Soviet Studies in Philosophy

ISSN: 0038-5883 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrsp19

The Philosophical Importance of the Problem of

Natural and Artificial Intellects

P. K. Anokhin

To cite this article: P. K. Anokhin (1976) The Philosophical Importance of the Problem of
Natural and Artificial Intellects, Soviet Studies in Philosophy, 14:4, 3-27

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RSP1061-196714043

Published online: 20 Dec 2014.

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 Voprosy filosofii, 1973, No. 6

P. K. Anokhin
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE O F THE

PROBLEM O F NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLECTS

1. Introduction

It would be difficult to name a m o r e interesting scientific

problem than that of knowledge of the brain, its overall mech-
a n i s m s and i t s molecular nature. Rational management of the
brain in the future and utilization of the principles of i t s func-
tioning to construct various mechanisms t o undergird present-
day technological p r o g r e s s should follow a s direct consequences
of development of that s p h e r e of knowledge.
When a correspondent asked Norbert Wiener, "the father of
cybernetics," whether he would concede the possibility that highly
organized "intelligent machines" might enslave man in some
future time, Wiener replied, not without irony: "If that happens,
.
it will be man's fault. . ."
Both the question and the answer underline the extreme time-
liness of the problem of natural and artificial intellects. The
point is that s o m e workers in information theory hold that any-
thing and everything can be modeled and that it is even possible

The author, who is a department chairman a t the Sechenov

Medical Institute, is a member of the USSR Academy of Sci-
ences and a Lenin Laureate.
 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

to c r e a t e machines whose intellectual qualities will exceed

those of man. Hopes of this kind a r e widespread among physi-
cists, mathematicians, and workers in electronics. However,
a serious logical e r r o r is committed here, the essence ofwhich
will be clarified in this article.
Even apart from the importance of the problem of intellect,
to pass from study of fundamental problems of c e r e b r a l func-
tion a t the level of intelligence t o utilization of the r e s u l t s of
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r e s e a r c h in computer design s t i l l presents s e r i o u s obstacles.

T h e r e is a s yet no sufficiently complete model of an artificial
intellect corresponding t o present concepts of the functioning
of the brain under natural conditions.
The investigation of natural and artificial intelligence also
faces u s with a s e t of problems of a philosophical nature. For
in fact the thesis of materialist philosophy, "Matter is primary;
consciousness, secondary," establishes an organic, historical
connection between these phenomena, inasmuch a s we know that
the inorganic world existed long before the appearance of life
on our planet and, consequently, that the intellect must inevi-
tably reflect the laws of the inorganic world and "be inscribed"
therein. But if that is s o , then a l l the properties of the intellect
would have to have developed on the b a s i s of previous organic
f o r m s and would naturally have t o be adapted to the operation
of objects in the external world.
In other words, natural intellect, in i t s primitive f o r m the
intellect of animals and in its higher form the intellect of hu-
man beings, inevitably has to function on the basis of objective-
ly cognizable p r o c e s s e s and mechanisms. Examining the ques-
tion from i t s philosophical aspect, we can say that study of
artificial intelligence is one of the most important stages in
perceiving the material nature of psychological phenomena and
consequently promotes further development of the philosophy
of dialectical materialism.
It is c l e a r that one can hope for the creation of an artificial
intelligence only after the creation of a sufficiently solid "con-
ceptual bridge1' that would make possible maximum utilization
of our factual knowledge about the principles of the functioning
of the brain.
 SPRING 1976

2. The Most Important Features of the

Intellect and Their Characterization

In recent years, in connection with attempts to construct an

artificial intellect, researchers have confronted the necessity
of defining the intellect and identifying its characteristics.
Lacking this there is no way for neurophysiologists, psycholo-
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gists, and specialists in modeling the principal features of the intel-

lect in working constructs to find bases for contact with each other.
The success of McCulloch in creating an artificial neural
network is to be explained precisely by the fact that he identi-
fied certain characteristic logical features of cerebral function
very clearly and employed them in the design of a recognizing
and "thinking" device. (1) Thanks to such research, the prob-
lem of artificial intellects has been widely studied, particularly
by nerve information-theory specialists, but not by nerve physi-
ologists. The latter have continued to focus on classic nerve physi-
ology, with emphasis on the "reflex" manner of thought, which
does not provide an opportunity for understanding the decisive
properties characteristic specifically of intellectual activity.
A natural consequence has been vagueness in the understanding
of neurophysiological properties of intellect and a lack of sci-
entifically substantiated formulations. This has considerably
complicated contact among psychologists, nerve physiologists,
and data-processing specialists.
More and more frequently designers of artificial intellects
have been on the brink of studying precisely those properties
of the brain that physiologists have not even touched on in their
research.
Maron was perhaps the first of the cyberneticists to come
to the conclusion that one could not even speak of understanding
the intellect fully and of designing an "intellectual machine"
unless the given system were seen a s possessing the capacity
to predict. (2) Comparing the human brain to the most advanced
data-procesiing machines, he stated the difference between
them with particular clarity: the fact that the brain had the ca-
pacity to predict, and the machine did not.
According to Pavlov, the conditioned reflex is indubitably
 6 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

founded on prediction, because the conditioned response has the

character of a "warning." As our analysis has shown, the con-
ditioned reflex includes an apparatus that is created in the pro-
cess of shaping the reflex to evaluate the future situation, i.e.,
the acceptor of the result of the response. (3)
However, this problem is not dealt with a t a l l in the works
of nerve physiologists, inasmuch a s the dominant principle in
the understanding of nervous activity - the principle of the
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reflex a r c - completely rules out the very possibility of pre-

