The country of Grenarnia has begun to exhibit aggressive behaviour toward another state,

Svenborgia. How does Snyder and Christensen (chain-ganging and buck-passing) and Reiter
(bargaining and commitment problems) explain the variation in international aggression, and
which argument is more persuasive?

MID-TERM ESSAY – 800 words

Theories are essential to understanding the complex realities of international politics: they identify the
causal factors of international phenomena; highlight how these factors generate their effects; and
provide simplified models that explain otherwise complicated outcomes.

This essay will argue that Reiter’s theory is more persuasive than Snyder and Christensen’s theory for
explaining Grenarnia’s aggressive behaviour, as it does not rely on as many specific variables to
operate and thus has greater explanatory power than the latter’s theory.

Snyder and Christensen’s theory of buck-passing and chain-ganging explains Grenarnia’s aggression
towards Svenborgia as a product of Grenarnia’s security interdependence with other similarly
vulnerable states. To operate, Grenarnia must have a perceived offensive advantage relative to
Svenborgia, in that it believes that it is more capable of inflicting damage to an opponent than
protecting itself. Grenarnia would also have to be vulnerable and have a high need for allies,
consequently leading to its entry into an alliance with similarly placed states. Finally, Svenborgia
would need to pose a threat to this alliance. Assuming that these conditions are met, Grenarnia’s
aggression can be explained as follows. Grenarnia is a member of a military alliance, which is
threatened by Svenborgia. As this military alliance is interdependent and made up of similarly
vulnerable states, each member of the alliance has incentive to protect each other member, as failing
to do so would threaten the alliance, and thus each member’s security. Grenarnia, understanding this,
thus aggresses on Svenborgia, as a response to the latter’s threat to the alliance.

Reiter’s theory of bargaining and commitment problems explains Grenarnia’s aggression towards
Svenborgia as a product of Grenarnia’s stratagem of preventative war. To operate, Grenarnia must
have a perceived conflict of interest with Svenborgia and must fear a shifting power dynamic in the
future. Assuming that these conditions are met, Grenarnia’s aggression can be explained as follows.
Grenarnia has an ongoing dispute with Svenborgia. While Svenborgia strikes an agreement, Grenarnia
predicts that Svenborgia will become more powerful in the future, and thus believes Svenborgia may
seek to re-negotiate the agreement in the future. Due to this, Grenarnia cannot trust that Svenborgia
will credibly commit to the agreement, and thus has incentive to aggress - to fight a preventative war
now, before Svenborgia becomes more powerful in the future.

The strengths of Snyder and Christensen’s theory lie in its ability to explain instances of state
aggression when the aggressive state in question is not directly being threatened itself. That is, by
recognising that states may be interdependent on other states for their security, Snyder and
Christensen’s theory fills a gap explaining aggression by third-party states. Despite this, a pressing
weakness of Snyder and Christensen’s theory is that it assumes that states in interdependent alliances,
when threatened, resort to aggressive chain-ganging in order to protect the alliance and themselves.
This assumption poses a problem in cases where the value of the alliance may not outweigh the costs
of going to war, especially if the enemy state is extremely powerful. In these situations, the choice of
aggression may be irrational, even if the cost of failing to do so is the loss of the alliance. Snyder and
Christensen’s theory fails to cover these situations and forgoes to an extent the fact that states are, for
all intents and purposes, rational actors seeking to maximise their own gain.

The strengths of Reiter’s theory are its wide applicability, as its explanatory logic covers situations of
both benign and hostile states, and relies on very few variables to function – thus applying to a wider
range of scenarios as a result. Despite this, a pressing weakness of Reiter’s theory is that it assumes

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 The country of Grenarnia has begun to exhibit aggressive behaviour toward another state,
Svenborgia. How does Snyder and Christensen (chain-ganging and buck-passing) and Reiter
(bargaining and commitment problems) explain the variation in international aggression, and
which argument is more persuasive?

that states, when faced with a commitment problem from a potential rising opponent, will resort to
preventative war at first instance. This may not always be the case, and states may choose alternative
methods to alter the distribution of power in their favour – for instance, by increasing their defensive
capabilities.

Both of these weaknesses however, may be rebutted with the defence that these theories do not
assume aggression, but explain scenarios where aggression may simply be the most rational choice.
That is, states may well consider the costs of aggression and alternative options, but nevertheless find
overall that aggression is the most viable path of action.

On balance, Reiter’s theory is superior to Snyder and Christensen’s theory. This assessment is based
on Van Evera’s 7 attributes of a good theory: explanatory power; simplification; satisfaction; clearly
framed; falsifiable; explains important phenomena and prescriptive richness. While both theories meet
many of these criteria, Reiter’s theory has arguably more explanatory power than Snyder and
Christensen’s. This is because Reiter’s theory does not rely on as many specific criteria to function
(e.g. offensive advantage; need for allies; etc) and thus may apply to a wider set of scenarios.

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