Review Article

A Systematic Review of Theory of

Mind’s Precursors and Functions
Daniel G. Derksen,1,2 Michelle C. Hunsche,1 Megan E. Giroux,2 Deborah A. Connolly,2
and Daniel M. Bernstein1
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

1
Department of Psychology, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, Surrey, BC, Canada
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

2
Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada

Abstract: We conducted a systematic review of longitudinal theory of mind (ToM) studies, focusing on the precursors to and functional
outcomes of ToM in typically-developing samples. Our search yielded 87 longitudinal studies, all of which involved children and adolescents.
Early attention skills, executive function development, and the use of language are precursors to ToM development. Additionally, quality
interaction with parents and older siblings can foster early improvements in ToM. Healthy ToM development improves social relationships with
peers and produces greater desire to engage in prosocial behaviors. However, victimized individuals with highly-developed ToM may engage in
increased aggression. Future longitudinal research is needed to investigate the functional outcomes resulting from ToM changes in adulthood.

Keywords: theory of mind (ToM), ToM development, typically-developing samples, social cognition

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to understand our own
and others’ mental states, including beliefs, desires,
thoughts, intentions, and feelings (Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001). We rely on ToM in social interactions.
Take, for example, the awkwardness of a first date.
We try to infer what our companion is thinking (cognitive
ToM) and feeling (affective ToM), and try to present the
best version of ourselves. To navigate such social situations,
we must understand that people can hold beliefs and feel-
ings that differ from our own, and that people can even
hold false beliefs about reality.
Most ToM research has focused on cognitive ToM and
most of this work assesses how and when individuals
develop an understanding that people can hold false
beliefs. A common way to evaluate false-belief understand-
ing is via a change-in-location task (Wimmer & Perner,
1983). For instance, participants learn that a character
(e.g., Sally) leaves a wagon in the shed, but while Sally is
inside, another character (e.g., Anne) moves the wagon to
the backyard. Thus, Sally holds a false belief about the
wagon’s location. Participants must determine where
Sally will look for the wagon. If they report that Sally will
look in the shed, they are demonstrating false-belief
understanding.
ToM also involves emotion understanding, or the ability
to understand how another person feels. For example,
affective ToM measures could involve correctly matching
facial expressions with certain emotions or indicating
appropriate emotional responses to situations (Denham,
1986; Pons, Harris, & de Rosnay, 2004). Some ToM tasks
tap cognitive and affective ToM concurrently, though rea-
soning about beliefs versus emotions has been shown to
activate different neural regions (Schlaffke et al., 2015).
Throughout our review, we use the term ToM in a general
sense to describe both cognitive and affective ToM. We dis-
tinguish between the two when it is theoretically important
to do so.
Most ToM research has utilized a cross-sectional design.
This work reveals nascent ToM in infants, steep ToM
improvements from preschool to adolescence, relatively
stable ToM from adolescence to middle adulthood, fol-
lowed by ToM declines in older adulthood (Henry, Phillips,
Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005;
Wellman et al., 2001). Alternatively, longitudinal studies
provide unique insights into the lifespan theory of develop-
ment, which assumes a developmental continuity from
infancy to old age, and continued change throughout the
entire lifespan (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger,
2006). Longitudinal studies of ToM contribute to the
lifespan theory of development by examining both (1) pre-
cursors to ToM development and (2) functional outcomes
of ToM development. To understand how ToM develops
across the lifespan, we provide the first systematic review
of longitudinal ToM research.

Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97

https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000325
 88
Objectives
We reviewed factors that predict ToM development (ToM
precursors). We also examined how ToM affects social life
throughout the lifespan (ToM functions). ToM is often stud-
ied in atypical populations, especially people with Autism
Spectrum Disorders, because ToM is thought to be
impaired in these special populations (Baron-Cohen,
1989). However, our review focuses on typical development
across the lifespan. Therefore, we excluded studies of atyp-
ical populations from our review.
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Method
We conducted our search in July 2017 using the PsycINFO
database. Our initial search included the terms: [“theory of
mind” and longitudinal or “false belief*”1 and longitudinal].