dicting the future.
The essence of the matter is a s follows: excitation of anerve,
produced by stimulation of whatever receptor, travels, accord-
ing to reflex theory, along a "reflex a r c " in linear progression,
i.e., from point to point. However, by i t s very nature, predic-
tion presumes "running ahead," anticipation of the course of
the stimuli, meaning that the processes and the physiological
apparatus that will manifest themselves only in the closing
stage of reflex activity make their appearance a t the very out-
set. (4)
~ t t i e ecentered attention on that kind of nervous activity. (5)
In describing the construction of control mechanisms, he ob--
served: "A computer is capable of calculating continuously,
for each controlling motion that has previously been tried, the
probability that it will lead to the goal." (6) In speaking of the
goal to which all motions lead, Attlee thusemphasizes i t s
guiding influence on acts that bring future events closer.
The role of goal and prediction a r e dealt with most compre-
hensively in the book by Fogel, Owens, and Walsh. (7)
Defining the notion of "artificial intellect ," these authors
seek to find the common ground that might be shared by natural
and artificial intellects. They centered their attention, quite
correctly, in our opinion, not on the subtlety, accuracy, and
speed with which various operations were performed, but on
the logic of the mechanisms constituting the intellect. Among
these mechanisms they give first importance to "decision-
making" and "prediction," i.e., the shaping of goals. These
authors hold that it would be "more meaningful to define intel-
 SPRING 1976 7

lect in t e r m s of the behavior of some being striving toward a

goal, and to measure the level of his intellect by the adequacy
of the decisions he makes." (8) Thus, we s e e that their defini-
tion of intellect embraces th;most complicated forms of be-
havioral activity: goal-directed behavior, "decision-making,"
and prediction. This i s essentially true. However, a short-
coming of this definition lies in the fact that the factors signif-
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icant to, and characteristic of, the intellect a r e merely listed,

and a r e not presented in a logical connection and sequence that
would join them by a firm thread of systems determinism.
And the fact is that in the definitions above and, for that mat-
ter, in many others, a "goal" is presented a s something given
beforehand. Only thereafter does the chain of behavioral acts
aimed at the attainment of that goal begin to be examined. But
how did the goal itself come into being? What factors and what
material processes preceded i t s appearance and created there-
from the material apparatus guiding the specific striving of the
organism ? The writers mentioned above, a s well a s many
others (9), do not examine this "pre-goal" phase at all.
The same may be said of decision-making. What factors irn-
pel an organism to make a particular decision rather than some
other one? It i s clear that an uninterrupted process of choos-
ing the solution most adequate to a given situation takes place
in the decision-making process. But how does it occur? On
the basis of what specific mechanisms of nerve physiology is
the one particular behavioral degree of freedom chosen from
millions of possible degrees?
Usually all these questions a r e investigated independently,
apart from their logical connection on the scale of the total be-
havioral act; and, therefore, sometimes even correctly iden-
tified factors of natural intelligence such as, for example,
"prediction" (Fogel and others), goal-directed behavior, and
decision- making (Attlee) remain isolated fragments of intellect,
not interrelated by the logic of their functioning.
Evaluating the present stage in the investigation of the basic
characteristics specific to natural and artificial intellects, we
may state that the principal shortcoming of these studies is the
 8 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

absence of a universal model that would logically combine all

the stages of formation of intellectual a c t s . It is understood
that this model must a l s o reflect with sufficient completeness
the neurophysiological mechanisms of each fragment of the in-
tellectual processes.
Analyzing the meaning and content of a l l attempts to model
intellectual processes on the b a s i s of perceptrons, Rosenblatt
very vividly reflected the goals of those who a r e engaged in
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studying "decision-making" processes. He wrote:

. . . In the very near future i t will obviously b e neces-

s a r y t o develop an entire program of psychological ex-
periments with animals o r human beings to supplement
our data on the characteristics of models. When this
happens, models will in fact begin t o b e employed as
"predictive" devices, capable of processing definite data
(in the beginning perhaps quite crude) that human beings
have not yet observed. The ultimate employment of a
model of the brain, from the standpoint of psychological
value, r e p r e s e n t s precisely experiments of a kind in
which a model will correctly predict phenomena not yet
discovered in biological systems. (10) -

As we s e e , Rosenblatt places very high hopes on brain mod-

e l s of the "predictive" device type. However, in order for such
models to predict and orient themselves correctly to future
phenomena, they have t o borrow from the brain those proper-
t i e s and mechanisms, in the form of the acceptor of the r e s u l t s
of a c t s , that will provide the model with the possibility of shap-
ing a behavioral goal, t o predict the r e s u l t of the behavior it-
self, and, second by second, to monitor and compare the ob-
tained result with the previously s e t goal. It is precisely these
properties that not one of the existing models of the brain, i.e.,
of a n artificial intellect, possesses. It is c l e a r that such a
model, satisfying the r e s e a r c h e r , can be built only if knowledge
of nerve physiology is employed, without fail, for constant c o r -
rection of the working of this model.
 SPRING 1976 9

Despite the fact that much attention h a s been given in the

past decade to problems of decision-making, goal formulation,
and prediction, a l l attempts to c r e a t e an artificial intellect a r e
s t i l l in the very e a r l i e s t of stages.
A s we know, it is the custom in studying s y s t e m s in t e r m s
of established tradition to hold that any behavioral manifesta-
tion culminates in a n act. In this connection, the useful r e s u l t
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of the a c t is in fact never incorporated into the p r o c e s s a s a n

