Social Democratic party, the candidates,
the executive board, the constituency chairmen, the executive commit-

tee of the Federation of Danish Trade Unions and the Social
Democratic trade union chairmen. The purpose of this large, rather
formal assembly was to ratify the campaign plans prepared by the
party leadership and to galvanise the organisation. Once the campaign
started the central body responsible for political and organisational
questions consisted of: (i) the party chairman, the two deputy chair-
men, and the party secretary, (ii) the chairman, deputy chairman and
secretary of the parliamentary group and (iii) four 'technicians'. The
latter were the heads of the political-economic department, the press
agency, the organisational secretariat and the trade union secretariat.
This group decided on issues relating to campaign strategy, themes
and propaganda; on who was to represent the party at the daily press
conferences and on television and radio. The core group taking care of
the daily actions and decisions during the campaign was a smaller
coterie, the size of which depended on who of the above were able to
attend the twice daily coordination meetings. Candidate nomination is
the responsibility of the local branches, as is the case with all five
parties analysed here, and local campaign autonomy generally is
relatively high. The candidates were free to choose from among the
campaign material produced by headquarters and they could conduct
their own campaign according to local conditions, so long as this was
in line with centrally agreed strategy and themes. The 1990 campaign
showed no serious deviations by the candidates which were sufficient
to warrant denials or sanctions by central office.
When a general election is called the entire party organisation
immediately concentrates all resources on the campaign. The Social
Democratic party has the largest party organisation in Denmark with
30-35 employees at party headquarters and an additional 10-20 staff
during an election campaign. In addition the party's press agency as
well as the political-economic department and the secretariat of the
parliamentary group participate in the campaign, approximately
twenty persons in all. The party also has three regional offices with
a further three employees. The Danish labour movement has always
been dominated by the Social Democrats and over the years a network
has developed between the party and trade unions. This means that the
party can draw on the organisational as well as the financial resources
of the Federation of Trade Unions and other organisations of the
labour movement. It is difficult to give a precise overall number for the
professional manpower engaged in the Social Democratic campaign.
The reliable estimate is about 100 persons.
Among the 95 000 Social Democratic party members the tradition of

participating actively in election campaigns has always been strong.
The party is better off as regards the amount of voluntary manpower
than other Danish parties. However, it takes time to get an organisa-
tion of this size in motion and, given the traditionally short period of
campaigning, this has often been to the disadvantage of the party. But
due to the high level of preparation in 1990 it turned out to be one of
the key factors in the success of the party, since a major part of the
campaign was carried out by the regional and local branches. The
campaign budget amounted to DKr 10 million, with DKr 8 million
coming from the trade unions. The largest amount, DKr 5 million, was
used on advertising in the printed press, primarily the dailies.
Approximately Dkr 800 000 was spent on producing the election
broadcast for the first national television channel. The technical
facilities of the party included fax links to most of the regional
organisations. Generally speaking, fax links are of some importance
to all Danish parties, particularly at their head offices; computer links
have not yet been established.
The Social Liberal party's election committee was the principal
decision-making body, its members being the core group of the party
including the two parliamentary leaders, Marianne Jelved and Niels
Helveg Petersen. This committee - which is a permanent body but
does not function between elections - decided on campaign themes as
well as technical details, meeting three times during the first week of
the campaign. The leader of the party organisation, who chaired the
election committee meetings, played an important role throughout the
1990 campaign particularly due to the lack of experience of the new
staff. The national board and all candidates were brought together for
a meeting on the first Saturday of the campaign for a pep talk and the
launching of the election manifesto.
The Social Liberals have less than 9000 members, making it one of
the smallest Danish parties. It also has weak local branch structures.
The head office employs ten persons and only a few extra volunteers
participated. In general, very few party activists participated in this
campaign. Large parts of the party were dissatisfied with the decision
to join the government in 1988 and since then they have been rather
passive. In total some DKr 1 million was spent on the national
campaign. The party allows open access to its accounts and does
not in principle accept financial support from business organisations.
Forty per cent of the expenses were covered by donations, which is less
than the party was able to raise in its heyday in the early 1970s. It
spent DKr 178 000 on the television broadcast and DKr 392 000 on
advertising. 10
The campaign managers of the Conservatives were a group of nine
headed by prime minister Schluter and in reality also selected by him.
Members included two central cabinet ministers, the chairman of the
parliamentary group, the party's general secretary, the press officer
and two representatives of Saatchi's. The group met every second or
third day, while a narrower group, consisting of Schluter, the party's
general secretary and the leader of the parliamentary group, met more
often, sometimes together with the press officer. Schluter's central
position is quite remarkable: he not only chaired these central
campaign bodies, he also took a very active part in their work,
checking everything before its implementation. Some campaign mater-
ial was distributed from headquarters to local branches and candi-
dates, but the campaign as such was not very centralised. Nominations
take place locally, and only rarely is the head office involved in this
process. A few Conservative candidates did deviate from the party line
and had a lot of media coverage, as was probably their intention. One
young Conservative in Copenhagen argued that recipients of social
benefits should be deprived of voting rights. It was immediately
announced by the chairman of the parliamentary group that this
would never be Conservative policy. Incidents like this might be said
to have created some conusion among potential Conservative voters.
The entire campaign costs of the Conservatives approached DKr 6
miilion which were covered by some 1600 financial contributions
primarily from a variety of organisations and private companies.
Thus the ordinary budget of the party, which is mainly covered by
membership fees and public funding (available only since 1987), was
not affected by the election. 11 Advertising cost almost DKr 4 miilion,
while the costs of producing the television election broadcast was DKr
400 000. The rest was used on local radio spots and on posters,
meetings and so on. The staffing of the central office were primarily
the seventeen full time employees assisted by five part-time staff. Some
six to seven employees of the press services and the party's political-
economic department also assisted. The tradition of voluntary
assistance among the party's 36-37 000 members is not very strong.
The national committee and candidates of the Christian People's
party were summoned in the first weekend after the announcement of
the election. The role of this rather formal assembly was to confirm the
campaign strategy. For day-to-day decisions the party chairman, the
party secretary and the chairman of the standing election committee
liaised among themselves. The campaign was centralised as regards

decisions on central themes, overall strategy, production of material
and so forth. Candidates are nominated locally and must be approved
by the national committee. They are autonomous in their campaigns
so long as they stick to the broad guidelines of the party. For the most
part they use material produced by the party headquarters. The party
organisation concentrates all resources on the campaign when a
general election is called. In 1990 headquarters had five employees
and the secretariat of the parliamentary group employed seven,
making a total of twelve paid party officials to run the campaign.
The party has no regional or local employees. This modest amount of
professional manpower makes the party dependent on the voluntary
activities of its 9000 members. They are centrally registered which
means that they can be reached quickly by mail. Although only some
of them - albeit a relatively high proportion - participate actively in
the campaign, they, together with the local candidates, are the party's
real asset. The total campaign budget balanced at DKr 400000. The
largest items on the budget were the production of the election folder,
the television election broadcast and newspaper advertising.
In the Liberal party between elections an informal group discusses
election scenarios and campaign ideas. This small group is chaired by
the general secretary and attended by party leaders and media
personalities of Liberal inclination. It is important for the formula-
tion of the party's election campaign plans, for discussing and deciding
on campaign themes. Once the 1990 campaign began it was managed
from the party's head office. Responsibility for planning, management
and implementation rested solely with the general secretary and the
party leader, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen.
Neither the executive board nor the national board were at any stage
involved in the campaign. The Liberal party has a strong organisation
with 77 000 members and 900 local branches as of late 1989. There is
no tradition of nationally standardised campaigns as the party stresses
the independence and importance of its local organisations. It is a
cohesive, homogeneous party without serious internal conflicts. The
result is an organisation able to mobilise its human resources speedily
in election campaigns. The main activity of head office is to facilitate
the campaigns of the local organisations by the production of
candidate posters and the distribution of a newsletter with a circula-
tion of 2300 copies. During the campaign the Liberals raised DKr 5-6
million. The party also has a considerable capital, the size of which is
unknown, but the interest in 1989 amounted to DKr 1.6 million -
almost as much as the state grants. 12 The policy of the party is that
fund-raising should cover all campaign related expenses. Central
campaign expenditure totalled some DKr 5 million: DKr 3 million
on newspaper advertisements, DKr 550 000 on the television broadcast
and DKr 500 000 on candidate posters. A direct mail drop to farmers
cost a further DKr 250 000. The party employs fourteen to fifteen staff
at head office and three journalists at the press office at Christiansborg
(the premises of the Folketing). The head office employed an
additional three or four persons during the campaign.
The Social Democrats decided to go on the offensive with a distinctly

positive campaign. In this the party constantly stressed the need for
cooperation among the parties after the election and the necessity for a
strong majority coalition government with broad and durable legisla-
tive solutions to the problems facing the nation. Even when statements
from the other parties made it abundantly clear that a coalition
government led by the Social Democrats was out of the question,
the party doggedly continued to stress the theme. Rather than a
defensive strategy, the party sought to create the impression that it
was a safe winner. The campaign concentrated more on presenting
party image than was the case in 1988. The party leader was shown as
the natural prime ministerial candidate: he was directed to debate only
with the incumbent prime minister and to appear calm, well prepared
and statesmanlike. Before the prime time television debate his schedule
was arranged to give him an entire day without meetings in order to be
properly prepared and refreshed.
In line with the trend in recent Danish elections, the party saw
presentation on nationwide television as the most important commu-
nication channel. In light of this the television election broadcast,
which was produced by artists instead of advertising people, adopted a
snappy, music-video format. A series of early morning press confer-
ences was also planned. Most of these took place, but the party
leadership felt that the messages were not communicated in a
satisfactory way so during the last days of the campaign some were
cancelled. In previous campaigns large sums were spent on full-page
national newspaper advertisements. In 1988- and again in 1990- the
party's preference was for smaller advertisements. These were cheaper,
allowing the party to advertise in all the newspapers every day during
the last fourteen days of the campaign. The party planned two
campaigns: one using all available media and one focusing solely on
internal networks. The proposed strategy was to concentrate on the
media in the first part of the campaign and then to switch the focus to
local activities in the second part. As regards the local activities an
increasing interest in door-to-door canvassing and all sorts of
campaign gimmicks was clearly visible. In the last few years the party
has registered its members centrally thereby allowing head office to
communicate directly and quickly with them. This facility was used for
the first time in 1990. Direct mailing of members and the distribution
of a recently established members' magazine demonstrated the party's
intention to bypass - or rather to complement - the media, thereby
implementing the overall communication plan.
The Social Liberal party adopted a non-aggressive campaign
strategy, appealing for a new mandate on a joint government plat-
form. Its main issue was the general economic plan over which the
election was called. The strategy was rigidly adhered to throughout the
three-week campaign, even when the government partners started to
deviate from their common ground and media attention swayed; even
when the party lost the initiative and was put in a defensive position.
At the last of its eleven press conferences the party tried to adapt to the
situation where the Conservative and the Liberals were aggressively
pursuing their own ends by laying out new aims for Social Liberal
participation in a government after the election.
In the 1988 campaign the focus had been on the image of the
parliamentary leader, Niels Helveg Petersen. The party lost votes and
one seat. This time it decided not to focus on individuals; instead, it
tried to focus on the parliamentary group and the five ministers as a
team. Apart from a few loose discussions there were no specific
attempts to train and prepare the leaders for the television debates.
The election manifesto highlighted the five issue areas where the party
held ministries: environment, social welfare, culture, energy and
economy. It was prepared by the party organisation leader, ratified
by the national executive and printed in full in the election folder. An
official election post-mortem by the national executive was to describe
the manifesto as 'complicated, long, technical and "boring"' . 13 The
party's press meetings did not get extensive media coverage. Only one
meeting - where the Minister of Environment and a prominent
defector from the Liberals, now running as a Social Liberal, launched
themselves as new political partners in a multimember constituency
outside Copenhagen - achieved the kind of media attention which the

party was used to from previous elections.
The opinion polls predicted Conservative losses and so the general
strategy adopted by the Conservative party was to minimise these,
doing everything possible to stay in office, that is to continue with a
non-socialist coalition government led by a Conservative prime
minister. This defensive strategy called for a willingness to abide by
the government's record- not only since 1988 but also from the time
Schluter formed his first coalition in 1982 - as well as for a strong
focus on leader image. These two lines ran parallel as the party leader
saw no reason (and would not be able) to deny his responsibility for
government performance. Indirect communication activities were
viewed as most important and therefore television programmes, press
conferences, encounters with opponents and anything which would
receive media coverage, were given highest priority. The campaign was
divided into three phases: in the first week the central theme should be
'Schluter again- who else?'; then various policy-related themes should
be launched; the end of the campaign should see a return to the theme
ofPoul Schluter as the only possible prime minister, stressing therefore
- albeit indirectly - the inappropriateness of the main alternative
contender, Svend Auken. The Social Democratic leader was not
popular in non-socialist circles: Schluter had accused him of being
unreliable, allegedly one reason for calling the 1988 election (Petersen
and Svensson, 1989).
To the surprise of the bourgeois politicians - including Schluter and
his Conservative high command - it proved difficult to ruffie Auken;
he appeared calmer and more statesmanlike than before. This so-
called 'new Auken' took his opponents by surprise, making it difficult
for them to find ways of displaying his alleged faults. The Conserva-
tives also had to revise their plans for which policy proposals to
discuss. Opinion polls indicated that the electorate were not so fixed
on taxes as the Conservatives had supposed. These changes in the
Conservative campaign plans brought about a diffuse impression, not
helped by campaign messages from Conservative candidates which
deviated from the party line on some issues, and by open conflicts
between some of the Liberal and some of the Conservative cabinet
ministers.
As a party constantly fighting to stay over the 2 per cent threshold,
one might perhaps expect an aggressive campaign style by the Christ-
ian People's party. But it is also a centre party, seeking to cooperate
with both sides in parliament (Pedersen, 1987) and it has generally
conducted modest, sober campaigns. The 1990 campaign was no

exception. The party strategists realised the importance of the broad-
casting media, whether through the television election broadcast, the
great debate, or presentations on the local radio and television
channels. But the party elite had other ideas. More money than ever
before was spent on advertising in both national and local newspapers,
with perhaps more priority to the local press. For the first time the
party also presented its campaign themes in a folder in which the local
candidates could enclose their personal campaign material. Tradition-
ally the party has focused on party image and policy proposals, even
to the degree of not having candidate photographs on its posters. This
reflects leadership conflicts in the party's formative years; since then it
has abstained from focusing on leader image and from arranging
leaders' tours. However, in the spring of 1990 the party elected a
popular, young chairman and he was portrayed together with the
party's MPs in the folder and on posters. Thus even in the Christian
People's party the marketing of individuals has now been introduced.
Only a few morning press conferences were held. Any efforts to set the
political agenda or even themes of the day were abandoned in advance
because of the minimal interest shown by journalists in the party's
press conferences in previous elections. This is the fate of a small
party, underlining the importance· of equal access for the parties to
national television. The party has the potential of bypassing the media,
communicating directly with its members, but its modest financial
resources put a barrier to this option.
The Liberal party chose as a main campaign strategy to attack the
Social Democrats vigorously, and statements from party leaders- as
well as party newspaper advertisements - were often aggressive
comparisons with Social Democratic statements highlighting the
differences between the two parties. During the first week of the
campaign Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, party leader and Minister of For-
eign Affairs, tried to provoke Svend Auken into a direct media
encounter. Auken declined, using the excuse of time shortages and
proposing instead that Ellemann-Jensen meet Ritt Bjerregaard, the
prospective Social Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs. This
meeting never occurred; indeed, the only encounter Ellemann-Jensen
was to have was a street meeting, attracting extensive media coverage,
between him and the popular comedian Jacob Haugaard, who was
running as an independent in the same constituency. Apart from
focusing on leader image, the Liberals tried to stick to the issues on
which the election was called, stressing in particular the issues of
progressive taxation and state of the economy. The party succeeded in

dominating the discussion on these themes by quite provocatively
drawing attention to the alleged benefits for the lower income brackets
if progressive taxation (including the 6 per cent tax) was reduced.
The Liberal party has always been supported by farmers, but during
this campaign agricultural issues were not on the agenda. The party
sent out direct mail to all farmers to assure them that the Liberals were
still actively supporting 'the trade which for decades has contributed to
securing the economic foundation of the Danish welfare-society'. 14
Thus the Liberal party was actively trying to reach out for new -
especially young - voters while at the same time holding on to its
traditional electorate. The party received a lot of attention throughout
the campaign. It managed to dominate the political agenda in a well-
organised, aggressive campaign which gave top priority to leader
image (Ellemann-Jensen being a popular figure in non-socialist
circles). The professionalism of the Liberals' campaign was under-
lined by the efforts the leaders went through to prepare themselves for
questions from journalists after their presentation programme. Even
though Ellemann-Jensen is a ·former television reporter he was still
given a five-hour training session before the programme. For all the
party's professionalism, however, the personal attacks on Svend
Auken tended to do more harm than good. Liberal strategists neither
could nor wanted to change the direction of the campaign. On polling
day Ellemann-Jensen was to conclude that the election and the
campaign had been 'plastic'.
THE RESULT
Some commentators expected that the background to the general

election would make fiscal and economic policy issues - especially
the problem of unemployment - prominent in the campaign. It was
evident, however, that such issues were not central to the political
debates, perhaps reflecting their technical character, but also because
they do not appeal to Danish voters who oppose any threat (real or
imagined) to the traditional welfare state. Questions of future govern-
ment composition - and in particular whether Pout Schluter or Svend
Auken should be prime minister - were much more central during the
three weeks of election campaigning. That such questions should be
the main issue - as they have tended to be in recent campaigns - was
accepted by all political parties even though from time to time they
tried to hide this behind various policy proposals.
Table 4.1 The Danish 1990 election
May 1988 December 1990

Seats Votes Change Seats Votes Change
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Socialist
People's party 24 13.0 -1.6 15 8.3 -4.7
Social Democrats 55 29.8 +0.5 69 37.4 +7.6
Social Liberals 10 5.6 -0.6 7 3.5 -2.1
Centre Democrats 9 4.7 -0.1 9 5.1 +0.4
Christian
People's party 4 2.0 -0.4 4 2.3 +0.3
Conservatives 35 19.3 -1.5 30 16.0 -3.3
Liberals 22 11.8 + 1.3 29 15.8 +4.0
Progress party 16 9.0 +4.2 12 6.4 -2.6
Others 0 4.8 -1.8 0 5.2 +0.4
Total 175° 100.0 0.0 175. 100.0 0.0
•Two seats from Greenland and two from the Faroe Islands are disregarded.
The election results and their 1988 comparisons are shown in Table
4.1. 15 Evidently the Social Democrats and the Liberals were the
victors. The Social Democratic party gained as much as 7.6 percent-
age points which brought it back to its level of the late 1970s. The
Liberal party also did better than in recent elections, partly at the
expense of its government coalition partner, the Conservatives. The
third coalition partner, the Social Liberals, performed badly losing
virtually a third of their 1988 electoral strength. The final party under
scrutiny here, the Christian People's party, succeeded in surmounting
the 2 per cent threshold with a slightly higher margin than in 1988.
How do these election results correspond to the election campaigns
of the five parties? Interestingly enough the campaigns of the Social
Democrats and the Liberals had a number of features in common: (i)
before the election both were doing well in the opinion polls which
gave them a good starting position and also encouraged them to
launch an aggressive strategy; (ii) they were well prepared for the
campaign - perhaps better than the other parties - and they stuck to
their campaign plans and themes; (iii) each used a double strategy,
aiming at the general electorate as well as their traditional constituen-
cies; (iv) they have bigger and better organisations than other Danish
parties, a fact which allows them to coordinate both national and local
campaigns to a much higher degree than other parties. The two parties
also saw each other as main contenders, operating as exponents of two
general tendencies in modern Danish society: one as the main defender
of the public sector and the welfare state, the other as a constituent
element in 'the Liberal wave'. There is a clear-cut connection between
both parties' campaigns, certain central tendencies in present-day
Danish society and the election results themselves. One conclusion,
therefore, is that the explanations offered for the electoral success of
these two parties are valid on both sides of the political-ideological
spectrum. This makes the general conclusion - that the campaign as
such did matter - even more plausible.
Another striking feature in explaining the success of both parties is
their stress on leader image. However, this is a feature they share in
common with the three other parties under scrutiny, albeit to varying
degrees. It is particularly evident in the case of the Conservatives'
stress on the image of prime minister Schluter; it is also striking in the
campaign of the Christian People's party; and indeed the poor result
of the Social Liberal party might at least be partially explained by its
problems with leader image, as well as in the way its election
committee acted on this matter. Immediately after the election results
were known the Social Liberals withdrew from the government and
soon after there was a change of party leadership. Since no other
government could be formed, Schluter was able to continue with yet
another non-socialist minority coalition government, this time con-
sisting only of his own Conservatives and the Liberals. Thus, in spite
of their losses, the Conservatives succeeded in securing their main
objective.
We can draw some general conclusions about Danish election
campaigns. First, compared to a number of other countries, they are
not very costly. Second, Danish parties are reluctant to make use of
many of the paraphernalia of contemporary campaigns such as market
research, or consultants. Third, the parties generally are highly
centralised and tend to concentrate on the use of the media (and in
particular television, see also Siune, 1986) thereby reflecting how the
electoral system operates. Finally, since Danish campaigns are rather
short (often only three weeks) and quite regular occurrences, it is

difficult for the parties to plan their campaigns in every detail.
Therefore, the parties' ability to stick to their plans and at the same
time to be flexible seems to be of crucial importance for the eventual
outcome of the election.
Notes
I. On the 1988 campaigns of three of these parties see Bille (1991b). In
general on the 1987 and 1988 campaigns see Siune (1989).
2. Information on the Social Democrats is primarily based on interviews
with the party's organisational secretary, Henrik Ssrensen, and the head
of the political and economic department, Jacob Buksti.
3. Information here is from a paper by Jacob Buksti: 'Overvejelser vedr. den
politiske strategi frem til et kommende folketingsvalg', 7 June 1990
(mimeo).
4. Information on the Social Liberals is primarily based on interviews with
the general secretary, Kurt Buch Jensen, and the press officer, Bo
Jeppesen.
5. Each registered party is allowed to make one election broadcast of ten
minutes duration. This is followed by a discussion programme where
journalists cross-examine politicians representing the party.
6. Information on the Conservatives is based on an interview with the party's
general secretary, John Wagner.
7. Information on the Christian People's party is based on an interview with
the party secretary, Niels Chr. Andersen.
8. Information on the Liberals is primarily based on an interview with the
party's general secretary, Claus Hjort Frederiksen.
9. Bersen, 6 December 1991.
10. Preliminary account of the 1990 general election, presented to the
National Board of the Social Liberals, 7 February 1991.
II. The parties are allocated public funding each year on the basis of the
number of votes won at the most recent election: DKr 5 per vote in general
elections, DKr 3 in municipal elections and DKr 2 in county elections.
12. Accounts of the National Liberal Organisation 1989, presented to the
1990 party congress. These accounts are the first ever published by the
Liberal party.
13. The Executive Committee's Evaluation Report on the General Election,
12 December 1991. Report to the National Board, 26 January 1991.
14. Quoted from a letter to Danish farmers by Ellemann-Jensen.
15. For analysis of the 1987 and 1988 elections see Elklit and Tonsgaard
(1989). On the 1990 election see Borre (1991).
References
Bille, L. (1989), 'Denmark: The Oscillating Party System', West European

Politics, 12, pp. 42-58.
- - (1991a), 'Politisk kronik 2. halvar 1990', lJkonomi & Politik, 64, pp. 35-
42.
- - (199lb), 'Election Campaigning in Denmark', Scandinavian Political
Studies, 14, pp. 205-18.
Borre, 0. (199l),'The Danish General Election of 1990', Electoral Studies, 10,
pp. 133-8.
Elklit, J. (1991a), 'Faldet i medlemstal i danske politiske partier', Politica, 23,
pp. 6(}-83.
- - (199lb), 'Sub-National Election Campaigns: The Danish Local Elections
of November 1989', Scandinavian Political Studies, 14, pp. 219-39.
--and Pade, A. B. (1991), Election Administration in Denmark (Copenha-
gen: Ministry of the Interior).
- - and Tonsgaard, 0. (eds) (1989), To folketingsvalg. Vttlgerholdninger og
vttlgeradfttrd i 1987 og 1988 (Aarhus: Politica).
Pedersen, M. N. (1987), 'The Danish "Working Multiparty System": Break-
down or Adaption?', in H. Daa1der (ed.), Party Systems in Denmark,
Austria, Switzerland, The Netherlands, and Belgium (London: Francis
Pinter).
Petersen N. and Svensson, P. (1989), 'Valgenes politiske sammenhamg', in J.
Elklit and 0. Tonsgaard (eds), To folketingsvalg. Vttlgerho/dninger og
vttlgeradfterd i 1987 og 1988 (Aarhus: Politica).
Siune, K. (1986), 'Bestemmer TV valgresultatet?', in J. E1klit and 0.
Tonsgaard (eds), Valg og vtelgeradfttrd. Studier i dansk politik, 2nd edn
(Aarhus: Politica).
- - (1989), 'Valgkampene og vrelgerne', in J. E1klit and 0. Tonsgaard (eds),
To folketingsvalg. Vtelgerholdninger og vttlgeradfttrd I 1987 og 1988 (Aarhus:
Politics).
5 Finland: The 1991
Campaign1
Jan Sundberg and Stefan Hognabba
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and evaluate how the five most
important parties in Finland planned and organised their campaigns in
the 1991 election and with what result. The discussion stems from an
institutional framework in which laws and regulations are seen to have
an essential impact on how parties run their campaigns. Of course,
campaigning in Finland follows the general trend of change caused by
the increasing role of modern mass media in elections. But electoral
laws and the public regulations of parties, especially reforms starting
in 1954, have had such a comprehensive impact on election campaigns
that they must briefly be discussed. Since the introduction of universal
suffrage in 1906 Finland has had a constituency based, proportional
voting system. In only one of the current fifteen constituencies (Aland
Islands) does a system of plural voting prevail. The combination of
proportional voting and a complex cleavage structure has encouraged
candidates to stress consistent party appeals. In the original list system
which was used in parliamentary elections the voters had to choose
between candidate lists (one list included a maximum of two candi-
dates and one deputy). Since 1954 important changes to the system
have made it possible to vote only for one individual candidate. This
change has converted the Finnish electoral system into a unique list
system with voting for individual candidates. The order of the
candidates on the lists is not predetermined but depends entirely on
the outcome of the voting. Already in the late 1960s Klaus Tornudd
(1968, p. 58) noted that the electoral campaign was highly individua-
listic: 'The party organizations of course do their share of electioneer-
ing, put out pamphlets and publish advertisements featuring all their
candidates, but this activity is supplemented and often almost
drowned by agitation on behalf of individual candidates, sometimes
more or less openly competing within the same electoral alliance'.
82
Jan Sundberg and Stefan Hognabba 83
With the introduction of the Parties Act in 1969 all forms of non-
democratic organisation were outlawed, the implication being that
devotee party organisations based on cells and democratic centralism
(the Communist party) were not permitted in law (all forms of fascist
party models were outlawed at the end of the Second World War).
Thus all parties - regardless of organisational type and colour - must
follow democratic principte·s in their internal decision-making and in
their organisational structure (Parti/ag, 1969). Under the terms of this
Act all kind of centralised, parallel campaign organisations did not
satisfy the criterion of a democratic organisation. Under the Parlia-
mentary Elections Act primary elections among party members living
in the constituency were made compulsory (Lag om riksdagsmannaval,
1975). These Acts have increased the need for candidates to appeal
directly and personally to the voters: the voter casts his or her ballot
for an individual candidate, and the ballot also counts for the party list
on which it appears (Arter, 1984; Thomas, 1985). The regulations
enacted by these laws have resulted in the following three main
characteristics: (i) the disparity between parties has been reduced; (ii)
the candidate lists have promoted individualism in elections; (iii)
formal national party control over the subnational party in candidate
selection has been effectively curtailed.
The modernisation of campaigns has coincided with the new laws
on elections and parties and with increased media coverage. The first
modern campaign was in 1966 and this trend was strongly reinforced
in the 1970 election. The television replaced old campaign methods by
becoming the most important source of political information for
voters. Around the same time adolescents, born in the post-war baby
boom, entered the electorate and the parties had to find new methods
in line with the young pop culture (Rantala, 1972). The process of
modernisation increased rapidly in 1967 when parties represented in
parliament for the first time received public subsidies. In 1968 a total
of FIM I0 million was distributed to the parties according to their
number of MPs. This sum rapidly increased in the late 1970s and the
1980s. In 1990 FIM 68 million was provided for party support,
another FIM 4 million for international activities and FIM 10 million
went to the parliamentary parties (Wiberg, 1991). In total the parties
in parliament were in receipt of some FIM 30 per vote. The influx of
public money radically improved party finances and opened the
possibility of buying advertising and consultancy services. Before
1967 parties had very small financial resources to spend on cam-
paigns. A new trend began in the 1970s when supporter groups- with
84 Finland: The 1991 Campaign
sometimes hundreds of members - were formed around single

candidates. Those candidates lacking personal supporter groups
generally have little chance of being elected. In practice a supporter
group is a small active nucleus that attends to all the practical
arrangements. Its members need not be party members because other
qualifications are more important than formal membership. Formally
they are run totally independent of the party organisation. Indeed, in
practice the supporter groups often compete against other supporter
groups seeking a mandate on the common party list. In recent Finnish
elections there has been a distinct trend towards the situation where
the party organisation, with the help of its advertising agencies, assists
the individual candidates via their supporter groups and not vice versa.
The campaign, therefore, is increasingly very much a competition
between individual candidates with the larger organisational context in
the background.
The 1991 election was held on 17 March as per the legal
regulations (the third Sunday in March every fourth year). For the
first time in Finnish electoral history the two polling days were
reduced to one. A record number of parties participated in the
campaign. In total seventeen different parties contested with 1911
candidates, compared to the 1987 election when the number of
parties was eleven. In 1987 a new cabinet coalition had been formed
which radically diverged from the common red-green solution both in
colour and length. The Social Democrats and the conservatives
(National Coalition) formed a red-blue cabinet, led by a Social
Democratic president, which ran its full four-year term, leaving the
agrarians (Centre party) in opposition together with the communists
and some small parties. The coalition was an experiment in linking
together the old fundamental cleavage between work and capital at
the political level. The parties became very good coalition partners in
government, but their rank-and-file members and their voters never
gave the party elite full approval, and many of them were openly
opposed to the government. No cooperation existed between the
parties at the organisational level.
The five parties discussed in this chapter are the Left-Wing Alliance,
a new party formed in 1990 from the splintered and declining
communist movement, the Social Democratic party, the agrarian
Centre party, the Swedish People's party and the conservative
National Coalition. Three other parties with representation in parlia-
ment which are not discussed are the Christian League, the populist
Finnish Rural party and the Greens.
Jan Sundberg and Stefan Hiignabba 85
The Left-Wing Alliance, the Social Democrats, the Centre party and
the National Coalition all share the same market research agency,
Finnish Gallup, in their preparation of campaign strategy. The
findings are exclusively for the use of these four parties and each
has its own special arrangement in the research. 2
Reflecting the recency of its foundation (April 1990) the Left-Wing
Alliance started its preparations late, in September 1990. The party's
advertising agency, Focus OY, had the bulk of the responsibility for its
preparations and planning. Its task was to make use of those themes
the party wanted stressed, to design and print posters and leaflets for
the campaign and to handle the local radio advertisements. In forming
the campaign 'product' the party elite were given different alternatives
by the agency from which they could select their favoured options. In
addition the agency's function was to train the party's candidates for
television appearances, providing them with courses in an authentic
studio milieu.
External, specialist assistance was also used for arranging special
youth festivals around the country, for the printing of ballots during
the primary elections and for organising a direct mail service.
Although the external consultants had an essential role to play in
planning the campaign, the main work of the campaign itself was still
centred around the individual candidates. Of the party's 230 candi-
dates all except two or three were backed by a supporter group largely
made up of members of the Left-Wing Alliance. Their main task was
to arrange different types of political events, to advertise, collect
money, assist the candidate with political advice and to give the
candidate psychological support.
The Social Democrats' planning began in May 1989 when the
party's executive decided the timetable for completing the candidate
lists. At the same meeting the campaign timetable was discussed. The
privately commissioned polls were used to gather information about
people's attitudes to the main political issues and their standpoints on
societal matters at the grassroots level. The strategists were of the view
that opinion polls did not provide sufficient feedback on how the party
was perceived as acting. Therefore, it placed more confidence on
information about the electorate which was provided by the local
party branches around the country. The party central office made use
of one advertising agency, Bonare OY, whose work was supplemented
by a number of other agencies employed by the subnational organisa-
tions and the candidates. These advertising agencies were selected

some eight months before the election. Their principal role was to plan
and design the newspaper advertisements and other printed campaign
matter. In the initial planning phase their role was minimal: the party
leadership determined the means of transmitting party propaganda to
the voters. Only the details were discussed with the advertising
agencies. Of the 230 Social Democratic candidates about 90 per cent
had supporter groups to assist them in their campaigns.
The Centre party started its preparations in December 1988,
benefiting from its period in opposition to begin planning long in
advance. The commissioned opinion polls provided indications of how
voting preferences were changing over time both geographically and in
terms of changes in the social structure. They provided valuable
information about voter volatility and indications about the political
issues which would dominate the campaign. The preparatory meetings
were chaired by the party secretary, Seppo KiUiriainen. At the first,
December 1988, meeting the advertising agency, Sneii-Louhivuori-
Tallqvist OY, participated in a discussion on campaign themes in
the forthcoming election and on which political image the party should
choose. During the campaign itself this agency was used for all the
printed material; another agency, Kauppamainos OY, was commis-
sioned to produce the party leaflets, Traditionally the Centre party has
campaigned with minimal external assistance. This election was no
exception. As for the other parties, most of the campaign work was
centred on the individual candidates and their supporter groups.
Practically all candidates in the Centre party were assisted by a
supporter group.
The Swedish People's party's preparations started in the spring of
1989. During an ordinary meeting of the party leadership a general
discussion was held on matters relating to the forthcoming election.
The party does not bother with market research, believing it can
estimate the size of its electorate quite easily comprising as it does the
Swedish speaking population in Finland. All trends or changes in the
electorate in the various different Swedish speaking areas in Finland
are assessed and reported to head office by the party's local contacts
on the ground. These local contacts participate in different types of
party events and public meetings as a way of keeping in effective touch
with the electorate. On the basis of the information gathered at these
events the local contacts make their reports. These proved to be
invaluable sources of feedback for the party ·throughout the 1991
campaign. The party eschews the use of external consultants in
marketing itself to the public. When it requires an in-depth invest-

igation or special report an expert group of party members are
gathered to undertake the work. However, external assistance was
used in planning the advertising campaign. All advertisements in
Swedish were planned, designed and produced by central party
officials, though they sought specialist assistance on layout. The
Finnish advertisements were designed and produced in full by the
advertising agency, USP Helsinki OY. Professional assistance was also
used in the arrangement of a campaign tour around all the Swedish
areas in Finland: a voluntary project group organised special enter-
tainments. Most of the party's candidates were assisted by supporter
groups in much the same way as outlined above.
Preparations by the National Coalition for the 1991 campaign
started in May 1989. As part of the general market research
commissioned jointly by all the main parties, an opinion poll was
undertaken for the party during the period December 1990 to January
1991. This provided data on the electorate's knowledge of and
opinions about the National Coalition, an important source of
information for the party in planning what to stress in the cam-
paign. A principal target grouping in the poll was that part of the
electorate which had not yet decided how to vote. Once again there
was no prominent use of specialist external advice from consultants or
agencies either in planning or running the campaign. In planning and
designing the party's advertisements two different agencies were used:
Adax OY was responsible for the billboards, My & Grey OY
produced all the party's printed material. The bulk of the campaign
work was arranged through the supporter groups. All 'serious'
candidates had their own supporter groups, ranging in size from as
few as ten members up to many hundreds. Candidates with very high
prestige (the party leaders) were assisted by up to 2000 supporter
group members.
In Finland, party central offices play an essential role in campaigning.

In light of the fact that both the party districts and the supporter
groups tend to act independently of each other, it is important for the
party as a whole to coordinate the preparations of the party's
campaign. The most important tasks to be coordinated are the
planning and timing of how the campaign is to be fought. It is here
the political profile is created through the choice of electoral alliances,

issue orientation and ideological articulation. The party central office
does not have the authority to direct the party districts. Its role is to
provide the candidates with campaign material and to educate the
local campaign leaders. It tries to activate the members and followers
by organising public meetings, speeches and entertainment.
The role of the party leader has become more prominent primarily
as a result of developments in the mass media. The party leader has the
role of a roving ambassador: he or she personifies the party for the
voters. It is of great importance that the party leader is popular among
the voters: the whole party depends on the leader for the promotion of
its image. Whether this image is viewed positively or negatively by the
voters is of fundamental importance to the success of the campaign.
The bulk of the campaign work relating to and around the party
leader is organised by a supporter group which arranges and coordi-
nates the campaign tour and public appearances, and assists with the
data needed for electoral debates and the writing of speeches.
The manner in which the division of work in campaigning is
determined follows different lines depending on the function being
examined. According to the strategists we interviewed the power and
responsibility in campaigning lies with the party districts. It is the
districts which nominate the candidates in the constituencies and
which have overall responsibility for the campaign. If a campaign is
not successful it is the party district that is blamed and not the
candidates. The need for party members in campaign work is
marginal. They raise money and are invited to participate in those
activities organised by the party district or by the supporter groups.
Although the ordinary party members are seen in party literature as a
resource of fundamental importance for mass organisations, during
election time, however - when party activity is at its greatest - only a
small minority of the members are really activated. Most of the
activity among rank-and-file members is concentrated in the suppor-
ter groups who to a large extent finance the campaign costs through
their own activity. To summarise, according to all those interviewed
membership involvement in campaigning is seen to be important, but
they are easier to activate for a single candidate (via a supporter
group) than for the entire party.
The internal information and control between the different levels in
the organisation is exposed to uncertainty during election time. To be
effective the information flow follows important and easily accessible
stages in the party hierarchy. Formally, the most important organisa-
Jan Sundberg and Stefan Hiignabba 89
tionallevel in elections is the subnational or district organisation, from

which the electoral party activities in the constituencies are directed.
The party districts have the legal right to decide whether or not to
enter electoral alliances and with which party or parties. Given that
the candidates are selected and nominated in the districts it follows
that the campaigning is concentrated there as well. The accessibility is
high because all parties have paid staff members in their district
offices. The communication between professional units is much more
effective and technically more advanced than between non-profes-
sional units or between professional and non-professional units. At all
levels in the party hierarchy, where the units are assisted with paid
staff, the offices are as a rule equipped with modern communication
facilities such as fax machines, personal computers and sometimes
electronic mail. Thus the communication between the central party
office and the district offices all around the country works in a
professional way. But the communication between the local branches
or between the supporter groups who are run by volunteers is
capricious and characterised by competition. Campaigning in these
units is as much a competition between their own party candidates as
between candidates of other parties in the constituency. The commu-
nication is further complicated because the basic units usually lack
communication facilities which are available at the district offices.
Furthermore, the vertical communication between the local units and
the party district offices is old fashioned and depends strongly on how
well the local leaders fulfil their tasks. The communication between the
lowest and the highest level (that is the local unit and the central party
office) is even more problematic because information from the basic
units to the top often goes through the district offices first where the
information is processed and collated.
Effective communication in a democratic party organisation re-
quires a large supporting staff. The staff also has a key function in
assisting the candidates and the volunteers in campaigning. Before the
Parties Act came into force in 1969, parties with small staffing
resources developed parallel campaign organisations characterised
by direct communication and an authoritarian mode of manage-
ment. The information ran in both directions and the campaign
management was effective. But in the long run the system violated
the party democracy clause and the membership were not happy about
the strong power concentration at the top of the party.
Communication is not neutral: as shown by the discussion above, it
includes such factors as control, power and competition. The staff,
wherever it is located, is best controlled by the leading party

bureaucrats; whereas the voluntary members are less inclined to be
controlled. The disequilibrium in communication between the party
leadership and the basic units obstructs control and increases un-
certainty. This tendency is most prominent in candidate selection and
nomination. In campaigning, however, the party has to support all
candidates equally. The party leadership and staff are therefore
obliged to accept choices of candidates which are out of their direct
control. In that respect they act with some degree of uncertainty, but
because of the candidates' dependence on party support for campaign-
ing the control is strengthened. The stronger the dependence the more
the units are exposed to power from above in the party hierarchy.
According to the flows of effective communication it is the party staff
who exercise the day-to-day influence on the campaign in the basic
units and not the party leaders, whose main concern is to represent
and profile the party to the voters.
A division of labour in campaigning can therefore be seen as a
function of external and internal communication. The party leader-
ship, the most visible part of the party, undertakes the communication
to voters via the mass media. The party leader is to a large extent
dependent on the mass media, on the issues they raise, and on timing
and order. Their chance to control the process is very marginal, there
is little alternative but to respond and try to reach the voters via the
media. By contrast internal communication can be controlled and
managed according to quite different premises. Given the nature of
internal organisational activity, which follows specific rules and
norms, formal communication is dominated by the central party
staff. They have the formal executive power and the means of
control. It is when the communication is not working or when the
party candidates are openly competing that the management is out of
the immediate control of the party staff.
Public subsidies represent the most important source for financing
Finnish election campaigns. The central party office consumes a major
part of the public subsidies and only a minor part is transferred to the
districts with the result that, for the most part, the party districts, local
organisations and supporter groups have to raise their own campaign
money. The campaign material, distributed by the central party office,
facilitates the candidates' campaigning; usually they can also advertise
without charge in the party press. The tendency of recent years has
shown a gradual decline in the number of official party newspapers
and the, formally, independent press is becoming more dominant.
Most parties advertise in a wide range of newspapers, independently of

their political colour or party connection. Vote maximisation is the
dominating characteristic and the means to fulfil that aim seems to be
restricted by nothing other than financial limitations.
Table 5.1 Party central office budgets in the Finnish parliamentary elections
of 1975 to 1991 (in FIM millions)
Swedish Social
Centre National People's Democratic Left-Wing
party Coalition party party Alliance
1975 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.5

