Jc Beall Curriculum Vitae

Contact Details
Department of Philosophy Phone: on request
University of Notre Dame Email: jbeall@nd.edu
Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA Website: entailments.net

Education
University of Massachusetts, Amherst MA, PhD (Philosophy) May 1998
Australian National University Postgraduate studies 1993
Princeton University Postgraduate studies 1990–92
Princeton Theological Seminary MDiv (Academic Track) May 1992
Grove City College (PA, USA) BA (Philosophy) May 1989

Career History
St Andrews Global Fellow, University of St Andrews, [2021-2022]
The O’Neill Family Chair in Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 2020-
Research Fellow, Center for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, [2018-2019]
Distinguished Shinhan Professor, Yonsei University (Korea), [2018]
Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor, University of Connecticut (Storrs), [2015–20]
Professorship in Philosophy (fractional), University of Tasmania, [2015–2018]
Professorial Fellow, Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, [2013–15]
Professorship in Philosophy, University of Otago, 2-year appt [2011–13]
Associate Research Fellow, NIP, University of Aberdeen, [2009–15]
Professor of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, [2007–2015]
Associate Professor (Philosophy), University of Connecticut, [2004–2007]
Associate Research Fellow, Arché Centre, University of St Andrews, [2005–2015]
Visiting Fellow, University of Melbourne, [June 2002]
Visiting Scholar, Philosophy Subfaculty, Oxford University, [July–Aug 2001]
Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut, [2000–2003]
Lecturer B, Victoria University of Wellington, [Jan–July 2000]
Lecturer A, then Lecturer B, University of Tasmania, [1998-1999]

Awards, Honors
St Andrews Global Fellow, University of St Andrews, 2021-2022
Research Fellow, CPR, University of Notre Dame, 2018-19
Distinguished Shinhan Professorship, Yonsei University, 2018
Endowed Thacher Lecture, George Washington University, 2018
Keynote, Philosophical Logic Plenary Session, 2018 Annual North American ASL Meeting
Edward C. Marth Graduate Mentorship Award, University of Connecticut, Oct 2013
British Academy Endorsement: ‘Exceptional Talent’ in Logic and Philosophy, Aug 2013
Visiting Fellow, Sydney Centre for Foundations of Science, Sydney, 2008; 2012
Daniel Taylor Fellow, University of Otago, 2009
Honorary Research Associate, University of Aberdeen, 2009–15
Honorary Research Associate, University of St Andrews, 2005–
University Fellow, University of Melbourne, 2003
A. Ambrose Lazerowitz/T. Tymoczko Memorial Logic Lecture, Smith College, 2001
Books
monographs
- Divine Contradiction, Oxford: OUP, forthcoming.
- The Contradictory Christ, Oxford: OUP, 2021.
- Formal Theories of Truth, Oxford: OUP, 2018 (with M. Glanzberg and D. Ripley).
- Spandrels of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- Logical Pluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 (with G. Restall).

edited collections
- Revenge of the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Truth, special issue of The Monist, 2005.
- The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford: OUP (w/ G. Priest and B. Armour-Garb), 2004.
- Deflationism and Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press (with B. Armour-Garb), 2006.
- Deflationary Truth, Chicago: Open Court Press (with B. Armour-Garb), 2004.

textbooks
- Truth: The Basics, Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming (w/ B. Middleton).
- Revised 2nd Edition of Logic: The Basics, Oxford: Routledge, 2016 (w/ S. Logan).
- Logic: The Basics, Oxford: Routledge, 2010.
- Supplement to Logic: The Basics (1st ed.), Oxford: Routledge, 2010 (with D. Ripley).
- Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic, Oxford:
Oxford University Press (with Bas van Fraassen), 2004.

Refereed Philosophy and Logic Papers/Chapters

– Transparent truth as a logical property, in M. Lynch et al., eds., The Nature of Truth,
2ed., Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2021.
– A tale of excluding the middle. In Heinrich Wansing, ed., Logical Investigations, Volume
27, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2021 (with G. Priest).
– A note on FDE ‘all the way up’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume 61, Number
2, pp. 283-296, 2020 (w/ Caleb Camrud).
– Fully divine and fully human: a bi-modal outline towards consistency. Religious Studies,
forthcoming, 2020 (w/ A. J. Cotnoir). (doi: doi.org/10.1017/S0034412520000360)
– FDE as The One True Logic. In H. Omori and H. Wansing, eds., New Essays on Belnap-
Dunn Logic, Springer 2019, pp 115-126.
– A neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of christology. Faith and Philos-
ophy, 36:2, 2019 (w/ J. Henderson). (doi: doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201957124)
– Non-classical truth theories. In M. Glanzberg, ed., Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2018 (with D. Ripley).