independent physiological category. However, it is precisely
on this point that t h e r e is a tragic, mutual lack of understanding
between m e m b e r s of very closely related fields of science:
nerve physiology and psychology. For the latter, as we know,
goals and decision-making have become necessary factors in
the study of intellectual processes.
Cybernetics has introduced into psychology a whole list of
bold ideas that have compelled it to accept such synthesizing
notions as goal, benefit, prediction, etc.
One could name a large number of studies in recent y e a r s in
which the problem of "decision-making" in the most diverse
situations is dealt with in great detail. The most complete s u r -
veys of the r e s u l t s of study of this subject have been made at
special symposia. (11)
One of the significant events in the investigation of the char-
a c t e r i s t i c features of the intellect has been the establishment
in France of a n institute of "high syntheses" for the study of
"decision-making" and of ways of constructing a n "artificial
intellect" (Institut d e s Hautes Syntheses, Nice, France). At
one of i t s most recent sessions, in 1971, the institute held a
special discussion of the question of the relationship between
a natural and a n artificial intellect.
The International Congress of Psychology (Tokyo, 1972) held
a special symposium on the problem of "decision-making" (Dy-
namic Aspects of "Decision-Making"). (12) In papers by W. Ed-
wards, G. Ekel, M. Todd, and M. ~esik,uestions pertaining to
the principal factors involved in making and implementing deci-
sions w e r e posed once again. Ekel placed particular emphasis
a l s o on the physiological c o r r e l a t e s of decision-making and on
 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

the corresponding positive and negative emotional states.

All that has been said above may be summarized a s follows:
a ) The great attention given to the problems of natural and
artificial intellects has posed, for specialists in different
branches of science, urgent tasks in the study of the principal
features of natural intellects and the application of the results
of such studies to construction of an artificial intellect. The
very possibility of successful solution of these problems prom-
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ises wide prospects of progressive development of many

spheres of production and industry.
Utilization of the results of such investigations in electronics,
medicine, educational theory, and other spheres may lead to
revolutionary advances in these fields. Therefore, proper un-
derstanding of the essence of such progress is very important.
b) Despite the importance of the problem, i t s present state
cannot be regarded a s satisfactory. There is no clear defini-
tion of the very concept of the intellect, its makeup, and the de-
cisive mechanisms of i t s various operations. Not only have the
most synthesizing key mechanisms characteristic of the intel-
lect, such a s "decision-making," "goal," and "prediction," not
been studied in their profound neurophysiological content but
even their operational interaction at the moment intellectual
acts a r e carried out has not been discovered.
In subsequent sections of the present article we shall attempt
to employ a systems approach in the form of functional systems
theory to the study of this problem, a theory developed in our
laboratory over the past forty years.

3 . A Functional Svstem a s the Logical

Model for an Artificial Intellect

As we have already seen, one of the significant trends in

modern nerve physiology i s the isolation of the various mecha-
nisms of the brain for convenience of experimentation on them
in order to study their properties. This analytical technique,
shared by many biological disciplines, has already yielded sig-
nificant results. However, it is useful and good only at a c e r -
 SPRING 1976 11

tain stage in scientific research: in the collection of primary

data and in the period of preparation for broad generalizations.
All the functions of an organism, particularly the functions
of i t s nervous system, a r e , by their very nature, logically inte-
grated; and a n understanding of their biological meaning there-
fore depends on that "higher synthesis" in which the r e a l role
of each mechanism in the formation of the cooperative whole
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is revealed. The theory of a functional system has a s its goal

the discovery of the organic unity of mechanisms that a r e usu-
ally investigated individually.

Efferent Stimuli

General diagram of a functional system a s the logical model

of a behavioral act in t e r m s of the most characteristic and i m -
portant mechanisms of intellectual activity.
The development of a behavioral a c t before the stage of
emergence of afferent stimuli t o the periphery and the shaping
of the action. One s e e s the action result acceptor already shaped,
making the prediction of the properties of the future result.

Many y e a r s ago, in studying the process of compensation for

interrupted functions, we saw that a l l the complex factors of
 12 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

activity, such a s memory, emotion, and goal, present them-

selves in organic unity; and it is only this unity that is capable
of restoring the disordered function. (13) By virtue of its sys-
tems characteristic, we designated thisfunctional unity a func-
tional system. It represents, a s a complete unit, the activity
of any living organism and consists of a whole s e r i e s of key
mechanisms serving to assure the logical and physiological
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shaping of a behavioral act (see diagram).

Inasmuch a s we have described the theory of a functional
system repeatedly in various publications, we shall here pro-
vide only a brief description of its key mechanisms from the
standpoint of their importance in the building of an "artificial
intellect."
A functional system eliminates a defect present in existing
models of the intellect. As we have already noted, the "deci-
sion-making" mechanism is regarded by most authors a s some-
thing primary and a point of departure for a l l other processes
in an intellectual act. Such an approach cannot satisfy an ob-
jectively minded investigator, inasmuch a s the making of a de-
cision has to be preceded by a highly complex processing of
diverse kinds of information.
We have termed this stage of the intellectual act "afferent
synthesis" because, in the course of this synthesis, simultane-
-processing of the most diverse kinds of information, reach-
ous
ing the central nervous system from both the external and the
internal world, takes place. At this stage of "pre-decision" a
number of stimuli undergo synthesis. Like the behavioral act
a s a whole, the "pre-decision" stage takes shape on the basis
of the emotion or motivation dominant at the given moment.
The latter, to speak in psychological terms, represents a de-
s i r e o r need. This dominating excitation, a s experiments with
simple forms of needs (hunger, thirst, sex, etc.) demonstrate,
has the capacity to extract from numerous synaptic brain struc-
tures all that in the pastwas associatedwith satisfaction o r per-
mission of precisely this need, dominant at the given moment
(experiments by our colleagues Sudakov, Kotov, Zhuravlev,
and others).
 SPRING 1976 13