1979 1.1 1.4 0.6 1.2
1983 1.8 1.5 0.9 1.6
1987 3.1 2.4 1.0 3.3 1.1*
1991 3.7 4.1 1.3 3.1 3.2
•The figures are for the communist Finnish People's Democratic League
which was transformed into a totally new party, the Left-Wing Alliance in
1990.
Source: Party accounts and interview data from 1991.
As shown in Table 5.1 the campaign budgets of the four old parties
have increased on average by more than four times since the 1975
election. It is noteworthy that the new Left-Wing Alliance's budget
was three times higher in 1991 than in the election of 1987. More
money than ever before was raised for the 1991 election, none the less
expenditure easily outstripped re\ enue. In addition, the figures
reported in Table 5.1 do not include the total expenditures of party
districts, branches and supporter groups. Most candidates had to take
out bank loans, and the supporter groups raised a lot of 'invisible'
money which did not appear in the party accounts. It is a very time
consuming and problematic operation to derive an estimate of total
expenditure ranging from the lowest to the highest level in the party
organisation. The 'invisible' revenue, for instance, may be gathered as
extra membership fees from members either in one branch only, or on
the other extreme, from all party members. Much more common than
this are the various donations from private supporters, supporting
organisations and/or from private businesses. In contrast to the public
funds collected from taxpayers, there is no desire either among the
92 .Finland: The 1991 Campaign
donors or among the party treasurers to have 'invisible' revenue

appear in the official party accounts.
Campaigning does not only require adequate revenue; without
human resources the parties have no chance of competing. All five
parties can be characterised as mass organisations. Members are the
cheapest workforce but they are not easily activated and are not
trained to do skilled campaign work. Therefore, volunteers are
reduced to doing the most simple work such as delivering propaganda
leaflets to the voters. Door-to-door canvassing is a more advanced
task for active members. Although studies show the advantages of
canvassing, it has not been accepted by Finnish voters and is not
actively practised by the parties.
The professionalisation of campaigning has put more pressure than
before on the party staff. Their professional skills and their full
working day capacity is a resource that could hardly be met by the
use of voluntary party members. Over the past decades the numbers of
staff members have increased, though the totals for the Social
Democrats or the National Coalition are still less than fifty employees
at party central office. Less than thirty of these are skilled enough to
undertake qualified party work. It is their responsibility to write
speeches, produce party documents, teach members about campaign
work and to plan, prepare, coordinate and direct the whole campaign.
The staff is overloaded with work during the intensive campaign
weeks. None the less temporary campaign workers are hired only as
an exception. This does not imply that the party staff undertake all the
professional work. As already discussed above, much of the advertis-
ing work is arranged by hired agencies at great expense. To reduce
costs and thereby maximise resources the staff in each of the parties'
ancillary and affiliated organisations are also involved in campaign
work. The involvement comes naturally because these organisations
(women, youth, education, temperance, vocational and so on) are
usually located in the same building as the party central office. Thus
the staff of these organisations and the party share a common
workplace and together their economic and human resources are
impressive. The activity of these ancillary and affiliated organisations
is mainly financed from the state budget under 'non-political' headings
such as youth culture, education, temperance and the like. Resources
are transferred to the party when the education organisation is
responsible for educating all the party campaign workers, or when
the women's and youth organisations take the responsibility of
producing party propaganda for their members and supporters. In
essence, the more loosely connected labour unions and the workers'
sports federation support the socialist parties economically and
promote party messages among their members. The system works in
similar ways for the agrarian Centre party where the producers'
organisations have a key role. The Swedish People's party has
connections with many Swedish organisations and for these, as for
the agrarians, the barrier between what is regarded as politics and
what is not is low. Finally, the conservative National Coalition has
close ties with the economically strong employers' organisations. All in
all the staff in these supporting organisations are often party members
or adherents, and their members - at least those in leading positions -
in a similar way are either party members or adherents. Although this
system of organised resource allocation seems to function well, there
are signs among the labour union members that the socialist domi-
nance may be threatened in the future. The important socialisation
channel of the workers' sports federation may soon merge with the
national non-socialist federation. Such a change would considerably
weaken the organisational resources of labour parties during election
time.
In contrast to elections in the past, the 1991 election campaign was

heavily influenced by an international conflict which had no apparent
connection to the internal Finnish political arena. As a consequence,
just as the political intensity was increasing at the outset of the
campaign, media and general interest in it were distracted. The
outbreak of the Gulf War switched mass media attention away from
the campaign in the cold north to the hot battle fields of Kuwait.
There was little sign of any sustained attempt to relaunch the
campaign and the silent party contest continued to the very end of
the war. This experience shows how much campaigning is dependent
on mass media and how vulnerable the mass media are to a tendency
to switch focus from one important topic to another. The big losers in
the process were the parties because they failed to maintain their
position at the top of the media agenda. It was rather like a game
where the winner takes all and the losers have no other option but to
wait for better times. We can also conclude from this that a strike, a
lock out, or any other break in media flow would have a disastrous
effect on campaigning. To take this point further, it seems likely that
free elections in a modern democracy would easily collapse if the mass

media, for one reason or another, were to ignore election campaigning.
If this is the case, even a written law on mass media responsibility in
elections may be too weak a guarantee to protect democracy.
This was the first campaign for the Left-Wing Alliance. Its
predecessor had a long communist heritage: the new party was meant
to be something totally different from the obsolete communist move-
ment. Instead of one strong leader the leadership was originally
supposed to be shared by three, Claes Andersson, Salme Kandolin
and Kari Uotila, all with equal strength. It quickly became clear that
the party's advertisements, particularly in their presentation of leader
image, would be diluted by their portrayal of the collective leadership.
In the campaign all three leaders were supposed to have equal shares
of the party's communication messages. As time proceeded, however,
the campaign was more and more dominated by one of the three, the
Swedish speaking poet, Claes Andersson. He was well known to the
voters from his literary contributions and he became personified as
party leader by the mass media. The new image was not viewed with
approval by the party's members and traditional voters. They had very
fixed views on propaganda content and on campaign style. The party
leaders, however, were convinced that there was no choice, there was
no way back to the old-fashioned style.
Before the outbreak of the GulfWar European integration had been
the main theme of the Social Democrats. By the time the party had
managed to restart its campaign time had virtually run out. There were
no resources left to raise the same theme again. Towards the end of the
election campaign the debate was dominated by the question of the
future composition of the new cabinet and the Social Democratic
party found itself on the defensive. According to its leading strategists
the tactics in this election of the opposition parties, led by the Centre
party, were considerably different from previous campaigns. Instead
of raising their own themes, the opposition proceeded to attack the
government: there was little attempt by the opposition to present their
alternative ideas. This was seen as a new development in Finnish
election campaigning which the Social Democrats had not taken into
account. The party's strategists had presumed that they could ride on
an image of safety and continuity, reflecting the Social Democrats'
long cabinet experience. However, this image, if anything, tended to
give a picture of the party as rigid and obsolete.
The Centre party had been forced into opposition by the Social
Democrats after the 1987 election. It was a shock and a totally new
situation for the most experienced government party to be ignored by

the Social Democrats and the National Coalition. The agrarians have a
long coalition experience with the former and, with the latter, a strong
non-socialist partnership in Parliament. In the light of this, it was only
natural that the party should emphasise strongly its discontent with the
cabinet. The Social Democrats and the conservatives were accused of
favouring the urban areas in the south and of disregarding the
peripheral areas in the north and east. This theme was supported by
the mass media which strongly helped the party in putting this issue at
the top of the electoral agenda for the duration of the campaign. Hence
the agrarian campaign theme became the most dominant and visible.
The Social Democrats and the conservatives had no choice but to set
their own themes aside and instead to concentrate on defending their
coalition government. The Centre party's success in choosing and
promoting the dominant campaign theme strengthened its image. Its
new leader, Esko Abo, and its large organisation were both emphasised
as strong, challenging forces to be reckoned with by the power holders.
There is no better image to be achieved by a party than that of being the
strong defender of the weak against the mighty in society.
The theme of the Swedish People's party's campaign was very
simple, promising no immediate gains for the voters. The Finnish
economy would have to be restructured and, in the meantime, there
could be no promises of any handouts for the voters. Although the
Finnish economic crisis was rapidly deepening, the government parties
-with the exception of the Swedish People's party- preferred to avoid
discussing negative economic prospects. Whatever theme the Swedish
People's party chooses it is always overshadowed by the relationship
between the Swedish minority and the Finnish majority. In the autumn
of 1990, the party managed to defeat a proposal in parliament to
abolish the obligatory teaching of Swedish in Finnish speaking
schools. Feelings ran high and the mass media were full of strong
anti-Swedish emotions from some populist MPs and from the public at
large. Incidents like this are very beneficial for the Swedish People's
party in elections, helping it to attract sympathy votes.
In recent elections the party has systematically made efforts to
change its image. The 1991 election was no exception. The party
actively wants to win votes from Finns. Therefore, the unilingual
Swedish party image has been undergoing a change towards bilingual-
ism. By advertising in Finnish the party sought to attract liberal Finns
who support the Swedish minority and the party's efforts to deepen
Finland's ties with the rest of Scandinavia.
According to a National Coalition opinion poll conducted for

internal use, the respondents had quite a negative view of the party.
Its members were characterised as arrogant and distant. It turned out
to be an impossible task to improve the party's image during the short
campaign. The intention was to be seen as more caring about the
voters and to appear as a safe choice. The themes followed the same
careful style. In general the party was characterised as pro Common
Market; individual themes focused on included lowering taxes, better
housing, stronger defence, greater economic productivity, a reduced
public bureaucracy. Promises to the voters were allowed only if they
could be regarded as feasible in a conservative coalition government.
On that point all the coalition parties seemed to follow the same
careful line. All of them must have known that the 1991 state budget
would be in grave difficulties in the light of the country's severe
economic decline. The National Coalition's strategists were not
satisfied with their campaign. Neither the themes nor the efforts to
change the party image were successful. It was believed that the Centre
party had a big advantage by its position in opposition which it
utilised in an unfair way.
THE RESULT
Voter turnout is a good measure of how well the competing parties

managed to mobilise the electorate in the campaign. In the period
from 1962 to 1983 turnout has fluctuated between 79.7 to 85.1 per
cent. In the 1987 election turnout sank to 76.4 per cent which
corresponds to the average level in the 1940s and 1950s. The decline
continued and in 1991 only 72 per cent of the electorate voted.
Whether or not this low record was caused by the short campaign is
open to discussion. It is, however, apparent that the campaign failed to
mobilise the voters to the same extent as before.
The successful campaign of the Centre party had strong effects on
the electoral results (Table 5.2). The agrarians were the indisputable
winners of the election. By contrast the lacklustre performances of the
Social Democrats and the National Coalition produced an electoral
setback for them. With fifteen new seats and almost 25 per cent of the
vote the agrarians are now the biggest party, a position they have not
held since the 1962 election. The other victors in this election were the
Christian League (eight seats), the Greens (ten seats) and the liberals
(one seat). The populist Finnish Rural party was the sole small party
Jan Sundberg and Stefan Hlignabba 97
to lose support (and seven seats). All in all, of the seventeen parties
that competed in the election, nine managed to win seats in parlia-
ment. As a result the parliament is more fragmented than ever before.
Table 5.2 The Finnish 1991 parliamentary election
Seats Change Votes(%) Change(%)

Left-Wing Alliance• 19 -1 10.1 -3.6
Social Democratic party 48 -8 22.1 -2.0
Centre party 55 + 15 24.8 +7.2
Swedish People's party 12 -1 5.5 +0.2
National Coalition 40 -13 19.3 -3.8
Others 26 +8 18.2 + 1.9
•The change refers to the added totals of the Finnish People's Democratic
League and the Democratic Alternative.
Source: Official returns and official preliminary reports.
There is no direct correlation between the amount of money

invested in the campaign and electoral success. The Greens managed
to more than double their representation in parliament with very
scarce economic resources. By contrast the National Coalition
invested, in vain, more money in the campaign than any other
party. The result was discouraging with the loss of fifteen seats. Party
image and choice of themes is very important to a successful
campaign. If a party does not manage to find the right theme at the
right moment money can be no guarantee of success. Those who
manage to make the right choices are the freeriders of the system
because the mass media pay attention and magnify their issues totally
free of charge. In this campaign the Centre party came very close to
this freeriding phenomenon. No wonder that its main competitors
were so indignant after the election.
To put these concluding points more formally, we suggest that there
are two variables which are essential in understanding the mechanisms
behind successful campaigning. First, there are the campaign resources
which include both money and human resources. Second, there is the
phenomenon of freeriding where the right choice of theme(s) attracts
mass media attention and magnifies the issue to the public free of
charge. Overall the outcome of a campaign can be systemised in the
following matrix (Figure 5.1).
Freeriding
yes no
I II
Campaign
Resources
low III IV
Figure 5.1 The key factors to successful campaigning
I. High campaign resources in combination with freeriding is the

most successful option for winning an election. It is only certain
types of parties which have these possibilities: they are big and
well established in the party system. Therefore, the result often
leads to power maximisation because an electoral victory gives
access to offices in government.
II. As in the previous case, parties in this cell are big and well
established. They pay a high price for the campaign but they fail
to get the degree of support sought. At best they manage to keep
their share of the vote, and if their close competitor takes the
advantage of freeriding, the electoral losses can be considerable.
III. Parties with low campaign resources have weak organisations
and few if any seats in parliament. This need not hinder
freeriding. Small parties are often led by charismatic leaders
who can utilise freeriding with remarkable results. But with
small organisational resources the victory can easily turn to
failure in the next election.
IV. As in the previous case, parties in this cell have weak organisa-
tions and few if any seats in parliament. Their prospects of
winning seats in elections are weak without a freeriding pull.
At best they may keep the share of vote, but if their closest
competitors take advantage of freeriding the electoral base may
disappear.
Finally, because freeriding is one of the key factors to success in

campaigning it is as much the parties as the individual candidates who
attempt to utilise the option. A candidate with a background as a well-
known sportsman or actor has a freerider advantage in the mass
media. Regardless of whether or not the party manages to achieve a

freerider option, the well-known candidate may nevertheless succeed
with his or her own theme in the constituency.
Notes
1. The background interviews for this chapter were conducted by Hognabba

and the chapter was written by Sundberg. Among those interviewed were:
Peter Heinstrom, party secretary, Swedish People's party; Jouko Nuuti-
nen, project secretary, Left-Wing Alliance; Jorma Saloniemi, party
secretary, National Coalition; Jukka Koivisto, information director,
National Coalition; Jussi Yli-Lahti, director of the political division,
Centre party; Jorma Westlund, director of the organisation, Social
Democratic party.
2. The four party polls have been undertaken annually since 1973. No
serious conflicts have appeared as this arrangement has proven to be
beneficial for the participants. Each party has the option of commission-
ing separate questions for their own use as part of the common
questionnaire.
References
Arter, D. (1984), The Nordic Parliaments (London: C. Hurst).

Lag om riksdagsmannaval, 16 May 1975, 319.
Partilag, 10 January 1969, 191.
Rantala, 0. {1972), 'Vaalikampanjain yleislinjat', in P. Pesonen (ed.),
Protestivaalit nuorisovaa/it (Helsinki: Ylioppilastuki).
Thomas, A. (1985), 'Members of Parliament and Access to Politics in
Scandinavia', in V. Bogdanor (ed.), Representatives of the People (Lon-
don: Gower).
Tornudd, K. (1968), The Electoral System of Finland (London: Hugh Evelyn).
Wiberg, M. (1991), 'Public Financing of Parties as Arcana Imperii in Finland',
in M. Wiberg (ed.), The Public Purse and Political Parties (Helsinki: Finnish
Political Science Association).
6 France: The 1988
Presidential Campaign
Kay Lawson and Colette Ysmal
In 1988 the French voters gave Fran~ois Mitterrand a second term as

president. Although it was clear long in advance that the Socialist
leader would be one of two candidates in the run-off election, his final
victory was far from certain. In the end his margin of victory was
relatively strong: 54.01 per cent to Jacques Chirac's 45.98 per cent. The
1988 campaign took place, as do all campaigns, in the context of a
national political system, consisting of four key components: the
constitutional system, the party system, the electoral system and the
campaign system.
The French constitutional system is best described as quasi-
presidential. The constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958
and significantly amended in 1962, gives the president the popular
base of direct election and a number of important formal powers. At
the same time, it gives the government the right to determine and
direct the policy of the nation, and makes the prime minister
responsible for directing the operation of the government, ensuring
the execution of Jaws, and providing for national defence. The actual
operation of this system of overlapping powers is complex and
political. So long as the president has the trust and support of a
strong majority of the people, then he or she will be the most powerful
leader, choosing and dismissing premiers and governments at will and
guiding all the affairs of state.
However, once the political balance shifts away from a president,
and the French people elect a legislature whose majority does not
support the president's party or policy, then a significant measure of
power shifts into the hands of the prime minister. The president is
politically obliged to select a prime minister of whom the new National
Assembly approves; otherwise, the legislature would be capable of
bringing the government down by a motion of censure. This person
will be of a different party from the president, and have a different
100
Kay Lawson and Colette Ysma/ 101
programme, and although the president will still have significant

powers, the powers of the prime minister now become significant in
their own right. This is the situation the French have termed
'cohabitation', and it occurred for the first time in 1986 when the
Socialists and their left-wing partners lost the control of the legislature
which they had gained in 1981 shortly after the election of Mitterrand
to the presidency, and as a consequence Chirac was appointed prime
minister. It is the situation that prevailed as Mitterrand's first term in
office drew to an end, and he and Chirac became the chief contestants
in the presidential election of 1988.
The party system is as subtle, as complex and as sensitive to political
change as the constitution to which it responds (Lawson, 1981; Ysmal,
1989). There are five key political movements: the Communist party
(PCF), the Socialist party (PS), the Union for French Democracy
(UDF, itself composed of several parties), the Gaullists (RPR, for
Rassemblement pour Ia Republique), and the National Front. The
Communists and the National Front, on the far left and very far right
respectively, attract only around 10 to 12 per cent of the vote each, but
the power of the former has been sharply on the decline and that of the
latter alarmingly on the rise (rising to 14 per cent in the presidential
election of 1988). The chief parties contending for control of the
offices of state are the Socialists, and the UDF and RPR, the latter
two constituting the 'classical right'. The Socialists normally seek to
work in alliance with the Communists, with a more recent effort to
'open to the centre'; the UDF and the RPR routinely (if not always
harmoniously) work in alliance and normally seek to avoid the need
for the support of the openly racist National Front (but do not always
succeed in that effort, particularly in local elections). 1
The French have also devised a hybrid electoral system of single
member districts with run-off elections. In presidential elections only
the top two candidates compete in the run-off, which takes place two
weeks after the first contest. 2 The combination of hybrid constitu-
tional and electoral systems is powerful in shaping the organisation
and strategies of the parties. Because the presidency is so strong an
office, it is important for every party to have a leader who is
'presidentiable' and can attract a mass following. At the same time,
every party is continuously motivated to try to augment its strength in
parliament, either to give a successful presidential candidate adequate
support once in office or to be able to deny that support and form an
alternative power base when it cannot control the presidency. The first
ballot of the two ballot electoral system permits new parties not yet
102 France~· The 1988 Presidential Campaign
ready to play the presidential game to form and compete, reluctant

alliance partners to differentiate themselves from each other in the
voters' minds, and voters to express their true opinions without serious
risk to the formation of an effective government. Then, once the
results are in, minor candidates are forced out and alliance partners
combine pragmatically, either withdrawing candidates in each other's
favour according to which party did better in each constituency in
legislative elections or, in presidential elections, lending support to the
alliance candidate who remains in the run-off.
The net result of the combination of these institutional forces for
French parties is: (i) parties which are increasingly centralised and
personalised, yet which must nevertheless maintain strength within
constituencies, and (ii) a porous party system, always open both to
new arrivals and to new departures. It is a system which lives and
breathes, and maintains a vitality unusual in the present era of
worldwide party decline. However, it is also true that the increasing
personalisation of French parties, combined with the non-institutional
forces of contemporary revolutionary changes in communications
technology, has served in France as elsewhere to weaken the parties
and to give political campaigns a strong flavour of modern commer-
cialisation.
The strength of these new forces was first felt in 1965, for three
reasons. This was the first presidential campaign after the adoption of
presidential election by universal suffrage: direct election of the
nation's most important leader dramatised and personalised the
campaign. Second, television had by this time become sufficiently
significant in the daily lives of the French to motivate its greater
political use. Third, public opinion polling had become more common,
more popular and more credible.
A relatively minor centrist candidate in the 1965 struggle for the
presidency, Jean Lecanuet, was the first to take the plunge and use a
modern marketing strategy in his campaign. Lecanuet had a team of
marketing specialists, and under their guidance he became the first
candidate to pay individuals to put up campaign posters, the first to
use campaign 'gadgets', the first to use marketing research- and even
the first to have his teeth capped. Lecanuet's chief advisor was Michel
Bongrand, who later worked for Pompidou and created his own
political marketing company in 1968. The demand for such services
grew, particularly after consultant Jacques Seguela was credited with a
key role in Mitterrand's 1981 election victory, and Dominique Baudis
and Alain Carignon won the mayoral races in Toulouse and Grenoble
Kay Lawson and Colette Ysmal 103
respectively (Genies, 1987). In the shift to political marketing,

candidate loyalty to a party and its programme have become less
important, as have the volunteer efforts of party militants.
Under French law the official presidential campaign begins only two
weeks before the first ballot. But all that really means is that no public
monies will be visibly spent on the campaign before then: campaign
literature paid for by the state will not be sent out, official public
billboards (of equal size and equal number for each candidate) will not
be put up in their appointed spots, and free use of radio and television
will not be allowed. There is nothing to stop the candidates from
beginning unofficial but unmistakably campaign-directed activity
whenever they wish.
The tendency towards an early commencement of presidential
campaign activity is compounded in France by factors already
mentioned: as each party must have its 'presidentiable' candidate,
there is a sense in which as soon as that person is clearly identified, he
or she is permanently campaigning. As Olivier Duhamel (1989, p. 133)
has pointed out, 'no one in France doubted, more than two years
before the election, that Barre, Chirac and Mitterrand ... would be
the three great candidates'. Nor are French candidates as subject to
sudden death as in the United States - the French media have no
tradition of prying into the private lives of their leaders (and in any
case the reaction of the French to a scandal of the type that brought
down Gary Hart would more likely be amused approval).
The official campaign season is always conducted under a set of
elaborate rules: those for the presidential election of 1988 were
carefully spelled out by the Ministry of the Interior in a twenty-
three-page memorandum to all candidates and enforced by a National
Commission for the Control of the Electoral Campaign which
maintained local offices in every department (Ministere de
l'Interieur, 1988). It was the responsibility of this Commission to
send out the candidates' official 'declarations' and to make the
necessary arrangements for the official posters on the official bill-
boards, as well as to rule on any problems developing in the course of
the campaign. All the official announcements of the candidates were to
be prepared according to rigorously standardised formats: the official
poster stating the candidate's declarations had to be exactly 594 x 841
104 France.' The 1988 Presidential Campaign
mm and the candidate was required to deliver 150 copies no later than
8 pm on 10 April; the official poster announcing meetings and
broadcasts on behalf of the candidate could not be larger than 297 x
420 mm; posters must not be printed in blue, white and red (the
colours of the French flag; no candidate should suggest he or she is the
only patriotic choice). It was formally forbidden to put up posters
anywhere other than the official locations or to use paid advertising in
the press or 'by any means of audiovisual propaganda'. Public
employees were forbidden to distribute campaign propaganda and
all printers and editors as well as the candidates themselves were held
responsible for complying with the regulations.
Under a law passed on 11 March 1988, every French candidate is
required to record all campaign monies received and disbursed in the
six months preceding the campaign; however, for this particular
election, accounts had to be kept only between the date of the passage
of the law and the election (about five weeks). The new law limited
individuals to giving FF20 000 per candidate and groups to FF50 000;
such gifts are tax deductible, but must not represent more than 1.25
per cent of the taxable income of individuals or more than 2 per cent
of the taxable income of groups. No limit is set on the amount a
political party may give a candidate. Any gift greater than FF2000
must be made by cheque, and anonymous gifts made in cash must not
exceed 20 per cent of the total finances of the campaign. Loans or
'advances' count as contributions. And no matter how much he or she
has received, the candidate is not supposed to spend more than FF120
million on the campaign for the first ballot or exceed an additional
FF20 million for the run-off election.
In addition to contributions, presidential candidates may count on a
large degree of public financing. The state pays for all official posters,
for their transport from printer to points of distribution and for the
costs of hanging them. It reimburses candidates for up to FF6 million
of their expenses if they obtain 5 per cent or more of the vote on the
first ballot, and for up to FF30 million if they are in the run-off
(always under the condition that they have submitted their accounts
properly and have not spent more than allowed by law). They are also
guaranteed equal free time on radio and television.
If the official campaign were the only campaign, the above rules
would no doubt serve as a sufficient control on campaign finance. As
we have noted, however, the unofficial campaign begins long in
advance. In practice great sums are spent without any accountability
whatsoever prior to the official campaign.
French candidates and their parties raise campaign monies in four

ways. First, party organisers seek contributions from individuals,
usually requesting cheques made out to the candidate's organisation.
The Communist party in particular has relied on this method of
raising money. Second, all the parties sell various campaign objects
and miscellaneous items at public meetings. The Rally for the
Republic was particularly inventive in this domain: one of its most
popular badges, printed only with the name of Jacques Chirac, could
be made to play the Marseillaise. The National Front not only sold
campaign paraphernalia, but charged an admission fee to meetings at
which their candidate was to appear.
The third method of fundraising is to seek gifts from individuals and
(especially) from businesses. Prior to the limitations imposed by the
law of March 1988, such gifts were secret and unlimited. Since the
passage of that law, the general suspicion is that such gifts continue to
be made, particularly by private enterprises to parties on the right, but
that now the donors cover their tracks by creating a false paper trail.
The Socialists, presumably piqued by the greater ease right-wing
parties have in making successful appeals to corporations, went so
far in 1988 as to create a false corporation with false bills to cover
private donations. Unfortunately for the PS, the real mission of the
Societe Urba-Technique, a private company that was ostensibly doing
jobs for local governments but in fact served only to launder campaign
monies, was eventually discovered. The scandal that ensued produced
considerable newsprint and a fair amount of interest, but very little
amazement. According to recent opinion polls, the French are readier
than ever to believe that les hommes politiques are corrupt (the
proportion willing to say so moved from 38 per cent in 1977 to 55
per cent in 1990) and less and less likely to believe that politics is 'an
honourable activity' (from 65 per cent in 1985 to 50 per cent in 1990). 3
The fourth method of campaign financing is for the candidate's
party to make gifts to the candidate, often by paying for such items as
hall rentals, chairs, security forces, music and refreshments. The
parties themselves receive public financing from the state, in addition
to members' dues and the gifts made directly to them by interested
individuals and corporations. The RPR and the PS were particularly
generous to their candidates who were, not coincidentally, the two
candidates who made it into the run-ofT election.
One of the first uses to which campaign funds are put is to pay for
the services of skilled political consultants. The consultants are
themselves key participants in fund-raising, but in addition they
106 France: The 1988 Presidential Campaign
conduct polls - or consult those conducted by others - to determine

the key issues of the day, develop the personal campaign skills of the
candidates and fabricate the image the candidate will present.
Polls are extremely important in French campaigns. From October
1987 to June 1988 two or three new polls were published every day by
the press, totalling nearly 900. Some related to the qualities of the
candidates (their images, their qualifications to be president, how well
they could be expected to meet the demands of the voters), some to the
voting intentions of the electorate (by socio-demographic categories,
including religion, an important variable in France), and still others to
voters' attitudes (their values, ideologies, and/or opinions on key
issues of the day). The sample is always national. Although panels
are not employed, the same questions are asked over and over again,
in order to track changes over time.
A distinctive aspect of the French campaign is the widespread
dependency on private polling agencies that do not have strong
political links to the party or the candidate. SOFRES, IFOP, CSA,
BVA and Louis-Harris France are all used extensively by the
candidates.4 Furthermore, these agencies in tum rely heavily on the
skills of political scientists trained in survey research for analysis of the
results. The link between academic expertise and candidate perfor-
mance is unusually strong in France. Gerard Grunberg, a Director of
Research at CNRS (The National Centre for Scientific Research), was
one of the chief campaign advisers of Michel Rocard and then, when
Rocard became prime minister, stepped down from his academic post
altogether to become Adviser for Opinion and Elections, a paid
government position on Rocard's official staff. Political scientists
Jean-Luc Parodi and Roland Cayrol have also offered their services
to Rocard, while their colleague Jean Charlot has analysed poll data
for Chirac as mayor of Paris and also as presidential candidate.
Professor Alain Lancelot, now Director of the Institut d'Etudes
politiques de Paris, has been an adviser to Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
Besides the published polls, the candidates often have access to
useful information through the agencies they control. A candidate who
is also the prime minister may learn more from his own Service
d'Information et de Diffusion than he can from any poll; one who is
president is similarly aided by queries conducted at his official request
and, of course, at taxpayers' expense. The candidates of the PS, the
RPR and the UDF normally rely as well on private polls ordered by
their parties; those of the PC and the FN are more likely to use what
they can find in the press. In general, the PC is least likely to bother
with polls or any of the political marketing paraphernalia. The

Communist Central Committee approves the themes defined by the
party's Bureau Politique, after which the candidate places his trust in
the wisdom of the party and the ability of its militants. The National
Front is ready to wage a more modern campaign, but relies largely on
in-house students or practitioners of political science, market research
and advertising. The major French candidates, however, believe in the
polls and use them to thread their way through the campaign shoals.
In 1988 it soon became clear that five issues would dominate the
campaign: the economy, education, social policy, civil liberties and the
role of France in the world. The French economy had not yet fully
rebounded from the mid-1970s' oil crisis. Unemployment and the
concomitant problem of how to maintain a minimum revenue for
everyone, the budget deficit, the relative virtues of nationalisation and
privatisation, the threat of excessive foreign intervention, the needs of
small and medium-sized enterprises, the problems of agriculture, and
the rights of workers were central concerns in this domain.
A second major issue was education. Social policy, an umbrella term
covering such issues as the problem of abortion, the need to modernise
the health care system, rising rates of crime and the ever more serious
problem of immigration, provided a third topic of concern, while civil
liberties constituted the fourth major campaign issue. This latter
question has recently focused on the role of the state. How can its
strength be maintained, both as the provider of the wide range of
social services to which the French are accustomed, and as a force in
the world at large, without its becoming at the same time too heavy a
force in the daily life of French citizens? Can administrative decen-
tralisation stimulate greater political participation and in any case,
what role should ordinary citizens play in local planning? Closely
connected to the fourth topic is the fifth: the role of France in the
world. This question covers a wide range of subissues, such as
maintaining national independence, peace, disarmament, France's
international role and the building of Europe.
Besides determining the issues of the day, political consultants also
do what they can do to prepare their candidates to perform well for
the media. Panels of persons deemed representative of the future
telespectateurs are asked to give their reactions to trial perfor-
mances, after which the experts work to improve the candidates'
presentations (Madelin, 1987). The candidates are urged to alter their
style accordingly. In preparing his candidate for the 1981 television
campaign, Serge Moati helped Mitterrand show himself as 'the man of
passion and the man of faith', overcoming an earlier tendency to freeze

before the camera (Daney et a/., 1981). The most publicised 'make-
over' for the 1988 campaign was that of Chirac. Notoriously ag-
gressive and quick to anger in television appearances, Chirac was
advised not to lift his chin every time he made his point, not to attack
journalists who posed unfriendly questions, and to do his best to adopt
a 'relaxed and natural' style. To the relief of both his admirers and his
detractors, he was not always capable of obeying his advisers, but the
change was nevertheless remarkable (Jarreau, 1988).
The search for the correct campaign slogan is another task under-
taken by political marketers in advance of the campaign. Some way
must be found to 'create a difference among the competitors' (Boy et
a/., 1984). Mitterrand's 1981 slogan had been 'Ia force tranquille'; in
1988 Seguela used 'Ia generation Mitterrand' to suggest the depth of
popular commitment to keeping the president in power for a second
term. For Seguela, political advertising must be 'une publicite de
coeur'; at the same time his fear that the French were 'hesitating
between reason and passion, between merchants and poets', and that
there might even be a growing wave of'publiphobie', persuaded him in
1988 that it would be best to limit political marketing to as brief a
period of time as possible (Huet, 1988; Seguela, 1987).
As in other countries, French political campaigns are more and more

likely to be run by the candidates' own organisations, with the parties
and their militants playing an ever lesser role. The tendency is
compounded in French presidential elections by the fact that any
serious candidate must necessarily gather in voters beyond the
supporters of his own party, particularly after the first ballot. The
result is that the candidate is always the chief of his own campaign,
surrounded by his own organisation. The latter normally consists of
members of his party, plus political and marketing experts who are
brought in as deemed necessary. To the extent that the candidate has
already defined his strategy, the hired professionals are expected to
accept the restraints thus imposed. For example, although it was
Seguela who invented 'Ia generation Mitterrand' as a campaign
slogan, he did so in the context of Mitterrand's own concern to
convey the idea of a long stay in office that would not be too long
and to ward off any unwelcome references to his age. Similarly,
advisers to Raymond Barre had to work within the unshakeable

determination of their candidate to maintain a 'dignified and sober'
campaign, one in which both attacks against his adversaries and
excessive promises to the voters were declared out of order, regardless
of the costs in votes (which proved considerable). Only Communist
candidates are likely to cede final control to others (and those others
are, as we have seen, party leaders rather than outside consultants). In
all other cases the candidate remains in charge, and if he decides not to
accept his team's advice then his is the course that will be followed.
It is not merely the final word that rests at the top. French
campaigns are strongly centralised in all respects. The organisation
is coordinated by the central staff and the messages to be distributed
are highly standardised. Although strategy and tactics are set at the
national level, militants at the departmental and local levels of the
parties often play a part in determining exactly how best to carry out
national orders in their own domains.
There are, of course, differences from candidate to candidate in how
campaigns are organised. In 1988 the two leading contenders each had
multiple staffs. Mitterrand had that of the Elysee headed by Jacques
Attali and Jean-Louis Bianco, but also the official campaign staff,
headed by such party stalwarts as Lionel Jospin. Similarly, Chirac
could draw on staffs both at the Matignon and the Hotel de Ville
(where Charles Pasqua and Alain Juppe occupied key roles) and also
at the rue de Litle headquarters of the RPR (where his chief lieutenant
was Jacques Toubon). In these two campaigns the staffs of the official
posts were responsible for writing speeches and developing candidate
images, arranging and guiding interviews, and planning trips, while
those at party headquarters took charge of coordinating the organisa-
tion of the campaign in liaison with the local branches of the parties.
Mitterrand could draw upon the services of at least eighty staff at the
Elysee, while Chirac, as prime minister and mayor of Paris, had a
much wider army at his command.
What work could not be done by official staffs was performed in
rented apartments equipped with numerous telephones, fax machines
and copying machines. Computers were used to maintain contact
between the candidates and their local organisations. Volunteers and
temporary paid staff were also used to help with large and urgent
tasks, such as mass mailings.
Barre's unimpressive campaign was no doubt due in part to the
weakness of party support. Of the various parties forming the UDF,
only the CDS backed him enthusiastically, and none had either the
110 France.' The 1988 Presidential Campaign
grassroots organisation or the modern technology in place to stage an

effective campaign. His own staff, approximately twenty persons
headed by Pierre Andre Wiltzer (Barre's chef du cabinet when he
was prime minister) and Philippe Mestre (a member of parliament
from the Vendee), consisted of little more than a small contingent of
economists.
Although somewhat reduced in size to match the party's shrinking
fortunes, the Communist party continues to maintain a large paid
staff, particularly in Paris, and this corps of party functionaries,
supplemented by the work of still loyal militants, means that the
party's declining strength cannot be ascribed to lack of campaign
personnel. In addition the Communist candidate had at his disposal
the party's own printing press and the elaborate network of phone, fax
and computer lines that keep the national party in constant contact
with its base.
As in other modern campaigns, French candidates seek the endorse-
ments of various support groups. The major French unions have long
been associated with particular parties, but in recent years that
association has become less likely to produce tangible support. Party
loyalties have weakened for trade union members as they have for all
the French, and union leaders are reluctant to engage in overtly
supportive activities that might divide their membership. This cau-
tiousness was apparent in 1988 in the Communist CGT, which
recognised that despite its leaders' loyalty to Lajoinie many of the
members were openly supporting Mitterrand, in the CFDT which
endorsed no one (having endorsed Mitterrand in 1981), and in the
major agricultural association, the FNSEA, where the leaders fa-
voured Chirac but many of the rank and file found his conservatism
inadequately dogmatic and not a few preferred the rhetoric and
promises of Le Pen.
In recent years the quest for endorsements has been directed less to
established interest groups than to ad hoc comites de soutien.
Distinguished citizens are asked to 'lend their names' to these
committees, each of which constitutes as many leading members as
possible of a particular set of public servants or a particular
occupation. Although it seems probable that most voters do not pay
much attention to these lists and that when they do they are as likely to
be negatively as positively influenced, still the struggle to form such
committees is an ardent one. It took a particularly interesting form in
1988 when Barre and Chirac waged what came to be known as 'the
battle of support committees'. On 8 February, exactly three months
Kay Lawson and Colette Ysmal Ill
before the date of the run-off election, Chirac announced the 'formal
support' of 5000 mayors and 1500 regional and departmental repre-
sentatives. For the next few weeks he kept announcing new lists
(departmental committees, socio-professional committees, presidents
of regional committees, 100 nationally distinguished citizens, thirty
leading 'personalities' in a particular department). The Barre camp
responded by terming such tactics divisive of the moderate right, likely
to suggest that it was 'confused', and not in conformity with the spirit
of union, while claiming that of course Barre could come up with
comparable lists if it were not so contemptible a tactic.
The press picked up on the struggle and made much of it. Forming
the committees was reported as if it were an extremely important
matter, despite a complete lack of evidence of their efficacy. The
competing teams of political professionals constantly sought to wrest
ever greater 'visibilisation' of the political coups they believed they
were achieving when either adding new committees (Chirac) or getting
new personages to deplore the tactic (Barre). Then, apparently
becoming concerned that Barre's support in the run-off might be at
risk, the Chirac team called a halt, and no more committees were
announced during the final weeks of the campaign. According to Jean-
Baptiste Legavre, the 'bataille des comites de soutien' did more to
demonstrate how politicians and journalists unthinkingly accept and
conform to 'rites and practices to which the voter is presumed to be
attentive' than it did to make a significant contribution to the relative
success or failure of either candidate (Legavre, 1990). The possible
insignificance of such committees to the overall campaign organisation
is underlined by the fact that the eventual winner had none. More
eager to maintain his image as rassembleur than to find himself
surrounded by zealots, Mitterrand had no comites de soutien, unless
one counts that formed without his permission by the monthly journal
Globe, which presented the president as the flawless hero of French
socialism.
Mitterrand has been hard at work on his image for many years.
Despite his earlier expressed contempt for the autocratic and aristo-
cratic styles of de Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing, once in the presidency
Mitterrand has been almost as grandly aloof as any of his predeces-
sors. Almost, but not quite. What Mitterrand has that they Jacked is
an ability to communicate that although he is the President of France,

and unfailingly insistent upon the respect that is due to that office, he
is also able to empathise with the feelings and needs of the oppressed.
The key word here is 'empathise' - Mitterrand does not offer distant
sympathy. Using humour, popular expressions and easily understood
examples, he knows how to move, often with dazzling alacrity in the
same address, back and forth from the supremely presidential to the
understanding and familiar 'uncle' (a pet name the French have given
him both ironically and affectionately). In 1988 his advisers urged him
to place yet greater stress on presidentialism, emphasising the dignity
of his role and his function as the rassemb/eur of the nation, and to a
certain extent he complied with this advice, particularly in adopting a
rather more sober tone of address. But a leftist candidate cannot rely
exclusively upon what the French call the 'gold and tinsel' of public
office and Mitterrand made clear from the beginning that he would be
a candidate as well the president (Lhomeau, 1988).
Mitterrand's experience, judgement and skill made him a formidable
contender and, unfortunately for them, none of his chief competitors
was blessed with equivalent attributes. As mentioned above, a central
concern of the Chirac campaign staff was to improve the image of
their candidate. Chirac does not lack for bonhomie; he is known as a
highly sociable man who truly enjoys the human contacts he makes in
the course of campaigning. But the emotionalism that takes the form
of attractive warmth when he is among friends in agreeable surround-
ings is also likely to burst out in unseemly attacks on his enemies when
the opposite conditions prevail. Chirac's image problem is not in
seeming cold or aloof, but rather unpresidentially hostile, defensive
and inconsistent, ready to say whatever he pleases when provoked,
even in contradiction to his own solemn past assertions.
Barre, on the other hand, is aloof and his campaign style has always
been to insist on his right to be so. The image he and his supporters have
insisted on trying to sell to the French is that of a distinguished and
accomplished statesman who refuses to be concerned about images and
thoroughly disdains the idea of selling anything to anybody. The
French are probably more likely than any other people to respect that
stance; however, unfortunately for Barre, the substantive message he
seeks to convey is in fact not a popular one (see below).
It may seem difficult to imagine a candidate whose campaign is
openly racist and anti-semite as just an all around 'great guy' but such
is the image Jean Marie Le Pen seeks to convey. He is, he would have
the voters believe, simply an average Frenchman who speaks with
good sense and knows how to make everything easy to understand.