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- The simple argument for subclassical logic. In C. Juhl & J. Schechter, eds., Philosophical
Issues: Philosophy of Logic and Inference, 28 (1):30-54, 2018.
* Selected as one of Top-10 Articles in Philosophy for year 2018; reprinted in The
Philosopher’s Annual. http://www.philosophersannual.org/.
– God of the gaps. Analysis, 77 (4): 681-689, 2017 (with A. J. Cotnoir).
– There is no logical negation: true, false, both and neither. In P. Girard and Z. Weber,
eds., Non-classicality: Logic, Philosophy, and Mathematics, a special volume of Australasian
Journal of Logic, 2018.
– Do laws deliver gluts? In H. Patrick Glenn and Lionel D. Smith, ed., Law and the New
Logics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199-207, 2017.
– Off-topic: a new interpretation of Weak Kleene Logic. Australasian Journal of Logic,
(13:6), Article no. 1, 2016. (http://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/issue/view/478)
– Trivializing sentences and the promise of semantic completeness. Analysis, 75 (4):573-584,
2015.
– Non-detachable validity and deflationism. In C. Caret and O. Hjortland, ed., Foundations
of Logical Consequence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 276-285, 2015.
– The end of inclosure. Mind, 123 (491):829-849, 2014.
– Tolerance without gluts. Mind, 123 (491):791-811, 2014.
- Two flavors of Curry’s paradox. Journal of Philosophy, 110 (3), pp. 143-165, 2013 (with
J. Murzi).
– Shrieking against gluts. Analysis (2013) 73 (3):438-445.
– Free of detachment: logic, rationality, and gluts. Noûs, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12029.
* Selected as one of Top-10 Articles in Philosophy for year 2013; reprinted in The
Philosopher’s Annual. http://www.philosophersannual.org/.
- A simple approach towards recapturing consistent theories in paraconsistent settings.
Review of Symbolic Logic, Vo6:No4, December 2013, pp 755-764.
- LP+ , K3+ , FDE+ and their classical collapse. Review Symbolic Logic, v6n4, 2013.
- A note on freedom from detachment in the Logic of Paradox. Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic, Volume 54, Number 1, pp. 15-20, 2013. (with T. Forster and J. Seligman).
– Why Priest’s reassurance is not reassuring. Analysis 72 (3): 517-525, 2012.
- Future contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):547-557, 2012.
- Multiple-conclusion LP and default classicality. Review of Symbolic Logic v4:n2, 2011.
- Adding to relevant restricted quantification. Australasian Journal of Logic v10:2011.
- Dialetheists against Pinocchio. Analysis 71:4, pp. 689–691, 2011.
- Can u do that? Analysis 71:2, pp. 280–285, 2011 (with G. Priest and Z. Weber).
- Strict-choice validities. In D. Cohnitz, P. Pagin and M. Rossberg, Erkenntnis (Special
issue): Monism, Pluralism, Relativism: New Essays on the Status of Logic, 79, pp. 301–307,
2014.
- Deflated truth pluralism. In C. Wright and N. Pedersen, eds., Alethic Pluralism: Current
Debates, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