In the p r o c e s s by which stimuli travel through brain neurons,

other stimuli inevitably a r e introduced from the complex of
factors in the external environment.
Thus - and this h a s been experimentally demonstrated -
stimuli from t h r e e different s o u r c e s simultaneously work upon
each neuron of the c e r e b r a l cortex: internal excitement a s s o -
ciated with the shaping of one o r another dominant motivation,
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external stimuli made available by means of the given situation,

and the stimuli of memory extracted both by motivation and by
the given situational afferentation. Only simultaneous proces-
sing of these stimuli and matching of a l l combinations of stimu-
l i with past experience provide the organism with the opportu-
nity to make a particular decision s o a s to obtain a satisfactory
result.
Experimental studies testify t o the fact that all the stimuli
cited and, sometimes, additionally, a special r e l e a s e factor
(for example, a conditioned signal) must meet simultaneously
a t the identical neuron o r , m o r e accurately, at each of millions
of neurons.
At the stage of "pre-decision," i.e., of afferent synthesis, a
most important question is decided in a l l c a s e s of shaping of a
behavioral act: the question of what useful r e s u l t must be ob-
tained in the given situation and with what combination of com-
ponent stimuli of that stage.
We s e e that only a rigorously scientific study of the stage of
"pre-decision" can lead t o a perfectly p r e c i s e determinist ex-
planation of the very process of decision-making. The fact is
that micro-electronic study of individual neurons of the c e r e -
b r a l cortex has demonstrated that this procedure of processing
a l l the initial information is performed with the a s s i s t a n c e of
numerous dynamic mechanisms whose biological meaning con-
s i s t s in the development of the most adequate solution for the
given situation and ensuring i t s most p r e c i s e implementation.
Thus, for example, the activating apparatus of the subcortical
region (hypothalamus; reticular formation) handles the forma-
tion of associations and the extraction of information from the
memory. These s a m e activating stimuli substantially i n c r e a s e
 14 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

the various capacities of nerve elements of the c e r e b r a l cortex

and, in particular, the capacity for the convergence upon them
of diverse stimuli. To this must be added the intensification of
reverberations of stimuli between the cortex and the subcorti-
c a l regions, thanks to which a s e a r c h for the most productive
possible synthesis for the forthcoming decision-making can be
c a r r i e d out (A. I. Shumilina's experiments).
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Hence, we have to give consideration t o everything that neuro-

physiological experiments can provide for an understanding of
the mechanisms of decision-making a s one of the most impor-
tant factors in the shaping of an intellect.

4. Neurophysiological P r e m i s e s for Decision-making

In o r d e r to understand this critical synthetic process of in-

tellectual activity, we have to conceive of the individual neuron,
and millions of neurons, a s s t r u c t u r e s possessing innumerable
degrees of freedom determined by the capacity of the neuron
to produce the most diverse configurations of nerve discharges.
Simple mathematical calculation shows that the number of
degrees of freedom on the scale of the brain as a whole could
be written, but with difficulty, by a number 9.5 million kilome-
t e r s long! It is precisely this quantity of degrees of freedom
of the c e r e b r a l cortex that makes up that infinite keyboard on
which the hundreds of millions of different melodies of behavior
a1 and intellectual a c t s a r e played.
Thus, the brain and the organism possess a t any given mo-
ment an unlimited quantity of degrees of freedom the simulta-
neous release of which would lead to monstrous chaos in the
behavior of the organism. The organized behavior of humans
and animals presumes an inevitable limitation of this enormous
diversity. Consequently, decision-making, by i t s very nature,
consists of the choice of one degree of freedom, that which is
most adequate to satisfying the demands of the given situation.
The essence of the problem lies in how the brain chooses,
among the billions of degrees of freedom, the one that yields
a useful effect precisely in the particular situation.
 SPRING 1976 15

Here it is necessary to deal with a question that usually e s -

capes the attention of the investigator, but that inevitably a r i s e s
if one adheres to the systems theory, i.e., i f one examines the
entire process of construction of a behavioral act from the a s -
pect of a functional system.
Through careful study of the general pattern of consecutive
operation of a functional system's key mechanisms it becomes
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possible to see that decision-making is based on the result that

corresponds to the motivation dominant at the given moment.
Observations in recent years testify, however, to the effect
that in the stage of afferent synthesis, it is not only general
afferent features of a particular external situation that a r e ex-
tracted from the memory but the characteristics of those r e -
sults that on previous occasions followed from similar motiva-
tional and emotional conditions.
In other words, the brain possesses an awesome capacity for
system generalization of stimuli, a capacity to encompass not
only the special characteristics of given events but the degree
of success and the usefulness of results obtained in analogous
situations in the past. The results of past experience can be
consecutively extracted from the memory and compared with
the needs of the particular situation until the motivation domi-
nant today comes to correspond entirely to one of the results
of the past. This may perhaps be one of the most remarkable
capacities of the brain: the sifting through of the recalled r e -
sults of the past and comparison of them with the needs of the
moment.
Motivational excitation, having arisen in the emotional struc-
tures of the brain (hypothalamus, limbic system, and reticular
formation), also irradiates into those cerebral structures that
preserve in memory the very results of various ways of satis-
fying the particular motivation in the past.
For example, appetite depends on the lateral nucleus hy-
pothalamus's being uninterruptedly stimulated by "hungry"
blood. This excitation, a s it r i s e s in the cerebral cortex in an
ascending direction, here mobilizes elements of past experi-
ence pertaining precisely to the given motivation. We begin to
 16 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

s o r t out the possibilities of satisfying it in accordance with the

particular situation. Simply, we look for something t o bite and
chew. And we often say that we won't go to a particular r e s -
taurant "because t h e r e they feed you badly."
What does such a decision mean from the standpoint of nerve
physiology ? It signifies (see diagram) that, in going over the
possibilities of satisfying the food motivation, we extract from
memory not only information about going t o that restaurant i n
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the past but a l s o the result of such a visit, i.e., we recollect