Not for him the language of specialists and intellectuals that nobody
can understand. Here is his explanation of why the French feel
unhappy to have so many immigrants in their midst: 'one loves
one's brother and sister better than one's cousin, one's cousin better
than one's neighbours, one's neighbours better than strangers'.
Despite his agricultural origins, Communist candidate Andre
Lajoinie strove valiantly to incarnate the militant worker. Only he
could really understand, claimed his campaign, the problems of
workers on low salaries always menaced by unemployment. Lacking
the powerful rhetoric of his predecessor, Georges Marchais (still
secretary general of the party), as well as Marchais' obvious personal
gusto, Lajoinie seemed burdened by a role too heavy for his talents.
The impression he made was of the sacrificial victim he no doubt was,
tossed into the electoral fires at a time when the party, torn by internal
divisions and racked by international transformations, could not
possibly expect to do well.
Of the parties backing the major candidates, only those on the left
gave much attention to their own images. Barre had no official party
backing. The Gaullist mode has always been to de-emphasise party
and to favour individual candidates. It is only a slight exaggeration to
say that the National Front is Le Pen; the party has little identity in
the public mind beyond that of serving as his personal organisation,
particularly during presidential electoral seasons.
The Socialist party, on the other hand, has a strong identity, and
works hard to maintain it. Since 1969, the symbol of the party has
been a full red rose grasped in a closed fist, symbolically presenting
'the contrast between force and beauty, hardness and softness, black
and red', and this tradition continued in 1988 (Freyssinet-Dominjon,
1990, p. 21). During the campaign the rose was held in the party's
posters by a man, a pregnant woman, or a baby, always in association
with the word 'Liberty', 'Equality' or 'Freedom', 'the three republican
virtues abused by the opposition when in power and dear to socialists'
(ibid., p. 57). While Mitterrand stressed opening to the centre, the
party stressed the Socialist accomplishments while in power, de-
nounced Chirac's work (1986--8) and explained the 'new socialism'
(emphasis on solidarity). The candidate might reach out to whom he
wished; the party sought to persuade its supporters that the organisa-
tion itself remained distinct and attractive.
The Communist party, resigned in advance to a severe electoral loss,
placed great emphasis throughout the 1988 campaign on the continu-
ing viability of the organisation. Claiming to be the only 'party of the

working class' and the only group able to respond to the demands of
the lower class, the PCF assured the French it would survive, whatever
short term disasters might befall it.
In addition to candidate and party images, each campaign also
sought to develop an issue image. As we have mentioned earlier, the
key issues of the campaign were the economy, education, social policy,
civil liberties and the role of France in the world. Each candidate chose
his own way of touching on these points. Mitterrand stressed the need
to continue the programmes he had begun to modernise the economy
and combat unemployment, to unify the French through institutional
reform and to construct a stronger Europe. Chirac played to his
stronger points, security and immigration policy, but also insisted
that placing him in the presidency would permit France to pursue the
economic recovery which he gave himself credit for beginning in the
two years of cohabitation; he also tended to define France's role in the
world largely in terms of her role in Europe. Barre's chief issues were
similar to Chirac's with somewhat more emphasis on fiscal soundness
and education (Missika and Bregman, 1988). Lajoinie made employ-
ment, retraining and buying power the key planks in his programme,
while Le Pen continued to declaim the need for harsher measures to
limit immigration and improve personal security (although his
supporters by now placed unemployment at the top of the list of
their concerns). 5
As Jean-Louis Missika and Dorine Bregman (1988) point out, one
of the striking differences between the 1988 campaign and the 1986
legislative campaign was the greater emphasis the three major
candidates gave to the problem of unemployment when discussing
the economy. According to these analysts, the reason for this was not
that the problem had become significantly greater or lesser, nor that
public opinion had become less sceptical regarding past efforts of both
political left and right to resolve it, but rather that the politicians had
found a new approach. Instead of promising more jobs, they now
promised more education, and in particular more and better job
retraining. This new emphasis had the virtues of being something
one could talk about in imprecise terms, of sounding suitably realistic
and of speaking directly to the interests of the people: the French now
listed formation (training) as their second 'essential preoccupation',
right after the problem of employment.
The tendency of all the candidates to say very much the same thing,
and to say that as vaguely as possible, was noteworthy throughout the
campaign. The Mitterrand campaign sought to create an identity of its

own by having the president stress such fine but substantively empty
concepts as 'rassemblement' (bringing all the French together, over-
coming excessive partisanship), 'ouverture' (extending a welcome to
candidates and voters of other parties, particularly those of the
centre), 'La France unie' and, simplest of all, 'l'union' (Boyer, 1990).
Although Mitterrand began the game, the other candidates found
these concepts so wonderfully vague yet electorally appealing that
soon they were all using them in speech after speech. As Bernard
Vasseur (among others) pointed out, the problem the leading candi-
dates faced with regard to substance was that they agreed too well with
one another, '(there existed a] need to criticise the other, without being
able to criticise him with regard to substance. From this came the
contortions and variations regarding style, "look", personal equation,
etc.' (Vasseur, 1988, p. 4). The excessive reliance on style and on a
vocabulary that obscured rather than clarified the issues was seen by
some as the reason for the unusually high rate of abstention in the
election.
In any case, images of any type are successful only if they reach the
voters, and for this suitable tactics must be devised. Not every tactic is
available to every candidate. Candidates with as rich an experience of
past campaigns as the major candidates in 1988 naturally bring their
own strengths, weaknesses and individual styles to the task. Only
Lajoinie was a relative newcomer, but in his case the PCP itself had a
history and tradition that would guide the campaign, particularly
given its own high measure of control over all decisions taken.
In addition to individual proclivities of the candidates, the choice of
tactics is constrained by calculations peculiar to this contest. In 1988
Mitterrand was certain from the beginning that he and Chirac would
be in the run-off, but this certainty was not shared by the right-wing
candidates themselves. As a result, the chief fire of the Socialists was
directed against Chirac throughout the electoral season, whereas the
right-wing candidates (including Chirac) spent much of their ammuni-
tion upon each other up until the first ballot. Within these limitations,
then, tactics were chosen to convey what the strategists hoped would
be the winning images. These tactics were designed either to gain
maximum media coverage or to communicate directly to the voters.
An important example of how French campaign strategists seek to
gain maximum positive media coverage without having to pay for it is
what is termed the 'political coup'. The coup is a political blow which
dazzles the public and discourages the opposition (Dobry, 1986). In
order to succeed, it must be well-timed and aggressive. Not all coups

can be planned in advance; successful use of the tactic means
maintaining alertness to new opportunities to strike a sudden and
perhaps crippling blow, either by a positive act or a negative attack.
The coup can take many forms. Chirac, perhaps the most committed
to this tactic of France's current stable of perennial candidates, used
everything from the strategic release of the names of comites de soutien
to efforts to bring France's hostages back from the Lebanon. Some
analysts believe he even went so far as to instigate a revival of the
hostilities between the colonial settlers and the native population in
New Caledonia, in an effort to produce a dramatic demonstration that
a much vaunted Socialist solution to that island's long history of
struggle was a failure. 6
Such heavy-handed tactics were not for Mitterrand, whose own
efforts to produce the telling coup were more likely to take the form of
unexpected verbal attack. For example, in the televised debate between
himself and Chirac a few days before the second ballot, he repeatedly
called his opponent M. le Premier Minister, hoping thus to force
Chirac to call him M. le President. Although Chirac refused to do so,
the tactic succeeded in keeping viewers aware both that Chirac's role
was secondary to Mitterrand's, yet at the same time it was in that not
unimportant role that he had made all the errors of which Mitterrand
accused him (with the implicit message that he should therefore not be
trusted with a yet higher post). Mitterrand was generally acknow-
ledged as having achieved a great success with this simple device.
Beyond the search for the coup, French campaigns are very much
like those of other western democracies in their quest to interest the
media. Press conferences are held and the candidate's day is arranged
with an eye to the interesting photos that his various visits may
produce. The task was more difficult in 1988 for several reasons.
First, there has been a general deregulation of television since the late
1980s, when one of France's three major public networks was
privatised and two other private networks were created, meaning
that the media were freer to pick what events to cover and what
times to broadcast that coverage. Even though the remaining major
public network was obliged to broadcast the official campaign, it did
not need to do so in prime time, when the competition from the other
networks would be at its strongest. Furthermore, the freedom of all
the media was enhanced by the fact that one major candidate was
president and the other prime minister; there could be no question of
an unambiguous 'official' pressure to favour one over the other. The
net result was considerably less television coverage than has been the
custom in France in the past. Only by staging the most spectacular of
mass meetings or the most dramatic of debates could the various
campaigns count on adequate coverage.
Given the difficulties of attracting media attention, there was a
somewhat greater attempt than usual to communicate directly to the
voters. However, the high cost of postage means that it is difficult to
rely on direct mail; in 1988 only Mitterrand sent out a mass mailing,
reaching some 3 million homes with his 'Lettre aux Fran~tais'.
Telephone and door-to-door canvassing is likely to have an adverse
result on the French, who zealously protect the privacy of the home; in
addition, the local parties seldom have sufficient militants to do the
job well. By far the most common tactic of direct communication is
the poster, particularly those termed affiches sauvages, those which are
put up when and where they ought not to be, often over those of other
candidates.
The other major form of direct communication is the public
meeting, which may be anything from a small group meeting in
someone's living room to hear a representative of the candidate, to
the candidate himself addressing a large crowd or having dinner with a
small and influential group. All the candidates travelled a great deal
during the 1988 campaign. Le Pen began such trips more than a year
in advance, Chirac staged fifteen large rallies between January and
April; Mitterrand began with plans for four meetings but then raised
the number to eight, Barre held ten large gatherings, and Lajoinie
visited every departmental branch of his party, holding large meetings
in fifteen of them. The preference for huge gatherings was apparent
and even then the candidates worried that they might be losing time,
given that 'the least important television show, even local, can give one
tens of thousands [of viewers]'. 7
Whatever form the direct contact may take, it is up to the
professional consultants to devise the messages and design the
posters, the handouts, and the vast array of campaign gimmickry.
The message must be something that can be quickly recognised as
signifying the particular candidate. According to Seguela (1987), it
must have content as well as style: 'invented to communicate the
essence, form has never replaced it'. However, as we have already seen,
'essence' need not mean clear explication of detailed issue positions.
Only the Communists have continued to explain their positions in
detail in handouts and posters, with the result that their efforts now
appear surprisingly dated and verbose. The other candidates keep their
messages short and snappy, and are as likely to have them printed on
scarves or badges or T-shirts as on paper.
As they have modernised, French campaigns have become less
reliant on individual militants. Party activists are still needed to put
up posters, to distribute party literature and to turn out in massive
numbers at staged rallies. But as in other nations where excessively
personalised campaigning via the media on the advice of political
consultants has become the norm, the candidates now rely less on
volunteer labour. Like the ordinary voters, the true believers may as
well stay at home and watch it all on television; they are less likely to
get in the way.
CONCLUSION: PLUS c:;A CHANGE, PLUS C'EST PARTOUT

LA MEME CHOSE
Thus French campaigning has become all too similar to modern

campaigns everywhere. We conclude by suggesting that this is an
unfortunate development, not only for France but for all modern
democracies. In a democracy elections offer voters their chief and
sometimes only chance to influence the course of public life. Ideally
the political campaign opens a dialogue between citizens and their
governments and creates an arena for public debate. Party activists
develop programmes, choose and support candidates who believe in
that programme, and take an active part in the campaigns, providing
the voters with familiar political images and cues. Working with their
candidates, they seek to persuade and sometimes even to educate.
Voters listen, respond, sometimes learn and sometimes even change
their minds. Out of the process a link is forged from the democratic
base to the decision-making top.
Did ideal campaigns ever exist? Probably not, but there can be little
doubt that current developments have taken our 'democracies' yet
further away from the kind of elections that would lend credibility to
the name they have given themselves. And now even the French, those
most consciously intellectual of peoples, have permitted their cam-
paigns to fall to the new international low. Particularly apparent in
1988 was the greatly diminished role of the parties. Only in the case of
the National Front was there any evidence that the campaign served to
bring in new militants (whereas in 1981 all the parties had reported
increased recruitment during the electoral season). Only the Commun-
ists made any serious attempt to associate their party's members in
their candidate's campaign, and they did so only under conditions of

the most disciplined adherence to an internationally repudiated
ideology. Barre had no party and Le Pen took little interest in his.
Mitterrand and Chirac both campaigned 'above party', or reached out
'beyond party'. Socialist activists complained of their inactivity, while
RPR militants accepted theirs; the net result was very much the same.
In sum the consultant-run campaigns of 1988 neatly met all the
criteria of modernisation. It does not seem to us to be an improve-
ment. A democratic campaign ought to be more than a pyrotechnic
display of technological gadgetry and showmanship overwhelming
what little civic concern a population already suffering from sensory
glut might be able to muster in the cause of its own collective
betterment. As parties, parliamentarians and the associational forces
of civil society give way to those for whom winning elections is simply
a business like any other, the delicate democratic art of forging
meaningful links between rulers and the ruled is replaced by the
crude huckstering of icons that melt before we can get home from
the polls~ If the thoughtful and clever French cannot recognise what is
going on, and find a way to prevent it, what hope is there for the
others?
Notes
I. The party system underwent a significant change in 1989 when the
ecologists, who had been unsuccessful since 1974, won about 10 per cent
of the vote in both municipal and European elections.
2. In 1986 the Socialists changed the electoral system to one of proportional
representation. In 1988 the Gaullists changed it back to the two-ballot
system.
3. It is not only corporations that make donations. In 1988 it was widely
reported that part of Le Pen's treasury was donated by an organisation,
CAUSA, which was linked to the Moon religious sect.
4. SOFRES, Societe Fran~aise d'Enquetes par Sondages; IFOP, Institut
Fran~ais d'Opinion Publique; BVA, Brule et Vigne Associes; CSA,
Conseils, Sondages, Analyses.
5. L'e/ection presidentielle, Le Monde Dossiers et Documents, May 1988,
pp. 17-25.
6. There was in fact a revival of such hostility, leading to new clashes, the
killing of police and a retaliatory assassination.
7. Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber, quoted in Madelin (1987, p. 195).
120 France:· The 1988 Presidential Campaign
References
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12 March.
Boyer, H. (1990), 'Ouverture et rassemblement, deux mots-slogans en 1988',
MOTS, 22, pp. 5-18.
Daney, S., Gere F. and Toubiana, S. (1981), 'La campagne presidentielle de F.
Mitterrand', Cahiers du Cinema (Autumn).
Dobry, M. (1986), Socio/oqie des Crises Politiques (Paris: Presses de Ia
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques).
Duhamel, 0. (1989), 'Convergences ml:diatiques: Les presidentielles franco-
americaines', Esprit, nos 148-9.
Freyssinet-Dominjon, J. (1990), 'Dix ans d'affiches du Parti socialiste 1980-
1989', MOTS, 22.
Genies, P. EPP, (1987), no. 1484 (25 February).
Huet, S. (1988), 'Les publicitaires dans Ia course au "look"', Le Figaro, 1
March.
Jarreau, P. (1988), 'Jacques Chirac dans Ia boite a images', Le Monde Radio-
Television, 11 January.
Lawson, K. (1981), 'The Impact of Party Reform on Party Systems',
Comparative Politics (July) pp. 401-19.
Legavre, J.-B. (1990), 'La "bataille des comites de soutien" ou Ia droite en
campagne', Revue Franpaise de Science Politique, 40, pp. 793-808.
Lhomeau, J.-Y. (1988), 'Le style epistolaire et l'ec1at du clip', L'e/ection
presidentiel/e, Le Monde Dossiers et Documents (May).
Madelin, H. (1987), 'La politique au miroir de Ia television', Etudes
(February).
Ministere de l'Interieur, Republique Fran~aise (1988), 'Memento a l'usage des
candidats', Textes et documents relatifs d !'electin presidentiel/e des 24 avril et
8 mai 1988 (Paris: La Documentation fran~ise).
Missika, J.-L. and Bregman, D. (1988), 'Les priorites comparees des candidats
et des medias', L'election presidentielle, Le Monde Dossiers et Documents
(May).
Seguela, J. (1987), 'Le look est mort, vive le look', Liberation, 16 December.
Vasseur, B. (1988), 'Modemite et Politique: Quelques reflexions a propos de
deux campagnes electorates', La Pensee, nos 265-6 (December), p. 4.
Ysmal, C. (1989), Les partis politiques sous Ia Ve Republique (Paris: Mont-
chrestien).
7 Germany: The 1990
All-German Election
Campaign 1
Bernhard Boll and Thomas Poguntke
The first all-German election campaign confronted politicians with

quite a unique challenge. Not only had they to adapt to quickly
changing political circumstances, it was a substantially changed nation
that went to the polls on 2 December 1990. The population of the
Federal Republic had grown by some 16 millions; it suddenly had a
common border with Poland and was granted full sovereignty by the
Allied Powers of the Second World War. Despite the dramatic speed
of political change throughout 1989 and 1990, the institutional and
legal framework for the all-German election closely resembled that of
the old Federal Republic. Constitutionally the GDR had simply joined
the Federal Republic which meant that all constitutional and legal
regulations remained unchanged. German parties are entitled to
generous election reimbursement which is allocated according to their
vote percentages, calculated on the basis of OMS per person entitled
to vote (von Arnim, 1991). In addition, parties are entitled to
broadcast a small number of unpaid campaign spots on both public
TV stations. In 1990, for the first time, paid broadcasting on the newly
established private television stations played an important role,
though, with few exceptions, these reached only the western part of
the united Germany. There are no limits to campaign expenditure
although parties are required to disclose their income and expenditure.
An important contextual change related to the proportional represen-
tation electoral system. After lengthy and confusing debates and a
decision by the Constitutional Court, the united country was divided
into two electoral territories with separate 5 per cent hurdles. It was
felt that a nationwide threshold would have disadvantaged newly
formed parties in the former GDR. Parties which managed to win 5
per cent in one part of the country had all their votes counted.
121
122 Germany: Th'e 1990 All-German Election Campaign
In short, while the political circumstances of the 1990 campaign

were quite exceptional, parties were not subject to institutional
constraints compelling them to alter their campaign techniques
drastically. As a result of PR, election campaigns have traditionally
been centred on the qualities of the incumbent chancellor and his
opposition challenger. With the advent of television and modern
polling techniques, marketing methods have increasingly backstaged
a more traditional campaign style which was more strongly based on
political discourse and debate (Oellerking, 1988; Wortmann, 1989).
This chapter attempts to answer the question whether this trend was
continued in the 1990 campaign and whether or not the excepional
political circumstances led the parties to change their campaign
techniques. Clearly any such analysis needs to be based on a brief
recollection of the most important political developents of late 1989
and 1990.
It is an almost forgotten ironical footnote of history that influential
Christian Democrats challenged chancellor Helmut Kohl's position
shortly before the most successful year in his entire political career.
Concerned about poor Land election results and a downward trend in
national opinion polls, they conspired in summer 1989 to install the
then Baden-Wtirttemberg prime minister Lothar Spath as party leader.
This 'coup d'etat' failed (Schultze, 1991). It is probably even more
ironical that the first indications of German unification were viewed
very enthusiastically in SPD party headquarters. The party had been
suffering from a structural disadvantage throughout post-war history
and was hoping to revive its old, East German Protestant strongholds
from the period of the Weimar Republic (Mielke, 1991; Padgett and
Burkett, 1986). Early opinion polls before the first free election to the
East German Volkskammer in March 1990 predicted an overwhelm-
ing victory for the Social Democrats. Although later polls showed the
Social Democrats losing ground as the Volkskammer elections
approached, the party was widely expected to become the leading
party of the first democratically elected East German government
(Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1990b). When the first predictions were
televised on election night things looked dramatically different. In the
end, the Christian Democratic led 'Alliance for Germany' polled more
than twice as many votes as the Social Democrats (Table 7.1).
Clearly nobody could have envisaged the rapid erosion of authority
of the Modrow government and the almost complete and sudden
collapse of support for an independent East German path to demo-
cracy.
Bernhard Boll and Thomas Poguntke 123
Table 1.1 All-German election results, 1990
Volkskammer elections Bundestag elections

East West Total Seats
(%) (%) (%) (%)

CDU/CSU 1 40.8 41.8 44.3 43.8 319
DSU 6.3 1.0 0.2
FDP2 5.3 12.9 10.6 11.0 79
SPD 21.9 24.3 35.7 33.5 239
Griine/Biindnis '903 4.9 6.0 4.8 3.9 g4
PDS 16.4 11.1 0.3 2.4 174
Other 4.4 2.9 4.3 4.0
Notes
1 CSU only in Bavaria. For the Volkskammer election CDU, DSU and DA
(0.9 per cent) were united in the 'Alliance for Germany'.
2 'Alliance of Free Democrats'.
3 No alliance for the Volkskammer elections where there was no 5 per cent
threshold.
4 Above 5 per cent in the eastern electoral territory.
In November 1989, the monolithic system succumbed to street

pressures and invited the political cooperation of opposition groups
who were brought together at a national 'round table' to draft a new,
democratic constitution and prepare free elections for 6 May 1990.
When Kohl issued his ten point declaration on 28 November 1989,
unification was still regarded as a very vague and long-term objective.
Shortly before Christmas Kohl and Modrow agreed on .a
Vertragsgemeinschaft (union treaty), which would eventually lead to
some sort of union between the two Germanies. Less than three weeks
later, the Monday demonstrations were dominated by thousands of
German flags and the masses demanded fast unification. Exactly two
months after his first meeting with Helmut Kohl, the East German
prime minister, Hans Modrow- a man who had been part of the East
German nomenclature - called for steps towards unification with the
Federal Republic.
Why was it that the Christian Democrats and the Liberals were to
benefit so much more from these developments than the Social
Democrats and Greens? Before we can answer this question, we need
to take a closer look at the formative phase of a party system which
124 Germany: The 1990 All-German Election Campaign
was - for a few weeks only - expected to become the central political
force of a democratic East Germany, but which, in the event, turned
out to be a virtual appendix to the West German party system even at
the first free East German election of March 1990.
With hindsight it is clear that the role of the 'citizens' movements'
during the 'German revolution' were overestimated both by them-
selves and by their political foes. The collapse of the old regime was
initiated by the massive numbers of refugees exiting via the embassies
and the Hungarian border in summer 1989. In the wake of growing,
and increasingly open, unrest and opposition, the leaders of numerous
small opposition groups assumed the role of revolutionary elites
lending their voices to the masses without necessarily expressing their
most salient desires. This became apparent almost immediately after
the liberalisation of the old regime and the opening of the borders,
when the intellectual figureheads of the supposedly first democratic
revolution quickly lost their mass following and hence their political
weight. During this period numerous parties and citizens' movements
were founded. Most were doomed to failure, but some of them
managed to survive the all-German elections.
Let us focus first on those movement initiatives which were
eventually to form the Alliance '90 (Bilndnis '90). Any attempt to
account in detail for their ideological differences is impossible in this
chapter. In fact it could be argued that, due to their very nature as
open and grassroots democratic organisations, it would be impossible
to identify authoritative political positions for individual initiatives.
This is corroborated by the intricate history of mergers and splits in
the first months of 1990 (Milller-Enbergs eta/., 1991).
Coming from a background in the illegal peace and environmental
movements, sheltered by the Protestant church and strongly influ-
enced by progressive elements in the Protestant clergy and dissenting
intellectuals, the movements were oriented towards the ideal of a third
path between capitalism and socialism, to be realised in an indepen-
dent GDR (Musiolek and Wuttke, 1990; Thaysen, 1990a,b). This
implied both a reluctant acceptance of the inevitable demise of the
East German state and a recurrent insistence on the preservation of an
independent GDR identity. Hence during the Volkskammer election
campaign, which was dominated by the unification issue, the citizens'
movements were already 'out of tune' with the overwhelming majority
of the East German population. Furthermore, their concern with an
autonomous identity was a major obstacle to the formation of efficient
alliances for the series of elections in 1990 (Miiller-Enbergs, 1991;

Miiller-Rommel, 1991; Miiller-Rommel and Poguntke, 1991).
Another stumbling block proved to be the reluctance of the move-
ments to become political parties with at least a minimal organisa-
tional structure and a clearly defined programme. Consequently, a
staggering number of new parties attempted to establish a niche in this
new electoral market. Only three obtained significant results at the
Volkskammer elections: the SDP, which was set up illegally in
October, renamed itself the SPD in January and merged with the
West German Social Democrats in September; the Greens, who joined
their counterparts on 3 December, exactly one second too late (see
below); and the DSU, which was almost annihilated in the Bundestag
elections. All other parties either disappeared or were absorbed by
alliances dominated by the former bloc parties, LDPD and CDU,
which eventually led them into mergers with the West German FDP
and CDU.
Cooperation of the FDP and CDU/CSU with their 'sister parties' in
the east - which had been discredited by decades of cooperation with
the old regime - seemed to be laden with enormous risk. As the regime
began to crumble, the East German Liberals and Christian Democrats
skilfully adapted to the changing political context by assuming
increasingly critical roles and replacing their old leaderships by less
discredited functionaries from the back rows. However, it was by no
means certain that the East German population would believe in the
credibility of their democratic transformation. On the other hand, it
was believed that access to the enormous organisational resources of
the former bloc parties would probably make up for this disadvantage.
Both the CDU and the LDPD had been able to build up a very efficient
organisational infrastructure over the decades, including a tightly knit
network of party offices with full-time staff, an infrastructure for
communication and a party-owned press. At least part of the mass
membership could be counted on as important 'agents' of communica-
tion and grassroots campaigning, and these parties were able to provide
experienced political personnel from their lower ranks who had been
sufficiently far away from the centres of power in order not to be
discredited, but who would still have been able to acquire valuable
knowledge about personal networks inside the state machinery.
The West German Christian Democrats, after a hesitant start,
managed to legitimise the East German CDU through the formation
of the 'Alliance for Germany' which included the former 'bloc party'
CDU as well as political forces with a background of opposition to the

old regime, like Demokratischer Aufbruch (DA) and the more
conservative Deutsche Soziale Union. Similarly, the PDP promoted
an 'Alliance of Free Democrats' which also led to a merger of old and
new political forces. The Deutsche Forumpartei, a group that had left
the more left wing Neues Forum, and the newly formed East German
PDP joined forces with the LDPD, which changed its name to LDP.
Looming unification affected the West German Greens in three
ways. First, it had been the only relevant West German party calling
for two separate German states. Consequently it found it extremely
difficult to accept that unification was unavoidable (Poguntke, 1990).
This process was delayed by the peculiarities of the Green organisa-
tional structure (Poguntke, 1987). Second, the challenge from the PDS
led to the defection of several prominent members of the eco-socialist
tendency. Finally, the political agenda was entirely dominated by
issues relating to unification; all issues which normally favour the
Greens were completely backstaged (Gibowski and Kaase, 1991).
To make matters worse, the Green party lacked a natural partner in
the east. Instead it had to forge electoral alliances with half a dozen
small groups which were the offspring of the democratic resistance to
the old regime. Whereas citizens' movements and Greens ran separ-
ately for the Volkskammer elections, they joined forces for the
Bundestag election under the label of Griine/Biindnis '90. 2 Due to
reservations among the various citizens' movements about an alliance
with a united Green Party, the Greens postponed the merger until the
night of the election. This move, which appeared necessary because the
citizens' movements feared western domination, proved to be dis-
astrous. The West German Greens missed the 5 per cent hurdle by a
0.2 per cent margin.
In short, the Christian Democrats and Liberals benefited from the
organisational network of the old 'bloc parties' during the election
campaign for the Volkskammer elections and to a lesser extent also for
the Bundestag elections, by which time the old party organisations had
begun to disintegrate. They shared this advantage with the former
Communist party (PDS). By contrast the Social Democrats, the
various groups from the Biirgerbewegungen (citizens' movements)
and the Greens had to start from scratch in building up an organisa-
tional infrastructure. The established West German parties (not
including the Greens) effectively took over the campaign management
of their sister parties for the Volkskammer elections. This enabled the
Christian Democrats to fight a very successful campaign which centred
on the West German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, presented as the

guarantor of economic prosperity and quick unification. The decisive
vote winner was probably the carefully launched promise that the East
German currency would be converted into 'hard' western Deutsche
Marks on a I to I ratio. The campaign of the governing coalition also
benefited from the rapidly declining attractiveness of alternative
models of a 'third path' between capitalism and socialism. Whilst
opposition elites in the SPD, citizens' movements and the Greens were
still searching for an independent GDR identity, the majority of the
population had already opted for the 'easy way out', the merger with
the economically successful FRG.
The Volkskammer elections were perceived by the East German
electorate as a plebiscite on the issue of fast unification (Kaase and
Gibowski, 1990). The CDU as the leading party of the West German
government could offer both an unambiguous support for this strategy
and the power to execute it. The fact that the East German CDU -
although tainted by its cooperation with the old regime - was able to
gain the dominant position in the Christian-Conservative 'Alliance for
Germany' clearly indicates that electoral behaviour in the East was
strongly influenced by the image of the West German parties (see
Table 7.I). Boldly put, the first free Volkskammer elections represen-
ted a unique case of elections where the electorate of a sovereign state
effectively voted for 'foreign' parties. However, it remains question-
able to what extent these images already existed before the opening of
the borders, as a result of the exposure of the East German population
to West German television.
It is possible to distinguish between the long-term, strategic prepara-

tions of a party and those activities which are directly related to the
'hot phase' of an election campaign. Obviously the substantive content
of the campaign depends not only on a party's long-term objectives
but also on the most salient issues once a campaign gets under way.
From this perspective the 1990 election campaign clearly represents a
deviant case because none of the competing parties, when they started
their long-term planning, could have envisaged the dramatic events
following the fall of the Berlin wall. In the case of the SPD this phase
arguably began even before the 1987-90 election cycle. The revision of
the party's basic programme was initiated with the clear objective of
enabling the party to win back governmental power on the federal

level after the 1983 elections, and it was at least tacitly accepted that
this could hardly be achieved by 1987.
This example, however, probably stretches the argument too far. If
we focus on the beginning of the actual preparations for campaigning,
like creating election teams, drawing up timetables, booking conven-
tion halls and the like, German parties usually begin even at the local
level at least six months prior to election day (SPD, 1990). Of course,
things were more complicated in 1990. When the FDP and CDU had
their first preparatory meetings in autumn 1989, nobody could have
envisaged all-German elections. Throughout the first six months of
1990 it remained an open question whether or not there would be all-
German elections and the final decision came as late as 9 August 1990.
ORGANISATION AND CONTROL3
The CDU operated with a threefold division of labour. The first group
to meet, in late autumn 1989, was an election committee which was
chaired by the party general secretary. It included the general manager
and the departmental heads of party headquarters. This group looked
in broad terms at the current state and political situation of the party,
at logistic aspects of a campaign and at a preliminary plan of the
campaign budget. Throughout the campaign the group was respons-
ible for strategic planning.
The second group, headed by the general manager of the party, was
in charge of all questions on the technicalities of running the
campaign, including public relations. A third group, chaired by
Kohl, supervised all these activities. It consisted of the general
secretary, reporting to the group about all activities, several members
of the Bundestag, personal advisers, and - with an advisory function
only - the most important campaign officers. Routine monthly
meetings of the national party management with the Land party
managers were turned into a central means of coordinating the
campaign. Throughout the campaign survey material provided by
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation was used to monitor its progress.
The national party had several methods of achieving a uniform
campaign image. A common set of symbols and colours was used for
all campaign materials (posters, leaflets, gifts) which were sold to the
various party levels. As a result of the internal distribution of power,
which is required by the party law, German party headquarters cannot
force lower party units to buy this material; nor, however, can a
national party afford to finance the entire campaign. With this basic
budgetary point in mind, it is nevertheless worth noting that CDU
party headquarters alone spent a total of DM40 million on the
campaign.
In order to motivate lower party levels a set of 3000 free posters
were provided by headquarters for each CDU district. This ensured
that three different kinds of posters, presenting national party slogans,
proliferated nationwide. The national party employed a poster
advertising company for a cross-country billboard campaign. The
national party produced four different TV spots which were broad-
cast on both public and private television stations (Table 7.2). In
addition about 200 commercials were aired on all public and private
radio stations and seven advertisements were published in all regional
newspapers during the last three weeks of the campaign. Cinema
commercials and video clips in discos were also employed as part of
a special youth campaign. The CDU used fax machines on a larger
scale than ever before. Almost all constituency offices of the party
could be reached within twenty minutes to circulate latest updates of
organisational or political interest. The media campaign was supple-
mented by a large number of campaign rallies. Party headquarters
coordinated the schedule of about 100 nationally established politi-
cians who delivered some 1000 campaign speeches.
Table 1.2 Party political campaign broadcasts in Germany
Television stations1
ARD ZDF RTL SATJ PR07 Tele5
CDU 8 8 26 27 24 26
csu 4 4
SPD 8 8 26 27
PDS 6 6
Greens 4 4
Greens/Alliance'90 4 4
Note
1 ARD and ZDF are public television stations which provide a small
amount of free broadcasting time to political parties during election
campaigns. The number of unpaid TV spots depends on the previous
election results.
Organisational and technical shortcomings characterised the cam-

paign in the eastern part of the country. It was particularly difficult to
reach it by telephone, though, within the former GDR, telephone
connections worked fairly well. Clearly the programmatic and orga-
nisational planning was generated and controlled in Bonn, with only
extraordinary meetings in Berlin. Cooperation with the eastern party
organisation was apparently good. Western know-how of modem
campaigning was immediately accepted and executed with the help
of smooth western persuasion. However, the new eastern partners
were exposed to a more competitive atmosphere of campaign activities
and longer working hours than they were ever accustomed to before. It
is interesting to note how far the two Germanies had drifted apart over
the past forty years. Surprisingly, campaign materials had to be
adapted to East German lingua by eastern party activists. As was
the case during the Volkskammer election, an intraparty activity called
'friends helping friends' ensured close cooperation at all eastern and
western party levels. This activity encompassed material and help
ranging from the provision of personal computers to such local
activities as the hanging of party posters. It is apparent that compared
to the Volkskammer election campaign, the level of mobilisation in the
east was lower during the Bundestag election campaign.
The sister party of the CDU, the Christian Social Union, is
regionally limited to Bavaria and its campaign activities, even for
national elections, are therefore geographically defined. Its Munich
based headquarters had to prepare for both a Land election on 14
October and the federal elections on 2 December. Consequently the
party combined both dates in terms of the campaign organisation.
Usually, about a year ahead of any election, a body consisting of PR
managers, members of the political staff and departmental heads,
chaired by the party manager, meets to develop the strategy and
programme for the approaching campaign and debates all logistic and
organisational technicalities. At this stage an overall campaign
concept is created in close cooperation between the party manager,
the general secretary and the party chairman. This is then put to the
party board, which consists of the upper echelons of the party
hierarchy. The party strategists used the October Land elections as a
final test for the party's December campaign. In most cases the Land
election party logos, slogans and mottos were virtually identical. As a
result, this time round the national campaign concept was accepted by
the party board as late as 29 October, two weeks after the Land
election and just six weeks before the national election polling day.
The CSU operates the most differentiated and efficient party

organisation of all German parties (Mintzel, 1990). Headquarters
communicates directly with all district organisations via a computer
online system. It is also connected with all forty-five national election
constituency offices which frequently comprise more than one district
organisation. All forty-five offices are equipped with fax machines,
used to inform the local managers about party promotion items and
their prices or latest updates of the party's campaign strategy. Similar
to the CDU, a uniform, standardised image of the party across
Bavaria was guaranteed by the delivery of a quantity of posters free
of charge to the party levels. Posters featuring the local candidates or
campaign gifts had to be paid for. In addition, CSU headquarters
mounted numerous billboard-sized posters and made use of advertise-
ment pillars.
Much of the headquarters DM9 million campaign budget was spent
on the media campaign, particularly in the last three weeks before the
election. Even though campaigning only in Bavaria, four different TV
spots were broadcast on both public stations nationwide (Table 7.2).
Also heard across the entire nation were four radio spots aired by
publicly owned stations and ten spots broadcast by a Bavarian radio
station. All regional and Bavarian newspapers printed full page
advertisements featuring the CSU's national politicians as well as
Kohl. Additionally, the party magazine was attached as an enclosure
to these newspapers with a total circulation of 3.2 million copies.
These promoted the party's points of view as well as the local
candidate on the last page of the magazine.
The CSU played an active role in sponsoring the recently established
conservative party, DSU, in eastern Germany, running campaign
events in Thuringia and Saxony where the DSU was expected to
have its biggest success. This cooperation was generally arranged by
local or district party levels, particularly from northern Bavaria, which
had to struggle with a number of technical, communication and
organisational shortcomings in their effort to introduce new cam-
paign techniques to their political partners. The Munich headquarters
was not actively involved in the coordination of these campaign
activities; however, the general guidelines were set by several meetings
between the party leaders. Overall headquarters' campaign aid was
noticeably less than the high amounts provided during the Volkskam-
mer elections. The DSU was equipped with financial means through
election reimbursements and through earlier organisational help from
the CSU, so active personal and material aid no longer seemed so
necessary. Furthermore, the CDU increasingly resented these activi-

ties.4
It was not only the series of disappointing East German election
results in 1990 that frustrated Social Democratic party strategists. The
political turmoil of unification als·o devalued all the efforts that had
gone into the preparation of what was to be a carefully designed
election campaign along lines that political scientists like to recom-
mend. The stage had been well set for the recovery of governmental
power in Bonn. The party had modernised its programmatic appeal,
gained economic and ecological competence, fundamentally revised its
famous Godesberg programme and was about to select a chancellor
candidate who could authentically represent this new Social Demo-
cracy. Between 1987 and 1989 a working group under the auspices of
the future chancellor candidate, Oskar Lafontaine, had written a
programme, 'progress '90', which was intended to be the Social
Democratic answer to the ecological and social problems of the
1990s. On the basis of this document, the same group wrote the
election platform which was approved by the SPD campaign congress
in September 1990. Between January and October 1989, the party had
commissioned a series of five representative surveys designed to
measure political preferences and trends, identify strengths and
weaknesses of the SPD's competence profile and gauge the images
of Kohl and Lafontaine. Expecting enormous costs for campaigning in
East Germany, it was decided not to continue this series in the election
year. Hence campaign planning for the all-German election had to be
based on a fairly narrow data base, including a representative survey
in both parts of Germany, commissioned shortly after the opening of
the borders, and several non-representative, qualitative studies in East
Germany in summer and autumn 1990 in order to identify attitudinal
trends. In view of a politically very fluid situation, this shortage of
survey data was probably not a decisive disadvantage. Campaign
planning was supported by a group of independent - though
sympathetic - academic advisers, the so-called Gespriichskreis
Sozialwissenschaften, and strongly focused on Lafontaine. In its
campaign preparations the SPD invested much energy in the creation
of a corporate image. A unified design for all campaign material, such
as posters, brochures and information leaflets, had been developed
and scientifically tested.
As was the case for most of its West German competitors, when the
Social Democratic campaign preparations began, all-German elections
were still almost unthinkable. In September 1989 the technical cam-
paign committee met for the first time. This consisted of the senior
members of party headquarters staff and some close aides of Lafontaine
from the Saarland. It set up four divisions which were responsible for
strategy, marketing, technical management and support for the chan-
cellor candidate. Shortly afterwards the political campaign committee
was appointed by the party board (Parteivorstand). The two groups
were coordinated by the chairman of the technical committee who was a
member of both. The campaign was characterised by enormous
technical difficulties in the eastern part of the country. In addition to
the usual problems of communication and transport, the party suffered
from an almost complete lack of members in East Germany. The
estimated 15 000 or 18 000 members could not be expected to mount
an efficient grassroots campaign. In the western part of the country
local party groups were, as usual, in charge of hanging placards and
distributing leaflets and the party's special election newspaper, which
was issued on four Sundays during the run-up to the election. It
appeared with different local editions covering constituency and
national politics. In East Germany commercial distribution services
had to be used for most of these activities. Clearly the network of
partnerships between eastern and western lower-level units, which had
provided enthusiastic support during the Volkskammer election cam-
paign, could not compensate for the lack of manpower.
Whereas West German local units had to pay for campaign
material, most of the cost for the eastern campaign had to be borne
by the national party. Furthermore, campaign slogans needed adapta-
tion. After forty years of Communist rule and linguistic domination,
Social Democratic key concepts like 'solidarity' had a decidedly
negative connotation in the east. Local activities were complemented
in the last six weeks by a nationwide billboard campaign, organised
and financed by party headquarters, a series of TV spots on public and
private television, newspaper advertisements and a centralised coordi-
nation of campaign speeches by national party elites. Overall, the
Social Democratic headquarters spent approximately DM60 million
on the campaign.
The FDP election committee met for the first time in early autumn
1989 for a brainstorm on the next national election campaign for the
old Federal Republic. The members included the national party
manager, the political staff and the department heads of party
headquarters. Representatives of the public relations division and
the party's long established service company (Comdok), participated
in these first monthly meetings. After the general structure of the
campaign had been developed, meetings with the Land party managers
clarified organisational and technical details and an additional public
relations agency completed the promotional components for the
campaign.
Once it was obvious that there would be all-German elections, the
PDP initially countenanced a split campaign, campaigning with
different emphases in the east and west. Subsequently, it decided to
opt instead for an extended version of the original campaign, knowing
that topics like unification and the expected economic difficulties of
the unification process were both fields covered by leading liberal
politicians. The political and promotional aspects of campaign
strategy were accepted by the party's executive committee with only
marginal changes in early June, 1990. Thereafter the election commit-
tee began to meet at weekly intervals.
The budgeting of campaign expenses was structured in almost the
same way as was the case with the CDU and the CSU. PDP
headquarters spent DM12.8 million on broadcasting and newspaper
advertising, on billboards and placards with a campaign emphasising
its national politicians and key topics. In addition headquarters
provided coupons, worth DM2000, to each local party organisation
in order to guarantee the national party's presence in constituencies.
The vouchers enabled the party levels to buy a selection of material
chosen from a catalogue of promotional items. Another DMlOOO was
granted to support local newspaper advertising or local campaign
activities. Any other costs exceeding this amount were borne by the
party levels themselves. Headquarters coordinated the campaign
speech schedule of twenty-three nationally ranked politicians. It also
subsidised major party campaign events in all sixteen Lander. Overall
the FDP was successful in concentrating its campaigning in East
Germany. In total, according to party figures, 465 national campaign
events were arranged in the eleven old western Lander and 200 in the
five new eastern Lander.
The party operates a nationwide online computer system that
facilitates both electronic mail as well as information via a data
bank. The latter consists of all sorts of data, such as election results,
the views of the party on the most crucial and controversial political
topics and the related speeches of the party's ministers and chairman.
Thus far this network only links headquarters with Land party offices
and the system was only available in the western part of Germany.
Contact with the east was - with enormous technical problems - via
telephones, sometimes by faxes or, even more rarely, by radio
telephones. A Berlin based, three-person campaign unit, used during

the Volkskammer elections, was again in operation for the following
election. It coordinated the national campaign in the east, implement-
ing advice and directives from Bonn headquarters and organising the
schedule of speakers in eastern Germany.
This campaign was different from the Volkskammer elections in two
respects. Though still accustomed to centrally issued instructions,
there were more eastern party personnel participating in this cam-
paign as compared to the Volkskammer campaign. In the latter almost
all the crucial campaign jobs - down to the management of local
postering - were exclusively in western hands. That changed for the
Bundestag elections where the eastern campaign was mainly run with
local personnel. Furthermore, the more the newly elected eastern party
functionaries established themselves, the less contact they had with the
Berlin unit. Instead they increasingly contacted Bonn headquarters
directly. However, the party encountered difficulties, similar to the
CDU, when using the organisation and the communication network of
the former LDP. Although the eastern party members were willing
participants in the campaign, much persuasion and explanation were
needed to clarify the nature and rules of a competitive, short-lived, but
intense engagement in the modern election campaign game.
Heir to the former Socialist state party, SED, the PDS (Partei des
demokratischen Sozialismus) clearly possessed the strongest party
organisation in the former GDR. The party attempted to develop an
organisational structure in the west but the main emphasis clearly was
on the East German part of the campaign. Contacts were made with
western sympathisers in early 1990 and, as a result of the final decision
on the electoral law, these led to the expansion of the PDS to West
Germany, where sympathisers could organise and campaign. Appar-
ently the numbers involved were very small as many of these people
were interested in the PDS, but often not at all inclined to work as
campaign activists. The Volkskammer election results indicated that
the party essentially represented a lobby for the core of beneficiaries of
the old regime (Kaase and Gibowski, 1990). The PDS therefore
concentrated its campaign on the territory of the former GDR. The
election group, chaired by Andre Brie, member of the party commit-
tee, consisted of six full-time members of staff, who headed six task
forces with a total of twenty voluntary members. They were in charge
of election analysis, strategy, PR, media, personnel and operative
election planning. Later on two representatives of the western party
groups joined this body.
The PDS, of course, still had access to the existing SED party
structure in the GDR, but it suffered in terms of personal support and
the loss of the bulk of its membership. Its offices in the new Lander
were still fairly efficient, but the constituency offices lacked exper-
ienced campaign personnel. Therefore another eighty people - all
former staff of the party that worked on a voluntary basis - were
sent to support the constituency offices.
The PDS campaign varied in the two parts of Germany. Despite the
fact that the membership of the Berlin based election group included
western representatives, there were independent, contrasting cam-
paigns in the east and the west. In West Germany the PDS established
information offices in the biggest cities in all eleven Lander. Once it
had become clear at the July meetings with western sympathisers that
only a limited network had been established, some former members of
the West German Green party and of the Social Democrats, together
with what was left from the German Communist party (DKP)
organised the campaign independently. Their activities concentrated
mainly on an election campaign tour of twenty-one West German
cities, with Hamburg, Cologne and Munich having the largest
campaign groups. The party's most celebrated politicians, former
GDR prime minister Modrow and the party's chairman, Gregor
Gysi, took part in the tour which was held in the last three weeks of
the national campaign and represented a mixture of musical and
artistic events, political talks and press conferences.
In East Germany the election group managed the timetable for
campaign speeches of the party's thirty major candidates. Head-
quarters suggested 'double-day events'. Regional and local party
offices were informed about the date of the arrival of the candidate
who would stay for two days in the region, performing a programme
of visits, talks and speeches, planned and organised by the local party
offices. Campaign slogans and communication tactics also differed in
east and west. While in the west neutral newspapers with aggressive
slogans, word puns, and serious programmatic texts were circulated,
the PDS produced colourful magazines for the east, emphasising the
democratic need for a good opposition and featuring local candidates.
The PDS even invited East German writers to compose sensitive
slogans especially designed for the East German population.
Generally all billboards, posters and placards for all party levels
were centrally financed. The lower party levels had only to pay for
smaller items of merchandising. The party encountered difficulties
when it attempted to place newspaper advertisements. In some cases
publishers rejected its orders but after legal quarrels eventually

accepted. In addition, the PDS produced six TV spots and numerous
radio clips in a campaign that totalled a remarkable expenditure of
DM23 million.
The most conspicuous characteristic of the Green campaign was its
virtual absence. Overall the national party spent a mere DMl.S million
on the entire campaign, including the support for its eastern allies.
Ever since the party's election committee was established by the Hagen
conference in April 1990, it found itself paralysed by faction fighting.
Nevertheless technical campaign preparations were started with a staff
of about twenty-five people working at the party's Bonn headquarters.
The party was apparently secretly longing for political suicide and
decided at its national congress of June 1990 to reduce all activities of
the national party to an absolute minimum. After a recommendation
by the national party's council of finance, headquarters would not
finance any renting of commercial advertising spaces, any radio or
cinema spots, or any nationwide cultural campaign tour on the scale
used in previous campaigns. Funds that had previously sponsored
voters' initiatives were not available any more; even the free campaign
newspaper fell victim to the council's recommendation.
The background to all this was the idea of a decentralised campaign
management that should motivate all party levels to create (and pay
for) their own campaign ideas, along the lines of a rudimentary
national campaign structure. The latter was explained in a specially
designed all-German national election folder that was sold to the party
units for DMSO apiece. Some services and activities were at least
granted by party headquarters. An artists' competition was held for
the design of a special poster series, featuring the most important
Green topics. These posters were not especially designed for the
national campaign, but for general use. The election committee also
selected and ordered special campaign posters from a Cologne PR
company. In deliberate contrast to the colourful (and, it argued, rather
trivial) campaign style of its competitors, there was an attempt to
design Green pro~otion items in a functional and objective fashion.
With this it was hoped to emphasise the seriousness of the party's
political positions. Like the other parties, the Green party tried to
create a uniform appearance with a high recognition rate of party
material and logos. Headquarters services also included a list of
specialists working in different policy fields, usually a legislator or
legislative staff. All party levels could dial directly and ask for
campaign support or more detailed information.
The core of campaign activities by the headquarters consisted of the

organisation of a so-called 'ultimate climate express', and four minor
cabaret groups that toured only selected West German cities. The
lower levels were asked to prepare campaign activities independently
around the arrival of the climate express. The reception of this train,
which was used to focus on global climate problems, varied greatly. In
some cases it was the celebrated climax of a few days' activity; in
others, local organisations welcomed the train with only minimum
campaign effort.
As mentioned above, an alliance of the East German Green party
and several citizens' movements ran an independent campaign in East
Germany. The strong concern of the eastern partners with the
preservation of their political autonomy and identity was respected
by the West German Greens who provided only limited support. The
'climate express' made a short detour to East Germany and campaign
material was provided upon request. However, no West German
Green campaign managers helped to run the eastern campaign, which
was also very decentralised and locally oriented. Consequently the
'purple caravan', a campaign tour featuring local artists was the most
prominent centrally organised campaign activity of the Greens/
Alliance '90 in the east.
The result of the Volkskammer elections left the eastern Social