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- On the ternary relation and conditionality. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2012); 41:595–
612 (with R. Brady, J. M. Dunn, A. Hazen, E. Mares, R. K. Meyer, G. Priest, G. Restall,
D. Ripley, J. Slaney, R. Sylvan).
- Vague intensions: a modest marriage proposal. In Moruzzi & Dietz, eds, Cuts and Clouds:
Essays on the Nature and Logic Vagueness, Oxford: OUP, pp. 187–200, 2010.
- Truth, necessity, and abnormal worlds. In M. Pelis, ed., Logica Yearbook 2009, College
Publications, pp. 17–33, 2010.
- Prolegomenon to future revenge. In Beall, ed., Revenge of the Liar, OUP, pp. 1–30.
- Where the paths meet: remarks on truth and paradox. In S. French, ed., Midwest Studies:
Truth, South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 2008 (with M. Glanzberg).
- ‘Unsettledness’ in a bivalent language: a modest, non-epistemic proposal. In H. Dyke,
ed., From Truth to Reality: Essays on the Logic and Nature of Truth, Routledge, 2008.
- Truth and Paradox—A Philosophical Sketch. In D. Jacquette, ed., Handbook of the
Philosophy of Science Volume X: Philosophy of Logic, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 325–410.
- True, false, and paranormal. Analysis 66:2, pp.102–114, 2006. (Selected for Analysis
Preprints.)
- Modelling the ‘Ordinary View’. In P. Greenough et al., eds., Truth and Realism: Current
Debates, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 61–74.
- Not deep inconsistency. Australasian Journal of Logic, 2007.
- Analetheism and Dialetheism. Analysis Jan 2004 (with D. Ripley).
- Relevant Restricted Quantification. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2006, 6:35, pp. 587–
598 (with R. Brady, A. Hazen, G. Priest, G. Restall).
- Knowability and Odd Epistemic Possibilities. In J. Salerno, ed., New Essays on Knowa-
bility, Oxford University Press, pp. 105–127.
- Transparent Disquotationalism. In Beall et al., eds., Deflationism and Paradox, Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp.7–22. [NB: This paper was blind- and externally refereed.]
- Minimalism, Epistemicism, and Paradox. In Beall et al., eds., Deflationism and Paradox,
Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.85–96. [NB: blind- and externally refereed.]
- On the Singularity Theory of Denotation. In Beall, ed., Liars and Heaps, Oxford University
Press, 2004, pp.53–62. [NB: blind- and externally refereed.]
- True and False—As If. In Priest et al., eds, The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp.197–216. [NB: blind- and externally refereed.]
- At the Intersection of Truth and Falsity. In G. Priest et al., eds., The Law of Non-
Contradiction, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.7–19.
- Negation on Holiday: Double-Aspect Dialetheism. In D. DeVidi et al., eds., A Logical
Approach to Philosophy, Kluwer, pp. 169–92.
- Deflationism and gaps: untying ‘not’s in the debate. Analysis (October 62.4 2003).
- Is Yablo’s paradox non-circular? Analysis 61:3, July 2001, pp.176–87.
- A neglected deflationary approach to the liar. Analysis 61.2, April 2001, pp.129–36.
- Dialetheism and the Probability of Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
79:1, March 2001, pp.114–18.
- Existence Claims and Causation. Philosophia Mathematica (3), V. 9, 2001, pp.80–6.

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 - A Neglected Response to The Grim Result. Analysis 60:1, January 2000, pp.38–41.
- On the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophy 75:291, January 2000, pp.127–30.
- Minimalism, gaps, and the Holton conditional. Analysis 60:4, Oct 2000, pp.340–351.
- Fitch’s Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philos-
ophy 78:2, June 2000, pp. 241–247.
- On Truthmakers for Negative Truths. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78:2, June 2000,
pp.264–268.
- On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates. The Philosophical Quarterly
50:200, July 2000, pp. 380–382.
- Completing Sorensen’s Menu: A Non-Modal Yabloesque Curry. Mind 108:432, October
1999, pp.737–739.
- Is the Observable World Consistent? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78:1, 2000,
pp.113–118.
- From Full Blooded Platonism To Really Full Blooded Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica
(3) Vol. 7, October 1999, pp.321–25.
- A Priestly Recipe for Explosive Curry. Logical Studies 2001, No. 7. (Special Issue:
Proceedings of the International Conference Third Smirnov Readings Moscow, 5.24-5.27.01)
- Should Deflationists be Dialetheists? Noûs 37:2 2003, pp.303–24 (w/ B. Armour-Garb).
- Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction. The Philosophical Quarterly 52:207, April
2002, pp.217–225.
- Can deflationists be dialetheists? Journal of Philosophical Logic 30:6, December 2001,
pp.593–608 (with B. Armour-Garb).
- The simple liar without bivalence? Analysis 62.1, Jan 2002, pp.22–26 (with O. Bueno).
- Looking for Contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:4, December 2001,
pp.565–570 (with M. Colyvan).
- From Heaps of Gluts to Hyde-ing the Sorites. Mind 110:438, Apr 2001:401-408 (w/ M.
Colyvan).
- Defending Logical Pluralism. In B. Brown and J.Woods, eds., Logical Consequences,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001 (with G. Restall).
- Logical Pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, December 2000, pp.475–93
(with G. Restall). (Selected for the Special 2000 AJP Volume on Logic).
Refereed Encyclopedia and Related Entries
- Logic. In Duncan Pritchard, ed., Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy (with John P.
Burgess), 2017.
- Curry’s paradox. In E. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Link: http:
//plato.stanford.edu/entries/curry-paradox/.]
- Liar paradox. In E. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (with M. Glanzberg).
[Link: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/.]
- Logical consequence. In E. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (with G.
Restall). [Link: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence/.]
- Consistency, truth, and paradox. In P. Hogan, ed., Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Lan-
guage Sciences.