the meal itself and the t a s t e sensations from the food obtained
a t some previous time in that restaurant.
It is c l e a r from the diagram that virtually the entire func-
tional system And a l l i t s mechanisms, including the mechanism
for estimating the r e s u l t obtained, a r e incorporated in the pro-
c e s s of recollection under the influence of the dominant moti-
vation.
An amazing thing! The intellect functions by harmoniously
combining the most important factors of the neurophysiological
base required for decision-making: the entire present situation
(hunger) and the entire diversity of one's past experience asso-
ciated with satisfaction of the need for food. It would s e e m that
this system of interaction would be very remote from the r e a l
s t r u c t u r e of the brain. However, we s e e that each element of
our intellectual activity h a s a very definite b a s i s in nerve
physiology. The mechanisms of the functional system consti-
tuting it a r e undergoing detailed study in our laboratory. (14)
Returning t o decision-making, which, in accordance withour
diagram, is the r e s u l t of prior afferent synthesis, we have to
admit, on the b a s i s of a l l the foregoing, that the universal
s e a r c h through a l l f o r m e r r e s u l t s of action and a l l previous
evaluations of r e s u l t s extracted f r o m the memory take place i n
accordance with the motivation dominant at the moment. The
p r o c e s s of reverberation, mobilizing all the t r e a s u r e s in the
storehouses of our memory, is required precisely for this
critical stage. Consequently, "decision-making," a s denoted
in our model (see diagram), is the procedure whose result is
accepted after combing through the "imagined" r e s u l t s most
adequate t o the given situation.
 SPRING 1976 17

F r o m the standpoint of nerve physiology this p r o c e s s of

choice of degree of freedom consists, obviously, of continuous
scanning of various r e s u l t s , and the standard for this scanning
is the motivation dominant a t the given moment. Experiments
in our laboratory have demonstrated that in a number of spe-
cific situations (15), cortico-hypothalamic reverberation can
b e quite
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5. The Action Result A c c e ~ t o r

In this section we come to the analysis of that aspect of our

neurophysiological apparatus which is c r i s s c r o s s e d with the
leading lines of historical attempts to decipher the m y s t e r i e s
of the human mind ("goal," "prediction," " e r r o r , " "memory,"
"expectation," and much else). As it t u r n s out, all these fac-
t o r s have a single, common, neurophysiological c o r e that comes
into play quite clearly a t the moment a decision is taken (or a
little later). Above all, I have in mind the neurophysiological
apparatus of prediction, which we have t e r m e d "the action r e -
sult acceptor." What is this a p p a r a t u s ? What is i t s nature,
and what a r e i t s functions ? Thanks t o the combing through of
a l l the t r a c e s of past r e s u l t s and relating them to the particu-
l a r dominant motivation, this apparatus concentrates in itself
a l l the afferent signals of that ultimate result for the sake of
which the decision was taken.
Let u s analyze an example. If a decision has been made to
take a g l a s s from the table, then the r e s u l t acceptor making
i t s appearance will have concentrated within it a l l the features
of a glass pertaining t o the action: i t s external appearance,
weight, tactile features perceptible t o cutaneous receptors,
temperature, and s o forth. The meaning of this apparatus, an-
ticipating and predicting the properties of the future result.
l i e s i n the fact that; a t the end of the action, that is, after the
g l a s s has been picked up, a l l the information on the p a r a m e t e r s
of that action will have to have been received. It is precisely
a t this moment that comparison of the r e s u l t predicted in the
action r e s u l t acceptor (to pick up the glass) with the parame-
t e r s of the actual result takes place. (16) -
 18 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

At the moment when the two s e t s of stimuli a r e compared,

the nervous system monitors the r e s u l t s of the action taken.
If the comparison shows that the forecast p a r a m e t e r s (predic-
tion) in the acceptor of the anticipated r e s u l t correspond en-
tirely to the p a r a m e t e r s of the actual result, the given action
is completed, and i t s r e s u l t s receive "sanction" and a r e uti-
lized to shape the following stage of behavior. However, if it
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is found that the p a r a m e t e r s of the r e s u l t of the action that a c -

tually took place fail t o accord with those predicted, this dis-
agreement stimulates construction and selection of a new pro-
gram of action that a s s u r e s m o r e accurately that the predicted
r e s u l t s will follow.
Inasmuch as our e n t i r e behavior consists of a genuine con-
tinuum of r e s u l t s g r e a t and s m a l l (17), in practice this kind of
comparison occurs continuously in t h e nervous system. Thus,
for example, even the r e s u l t s of such insignificant actions a s
opening a door on a stair-landing, descending a s t a i r c a s e , get-
ting into a bus, and s o forth, a r e evaluated, and shape a chain
for the reception of subsequent results. However, they too may
be subdivided into other, m o r e minute, r e s u l t s : for example,
placing one's foot on the f i r s t s t e p of the bus, on the second,
and s o forth. It is amazing that our nervous system is r e -
quired, without exception, t o obtain, from each such "small"
result, information that is processed in the corresponding ac-
tion result acceptor. At the slightest failure of the r e s u l t t o
correspond t o the prediction (say, we m i s s e d a step), the brain
immediately s e l e c t s a new motion.
This brief description of the functions of the apparatus pre-
dicting results r e n d e r s i t s title - the action result acceptor -
comprehensible. The Latin word acceptare p o s s e s s e s two
meanings: "I accept" and "I approve," which a r e represented
in the functions of the action r e s u l t acceptor. (18)
Numerous experiments on the cellular and n z r o c h e m i c a l
levels have been conducted in our laboratory t o investigate how
that apparatus of prediction is created i n each s e p a r a t e c a s e
and what i t s functions a r e on the s c a l e of the functional system
a s a whole (see diagram).
 SPRING 1976