Democrats with the dilemma of deciding whether to share opposition
with the reforming PDS or to join a grand coalition which was to
promote the process of economic and national unification. The
decision to succumb to the call for national responsibility placed the
SPD in a somewhat schizophrenic position. In fact it could be argued
that it deprived its all-German chancellor candidate of any possibility
of successfully implementing his strategy of confrontation. How could
the Social Democrat party in the west credibly oppose policies which
were agreed between the West German government and the East
German grand coalition of which it was a part? In this context it is
important to be aware of the fact that all established German parties
effectively began to dominate the organisational and political leader-
ship of their East German sister parties before they merged officially.
The impact of organisational resources, particularly during the
nascent phase of the East German party system, has been discussed
above. However, probably more decisive than differential resources

were differential strategic positions. The year 1990 was the time of the
executive: currency union, unification treaty, '2 plus 4 talks', virtually
all important decisions were determined at the governmental level.
Overwhelmed by the rapid course of events, neither the parties in the
Bundestag nor those in the Volkskammer could refuse to ratify these
intergovernmental agreements without being accused of obstructing
the sacred goal of unification. In effect the West German government
was largely in a position to determine the course of events, at least
versus its East German counterpart. It became perfectly clear during
the negotiations that unification was not going to be a merger between
two equal partners. Clearly, whoever is bankrupt cannot dictate
conditions. Consequently, the Social Democrats - who in any event
were dispensable for a governmental majority - could not play a
significant role at governmental level in the east in the processes
leading up to unification. Nor could - or dared - they at the
parliamentary level in the west. When in May 1990 Lafontaine
wanted the Social Democratic Bundestag party to vote against the
state treaty on 'economic, monetary and social union' in order to
register opposition to the economic hazards which he (rightly)
expected from speedy unification, he was defeated because the MPs
feared the stigma of insufficient national enthusiasm. It is clear his
strategy did not envisage more than symbolic opposition since he did
not want the Social Democratic Land governments to obstruct the
treaty in the Bundesrat. Like their party elites, Social Democratic
supporters were split over the right strategy towards unification
(Gibowski and Kaase, 1991).
Opinion polls show it was this debate that lost the Social Democrats
the election. For most of the three year period after summer 1987, the
Social Democrats had been leading in the polls and it was by no means
certain that the Kohl government would be able to repeat its over-
whelming success of the Volkskammer elections in a united Germany
(Forschungsgruppe, 1990a). Despite Kohl's skilful handling of the
unification issue, the government was still losing Land elections in the
west. It is possible to regard this as an indicator that enthusiasm with
unification was probably lower in the west than the opinion surveys
indicated. However, once it became apparent that the Social Demo-
crats had no coherent strategy regarding unification, electoral support
for Lafontaine vanished. It should be mentioned in this context that,
as a result of his injuries following an assassination attempt in April,
Lafontaine had been 'off duty' for a crucial period before this debate.
As a result, he apparently misjudged the mood inside the federal

parliamentary party.
In view of the weak strategic position of the SPD (and the Greens),
Kohl's strategy of ignoring the opposition as much as possible was
certainly promising. Any substantive debate over competing political
strategies on the future of Germany bore the risk of bringing
Lafontaine back into the centre of the debate. From this perspective
it was advantageous for Kohl to avoid a direct TV confrontation with
Lafontaine. Similarly, the Liberals also avoided aggressive campaign-
ing and tried to claim as much credit for unification as possible;
particularly for the East German born foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich
Genscher. The results, in Table 7.1, show that this strategy was
successful. The SPD and the Greens suffered a devastating defeat
whereas the coalition won a comfortable majority.
CONCLUSION
It is interesting to note how much emphasis parties still place on quite

traditional grass roots canvassing and on permanent effort aimed at
creating a positive image of the party in the neighbourhood and
community. Even in the age of the mass media, face-to-face campaign-
ing is still considered to be an important element of a successful
campaign. Clearly the image that parties attempt to create through
media strategies and promotion of their elites needs validation on the
local level. It goes without saying that these local activities presuppose
an active party membership. In the eastern part of the country this was
either absent or else lacking in experience. Consequently all parties
were forced, to varying degrees, to run organisationally split cam-
paigns. The Christian Democrats, Liberals and Social Democrats ran
much of the campaign in the former GDR from Bonn which heavily
strained their resources. By contrast they could rely on the money and
manpower of lower level units in the west where party headquarters
largely functioned as service centres. Despite these organisational
differences, campaign emphases and strategies were almost identical
in both parts of the country.
Things were different for the PDS and the Greens. Both parties ran
split campaigns. The PDS lacked any potential in the west and
therefore concentrated its campaign efforts. on its former realm; the
Greens campaigned as separate parties. Like in earlier campaigns, the
West German Greens adhered to their decentralised, low-key cam-
paign style. Previously a favourable political agenda had usually

relieved the Greens from the need for vigorous campaigning. Unifica-
tion, however, had completely backstaged all political issues which
might have had positive effects for the party. It is a reasonable
assumption that its minimalist campaign accounts in part for the
disastrous election results. Furthermore, there is an element of myth in
the Green claim that its decentralised way of campaigning differs
fundamentally from that of its competitors. As a result of the
stipulations of the German party law, which guarantees internal party
democracy and a vertical distribution of power and financial re-
sources, all party headquarters cannot impose their campaign em-
phases and methods on lower level party units. They have to seek their
cooperation through conviction and the creation of incentives. The
nationwide campaign - transmitted through national newspapers and
electronic media- may be under the control of the central parties, but
local and regional newspapers and radio stations, at least in theory,
provide ample outlets for independent or even dissenting campaigns of
lower level party units. Although it is true that Green headquarters did
not try to impose a unified campaign on the party, the mere fact that
the central party offered a limited selection of posters and campaign
material created and selected at the national level certainly had
standardising effects. And, of course, there were national TV spots
as well. Increasingly German parties use new means of communica-
tion, like fax, online electronic mail, or data banks, primarily as a
means of briefing lower party levels very quickly. There can be little
doubt that parties will make more and more use of these communica-
tion devices, which may improve their capacity to react coherently to
unexpected developments during campaigns as well as in everyday
politics.
Politically the 1990 campaign was entirely dominated by the
question of the future problems associated with unification. In this
unusual context, the past record of the government played hardly any
role. Although the campaign was highly personalised it would be
erroneous to take this as an indication of a trend. Rather it was the
political circumstances which suggested a personalised strategy to both
leading parties. When SPD strategists met before the fall of the Berlin
wall, Lafontaine's competence and appeal seemed to be a major asset
for the campaign. It was certainly not predictable that Kohl, as a result
of his skilful handling of unification, would be able to benefit from a
personalised campaign himself. In a nutshell, parties on the whole did
not fundamentally change their way of campaigning except for more
use of private electronic media and of new means of office communi-

cations. Even for the all-German elections, all parties still regarded
traditional campaign techniques as most promising - ordinary
methods under extraordinary conditions.
Notes
1. Research for this chapter was supported by the German Research

Foundation (DFG) grant WI 896/2-1.
2. The alliance consisted of the following groups: Neues Forum, Demokratie
Jetzt, Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, Griine, Unabhiingiger
Frauenverband, individual candidates of the Vereinigte Linke.
3. The following analyses are based heavily on interviews with employees at
the parties' headquarters. CDU: Walter Briickmann, PR department
head; CSU: Ulrich Korner, PR department staff; SPD: Malte Ristau,
analysis and election department staff and Max Doming, organisation
department staff; FDP: Klaus Pfnorr, organisation department head;
PDS: Norbert Gustmann, PR staff of the parliamentary party; Greens:
Gerhard Lippe, organisation department staff. In addition, internal
election reports and campaign manuals were analysed.
4. The CDU was concerned that an old agreement that the CSU should be
active only in Bavaria was being circumvented. Kohl made it clear at a
meeting with the Bavarian sister party that a national expansion of the
CSU via the DSU would not be advantagous for either Christian
Democratic party.
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8 The Netherlands:
The 1989 Campaign
Philip van Praag Jr
SEITING AND NATIONAL CONTEXT
Election campaigns in the depillarised Dutch political system are

characterised by a striking paradox. Dutch political parties enjoy a
high degree of freedom in the way they conduct their campaigns.
Moreover, the financing of election campaigns is not subject to
external guidelines. However, in few countries do parties voluntarily
impose so many restrictions upon their campaign activities as in the
Netherlands. Election campaigns are very inexpensive and are largely
financed by member contributions. In the streets the campaigns are
virtually invisible; the attitude of the political parties towards each
other is highly correct and positive; personal attacks on politicians are
few and far between, and negative campaigning is non-existent.
Compared with many other countries and when seen through the
eyes of foreigners observers, election campaigns in the Netherlands are
dull, as are Dutch politics in general.
The apparent major changes in Dutch politics since the mid-1960s
have modified the political culture and structure only marginally.
Lijphart has recently concluded that by comparative standards the
extent of change is quite unimpressive. The politics of accommodation
did not undergo the complete metamorphosis into its polar opposite
which he suggested was happening in the 1970s (Lijphart, 1989). The
Netherlands is still a consensus democracy. Cultural changes are
primarily located in the field of private affairs and moral issues; the
Dutch have become more tolerant and libertarian (Thomassen and
van Deth, 1989). The political structure, however, has hardly been
affected, there is still a multiparty system with an electoral system
based on an extreme kind of proportional representation (a PR-list
system). The threshold for new parties is very low; they need just 0.67
per cent of the valid votes to win a seat in parliament. The Dutch party
system has always been one of minority parties. All parties enter
144
Philip van Praag Jr 145
elections confident that no single party will gain an independent

majority. Even after the depillarisation process, the Netherlands is
still governed by coalition cabinets. 1
In the 1970s, a significant change in the party system was brought
about by the merger of the three major denominational parties (the
Catholic KVP, the Calvinist ARP and the Reformed CHU) into one
broad Christian centre party, the CDA. In the latter half of the 1980s
the three small left-wing parties (the radical-socialist PSP, the
communist CPN and the radical PPR) opened talks on far-reaching
cooperation. In 1989, for the first time, these three parties and the
small radical-Christian EVP took part in the election with a joint list
of candidates under the name of Green Left (Groen Links). In the
meantime, the four parties have merged.
The Dutch media system is often judged a mixture of pillarisation,
including a number of rather long-standing broadcasting corporations
with a partly religious background, and of new corporations, aimed at
a general public, dating from the late 1960s (Brants, 1985). The
different broadcasting organisations have three channels at their
disposition. In the autumn of 1989 a fourth commercial channel
entered the fray. The September 1989 campaign was the last time
the public broadcasting system, and its common news broadcasts on
the three channels, held a monopoly on campaign reporting.
The consensual democracy of the Netherlands allows the editorial
staff of television news programmes a great deal of freedom in their
coverage of election campaigns. They are not bound by external rules.
Just like all other news items, election campaigns must be covered
impartially and factually. Fundamental changes in the style of
campaign coverage - such as the 1986 introduction of a daily
campaign feature, copied from the BBC - were not brought about
by political pressure but by the arrival of new editors.
In general, most parties have access to television through friendly
broadcasting corporations. At election time this becomes apparent
both in news programmes and talkshows. It is no coincidence that
most complaints about neglect by television are made by the small left-
wing parties, which, unlike the small right-wing religious parties, do
not have any broadcasting friends. The structure of the Dutch
broadcasting system, which goes back to the days of pillarisation,
still guarantees a high degree of political pluriformity.
The modernisation of Dutch election campaigns started in the
1960s. With its electoral defeat in 1959, the PvdA (Social Demo-
crats) was made aware of the electorate's decreasing loyalty. As a
146 The Netherlands: The 1989 Campaign
result, since 1960 it has been conducting regular surveys of voters.

Friendly television producers and reporters were brought in to advise
on the possible contribution of television to campaigning. The PvdA
campaign of 1967 was the first campaign to be run on modem lines: it
had only one leading candidate, Joop den Uyl, as against three in
1963; a more centralised campaign organisation; and a strategy clearly
directed at the media. The activities of advertising agencies were no
longer limited to executive tasks but now also included the planning of
the campaign (van Praag Jr, 1991). The PvdA was not the only party
in 1967 to conduct a modem campaign. Even more remarkable was
the successful campaign of a new party, Democrats 66 (D66). With the
help of an advertising agency, this pragmatic and progressive group
managed to build up the image of a fast, young and dynamic party. A
highly professional television broadcast and the charming television
performance of the leading candidate, Hans van Mierlo, formed the
finishing touches to this campaign (Brants eta/., 1982).
The 1977 PvdA campaign signified the next historic milestone in the
modernisation process. Aware of the advantage a popular incumbent
prime minister could bring, the PvdA systematically built up its
campaign around its prime minister, den Uyl, deliberately portraying
him as an international statesman unable to devote much time to
campaigning. This was the first time in the television era that an
incumbent Dutch prime minister took a central position in a campaign
(van Praag jr, 1991). In earlier elections (1963, 1967, 1971 and 1972)
the various Christian parties had kept their prime ministers in the
background. The manner in which the CDA in the elections of 1986
and 1989 centred its campaigns on its prime minister, Ruud Lubbers,
shows great similarity to the PvdA campaign of 1977.
In principle, general elections in the Netherlands are held every four
years. The election of 6 September 1989 was early, caused by the fall of
the Lubbers II government of Christian Democrats and Liberals on 2
May 1989. The issue sparking off the cabinet crisis was remarkable. In
a disagreement over environmental policy, the VVD (Liberals)
parliamentary party was unable to approve the cabinet decision to
lower tax relief for car commuter traffic. Two important VVD
ministers, including its popular minister of the environment, opposed
their own parliamentary group and their political leader, Joris
Voorhoeve. The great dissatisfaction of the Liberal parliamentary
party with the dominant position of the Christian Democrats in the
coalition also played a part. When the government fell the parties'
preparations for the European Parliament elections of 15 June were at
an advanced stage. In early May all parties adjusted their campaigns

slightly, putting greater emphasis on the national aspect.
In a multiparty system such the Netherlands the number of parties
campaigning in elections is always high. In 1986 and 1989, their
number totalled twenty-seven and twenty-five respectively and in
each, nine parties succeeded in gaining at least one seat. This chapter
discusses the campaigns of the five major parties: the Christian
Democrats (CDA), the Social Democrats (PvdA), the Liberals
(VVD), the Progressive Liberals (D66) and the Green Left (the
alliance of three small left-wing parties).
All five parties began preparing for the European Parliament election
in the autumn of 1988. The internal informative and motivational
campaigns had begun well before the fall of the government. This was
deemed necessary because the European Parliament election, a second
order election, has very little appeal for party activists. The three small
left parties found themselves in a special position. In 1984, faced by a
higher electoral threshold of 4 per cent for the Euro election, they had
campaigned with a joint list of candidates, but in April 1989 talks on
national cooperation or a merger were still dragging along.
Once it became clear, in the first week of May, that a general
election would take place in September, the CDA, already at an
advanced stage in its Euro campaign preparations, needed to make
few changes. Apart from giving more prominence to national politi-
cians, the CDA hardly changed the structure of its campaign at all.
Basically the campaign organisation was the same as in 1986. There
may have been a new secretary to the party executive committee (Cees
Bremmer), who was also campaign manager, but this person had been
working at party headquarters for quite some time.
The campaign was led by the party's campaign committee, a small
club consisting of prime minister Lubbers, the chairman of the
parliamentary party, the party chairman and the campaign manager.
The information officers of the party and the parliamentary party
acted as advisers. The campaign committee met at least once a week
and intensive bilateral talks between the persons concerned also took
place frequently. It took the major strategic decisions. The heart of the
campaign, however, consisted of the campaign staff who met on a
daily basis. Under the direction of the campaign manager, the daily
campaign decisions were taken by the party chairman, the information

officers and a few other officials at party headquarters. The involve-
ment of the party at large in the campaign was via the national
propaganda committee (Landelijke Propaganda Commissie), on which
all provincial campaign managers sit. This committee acts in the first
place as a sounding board, where new ideas are submitted and, subject
to their reception, modified.
The CDA campaign budget amounted to fll.4 million. This
compares with fl1.3 million spent on its 1986 campaign and fl1.5
million on the 1981 campaign (Koole, 1990). Following a minor public
outcry during the first CDA campaign in 1977 (van Praag Jr, 1991),
the CDA had decided not to accept any more gifts from trade and
industry. Since then, election campaigns have been fully financed by
member contributions. In 1989, fl400000 were withdrawn from the
election fund (an annual reserve for elections); a fund raising drive
among members yielded more than fll million.
The CDA subscribes to the weekly opinion polls carried out by the
InterView agency. The party also has access to the results of surveys
by the Government Information Service (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst). In
addition the party commissioned its own qualitative and quantitative
research in the preparatory stages of the campaign. This research was
supervised by the party and interpreted by a commission of enquiry
consisting of the party secretary (who was also campaign manager),
the party information officer and marketing specialists. As was the
case in 1986, the focus was mainly on assessing voter perceptions of
the party's strengths and weaknesses, their evaluation of cabinet policy
and the image of the party's major politicians. This research, also
carried out by InterView, played an important part in developing the
basic structure of the campaign. No surveys were commissioned in the
final weeks of the campaign. In total the party's research was allocated
just fl85 000 in the campaign budget.
The bulk of the party's expenditure went on daily newspaper
advertisements (fl750 000), brochures and propaganda material
(fll50000) and six major campaign events. Even though the effective-
ness of advertising was strongly questioned within the party, it still
represented more than 50 per cent of total expenditure. A large sum
was spent on billboards, 3500 in all, located alongside motorways on
the land of sympathetic farmers. The party had been investigating the
potential of billboard advertising since its first use in 1986. As the
enthusiasm of local and provincial campaign teams is considered very
important, a large sum of money was assigned to local campaign
activities. The direct, personal approach of the electorate, which is

highly valued, is one of the responsibilities of local and provincial
teams.
In each campaign the CDA tries to tap as much of its own reservoir
of specialists as possible. Although the party uses the services of an
advertising agency (HDM), great store is placed on the need to get a
second opinion. The advertising agency generally designs the adverti-
sements and posters, but according to strict guidelines. In 1989 the
agency produced the campaign slogan 'On with Lubbers' and was
involved in the qualitative testing of it. The ideas for a short television
propaganda film were developed by the party's information depart-
ment. This was based largely on already existing film material and was
judged as very successful by the advertising specialists. The CDA
systematically keeps track of international developments in election
campaigning. It subscribes to the journal, Campaign and Elections. On
a more or less regular basis campaign experiences are exchanged with
other Christian parties, especially the German CDU and the Belgian
CVP.
The early election date took the PvdA by surprise. After its
disappointing 1986 election result (fifty-two seats), the PvdA had
been reconsidering its position since 1987. Its research showed that
the party had become politically isolated and had alienated its possible
coalition partner, the CDA. The PvdA had very little attraction for
voters of the political centre, many of whom had given their vote to
the CDA because they supported the socio-economic policy of the
Lubbers cabinet. This partly accounted for the CDA's electoral gains
in 1986 (from forty-four to fifty-three seats) (Irwin et a/., 1987; Irwin
and Holsteyn, 1989; van der Eijk and van Praag Jr, 1987). The PvdA
decided to end its polarisation strategy against the CDA, which it had
applied since the 1970s. The party's political isolation had to be
broken; it had to become more attractive for voters from the political
centre. To do so the party programme and organisation had to be
adjusted. The retirement of den Uyl after twenty years of leadership
and the appointment of Wim Kok (the popular former chairman of
the FNV trade union) as the new political leader of the PvdA also
created opportunities for a new policy.
By May 1989 this process had by no means been completed:
discussions about the party programme were still in progress; the
proposed restructuring of the party had not materialised; plans to
(re)introduce a systematic research policy had not yet been carried out
because, in the opinion of the former campaign manager, research was
not given any priority by the party executive. However, in 1988 the
Social Democrats had concluded a contract with a new advertising
agency, Saatchi and Saatchi. This contract received a great deal of
publicity and raised much criticism in the party and the media because
of the former ties of the British parent company with the Conservative
party and with the apartheid regime in South Africa.
In several respects the PvdA campaign organisation in 1989 differed
strikingly from the organisation in 1986. As in former elections the
campaign was led by a political campaign committee (Polca). In 1986
the composition of the committee was very diverse and included, in
addition to the party's political leader (den Uyl) and the campaign
manager, representatives of the youth organisation (Young Socialists),
the women's organisation (the Red Women) and the scientific bureau.
The political responsibility was in the hands of the party executive,
especially of the party chairman (van den Berg) and the party
secretary. In 1989, however, the committee was much smaller,
comprising party chairman Marian Sint, the deputy chairman of the
executive, party leader Kok, number two in the parliamentary party,
Thijs Woltgens, party secretary, Allard Beck, and the information
officer of the parliamentary party. The party's information officer-
who was also the campaign manager in 1986 and for the 1989 Euro
election - announced his departure in early May and so only made
marginal contributions to the 1989 campaign.
The PvdA had fll.3 million at its disposal. A collection among
members yielded half a million, a further fl800 000 came from the
campaign fund. The major expenditure (fl400 000) was on election
materials such as posters, leaflets, election papers and stickers. Over
fl200 000 was spent on advertising, fl200 000 on several major
campaign events, and a pop concert for young people cost fll25 000.
Research was allotted fl45 000.
As was the case in 1986, the VVD campaign was led by a small
campaign team. The campaign manager was Hugo Dittmar, the
secretary for public relations, information and campaigns at party
headquarters. Dittmar had participated in all VVD campaigns since
1981: this was his first time as campaign manager. Other members of
the campaign team included party chairman, Leendert Ginjaar, party
leader, Joris Voorhoeve, the general secretary of the party and the
information officer of the parliamentary party. The first candidate
from the European Parliament election campaign was also included.
After the collapse of the cabinet, Hermans, the second chairman of the
VVD parliamentary party, was added to the team. His particular
responsibility was media coordination and maintaining contacts with

the parliamentary group. In the final three weeks the campaign team
met daily, sometimes even on Sundays. Politically it was supported by
a team of staff members of the parliamentary party who provided
statements and background information. From an organisational
point of view the team was supported by several smaller committees
responsible for campaign materials, various events, the final night of
the campaign and voter contact.
Since 1977 the VVD's campaigns have been organised in close
cooperation with the advertising agency, NAVAR. By 1988 the party
had grown tired of this relationship. Surprised by the cabinet crisis,
however, the VVD had no choice but to fall back on the creative team
of one of NAVAR's partners, ARA, which made use of the expertise
of NAVAR. The VVD campaign budget amounted to fll million.
Fund-raising among party members yielded fl600000. The balance
was financed from the election fund. Advertisements in daily papers
accounted for the greater part of the expenses (fl450 000). In addition,
fll 00 000 were spent on campaign events, fllOO 000 on temporary staff
and f1150 000 on public meetings which were referred to as 'Parliament
on Wheels'. 2 The party's national organisation does not spend money
on electoral leaflets and brochures, instead local branches buy election
materials from headquarters at cost price. This helps explain why
research into branch level expenses in 1986 shows the VVD spending
more money locally than the CDA and PvdA. 3 Traditionally, the VVD
spends hardly any money on research. The party subscribes to weekly
polls but only occasionally does it have a research agency test a slogan
or analyse certain matters in more detail. There is no systematic
research policy. Leading politicians in the VVD give little priority to
research, setting great store on daily contact with voters and their
many engagements throughout the country. On an ad hoc basis
sympathetic experts are called in. In the 1989 campaign, these were
asked how the positive characteristics of party leader Voorhoeve could
be shown to best advantage.
The Democrats 66 organisation is the least structured of the major
parties. It is also one of the poorest with only 9000 members in 1989.
D66 is the only party to have an internal referendum to establish the
order of its list of parliamentary candidates. Because of its weak
organisational structure D66 campaigns are often more loosely
organised than those of other parties. However, D66's playful
campaign s.tyle and original ideas frequently attract a great deal of
publicity.
In 1989, Ernst Bakker was campaign manager both for the Euro
election and the general election. Bakker was closely involved in the
1977, 1981 and 1982 campaigns and is credited by many with the
party's 1981 electoral success (11.1 per cent). When the cabinet fell
D66, like the other parties, put greater emphasis on the national
aspect, assigning political leader van Mierlo a more prominent role.
The campaign team included van Mierlo, Bakker, the party chairman,
the treasurer, the press officer of the parliamentary group and a
representative of the youth organisation. The technical aspects of
the campaign were taken care of by the campaign committee. In the
final weeks of the election the trio of van Mierlo, Bakker and the
parliamentary party press officer met daily and took the major
strategic decisions.
The D66 campaign budget of fl600 000 - including between
fll 00 000 and 150 000 on the Euro election - barely exceeded that of
1986 (fl575 000). Collections among members raised fl300 000 and the
election fund contributed fl275 000. The major items of expenditure
were leaflets and posters (fl200 000) and advertisements (fll25 000). It
was decided that, instead of small advertisements, a limited number of
large advertisements would be used; the view was that small advertise-
ments were all too often associated with small parties. D66 does not
generally spend money on research. Target groups are determined on
the basis of an analysis of the election results and of existing and
publicly available research material. Occasionally, the party is given
research material by survey agencies free of charge. The party does not
use the services of an advertising agency, but advertising and media
specialists have tended to offer their help.
The campaign preparations of the Green Left started late. At the
end of April 1989 the cooperation of the four small left-wing parties
(the radical-socialist PSP, the radical PPR, the communist CPN and
the very small Evangelical People's party) was at a deadlock. The early
parliamentary elections meant an enormous incentive to try once more
to give shape to their cooperation. Under the pressure of the
approaching election they suddenly managed to submit a joint list of
candidates and to make agreements on further cooperation. But this
meant that the campaign preparations and organisation of Green Left
were not launched until the end of June. Moreover, there was very
little time to integrate the various campaign traditions and frequently
the composition of committees was not based on expertise but on
parity between the parties.
Green Left made only very limited use of the campaign organisation
established for the Euro election. New bodies staffed by new people
were set up. At the head of the campaign stood a committee of four
people (the top executives of the parties concerned), who on the basis
of the campaign plan approved by the interim management of Green
Left led the organisation of the campaign. The campaign manager,
former PPR chairman, Wim de Boer - who had played a key role in
stimulating the cooperation - participated in this committee but did
not have voting rights. Political and strategic decisions were made at
the campaign meetings, attended by the four leading candidates and
the parties' four representatives. It was intended that whenever
necessary this group should meet during the campaign; in practice,
however, they hardly ever did. Several other smaller groups occupied
themselves with special tasks such as radio and television broadcasts,
copy writing and the closing campaign event. Although not commis-
sioning work from an advertising agency, Green Left did work
together with a design studio and an agency (Meyson) placing
advertisements at reduced rates. For the television broadcasts help
was sought from a small production agency.
Green Left did not subscribe to the weekly Nipo or InterView
opinion polls. When planning the campaign it did not carry out any
research, nor did it make systematic use of existing research. The
budget amounted to fl470 000. Most expenses (fl200 000) were related
to the campaign material, including a general brochure (1.1 million
copies), a special issue brochure (160 000), stickers (50 000) and posters
(50 000). The end-of-campaign event, costing a further fl30 000, was
judged generally as not particularly successful.
Ever since the introduction of proportional representation in 1918,

Dutch election campaigning has been strongly controlled by the
centre. Party headquarters in particular have taken a dominant
position in the organisation and control of campaigns. The ever more
important role of television and th~ growing number of floating voters
have further encouraged centralisation. A certain tension between the
parliamentary party and the party headquarters is intrinsic to a
modem campaign. In the Christian parties, notably the former
KVP, and the liberal parties (VVD and D66), the party leader has
always strongly influenced the campaign. To a lesser extent this applies

to the Social Democrats, whose campaigns are often accompanied by
tensions between the party leader and parliamentary party on the one
hand, and the party executive on the other. It is no coincidence that,
unlike the CDA, VVD and 066, the PvdA should have its head-
quarters in Amsterdam and not in the Hague. The PvdA national
headquarters are also considerably larger than those of the CDA and
VVD (Koole, 1989). In 1987 it was staffed by fifty-four persons.
Much more so than in 1986 the focus of the PvdA campaign was on
the parliamentary party, notably on political leader Kok and his
support group of MPs and some advisers, referred to within the
party as 'The Hague Polca'. Two factors may account for the shift
in responsibility from party headquarters to the parliamentary party.
For some time past the influence of the party executive on party p()licy
had been diminishing in favour of the parliamentary party. Secondly,
there has been quite a few personnel changes: the leadership change
from den Uyl to Kok; the appointments of a new party chairman in
1987 and a new party secretary in early 1989. Moreover, in the spring
of 1989 it was clear that the party information officer (and campaign
manager) was about to accept a new job. A party executive without
past experience in campaigning and with an outgoing campaign
manager provided the new party leader and parliamentary party with
an opportunity to influence the nature of the campaign more strongly
than before.
The VVD witnessed a shift in the opposite direction: the 1989
campaign manager was not the information officer of the parliamen-
tary group but rather the information officer of the party organisation.
This shift was the direct result of personnel changes in the parliamen-
tary party. Internal political problems in the VVD naturally gave some
more prominence to the role played by the party executive, though this
is likely to have been an incidental shift only. In the campaign
organisation of 066 the focus was on campaign manager Bakker
and party leader van Mierlo.
In the Green Left's campaign organisation there was a remarkably
strong focus on the party executives represented on the campaign
committee; the professional politicians played minor roles. For
instance, in the last three weeks of the campaign there was no forum
for systematic consultations between the campaign leader, the political
leader and the other prominent politicians of the new group. This was
a campaign organisation in which politicians, who after all should
have been the pillars of the campaign, were assigned secondary roles.
Philip van Praag Jr ISS
Political and strategic adjustment of the campaign was virtually

impossible. Although the set-up of the Green Left campaign was
more modern than those of its constituent parties in the past, it was
nevertheless a traditional and quite unprofessional campaign in
comparison with the other parties.
All party headquarters used fax machines for their press relations,
but for internal communication purposes - such as communication
with provincial campaign teams - fax machines were rarely used. Only
the CDA had started building up a fax network in 1989.
In the United States media campaign reporting bears a strong

resemblance to 'horse race' journalism (Joslyn, 1984). Likewise the
media in the Netherlands have felt strongly inclined in the last fifteen
years to focus their attention away from substantial issues. During
each campaign the media, and to a lesser extent the major parties, are
preoccupied with two strategic issues. In the first place, there is the
issue of government composition - the question of 'who will govern
with whom' - usually narrowed down to the question of whether the
CDA will govern together with the VVD, or with the PvdA. In the
second place, there is the question of which party will become the
largest party, the PvdA or the CDA. From a political point of view
this is an important question because the largest party has the first
right to try to form a coalition government and because it can also
supply the prime minister. In the case of CDA-PvdA coalitions this
has been a particularly significant issue.
During the 1986 election campaign the CDA for the first time
openly stated its preference for a coalition partner prior to polling day.
The main CDA campaign issue then was continuation of the CDA-
VVD coalition which had governed the country since 1982 under the
leadership of CDA prime minister Lubbers. With the slogan 'Let
Lubbers finish his job' (reminiscent of Reagan's 1984 campaign) the
CDA fought a successful campaign, gaining nine seats and becoming
the largest party. In the process Lubbers had become the most popular
politician in the Netherlands. After the cabinet crisis in 1989 the CDA
could not make a clear statement about its coalition preference. The
campaign was therefore organised along three lines. First, attention
again focused on Lubbers: the confidence many voters, especially
VVD sympathisers, had in him was turned to maximum advantage,
as exemplified by the slogan 'On with Lubbers'. The message was

clear: irrespective of who formed the next coalition government,
Lubbers had to be returned as prime minister. Second, research
indicated that the CDA was regarded as the stable factor in Dutch
politics, as the party not to be blamed for the cabinet crisis and not
given to squabbling while important issues had to be tackled.
Consequently, as little attention as possible was given to other parties
and their campaign statements were ignored. Third, research showed
that the rank and file of the CDA no longer had any major objections
to a coalition with the PvdA (in 1986 they had), provided the economic
policy of the CDA-VVD coalition was continued. A central theme,
therefore, in the CDA campaign was 'continuity and innovation'
where new priorities would have to be established with due regard
to priorities already set. In the course of the campaign Lubbers
discussed the 'agenda for the nineties'. The main CDA issues were
the environment, medical care, education and criminality. In general
the campaign radiated self-confidence. The party's aim was to retain
its 1986 result of fifty-three seats and possibly to win two more seats.
The results of the European Parliament election were encouraging
(34.6 per cent). An important objective was to retain the support of
non-Christian voters won in 1986 (12 per cent) and to continue to be
the most attractive party for young voters. Furthermore, the CDA
focused on big cities and urban areas housing many (potential)
supporters.
As the campaign progressed some problems arose. It had been
planned for Lubbers to conduct a presidential campaign, as in 1986.
As a statesman of international stature he would limit his participation
in campaign activities and spend most of his time governing the
country. He was scheduled to appear at six major campaign events,
on some television programmes and the televised debates with other
candidates. To some extent this strategy backfired. The television
evening news started its comprehensive election coverage more than
two weeks before polling day. In the first week the theme mentioned
almost daily was that Lubbers had very little time for campaigning.
Journalists like to have statements and pictures of principal candidates
and therefore it was the other parties which were able to determine the
agenda in the first week.
With hindsight the CDA views the overdistant attitude of Lubbers as
a minor flaw in its strategy. Moreover, Lubbers' television perfor-
mances were not always successful. The important live debate, four
days before polling, with the PvdA's principal candidate, Kok, was won
on points by Kok. His well-argued and pertinent criticism of cabinet

policy forced Lubbers onto the defensive. Afraid that as a consequences
of the debate the PvdA would become the largest party, the CDA
decided to advertise more widely in the last few days than had originally
been planned. The party was more satisfied with Lubbers' television
performance in the closing debate, between the leading candidates of
CDA, PvdA, VVD, 066 and Green Left, on the evening before polling.
In this debate Lubbers managed to present himself as a statesman
unwilling to join the bickering of the other candidates.
The PvdA viewed the cabinet crisis and early elections as an
excellent opportunity to return to office. Its main objective was to
present the party as rejuvenated, ready and able to bear the responsi-
bilities of government. It was intended that the campaign should
neither deter voters of the political centre nor provide potential
coalition partners with excuses to exclude the PvdA. The party's first
preference was for cooperation with the CDA, but a coalition with the
VVD was not ruled out. The electoral platform 'A Choice for Quality'
had to be sound and realistic, showing the party's ability to delineate a
successful economic policy. In the first week the campaign received an
important boost when the Central Planning Bureau - in calculating
the financial consequences of the electoral platforms of CDA, PvdA,
VVD and D66 - found that the PvdA programme would lead to
higher economic growth (2.5 per cent) and more employment, while its
effects on purchasing power would be similar to those of the VVD and
CDA programmes.
The PvdA called for government investment in the material and
non-material infrastructure of the Netherlands, especially in public
transport, medical care, education and the environment. It was in
favour of reestablishing the link between wage levels in trade and
industry, civil service salaries and social security benefits. In spite of
the electoral slogan 'time for a different policy', these proposals were
not presented as a fundamental alternative to government policy of the
previous few years, but rather as a shift of emphasis, a qualitative
improvement. This was deemed necessary to enable a coalition with
the CDA and to win over voters from the political centre. The implied
danger was that the PvdA's own voters would no longer be able to
identify fully with the party and would either stay at home or go over
to Green Left. For this reason the PvdA attacked the Green Left on
several occasions, for instance on its 'unrealistic' financial programme.
The CDA, too, was treated more harshly towards the end of the
campaign.
The PvdA sought to present the image of self-confidence, reliability,

quality, the status of a natural government party. In addition political
leader Kok was portrayed as a future prime minister with the qualities
of determination, reliability, competence and integrity. The PvdA
succeeded only partly in building up these images. Kok's integrity
and reliability were widely recognised, but his competence and
determination were open to some doubt. Research showed that
Lubbers scored considerably better on these points. The PvdA
campaign, which received much media praise, passed off quite
smoothly. No major political errors were made and Kok's perfor-
mance in debates with Beckers (Green Left) and Lubbers was seen to
carry conviction.
The VVD conducted a defensive campaign. A significant part of its
own electorate failed to understand why the VVD had brought down
the CDA-VVD cabinet. Not only were the voters pleased with the
cabinet, they also had high regard for the CDA prime minister. The
VVD was faced with the task of regaining the confidence of its voters,
a tall order, the more so since after the elections the VVD again
proposed forming a coalition with the CDA. Moreover, the party was
greatly divided after the fall of the cabinet. Two popular ministers,
who had disagreed with the parliamentary party, openly attacked the
party line. One minister, Neelie Smit-Kroes, retired from politics, the
other, former party leader, Ed Nijpels, was again standing for election,
but he was viewed as a highly controversial person by some senior
party officials. An additional problem for the VVD was that party
leader Voorhoeve had little charisma and lacked experience in
campaigning. Given the circumstances, the VVD could only try to
minimise its electoral losses.
In the light of its position the VVD, more so than the other parties,
inserted full page advertisements in the daily papers which focused on
such substantial issues as further reductions in the financial burden, a
soundly financed environmental policy, proper education and house
ownership. In a strategy which in the past had so often paid off, it was
pointed out that a rise in support for the CDA and a major loss for the
VVD would increase the danger of a PvdA-CDA coalition. The news
that Hans Wiegel- the popular political leader from 1971 to 1982-
would deliver a major speech at the party's end-of-campaign meeting,
attracted a lot of publicity and raised speculation of a possible
comeback. According to the opinions polls, the return of Wiegel to
national politics would have won the party more votc:s. However,
Wiegel refused to take such a step, for the time being. The VVD's
closing event, attracting 6500 spectators, was a great success, but the
televised closing debate between the leading candidates was not. In
spite of Voorhoeve's extremely careful preparations he made a very
weak impression.
The potential for survival of 066 has suffered a number of blows
over the years. In the 1974 provincial elections the party won just 1 per
cent of the vote. After improvements in 1977 and 1981 (up to 11.1 per
cent), the vote fell back to 2 per cent in the 1984 European Parliament
election. In 1986 the return of van Mierlo (leading candidate in 1967,
1971 and 1972) as political leader pulled the party out of the political
abyss and won it nine seats (6.1 per cent of the vote). D66's problem
has always been a relative lack of loyal supporters; this compares with
the large number of voters mentioning the party as their second
choice. Its electoral fortunes have always been determined by the
movements of its competitors, particularly the PvdA and to a lesser
extent the VVD. The result of the European Parliament election in
June 1989 when its vote dropped to 5.9 per cent was disappointing.
During the summer months the 066 vote seemed to stabilise at around
6 per cent.
066 target groups are always the well educated. The party has a
particularly strong position in some university cities, commuter towns
and, more generally, in the western part of the Netherlands. Its
position is relatively weak in the east. The 066 campaign centred on
five major campaign events throughout the country. Two issues played
an important part, issues which in the past had produced electoral
success. The first of these, the environment, required a clear stance,
particularly in the light of competition from the Green Left. The 066
advertisements were designed appropriately, with the following state-
ment: 'Twenty years ago we said, "Let's share alike in a clean
country." Now left and right are beginning to understand what we
meant at the time.' D66's second theme also revived an old issue: the
need for administrative innovation, for a government which would pay
better attention to its people. In the televised closing debate van
Mierlo launched a proposal to set up a parliamentary committee for
administrative reforms after the election. 066 also distinguished itself
on non-material issues, such as good euthanasia arrangements.
The alliance of small left-wing parties had a good European
Parliament election, winning 7 per cent of the vote. As a new party
Green Left received much more attention from the media than the
separate small parties had in the past. Up to the beginning of August
the opinion polls showed Green Left climbing to about 9 per cent. The
party started its campaign in mid-August, a week before the other

major parties, with a train journey widely covered by the media. It
feared that as the campaign moved on the media would chiefly focus
on the major parties and in this it was proven right. When on a few
occasions Green Left did attract publicity this was mostly negative.
The party had not asked the Central Planning Bureau to calculate the
financial consequences of its electoral platform, leaving it wide open to
criticism from its opponents. A debate between the party's leading
candidate, Ria Beckers, and Kok of the PvdA was judged a victory for
the PvdA. Kok's statement that maintaining castles in the air is a very
costly business was inadequately refuted by Beckers. In this manner
the PvdA succeeded in forcing its competitor on the left wing into a
very defensive position. The Green Left's end-of-campaign event on a
Sunday afternoon drew fewer people than expected and was all but
completely ignored by the media. The fact that Green Left was
allowed to participate in the closing television debate was significant
but, according to many journalists, Beckers performance was very
disappointing and unlikely to convince the electorate.
THE RESULT
The 1989 results were far from shocking (Table 8.1). Remarkably the
CDA retained the seats it had won in 1986. As expected the VVD lost
support and the Green Left had a disappointing result. Reflecting a
good campaign D66 came out as the biggest gainer. And the PvdA
result was striking. Not only had its campaign been praised by
journalists, but research carried out by the University of Amsterdam
indicated that it conducted the best campaign. The party had managed
to remove many doubts among its 1986 supporters and had convinced
a number of voters not to turn to Green Left, yet it still lost three seats.
The University of Amsterdam research involved a panel of 1000
voters who were interviewed daily in the final three weeks before
polling day. 4 Its main findings were that the PvdA would have suffered
a far greater loss but for a good campaign, that the number of Green
Left supporters steadily dwindled during the three weeks, that the
VVD failed to win back supporters it lost after the cabinet crisis, that
D66 conducted a good campaign, and that the CDA campaign was
successful in the last week only. Voters changing their party preference
during the course of the campaign viewed the quality of a party's
leading candidate as important (25 per cent), but not all-important.