The terms ensured that the articles contained the word lon-
gitudinal, while also containing theory of mind, false belief, or
both. In addition, we restricted search results to peer-
reviewed articles published in or after 1978 (the date of
the first ToM publication – Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
This initial search yielded 261 articles. Then, we applied
our inclusion criteria: (1) at least one typically-developing
sample was present; (2) participants were tested over at
least two time points; (3) at least one month separated each
testing time point; and (4) the article was published in
English. Finally, we included longitudinal studies that had
been cited in the relevant articles identified in our search,
and that fit our inclusion criteria. In total, we included 88
longitudinal studies in our systematic review (studies
included in our systematic review are preceded by “*” in
the References). Two overarching research questions
guided our review: (1) which factors act as precursors to
ToM development across the lifespan; and (2) what func-
tion does ToM play in social development across the lifes-
pan? After organizing articles according to these two
research questions, we further categorized articles by topic.
Precursor topics included: attention; executive function;
language; and the early social environment. Function topics
included: peer acceptance and prosocial behavior; aggres-
sion; and epistemology.
In Table 1 in the Electronic Supplementary Material
(ESM 1), we include the following information for each
paper in our review: age at time of testing, sample size after
attrition, topic heading in our review, and ToM measures
used. References that meet our inclusion criteria but that
1
Our search yielded only one article investigating ToM in adults using a longitudinal design. The study showed increased emotion recognition and
changes to associated neural regions after a training regimen (Mascaro, Rilling, Negi, & Raison, 2013). Because age was not the primary factor of
interest in this study, we did not include this article in our systematic review. We cover adult ToM in the Discussion section.
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97
D. G. Derksen et al., Precursors and Functions of ToM
are not cited in the review are also included in the supple-
mentary materials.
Results
Precursors to Theory of Mind
Children begin to show proficiency in basic cognitive ToM
tasks between the age of 3 and 5 (Wellman et al., 2001). We
begin our review by discussing how infants’ attentional
skills act as precursors to ToM development in the pre-
school (3–5) years. We then consider early executive func-
tion and language abilities and how they relate to ToM
development. Finally, we discuss the association between
environmental factors, such as the parent-child relationship
and sibling-child relationship on ToM development.
Attention
Attention in preverbal infancy may lay the groundwork for
later ToM development. Researchers measure infant atten-
tion using looking time (i.e., how long the infant looks at
different stimuli), gaze-following and point-following (i.e.,
whether the infant can follow the gaze or pointing gesture
of an experimenter), or by other nonverbal behaviors
(e.g., infant hands the experimenter a toy when prompted).
Infants’ attention to an agent’s intentional action predicts
better ToM in preschool (e.g., Aschersleben, Hofer, &
Jovanovic, 2008; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2007;
Wellman, Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, & LaLonde, 2004). For
example, children’s anticipatory looking at 18 months pre-
dicts improved ToM at 48 months (Thoermer, Sodian,
Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012). However, it is possible that
mental-state talk, which develops after early attention skills,
partially mediates the link between early attention skills
and ToM in preschool. Indeed, infants who successfully fol-
low an experimenter’s gaze show increased mental-state
term usage at 2.5 years of age and better ToM at 4.5 years
of age (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015).
Attention allows for coordinated joint engagement (infant
acknowledges caregiver) and symbol-infused joint engage-
ment (caregiver and infant attend to the same symbols
and objects), both of which predict ToM performance in
preschool (Charman et al., 2000; Nelson, Adamson, &
Bakeman, 2008; Sung & Hsu, 2014). During joint engage-
ment, the infant and caregiver can both use pointing to
establish shared meaning (i.e., declarative pointing toward
an object) or to direct behavior (i.e., imperative pointing to
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 D. G. Derksen et al., Precursors and Functions of ToM
request an object; Brinck, 2004). Understanding and
responding to imperative requests in infancy predicts later
mental-state talk and better ToM in preschool (Colonnesi,
Rieffe, Koops, & Perucchini, 2008; Kristen, Sodian,
Thoermer, & Perst, 2011). Declarative pointing also predicts
ToM performance in preschool (Sodian & Kristen-Antonow,
2015).