Now we a r e in a position to evaluate the significance of that

apparatus in relation t o the intellectual functioning of humans
and animals and t o determine i t s r o l e in studying a n artificial
intellect. In the f i r s t place it is a n apparatus of prediction, in-
asmuch a s the properties of a future, a s yet unattained, result
a r e predicted in it. Since in a l l our actions the obtaining of any
r e s u l t is associated with a previously s e t goal, it is quite obvi-
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ous that the apparatus of the action r e s u l t acceptor is in prac-

t i c e virtually a goal apparatus. It follows from this that a s we
understand it and a s shown in our experiments, a goal is not
something t h e r e from the beginning, but is something prepared
by the complex work of the nervous system in the stage of af-
ferent synthesis. It is precisely this circumstance that makes
it possible to e x p r e s s a goal a s a psychological conception in
the language of neurophysiological mechanisms and objective
causal connections among the p r o c e s s e s occurring in the brain.
It should be emphasized that in considering questions of pre-
dictions and goals the philosophical aspect of the problem of
intelligence and i t s solution on the foundation of the concept of
a functional system e m e r g e with particular clarity.
It is a fact that until quite recently merely to utter such
words a s "prediction," "goal,ll and "purposeful behavior"
threatened a physiologist with accusations of idealism and
breaking with materialist principles. That situation in physi-
ology is historically quite explainable, inasmuch a s the appro-
priate "scientific climate" for a materialist solution of the
problem of goal and prediction had not yet been prepared. It
was reflex theory that primarily s e r v e d t o c r e a t e this climate
in c e r e b r a l physiology.
And, a s a natural consequence, we resigned ourselves to a
striking paradox: every thinking person was perfectly aware
that he s e t the goal of doing "something" considerably before
that "something" was implemented. But a t the s a m e time, the
physiology of the brain had no way of explaining the mechanisms
by which the brain posed a "goal," and with the help of which it
was able t o predict the realization of that "goal."
The attitude toward that problem changed radically with the
 20 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

discovery of the objective laws of nerve physiology that account

for the higher functions of the intellect. Today, a s one may s e e ,
this problem is being successfully worked out on the b a s i s of
the principles and categories of dialectical materialism, which
is bringing u s c l o s e r to a genuine modeling of the intellect.
This is becoming possible thanks t o the fact that the concept
of a functional system makes it possible to encompass a l l the
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basic mechanisms that help u s t o understand the natural intellect.

As electrophysiological studies of the shaping of this kind of
apparatus in the human being demonstrate, we a r e able artifi-
cially to introduce and extract from the action result acceptor
any desired new components (what is t e r m e d "enrichment of
the action r e s u l t acceptor"); and this considerably enhances
our power, our ability t o influence intellectual activity, particu-
larly with respect to learning processes.

6. Evolution of the Fundamental P r o p e r t i e s of the Intellect

A question a r i s e s , however. A r e a l l the fundamental mecha-

nisms of the intellect described above characteristic only of
the higher levels of development of animals, o r even only of
the human b r a i n ? This is a key question, because it is very
intimately associated with other questions, for example, Do
animals possess intelligence ? and When and in what animals
did it appear in the evolutionary p r o c e s s ?
Fogel and others made an interesting attempt to build an evo-
lutionary model of an "artificial intellect" that would have to
perfect i t s fundamental qualities by a process of addition of
primitive mechanisms in subsequent "generations." (19) It
must b e noted that in evolutionary modeling, the a c c u ~ u l a t i o n
of experience is achieved in a somewhat different fashion than
in the intellect of animals in the process of evolution.
In responding t o the questions posed above, we must f i r s t of
a l l state the basic proposition we have a r r i v e d a t a s the result
of many y e a r s of work on the properties of the intellect, as
described in the foregoing. None of the properties of c e r e b r a l
activity that we examined above a s characteristic features of
 SPRING 1976

the intellect appeared suddenly, a t some "Rubicon" before

which that property did not exist and after which it came into
being.
All these properties a r o s e a t the dawn of the origin of life,
and even then they w e r e a l l p a r t of a dynamic physiological
architecture. Moreover, they constituted a conditio sine qua
non for the very development of living beings.
-
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This may seem strange, inasmuch as we always describe

the intellect a s the supreme property of life, present a t most
in the very highest and most developed m e m b e r s of the animal
kingdom.
However, our amazement immediately disappears if we con-
s i d e r how the emergence of the intellect occurred. Consider,
for example, prediction of future events o r the r e s u l t s of some
activity that can be c a r r i e d out only by s o m e clearly defined
functional system.
What a r e the conditions of the external and internal world of
an animal under which prediction is possible ? The principal
condition for prediction is that the chain of events with r e s p e c t
to which the prediction is expressed has been repeatedly r e -
iterated i n the past at given points in space and given moments
in time. Our intelligence is capable of predicting that evening
will follow morning, and night will follow evening, only because
that inviolable course of external events h a s been repeated for
millions of y e a r s , both when living beings, including man, ex-
isted and when t h e r e was not even a hint that they would appear.
Here we have t o depart somewhat from concrete neurophysi-
ological p r o c e s s e s and mechanisms and have r e c o u r s e to gen-
eralizations of a broader nature.
The space-time continuum of the motion of m a t t e r , as Planck
justly observed, is a n absolute law of the universe. But that
law was operative long before the appearance of life on earth.
In other words, life, that i s , living beings, had, willy-nilly, to
"inscribe themselves" within the confines prescribed by that
fundamental law; and only under that conditon was their s u r -
vival assured. It was this fact that led to the conclusion that
it was precisely the property of being inscribed, o r the reflec-
 22 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