The biggest cause for a change of mind (32 per cent) was due to the
stance a party took on specific issues, for instance on income, or
environmental policies. Strategic considerations also played an impor-
tant part.
Table 8.1 The Dutch 1989 election
Seats (%) votes (%)change
CDA 54 35.3 0.7

PvdA 49 31.9 -1.4
VVD 22 14.6 -2.8
D66 12 7.9 1.8
Green Left 6 4.1 0.8
Other 7 6.2 0.9
There is no reason to expect profound changes in the campaigns of

Dutch political parties. Although a personalisation of politics in the
Netherlands is definitely taking place, campaigns are still strongly
characterised by the political issues themselves. Future campaigns will
be as dull, positive and correct as in the past.
Notes
1. For a detailed discussion of the Dutch party system, see Daalder (1987).
2. The VVD has a trailer which reconstructs part of the Dutch parliament
and this is transported throughout the country as a prop for discussion
with voters.
3. In 1986 the local party branches of the VVD spent an estimated fl900 000
on the national election. The local branches of the CDA spent fl750 000
and the PvdA branches spent 0670000 (Koole, 1990; van Praag Jr, 1987).
4. The research was carried out by Willem Saris, Kees de Rooy and Kees
Maas and was published in issues of the professional advertising journal,
Adformatie (3 August 1989; 24 August 1989; 31 August 1989; 7 September
1989; 12 October 1989).
References
Brants, K., Kok, W. and Praag Jr, Ph. van (1982), De Strijd om de
Kiezersgunst, Verkiezingscampagnes in Nederland (Amsterdam: Kobra).
Brants, K. (1985),'Broadcasting and Politics in the Netherlands: From Pillar
to Post', West European Politics, 8, pp. 104-21.
Daalder, H. (1987),'The Dutch Party System: From Segmentation to Polar-
ization - and Then?', in H. Daalder (ed.), Party Systems in Denmark,
Austria, Switzerland, The Netherlands and Belgium (London: Frances
Pinter).
Eijk, C. E. van der and Praag Jr, Ph. van (eds) (1987), De strijd om de
meerderheid; de verkiezingen van 1986 (Amsterdam: CT-Press).
Irwin, G. A., Eijk, C. E. van der, Holsteyn, J. J. M., Niemoller, B. (1987),
'Verzuiling, issues, kandidaten en ideologie in de verkiezingen van 1986',
Acta Politica, 22, pp. 129-79.
- - and Holsteyn, J. J. M. (1989) 'Towards a More Open Model of
Competition', in H. Daalder and G. A. Irwin (eds), Politics in _the Nether-
lands. How much change? (London: Frank Cass).
Joslyn, R. (1984), Mass Media and Elections (Reading, Mass: Addison-
Wesley).
Koole, R. A. (1989), 'The "modesty" of Dutch party finance', in H. E.
Alexander (ed.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s (Cambridge:
- - (1990), 'Political Parties Going Dutch: Party Finance in The Nether-
lands', Acta Politica, 25, pp. 37-65.
Lijphart, A. (1989), 'From the Politics of Accommodation to Adversarial
Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment' in H. Daalder and G. A. Irwin
(eds), Politics in the Netherlands. How Much Change? (London: Frank
Cass).
Praag Jr, Ph. van (1987),'Verkiezingscampagnes in de afdelingen', Jaarboek
Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen 1986 (Groningen:
DNPP).
- - (1991), Strategie en Illussie; Elfjaar intern debat in de PvdA (1966-1977)
(Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis).
Thomassen, J.J.A. and Deth, J. W. van (1989), 'How New is Dutch Politics',
in H. Daalder and G. A. Irwin (eds), Politics in the Netherlands. How Much
Change? (London: Frank Cass).
9 New Zealand: The 1987
Campaign
David Denemark
In two important respects the 1987 New Zealand general election

represented a crucial, 'threshold election'. First, traditional patterns of
party loyalty, political trust and turnout were being challenged to an
unprecedented degree. Second, as a considered strategic response to
that electoral instability, Labour pursued New Zealand's first truly
'modern campaign', a campaign comprehensively built around polling,
targeted appeals and the professional, managed use of the mass media
(Denemark, 1991). These challenges to 'politics as usual', both
electorally and in terms of campaign technique, occurred in a political
system notable for its tranquillity. New Zealand's ninety-seven-seat,
unicameral parliament, selected every three years, is the locus of
considerable, potentially transformative power. Its first-past-the-post
electoral system and its relatively marked social polarity (urban
working class versus urban business and rural farming interests) have
historically served to delineate support for the two major parties,
Labour and National. It has also promoted two-party government/
opposition electoral contests for power, whilst stifling any significant
longevity for the occasional surfacing of essentially protest third
parties (Robinson, 1967). The relative consistency of this electoral,
governmental and programmatic bifurcation sustained several impor-
tant forms of political attitudinal stability: high levels of party
identification (Lamare, 1984; Vowles, 1987), political awareness,
concern and turnout (Bean, 1986; Nagel, 1988), political interest
(Lamare, 1984), and political efficacy and trust in government
(Robinson, 1967).
Echoing this electoral stability, New Zealand's election campaigning
remained focused on essentially traditional techniques until the mid-
1970s. Thus intensive campaigning remained short (three to four
weeks) and revolved around the formal presentation of policy plat-
forms through the issuance of manifestos and policy pamphlets
163
164 New Zealand: The 1987 Campaign
(Cleveland, 1980) as well as mass rallies in the urban centres, and the
presentation of the party leaders and the entire cabinet or shadow
cabinet and their policies (Garnier and Levine, 1981). The use and
sophistication of television in campaigns arose rather belatedly in the
1970s. Though there was a significant reliance on television by
Labour's Kirk in 1972 and National's Muldoon in 1975, New
Zealand did not experience a true presidential style campaign, geared
primarily to televised images of both leaders, until the 1978 election
(Cleveland, 1980). And then, despite the rise of presidentialism, New
Zealand's essentially stable, bloc-oriented electoral politics meant that
campaign strategies remained largely unchanged. This included an
ongoing opposition to reliance on polling and direct mail techniques in
order to target particular sections of the electorate. This opposition to
modern campaign techniques was to relax for Labour in 1987, then for
National in 1990, in the face of rapidly increasing voting fluidity, voter
cynicism, and declines in turnout - all of which diminished electoral
predictability.
By far the most important source of the recent rise in New Zealand's
electoral fracture was Labour's dramatic policy volte face following its
election in 1984. After a half-century commitment to Keynesian
economics, welfare provision, an alliance with the unions and broad
government intervention, the fourth Labour government resolutely
affirmed a set of monetarist, market-oriented policies that echoed
those of Thatcherism (Boston, 1987). More specifically Labour
pursued cuts in marginal income tax rates, public sector cutbacks
and a fundamental reduction in the redistributive role of the state.
Altogether Labour's policy reversals suggested, especially to its own
parliamentary elite, the potential for electoral upheaval. Leading into
the 1987 election Labour's programme was being portrayed across the
political landscape as a betrayal of both its philosophical roots and of
its erstwhile loyalists: union members, working-class constituents and
the welfare-dependent. At the same time, its pursuit of market
liberalisation and tax reductions was viewed as largely benefiting its
historical opponents: big business, white collar employees and, to a
lesser degree, farmers.
In short, the 1987 election in New Zealand was called amidst
unprecedented electoral flux. Given the perception of dismantled
voting blocs, the Labour government would need to attract cross-
class support from dissimilar, increasingly cynical electoral bases. At
the same time it would need to convince a shell-shi:>cked electorate
that, despite the policy reversals, its long-term strategies would be
David Denemark 165
proven to be on target and, across a second term, would benefit all,

including its working-class supporters. National, in opposition, would
need to discredit Labour's claim to 'three more years' and thus to
convince voters that Labour's economic mismanagement and over-
zealous reformism would only prove disastrous. At minimum National
would need to retain its middle-class support while convincing some
sceptical Labour loyalists, particularly among the ranks of the less well
off, not to bother voting or perhaps, though less likely, to switch to
National. Labour's response, reflecting the reformists' grasp on its
parliamentary executive, was to forge a trail-blazing 'modem cam-
paign' in order to pursue targeted appeals to key, specific elements
within what was perceived to be a dangerously fragmented electorate.
National, constrained by inertia in its party executive, remained
tradition bound in its campaign. The remainder of this chapter
explores the campaign drawing heavily from insights derived from a
series of interviews conducted in Wellington in November 1989. 1
Labour's president, Margaret Wilson, perhaps anticipating the un-

certainties that would plague the fourth Labour government, has
suggested it was 'obvious' following the 1984 election that Labour
would have 'little chance of re-election' unless the party 'embarked
immediately upon a three year organisational strategy' (Wilson, 1987,
p. 5). This was pursued zealously with the campaign committee
meeting on a monthly basis across the full term and the strategy
committee developing issue strategies as early as August 1986 (Wilson,
1989, p. 127). Early on, Labour also actively sought to rebuild the
eroded ranks of its party membership, to achieve Wilson's goal of
recruiting 10 000 volunteers into the campaign (ibid., p. 111) and to
reorganise the party's resources and administration. More specifically
this involved appointing a new general secretary (Tony Timms), the
hiring of new campaign staff, the centralisation and redistribution of
party finances and the central computerisation of membership roles
and other administrative information (Wilson, 1987, p. 5).
The Labour campaign was put into high gear in the early weeks of
1987 when it began to commit sizeable funds into depth polls and
qualitative research in order to formulate its key issue stances and
advertising formats. The actual campaign, suggests Labour's chief
press secretary, Ross Vintiner, was planned about six months before
the August election, with the placing of the first Sunday newspaper
advertisements beginning roughly three months before election day in
an attempt, based on early polling results, to 'set the agenda on the key
issues' (interview). The formal campaign was launched in Christchurch
on 27 July, beginning three weeks of intensive media barrages, the
leader's tour and virtually constant polling and direct mail appeals.
In 1987 New Zealand MPs were strictly limited to spending no more
than NZ$5000 on their personal campaigns in the final three months.
However, the political parties operated virtually without restrictions,
either in terms of spending limits or declarations of sources. Reflecting
these rules Labour pursued an intensive three year centralised strategy
to maximise its national-level funds and to reserve those funds
virtually wholly for use in key marginal seats and for the centrally
dictated regimen of polling, research and advc:rtising. Sources of funds
included the traditional ones of party members and supporters and
union affiliation fees which are often increased, for political purposes,
in election years. But importantly, if politically sensitively, Labour
benefited dramatically from business contributions, reflecting the
fourth Labour government's increasingly pro-business stances (Wil-
son, 1989, p. 117).
Labour's twelve month budget was varyingly estimated at between
NZ$2-3.5 million, with the high end of the range the most likely of the
estimates. The party's chief press secretary, Ross Vintiner, suggests
that 60 to 70 per cent of the budget was spent on advertising
(interview). Other key costs were marginal electorate polling, qualita-
tive research, print and radio advertising and Labour's expensively
produced television advertisements (Wilson interview).
Labour employed John Utting, of the Australian Labor party, to
coordinate its qualitative polling, thereby introducing the influence of
Australian electoral techniques, long reliant on sophisticated polls.
Several firms conducted quantitative polls for Labour in the early
stages, though the Auckland firm, Insight, was used exclusively during
the campaign to sustain a regimen of tracking polls at the national
level and within key marginals. In the final three weeks a national
tracking poll was conducted every three days (Vintiner interview). The
Wellington firm, Colenso- which had been responsible for National's
advertisements in 1975- was in charge of Labour's advertising, while
Baldwin Boyle provided public relations advice (James, 1987).
From the outset it seems clear the Labour party and campaign elite
embraced polling and market research as the basis for both the
campaign's overall design and for its specific issue formulation.
/)avid Denemark 167
Polling and advertising professionals were frequently consulted parti-

cularly during the issue-formative stages of the campaign. Polling
research was instrumentally used to identify marginal seats and, within
them, key vulnerable groups or swinging groups of voters and their
issue priorities. Direct mail messages to these linchpin groups were
subsequently designed on the basis of that research. Polling research
was also used to discern voters' sensitivity to positive or negative
themes and 'hard' or 'soft' appeals, and to determine which members
of the Labour leadership were viewed as sufficiently credible to
warrant their inclusion in television advertisements.
Thus president Wilson and other strategists in the campaign
executive relied on polls and professional research in virtually every
aspect of the design and guidance of Labour's campaign marketing.
They did so, Wilson suggests, 'mainly because of the accurate insight
they give into the attitudes and opinions of voters' (interview). It is a
strategic utilisation of research that was knowingly derived from
American and Australian campaigns in particular (see Mills, 1986).
In this sense Vintiner personally paid homage to George Bush's
Republican party campaign as 'probably one of the best in the world'
(interview), and had studied both Margaret Thatcher's media campaign
techniques and those used in Australia. In short New Zealand Labour
actively subscribed to an essentially American 'modem campaign' as
the strategic response to its electoral quandaries.
James (1987) argues that the National party, heading into the 1987
election, remained organisationally and ideologically deeply divided.
Unlike Labour's increasing dominance by a new, progressive elite,
National, from 1982 on, allowed its own 'new breed' of MPs to fade
from its ranks, leaving the party 'increasingly dependent on older age
groups and deprived of the revitalising and regenerative input a new
generation brings.' Furthermore, the elevation of Neville Young to the
party presidency and Jim Bolger to the party leadership had not
produced a 'miracle cure' for its deep disunity. National remained a
party without a coherent national-level leadership. The consequences
for campaign planning, finance and organisation were severe. Little
formal organised work was done before Christmas 1986 (Young
interview). Then, according to Young, in the early months of 1987,
campaign planning was 'disrupted' because of a public fight between
the left and right wings of the parliamentary caucus over policy
position and the 'acceptance of leadership'. Selected as the new party
secretary general in March 1987, Max Bradford found himself, as
campaign director, scolding party members for 'operating as if the
election was in November, not August' (James, 1987, p. 29). He

complained that 'virtually nothing' was done before his arrival. On
the basis of polling conducted in April, basic decisions were made that
were inflexibly to 'set the course for the election campaign' (Bradford
interview). Like president Young, Bradford has since concluded that a
campaign cannot be a purely election year process; he feels that the
lack of National's campaign planning 'showed in the final results'.
National's internal disunity exacerbated its already tenuous finan-
cial situation. In opposition it was naturally disadvantaged vis-d-vis
fund-raising despite its roughly 100 000: lO 000 advantage in party
membership. When combined with Labour's ability to attract busi-
ness contributions, National found itself strapped for resources. The
total budget was estimated at between NZ$1 and 1.5 million, much of
it drawn from contributions by wealthy individuals (Young interview).
Aware of Labour's expensive, sophisticated polling, National could
not follow suit both for financial reasons and because of a lack of
organisational coherence and commitment to modern techniques.
Thus, without a tightly coordinated central campaign structure,
National continued to run things on a 'traditional basis.' So while
Labour starved both its strongest and weakest electorates of campaign
funds, reserving finances for 'winnable' key marginal seats, Bradford
suggests that National repeatedly capitulated to local demands on
party resources, including those from its safest seats. With few
resources to utilise and the bulk of its budget committed to television
advertising National was forced to turn to ad hoc, local and published
polls whose results were late, inconsistent and often inaccurate.
Approximately NZ$50 000 was spent on radio advertising and a 'hell
of a lot of money' on full-page newspaper advertisements from June
on, which, Bradford argues, was money largely wasted. In short
National's limited funds were kept from being used beneficially
because of both its fractured internal organisation and its lack of a
unified campaign strategy.
One of the few campaign goals accomplished by National before
Bradford's arrival in March 1987 was its intensive pursuit of depth-
interview, qualitative polling in November 1986. At that time the
Wellington firm of Colmar and Brunton tested a focus-group of
potential swing voters to establish their political concerns and issue
priorities. Key groups included the unemployed and elderly super-
annuitants. On the basis of this qualitative research, National's
advertising firm, Ted Bates, developed a series of messages on
unemployment, education, superannuation surcharges and ANZUS
David Denemark 169
(the Australia, New Zealand, United States treaty for mutual protec-
tion). However, other groups and issues remained essentially untar-
geted, reflecting Bradford's late arrival and the fact that president
Young 'didn't have much idea of targeting anyway, and [leader] Jim
Bolger was more interested in the big picture messages rather than
deep targeting' (Bradford interview). Similarly, little follow-up quali-
tative polling and consistent quantitative polling was pursued. Natio-
nal ran a nationwide poll only once every three months until the last
period before the election and then only two or three in the last two
months (Bradford interview). Relying then on published polls, ad hoc
polls and polls run separately by local party divisions, whole areas in
New Zealand remained unsurveyed, or had been polled in a manner
that 'left something to be desired'. The consequence was an inability to
adjust National's campaign away from its deleterious negativism and
its continued reliance on an 'old style of political advertising which
concentrated on glossy images ... sloganeering rather than rock-solid
messages' (Bradford interview).
In short, despite the fact that the core National campaign leadership
relied on the advice of its advertising firm and utilised qualitative
research to design its advertisements, it seems clear it did not have the
resources; the organisational coherence, or the strategic will to pursue
the ongoing, rigorous, modem campaign that Labour had followed
from the outset. In 1987 National remained suspicious of polling and
targeting and the expert-based professionalism they demand.
Labour's campaign organisational logic closely echoed several crucial

aspects of the party's strategic response to its electoral quandaries.
First, with the perception that the electorate was fragmented to an
unprecedented degree, the party actively embraced polling, targeting
and direct mail as the technical means to forge simultaneous,
particularistic appeals to vulnerable groups of swinging voters while
placating its erstwhile stalwarts. As a strategy premised on both
professional expertise and on large amounts of resources, Labour by
necessity affirmed an organisational logic focused on a central 'head
office' which could maintain close links with polling, research,
advertising and strategic advisers. Similarly, in an election where
Labour's programmatic reversals had clouded, if not eroded, tradi-
tional voting blocs and winning margins, the focusing of the campaign
on a relative handful of marginal seats became supremely important.

Labour could not afford to squander organisational energy or
resources on 'safe seats' or on unwinnable National strongholds. As
a consequence a largely instrumental, centralised determination of
campaign effort was imperative for the party.
And finally, Labour's attempt to sidestep the controversies sur-
rounding its economic policy reforms and instead to affirm an image
of managerial competence, meant it had to portray itself as a calm,
confident government going about 'business as usual' and wholly
deserving of three more years in office. Internal dissent and contro-
versy within the campaign organisation could only undo Labour's
image-building efforts. The tightly disciplined organisational structure
that emerged effectively met Labour's threefold set of strategic
requisites and, suggests James (1987), was a critical factor in
Labour's victory.
At the heart of Labour's campaign organisation was a strategy
committee comprised of Prime Minister David Lange, Deputy Prime
Minister Geoffrey Palmer, minister of Finance Roger Douglas, general
secretary Tony Timms, marginal. seats committee chair Helen Clark
(who had played that role in 1984) and party president Margaret
Wilson. In reality Wilson acted as campaign coordinator and, in daily
consultation with the prime minister and with the assistance of Timms,
made most of the key decisions. These head office duties involved
frequent liaison with polling and advertising advisers and coordination
of the six full-time Wellington staff which included a women's
organiser and the trade union organiser. The Wellington headquar-
ters also liaised with full-time organisers in Dunedin, Auckland and
Christchurch and with other part-time local marginal seats coordina-
tors, bringing the total number of Labour's staff to approximately
twenty (Wilson interview). The head office was also responsible for the
supervision of activities delegated to other national-level committees,
such as the marginal seats committee, the publicity committee and the
larger campaign committee, which included a frequently unwieldy
number of representatives from the parliamentary caucus (Wilson,
1989). Wilson and the strategy committee also coordinated and
occasionally 'dictated down to fine detail the organisation at the
local level in the marginals' (James, 1987, p. 60), and had a similarly
specific say in the prime minister's three-week tour (orchestrated by
Ross Vintiner). During this time the prime minister returned to
Wellington each evening both to affirm Labour's image of 'business
as usual' and to allow his participation in coordinating strategy. Thus
David Denemark 171
daily meetings were held to discuss each day's events, to make any
necessary strategic shifts, and to schedule Lange into only key areas,
particularly those marginal seats on Labour's poll-derived 'hitlist.'
Thus, at a time when Labour was undergoing its most drastic policy
reorientation and was internally divided particularly on its economic
programme, the party none the less successfully orchestrated a tightly
structured campaign regimen that allowed it to convey its desired
image of competent leadership. According to Wilson it also allowed
the party to resist local electorate 'parochialism' with its inevitable
demands on resources and time. Instead, following the dictates of the
central strategists and media and polling experts, campaign staff could
'redirect money and people from one part to another during the
campaign' (Wilson, 1989, p. 139). Though this clearly involved a
strategic ascendancy for professionals in the Labour campaign, it
would seem Wilson managed to achieve the unlikely compliance, if
not active cooperation, of traditional elements within the party
organisation.
Finally, Labour's disciplined organisational structure allowed the
party to focus instrumentally on the new technologies being employed
effectively for the first time. Most importantly, this involved centrally
controlled computer-based direct mail and fund-raising. Though
initially wary of the head office computerising the party's whole
membership and financial system, local party organisations seemed
to yield to the need for centralised control of the direct mail process.
This technique was used both for conveying particularistic messages to
targeted groups in Labour's eight to ten key marginal seats and, under
the supervision of Mike Williams, for Labour's successful nationwide
fund-raising efforts in 1987 - crucial overall for enabling Labour to
purchase its expensive polling and advertising expertise (James, 1987).
Altogether Labour's organisational professionalism virtually echoed
and helped to sustain the professional 'modem campaign' techniques
it had so actively embraced. It was a discipline virtually unseen in the
National camp.
If the success of Labour's modern campaign was premised on its
creation of a centralised, disciplined campaign organisation, Natio-
nal's failure to build a viable campaign was equally the product of its
lack of a commitment to a unified, centralised structure to enable it to
pursue resource allocation, polling, targeted appeals and media
management. As suggested above, National entered the 1987 cam-
paign deeply divided over both its leadership and its programmatic
orientation (James and McRobie, 1987). This ideological and leader-
ship disunity would prove profoundly disabling to National's cam-

paign organisation. Without an equivalent to Labour's dramatic
policy and leadership purge, which had enabled the building of a
coherent, managerial centralism to accommodate its policy revolution,
National's campaign organisation remained at best tentative. In this
sense National experimented halfheartedly with the techniques Labour
had enthusiastically embraced and succumbed repeatedly to the voices
of traditional campaign approaches and the parochialism of local
demands on resources and the leader's time. In short, though the
National leadership seemed aware of the increasing fluidity and issue-
specific complexity of the New Zealand electorate (McKinnon inter-
view), it had not sufficiently divested itself of traditionalism to enable
it to pursue a modern campaign and its concomitant organisational
structure.
The National campaign structure, as with Labour's, revolved
around a troika comprised of leader Jim Bolger, President Neville
Young, and secretary general Max Bradford. Bradford has suggested
that his role represented 'the equivalent of the campaign directorship
during the election campaign', though President Young played a key
role in organising campaign and leader finances and in maintaining a
liaison with the larger caucus. Beyond these three the campaign
planning committee, chaired by Young, included the deputy opposi-
tion leader George Gair as well as Bill Birch and others on the national
executive and two divisional chairmen (Bradford interview). Logistic
support for the leader was undertaken by Rob Eaddy (one of
National's press secretaries and its chief research officer), while daily
compilation and analysis of media coverage was done by Australian
Dr John Taylor. Influential advertising advice throughout the cam-
paign was provided by Mike Wall of National's advertising firm, Ted
Bates, then based in Auckland. Daily meetings of this group were held
in Wellington to consider issues of the day drawn from media coverage
around the country. Leader Bolger would then use these themes in his
daily mid-morning press conference. Poll results and advertising
advice would also be generally discussed at these sessions. It was
here that Bates' considerable professional influence was felt by party
strategists. Early on the Bates agency, using Colmar and Brunton's
qualitative polling results, designed advertisements and issue themes,
essentially fixing the campaign's tenor, given a lack of resources and
polling later on that might have enabled the party to shift its stances.
Operating beneath this committee in the Wellington headquarters
was a full-time staff of seven, complemented by a small group of full-
David Denemark 173
time staff in each of National's divisional offices: two in Dunedin;

three in Christchurch; three in Waikato; five in Auckland; and four in
Wellington. Bradford arranged for each divisional director to have a
fax machine allowing them direct linkage with the head office in
Wellington. It was on these machines that clippings of regional
newspaper coverage were submitted for daily perusal by the campaign
planning committee. Unlike Labour, National in 1987 had no
centralised computerisation of membership rules or computer links
with its divisional offices, though different branches had nominal
computer capacity for their local use. Further, unlike Labour's union
associations, National benefited from no formal financial or electoral
assistance from support groups. National relied rather on its own
committees to solicit aid from the community. None the less, despite
these other central figures and support staff in the campaign, it was the
trio of Bolger, Young and Bradford, with the advice of Wall, which
was ultimately responsible for most of the organisational and strategic
decisions made during the campaign (Bradford interview). As a
consequence with the fundamental capitulation of all three to
campaign traditionalism it was virtually assured that National would
fail to utilise modern techniques to any effect in the campaign.
National's organisational parochialism was evident in three re-
spects. First, unlike Labour, without a dominant national leadership
to impose a centralised coordination on local party organisations,
National's funds and Bolger's time on the three-week leader's tour
continued to be drawn into the party's safe seats in order to placate
local demands. This, argues Eaddy (interview), 'diverted attention'
from the marginals which never saw the financial focus Labour had
brought to bear on its 'hitlist'. A second, follow-on consequence of
National's structural incoherence and lack of funds was its failure to
pursue a concerted regimen of polling, necessary to sustain targeted
appeals and to allow flexibility on issue stances. Instead, as we have
seen, National relied for the most part on published media polls and
ad hoc, local and volunteer-run polls whose results were often
untimely, inconsistent and inappropriate. A third failing of the
National campaign, also reflecting the lack of professionalism in the
head office, was the lack of sophistication evident in its programme of
targeting. Though National decided upon a 'hitlist' of eighteen
marginal seats and a handful of key swinging groups, few resources
and appeals were geared to them. Direct mail played virtually no role
in the National campaign. In this sense Bradford admits he 'didn't
really appreciate the importance of a high level of targeting right down
to the electorate level and to particular groups' (interview). Indeed all

three in the National troika remained traditional in their suspicion of
targeting and their preference for 'the big picture'.
Altogether National's deep organisational divisions and inexper-
ience precluded its developing a modern campaign, or even effectively
utilising the techniques it did employ. At a time when Labour was
focusing in on particularistic messages geared to key groups of voters
in a select few marginals, National squandered its resources, misspent
its leader's time and, as we will see, failed to readjust its media
messages. They were organisational failings that were seen by most
involved in the National campaign as crucial in its defeat.
Labour's strategic response to its electoral uncertainty in 1987 was to

develop a poll-driven, three-level framework of campaign themes and
appeals, within which reassuring general television advertisements and
media coverage, marginal seat direct appeals and group-specific
targeted appeals could simultaneously attract the support of tradi-
tional Labour voters and white collar converts. Each strategic level
rested essentially on the modern techniques of polling, targeting, a
tightly disciplined organisational structure and the managed use of the
mass media.
At the first level, geared for general consumption, Labour used its
early qualitative polling research to formulate a set of overall
campaign themes. These themes echoed poll results suggesting that
New Zealanders, though wary, generally remained optimistic about
the economic future, given the then buoyant economy. When com-
bined with Labour's lead in electoral polls, the decision was made to
develop a positive, purposely non-controversial set of general appeals
that stressed Labour's right to 'three more years'. It did so by
presenting a 'half-time message' to both Labour's supporters and to
the electorate in general: Labour's policy framework was merely the
first half of a calculated long-term programme which, in the second
term, would be proven beneficial to all (James, 1987, p. 58). As such
Labour sought to avoid all controversy and negativism which Wilson
and Vintiner felt would only undermine its incumbency image and
invite National to launch specific policy attacks on Labour's obviously
unorthodox economic policies (Vintiner interview). Instead it set about
championing only positive themes within which it presented itself as
David Denemark 175
the 'natural party of government' whose dedication to 'business as

usual' indicated its right to re-election and completion of its long-term
programme.
More specifically, drawing extensively on its qualitative research,
Labour's advertising firm, Colenso, began to construct a series of very
polished television advertisements that portrayed the Labour govern-
ment as competent administrators. Filmed amidst expensively pro-
duced sets conveying the image of a corporate boardroom, Prime
Minister Lange and a few key cabinet members were shown calmly
going about their day-to-day governmental duties. In a similar
thematic tactic, Lange was directed by the head office to return to
Wellington each day during his three-week leader's tour in order
continually to affirm his incumbent image by being seen signing
documents and performing other prime ministerial tasks.
A second level of Labour's campaign themes, equally dependent on
polling and professional advice, was designed to target and then
placate vulnerable groups of voters within Labour's camp. This was
done by using qualitative and then quantitative tracking polls to
discern both the aspects of Labour's programme that were most
responsible for voters' dissatisfaction with the government and the
messages and themes that were most likely to woo undecided and
wavering voters back into the Labour column. President Wilson
suggests that Labour's single 'greatest fear' in the 1987 election was
non-voting by its erstwhile supporters (1989, p. 139). In particular
Labour's polls had identified the young and young working women as
the most important of these undecided, potential non-voters. As a
consequence, they were targeted for both nationwide television
advertisements and for direct mailings, especially within Labour's
ten key marginal seats. In general, the purpose of these messages
was to reassure these important sources of support that, despite its
policy reversals, Labour remained the party of social concern and
progressive values.
More than any other issue, polls showed that the Labour govern-
ment's anti-nuclear stand - its refusal to allow nuclear-armed and
nuclear-powered ships into New Zealand ports - was strongly
supported by both of the party's vulnerable voting groups. Thus
Colenso designed a 'warm and fuzzy' television advertisement in
which Prime Minister Lange discussed New Zealand's world leader-
ship on that issue. In short, Labour's campaign instrumentally
emphasised a fervent anti-nuclearism in a calculated attempt to
present the 'other side of the coin' to Labour's widely perceived
austere and uncaring economic policies, and to placate key groups of

undecideds and potential bolters from Labour's ranks. It was a
technique viewed by the Labour campaign leadership as overwhelm-
ingly successful and seen by Vowles (1990) as a crucial element in
Labour's electoral victory. Similar advertisements were designed on
the issue of education, because women in particular were found in
Labour's qualitative polls to be concerned about the party's commit-
ment to such social issues. Again a nationwide television advertise-
ment was designed to allay their fears while computer-generated direct
mailings were sent to reinforce this theme. Altogether Labour's poll-
driven advertising allowed it, even in the most uncertain of electoral
times, to 'remain positive, unrelentingly positive' (Wilson, 1987, p. 9).
The third level of Labour's thematic campaign, again driven by
polling, was directed at key marginal seats. Here Labour's campaign
staff effectively abandoned eighty-seven ofNew Zealand's ninety-seven
seats as either Labour or National strongholds. They designed
particularistic messages geared to key groups of potential converts or
defectors in the remaining ten marginals. In this process computer-
based lists, derived from the electoral rolls, were used to create
'personalised' letters for individuals within these key groups. These
letters, to groups like women and the young, included both general
statements and harder-hitting versions of themes introduced in La-
bour's early full-page newspaper advertisements and then in its
television advertisements, focusing on such issues as anti-nuclearism
and education. Both Wilson and Vintiner felt the direct-mail technique
in targeted marginal seats, used effectively for the first time in 1987, was
instrumental in Labour's successful 'segmentation' of the electorate
and in its presentation of distinct appeals to those dissimilar segments.
At the heart of all three levels of Labour's issue campaign and its
dedication to presenting itself as a confident incumbent, was the
party's commitment to discipline, expert advice and a 'professional-
ism' that implied the calculated management of resources, of the
leader's time and of the mass media. This was seen in particular on
Lange's three-week leader's tour. There traditional tactics like spon-
taneous walkabouts, talkback radio and mass rallies were all but
dropped from the campaign in favour of carefully scripted photo
opportunities and managed media events in select marginal seats.
Similarly, to avoid controversy, Labour only produced its manifesto
after the election-day.
A final way Labour pursued its professional campaign was a
twofold strategy of 'media management', designed to augment its
David Denemark 177
expensive three-minute television advertisements given New Zeal-

and's strict controls on political broadcasting and advertising time.
The first of these strategies was to create a series of 'unpaid ads' in
which official Labour government public service messages carried
decidedly pro-Labour messages on taxes, job training schemes and
crime. The second strategy was to dominate the 6.30 national evening
news through 'managing' TVNZ's coverage of the leaders' tours. To
this end Labour's head office designed photo opportunities and sound
bite speech punchlines for Lange and orchestrated their timing to
maximise the likelihood of their being carried on the evening news. It
was a successful tactic with, by Vintiner's estimates, Labour domina-
ting the television news by a ratio of 5:2 (interview). Finally, Labour
actively sought to set the television agenda. This was done through
orchestrating morning radio news programmes whose issues tended to
be picked up and carried by both television and newspapers across the
day. To this end, Lange granted evening interviews to radio corre-
spondents with the stipulation that they remain 'embargoed' until the
next morning's national radio shows, allowing Labour effectively to
set the daily themes for the nation's media during the final weeks of
the campaign.
Put on its back foot by Labour's assumption of traditionally
National issue territory and stymied by electoral support for La-
bour, National seemed able only reactively to attempt to undo
Labour's lead by developing an essentially negative, critical cam-
paign. But with a campaign head office and party executive still
dominated by traditionalism and inexperience, National's campaign
remained bound to traditional techniques that could not effectively
focus or adjust its negativism in the final weeks of the campaign. As a
consequence National was doomed to chip away at, but not overcome,
Labour's winning margin.
At the heart of National's framework of campaign themes was its
early qualitative research which identified certain key swinging groups
and the sorts of issues that concerned them most. With polling
research showing, among others, superannuitants to be a key group
of swinging voters, National designed advertisements that attacked
Labour's proposed surtax on superannuation. Its inroads were limited,
however, as research showed that many elderly at that time were
optimistically investing in the share market which, reflecting Labour's
pro-business policies, was booming. The result was an undermining of
National's 'gloom and doom' prognostications (Eaddy interview)
which had also stressed issues such as rising unemployment.
National's attempts to find critical economic footholds were given a

late boost when it obtained a copy of a secret, in-house Labour
document on its future policy options written by political-economic
consultant, Simon Walker. With Labour campaigning on themes of
non-controversy and confidence in its proposed second term National
gleefully announced Labour's 'hidden agenda' of such policies as the
introduction of a goods and services tax and a capital gains tax, and
'milked that for all it was worth' (Eaddy interview). Altogether it was a
conscious strategy to suggest that voters could not 'trust Labour' - an
appeal that seemed to help National begin to close the gap from a 26
per cent deficit in a June 1987 Heylen Poll to an election night margin
of 2.8 per cent (Eaddy interview). None the less, National's gains were
largely general ones across the electorate, with gains in its key
marginal seats and amongst its targeted groups remaining much more
modest.
With National pursuing only limited marginal seat polling and
never coherently marshalling party resources, it remained largely
incapable of retooling the campaign to home in on specific targets in
the electorate during the final weeks of the campaign. As it was,
National's television advertisements continued to be general appeals
on issues such as unemployment, education, crime and ANZUS, while
other 'peripheral' issues that were stressed included overcrowded jails,
access to primary health care and the need for more policemen
(McKinnon interview). The result was National's expensively pro-
duced advertisements, which had been developed early in May,
remained 'fuzzy' and inappropriately negative -· prompting Bradford
to conclude that National 'wasted probably NZ$400 000 to
NZ$500 000 on television in 1987 in a way which was terribly
dangerous for us' (interview).
The remainder of National's campaign themes revolved around a
series of more or less traditional techniques including twice-daily
(morning and evening) press conferences, a daily speech, voluminous
daily press releases, an eighty-eight-page manifesto, extensive use of
local talkback radio and the final three-week leader's tour, appreciably
buoyed by Bolger's personal zeal on the hustings (Eaddy interview).
On the tour Bolger, accompanied by his wife and three press
secretaries (including Eaddy), used a chartered airplane to cover
New Zealand. The tour was built around five mass rallies in the
main urban centres at which National pursued filming to be used as
backdrop 'befores and afters' in its advertisements. Bolger was seen as
performing well in these speeches and, unlike Lange for Labour, was
David Denemark 179
seen by the National's head office as its only 'known commodity'