In sum, shared experiences and the skills that facilitate
such experiences aid ToM development. Although point-
following, gaze-following, understanding intention, and
joint-engagement capture infant attention in a narrow
sense, they uniquely predict ToM development.
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Executive Function
Executive Function (EF) is a cognitive control mechanism
responsible for shifting, monitoring, updating, and inhibiting
information (Miyake et al., 2000). Strong and consistent
correlations have been observed between EF and ToM in
children (Devine & Hughes, 2014). However, the precise
role that EF plays in ToM remains unclear. The emergence
hypothesis considers EF to be a precursor to ToM develop-
ment (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). Conversely, the expression
hypothesis states that overlapping task demands underlie
the EF-ToM correlation (Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002).
According to the emergence view, normal ToM develop-
ment requires that children first develop EF. Initial longitu-
dinal assessments show preschoolers’ performance on EF
tasks predicts improved performance on later ToM tasks
(Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Hughes, 1998).
Further, EF development precedes ToM development
(Flynn, O’Malley, & Wood, 2004; Müller, Liebermann-
Finestone, Carpendale, Hammond, & Bibok, 2012). While
some research suggests a bidirectional association between
EF and ToM in preschool (McAlister & Peterson, 2013),
a large (N = 226) and diverse sample of 3- to 5-year-olds
revealed a clear unidirectional EF?ToM link (Marcovitch
et al., 2015).
Although the emergence account best describes the asso-
ciation between EF and ToM in preschoolers, by middle
childhood, there is evidence for the expression account.
Between 6 and 11 years, aspects of EF, including working
memory and attention-shifting, share a bidirectional associ-
ation with future ToM performance (Austin, Groppe, &
Elsner, 2014). That is, EF predicts future ToM performance
and ToM predicts future EF performance. The shift from a
unidirectional to a bidirectional association between EF and
ToM from preschool to middle childhood suggests a
developmental shift from an emergence account to an
expression account that occurs sometime between pre-
school and early childhood.
However, it is worth noting that EF and ToM tasks used
in middle childhood often differ from those used in pre-
school. Thus, the change in association may, more simply,
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89
be due to differences in task demands. Support for this
view comes from one study in which the researchers found
no predictive association between EF and ToM in a pre-
school sample re-tested with the same EF task 4 years later
(Devine, White, Ensor, & Hughes, 2016). The authors note,
however, that ceiling effects and the long delay between
time points may have masked longitudinal effects.
Language
Before children perform well on ToM tasks, they begin to
talk about mental states. From 24 to 36 months of age, chil-
dren not only refer to their internal states but also try to
manipulate others (Brown & Dunn, 1991; Newton, Reddy,
& Bull, 2000). At age 2, children increase their use of both
thinking terms and feeling terms, an effect that occurs cross-
culturally (Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003;
Kristen, Sodian, Licata, Thoermer, & Poulin-Dubois,
2012). Between 4 and 5 years, children’s mental-state talk
continues to increase and relates to later ToM performance
(Hughes & Dunn, 1998). ToM performance at age 3 pre-
dicts mental-state talk used in conversations with a best
friend 3 years later (Hughes, Ensor, & Marks, 2010). Both
the early emergence of mental-state talk and its increased
usage alongside ToM development suggest a possible
developmental continuity. Children talk more about their
own and other people’s thoughts shortly before developing
proficiency in ToM tasks. This may reflect a nascent under-
standing of the mind.
Early language ability, such as sentence complexity and
grammar at 24 months and verbal intelligence at 48
months, predicts ToM at 48 months (Farrar & Maag,
2002; Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2001). Moreover, early
understanding of syntax predicts ToM between 3 and
4 years, although ToM does not predict understanding of
syntax (Astington & Jenkins 1999). Specifically, children
require an understanding of false compliments before they
understand false beliefs (e.g., “He thought he found his
ring, . . . but it was really a bottle cap. What did he think?”;
de Villiers & Pyers, 2002, p. 1043). However, this
association may not exist across all languages (Tardif, So,
& Kaciroti, 2007).