tion by
- living beings of the space-time continuum, that became
an absolutely essential condition of prediction.
Having considered this question a s it applied to a list of bio-
logical phenomena, we formulated, years ago, the principle of
anticipatory reflection by the brain of an actual s e r i e s of events
in the environment. It is precisely this property that is the
primeval characteristic of protoplasmic processes even in the
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lowest animals, for which the change of, for example, seasonal
phenomena (summer - fall - winter - spring - summer) has
been an unchanging condition for life over the course of mil-
lions of years.
One may cite dozens of examples of astounding precision and
purposeful adaptation to these absolute laws of the inorganic
world.
Thus, for example, naturalists have, for a long time, been in-
terested in the following paradoxical phenomenon. The grub of
a (Barcon) wasp spends the winter in the stage of a grub, and
in the spring the next cycles of development occur. One fact
therein is amazing: how the grub, containing a large amount
of fluid (water) in i t s body, is capable of surviving a temperature
close to -40". It was hypothesized that the water it contained
would have to freeze, that virtually all the protoplasmic com-
pounds in its cells would be destroyed, and the grub itselfwould
die. But the grub of that wasp does not die. Investigations in
recent years have shown that the Barcon grub possesses a
striking adaptability that appears with a remarkable anticipa-
tion ("prediction") of the course of natural phenomena. It
has been revealed that the earliest frosts of autumn a r e a stimu-
lus for the rapid formation of glycerine and its storage, which
substantially reduce the freezing point in the protoplasm of the
grub's cells. As a consequence, the grub proves to be protected
against frosts.
What is most important in this phenomenon i s the fact that
the cryoscopic point of the protoplasm is reduced by consider-
ably more than is required by the r e a l cooling at the moment.
After the mild frosts of autumn, the grub proves capable of
withstanding temperatures down to -40".
 SPRING 1976 23

This interesting fact shows that "prediction," i.e., creation

of conditions for reactions that will be needed only in the fu-
ture, is a universal phenomenon of living nature, based on a
rhythm in space-time phenomena that is conditioned either by
the course of processes in inorganic nature o r by repetition of
events by virtue of active movement of an animal in its en-
vironment.
In essence, Pavlov's discovery of the conditioned reflex was
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the discovery of anticipatory reflections of the environment in

a highly specialized substrate - the nervous system. The fact
is that when the dog secretes saliva in response to the ringing
of a bell, this occurs not because the saliva has to "digest the
bell," but because in the future food will appear that will have
to be digested. Consequently, by virtue of repetition of a se-
quence of specific actions within the environment we have cre-
ated a line of eased reactions in which a l l that is needed is the
first impulse for a chemical reaction to occur in protoplasm,
like the reaction in a powder fuse, projecting itself through the
nervous system into the future, anticipating the subsequent de-
velopment of external events.
It becomes clear, from various examples and reasoning pre-
viously adduced, that "prediction" a s a separable phenomenon
of intelligent action has deep, historical roots. At the highest
stage of evolution, the nervous system became the organ of
this anticipatory process. It was precisely that which sharp-
ened and accelerated the anticipatory processes 100-fold, and
it i s precisely thanks to it that we a r e able to c a r r y out an al-
most unbelievable voyage through the future in response to an
impulse or signal from the environment.
Evolution, beginning with primitive, protoplasmic "predic-
tion," perfected this process in the material phenomena of the
brain to such a degree that the brain became an organ that, at
each given moment of its activity, combines in itself past,
present, and future.
All this is not the fantasy of a nerve physiologist. The micro-
electrode technique has provided us with a means of establish-
ing the fact that some neurons experiencing - r e a l stimuli in-
 24 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

corporate accumulated - past experience and, at the same time,

establish processes containing the property of the same result
of action that will be obtained only in the future. In our labora-
tory we have termed these cerebral nerve cells "neurons of
three tenses."
In summing up discussion of the problem of "prediction," we
must emphasize that the kind of "prediction" revealed at higher
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stages of intellectual activity is a product of the most advanced

development of a prototypical process that is manifested a s
early a s in the anticipatory protoplasmic reflection of reality.
However, let us return to the natural development of events
in the shaping of behavioral acts on the highest level. The pro-
cess of afferent synthesis, a s we have already stated, termi-
nates with the adoption of a decision that is the consequence of
the picking over of possible results organically associated in
the past with the given motivation. It is in this manner that
one of the most remarkable phenomena in cerebral activity oc-
curs: the shaping, at the level of the nervous system, of a mod-
e l of all the signals and properties of a future useful result, in
connection with which and for the sake of which processes of
afferent synthesis were developed. And that is what a goal is.

7. Conclusion

The considerations presented in this article persuade us that,

in order to gain a knowledge of the principal properties of nat-
ural and artificial intellects, it is necessary to re-equip all
current nerve physiology with a new set of ideas and to develop
new approaches to techniques and methodology. The fact is that
quests for the most characteristic features of artificial intel-
lect have shown that nerve physiology, if it builds only on the
traditional and primarily analytical basis, cannot hope for suc-
c e s s in solving the problem.
A French physiologist of the highest distinction, A. Fessard,
once wrote, in connection with the appearance of cybernetics,
that science had entered the feedback e r a . (20) This was quite
true. But to that one must add the fact that G r v e physiology
 SPRING 1976 25

had entered the e r a of a broader and deeper synthesis of neuro-

physiological and behavioral r e s e a r c h tasks, of a new synthesis
of data obtained in the various biological sciences. Above all,
one must speak here of the development of the s y s t e m s ap-
proach, which contained a l l the opportunities f o r study of the
very highest f o r m s of c e r e b r a l activity: "decision-making,"
"goal, " "prediction," "intelligence," and others.
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The approach suggested in the present a r t i c l e , resting upon