(Eaddy interview). As such he was asked to carry much of the
campaign in the final weeks on the force of his personality. Despite
the protestations from National's staff, Bolger throughout remained
reluctant about being coached and constrained in his style. Thus even
though Eaddy and others designed location-specific material, such as
policy releases and photo opportunities, and sought to 'manage'
Bolger's local schedules as best they could, by assuring supportive
crowds and avoiding demonstrators, Bolger remained much less
regimented than Lange. It was only on occasions such as the televised
leaders' debates (held on successive Sunday evenings in the final
weeks) that Bolger was closely coached on issue stances and on such
'style' fine points as the colour of his suit and tie, what sort of glasses
he should wear and his hair grooming (Eaddy interview). Thus, by and
large, National's campaign remained a twofold framework of general
appeal, negative television· and newspaper advertisements and a
frenetic three-week leader's tour made largely successful by Bolger's
personal energies. None the less, without an effective centraiiy
coordinated focus on key marginals and targeted groups and without
a concerted marshalling of resources to sustain support polling and
direct-mail appeals, National's upswing in support across the cam-
paign was a general one that was never paraiieled in its marginal seats.
THE RESULT
Despite its dramatic policy volteface between 1984 and 1987 Labour
was manifestly successful in its strategy to convince voters of its need
for 'three more years'. It appeared to have 'ridden a wave of residual
loyalties to reelection' (Denemark, 1990, p. 76) and, at least in 1987, to
have side-stepped the potential for profound electoral backlash from
its own supporters whose interests were so obviously threatened by the
fourth Labour government's programmatic reforms. This was accom-
plished, above all, by Labour 'using its professional skills to the fullest'
and thereby 'maximising votes where they counted most' (Boston and
Jackson, 1988, p. 72). That is, reflecting Labour's considered profes-
sional strategies from the outset, the central reason for Labour's
success was its victory in New Zealand's seventeen most marginal
seats. Despite an overall two party nationwide swing to National since
1984, Labour realised a shift in its favour of 0.4 per cent in these
marginals and a net gain of two seats.
180 New· Zealand: The 1987 Campaign
Table 9.1 The New Zealand 1987 election
1987 1984
Seats Votes Seats Votes Change
(%) (%) (%)
National 39 44.0 37 35.9 + 8.1
Labour 58 48.0 56 43.0 + 5.0
Social Credit
(Democrat) 0 5.1 2 7.6 -1.9
New Zealand
party 0 0.3 0 12.2 -11.9
Source: Official returns and Keesings, October 1987, p. 35456.
The final tallies are shown in Table 9.1. As James concludes,

'National failed and Labour held where it was vital, in middling
New Zealand' (1987, p. 58). It was a result that appeared to vindicate
Labour's decision to build New Zealand's first truly 'modern cam-
paign' and thereby pursue its poll-driven strategy of targeting and the
concentration of its resources, messages and leader's tour into its
'hitlist' of marginal seats. These estimations of the reasons for
Labour's success were broadly acknowledged by the campaign leaders
themselves. While Labour did not conduct a formal 'post-mortem' on
the campaign, Wilson and Vintiner none the less both stressed the role
of their modern techniques in their victory. Interestingly, Vintiner
argued in 1989 that Labour, in 1990, would need to pursue even
further segmentation of issues, more emphasis on direct mail and
personalised letters and more specific, daily polls along the lines of the
American Republican party (interview). With Vintiner in charge of
advertising for Labour in the 1990 election (through his Bloom
agency) and with continued use of John Utting and Insight to conduct
qualitative polls and market research, as well as Labour's ongoing
commitment to a sophisticated regimen of poll-driven direct mail
techniques (James and McRobie, 1990), it seems clear Labour
continued to embrace the techniques of the modern campaign
following their 1987 success.
But it was amongst National's leadership that one saw the most
interesting consequences of the 1987 campaign. There a series of'post-
mortem' sessions crystallised a campaign technique dichotomy. On the
one hand, President Young and whip McKinnon seemed to conclude
David Denemark 181
that, given New Zealanders' economic optimism in 1987, there was

little National could have done to win, irrespective of the techniques
used. However, for secretary general Bradford and press secretary
Eaddy, the Labour victory clearly signalled the need for a three-year
campaign revolving around modern techniques, especially sophistica-
ted polling, a new approach to the use of television and a concerted
push in the realm of targeted direct mail (Bradford interview).
Bradford lost his argument with President Young over the rapid
introduction of new campaign approaches and resigned in February
1988 (James and McRobie, 1990). However, with the election of John
Collinge to the National presidency in August 1989, National yielded
to the 'progressive' forces supporting new electoral techniques and
proceeded to build a veritable archetype of the modern campaign for
its hugely successful 1990 election. More specifically, National em-
braced targeting in marginal seats, extensive market research and
polling at both the national and electorate level, direct mail in key
seats, and a highly centralised campaign organisation to coordinate
those techniques (Collinge, 1990). Collinge cites National's modern
campaign organisation and technologies as a key to its 1990 victory.
In conclusion, under the pressure of unprecedented electoral
uncertainty in 1987, Labour crossed the threshold of the modern
campaign for the first time in New Zealand. Subsequently the lessons
of Labour's success appear to have prevailed across the aisle,
providing a needed catalyst for political learning amongst the Natio-
nal leadership. With both parties fully utilising advanced campaign
techniques in the 1990 election and continuing to look to America and
Australia for further technical innovation, New Zealand in the 1990s
would appear to have permanently entered the world of the modern
campaign.
Note
J. These included: Labour president, Margaret Wilson; National president,

Neville Young; Labour's chief press secretary, Ross Vintiner; National's
senior research officer and press secretary, Robert Eaddy; National's chief
parliamentary whip, Don McKinnon; and its secretary genera) and
campaign director, Max Bradford. I also interviewed an additional
individual close to the Labour campaign who wished his ideas to remain
anonymous.
References
Bean, C. (1986), 'Electoral Law, Electoral Behaviour and Electoral Outcomes:

Australia and New Zealand Compared', The Journal of Commonwealth and
Comparative Politics, 24, pp. 57-73.
Boston, J. (1987), 'Thatcherism and Rogernomics: Changing the Rules of the
Game- Comparisons and Contrasts', Political Science, 39, pp. 129-52.
--and Jackson, K. (1988), 'The New Zealand General Election of 1987',
Electoral Studies, 1.
Cleveland, L. (1980), 'The Mass Media', in H. R. Penniman (ed.), New
Zealand at the Polls: The General Election of 1978 (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute).
Collinge, J. (1990), 'The National Party Campaign', paper presented at the
1990 General Election Conference, Victoria University, Wellington (De-
cember).
Denemark, D. (1990), 'The Political Consequences of Labour's New Right
Agenda: Findings from the Fendalton Survey, 1987', Political Science, 41,
pp. 62-82.
- - (1991), 'Electoral Instability and the Modern Campaign: New Zealand
Labour in 1987', Australian Journal of Political Science, 26.
Garnier, T. and Levine, S. (1981), Election '81 (Auckland: Methuen).
James, C. (1987),'Do Your Best or Worst', in The 1987 General Election: What
Happened? (Wellington: Social Sciences Research Fund Committee).
--and McRobie, A. (1987), The Election Book (Wellington: Allen & Unwin/
Port Nicholson Press).
--and McRobie, A. (1990), Changes? The 1990 Election (Wellington: Allen
& Unwin/Port Nicholson Press).
Lamare, J. (1984), 'Party Identification and Voting Behaviour in New
Zealand', Political Science, 36, pp. 1-9.
Mills, S. (1986), The New Machine Men: Polls and Persuasion in Australian
Politics (Ringwood: Penguin).
Nagel, J. (1988), 'Voter Turnout in New Zealand General Elections, 1928-
1988', Political Science, 40, pp. 16-38.
Robinson, A. (1967), 'Class Voting in New Zealand: A Comment on Alford's
Comparison of Class Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems', in S.
M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New
York: Free Press).
Vowles, J. (1987), 'Social Structure and Political Attitudes: A Report of 1984
Election Voting in Three Auckland Marginals', Political Science, 39, pp. 17-
31.
- - (1990), 'Nuclear Free New Zealand and Rogernomics: The Survival of a
Labour Government', Politics, 25, pp. 81-91.
Wilson, M. (1987), 'A President's View', in The 1987 General Electio11: What
Happe11ed? (Wellington: Social Sciences Research Fund Committee).
- - (1989), Labour in Government, 1984-1987 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin/Port
Nicholson Press).
10 The USA: The 1990
Congressional
Campaign 1
Richard S. Katz and Robin Kolodny
Discussions of American election campaigns focus typically on the

presidency. In this chapter we focus on congressional dections. As
elections to legislative chambers they are more directly comparable to
the parliamentary elections that are the concern of most of the other
chapters of this volume. Each presidential election involves either a
sitting president or does not, a vitally important contextual variable
that, due to the constitutional limitation on presidential re-election, is
often known years in advance. While this is true also for individual
congressional seats (except that there are no limits to congressional
service with some members serving for thirty years or more), each
overall congressional election involves a mix of incumbent re-election
bids and open seats. In contrast to the idiosyncratic nature of
presidential elections in which the personalities, policies and records
of two national candidates receive massive news coverage, congres-
sional elections are the aggregation of many races most of which
receive little individual media attention. As a result, in contrast to the
highly individual nature of a presidential election, an election of the
Congress, in which the effects of individuaJ candidates and consti-
tuency circumstances can be expected to 'average out,' has the
potential to be a contest between parties rather than simply between
individual candidates and so is a better venue for assessing the role of
party organisations in the campaign process and, perhaps, also for
assessing trends in party support.
Although presidential elections appear to be contested by parties,
this is only nominally so. The role of the national party organisations
has always been limited, but since the 1974 Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments this situation has been formalised. The national
183
184 The USA: The 1990 Congressional Campaign
party organisations are prohibited from backing any particular

candidate for the presidential nomination during the primary and
caucus season. The nominating conventions themselves r.ow do little
more than confirm the results of primary elections in which anyone
can run and in which voting, far from being restricted to party
members (there being none in the United States), is often open to
people with no, or even the opposing, party allegiance. 2 Once the
nominations are made, the party national committee may run the
campaign of a candidate who accepts public funding only if the
candidate designates that national committee as his or her campaign
committee and, even if so designated, in practice usually is in effect a
vessel to contain the candidate's personal organisation from the
primary campaign. Rarely is the person who was national chairman
at the beginning of a presidential year still in office a few weeks after
the nominating convention unless it has simply renominated a sitting
president.
In fact the basic theme of this chapter is that congressional elections
are not primarily national contests between parties either, but
(although either characterisation carried to its extreme would be an
exaggeration) are better described as simultaneous constituency-level
contests between pairs of candidates who incidentally have party labels
and patronise a common core of purveyors of campaign services. 3 This
lack of 'partyness' is typical of congressional conduct of legislative
business, with relatively few votes dividing a majority of one party
from a majority of the other and with the average party unity scores
(the percentage of the time the member votes with the majority of his/
her party) on those votes that do divide the parties barely halfway
between the theoretical minimum of 0.5 and a perfect 1.0;4 it is
similarly pronounced, looking at support for the proposals of the
president. In this context it is easy to wonder whether congressional
elections can be interpreted either as choices between parties or as
referenda on the president's performance (Campbell, 1960; Kernell,
1977; Tufte, 1975). This last point is of particular relevance because
our detailed subject is a mid-term congressional election (where the
presidency is not at stake). While we are not directly concerned with
the tendency of the president's party to lose seats at mid-term
elections, it forms part of the strategic context in which the 1990
election was fought. An additional contextual factor is that 1990 was
the last election before the constitutionally mandated reapportionment
and redistricting to be based on the 1990 census. While this had no
direct impact on the Senate it meant that virtually every House district
Richard S. Katz and Robin Kolodny 185
(the exceptions being those states with only one representative) was
likely to change and could be changed substantially before those who
won in 1990 would stand for re-election.
Before assessing the role of party organisations in congressional
campaigns it is first necessary to identify them. Often the national
committee of each party is taken to be the party organisation. In fact
each of the two major American parties has two additional indepen-
dent and coequal committees, the Democratic Congressional Cam-
paign Committee (DCCC) and National Republican Campaign
Committee (NRCC) in the House of Representatives and the Demo-
cratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) and National Repu-
blican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) in the Senate. While each party's
committees share the goal of maximising partisan presence by electoral
means, the similarities end there. Both their constituencies and their
functions differ. The national committee nominally is responsible to
and composed of representatives of the state parties, although the
national committee of the president's party generally is dominated,
and its chairman named, by him. Its primary responsibility is the
presidential election although it also provides technical and other
assistance to state and local parties. The House and Senate commit-
tees, on the other hand, are creatures of their respective party caucuses
and are primarily concerned with the election of members of their own
chambers. All the party committees offer candidates (incumbents and
challengers) support in both cash and 'in-kind' contributions, subject
to various statutory limitations. The two questions, both of which we
would answer in the negative at least in the case of congressional
elections, are whether any or all of these committees make contribu-
tions to individual campaigns that are large enough or central enough,
and whether the actions of the committees are sufficiently coordinated
or controlling, for the campaign to be described as a 'party campaign'.
Both the impact of legal restrictions on party support of candidates
and the more general strategic problems of campaigning for the House
are quite different from those of campaigning for the Senate. Looking
first at the general differences, senators, and especially first time
senatorial candidates, are usually far more experienced, more widely
known and often personally richer than their House counterparts. A
typical senatorial district (that is a state) will include many media
markets; an urban House district will often represent only a fraction of
a single market. 5 Aside from making the decision whether to buy
media time easier for a senatorial candidate, this also means that
senatorial campaigns are more likely to be regarded as newsworthy.
One consequence is that the two party committees in one of the

chambers resemble one another far more in both structure and in
operation than do any pair of committees in the same party. Such
differences are both reflected in and compounded by differences in
campaign regulation. The Federal Election Campaign Act allows
party committees to make two kinds of direct expenditures on behalf
of their candidates. First, each committee is allowed to make a cash
contribution of $5000 per House candidate per election (primary,
general, special); for Senate candidates there is a combined party
limit of $17 500. Second, in general elections only, the parties are also
allowed to make 'coordinated expenditures' - expenditures made
directly by the parties but with the knowledge and consent of the
candidate. In House races the limit is $10000 plus Cost of Living
Adjustment (COLA) ($25140 in 1990). For the Senate the limit is 2¢
times the state voting age population (with a minimum of $20 000) plus
COLA. In 1990, the range was from $50280 (thirteen states) to
$1 073 478 (California). In addition since 1980, state parties, which
are subject to the same limitations on coordinated expenditures in
congressional campaigns in their states, have been able to sign 'agency
agreements' with the congressional committees, effectively allowing
the latter to double their coordinated expenditures (FEC v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee et a/.).
Also since 1980 parties have been able to make unlimited expendi-
tures for 'party building' activities (voter registration and list develop-
ment, get-out-the-vote letters or phone banks) in which the party
advocates only itself rather than any particular candidate. As an
extreme example of these 'soft money' activities the DCCC and
DNC built a state-of-the-art communications centre which could be
rented to candidates at bargain-basement prices without having to
charge the capital costs against any candidate's support limits. The
party committees can also circumvent the limitations on direct
contributions by 'advising' donors to give directly to a candidate's
campaign and by 'bundling,' receiving donations themselves and then
channelling funds to the candidate. As a result of these differences the
services provided by the House and Senate campaign committees also
differ significantly. Because senatorial candidates are usually well-
seasoned politicians able to hire their own consultants, they do not
request or require much strategic service from the party committees.
What they want is free money and that is what the senatorial
committees are structured to give. With much lower contribution
limits and often less experienced candidates, the House committees
RichardS. Katz and Robin Kolodny 187
specialise in providing advice and subsidised services. These services

include low cost rental of mailing lists, assembly of direct mail fund-
raising letters and below market use of television and radio studios.
They also provide candidate and spouse training, video coaching and
opposition research.
PARTY CAMPAIGNING
A campaign can be divided into several functions: advance planning;

candidate recruitment and selection; the amassing and allocation of
resources; choice of issues to be emphasised and determination of
positions on them; and, in the case of legislative elections, coordina-
tion of effort across constituencies. How, and how much, do American
parties, especially as embodied in their three national committees,
perform these functions?
Planning
Particularly since the mid-1970s the six party committees have been
year round operations with permanent premises. Although the size of
the staffs ebbs and flows with the electoral cycle, all six committees
have core staff that begin campaigning for the next election often
before the last election has taken place. With a fixed election cycle,
plans can be laid years in advance. In 1990 the national committees of
both parties, but especially the Republicans, devoted much of their
effort to planning for the post-reapportionment, 1992 elections. The
actual effectiveness of such planning is limited by a number of factors,
however. First, of course, is the force of changing circumstances; the
parties basically are unable to predict, let alone determine, which
issues will be significant or which candidates will choose to run in any
particular election. Second, the fragmented nature of American
politics means both that there is unlikely to be any single strategy
that would be uniformly effective and little press or public expectation
that a party will have a uniform national strategy. Third, although all
the committees have a core of permanent staff positions, turnover of
staff members is extremely high with the inevitable effect on continuity
of planning. Finally, one should remember that the fixed election cycle
encourages advanced planning by all the participants in the electoral
process including political commentators, potential candidates and the
various firms and consultants within the campaign industry.
Recruitment
The NRCC and the DCCC both claim to be highly involved in

candidate recruitment. Actually a more appropriate term for their
activities would be candidate 'prospecting' as the committees have no
means to assure nomination for a candidate. While party organisers
may encourage a particular candidate to come forward, they cannot
prevent others from challenging him or her in a primary election. The
winner of the primary automatically becomes the party nominee. In
many races, however, the problem is not selecting the best candidate,
but dredging up a presentable candidate. If in the case of a contested
nomination the party has little capacity to make its preferences stick,
in this case it has very little discretion- beggars can't be choosers. But
the congressional campaign committees have also adopted a 'non-
discouragement' strategy when it comes to nominations. The NRCC
has not endorsed candidates in primary elections unless the entire
Republican delegation from the state, the entire NRCC and a
substantial portion of state and local party officials agree. Even when
the NRCC has encouraged a candidate to come forward, they offer
services such as opposition research and generic primary strategies to
challengers as well. The DCCC, although also claiming to be involved
in candidate recruitment, is prohibited by its constitution from
becoming involved in primaries, necessarily limiting its effectiveness
in candidate recruitment.
The senatorial committees face a different scenario. Candidates
normally present themselves without any need to be recruited. The
DSCC, however, occasionally uses pre-primary polls that show a seat
to be more winnable than originally thought in order to entice more
attractive potential candidates. The DSCC stays neutral in primaries
because, as their staff members explain, they want candidates who can
withstand the electoral test, not necessarily those that look best on
paper (Dunn interview). Similarly the NRSC avoids primary involve-
ment. They see primary struggles as healthy testing grounds for
revealing the weaknesses of the campaign organisations (Grotta
interview). In 1990 the Republican National Committee, on the other
hand, abandoned the traditional hands off policy to support the
primary favourites of President Bush. In one particular case the
RNC supported Robert Smith in the Republican senatorial primary
in New Hampshire notwithstanding the protest of Republican state
chairman, Rona Charbonneau (Broder, 1990).
Resource Allocation
The congressional party committees provide campaign money and

services in pretty much the same manner. Allocation of resources to
individual candidates is determined with regard to two competing sets
of criteria. On one hand, support depends on the perceived marginality
or 'winnability' of the contest. On the other hand, according to
committee staff members, the fact that the congressional campaign
committees are run by incumbents dictates an alternative set of
priorities: incumbent maintenance first; open seats (especially those
that were held previously by the party) second; and challengers third.
The way this played out in the 1990 campaign is shown in Tables 10.1
and l 0.2. Table l 0.1 shows the magnitude of the party committees'
contributions to candidates' campaigns broken down by chamber,
party, incumbency status and outcome. In each case only support
from the committee of the corresponding chamber has been included. 6
Several significant differences are apparent. With the exception of
Democratic challengers to safe Republican seats, Senate candidates
nearly all receive party contributions near the legal maximum; the
House committees cannot afford anything approaching such universal
generosity and so must make choices. Wilhin that constraint, the
House Republicans tend towards a bimodal distribution with some
candidates receiving close to the maximum at the cost of making only
token (or no) contributions to many more; the Democrats tend to a
flatter distribution with proportionately more small contributions.
Both parties try to distinguish challengers and candidates in open
seats who have a reasonable chance of winning (in particular those in
open seats formerly held by the party) from those who do not and
concentrate support on the former; none the less, this does not prevent
them from contributing, in a few cases significantly, to the campaigns
of incumbents facing no opposition at all.
Table 10.2 extends these comparisons by showing the average
magnitude of direct contributions and coordinated expenditures
broken down by chamber, party and incumbency status as well as
the average net disbursements of the candidates' full election cycle
campaigns. In each case the average is figured over the number of
candidates in the relevant category (that is the average party contribu-
tion is figured on the basis of the number of candidates who actually
received a direct party contribution and so on). The Senate figures
reveal little beyond what was shown in Table 10.1; basically, both
Table 10.1 US party committee contributions by party, chamber, incumbency status, and outcome \0
0
-
House Democrats
Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent, no Challenger Challenger Democratic Rep. open Rep. seat
Contribution" won lost contest won lost open seat seat help by won by
help by Rep. Democrats
Democrats
Nothing 45 1 21 45 2 1
Token 70 1 22 32 1 4
Small 56 1 5 3 14 1 3 4
Large 17 3 4 21 3 4 1
Maximum 2 1 3 1
House Republicans
Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent, Challenger Challenger Republican Democrat Republican

Contribution" won lost no contest won lost open seat open seat open seat
help by help by won by
Republicans Democrats Democrats
Nothing 9 3 1 148 4
Token 79 1 25 18 1
Small 12 2 4 2 12 5 1 1
Large 6 6 1 1
Maximum 6 6 3 11 6 4 3
Senate Democrats
Incumbent Incumbent Incumbent, Challenger Challenger Republican open

Contributiona won lost no contest won lost seat held by
Republican
Nothing 2 4
Token 1
Small 4 2
Large 6 1 1 1
Maximum 4 5 2
Senate Republicans
Incumbent Incumbent Incwnbent, Challenger Challenger Republican open

Contributiona won lost no contest won lost seat held by
Republicans
Nothing
TokeD 1
Small 1 2 2
Large 1 1
Maximum 10 1 10 3
Notes
a. Party contributions are classified according to the following scheme:
House Senate
Nothing $0 so
Token $1-2500 $1-$5000
Small $2501-$20000 $5001-20 per cent of1egal maximum
Large $20001-$50000 20 per cent- 87 per cent oflegal maximum
\0
Maximum $50001-$60000 over 87 per cent of legal maximum -
192 The USA.' The 1990 Congressional Campaign
parties give everything they are allowed to all their candidates. The
House figures are more illuminating. Contrary to reports from
committee staffers (Amend, Dunn, Grotta interviews), both parties
on average make larger contributions to open-seat races, followed by
contributions to challengers, with incumbents receiving the smallest
average contributions. Despite efforts to target contributions to
incumbents who were in trouble both parties missed some important
races. 7 As the 'n's show, not all candidates who receive party support
receive both kinds of support. There is a significant tendency here for
the House Democrats to receive support in the form of coordinated
expenditures while Republicans are more likely to receive cash;
moreover, when the Republicans make coordinated expenditures on
behalf of a candidate they appear to be much larger than those made
by the Democrats.
In assessing the utility of party committee contributions to individ-
ual candidates it is necessary to supplement the figures with a note of
political realism. American campaigns are directed locally; cash to
help pay the bills the candidate chooses to incur is always useful.
Coordinated expenditures may take the form of agreement to pay
those same bills, in which case they are equally useful, but they may
take other forms as well. At the other extreme, the party committee
may conduct a statewide poll and provide the results to candidates -
consequently reporting the assessed value as a coordinated expendi-
ture - even though the candidates have no interest in, or use for, the
data. On the other hand, even when coordinated expenditures are of
little use to the candidate they may be of great use to the party. A large
number of relatively small coordinated expenditures can make a party
seem very active in the great constellation of congressional races even
if it has little or no impact in individual races. For the party
committees the appearance of making extensive contributions may
be more important than the reality. 8 Finally, Table 10.2 shows that
even in those cases in which the parties 'max-out' in their contributions
to a candidate, total party support is still only a very small fraction of
the cost of a competitive American congressional campaign.
Campaign Issues
All the party committees offer advice and counsel regarding the
selection of issues and issue positions. What is most striking about
this advice, however, is that, although there is a nominal party line,
candidates are rarely punished for deviating from it. Indeed should a
Table 10.2 US party contributions and candidate disbursements by party, chamber, and incumbency status
House of Representatives Senate
Party Coordinated Net Party Coordinated Net

contribution expenditures disbursement contribution expenditure disbursement
Republicans
Incumbents Total 263045 680050 61856230 247313 3688123 52005070
n 140 24 153 15 14 15
Average 1879 28335 404289 16488 263480 3476005
Challengers Total 277808 863646 25969974 208810 3461434 27316720
n 49 26 201 14 12 14
Average 5670 33217 129204 14915 288453 1951194
Open Seats Total 287678 1237366 23 826638 41489 432745 6796715
n 23 21 28 3 3 3
Average 12508 58922 850951 13829 144248 2265538
Democrats
Incumbents Total 169 586 1081272 99562539 220793 2722650 61505136
n 120 146 244 13 14 17
Average 1413 7406 408043 16984 194475 3617949
Challengers Total 97737 1109 391 19542624 140000 1513469 19329592
n 38 66 120 8 9 13
Average 2572 16809 162855 17500 168163 1486892
Open Seats Total 172104 634521 31066388 52500 282611 2807720
n 19 23 28 3 3 3
Average 9058 27588 1109 514 17500 94204 935907
1.0
\.>l
-
candidate's personal position differ from that of the party he will be

given help in developing a strategy to promote his own, contrary,
position. None of the committees would ever encourage a .:andidate to
take a position (or to do anything else) that they did not believe to be
in that candidate's electoral interest. Said NRSC press secretary
Wendy DeMocker, 'We would never, ever tell any of our candidates
where to stand on any issue, whether it be abortion, clean air or the
flag' (Schwartz, 1990). As for party loyalty another Republican official
put the matter succinctly: 'as long as they vote for Bob Michel for
Speaker, that's all I care about' (Maddox interview).
In fact individual and local electoral advantage entirely outweigh
considerations of party consistency. Nowhere is this better illustrated
than by the one major 'national issue' of the 1990 election, the budget
fiasco. In June, President Bush indicated that he would be willing to
abandon his 'no new taxes' pledge in the interest of negotiating (with
leaders from both parties in Congress) a responsible budget. Many
congressional Republicans felt they had been left to face the voter's
wrath over the President's abandonment of his 1988 'no new taxes'
pledge before an election in which he did not have to run. In response
House Republican whip, Newt Gingrich, led a crusade against the
President's plan. What might have been a major issue dividing
Republicans and Democrats instead divided the Republicans against
themselves. As the controversy intensified a marginal Republican
incumbent, Jim McCreary, had to face the voters in Louisiana's
potentially decisive primary. 9 Two days before the Louisiana primary
and the morning of the vote on the President's budget, McCreary had
still not made up his mind. Ed Rollins, co-chair of the NRCC,
suggested that McCreary vote against the budget plan and reiterate
his support for 'no new taxes'. The NRCC worked with the campaign
to create new advertisements that highlighted McCreary's opposition
to George Bush rather than his support for the President (Mattingly,
1990a). McCreary won the race with a comfortable 55 per cent of the
vote. The NRCC decided to recommend the same strategy to other
candidates in close races. Ed Rollins wrote a memo to this effect and
circulated it among Republican House candidates. President Bush
recoiled at this blatant internal party warfare and publicly demanded
the resignation of Ed Rollins (Balz, 1990). Rollins did not resign and
House Republicans continued to campaign against the budget when
they thought it in their own electoral interest to do so. In fact to vote
for the budget resolution represented a retreat from prior promises
and substantial potential for making political enemies for members of
both parties. As shown by Gary Jacobson's analysis of members'

votes, 'the greater their degree of electoral risk, the less likely they were
to support deficit reduction legislation' (Jacobson, 1990).
The major 'issue that wasn't' in 1990 was the Persian Gulf. Within a
week of the 2 August Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush had
committed 200 000 American troops to the defence of Saudi Arabia,
but this decision played no significant role in the 1990 elections. There
were several reasons. First, neither the President nor the members of
Congress wanted the Gulf to be an issue. As has become all too typical
of American government, whenever possible announcement of con-
troversial initiatives is postponed until the election is over; whenever
possible Congress avoids situations in which members will have to
take public stands on divisive issues. Within a week after the election
the commitment was doubled, but Congress took no major votes on
the question until January. Second, polls before the election showed
lopsided support for the president's action; no one wanted to appear
to be a wimp or unpatriotic, especially in the absence of any casualties.
More generally, congressional campaigns rarely involve foreign policy
issues except when, as in the case of trade policy, direct links can be
drawn to local interests.
Another issue which might have divided the parties but did not was
the Savings and Loan Crisis. 10 There was in fact little basis for making
it a party issue. The crisis was brought about by the decisions of a
recklessly deregulationist Republican president and a Democratic
Congress irresponsibly willing to do favours for big campaign
contributors; congressmen of both parties and in both chambers were
implicated in accepting large contributions from, and doing political
favours for, apparently guilty members of the Savings and Loan
industry. 11 For many members of Congress the S&L issue was
significant, but as a question of personal ethics rather than public
policy. Typically most of the incumbents who failed to win re-election
were caught in some scandal.
Coordination
The question of campaign coordination can be addressed in two ways,

coordination among constituencies and coordination between the
various party committees. In neither sense is there much coordination
in American campaigns. The party committees produce issue books
articulating and defending party positions on a wide range of issues
and candidates who have not previously taken a stand are encouraged
to adopt those of the party. This is analogous to the party whip's

function in Congress and is little more effective. This reflects what
might be call the 'Rhett Butler principle' - the party issue book
provides a fall back position when the member doesn't give a damn.
On the important issues (to them or their constituents) candidates
form their own positions which may or may not agree with those in the
issue book. Deviation from the party position almost never results in
loss of party support. 12 The committees also provide generic direct
mail pieces that candidates can tailor to their own needs and lists of
consultants that the committees have found to be congenial. In some
cases - although not in 1990 - one or the other party has produced
generic material for use by all candidates (who can raise the money
and choose to spend it that way). Examples are the 1980 Republican
'Vote Republican- For a Change' and the 1982 Democratic 'It Isn't
Fair -It's Republican' campaigns (Luntz, 1988, p. 134). None the less,
the important decisions are made by the candidates and their own
advisers locally.
Looking at coordination among the committees the Republicans
seem (or seemed until the Rollins affair) to cooperate more than the
Democrats. They share some fund-raising lists while the Democrats
practise competitive fund-raising (Dunn interview). Ever since the
congressional committees have been permitted to administer coordi-
nated expenditures through 'agency agreements' there has been
considerably less need for strategic planning between them and the
national committees. With their own independent sources of funds, 13
the congressional committees had no reason to seek financial assis-
tance (and therefore agreement with their strategies) from the national
committees. Furthermore, with thirty-six gubernatorial races taking
place in 1990 the national committees had more than enough activity
to focus on without having to edge into the realm of congressional
campaigns. The basic pattern of 'coordination' is simply that each
committee confines its activities to its own group of races and stays off
the other committees' turf.
Relevance of Party Support
The role of the national parties in congressional campaigning must be

assessed in the context of other resources available to candidates. We
have already shown that although the financial support given to
candidates by their parties appears substantial, when considered in
isolation it actually represents only about 10 per cent of the total spent
by the candidates. The parties also claim to offer a variety of other

services and assistance to their candidates, but here too there is less
than meets the eye. As Frank Luntz writes, 'political assistance from
the national parties is usually the last resort for the desperate
candidate' (Luntz, 1988, p. 46). Candidates who have a choice hire
their own advisers on the private market. If actions speak louder than
words then no more damning assessment of the value of party
assistance can be found than the fact that former NRSC Chairman
John Heinz 'preferred to use costly outside consultants rather than free
"in-house" advisors in his re-election campaigns. "He never used the
services of the NRSC when he ran"' (ibid., p. 140, quoting Republican
media consultant, John Deardourfl). On a more positive note, Paul
Herrnson characterises the party committees as purveyors of transac-
tional services or intermediaries between some candidates and the
campaign industry, suggesting that even if independent contractors
provide most of the actual services the parties are none the less
important players in the overall campaign process (Herrnson, I 988).
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CAMPAIGN INDUSTRY
The United States leads the world in the development and application
of high-tech tools for campaigning. Significantly, while the party
committees may act as intermediaries between candidates and the
vendors of these tools and in some cases may provide services directly
to candidates, the market is dominated by private contractors. Indeed,
while the House committees target a limited number of races (usually
about fifty) for intensive investment, a candidate generally must
establish a strong personal campaign as a prerequisite for party
support. Although the party committees were instrumental both in
developing many of the new techniques and in giving the leading
private operatives their starts, the committees are no longer the
directors of the campaign industry but merely one of its many
components. The campaign industry itself has boomed in the last
fifteen years. It has its own (non-partisan) trade association, the
American Association of Political Consultants. According to industry
publications, vendors specialise in the following: advertising agencies,
computer services (including both rentals and specialised software),
direct mail, fund-raising consultants, general consultants ('full service'
agencies), issue/petition management, list brokers and compilers (for
direct mail), media consultants, paraphernalia, polling/survey re-
search, print production, public relations, research/analysis, speech

writing and telemarketing. Altogether there are hundreds of firms,
most restricting their clientele to candidates of a single party, but with
partisanship determined by the candidate, not by any party committee.
As private entrepreneurs these vendors have a quite different agenda
from that of the party for whose candidates they work. An immediate
concern is getting paid (Hampton, 1991). Second is building a
reputation for effectiveness which can mean winning elections, but
also includes doing better than initially expected and making accurate
projections, even in defeat. Originally neither party nor ideology
played much role in consultants' selection of clients. As the industry
has matured many consultants have found that it is better for busines~
to restrict their clientele to a single party and/or to a particular agenda
(Luntz, 1988, pp. 50-1).
Novelty pays off in campaigning, but it wears off too. The campaign
industry is searching constantly for existing technologies that can be
adapted for their purposes. Prominent among the 'new' tools in 1990
were satellite links, CD-ROM and video mail. Confronted with the
federal budget impasse, members of Congress were unable to cam-
paign in their districts with the same intensity as their opponents. By
using satellite links for local broadcasts to send material taped just a
few hours before, or even for live debates, the incumbent can give the
illusion of being in the district even while he is stuck in Washington.
For example, Minnesota Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz debated
Democratic challenger Paul Wellstone from the National Press Club. 14
Although these facilities are available on the private market the party
organisations provide their candidates with studio facilities and
satellite time at well below market rates. (For ostensibly 'substan-
tive' rather than 'political' broadcasts incumbents can use even more
heavily subsidised congressional facilities (Kenworthy, 1990).)
Another technological adaptation is the use of CD-ROM for voter
contact activities. New firms have emerged specifically marketing
compact discs listing names, addresses and turnout records of all
registered voters in specified areas. Once the initial start-up cost is paid
the campaign can generate sophisticated cont2.ct tools in-house. These
include customised call sheets for 'phone banks; neighbourhood
walking sheets that can be modified to accommodate changing
needs; samples for quick polls; and groupings of voters by specific
characteristics (Campney, 1991). One of the problems confronting
House candidates in cities like New York and Los Angeles is that
media advertising rates are based on the size of the full media market,
Richard S. ·Katz and Robin Kolodny 199
only a fraction of which is in any particular district and therefore of

interest to a particular candidate. Even where there is a better fit
between media market and constituency boundaries, only an untarget-
able fraction are watching at any given time. At prices as low as $1.25
per copy, direct mail of VCR tapes was touted as the •marketing tool
of the next decade', allowing a longer message to be targeted to a
specific audience (Purpura, 1991).
RESULTS
The I990 congressional election was the only one after the war in
which 'the mean vote for incumbents of both parties fell' (Jacobson,
I 990). Despite this apparent anti-incumbent bias only I 5 of 406
Representatives and one of 35 Senators seeking re-election were
defeated. Overall only one Senate seat changed hands (from Republi-
can to Democrat) and only 19 House seats (with a net gain of 8 for the
Democrats plus the election of the only Socialist congressman, at the
expense of the Republicans). As shown in Table 10.3 the final line-up
in the House was 267 Democrats, 167 Republicans and one Socialist
who asked to join the Democratic caucus; in the Senate the net
outcome was 56 Democrats to 44 Republicans. Although one cannot
find the Democrats with a map in presidential politics they continue to
have a stranglehold on Congress.
Jacobson suggests one reason why neither party was able to
capitalise on anti-incumbent feelings in the electorate. By the time
these had become apparent, the nominees had already been deter-
mined, if not formally then because strong potential challengers had
already decided to wait until the new district lines were drawn for
1992. Another reason is the safety of most Congressional seats. With
an average vote percentage of over 65 per cent in 1988 most
incumbents could survive swings far larger than the 3.9 per cent that
actually occurred. Moreover, it is easy to mistake hostility towards
incumbents in general for opposition to particular incumbents. As
Fenno observed many years ago not only do Americans who dislike
Congress like their own congressmen, they like them for doing
precisely those things that they dislike in the institution as a whole -
supporting pork-barrel legislation (in this case 'vital federal projects'
in their own districts) and protecting special interests (in this qase their
constituents themselves) (Fenno, 1975).
200 The USA': The 1990 Congressional Campaign
Table 10.3 The US 1990 Congressional Election
House of Representatives
Total Democrats Republicans Other
All races 61352951 32471851 27 602241 1278859

Contested 54000715 28417086 24 773 563 810066
Seats 435 267 167 1
Vote change -0.46% +0.47%
(since 1988)
Senate
Total Democrats Republicans Other
All races 34919560 17907 507 16495462 516 681

