CHAPTER TWO

NATURA NATURANS A N D NATURA NATURATA

Transformed by Spinoza's doctrine of God's immanence, the scholastic

distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata becomes the expres-
sion of an infinite potency of continuity and differentiation.
This terminology is introduced in the Ethic by the scholium to
proposition 29, part I.
Before I go any farther, I wish here to explain, or rather to recall to
recollection, what we mean by natura naturans and what by natura naturata.
For, from what has gone before, I think it is plain that by natura naturans we
are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, or
those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, that
is to say . . . , God in so far as He is considered as a free cause. But by natura
naturata I understand everything which follows from the necessity of the
nature of God, or of any one of God's attributes, that is to say, all the modes
of God's attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in
God, and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived.
(schol. prop. 29, I)

Antequam ulterius pergam, hie, quid nobis per Naturam naturantem, &
quid per Naturam naturatam intelligendum sit, explicare volo, vel potius
monere. Nam ex antecedentibus jam constare existimo, nempe, quod per
Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id, quod in se est, & per se
concipitur, sive talia substantiae attributa, quae aeternam, & infinitam
essentiam exprimunt, hoc est . . . , Deus, quatenus, ut causa libera,
consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne, quod ex necessitate
Dei naturae, sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est, omnes
Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur, ut res, quae in Deo sunt,
& quae sine Deo nee esse, nee concipi possunt. (II, 71,5)

Thus, Spinoza distinguishes God from God's acts, distinguishes sub-

stance from its infinite modifications. Yet, this distinction posits a unity
and does not evince a separation. God is as God's acts. T r o m the
necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in infinite ways
. . . must follow' (prop. 16, I). God or substance, in which all is and
from which all must have its being, necessarily expresses itself as infinite
individuals. Nothing is outside substance: God cannot be divided from
His acts.
The scholium to proposition 29 differentiates natura naturans and natura
naturata by the opposition of freedom and necessity, identifying creativity
and the order of creation with freedom and necessity, respectively. Yet,
 NATURA NATU RANS AND NATURA NATU RATA 7

Spinoza has already demonstrated that, for a one beside whom there is
no other, freedom is necessity (prop. 17, I), the necessity of an infinite
internal complexity. God 'is compelled by no one' (prop. 17, I), but this
does not imply an arbitrary freedom of will. The world does not come to
be by divine fiat (props. 32 & 33 with dems., corols., schols., I). God's
freedom is not a freedom of contingency, but of a plenitude of meaning,
the infinite interdeterminations of an infinite power of forms of forms as
divine idea. All things come to be 'which can be conceived by the infinite
intellect' (prop. 16, I). God's freedom consists in being God.
We see emerging, in this discussion of freedom and necessity, the
tension of unity and plurality, the tension of the one and the many.
For God, substance, freedom and necessity are one, because He is one,
neither coerced by external others, nor fragmented and violated within
by an alien being (1st additional proof of God's existence following prop.
11, I). Substance is consistent with itself.
Here, the relevance of Spinoza's doctrine of the indivisibility of
substance comes to the fore as a basic interpretive principle in our
account of natura naturans and natura naturata. In the immanentist teaching
of Spinoza, the naturanslnaturata distinction becomes an account of
indivisibility and divisibility. It will be in this context that we find our
key to Spinoza's conception of individuality and plurality, his doctrine of
the one and the many.
'Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible' (prop. 13, I). In the
scholium to proposition 13, part I, Spinoza posits the logical inter-
changeability of the concepts of infinity and indivisibility. The infinite is,
as it were, by definition, necessarily indivisible. The divisible is always
the finite. God, as 'Being absolutely infinite' (def. 6, I), exists as the
power of unity.
While the theme of indivisible/divisible runs throughout the Ethic,
perhaps its most succinct and explicit expression can be found in
Spinoza's defense of God's corporeal or extended nature in the scholium
to proposition 15, part I. We may take this discussion as emblematic.
Opponents of God's corporeality argue that God's infinite nature
precludes extension. Starting from the premise that extension is com-
posed of parts, they develop a series of paradoxes concerning lesser and
greater infinites, and the additive generation of the infinite from the
finite. These they employ as reductio ad absurdum arguments for God's
incorporeality.
In this scholium, Spinoza demonstrates that the absurdity lies not in
the assumption that extension is infinite, but in the assumption that
extension is made up of discrete parts.
Calling upon those who deny the existence of a vacuum, he insists that