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Book Reviews
- Review of T. Maudlin, Truth and Paradox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), The
Philosophical Review, 2003.
- Review of K. Fine, Modality and Tense (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy, 2005.
- Review of G. Priest, Towards Non-Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
Notre Dame Philosophical Review, 2005.
- Review of S. Shapiro, Handbook of Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005.
- Review of J. Woods, Paradox and Paraconsistency (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2003 (with D. Ripley).
- Review of H. Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2003.
- Review of C. McGinn, Logical Properties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy, 2003.
- Review of R. Sorensen, Vagueness and Contradiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2002.
- Review of J. M. Dunn and G. M. Hardegree, Algebraic Methods in Philosophical Logic
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2002.
- Review of S. Soames, Understanding Truth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999),
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2001.
Recent Invited Lectures/Talks [Before Pandemic!]
- On subclassical logic and ‘conceptual engineering’. Logic Seminar (T. Hofweber), UNC
(Chapel Hill), Mar 2019.
- Lecture on truth, NYU and CUNY Grad Center, Nov 2019.
- Arché and Logos lectures, University of St Andrews, May 2019.
- Lecture on subclassical logic, Princeton University, April 2019.
- Long live classical logic. Colloquium, University of Notre Dame, Mar 2019.
- Series of lectures on in-progress Logic without detachment monograph. Yonsei University
(Korea), April 2018.
- Logic is nonclassical, and Tarski’s lessons are nonetheless correct. Public lecture. Yonsei
University (Korea), April 2018.
- Subclassical logic and our true classical-logic theories. Plenary-Session Talk in Philosoph-
ical Logic, North American Association for Symbolic Logic (Illinois), May 2018.
- Christ: A Contradiction! University of Notre Dame CPR talk (Indiana), Sept 2017.
- Truth, Struth, and Restricted Quantification. UNAM Institute for Philosophical Research
Colloquium (Mexico City), Sept 2017.
- On contextual truth. The Ohio State University, Mar 2017.
- On FDE as logic. Logic Seminar (G. Russell), UNC (Chapel Hill), Mar 2017.
- FDE as logic. Colloquium, University of Calgary, Sept 2016
- There is no logical negation. AAL, LaTrobe, Melbourne, June 2016

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- There is no logical negation. Invited Metaphysics/Logic talk, CUNY/NYU, Oct 2015
- The spirit is willing but the logic is weak. Keynote, Universal Logic Conference, Instanbul,
June 2015.
- The ways of subclassical logic: 5-lecture series. Universal Logic Summer School, Instanbul,
June 2015.
- On logic. Public lecture, University of Tasmania, Nov 2014.
- Hegelian conjunction. Technical University, Berlin (Germany), July 2014.
- Four shades of truth. Paderborn University, Paderborn (Germany), July 2014.
- Paradox: ancient and new. Keynote, Pacific APA Session, San Diego, April 2014.
- Living without detachment. Keynote, World Congress Paraconsistency (IV), Kolkata
(India), Ap 2014.
- Knower and truth. Philosophy talk, University of Virginia, Jan 2014.
- Truth and paradox: 7-lecture guest series, Paradoxes Seminar, MIT, Sept–Dec 13.
- Knower as spandrel of truth. Keynote, SIFA 3 Conference, Cagliari (Italy), Nov 13.
- It all comes down to truth. St A Undergraduate Philosophy Series, St Andrews, Oct 13.
- Logic and Rationality. Keynote, Logic and Politics Conference, Milan (Italy), Dec 13.
- Hegelian contradiction. Keynote, Logic-Contradiction Conf, Berlin (Germany), Dec 13.
- Non-detachment. Keynote, Non-classical logic conf, Ruhr-Universität Bochum (Germany),
Dec 13.
- Philosophy and many-valued logic. Guest Lecture, Cuny Graduate Center, Mar 13.
- The end of inclosure. Philosophy Colloquium, University of Alberta (Canada), Jan 13.
- Logic, rationality, and gluts. Keynote, In Contradiction, Glasgow University, Dec 12.
- Non-detachment. Keynote, Society for Exact Philosophy, Ohio State University, Oct 12.
- On non-detachment. Consequence and consequences, GAP Conference, University of
Konstanz (Germany), Oct 12.
- Classical recapture and detachment. Philosophy Colloquium, Otago University, July 12.
- Logic, choices, and detachment. Sydney Centre for Foundations of Science, June 12.
- Paradoxes and philosophy. Lehigh University, April 12.
- Detachment and logic. NELLC, Yale University, April 12.
- Truth without detachment. Axiomatic vs Semantic Truth, Munich Centre for Mathemat-
ical Philosophy, Mar 12.
- Truth without detachment. CUNY Graduate Center Colloquium, Feb 12.
- Truth without detachment. 5-talk lecture series, Arché, University of St Andrews, Jan 12.
- Non-detachable dialetheism. Auckland University, Philosophy Colloquium, August 2011.
- Temporal curry paradox. Beyond the Possible Conference, Melbourne, July 2011.
- Illogical times. Technische Universität Berlin, Conference on Contradiction, June 2011.
- On non-detachable validity. Princeton University, Conference on Truth, April 2011.
- Future contradictions. University of Minnesota, Philosophy Colloquium, Feb 2011.
- Vagueness and gluts. Princeton University, Philosophy Colloquium, Oct 2010.