Slade and Ruffman (2005) challenged the idea that the
association between language and ToM performance is uni-
directional, arguing that language tasks are more robust
and sensitive than are ToM tasks (e.g., language tasks
include many more items). After equating task sensitivity
between language and ToM tasks, Slade and Ruffman
observed a bidirectional association between language abil-
ity and ToM performance over time (see also, De Mulder,
2015). Thus, some understanding of grammar and syntax
may be required to perform well on ToM tasks. Perhaps
task demands are similar across ToM and language tasks,
creating a bidirectional relationship. Measures of semantic
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97
 90
and syntactic understanding are often correlated, and both
measures appear to predict ToM (Ruffman, Slade,
Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003). In fact, the
association between language and ToM is possibly an arti-
fact of the association between language and EF. Indeed,
Hughes and Ensor (2007) note that prior studies (e.g.,
Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Watson et al., 2001) do not
control for EF, and that language ability predicts EF rather
than ToM. Although EF may mediate the association
between ToM and some language measures, we are hesi-
tant to stake this claim against all language measures.
Given that language ability takes many forms (e.g., vocabu-
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lary, syntax, spatial language), as does EF (e.g., shifting,
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monitoring, and updating), it is unclear where task
demands overlap among language ability, EF, and ToM.
Rather, a link between ToM and later language ability is
consistent with the finding that ToM at age 4 predicts
reading comprehension at age 6 through the facilitation
of language development (Atkinson, Slade, Powell, & Levy,
2017; Guajardo & Cartwright, 2016). Thus, ToM and
language develop together, and facilitate one another.
This should come as no surprise, considering how vital
ToM and language are to social understanding.
The Early Social Environment
The parent-child relationship relates to ToM development.
For example, maternal mental-state talk has been found to
promote ToM development in preschool (Adrián,
Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Ensor & Hughes, 2008;
Moore, Furrow, Chiasson, & Patriquin, 1994; Ruffman,
Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006).
However, in one study, the effect of maternal mental-state
talk on ToM performance in a sample of 5-year-olds tested
again 1 year later was mediated fully by improvements in
memory for false compliments and EF (Farrant, Maybery,
& Fletcher, 2012). Still, exposure to parental mental-state
talk improves ToM development.
Early work shows that compared to insecurely attached
infants, securely attached infants perform better on ToM
tasks when they reach preschool age (Fonagy, 1996; Meins,
Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998). Because these
findings are difficult to replicate, attachment security may
relate only to specific ToM tasks or social contexts (Laranjo,
Bernier, Meins, & Carlson, 2010; Symons & Clark, 2000).
Meins et al. (1998) suggest that the appropriateness of
parent-child interactions could explain the association
between secure attachment and ToM development. Specif-
ically, Meins et al. consider appropriate mental-state talk to
(1) be congruent with the child’s desires/behavior; (2) be
related to similar events in time; or (3) direct the child to rel-
evant stimuli. Indeed, Centifanti, Meins, and Fernyhough
(2016) show that appropriate maternal mind-related
comments in infancy predict improved performance on
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97
D. G. Derksen et al., Precursors and Functions of ToM
various ToM tasks in preschool. Appropriate mind-related
comments continue to predict better ToM performance in
childhood (Kirk et al., 2015). Finally, attachment security
scores correlate with frequency of relevant mind-related
comments, which in turn predict better ToM (Meins
et al., 2002; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). Thus,
relevant mind-related comments appear to promote ToM
development.
The quality of the mother-child relationship also has
been investigated in terms of the mother’s emotional avail-
ability. Maternal emotional availability in infancy predicts
ToM performance in preschool even after controlling for
variance in maternal mental-state talk (Licata, Kristen, &
Sodian, 2016). Simply responding positively to children’s
emotions may be enough to facilitate emotion understand-
ing in preschoolers (Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994).
Regardless of the metric used, the quality of the parent-
child relationship in infancy clearly fosters ToM develop-
ment in preschoolers.