functional system theory, brings u s close, it s e e m s t o us, to
solving the as-yet mysterious problems of the intellect. In any
c a s e , certain aspects of the problem have become c l e a r to us,
and a c c e s s h a s been opened t o concrete scientific and experi-
mental investigation of aspects that very recently appeared to
b e the prerogative of psychology, and often seemed to be the
foundation for idealist interpretations.
Here, too, in the course of study of the historical antecedents
of the intellect, s e r i o u s generalizations have been made, p e r -
mitting a n understanding of i t s continuous evolution. The most
important properties of the intellect - afferent synthesis; goal-
setting, decision-making, and evaluation of the r e s u l t obtained;
prediction and feedback affer entation; and sanctioning the ob-
taining of a useful result - these p r o c e s s e s of synthesis have
had a long prehistory. They developed from those primitive
f o r m s that came into being a t the dawn of life on our planet.
This universal b a s i s of the architecture of the behavioral
a c t is that historical factor thanks to which life and the brain
developed to their highest stage - the human intellect.
The investigations of the last few y e a r s persuade u s even
m o r e that functional system theory is applicable to the solution
of problems of the intellect. Its concrete, synthesizing, key
mechanisms, which have been developed on a s y s t e m s basis,
make it possible to s e t up a "conceptual bridge" between nerve
physiology, psychology, and the problems that a r i s e along the
road t o solving the m y s t e r i e s of the intellect.
Consequently, the philosophy of dialectical materialism has
once again gained a proof that the intellect, that i s , the con-
scious activity and active transformation of the very p r o c e s s
 26 SOVIET STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

of adaptation to environmental factors, is truly a product of

historical development from matter to cognition, a develop-
ment grounded in the fundamental laws of the inorganic and
animate world on our planet.

Notes
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1) See W. McCulloch and W. Pitts, "Logicheskoe ischislenie

idei, otnosiashchikhsia k nervnoi aktivnosti," in Avtomaty, Mos-
cow, 1956; W. S. McCulloch, "Logic and Closed Loops for a
Computer Junket to Mars," in Neural Networks (symposium,
edited by E. R. Caianiello), New York, 1968; D. M. MacCay,
"Operational Aspect of Intellect," in Mechanization of Thought
Processes, Vol. I, London, 1959; M. Minskii, "Na puti k
iskusstvennomu intellektu," - TIRI, 1961, No. 49.
2) I.R.E. Transactions of Information Theory, Vol. It-8,
No. 5, Sept. 1962.
3) See I. P. Pavlov, Poln. sobr. trudov, Vol. IV, Lektsii o
rabote bol'shikh ~ o l u s h a r i aolovnoao
i mozaa. Moscow and
Leningrad, 1947.
4) See collection Problema tsentra i periferii v fiziologii
vysshei nervnoi deiatel'nosti, Gorki, 1935; P. K. Anokhin,
"Uzlovye voprosy v izuchenii vysshei nervnoi deiatel'nosti,"
in Problemy vysshei nervnoi deiatel'nosti, Moscow, 1949,
pp. 9-128.
5) See 0. M. Attlee, "Mekhanizatsiia protsessov myshleniia"
(closing remarks), in symposium Samoorganizuiushchiesia
sistemy, Moscow, 1964, pp. 430-434.
6) Ibid., p. 432.
7) L. Fogel, A. Owens, and M. Walsh, Iskusstvennyi intellekt
i evoliutsionnoe modelirovanie, Moscow, 1969.
8) Ibid., p. 19.
9) See, for example, M. Mesarovich, "Teoriia sistem i
biologiia: tochka zreniia teoretika," Sistemnye issledovaniia.
Ezhegodnik 1970, Moscow, 1970; T. H. Waterman, "Teoriia
sistem i biologiia: tochka zreniia biologa," ibid.; V. N. Sadov-
sky, "The History and Perspectives of the Systems Approach
 SPRING 1976 27

Development and General Systems Theory," International Con-

g r e s s of the History of Sciences (August 18-24, 1971), Mos-
cow, 1971.
10) F. Rosenblatt, Principles of Neurodynamics, Washing-
ton, 1962.
11) See, for example, R. M. Thrall, ed., Decision Processes,
New York, 1954.
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12) See XX congr6s International de Psychologie. Guide

R6sum6, Tokyo, 1972.
13) See P. K. Anokhin, Problemy tsentra i periferii v sovre-
mennoi fiziologii nervnoi deiatel'nosti, Gorki, 1935.
14) See P. K. Anokhin and K. V. Sudakov, llNeurofiziolo-
gicheskie mekhanizmy goloda i nasyshcheniia, " Uspekhi fizio-
logicheskikh nauk, 1971, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 3-4 1.
15) K. M. Kagramanov, "0 kholinergicheskikh i adrener-
gicheskikh mekhanizmakh deiatel'nosti golovnogo mozga."
Author's abstract of dissertation for doctoral degree, Mos-
cow, 1965.
16) See P. K. Anokhin, "Uzlovye voprosy v izuchenii vysshei
nervnoi deiatel'nosti," Problemy vysshei nervnoi deiatel'nosti,
MOSCOW, 1949, pp. 9-128.
17) See P. K. Anokhin, Printsipial'nye voprosy obshchei
teorii funktsional'nykh sistem, Moscow, 1971.
18) See P. K. Anokhin, llUzlovye voprosy v izuchenii vysshei
nervnoi deiatel'nosti," Problemy vysshei nervnoi deiatel'nosti,
Moscow, 1949; same author, llOsobennosti afferentnogo appara-
ta uslovnogo refleksa i ikh znachenie dlia psikhologii," Voprosy
psikhologii, 1955, No. 6.
19) See L. Fogel et al., Iskusstvennyi intellekt i evoliutsion-
noe modelirovanie.
20) Structure et hvolution des techniques, 1953/1954,
NO. 35-36.