Elected 1990 35 18 17 0
Total Senate 100 56 44 0
Note:
In the House 'all races' excludes seven districts in Louisiana (decided by
primary) and five in Florida (uncontested). In total there were 350 races in
which both major parties fielded candidates.
Source: Congressional Quarterly, 23 February 1991, p. 487.
Although there was little turnover of seats, the 1990 campaign had a
significant impact within the party organisations in government. The
case in point is the aforementioned dispute between the NRCC's co-
chair Ed Rollins and President Bush. Even though it is impossible to
measure the effect of the Rollins memo in electoral terms, given the
stability of congressional incumbency and the final result of the
elections, it is safe to say that it did not alter electoral outcomes
significantly. However, the Rollins-Bush dispute had substantial
political impact within the congressional Republican party, prompt-
ing a leadership challenge to NRCC chairman, Guy Vander Jagt (the
first since his initial election to the post fifteen years earlier). Vander
Jagt successfully defended his position although Rollins ultimately
chose to resign, returning to private consulting. The leadership
challenge, however, left the Republicans in considerable disarray.
Many congressional Republicans claimed to have supported Vander
Jagt precisely because the challenger (Donald Sundquist) was too
closely linked to the White House (Mattingly, 1990b). Some re-elected
incumbents and newly successful challengers who did not think the
NRCC had supported them adequately in the election took this

opportunity to oppose the NRCC chair. The truth of the matter is
that congressional campaign committee chairmen tend to be blamed
(as in this instance) or rewarded (as in the case of Senator George
Mitchell who became majority leader as a result of his tenure as head
of the DSCC during the 1986 election) for electoral outcomes that
have very little to do with the efforts of the organisations which they
oversaw. The Vander Jagt challenge also suggests that attempts to
direct the efforts of the congressional committees more toward
challengers and open seats will end and that a stronger incumbent
protection mentality will prevail.
In sum little changed as a result of the 1990 election and the biggest
likely change is a return to the status quo ante. The general security of
incumbent members of Congress - barring being personally caught in
a scandal - was underscored yet again, as was the degree to which
congressional campaigning is basically organised, financed and con-
trolled one race at a time. While the national party committees -and it
is important to reiterate that divisions between the branches of
government are reflected in divisions between these committees -
may play an important role as facilitators, congressional campaigning
remains essentially a local phenomenon.
Notes
1. In researching this chapter the following were interviewed: Deb Amend,
assistant campaign director, NRCC; Anita Dunn, communications dir-
ector, DSCC; John Grotta, director of voter programmes, NRSC; John
Maddox, director of the campaign division; NRCC.
2. Prior registration in a party (in some cases as little as ten days) is a
prerequisite for voting in its primary election in only twenty-six of the fifty
states.
3. In fact in a growing minority of cases the only opposition is in the party
primary. In these cases elections are nearly simultaneous contests (because
states hold their primaries on different days) between groups of candidates
who incidentally have the same party label.
4. In 1988 average party unity scores were 0.80 for Democrats and 0.74 for
Republicans in the House of Representatives (0.78 and 0.68 respectively in
the Senate). In 1989 the four corresponding figures were 0.81, 0.72, 0.78,
and 0.78 (Congressional Quarterly, 1989, 35B).
5. At the extreme, each of the New Jersey congressional districts is only part
of a broadcast media market that primarily serves another state.
202 The USA.• The 1990 Congressional Campaign
6. The DCCC contributed a total of $499 to Senate campaigns; the DSCC

contributed $15 000 to House campaigns ($10000 in special elections); and
the DNC contributed $46 150 to House campaigns ($2500 to the delegate
from the District of Columbia and the rest in special elections). The
NRCC contributed $105 333 to Senate campaigns (nine of fifteen were
former House members); the RNC contributed $255 578 to House
campaigns (with an emphasis on special elections and races in which the
Republican candidate was Black or female); the NRSC contributed
$173000 to House races.
7. Two defeated Democratic incumbents who received (virtually) no party
support were Douglas Bosco (CA-l, $0) and Doug Walgren (PA-18,
$561). On the Republican side Jack Buechner (M0-2) received only
$369 from his party. These races also show that the parties are watching
each other's opportunity lists; in none of these races did the successful
challenger receive more than a 'small' (as defined in Table 10.1)
contribution from his or her own party.
8. This is not unique to the party committees. Political action committees as
well may pad their FEC reports in order to appear more important than
they really are. The figures for party activity do not correspond to the
much higher estimates made by staff members of the campaign commit-
tees. In part this reflects the difference between 'hard' (reportable) and
'soft' (party building) money. The parties include 'soft' money in
estimating how much they 'spent in the last election cycle', even though
it may have little to do with actually winning seats. Again party officials
have every incentive to exaggerate their own effectiveness in raising funds.
9. In contrast to other states Louisiana's all-party primary election is really
the first ballot of a two-ballot majority electoral system. A candidate who
receives an absolute majority in the 'primary' is elected immediately,
without running in the November election.
10. The federal government insures deposits in Savings and Loan Associations
through the FSLIC. In response to the permissiveness of Reagan era
policies, a number of Savings and Loans made questionable investments
and in the late 1980s began to fail in sufficiently large numbers as to
deplete the FSLIC's reserves, requiring massive additional support from
the government.
11. Conveniently for them none of the 'Keating Five' (senators) were up for
re-election in 1990.
12. The exception that proves the rule is the 1990 senatorial candidacy of
David Duke in Louisiana. Duke, a former grand wizard of the KKK,
became a Republican simply by saying that he was one. He entered the
first round of the senatorial election (see note 9) as a Republican
notwithstanding the presence of a formally supported Republican candi-
date. Rather than risk another month of campaigning with Duke as their
candidate, a number of prominent Republican office-holders endorsed the
Democratic candidate for re-election and ultimately the party-endorsed
Republican candidate was persuaded to withdraw. In the end the
Democrat was reelected with 54 per cent of the vote to Duke's 44 per cent.
13. Since the 1974 campaign finance reform act it has become increasingly
important that the individual Senators or Congressmen selected to chair
one of the congressional committees have a relatively high profile so that

they may aid the committee's fund-raising efforts.
14. Boschwitz thought that a debate from Washington would gain him credit
as a 'workhorse' rather than a 'showhorse,' and counter Wellstone's
'Looking For Rudy' commercials. In fact the debate appears to have
boosted Wellstone's ultimately successful campaign, indicating why most
incumbents try to avoid debates with their lesser known opponents.
References
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Damage Control Over Handling of Budget', The Washington Post (26
October), p. Al.
Broder, D. (1990), 'National GOP Abandons Hands-Off Policy in Primaries',
The Washington Post (22 May), p. Al.
Campbell, A. (1960), 'Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change', Public
Opinion Quarterly (Fall), pp. 397-418.
Campney, B. (1991), 'COs Play Campaign Tunes: A Tale of Two Voter Files',
Campaign Magazine, 5, p. 38.
Congressional Quarterly (1989), CQ Alamanac JOist Congress, vol. XLV.
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Branch," How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?', in N.
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Herrnson, P. (1988), Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press).
Jacobson, G. (1990), 'Divided Government, Strategic Politicians, and the 1990
Congressional Elections', Midwest Political Science Association Annual
Meeting, (April).
Kenworthy, T. (1990), 'House Incumbents Ride the Airwaves', The Wash-
ington Post (17 October), p. Al.
Kernell, S. (1977), 'Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alterna-
tive Explanation of Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's
Party', American Political Science Review (March), pp. 44-66.
Luntz, F. I. (1988), Candidates, Consultants, and Campaigns: The Style and
Substance of American Electioneering (New York: Basil Blackwell).
Mattingly, K. (1990a), 'GOP Strategists Advise Hill Republicans in Tight
Races to Run Against the President', Roll Call, 36 (15 October) pp. 1, 34.
- - (1990b), 'Vander Jagt and Lewis Beat Back Challenges in GOP Leader
Races: Gingrich Seen as Hurt', Roll Call (6 December), p. 19.
Purpuro, L. (1991), 'It's in the VCR', Campaign (February), pp. 42-3.
Schwartz, M. (1990), 'GOP Advice on Flag Upsets Candidate', The Wash-
ington Post (20 June), p. A28.
Tufte, E. (1975), 'Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional
Elections', American Political Science Review (September), pp. 812-26.
11 The Informed Electorate?
Voter Responsiveness to
Campaigns in Britain and
Germany 1
Shaun Bowler, David Broughton,
Todd Donovan and Joseph Snipp
Previous studies of party competition and of voting behaviour often

seem to talk past, rather than to, each other (for further discussion see
Bowler, 1990; Budge and Farlie, 1983a; Budge and Farlie, 1983b). This
separation of voting and party behaviour is particularly striking in the
terms of the academic literature on the impact of campaigning.
Campaigns seek to mobilise and/or persuade voters, yet relatively
little work has been done in establishing that it is actually the party
campaign that produces such results. As other chapters in this volume
make clear, party managers and campaign advisers pay a great deal of
attention to the way voter attitudes and allegiances shift in response to
campaign themes. The study of this interaction between voters and
campaigns is, however, much less developed than other branches of
the voting studies literature.
In this chapter we examine the assumed link between voters and
campaigns in more detail, with particular emphasis on the cases of
Britain and Germany. More specifically, we consider whether or not
party campaigns have an impact upon voter attitudes, focusing in
particular upon the central issue of information gain. We begin with a
brief review of some of the existing literature.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Voters typically are deemed to make decisions in a context of imperfect

and limited political information (Downs, 1957). Additional informa-
204
S. Bowler, D. Broughton, T. Donovan and J. Snipp 205
tion may, of course, be made available via periodic party campaign

activity. However, the cost to the voter of obtaining complete and
perfect information upon which to base his or her vote choice is great.
To compensate for this, voters rely upon party identification to provide
the basis of partisan opinions and decisions (Campbell et a/., 1960).
Political opinions and political behaviour are not, however, immutable,
and modern election campaigns may be conceived as efforts by parties
aimed at political marketing to alter voter behaviour (Margolis and
Mauser, 1989). Whilst these campaigns may result in the transmission
of political information to the electorate, little is known about how this
information might affect voters, or which voters might be more likely to
be receptive to the dissemination of campaign information.
Although some studies of the effects of campaigns upon voters exist,
they seem surprisingly sparse (see Ansolabehere et a/., 1991 for a
recent review). This dearth of research may stem from the difficulty of
finding adequate data with which to evaluate the consequences of any
party's efforts at giving out favourable information over the course of
a campaign. A major related problem is one of research design and
procedure. It is very difficult to control for the many factors
exogenous to campaign activity. According to Stokes (1981, p. 279):
'it is all too easy after the fact to attribute to strategy and organization
the shifts of party strength that are due to broader conditions
prevailing in the country'. As a consequence of this problem, a
number of attempts have been made to evaluate whether or not the
campaign per se has any impact upon voters.
The first, and probably most important, of these attempts are the
early enquiries associated with the Columbia group, which led to
subsequent concern over the 'Berelson paradox'. The assumptions
which underlie this paradox are based upon normative conceptions
that democratic systems require informed citizens whose behaviour is
changeable. System change is said to be related to a party's incentives
to adapt its position to changing conditions. However, changes in
public opinion between and at elections are often attributed to the
least interested and least informed members of the electorate
(Berelson, 1952; Granberg and Holmberg, 1990). It appeared that
those farthest from the 'classical' conception of the deliberative
democratic citizen appear to hold the most volatile opinions and
partisan attachments (Berelson eta/., 1954; Converse, 1962).
Recent research has suggested that this paradox may be less true for
European, and specifically Swedish, voters than for US voters. The
difference may lie, in part at least, in the weaker partisan commitments
206 · The Informed Electorate?
that US voters hold (Granberg and Holmberg, 1990). One problem

with such studies is that they have not actually addressed Stokes'
concern in that, although such changes in opinion do occur over the
course of a campaign, it is by no means necessarily clear that the
campaign itself brought about the changes. Nevertheless, this litera-
ture does suggest that some voters are more likely than others to be
responsive to campaigns, and that those voters may be differentiated
from others by their general level of political interest.
Other studies have tried more directly to link campaigning effort
with voters and their behaviour. These studies have progressed
furthest in terms of candidate centred evaluations at particular points
within American presidential races. Bartels (1988), for example,
examines the formation of attitudes and opinions over the course of
a presidential primary. Lanoue and Schrott's study (1991) assesses the
impact of televised debates upon voter awareness and their opinions of
the candidates. That specific work has been extended to examine the
link between performance in televised debates and candidate evalua-
tions in West Germany (Schrott, 1989) and Canada (Lanoue, 1991).
This body of literature, especially that which relates to individual
candidates, has emphasised shifts in voter opinion and vote choice that
are related to campaign events. Another more party centred literature
has stressed the stability of voter choice in the face of campaign
activity. Studies examining canvassing efforts stress that such an
approach is not so much concerned with persuading supporters of
rival parties to change their minds as mobilising existing supporters or
even the undecided voters (Bochel and Denver, 1972; Denver and
Hands, 1972; Newton, 1972; Rose, 1974; see also Taylor and
Johnston, 1979). In an age of declining party membership, direct
mailings are the modern equivalent of the traditional canvass as
parties and candidates emphasise the mobilisation aspects of the
campaign. Within this set of studies, and in contrast to the studies
using Berelson's ideas, the emphasis is not so much upon the
instability but the stability of vote choice. Such an emphasis upon
stability is entirely consistent with the traditional Michigan model.
Changes in electoral outcomes stem from the different capacities of the
parties to target and mobilise their own loyalist supporters rather than
converting others to their cause.
Targeting is also a key theme of the literature which examines
aggregate spending patterns by parties in district based electoral
~ystems such as Britain or New Zealand (Johnston, 1977; Taylor
and Johnston, 1979). In these systems parties operate campaigns
under conditions of relatively scarce resources which means allocating

funds to marginal districts in order to maximise the impact (if any) of
party spending. If funds must be distributed strategically, voters are
likely to receive information germane to a party's campaign by virtue
of their geographical location. Therefore, in addition to expecting
variability in campaign effects across individuals distinguished by
levels of political interest, we may also expect variation in campaign
effects associated with the allocation of campaign resources. If these
resources are distributed unevenly across a territory, we might expect,
other things being equal, that individuals residing in areas of heavy
campaign activity may receive, and perhaps be more receptive to,
campaign information.
In short, the effective dissemination of information about a party
may be related to the amount of resources, or effort, dedicated to a
party's campaign. In a similar vein, spending may also lead to
conversion and mobilisation effects. For example, some studies show
that spending in competitive districts increases voter turnout by
mobilising the supporters of some British parties (Taylor, 1972) and
their Canadian counterparts (Chapman and Palda, 1989). The huge
literature on American congressional elections is largely concerned
with the impact of spending at district level, yet it is by no means clear
whether the impact of spending is associated with turnout rates or
conversion rates. Jacobson (1984) shows that marginal returns on vote
share from campaign spending for challengers in contests to the
American House of Representatives are substantial. Romero (1991)
takes this argument further by showing that these effects depend upon
the type of candidate. In much of this literature the issue of whether
these effects are due to mobilisation or conversion is not clearly
established. To some extent such distinctions are rarely made because
spending data are seldom linked with individual level attitudinal data.
This brief discussion highlights two distinct sets of questions
regarding campaigns which we will address in the remainder of this
chapter. First, is there any evidence that voters respond to information
transmitted by a party over the course of an election campaign?
Keeping in mind Stokes' concern mentioned above, can we find
direct evidence that it is the campaign itself which has an impact on
individual voters? Second, is it possible for us to distinguish more
clearly than in the past between groups of voters who are influenced by
the campaign?
Before attempting to assess whether or not party campaigning does
have an impact upon voters, we need appropriate individual level data
from elections where we also know what were the aims of the party
campaign. We can then try to link the two parts of the campaign
process - voter behaviour and party behaviour. The British and
German general elections of 1983 provide us with the necessary
evidence. A comparative study of campaigning (Farrell and Wort-
mann, 1987) provides us with an explicit account of party campaign
intentions for those two countries from within a common frame of
reference, whilst sample surveys for both provide us with the necessary
individual level data. We turn first to examine the case of Britain.
CAMPAIGN EFFORT AND CAMPAIGN EFFECTS: THE

BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1983
In their study of party strategy in European campaigns, Farrell and

Wortmann note that the British Conservatives in 1983 were ahead of
their opponents not just in terms of spending, but also with regard to
the use of campaigning techniques. The Conservatives, more than the
Labour party, made active use of market research and public opinion
polling in developing their campaign. Furthermore, they made efforts
to coordinate constituency efforts with Central Office themes. Farrell
and Wortmann indicate that the Conservative party's 1983 national
'communications policy' emphasised themes of Thatcher's leadership
image and the party's competence in handling unemployment, in
addition to including attacks suggesting that the Labour party
manifesto was overly radical. Whilst advertising materials used in
local campaigns are not controlled by the central party organisation,
many constituency associations followed suggestions on text and
artwork issued by Conservative headquarters in London. Most
campaign money spent locally was used to fund advertisements and
mailings. A study of the content of mailings used by local associations
in the 1983 general election indicated that national party themes were
in fact picked up by the Conservative constituency associations. Over
90 per cent dealt with the issue of unemployment; over one-quarter
claimed that the Labour party was 'extreme'. Thatcher's image was
mentioned in most Conservative addresses generated by the Conserva-
tive constituency associations, with 56 per cent of the addresses
including her photograph (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984).
In assessing whether or not campaigning made a difference in this
election we take the amount spent by a party as an indication of
campaign effort. Whilst some have doubted the importance of
spending in UK election campaigns (ibid.), the parties nevertheless

spent a considerable amount. To the extent that UK campaigns are
national ones, considerable attention is focused on national spending
upon hoardings and newspaper advertisements. In 1983, for example,
the Conservative party nationally spent £3.6 million. In addition to
these expenditures UK parties are also allowed to spend money, within
legal limits, in each constituency. In 1983, the Conservative party's
local associations spent a further £2.1 million. The vast majority of
these funds, locally and nationally, were given over to advertising (the
printing and distribution of election addresses in the constituencies
and posters).
Spending limits, however, do not mean that spending is uniform
between parties or across different constituencies. Whilst spending
more than Labour in aggregate, few local Conservative constituency
associations spent the legal maximum available. Since campaign funds
are relatively scarce, money is more likely to go to marginal seats
where the money has more chance of making some impact in the
contest (Johnston, 1977). In this chapter we are interested not just in
the question of where campaign effort, as measured by spending, was
directed, but also in the consequences of that effort. After demonstra-
ting that there is a logic to the allocation of campaign effort, can we
subsequently show that there are any tangible effects of such campaign
spending? Specifically, are voters who live in areas receiving higher
levels of campaign spending and activity more likely to have accurate
perceptions of a party's position on issues? Similarly, are voters living
in high campaign expenditure areas more likely to perceive a party in a
manner consistent with the themes being projected by the party
campaign? We turn first to examine the question of the relationship
between campaign effort and perception of the party.
Expenditure on such things as advertising, stationery, printing and
the mass media has the effect of increasing the total of political
information to which voters may be exposed. Furthermore, voters
receive this information passively. As campaign information is pro-
vided, voters are more likely to become aware of a party's themes and
its issue positions. As a party provides more of this 'free' information,
the choices between contending parties are clarified for voters, who
would otherwise have to rely upon their existing stock of political
information to come to decisions. Voters who are able to perceive a
choice between contending parties or candidates are more likely to
participate in electoral contests (Brody and Page, 1973). Therefore, we
might expect that the link between campaign spending and vote
behaviour is partially a product of effects that campaign spending has

upon the transmission of political information.
In order to test this hypothesis, we have analysed survey data from
the British National Election Survey of 1983.2 The survey asked
respondents to identify the position of the Conservative party on the
issues of price stability versus unemployment and public versus private
ownership of major industries. Additionally, the survey included
questions that tap particular themes that the Conservatives appeared
to stress over the course of the campaign. Survey results were then
matched to data detailing expenditure by Conservative candidates in
the constituencies covered by the survey. We expected more informa-
tion to be transmitted to individual voters if they lived in an area
characterised by high campaign spending. As a result, we gave each
individual a value based upon the percentage of the legal maximum
the Conservatives spent in the respondent's constituency.
Following Bartels' emphasis upon the role of information and
uncertainty in any campaign process, we expect spending of the types
mentioned above to affect individual perceptions of a political party in
two ways. First, spending makes general information about the parties
available. Therefore, voters living in areas of greater campaign
expenditure should show more consistency when identifying a par-
ty's position on a specific issue. In areas where little information is
transmitted by the party via campaign spending, we should expect to
see more variation based on uncertainty in the survey responses when
individuals are asked to place the party's stand on an issue.
Second, campaign expenditure may shape not just the content but
also the very presence of an opinion about the party. Voters living in
areas where more effort was directed at communicating the Conserva-
tive party's campaign themes about leadership, unemployment and
Labour may be expected to be more likely to respond to questions
about those themes in a manner consistent with the information
disseminated by the campaign.
Figure 11.1 displays the results of an examination of the variance in
perceptions of the Conservative party's position on four issue dimen-
sions. For macroeconomic policy, respondents were asked to place the
Conservatives along a 21 point scale where -10 indicates the party's
priority was best reflected as 'put people back to work' and + 10
indicated the Conservative priority was best described as 'keep prices
down'. Likewise, on the question of nationalisation, -10 indicated
'privatise more' and + 10 was 'nationalise more'. For nuclear
weapons, respondents were asked to identify the Conservative posi-
tion along a similar scale where -10 reflected 'get rid' of weapons, and
+ 10 stood for 'increase'. Finally, on social policy, a -10 response
indicates a perception that Conservatives seek to increase social
services, while a + 10 represents a perception that the party's policy
was to 'keep taxes down'.
Standard Deviation
4.0 l..-----..-------..-----.------r-----...1
lowest spending Highest spending
Campaign spending in constituency

(quartiles)
--------- Taxes Jobs v. prices
••••••••• Nationalism Weapons
Figure 11.1 Variance in perception of Conservative party campaign

themes by campaign spending in constituency
The total sample of 2151 valid survey responses was divided into
quartiles according to the level of local spending by Conservative
candidates (expressed as a percentage of total spending). The first
quartile includes individuals residing in constituencies where the party
spent the least and the fourth where they spent the most. The
perceptions of the Conservative position on all these issues are most
varied among respondents living in constituencies where Conservative
spending was lower. In constituencies where the Conservative party
spent least, respondents were more likely to place the Conservatives at
either end of the scale when identifying the party's position on
macroeconomic priorities, industry ownership, social services and
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in areas where Conservative

spending is greatest, responses on three out of the four themes are
notably less varied. We can clearly see, therefore, a reduction in voter
uncertainty over Conservative policy positions where the party's
campaign was most active.
The relationship between campaign spending and perceptions of the
Conservative party are further illustrated in Table 11.1. We have
identified three questions in the survey that tap major themes from
the Conservative campaign identified by the Farrell and Wortmann
study, and shown by Butler and Kavanagh to have been adopted by
local campaign associations. Voters were asked first 'which party is
best prepared to deal with unemployment?'; second, 'is Labour an
extreme or moderate party?'; third, 'which party leader is most likely
to get things done?' Responses to these questions were used as
dependent variables in an analysis designed to examine the hypothesis
that local campaign spending may condition voter perception in a
manner consistent with the party's themes. To the extent that
campaign spending is an indication of campaign effort, where that
effort is greatest we should expect to see the greatest impact upon
voter perceptions of the party. This does, in fact, tum out to be the
case.
All questions are coded such that 1 equals a response sympathetic to
the Conservatives, and 0 equals a non-sympathetic response. The
model includes control variables representing the respondents' socio-
economic status, their recalled vote in the previous election, strength
of Conservative identification, exposure to the campaign, and other
relevant factors. Conservative spending - operationalised as the
proportion of the legal maximum spent in each constituency -
displays a significant, positive relationship with responses to each of
these questions. The probability of a respondent answering these
questions in a manner that mirrors the Conservative party campaign
themes increases in areas where the Conservatives spent more. We can
therefore claim to have shown that for the Conservative party, their
campaign did 'work' in that it conveyed the image the campaign
managers wanted to get across to the voters. Table 11.2 illustrates this
conclusion further. The results of estimating an identical model show
that when a host of factors are controlled for, respondents were
significantly more likely to claim to have voted Conservative if they
lived in areas where Conservatives campaign spending was high. Over
and above such direct effects, we can see that the issues targeted by the
Conservative party also had a positive impact upon vote choice. As
Table 11.1 The impact of local campaign activity on perceptions of the

Conservative party campaign in 1983 (LOGIT estimates)
Unemployment Labour extreme Mrs Thatcher
Constant 4.05 3.81 4.7

EDUC -0.03 o.1o·· o.o6··
(.02) (.02) (.02)
VOTE79 0.67 •• 0.44·· 0.87••
(.06) (.05) (.06)
STRNGCON o.6o·· 0.19 •• o.5o··
(.09) (.09) (.16)
UNEMPLOY -0.06 0.05 -0.27".
(.14) (.09) (.09)
SPENDING o.4o·· 0.31 •• 0.29 ••
(.15) (.10) (.II)
CONTACT -0.10 0.006 0.02
(.07) (.05) (.06)
AGE -0.006•• 0.002 -0.006••
(.002) (0.001) (.001)
INCOME -0.03 o.o9·· o.o8··
(.03) (.02) (.03)
Notes
N=2103
The figures in parentheses are the standard errors.
•• =significant at .05 level or better
Notes on codings for Tables 11.1 and 11.2

Q59A = education
Qll = vote 79 (I= Con)
STRNGCON = strong Conservative ID (1,0)
UNEMPLOY = unemployed (1,0)
CONPROP = Conservative spending, % of legal max
Q2HI = contacted by Conservative canvasser,
Q56 = age, in years (categories of years)
Q50A = income (5 categories, I =low; 5=high)
BLUCOL= manufacturing, unskilled and semi skilled workers= I,
else= 0
Q19B, Q18, Q16 ... Conservative campaign themes (1,0)
in Table 11.1, perceptions of these campaign themes were also affected

by campaign effort. There is, then, a further indirect effect of
campaigning upon vote choice.
Table 11.2 The impact of campaign effort and the emphasised campaign
themes on the vote for the Conservative party, 1983
LOGIT estimates
Constant 2.97
Q59A .01
(.02)
Q11 1.03••
(.06)
STRNGCON .50..
(.13)
UNEMPLOY -.09
(.14)
CONPROP .54..
(.15)
Q2H1 .09
(.07)
Q56 -.001
(.002)
QSOA .087..
. (.03)
Q2A -.17..
(.08)
BLUCOL -.Is··
(.07)
Q19B .74••
(.08)
Q18A2 .26° 0
(.06)
Q16B .77..
(.08)
It may be objected that the 1983 British general election was

somewhat unusual; it was, after all, held in the wake of the Falklands
war. Furthermore, Mrs Thatcher's personality and the public's per-
ception of that personality can be said to have been affected as much
by four years in office as by the 1983 campaign itself. While the
differences between voter attitudes and perceptions in high and low
spending areas is therefore interesting, it is not necessarily conclusive
evidence that the course of campaign events and activity shaped voter
perceptions of the Conservative party, not least because questions of
causality cannot be resolved by cross-sectional data.
CAMPAIGN EFFORT AND CAMPAIGN EFFECTS: THE WEST

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS IN 1983
The German election of 1983 provides us with an interesting compar-

ison as well as an opportunity to assess the dynamics of opinion
change during an election campaign. The CDU in 1983, although the
incumbent party, did not have the record in office of the British
Conservatives; nor were the CDU's efforts affected by such factors as
the Falklands war. Moreover, the 1983 German election study is a
panel survey which permits us to examine directly temporal changes in
voter attitudes. Whilst the British election of 1983 allows us to
examine in cross-section the differences between perceptions in high
and low spending areas, the German election allows us to examine
voter perceptions as the campaign unfolds.
The CDU strategy in the 1983 federal election provides an example
of where· the themes and goals of a party's campaign were clearly
defined. Farrell and Wortmann note that the party's campaign was
conducted in two phases over identifiable time periods. The first phase
of the campaign, starting in November 1982, focused on issues, with
the goal of 'stimulating the electorate's attitudes towards the party's
selected issues' (Farrell and Wortmann, 1987, p. 301). The second
phase concentrated upon more general themes, such as candidate and
party symbolism and image, running over the last four to five weeks of
the campaign. From November through to the middle of February the
CDU's marketing strategy was designed to promote the party as the
most competent at handling issues considered important by the
electorate. Four specific issues targeted by the CDU in the first phase
of the campaign were identified: high levels of unemployment,
national debt, threats to pensions and the preservation of the Western
Alliance (ibid.).
The German Election Panel Study of 1983 includes two pre-election
samples of public attitudes towards German parties. Specifically the
surveys include questions regarding the respondents' comparative
evaluations of issues as well as each party's competence at handling
those issues. The timing of the first and second waves (18-25
November and 11-24 February respectively) of these panel interviews
corresponds to the key November and February dates of the start of

both phases of the campaign.
In order to assess the changes in public attitudes about German
parties occurring over the course of this campaign, we have examined
the data provided by the panel survey in terms of the four issues
emphasised in the CDU campaign. We also examined the changes in
public attitudes over issues that were not targeted in the CDU's
campaign strategy. This provides a 'control' for the possibility that
movement towards the CDU on these issues was not associated with
the issue-specific campaign themes, but rather were part of a general
movement toward the CDU, general dissatisfaction with the SPD, or
general shifts caused by increases in political interest or media
attention. These control issues differentiate the party's ability to deal
with issues such as law and order, the presence of foreign workers,
environmental concerns, missiles in Europe and citizen participation in
party and state politics. For all the questions voters were simply asked,
'Who is best qualified to deal with this issue; the CDU-CSU, the SPD,
both parties, or neither party?' 3
In comparing change in public attitudes about the CDU-CSU over
time, we can see that respondents became increasingly disposed to
view the CDU-CSU as the party 'best qualified' to handle the four
'targeted' issues emphasised in the party's campaign. Table 11.3
displays opinion change over time for the sample. The proportion of
respondents perceiving the CDU-CSU as 'qualified' increased from 4.5
per cent to 8 per cent on 'targeted' issues between November 1982 and
February 1983. Table 11.3 also contains z-scores, calculated to
establish the statistical significance (or otherwise) of these shifts
between November and February (Borhnstedt and Knoke, 1982). z-
scores for opinion change on each 'targeted' issue are great enough to
offer strong support for the hypothesis that the difference in opinions
between time points are statistically significant (if z > 1.96; p < .025).
Over the five non-targeted issues, however, changes in opinion about
the CDU-CSU ranged from only -1.7 per cent to 2.8 per cent, with no
statistically significant differences between November and February.
Discussion of the Berelson paradox above suggested that opinion
change over the course of a campaign of this sort may be greatest
among those having the least interest in politics. In order to examine
this proposition, we disaggregated the responses shown in Table 11.3,
dividing the sample of respondents into three subgroups characterised
by having high, moderate, and low self-reported levels of general
political interest. Table 11.4 illustrates that opinion changes on the
Table 11.3 Stability and change in attitudes towards the CDU-CSU
Per cent Change z-score
Targeted issues
Unemployment (Nov) 37.5
Unemployment (Feb) 45.5 +8.0 5.33
US relations (Nov) 50.0

US relations (Feb) 54.5 +4.5 2.22
Pensions (Nov) 35.9

Pensions (Feb) 42.0 +6.1 3.32
National debt (Nov) 49.8

National debt (Feb) 55.5 +5.7 2.89
Targeted issues
Average unweighted change +6.7
Non-targeted issues
Citizen part. (Nov) 20.4
Citizen part. (Feb) 20.7 +0.3 0.30
Missiles in FRG (Nov) 22.9

Missiles in FRG (Feb) 22.9 +0.0 0.00
Environment (Nov) 20.9

Environment (Feb) 23.6 +2.8 1.67
Law & order (Nov) 46.8

Law & order (Feb) 45.1 -1.7 0.85
Non-targeted issues
Average unweighted change + 1.45
CDU-CSU's targeted issues were greatest, and consistently significant,

among the least and only moderately interested voters. In comparing
whether such changes in opinion favouring the CDU-CSU were
greatest among those who named the SPD as the best party
('conversion') or those who had no clear perception of which party
had the best policy ('mobilisation'), we found that the ratio of
mobilised voters to converted ones ranged between 1.5:1 on the
Western Alliance issue to 4.2:1 on the issue of public debt. On
average the CDU-CSU picked up votes from the relatively uninformed

and uncertain voters as opposed to converting voters in a 2.5:1 ratio.
This is in line with the results drawn from American research
mentioned earlier.
Table 11.4 The Berelson paradox and the German electorate: change in
attitudes to the CDU-CSU by level of general interest in
politics in 1983
Level of interest in politics

High Medium Low
Targeted issues
Unemployment +7.2 +4.8 +9.6
(2.17) (0.99) (3.68)
US Relations +3.0 +4.0 +5.5
(0.85) (0.78) (1.96)
Pensions +4.0 +5.8 +7.6
(1.20) (1.10) (2.91)
National Debt +2.2 +7.7 +7.0
(0.64) (1.54) (2.57)
Unweighted average +4.1 +5.5 +7.4
Non-targeted issues
Missiles -0.8 -2.2 +1.1
(0.46) (0.78) (0.49)
Foreign workers + 1.5 -8.2 +3.8
(0.45) (1.68) (1.43)
Environment + 1.5 +1.4 +4.0
(0.52) (0.34) (1.77)
Law & order -3.4 -2.0 -0.9
(1.07) (0.40) (0.33)
Citizen
participation -2.9 + 1.9 + 1.7
(1.02) (0.53) (0.75)
Unweighted average -0.8 -0.9 + 1.9
In order to establish that the shifts seen in Table 11.3 were due to
the CDU-CSU campaign, it is important to look at the potential shifts
of voter perception of the SPD, the CDU-CSU's main opponents.
Since the question format allowed the respondents to choose 'both

parties' or 'neither party' as well as either the CDU-CSU or the SPD,
the gains by the CDU-CSU need not be mirrored by losses for the
SPD. If we see similar shifts in support for the SPD on our selected
issues, then our claim for party specific campaign effects is less
clearcut. It is important to note that since we do not know what the
campaign goals of the SPD were, we cannot actually pinpoint
campaign specific effects working for the SPD. We can only demon-
strate that the SPD did not gain in those particular policy areas from
which the CDU-CSU benefited. Looking at Table 11.5 we can see
that, although there are some scattered significant shifts toward the
SPD, they occur only on the non-targeted areas and not in any
consistent pattern.
Table I 1.5 Change in attitudes to the SPD by level of general interest in

politics, 1983
High Medium Low
CDU-CSU targeted issues

Unemployment +1.4 +3.5 +0.4
US relations -1.3 -3.1 -l.l
Pensions +l.4 -1.2 -3.8
National debt +0.7 -0.7 -3.5
Unweighted average +0.6 -0.4 -2.0
Non-targeted issues
Missiles +6.9•• +0.9 +5.6••
Foreign workers +2.2 -0.1 -0.4
Environment -1.8 -4.3 •• -4.5 ••
Law & order +3.9 -6.3 •• -2.9
Citizen participation +1.5 -4.1 •• +6.3 ••
Unweighted average +2.5 -2.8 +0.8
It appears therefore that, over the course of the 1983 campaign, as

the party provided information about itself to the public, voter
evaluations of the CDU-CSU became more favourable in response
to that information among the least interested portions of the
electorate. This finding is consistent with research by Converse that
shows opinion volatility to be greater amongst those electors who have

low amounts of 'stored' political information.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The form and function of the modern political campaign has come
under attack in many societies. Analysts bemoan the substitution of
finance for substance in the election strategies of the parties. Neverthe-
less, politicians do spend great amounts of time and money choosing
issues, with varying degrees of success, that they believe will sway the
electorate's mind. It is this very connection between money and votes,
this electoral 'black box', which is crucial to understanding democracy
and yet it remains the least examined. In this chapter we have shown
that since most voters make their choices with limited information,
attempts to increase voter awareness can translate into more votes. To
this end, parties do have strategies which contain and convey
information over policy choices and, more importantly, this informa-
tion can be successfully transmitted to the electorate. In some cases
this can mean changing a previously held opinion. In many more cases
it can mean a voter forming an opinion on an issue, perhaps for the
first time. In terms of normative democratic theory this is no mean
achievement. Campaigns and campaigning can be seen as a central
and essential part of the democratic process in providing a necessary
informational base from which a deliberative citizenry can begin its
deliberations.
Notes
1. Thanks are due to the Academic Senate of the University of California

Riverside for research support. The data employed are the 1983 UK
General Election Survey conducted by Heath, Jowell and Curtice and the
1983 German Panel Survey. These were obtained from the ICPSR, Ann
Arbor, Michigan. None of the original investigators is responsible for the
analyses contained in the chapter. The authors are solely responsible for
the interpretation of the data.
2. A similar survey was carried out by the same investigators in 1987. In the
same year the British Election Campaign Study at the University of
Glasgow focused specifically upon the election campaign (Miller et a/.,
1990).
3. The CSU campaign was not specifically included in the Farrell and
Wortmann study. However, since the CSU only campaigns in Bavaria,
this does not affect the following national analysis.
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12 Conclusion: The
Contemporary Election
Campaign 1
The previous chapters have examined differing national experiences

with campaigning. It is evident from these that politicians across
different systems and different parties take their campaigns very
seriously indeed. The evidence presented in Chapter 11 suggests the
parties have good reasons for attaching such importance to cam-
paigns. As was shown (p. 220), the party's campaign can lead to the
'changing [of] a previously held opinion. In many more cases it can
mean a voter forming an opinion on an issue, perhaps for the first
time.'
One particularly striking pattern that has emerged from the case
studies in this volume is that the whole process of campaigning
contains a great deal of similarity across both systems and parties.
While there may be doubts as to the extent to which American
campaign techniques have been exported to European and Australa-
sian countries, there can be little question that the techniques being
employed are broadly very similar. Clearly, then, the modern cam-
paign is not a phenomenon unique to the United States.
Furthermore, the modern campaign is manifestly a party campaign.
As recently as autumn 1991 Lauri Karvonen (1991, p. 195) wrote of
the 'one major imbalance' in campaign research being 'the emphasis
on candidates rather than on parties'. The special issue of Scandina-
vian Political Studies which he was editing was designed, at least in
part, to meet that gap. In similar fashion and along similar lines the
case studies in this volume have shown for the most part the
continuing central role which parties play in contemporary campaign-
ing. This is, of course, not so for the case of France (for presidential
elections) or the USA. The chapter by Katz and Kolodny shows (pace
Herrnson, 1988) how wrong it would be to ~ttach too much
importance to the role of parties in US congressional elections;
223
224 Conclusion: The Contemporary Election Campaign
rather, congressional elections (p. 184) 'are better described as

simultaneous constituency-level contests between pairs of candidates
who incidently have party labels and patronise a common core of
purveyors of campaign services'. Equally the French presidential
election is clearly as candidate-centred as any in the USA: note in
particular the role of the comites de soutien. These are exceptions
which would naturally be expected. There are other less likely ones,
such as the prominence of 'supporter groups' in Finland which, as
described by Sundberg and Hognabba, appear to play a role similar to
the American PACs. In Austria, the role ofVranitzky's 'above-party'
support group could also be viewed in this light. These exceptions -
full and partial - aside, the dominant picture throughout each of the
case studies is one of a campaign prepared, controlled and run by the
political parties.
In this chapter we review the findings of the case studies under a
number of very broad headings. First, we examine the campaign
environment facing parties across the different countries. We then
turn to examine differences and similarities in the means of waging
campaigns both at the general level of strategy and in the more short
term tactical considerations of how to get the message across. We
conclude with a discussion on the centralised nature of the contem-
porary campaign.
CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT
To some extent the case studies in this volume reveal a number of

similarities in the campaign environments of the parties. Generally
speaking, there are no limits on national spending or on the publica-
tion of poll data. But this does not imply that the environments are
entirely similar. Throughout the case studies it has been evident how,
in detail, there are certain variations, sometimes system based, some-
times party based. Of the system variables the ones that appear to
feature most prominently are those that relate to campaign finance
and access to electronic media.
It is clear from the case studies that campaigning has become a
costly exercise. The curious feature here is how, for the most part, the
state has not generally played a significant direct role. State campaign
funding is provided for parties in Austria and Germany and to
presidential candidates in France. In all the other cases considered
in this volume (including American congressional elections) the parties
receive no direct financial support. As we saw in Chapter 2, however,

even though financing is available to Austrian parties, the FPO refuses
to accept such funds. And while its competitors, the larger SPO and
OVP, accept the funding, they have adopted a 'fairness' agreement,
capping their expenditure in the final six weeks of a campaign.
Generally, there are many indirect campaign subsidies available,
such as those deriving from the general state support for party
organisations (Alexander, 1989), or campaign subsidies in kind like
free post or election broadcasts in state dominated broadcasting
systems. The state subsidy of party access to electronic media is, of
course, extremely important in an era when the party press is every-
where in decline and television has become the predominant medium.
The importance of television time can be seen in the specificity of the
rules governing its use. In New Zealand, for example, broadcasts are
allowed within specific time slots; no commercials are allowed shorter
than three minutes and the parties choose lots to determine the order
of appearance. More generally, there is also the issue of indirect
communication via news broadcasting and current affairs. Here, too,
the states we examined provide a wide range of differing campaign
environments for the parties. In some states (most notably the USA,
also the Netherlands and Italy) access to television time is unlimited.
Elsewhere - and especially where the state plays a large role in the
broadcasting system - some 'fairness' rule operates over access to the
airwaves. Most common among such rules is one which allots time
proportional to party strength such as in Ireland, New Zealand and
UK (thereby favouring larger parties). In Finland and Denmark all
parties are allowed equal access to television regardless of size or
strength.
Despite the diverse settings, there are evident similarities in the
process of campaigning and even in the way such a process has been
changing over time. And there have been distinct changes to the ways
in which parties run their campaigns. These, in turn, point to the
distinct organisational shifts which parties have been undergoing in
recent years. Evidence of amateur campaign practices, so dominant in
the past, are quite rare. In other words, changes in campaigning
methods reveal not so much party decline as party adaptation;
indeed, one could go so far as to suggest that, if anything, this is a
phenomenon of a strengthening party apparatus at the centre. These
changes have manifested themselves in two main (and related) ways:
(i) a change in strategy and tactics, and (ii) a change in the means and
methods of campaigning.
CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES
Changes in strategy can be seen in the increased attention which

parties evidently are giving to campaign organisation and preparation.
In all cases the pattern is the same. Either the party is able to make a
fairly good prediction as to when the election will take place (or a firm
prediction if the date is fixed) and begins its preparations long in
advance, or else, if caught on the hop- as in Germany (and to some
extent the Netherlands) this time or usually Denmark - the organisa-
tion is so developed as to cater for quick preparations.
As the case studies show, wherever a party's preparations appeared
inadequate or lacking in cohesion there were usually good reasons
particular to that case: an ill-defined campaign strategy (the Austrian
OVP, the German SPD, the New Zealand National party); problems
with leader image (the Austrian Social Liberals, the British SDP/
Liberal Alliance, the Dutch VVD, the New Zealand National party);
or, as shown by both the Austrian and German Greens, a reluctance to
campaign too overtly.
Most parties have long-term communication or strategy committees
(or departments) in situ, but once an election is under way the
tendency, for the most part, is to rely on ad hoc committees to
manage the campaign (a prominent exception are the campaign
strategy committee and campaign management team of the British
Labour party). These committees vary in size from two leading party
members plus a staff in the case of some Finnish parties, to around
twenty to twenty-five people involved for the case of New Zealand. All
the other systems operate within this range, with smaller parties in
general involving fewer people in the decision-making process from
the outset. In Germany, for example, around eight to ten were
involved in directing the campaign, in Austria around ten to fifteen.
The general trend is for real decision making to graduate towards a
smaller group of people at the centre of the party as the campaign
proceeds. Viewed as a whole, then, campaigns tend to be directed from
the centre by a small group around the party leadership; and there
seems little evidence to suggest that this is any less true for left-wing
parties, where one might expect internal organisational decision-
making processes to intervene more noticeably.
In all cases it is the parties or leading candidates who are in charge
and parties are reluctant to give over control of the campaign to
consultants. This does not preclude the fact that there are some
consultants of note with domineering characters, such as Jacques
Segeula in France (and Austria) or Peter Hiort in Denmark. The role

and scope of consultation seems to vary from party system to party
system. In Austria, independent consultants are more formally incor-
porated into party decision-making structures than elsewhere, while
parties in other systems (Germany or the Netherlands) seem reluctant
to use outside consultants, preferring their own in-house operations.
CHANGING MEANS AND METHODS OF CAMPAIGNING
For almost all the parties examined in this collection the overriding
strategic aim involved either the maintenance or increase of vote share
with, not surprisingly, incumbent parties on the whole favouring
maintenance of vote share rather than its increase. Of course, there
are various ways of achieving such goals, and it is these which would
seem to open up room for a great deal of diversity in the means by
which campaigns are conducted. This, too, has undergone some
sweeping changes in the fairly recent past in a way which could be
summarised as a gradual shift from labour-intensive campaign
practices to more capital-intensive campaign practices. Such trends
add up to a reduced role for the activists and a far greater role for the
newer technologies of media and telecommunications, a greater
emphasis on scientific gathering of voter feedback, and increased
campaign coordination from the centre. To put it more concretely,
there appear to be three main ways by which the means and methods
of campaigning can be seen to have been changing in recent years: the
use of agencies and consultants; television campaigning and the use of
new technologies of communication in general; methods of obtaining
'objective' feedback. Let us deal with each of these in tum.
It is no exaggeration to state that the use of advertising agencies by
parties is the norm in campaigning. Of course, there is nothing very
startling about that. Parties have been using advertising agencies for a
very long time. The main determinant is sufficient finance. It is when
we start to consider other possible functions for specialist agencies or
political consultants that the question of 'taste' or, perhaps, ideologi-
cal preference appears to be more relevant, and the variations which
occur not only separate one system from another, they also separate
one party from another. As expected, the American and French case
studies reveal the predominance of political consultancy, in the former
case the role of the parties appears to be little more than as service
agencies for the candidates' campaigns, in the latter case we were
dealing with a presidential campaign where the parties' role is notably