Siblings may also play a role in ToM development. For
instance, cooperation between 3-year-olds and their older
siblings predicts later ToM performance (Dunn, Brown,
Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). Specifically, role
enactment during pretend play facilitates ToM develop-
ment in young children, especially when they are engaged
with older siblings (Jenkins et al., 2003; Youngblade &
Dunn, 1995). This trend continues into the preschool years
(McAlister & Peterson, 2007).
A large scale (N = 385) study of 3-year-olds and their
siblings revealed that the association between having a sib-
ling and ToM may result from older siblings adjusting their
behavior in response to their younger siblings’ needs
(Prime, Plamondon, Pauker, Perlman, & Jenkins, 2016).
Having older siblings is especially predictive of ToM devel-
opment because older siblings can facilitate their younger
sibling’s learning about the mind by restructuring interac-
tions when needed. Thus, the positive effect of siblings on
ToM development may stem from older siblings engaging
in relevant pretend play (e.g., role enactment), and doing
so in a manner that is sensitive to the younger sibling’s
needs.
When we consider how parents and siblings affect ToM
development, the quality of social interaction is crucial.
In the parent’s case, it is not simply the exposure to
mind-related comments, but the appropriateness of these
comments. In the sibling’s case, it is not simply the relevant
pretend play, but rather the older sibling’s sensitivity to a
younger sibling’s needs within these social interactions.
Functional ToM
Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings
of others plays a functional role in our social lives.
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 D. G. Derksen et al., Precursors and Functions of ToM
We examine functional outcomes of ToM related to peer
acceptance, prosocial behavior, and aggression. When pos-
sible, we also examine how these factors influence ToM
development. Finally, we examine how ToM changes how
we think about the world.
Peer Acceptance and Prosocial Behavior
Peer rejection can be traumatic and have lasting psycholog-
ical consequences (Lev-Wiesel, Nuttman-Shwartz, &
Sternberg, 2006). Luckily, developing ToM skills may
reduce the risk of peer rejection. Particularly, early perfor-
mance on ToM tasks predicts peer acceptance and more
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mutually reciprocated friendships in elementary school,
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as well as more prosocial behavior (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin,
& Banerjee, 2012; Eggum et al., 2011; Fink, Begeer,
Hunt, & de Rosnay, 2014; Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaugh-
ter, & de Rosnay 2015). Thus, prosocial behavior may
mediate the effect of ToM task performance on peer
acceptance (Kuhnert, Begeer, Fink, & de Rosnay, 2017).
Overall, better ToM understanding promotes prosocial
behavior and peer acceptance. ToM may facilitate peer
acceptance by allowing us to better understand social faux
pas (Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011), preventing social
missteps.
Aggression
The association between performance on ToM tasks and
aggressive behavior may depend on social context. While
victimized children with lower ToM scores interpret nonag-
gressive acts as aggressive, children with higher ToM scores
use aggressive manipulation if victimized. For example, one
year after testing 5-year-olds’ ToM, Renouf et al. (2010)
collected teacher ratings of proactive aggression (e.g.,
“scares other children to get what he or she wants;”
p. 1114), reactive aggression (e.g., “reacted in aggressive
manner when teased or threatened;” p. 1114), and peer vic-
timization (e.g., “was hit or pushed by other children;”
p. 1114). Lower ToM scores in preschool correlated with
higher teacher-rated reactive aggression in kindergarten;
however, this was only true for children with higher
teacher-rated peer-victimization scores. Further, higher
ToM scores in preschool correlated with higher teacher-rated
proactive aggression in kindergarten, but again, only for
those with higher teacher-rated peer-victimization scores.
Similarly, Renouf et al. (2009) tested 5-year-olds’ ToM
performance and followed up 1 year later with measures
of indirect aggression (e.g., “said bad things behind others’
backs;” p. 542), physical aggression (e.g., “got into fights;”
p. 542), and prosocial behavior (e.g., “volunteered to clean
up a mess that somebody else made;” p. 542). Children
with better ToM scores had higher indirect aggression.
However, this association only occurred for children with
low to average prosocial behavior scores. Thus, a better
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91
ToM may enable more indirect aggression for those chil-
dren displaying fewer prosocial behaviors.