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 - Curry paradox. Arché at University of St Andrews, FLC Conference, Sep 2010.
- Vagueness and gluts. NIP at Univ. of Aberdeen, Language and Logic Conf., Sep 2010.
- Comments on Sider on fundamentality. UMass reunion conference, Amherst, Dec 2009.
- On paraconsistency. CUNY Grad. Center, NYC, Priest paradox seminar, Dec 2009.
- Actuality and non-normal worlds. University of Auckland, NZ, Aug 2009.
- Normality: an overspill result. Victoria University of Wellington, NZ, July 2009.
- Modal notions and contraction. University of Otago, Dunedin NZ, July 2009.
- Abnormal actuality. Henjice, CZ, Logica keynote talk, June 2009.
- Spandrels of truth. Union College, May 2009.
- Truth pluralism. Arché, University of St Andrews, Jan 2009.
- Transparent dialetheism. Yale University; Bobzien paradox seminar, 2008.
- On dialetheism. MIT; Ráyo paradox seminar, Nov 2008.
- Validity and truth-preservation. Tartu Estonia; Logical Pluralism conference, 2008.
- Paraconsistency and vagueness. University of Sydney, July 2008.
- Restricted generalizations in bxtt. University of Melbourne, June 2008.
- Vagueness and predicate term negation. MIT; McGee vagueness seminar, Mar 2008.
- Truth and P-sentences: comments on Vann McGee. 41st Chapel Hill Philosophy Collo-
quium, Chapel Hill NC, 2007.
- Non-epistemic unsettledness and bivalence. ‘Truth and Reality’ at Otago Uni, NZ, 2007.
- Truth and paradox (with M. Glanzberg), Math Methods in Philosophy, Banff Research
Center, Banff, 2007.
- Truthmakers. ‘Truthmakers’ session with T. Merricks at Central APA (Chicago), 2006.
- Semantical properties. University of Glasgow, UK, 2006.
- Abnormal worlds. Manchester University, UK, 2006.
- True and Paranormal. University of Pittsburgh, 2005.
- Why paradoxes matter. Arché, University of St Andrews, Nov 2005.
- True, False, and Paranormal. University of Notre Dame (Indiana, USA), 2005.
- Truth and Falsity. Colloquia at Smith and Mount Holyoke Colleges (MA, USA), 2005.
- Paradox and Paranormality. University of Richmond (Virginia), 2005.
- On Dialetheism. Philosophy of Mathematics Workshop, UNC Chapel Hill, 2004.
- The ‘Ordinary View’. Truth and Realism Conference, University of St Andrews, 2004.
- Restricted Quantification in Strong Paraconsistency. University of Melbourne, 2003.
- Full-blooded Inconsistency. Yale University, 2003.
- Paraconsistency and Mathematics. Logic Colloquium, University of Buffalo, 2002.
Select Professional and Administrative Service
- Editor Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ndpr.nd.edu, (2020–21).
- Associate Editor Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, ndpr.nd.edu, (2020–).
- Editor (Subject: Logic): Philosophy Compass journal, Oxford: Wiley (2015–19).
- Editor (Subject: Logic): Thought journal, Oxford: Wiley (2011–2016).

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- Coordinator: LP set theory workshop (uconn, 2013).
- Co-Founder and Director of the UConn Logic Group (2008–15): logic.uconn.edu.
- Co-founder of New England Logic and Language Colloquium (2006–).
- Editorial Board (Philosophy of Logic): Routledge Philosophy Compass Series (2005–).
- Tenure/Promotion Reviews (all external from 2004): 21.
- Ph.D. director/committee: eight/twenty (from 2004–).
- External PhD/MA theses: ten/seven.
- Regular Referee for: ....most mainstream philosophy journals and publishers, in addition
to most specialty logic journals, and some philosophy of religion journals.
- Nominating Editor for The Philosopher’s Annual (2004– ): philosophersannual.org/.
- Reviewer for Brian Leiter’s ‘philosophical gourmet report’ general rankings (2001-2015);
‘speciality rankings reviewer’ [No longer involved.]