less central than for a parliamentary election. By contrast, in Denmark
the parties generally appear reticent about making full use of the
campaign consultancy profession, causing Bille and his colleagues to
remark (p. 79): 'Danish parties are reluctant to make use of many of
the paraphernalia of contemporary campaigns.' Similarly Dutch
campaigns tend to be rather low-key affairs, quite 'dull' by foreign
standards (van Praag, p. 144). And within different political systems
there are particular parties which, for various reasons, either choose to
eschew the use of modern campaign techniques or are forced to by
circumstance (the Austrian and German Greens, the Swedish People's
Party in Finland, the New Zealand National party).
When talking of the use of consultants and agencies, there is one
trend of particular note which might be described as the 'Saatchi-
isation' of campaigning; by this we mean the increased tendency for
parties to make use of consultants and agencies which have proven
themselves in other systems, in other words the exporting of campaign
expertise. In Chapter I we referred to the role of organisations such as
the IAPC or WAPOR as forums via which campaign secrets are shared
and innovations copied. Political consultancy has become big business
on an international scale- as evident from the case studies above. We
saw how common the tendency was for parties to send their own
strategists to observe campaign practices in other countries (particu-
larly in the USA, Germany and the UK). There were also examples of
where agencies and political consultants were employed abroad:
Jacques Segeula, Mitterrand's advertising adviser, was employed by
the Austrian SPO, while the OVP employed an advertising agency used
by the German CDU; the New Zealand Labour party commissioned
polling research from a company used by its Australian counterpart.
But most striking of all is the use of Saatchi and Saatchi- as Paul Webb
demonstrates, an advertising agency whose fortunes have been so
closely tied up with those of the British Conservatives - by parties in
a number of countries: the Conservatives in Denmark; the Dutch Social
Democrats; the Irish Fianna Fail party (Farrell, 1990).
According to Anthony Smith (1981)- writing a decade ago- paid
television advertising was permitted only in Australia, Canada, Japan
and the USA. Broadcasting deregulation has added at least Germany
and Italy to the list. The telecommunications revolution has affected
the internal communication dynamics of parties, as demonstrated
most clearly in Boll and Poguntke's reference to the use of on-line
computer organisational links by German parties, or references in a
number of chapters to the use of electronic mail and fax links. It has
also affected more generally the communication and distribution
strategies of parties. We see this in a number of cases in the growing
use of direct mail techniques. Katz and Kolodny refer to such 'new
tools' in the 1990 US congressional elections as satellite links, CD-
ROM data bases of information on voters and video mail.
All chapters demonstrate the increasing importance of television as
a tool in election campaigning; as shown most dramatically by
Lubbers' difficulties in maintaining positive coverage in the Dutch
1989 campaign, or the efforts French candidates had to make in order
to attract adequate television coverage, or the difficulty Finnish parties
had in prising media attention away from the Gulf War, prompting
Sundberg and Hognabba to comment (p. 94) that 'free elections in a
modern democracy would easily collapse if the mass media ... were
to ignore election campaigning'. Research on campaigning in Norway
(Bj~rklund, 1991) and Sweden (Esaiasson, 1991) also refer to how
campaigns are increasingly 'media-driven'.
Concern over the increased reliance on media campaigning by parties
in part underlay the Australian Labor government's recent proposed
ban on all political advertising on radio and television. The basis for the
proposed ban was the report of a parliamentary committee which
showed that spending on political advertising on the airwaves had
risen by 109 per cent between 1984 and 1987, and this in a country where
parties are also allowed access to free broadcasts. According to a recent
report in Campaign magazine, '[n]ationwide election campaigns now
cost each major Australian party approximately [US]$7.7 or 90 cents
per capita, whereas the 1988 Bush and Dukakis campaigns [spent] ...
33 cents per capita'. 2 The Labor government's proposal has provoked
an outspoken and concerted campaign of opposition from the right and
from the broadcasting industry, to such a degree that the plan has been
shelved. This experience indicates the difficulty a government can have
in trying to rein in new campaign practices; that once resources like TV
spots are made available to the parties there is little apparently that can
be done after the event to control or delimit their access. It will be
interesting to see what happens on this score as parties, for instance,
start to make use of satellite television for political broadcasting.
As we have seen, one of the main functions of the various agencies
and consultants is in arranging the advertising campaign. Of all the
other possible functions (for a recent listing of the range of possibilities
in the USA see pp. 197-8), the next most common one is opinion
polling. As we discussed in Chapter 1, this is seen as the main
alternative form of campaign feedback to the subjective networks

provided by canvassing and the party activists; this is the 'scientific,'
objective feedback. It comes in various forms, most of which are used
in some way or another in all the cases above. The most common, and
more 'traditional', are the quantitative opinion polls of the electorate-
nationally or locally. Still very popular among the parties, there is
evidence, particularly in the smaller systems, that increasingly the
parties are saving money and, rather than commissioning their own
polls, rely instead on those available in the media or at most subscribe
to publicly available omnibus polls. The most interesting arrangement
here is in Finland where four of the main parties all share the same
agency, Finnish Gallup. The market research techniques have under-
gone considerable development over the years. The one-off, major
quantitative polls have been replaced or supplemented by panel
surveys, rolling polls, expert surveys, and qualitative research. While
polling has become a major staple of European and Australasian
elections, more advanced techniques, in particular the use of 'focus
groups', have not (yet) become so prevalent. The general rule of thumb
for the parties considered in these studies is to poll when one can
afford it. Even in Denmark, where Bille and his colleagues suggest that
parties do not find independent polling 'value for money,' the parties
still pay attention to publicly produced poll data. While there is
evidence in the case of some parties - most notably the Green parties
- of internal opposition to the idea of polling, the major brake on
polling generally is a lack of finance. To the extent that polls are
important, then, the larger and better financed parties are more
advantaged. Even where state financing is available the smaller
parties still run up against financial constraints on the capacity to poll.
Polling is, for many, a controversial subject in that it conjures up
images of the manipulation of public opinion - hence the long time
French ban on the publication of poll data in the run up to the
election. 3 It also suggests that parties increasingly 'stand for' little else
other than re-election. Within the terms of the literature on party
competition, polling plays an important role in providing parties with
information as to the opinions of voters. In the absence of such data,
parties can hardly fulfil the assumptions or predictions of such models
in seeking to maximise vote share. A necessary precondition for a
party to pursue the median voter, or the most votes, or whomever, is
that the party knows where voters stand on a variety of issues. The
accuracy with which, and the process(es) by which, rival candidates
acquire, or fail to acquire, such information is rarely discussed.
Despite this lack of attention, there is likely to be a fairly obvious

impact on electoral outcomes as the rivals position themselves in light
of such information as they might acquire, misinterpret or ignore.
Polling at least presents the possibility of such information being at the
parties' disposal. In the general absence of such information, parties
may end up providing voters with a one-off, take it or leave it, choice
at election time; leaving little room, until the next election, for parties
to adapt their policy positions. Therefore, whether we view this
question in terms of the political science literature on party competi-
tion, or in practical policy platform terms, the process of polling the
public/party response/poll again allows parties to be more responsive
to public preferences and concerns in the run-up to an election; to
adopt policies which have some relevance to the concerns of the
current electorate. Part of the use of polls is not only that parties
learn about the issues and concerns of the voters whom they seek to
represent, but also that parties can be responsive.
Whatever the source of the poll data - either from privately
commissioned or public sources - the parties evidence responsiveness
to them. It is apparent that the New Zealand Labour party, the
Danish Conservatives, several of the Finnish parties and the Dutch
CDA all changed their campaigns in light of poll information. Such
responsiveness is, moreover, centrally located and determined. It is
party leaders in conjunction with central advisers, rather than the rank
and file, who take the decisions to change.
CENTRALISED CAMPAIGN TACTICS
It may be - quite reasonably- argued that such centralisation simply

reflects the fact that decisions taken in a campaign are instances of
'crisis' decision-making; generally, short response times are necessi-
tated, and hence decision-making has to be centralised. But there is
something over and above this which suggests that the leaders are
becoming more important not just in decision-making but also as a
centre to the campaign. With the sole exception of the USA, among
the parliamentary elections considered in this volume (excluding
France; also including Ireland, 1989) the leader was a dominant or
major campaign theme for all but seven parties. That is for twenty-
three parties leader image was of major importance. The exceptions
seemed mostly to concern parties of the left. They consisted of th~
Labour parties of Ireland and New Zealand, the Greens of Austria
and Germany, the Swedish People's Party in Finland and the Social-
Liberals and Christian People's Party in Denmark.
Targeting, too, plays a major role in the conduct of any campaign.
Whatever the message, parties across different states are increasingly
adopting similar marketing strategies. For instance, direct mailing
techniques were employed in all the parliamentary campaigns (in-
cluding the USA). Not surprisingly, these party systems often saw
specific appeals to demographic, and in some cases, opinion subgroups
of the population. In that sense campaigns seem to be increasingly
keyed to turning out supporters rather than creating them.
How important the techniques of campaigning are becoming can be
seen to some extent by the judgement passed after the campaign has
ended and the election won or lost. Most of the chapters in this volume
concluded with a discussion of how 'campaigns matter' to election
results. Clearly winners are likely to be less dissatisfied with the
campaign than losers, but the winners are not necessarily the most
interesting group to examine. As we argued in Chapter 1, one of the
flaws of the general literature on campaigning is an overemphasis upon
the campaigns of the winners. The campaigns of the losers also shed
some interesting light on the increased importance of the techniques of
campaigning. The chapters reveal a large number of parties disappoin-
ted at their failure to get across their campaign message. According to
our survey of national experts (see note 1), there are nine parties which
fit into this category (the Social Democrats and National Coalition in
Finland, the Austrian OVP and Greens, the Danish Social-Liberals and
Conservatives, the British Alliance, and Fine Gael and the Progressive
Democrats in Ireland). It is possible to see this either as a failure of the
party's campaign or as the parties blaming the voters for inattentiveness
or distraction. Less ambiguous are other criticisms the parties appear to
have had of their own efforts: a misplaced emphasis, or badly timed
effort or, simply, a failure to counter the other parties campaign. And it
is these latter criticisms, taken together, which seem most common,
underpinning the idea that the process of campaigning is increasingly
important to the success or failure of parties at election time.
CONCLUSION
To a considerable degree, when we consider the parties and systems

covered in this volume, we find that there are some very general trends
in party campaigning shared across systems and across ideologies.
Perhaps this should come as little surprise. After all, all the parties
studied here are engaged in a broadly similar competition for votes.
Nevertheless, this broad similarity of purpose does not automatically
dictate a convergence of means. Yet in many important respects this is
what we do see across both systems and parties. While the messages of
the various parties may differ - perhaps markedly so - the means of
delivering and marketing such a message and discovering what voters
want, seem broadly similar. All in all, when we consider the central
direction of the campaign, the responsiveness of the party leadership
to poll information and the central role leaders play in the message of
the campaign itself, we see evidence of a broad convergence in
campaigning styles. This in itself is not without consequence for
broader debates on parties and party systems.
Kirchheimer's (1966) description of the 'catch-all' party, in which
party leaders become more dominant, is borne out dramatically across
a wide range of parties in this volume. Much of the debate over
Kirchheimer has focused on the ideological components of party
systems (Dittrich, 1983; Rose and Urwin, 1969; Wolinetz, 1979;
Zuckerman and Lichbach, 1977). Recently authors like Angelo
Panebianco (1988) and Peter Mair (1989) have argued that more
attention· should be given to the organisational consequences of
Kirchheimer's thesis. According to Panebianco (1988, p. 264) these
produce 'electoral-professional' parties which are characterised by
such factors as an increased role for professionals, an emphasis on
elections, pre-eminence of a 'personalized leadership', interest group
and state financing and a stress on issues and leadership. Much of this
adds up to a change in how parties fight election campaigns.
Throughout this volume we have seen evidence which is consistent
with the party organisational trends outlined by Kirchheimer and
described by Panebianco (for further discussion on the British case see
Webb, 1991).
We began, in Chapter I, with a concern that one of the major
intersections of the literature on electoral behaviour and of the
literature on political parties - that of the electoral campaign - has
gone largely unaddressed by political scientists. In this volume there
has been an effort to focus more centrally upon that intersection by
examining nine case studies in a variety of settings. We have now
arrived at the conclusion that there is, for all the diversity of ideologies
and cultures, an underlying similarity to many aspects of campaigns
and campaigning. This is not to say that we collectively present the
final word on the subject. On the contrary, the premise of this volume
is that it collectively represents some introductory text on a long and

wrongfully neglected subject.
Notes
1. Apart from an overview of the nine case studies, much of what follows is
based on replies to a questionnaire of the authors on the parliamentary
election case studies. We are grateful to them for the time they gave to
complete the questionnaire. David Farrell also completed one on the Irish
1989 election. For an account of that election, see Farrell (1990).
2. Campaign, July 1991, p. 6; The Australian, 26 March 1991.
3. It is worth noting in this context that the Irish government recently
announced its intention to introduce legislation banning the commission-
ing or publication of polls in the run up to elections. After some debate,
the issue was dropped.
References
Alexander, H. (ed.) (1989), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s

Bjt<Jrklund, T. (1991), 'Election Campaigns in Postwar Norway (1945--1989):
From Party-Controlled to Media-Driven Campaigns', Scandinavian Politi-
cal Studies, 14, pp. 279-302.
Dittrich, K. (1983), 'Testing the Catch-all Thesis: Some Difficulties and
Possibilities', in H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds), Western European Party
Systems: Continuity and Change (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage).
Esaiasson, P. (1991), '120 Years of Swedish Election Campaigns', Scandina-
vian Political Studies, 14, pp. 261-78.
Farrell, D. (1990), 'Campaign Strategies and Media Coverage', in M.
Gallagher and R. Sinnott (eds), How Ireland Voted, 1989 (Galway: Centre
for the Study of Irish Elections).
Herrnson, P. (1988), Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press).
Karvonen, L. (1991), 'The Study of Election Campaigns: An Introduction',
Scandinavian Political Studies, 14, pp. 195--203.
Kirchheimer, 0. (1966), 'The Transformation of Western European Party
Systems', in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds), Political Parties and
Political Development (Princeton: University Press).
Mair, P. (1989), 'Continuity, Change and the Vulnerability of Party', West
European Politics, 12, pp. 169-87.
Panebianco, A. (1988), Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge:
Rose, R. and Urwin, D. (1969), 'Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains
in Regimes', Comparative Political Studies, 2, pp. 7-fl7.
Smith, A. (1981), 'Mass Communications', in D. Butler, H. Penniman and A.
Ranney (eds), Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive
National Elections (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute).
Webb, P. D. (1991), 'Election Campaigning, Organisational Transformation
and the Professionalisation of the British Labour Party', European Journal
of Political Research.
Wolinetz, S. B. (1979), 'The Transformation of Western European Party
Systems Revisited', West European Politics, 2, pp. 4-28.
Zuckerman, A. and Lichbach, M. I. (1977), 'Stability and Change in European
Electorates', World Politics, 29, pp. 523-51.
Index
Abrams, M., 18, 19 Saatchi and Saatchi, 46, 48,
advance men, 16 49, 67, 71, 150, 228; Snell-
advertisements and posters, 8 Louhivuori-Tallqvist OY, 86;
Australia's proposal to ban Societe Fran~aise d'Enquetes
advertisements, 229 par Sondages (SOFRES),
case studies: Austria, 38; Britain, 106; Ted Bates, 168, 172;
46, 58; Denmark, 65, 67, 71, Trizeps, 31; USP Helsinki
73, 76; Finland, 85, 86, 87; OY, 87; von Mannstein,
France, 103-4, 117; Political Communication, 29,
Germany, 129, 131, 133, 134, 32; Young & Rubicam, 46, 48
136-7; Netherlands, 148, 149, see also political consultants
150, 151, 152, 153, 158, 159; AgranofT, R., 2, 3, 12, 18, 19
New Zealand, 168, 169, 172, Abo, E., 95
175, 176, 177, 178 Aktion '90, 32
agencies, 12-13 Alexander, H., 8, 19, 225, 234
advertising agencies, 227 'Alliance of Free Democrats'
firms: Abbot, Mead & Vickers, 47; (Germany), 126
Adax OY, 87; ARA, 151; 'Alliance for Germany', 125, 127
BJM (opinion) Research Alliance (UK) Planning Group, 50
Associates, 46; Bloom, 180; Amend, D., 192, 201
Bonare OY, 85; Brule et Andersen, N.C., 80
Vigne Associes (BVA), 106; Andersson, C., 94
Colenso, 166, 175; Colmar Anso1abehere, S., 205, 221
and Brunton, 168, 172; Archer, J., 48
Comdok, 133; Conseils, Arndt, J., 6, 19
Sondages, Analyses (CSA), Arnim, H.-H. von, 121, 142
106; Crone Film, 66; FCB/ Arter, D., 83, 99
Hiort, Stenius & Walter, 68; Ashdown, P., 60
Finnish Gallup, 85, 230; Atkinson, M., 18, 19
Focus OY, 85; Gallup, 46; Attali, J ., 109
Gould-Mattinson Associates, Auken, S., 65, 68, 75, 76, 77
47, 49; Harris, 46; HDM, Austrian Greens' ballot paper
149; Insight, 166, 180; Institut difficulties, 37-8
Fran~ais d'Opinion Publique
(IFOP), 106; InterView, 148, Bakker, E., 152, 154
153; Kauppamainos OY, 86; Balz, D., 194, 203
Louis-Harris France, 106; Banks, J., 49
MARPLAN, 47; Market and Barre, R., 109, 110, 111, 112, 114
Opinion Research Bartels, L. M., 206, 210, 221
International (MORI), 47; Bartels, R., 6, 19
Meyson, 153; My & Grey Bates, S., 18, 20
OY, 87; NAVAR, 151; Nipo, BBC, 45, 61
153; Nordisk Film, 68; Bean, C., 163, 182
Nl'lrgaard Mikkelsen, 66; Beck, A., 150
237
238 Index
Beck, P., 20 31; Britain, 45-{), 51, 209;

Beckers, R., 158, 160 Denmark, 70, 71, 72, 73;
Behr, R., 221 Finland, 91; France, 105, 119;
Berelson, B. R., 205, 206, 221 Germany, 129, 131, 133, 134,
'Berelson paradox', 205, 216 137; Netherlands, 148, 150,
Bernays, E., 18, 19 151, 152, 153, 161; New
Bianco, J.-L., 109 Zealand, 166, 168, 171; USA,
Bille, L., 63, 64, 80, 81, 228, 230 185, 186, 189-92, 193, 196,
Birch, B., 172 202
Bjeeregaard, R., 76 see also state funding
Bj0rklund, T., 229, 234 Campaign magazine, 12
Bochel, J. M., 2, 19, 206, 221 campaigns
Bochwitz, R., 198, 203 aggressive and defensive
Bohrnstedt, G. W., 216, 221 campaigning, 15
Boim, D., 18, 19 candidate-centred v. party-centred,
Bolger, J., 167, 169, 172, 173, 178, 3, 4, 5, 184, 22~
179 capital-intensive, 227
Boll, B., 228 cases: Britain, ~. 8, 11, 12;
Bongrand, M., 102 Canada, 7; France, 7;
Borre, 0., 80, 81 Germany, 8, 13; Ireland, 7,
Boston, J., 164, 179, 182 16; Israel, 8; Italy, 7; Japan,
Bowler, S., 7, 16, 19, 204, 221 8; USA, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12
Boy, D., 108, 120 centralisation of, 9, 231; in Austria,
Boyer, H., 115, 120 24, 31; Finland, 89-90
Boyle, B., 166 communications, 17
Bradford, M., 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, contextual factors and, 7-10, 13
178, 181 definition of, 1o-11
Brants, K., 145, 146, 162 literature on, 1-7, 204-8
Bregman, D., 114, 120 local campaigns, 8, 9
Bremmer, C., 147 new techniques, 197-9
Brie, A., 135 post-mortems, 232
British National Election Survey organisation of, 7, 9, 11, 14-15,
1983, 210 226
British Telecom Gold Mail-Box, 52 positive and negative campaigning,
Broder, D., 188, 203 15
Brody, R. A., 209, 221 professionalisation of, 2-3, 223; in
Broughton, D., 61 Austria, 27-8;
Briickmann, W., 142 Netherlands, 145-{); New
Budge, 1., 4, 15, 19, 204, 221 Zealand, 163, 164, 18o-l
Buksti, J., 80 rational choice and, 3-4
Burkett, T., 122, 143 and traditionalism in Denmark,
Bush, G., 194, 195, 200 65, 66, 67' 79
Butler, D., 2, 19, 45, 47, 49, 50, 61, campaign staffing, 14
208, 212, 221 case studies: Britain, 51-2;
Denmark, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73;
Campaign and Elections, 149 Finland, 89, 92; France, 109,
campaign agenda, 17 110; Germany, 135, 136, 137;
campaign finance, 8, 14, 206-7, 210 Netherlands, 154; New
case studies: Austria, 28, 29, 30, Zealand, 170, 172-3
Index 239
candidate selection Daney, S., 108, 120

case studies: Austria, 24; d'Arc Lorenz, J., 20
Denmark, 69, 71, 72; DeardourfT, J ., 197
Finland, 88; USA, 184, 188 de Boer, W., 153
canvassing, 13, 206 de Rooy, K., 161
Campbell, A., 184, 203, 205, 221 De~ocker, W., 194
Campney, B., 198, 203 democracy and campaigns, 118-19,
Carman, J., 6, 19 23(}-1
Cayrol, R., 106 den Uyl, J., 146, 149, 150
Central Planning Bureau Denemark, D., 163, 179, 182
(Netherlands), 157, 160 Denver, D., 2, 19, 206, 221
Chagall, D., 12, 18, 19 Deth, J. W. van, 144, 162
Chapman, R. G., 207, 221 Diamond, E., 18, 20
Charbonneau, R., 188 direct mail, 14, 206, 229, 232
Chartrand, R., 18, 19 case studies: Austria, 31;
Cheli, E., 5, 21 Denmark, 73, 74, 77;
Chirac, J., 100, 101, 106, 108, 109, Finland, 85; France, 109, 117;
Ill, 112, 114, 115, 116 New Zealand, 166, 167, 171,
citizens' movements (Germany), 124, 173, 175, 176; USA, 196, 199
126, 138 district reapportionment in the USA,
Clark, E., 18, 19 184-5, 187
Clark, H., 170 Dittmar, H., 150
Clarke, H. D., 61, 222 Dittrich, K., 233, 234
Cleveland, L., 164, 182 Dobbs, ~ .• 48, 49
Cockerell, M., 16, 19 Dobry,~ .• 115, 120
'cohabitation', 100-1 Doming,~ .• 142
Collinge, J., 181, 182 Douglas, R., 170
comites de soutien, 11(}-11, 116, 224 Downs, A., 3, 20, 204, 221
see also Political Action Duhamel, 0., 103, 120
Committees; supporter Duke, D., 202
groups Dunn, A., 188, 192, 196, 201
computers, 10, 14, 228 Dupoirier, E., 120
case studies: Britain, 52; Germany,
131, 134; New Zealand, 171,
173 Eaddy, R., 172, 173, 177, 178, 179,
Conservative party's (UK) campaign 181
tensions, 48, 57-8 East Germany, communication and
Conservative (UK) Strategy Group, technical difficulties, 130, 131,
49 133, 134, 135
Converse, P. E., 205, 219, 221 Eldersveld, S. J., 2, 20
Crewe, I., 2, 19 election issues
Crotty, W. L., 2, 20 case studies: Austria, 26-7, 35-8,
Crouse, T., 18, 20 41; Britain, 43-4, 51, 58-9;
Curtis, G., 8, 20 Britain (1983), 208, 21(}-14;
Cuthright, P., 2, 20 Denmark, 64, 66, 67, 68, 73,
74, 75, 77; Finland, 94, 95, 96;
Frani!C, 107, 114-15;
Daalder, H., 161, 162 Germany (1983), 215-19;
Dalton, R., 9, 20 Netherlands, 146, 155, 156,
240 Index
election issues Frederiken, C. H., 80

case studies (cont.) Freeman, R., 50
157, 158, 159; New Zealand, French presidential system, 100
164--5, 168-9, 170, 174, 175- Freyssinet-Dominjon, J., 113, 120
6, 177, 178; USA, 194-5, 202
election results Gair, G., 172
case studies: Austria, 39-40; Gamier, T., 164, 182
Britain, 59; Denmark, 63, 78; Genies, P, 103, 120
Finland, 96-7; France, 100; Genscher, H.-D., 140
Germany, 122-3, 140; Gl:re, F., 120
Netherlands, 160-1; New German Election Panel Study 1983,
Zealand, 179-80; USA, 199- 215
200 German Greens
elections, frequency in Denmark, 63, fail to unite, 125, 126
68 low-key campaign, 137-8
electoral and party laws, 8 German unification, 121, 122, 123-4,
case studies: Finland, 83; France, 138-9
103-4; Germany, 121; USA, Gesprachskreis Sozialwissenschaften,
183-4, 186, 201 132
electoral systems Gibowski, W. G., 126, 127, 135, 139,
case studies: Austria, 24-5; 142
Denmark, 64; Finland, 82; Gingrich, N., 194
France, 101-2, 119; Ginjaar, L., 150
Netherlands, 144; New Giscard d'Estaing, V., 14, 106
Zealand, 163 Gosnell, H., 2, 20
Elklit, J., 9, 20, 64, 67, 80, 81 Gonzalez, F., 16
Ellemann-Jensen, U., 72, 76, 77 Gould, P., 47, 49, 57, 58, 61
Ellis, A., 50 Graham, R., 16, 20
Eriksson, E. M., 18, 20 Granberg, D., 205, 206, 222
Esaiasson, P., 229, 234 Grausgruber, A., 42
Grotta, J., 188, 192, 201
Farlie, D., 4, 15, 19, 204, 221 Grunberg, G., 106
Farrell, D., 5, 9, 16, 17, 20, 208, 212, Gugerbauer, N., 30
215, 221, 228, 234 Gustmann, N., 142
Fatchett, D., 52, 61 Gysi, G., 136
fax links, 14, 229
case studies: Denmark, 70; Haggerty, B., 18, 20
Germany, 129, 131; Haider, J., 26, 27, 29-30, 37, 38, 39,
Netherlands, 155; New 40
Zealand, 173 Hampton, B., 198, 203
Federation of Danish Trade Unions, Hands, G., 206, 221
69 Harris, P. C., 18, 20
Fenno, R. F., 199, 203 Harris, R., 48, 49
FitzGerald, G., 16 Harris of Greenwich, Lord, 50
Flanagan, S., 20 Harrop, M., 2, 19, 20, 23, 61, 222
foreign campaigns, observation of Haugaard, J., 76
case studies: Austria, 28, 29, 30; Heinstrom, P., 99
Netherlands, 149; New Heinz, J., 197
Zealand, 167 Hennessy, P., 19
Index 241
Herd, P., 61 Kohl, H., 15, 122, 123, 128, 139, 141
Hermans, 150 Koivisto, J., 99
Herrnson, P., 197, 203, 223, 234 Kok, W., 149, 150, 154, 156, 158, 160,
Hewitt, P., 45, 47, 56, 57, 61 162
Hiebert, R., 18, 20 Kolodny, R., 18, 223, 229
Hiort, P., 68, 227 Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 13,
Hofstetter, C.R., 18, 20 128
Hognabba, S., 224, 229 Koole, R., 148, 154, 161, 162
Holmberg, S., 205, 206, 222 Korner, U., 142
Holsteyn, J. J. M., 149, 162 Kotler, P., 5, 6, 21
Howe, Sir G., 49 Kramer, G., 2, 21
Huet, S., 108, 120 Kurjian, D., 18, 21
Hughes, C., 49, 61
Hurd, D., 49 Labour party (New Zealand)
reorganisation, 165, 170, 171
Irvine, W., 7, 20 Labour party's (UK) Campaign
Irwin, G. A., 149, 162 Management Committee, 49
Iyengar, S., 221 Labour party's (UK) Campaign
Strategy Committee (CSC), 49,
Jackson, K., 179, 182 50
Jacobson, G., 195, 199, 203, 207, 222 Labour party's (UK) Shadow
James, C., 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, Communication Agency (SCA),
174, 180, 181, 182 47, 49, 51
Jamieson, K. H., 18, 20 Lacina, F., 35
Jarreau, P;, 108, 120 Lacy, J., 48
Jelved, M., 70 Lafontaine, 0., 132, 139, 141
Jensen, K. B., 80 Lajoinie, A., 113, 114, 115
Jeppesen, B., 80 Lamare, J., 163, 182
Johnston, R.J., 206, 209, 222 Lancelot, A., 106
Jones, R., 20 Lange, D., 170, 171, 171
Joslyn, R., 155, 162 Lanoue, D., 206, 222
Jospin, L., 109 Lawson, Sir C., 48
Juppe, A., 109 Lawson, K., 101, 120
Lawson, N., 49
Kiiiiriiiinen, S., 86 Lazarsfeld, P. F., 221
Kandolin, S., 94 leader image, 7, 9, 16, 231-2
Karvonen, L., 223, 234 case studies: Austria, 36-7; Britain,
Kasse, M., 126, 127, 135, 139, 142 56, 208; Denmark, 73, 75, 76,
Katz, D., 2, 20 71, 79; Finland, 88, 90, 94, 95;
Katz, R.S., 8, 18, 21, 223, 229 France, 113; Germany, 131;
Kavanagh, D., 2, 19, 45, 47, 49, 50, Netherlands, 146, 155-6, 158;
61, 208, 212, 221 New Zealand, 175, 179
Kelley, S., 18, 21 leaders' tour
Kenworthy, T., 198, 203 case studies: Austria, 39; France,
Kernell, S., 184, 203 117; New Zealand, 170, 175,
Kinnock, N., 44, 49, 54, 55, 56, 59 176, 177, 178
Kirchheimer, 0., 9, 21, 233, 234 Lecanuet, J., 102
Kleinhenz, T., 142 LeDuc, L., 61, 222
Knoke, D., 216, 221 Legavre, J.-B., 111, 120
242 Index
LePen, J. M., 112-13, 114 McRobie, A., 171, 180, 181, 182
Levine, S., 164, 182 media
Levy, s. J., 6, 21 coverage: in Austria, 25-6, 33-4;
Lhomeau, J.-Y., 112, 120 Finland, 93-4, 95, 97; France,
Liberal-SOP (UK) tensions, 55 103,1 16-17;Netherlands, 155,
Lichbach, M.l., 233, 235 156, 160; New Zealand, 177
Lijphart, A., 144, 162 horse-race coverage, 9
Lindon, D., 5, 21 in campaigns, 3, 17
Lippe, G., 142 rules on coverage, 8, 10, 225
Lotito, E., 20 system: in Austria, 25-6;
Lubbers, R., 146, 147, 155-6, 157, Denmark, 64; Netherlands,
158, 229 145
Luck, D.J., 6, 21 see also newspapers; television
Luntz, F., 8, 12, 21, 196, 197, 198, Mestre, P., llO
203 Meth-Cohn, D., 27, 41
Lupfer, M., 2, 21, 22 Meynaud, H. Y., 120
Mielke, G., 122, 143
Maas, K., 161 Militant tendency, 54, 57
Maddox, J., 194, 201 Miller, W. E., 221
Madelin, H., 107, 120 Miller, W. L., 2, 20, 44, 53, 55, 56, 57,
Mair, P., 233, 234 58-9, 61, 220, 222
Major, J., 60 Mills, S., l67, 182
Mandelson, P., 47, 49, 50, 56, 57, 61 Mintz, E., 18, 21
Mannelli, G., 5, 21 Mintzel, 131
Marchais, G., 113 Missika, J.-L., 114, 120
Margolis, M., 205, 222 Mitchell, G., 201
market research, 3, 4, 11-12, 229-31 Mitterrand, F., 100, 101, 107, 108,
case studies: Austria, 28, 29, 30, 109, I 11-12, 114, 115, 116
31; Britain, 46, 47; Denmark, Moati, S., 107
67; Finland, 85, 86, 87, 99; Modrow, H., 123, 136
France, 106; Germany, 128, Morrison, P., 48
132; Netherlands, 148, 150, Muller, W., 24, 25, 27, 41, 42
151, 152; New Zealand, 165, Milller-Enbergs, H., 124, 125, 143
166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, Miiller-Rommel, F., 125, 143
174, 175, 176, 177 Musiolek, B., 124, 143
French restrictions, 230
Ireland's proposal to ban polls, Nagel, J., 163, 182
234 Napolitan, J., 12, 13, 14, 18, 21
parties' response to polls, 231 National party's (New Zealand)
polls and democracy, 230-l disunity, 167-8, 171-2, 173
see also opinion poll trends New Caledonia, hostilities in, 116
Martel, M., 18, 21 Newby, D., 50
Mattingly, K., 194, 200, 203 newspapers, 10
Mauser, G., 5, 21, 205, 222 see also media; television
McAlpine, Lord, 48, 58 Newton, K., 206, 222
McCreary, J., 194 Niemoller, B., 162
McKinnon, D., 172, 178, 180, 181 Nijpels, E., 158
McLean, D., 61 Nimmo, D., 2, 21
McPhee, W.N., 221 Noelle-Neumann, E., 13, 14
Index 243
Nuutinen, J., 99 Netherlands, 145, 147; New

Zealand, 163
Oellerking, C., 122, 143 see also political parties
Ogris, G., 42 Pasqua, C., 109
opinion poll trends Payne, R., 18, 22
case studies: Austria, 27, 39-40, Pedersen, M., 9, 21, 63, 75, 81
41; Britain, 54-S, 56, 57, Peele, G., 18, 21, 22
58-9; Denmark, 75; Finland, Petersen, N., 75, 81
96; France, lOS; Germany, Petersen, N.H., 70, 74
122, 139; New Zealand, 178 Pfnorr, K., 142
see also market research Pinto-Duschinsky, M., 45, 51, 62
O'Shaughnessy, N.J., S, 18, 21 Pitchell, R. J ., 18, 22
Owen, D., SO, SS Plasser, F., 26, 41, 42
Poguntke, T., 10, 22, 125, 126, 143,
Pade, A. B., 64, 81 228
Padgett, S., 122, 143 Polca (Dutch PvdA's political
Page, B. 1., 209, 221 campaign committee) ISO, 154
Palda, K.S., 207, 221 Political Action Committees (PACs),
Palmer, G., 170 3, 8, 202, 224
Panebianco, A., SO, 61, 233, 234 see also comites de soutien;
Pardoe, J., 46, SO supporter groups
Parodi, J.-L., 106 political consultants, 3, 4, 5, 10,
party image, IS, 16 12-13, 17, 226-7, 228
case studies: Britain, 54, 55 associations: American
party logo, 16 Association of Political
party manifesto, IS, 16 Consultants (AAPC), 13,
case studies: Britain, 53-4, 208; 197; European Association of
Denmark, 74 Political Consultants
party members and branches (EAPC), 13; International
case studies: Denmark, 70, 71, 72; Association of Political
Finland, 92; Netherlands, lSI Consultants (IAPC), 13, 228
party national committees (USA) case studies: Britain, 48-9, SO;
Democratic Congressional Denmark, 68; France, 108-9;
Campaign Committee USA, 12, 13, 14, 197-8
(DCCC), 185, 186, 188; see also agencies; and individual
Democratic National names
Committee, 186; Democratic political marketing, 2, 5-6
Senatorial Campaign see also campaigns
Committee (DSCC), 185, political parties
188, 201; National adaptation of, 225
Republican Campaign catch-all, 9, 233
Committee (NRCC), 185, decline of 3, 12
188, 194, 201; National number of, 8
Republican Senatorial type of, 9, 10
Committee (NRSC), 185, see also party image: party logo:
188, 197 party manifesto: party system
party system Powell, C., 61
case studies: Austria, 26; Britain, Price, D., 2, 21, 22
43; France, 101, 119; product policy, 15-17
244 Index
Purpuro, L., 199, 203 Spath, L., 122

state funding, 224-5
Rantala, 0., 83, 99 case studies: Austria, 25, 28-9;
Reagan, R., 16 Denmark, 71, 80; Finland,
'Rhett Butler principle', 196 83, 90; France, 104;
Riegler, J., 27, 32, 36, 40 Germany, 121
Ristau, M., 142 see also campaign finance
Robertson, D., 4, 22 Statera, G., 2, 22
Robinson, A., 163, 182 Steinberg, A., 18, 23
Robinson, R., 9, 22 Steel, D., 50, 55
Rocard, M., 106 Stirnemann, A., 24, 42
Roll, C., 18, 22 Stokes, D. E., 205, 206, 207, 221, 222
Rollins, E., 194, 196, 200 Streicher, R., 35
Romero, D., 207, 222 Sundberg, J., 224, 229
Rose, R., 3, 22, 206, 222, 233, 235 Sundquist, D., 200
Ross, 1., 18, 22 supporter groups, 224
Rowland, R., 18, 22 case studies: Austria, 33; Finland,
83-4, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91
'Saatchi-isation', 228 see also comites de soutien; Political
see also agencies Action Committees
Sabato, L., 8, 12, 13, 18, 22 Svensson, P., 75, 81
Saloniemi, J., 99 Swaddle, K., 52, 62
Saris, W., 161
satellites, 10, 229 Taylor, A. H., 222
in US elections, 198 Taylor, J., 172
Schluter, P., 63, 64, 71, 75, 77, 79 Taylor, P. J., 206, 207, 222
Schmidt, H., 30 Tebbit, N., 48, 49
Schrott, P., 206, 222 technological revolution, 9-10, 228-9
Schultze, R. 0., 122, 143 television, 9, 10, 229
Schulz, M., 143 election broadcasts, 225; in
Schwartz, M., 194, 203 Austria, 38, Britain, 56;
Seguela, J., 28, 102, 108, 117, 120, Denmark, 66-7, 68, 71, 73,
227, 228 80; Germany, 121, 129, 131,
Shadegg, S., 18, 22 133, 137
Shama, A., 5, 22 TV debate: in France, 116;
Sherbourne, S., 49 Germany, 140; Netherlands,
Shyles, L., 18, 22 156-7, 159, 160; New
Sint, Marian, 150 Zealand, 179
Siune, K., 79, 80, 81 TV spots, 8, 10, 228
Smit-Kroes, N., 158 see also media; newspapers
Smith, A., 10, 22, 228, 235 Thatcher, M., 11, 16, 43, 44, 46, 48,
Smith, G., 143 49, 56
Smith, R., 188 Thaysen, U., 124, 143
Snyder, J.D., 18, 22 Thomas, A., 83, 99
Societe Urba-Technique (France), Thomas, H., 48
105 Thomassen, J.J.A., 144, 162
Sommer, F., 41, 42 Timms, T., 165, 170
Sonntag, N., 61 Tobe, F., 18, 23
Smrensen, H., 80 Tonsgaard, 0., 80, 81
Index 245
Tornudd, K., 82, 99 Wagner, J., 80

Toubiana, S., 120 Wakeham, J., 49
Toubon, J., 109 Walker, D., 19
Toynbee, P., 50 Walker, S., 178
Trade Unions for (UK) Labour Wall, M., 172, 173
(TUFL), 52 Wangen, E., 5, 23
Tucker, G., 49 Webb, P., 45, 49, 62, 228, 233, 235
Tufte, E., 184, 203 Weir, B., 2, 23
Tyler, P., 50 Wellstone, P., 198, 203
Tyler, R., 18, 23, 46, 49, 58, 62 West, D., 18, 23
Westland affair, 49, 56
Westlund, J., 99
Ulram, P.A., 42 White, T., I, 23
Uotila, K., 94 Whitelaw, Lord, 49
Urwin, D., 233, 235 Whiteley, P. F., 61, 222
Utting, J., 166, 180 Wiberg, M., 83, 99
Wiegel, H., 158
Wielgos, J., 143
van den Berg, 150 Williams, M., 171
van der Eijk, C. E., 149, 162 Wilson, D., 47, 50, 52, 55, 62
van Mierlo, H., 146, 152, 154, 159 Wilson, M., 165, 166, 167, 170, 171,
van Praag Jr, P., 146, 148, 149, 161, 174, 175, 176, 180, 181, 182
162, 228 Wiltzer, P.A., 110
Vander Jagt, G., 200, 201 Wintour, P., 49, 61
Vasseur, B., 115, 120 Witherspoon, J ., 18, 23
Vintiner, R., 165, 166, 167, 170, 174, Wolinetz, S. B., 233, 235
176, 177, 180, 181 Woltgens, T., 150
Volkskammer election, 123, 124, 125, Woo, L.C., I, 23
126-7 Worcester, R., 2, 12, 13, 23, 47
Voorhoeve, J., 146, 150, 151, 158, World Association of Public Opinion
159 Research (WAPOR), 13, 228
voters Wortmann, M., 5, 17, 20, 122, 143,
campaign effects on, 2, 204, 205, 208, 212, 215, 221
206, 207, 209, 210, 212-14, Wright, W., 18, 23
216-18, 219, 220 Wuttke, C., 124, 143
management of, 13
partisan commitment of, 205 Yli-Lahti, J., 99
political interest of, 205-6, 216 Young, Lord, 48
turnout of, 207 Young, N., 167, 168, 169, 172, 173,
uncertainty of, 4, 204-5 180, 181
volatility of, 9, 206 Ysmal, C., 101, 120
Vowles, J., 163, 176, 182
Vranitzky, F., 26, 27, 31, 33, 34-5, 38, Zuckerman, A., 233, 235
39, 40,224 Zukin, C., 18, 20

(Contemporary Political Studies) Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell (Eds.) - Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing-Palgrave Macmillan UK (1992)

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ELECTORAL STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL

First published in Great Britain 1992 by

A catalogue record for this book is available

ISBN 978-1-349-22413-5 ISBN 978-1-349-22411-1 (eBook)

First published in the United States of America 1992 by

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Study of Election Campaigning

5.1 The key factors to successful campaigning 98

2.1 Content analysis of media campaign reporting,

Bernhard Boll is a research fe11ow at the Research Unit for Societal

Shaun Bowler is an assistant professor of political science at the

David Broughton is a lecturer in politics at the School of European

David Denemark has been a lecturer in the Department of Politics,

Todd Donovan is an assistant professor of political science at Western

Jorgen ElkJit is a senior lecturer at the University of Aarhus. His most

David M. Farrell is Jean Monnet lecturer in European politics at the

Stefan Hognabba is a student of political science at the University of

Mikael V. Jacobsen is a research student in political science at the

RichardS. Katz is a professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins

Robin Kolodny is an instructor in political science at Temple Uni-

Kay Lawson, professor of political science and international relations

Wolfgang C. Miiller, reader in political science at the University of

Fritz Plasser is an associate professor of political science at the

Thomas Poguntke is a lecturer in political science at the University of

Joseph Snipp, a doctoral student at the University of California,

Jan Sundberg, associate professor at the department of political

Philip van Praag Jr is a lecturer in political science at the University of

Paul Webb, senior lecturer in politics and government at the City of

Colette Ysmal is a researcher at the Centre for the Study of French

Election campaigns attract great attention from voters, media and

These attempts by journalists and professionals to analyse cam-

CAMPAIGN STUDIES TO DATE

'The study of election campaigns, as opposed to elections', write

management which have seen the growing use and influence of

The most recent approaches to studying election campaigning have

of the marketing model (Arndt, 1978; Bartels, 1974; Carman, 1973;

HOW TO EXAMINE ELECTION CAMPAIGNING

This brief review of the available academic literature suggests con-

This book therefore is starting at base level: it is a conscious attempt

THE ROLE OF SETTING AND NATIONAL CONTEXT

One principal point to consider is whether, with 'all things being

Intra-system comparisons may be grouped under two main head-

competing strongly with the newspaper. Candidates were presented

EXAMINING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The previous section has shown the importance of setting and of

dissolution of Parliament, when the formal campaign begins and

Preparation and Planning

Parties which make minimal and/or last minute preparations for a

type of market research commissioned (surveys or focus groups). The

Following a suggestion by Sabato (1981), one could suggest a two-

canvass leaflets (often in the form of issue leaflets) and candidate

Organisation and Control

An examination of campaign organisation inside the party carries with

(who has worked on Kohl's campaigns) do not have significant powers

Campaign Themes and Images

and there is considerable scope for conflict. For example, in many

PLAN OF THE BOOK

The following chapters provide accounts of recent campaigns in

Abrams, M. (1964), 'Opinion Polls and Party Propaganda', Public Opinion

Pedersen, M. (1983), 'Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European

Statera, G. (1986), La Politico Spettacolo: Politici e Mass Media Nel/'era

By Austrian standards the 1990 parliamentary election was an

SETTING AND NATIONAL CONTEXT