Social dominance, which relates to aggression, also
appears to predict later ToM performance. In a naturalistic
study over the course of two preschool terms, social domi-
nance in the fall predicted higher ToM scores in the spring
(Pellegrini et al., 2011). Because the researchers measured
ToM performance only at the second time point, it is
difficult to interpret the nature of this link. It is possible that
improved ToM fosters social dominance such that the abil-
ity to understand others’ mental states puts children with
improved ToM at a social advantage. It is also possible that
social dominance precedes the development of ToM,
though this seems less likely. Despite the somewhat
complex association between ToM and aggressive behav-
ior, a non-aggressive temperament may predict improved
ToM development.
For example, Wellman, Lane, LaBounty, and Olson
(2011) tested children at age 3.5 and again at age 5.5 on a
battery of false-belief and behavioral measures. Results
show that having a shy-withdrawn temperament or percep-
tually sensitive temperament (e.g., “Seems to notice par-
ents’ facial expressions;” p. 321) at 3.5 years predicts
higher ToM scores 2 years later. Alternatively, having an
aggressive temperament predicts lower ToM scores. Simi-
larly, other work has shown that higher aggression toward
an unborn sibling and continued aggression throughout
the first year predicts lower ToM scores for the aggressor
in preschool (Song, Volling, Lane, & Wellman, 2016).
Finally, although better cognitive and affective ToM perfor-
mance relates to lower reactive aggression, only affective
ToM performance predicts lower proactive aggression
(Austin, Bondü, & Elsner, 2017). While this might seem log-
ical, the moderating role of EF is unclear. Indeed, the
negative association between ToM performance and
aggression disappears after controlling for children’s effort-
ful control (Olson, Lopez-Duran, Lunkenheimer, Chang, &
Sameroff, 2011). Thus, it may be that deficits in EF result in
both impaired ToM and increased aggression.
In sum, aggression can have a functional role in ToM
development for victimized individuals. Early aggressive
temperament, however, seems to hinder rather than help
ToM development in preschoolers. This is important in
light of Shakoor et al.’s (2012) finding that poor ToM perfor-
mance at age 5 predicts increased propensity to bully and
be bullied in adolescence. As the authors note, this has
implications for behavioral interventions which aim to
reduce early aggression or foster early improvements in
ToM. Considering Olson et al.’s (2011) findings, another
avenue may be fostering improved EF performance,
particularly effortful control in early childhood. Such
interventions may help reduce future bullying behavior
and victimization.
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97
 92
From Childhood to Adolescence – Rigid Absolutism
to Flexible Relativism
ToM development may promote flexible thinking. For
example, one study demonstrated that performance on
ToM tasks predicted improvements in divergent thinking
from 3 to 5 years. Although divergent thinking did not pre-
dict ToM performance, children displayed significant
improvements in divergent thinking once they developed
an understanding of false beliefs (Suddendorf & Fletcher-
Flinn, 1999). Thus, the same cognitive functions associated
with ToM tasks may also be instrumental in flexible and
divergent thinking.
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Divergent thinking and creativity may relate to both cog-
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nitive and affective ToM. Hughes and Dunn (2002) showed
children pictures of faces expressing happiness, sadness,
anger, or fear, and asked what kinds of things make them-
selves, their friends, and their mother feel that way.
Children were tested at age 4 and again 3 years later.
Not only did the diversity and creativity of responses
increase over time, but this increase correlated with perfor-
mance on ToM measures. These instances of divergent
thinking may indicate a fundamental shift in how children
think about the world. In a longitudinal study from child-
hood to adolescence, participants read vignettes in which
two characters disagreed about an issue. The issue either
centered on objective fact, mixed objective/subjective com-
ponents, or was based on entirely subjective opinion. Partic-
ipants had to explain which of the characters was right, and
why the characters might disagree. Despite individual dif-
ferences, participants transitioned from an absolutist (right
and wrong is static and binary) to a relativist (right and
wrong is fluid and contextual) epistemology between 10
and 16 years of age (Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002).
This shift in epistemology may result from good ToM.
Relativist thinking requires viewing the same object or situ-
ation differently depending on the context. Although chil-
dren master a basic understanding of false beliefs in
preschool, it may take until adolescence for relativist think-
ing to emerge (Miller, 2012). This change in epistemology
may also play into the development of humor. Bosacki
(2013) observed that ToM at age 8 related to more frequent
use of humor when describing oneself and situations at
age 10. Thus, ToM can have a dramatic effect on many
areas of our social life by altering the way we see the world.
Discussion
The current review of longitudinal ToM research can be
divided into two major themes: (1) precursors to ToM
development and (2) functional outcomes of ToM develop-
ment. We identified early attention skills, the development
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97
D. G. Derksen et al., Precursors and Functions of ToM
of EF, and the use of language as possible precursors to
ToM development. Additionally, parents’ and older sib-
lings’ sensitivity to a child’s needs throughout infancy and
childhood fosters early ToM improvements. Early ToM
development is important considering the function ToM
plays in aggression and peer acceptance in childhood and
adolescence. Indeed, healthy ToM development can lead
to improved social relationships and more prosocial
behaviors.
ToM development may also have negative outcomes. For
example, ToM performance predicts increased sensitivity to
teacher criticism in elementary school, though this can fos-
ter academic achievement (Dunn, 1995; Lecce, Caputi, &
Hughes, 2011; Lecce, Caputi, & Pagnin 2014). Furthermore,
higher ToM scores predict more proactive and indirect
aggression for victimized individuals. However, it is possi-
ble that this aggressive behavior buffers negative outcomes
for these victimized individuals. Regardless, ToM is a social
tool which may be used positively or negatively.
We must address two key developmental topics that were
not explicitly discussed in our review: imagination/pretense
and counterfactual thinking. Although imagination and pre-
tense are subsumed in some of the topics covered in the
current review (e.g., mother-child interactions, sibling inter-
actions, mental-state talk), there is one study that found
direct evidence for the role of imagination in ToM develop-
ment. Dore and Lillard (2015) found that preschoolers who
believe in fantasy characters and prefer fantasy media show
improvements in ToM 7 months later. Counterfactual rea-
soning, which requires considering alternatives to a known
truth, also relates to ToM (see Rafetseder & Perner, 2018).
Future longitudinal studies should focus on imagination
and counterfactual reasoning in relation to ToM
development.
ToM From a Lifespan Theory
of Development
The unique challenges that each person faces in life depend
on social and environmental context just as much as biolog-
ical changes in development. For example, the ToM
required to navigate peer-group interactions in childhood
and adolescence may differ from the ToM required to
navigate preschool. Unfortunately, after middle childhood,
longitudinal study of ToM declines, despite there being
important developmental periods (i.e., puberty) which may
further elucidate ToM development. Adult samples are also
understudied longitudinally. While we uncovered only one
longitudinal ToM study on typically-developing adult
samples, cross-sectional studies suggest that ToM continues
to develop as we age (Henry et al., 2013). Although adults
clearly outperform children on ToM tasks, adults are still
Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing
 D. G. Derksen et al., Precursors and Functions of ToM
vulnerable to error when trying to understand the mental
states of others (Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & Rakoczy,
2016). This is especially true when adults are under cogni-
tive load (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). With age comes fur-
ther declines in ToM performance (particularly after age 65)
that persist regardless of task format (i.e., visual or verbal)
and type of ToM (i.e., cognitive or affective ToM; Duval,
Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011). Further-
more, external demands on cognitive resources are signifi-
cantly more detrimental to older than to younger adults’
ToM performance (German & Hehman, 2006).
Considering the lack of longitudinal assessment of ToM
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
development in adulthood, it is unclear how individual dif-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ferences in development predict declines in ToM perfor-
mance. It is also unclear what long-term functional
outcomes these declines have on adult social relationships.
For example, one could speculate that given the epistemic
shift from absolutism to relativism and the increase in
divergent thinking that occurs between childhood and ado-
lescence, declines in ToM performance in older adults may
lead to more rigid, absolutist ways of thinking. Indeed,
cross-sectional research suggests that younger adults out-
perform older adults in the domains of divergent and con-
vergent creativity (Simon & Bock, 2016). Longitudinal
assessment of both ToM performance and creativity in
older adulthood could provide clarification.
The effect of ToM performance on aggression across the
lifespan is also unclear. Longitudinal assessment reveals
that ToM performance predicts higher proactive aggression
and lower reactive aggression (but only for victimized indi-
viduals), while a lower aggressive temperament predicts
higher ToM scores. It is unclear whether a decline in
ToM performance, or a situation which promotes victimiza-
tion, produces higher aggression. Wellman et al. (2011) sug-
gest that aggressive temperament may only affect ToM
during the earliest stage of ToM development (3–5 years
of age). However, cross-sectional studies of children and
preadolescents reveal a continued association between
aggression and ToM; though aggression relates positively
to ToM in childhood, the reverse occurs in preadolescence
(Kokkinos, Voulgaridou, Mandrali, & Parousidou, 2016). If
one assumes relative stability of ToM performance from
adolescence to adulthood, it is probable that the negative
correlation between ToM performance and aggression also
remains stable. What happens, however, when ToM decli-
nes in older adulthood? It is well documented that fron-
totemporal dementia and Alzheimer’s disease often relate
to impaired ToM performance (Bora, Walterfang, &
Velakoulis, 2015). An increase in aggression has also been
documented in these cases, though other probable causes
have been identified over and above impaired ToM skills
(Talerico, Evans, & Strumpf, 2002). Longitudinal assess-
ment of aggression and ToM from adulthood to older
Ó 2018 Hogrefe Publishing
93
adulthood could clarify how age-related declines in ToM
affect aggression in typically-developing adults.
Despite the holes in the literature, longitudinal studies to
date have provided relevant information beyond their
cross-sectional counterparts, specifically in relation to the
lifespan theory of development. By studying individual dif-
ferences longitudinally, researchers can evaluate contextual
and environmental factors during any developmental per-
iod. Importantly, researchers can build predictive models.
Further, researchers can identify risk factors, and develop
intervention and training programs where necessary. How-
ever, future research (both longitudinal and cross-sectional)
of ToM should adopt tasks suitable for use across the
lifespan (see Bernstein, Coolin, Fischer, Thornton, &
Sommerville, 2017). In short, we hope that our review stim-
ulates ToM research from a lifespan perspective.
We must acknowledge a limitation of our inclusion crite-
ria. Researchers often study ToM without referring to it as
such. For example, there is a diverse literature on mentaliz-
ing and social cognition. Although some of these studies
mention false belief, and would thus fall under our inclu-
sion criteria, some studies may have been excluded due
to differing terminologies for similar constructs. Also, using
false belief in our search criteria likely biased results toward
cognitive ToM. Future reviews may consider including
more diverse terms in their inclusion criteria.
Conclusion
Understanding our own and others’ thoughts and feelings
pervades social development. From our first childhood
friendships to our awkward first dates, to enduring relation-
ships, ToM is indispensable. Thus far, longitudinal assess-
ment of typically-developing individuals has focused
predominantly on infant, preschool, and childhood popula-
tions. Given the documented changes in ToM performance
in adulthood (from cross-sectional research), longitudinal
assessment of adults and older adults is the crucial next
step in investigating how ToM affects our lifelong social
functioning.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by grants to Megan E. Giroux
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship, to Deborah A.
Connolly from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (435-2013-0291), and to
Daniel M. Bernstein from the Canada Research Chairs
Program (950-228407) and Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (435-2015-0721).
The action editor for this article was Edgar Erdfelder.
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97
 94
Electronic Supplementary Material
The electronic supplementary material is available with the
online version of the article at https://doi.org/10.1027/
2151-2604/a000325
ESM 1. Text (.docx)
Table providing details of ToM studies reviewed.
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Received September 15, 2017
Revision received November 30, 2017
Accepted December 10, 2017
Published online March 14, 2018
Daniel G. Derksen
Department of Psychology
Simon Fraser University
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6
Canada
dgderkse@sfu.ca
Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2018), 226(2), 87–97