PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT, V. LAGUESMA 3.
3. Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule II
FACTS
NLM-Katipunan filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE in behalf of the rank''n file employees of
the progressive dev. Corp (pizza hut). Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging fraud, falsification and
misrepresentation in the respondent. The motion specifically alleged that a.) respondent union registration was
tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in the ratification of the
respondent union's constitution and by-laws and in the election of its officers that there were 2 sets of supposed
attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on june26,1993. b.) while the
application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the organizational meeting held
on much less, c.) application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the
organizational meeting held on 1993, the charter cert issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated 1993 or 1
day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the charter
cert and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter. d.) voting was not conducted by secret ballot in violation
of art. 241, sec(c) of the labor code (e) the constitution & by laws submitted.
ISSUE: Challenge the legal personality of the respondent union.
RULING
The court held that to determine the validity of labor unions art.234 requirements of registration must be complied
with. If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those
appearing on the face of the application and the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied
recognition as a legitimate labor org.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent union had been seriously challenge, it would have
been more prudent to have granted petitioners request for the suspension of proceedings in the cert election case,
until the issue of the legality of the union’s registration shall have been resolved. Failure of the med-arbiter and
public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of discretion.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No. 96425 / 205 SCRA 802
Topic: Government Regulation: Union Registration Requirements
FACTS:
1. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner
alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union,
was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153.
2. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP claimed that there was no existing
collective bargaining agreement and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.
Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a)
the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.
4. Respondent KILUSAN-TUCP submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had
submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the
local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan further averred that no books of
accounts could be submitted as the local union was only recently organized.
5. Petitioner PDC insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it found that the
alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the
corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the signature of
the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private respondent KILUSAN-TUCP therefore failed
to substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by the rules.
6. MED-ARBITER Dela Cruz: held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the
formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was
sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a
certification election should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.
7. Petitioner filed an MR to the Office of the Secretary.
8. SECRETARY Laguesma: denied the MR.
9. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was correct that a labor organization such as the respondent (KILUSAN)-
TUCP may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere expedient of
issuing a charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR and as such local or chapter must at the
same time comply with the requirement of submission of duly subscribed constitution and by-laws, list of officers
and books of accounts
RULING:
1. YES, because, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is
fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers be certified
under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent.
The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis
for approval of the application for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is
entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization. The employer naturally
needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will
in a marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and
misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for
a criminal charge of perjury.
In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Section
3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:
(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set
of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently
registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and
attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements.
The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the
case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and
attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union
registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in
conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive
measures against the commission of fraud.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.
DOCTRINE: Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered
with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof."
Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any
labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.
Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. A local or chapter
therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor
organization.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They
likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or
fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC.-CEBU B-MEG FEED PLANT vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to review and set aside two Resolutions of Mediator-Arbiter Achilles
V. Manit, dated January 5, 1994 and April 6, 1994, and the affirmation Order on appeal of the public respondent,
Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment. The petition below was
entitled: In Re: Petition for Direct Certification as the Sole and Exclusive Bargaining Agent of All Monthly Paid
Employees of SMFI-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant, docketed as OS-MA-A-3-51-94 (RO700-9309-RU-036).
FACTS:
On September 24, 1993, a petition for certification election among the monthly-paid employees of the San Miguel
Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant was filed by private respondent labor federation Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa (IBM, for brevity) before Med-Arbiter Achilles V. Manit, alleging, inter alia, that it is a legitimate
labor organization duly registered with the Department of labor and Employment (DOLE) under the Registration
Certificate No. 5369-IP. SMFI-Cebu B-Meg Feeds Plant (SMFI, for brevity), herein petitioner, is a business entity
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines which employs roughly seventy-five (75) monthly
paid employees, almost all of whom support the present petition. It was submitted in said petition that there has
been no certification election conducted in SMFI to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent thereat for
the past two years and that the proposed bargaining unit, which is SMFIs monthly paid employees, is an
unorganized one. It was also stated therein that petitioner IBM (herein private respondent) has already complied
with the mandatory requirements for the creation of its local or affiliate in SMFIs establishment.
On October 25, 1993, herein petitioner SMFI filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned petition dated
September 24, 1993 on the ground that a similar petition remains pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action before Med-Arbiter Achilles V. Manit.
ISSUE: whether or not a particular labor organization is legitimate since legitimate labor organizations have
exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be
certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining
When does a labor organization acquire legitimacy?
Whether or not petitioner is a legitimate labor organization will depend on the documents submitted by the
petitioner in the second petition
HELD: Ordinarily, a labor organization attains the status of legitimacy only upon the issuance in its name of a
Certificate of Registration by the Bureau of Labor Relations
We agree with this position of the public respondent and the Solicitor General. In addition, private respondents
Comment to this petition indicates that in the election of officers held to determine the representatives of IBM, the
faction of Mr. Meron lost to the group of Mr. Edilberto Galvez, and the latter was acknowledged as the duly
elected IBM National President.[17]Thus, the authority of Mr. Galvez to sign the charter certificate of IBM at
SMFI, as President of the IBM Federation,[18] can no longer be successfully questioned. A punctilious
examination of the records presents no evidence to the contrary and petitioner, instead of squarely refuting this
point, skirted the issue by insisting that the mere presence of two contending factions in the IBM prevents the
issuance of a valid and authentic charter certificate in favor of IBM at SMFI. This averment of petitioner simply
does not deserve any merit.
II. In any case, this Court notes that it is petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance
to the holding of a certification election among its monthly-paid rank-and-file employees. This must not be so, for
the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The only exception to this rule is
where the employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code
because it was requested to bargain collectively, which exception finds no application in the case before us. Its role
in a certification election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a certification election as it cannot
oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters orders related thereto. An employer that involves itself in a
certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a company union. This Court should be the
last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor.
When does a labor organization acquire legitimacy?
Answer: a labor organization attains the status of legitimacy only upon the issuance in its name of a Certificate of
Registration by the Bureau of Labor Relations
TOPIC: PRINCIPAL-AGENT
ELISCO-ELIROL LABOR UNION (NAFLU) vs. NORIEL
G.R. No. L-41955, December 29, 1977
FACTS: a CBA was negotiated and executed between the Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU and respondent
company Elizaled Steel, while the former is yet to be registered with the BLR.
Upon registration, at a special meeting called for the purpose, the general membership of petitioner decided to
disaffiliate from its mother union, the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
That respondent company without any justifiable reason refused and continues to refuse to recognize petitioner as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. By virtue of said refusal, petitioners filed a
petition before the BLR against respondent company, and NAFLU be ordered to stop from presenting itself as the
collective bargaining agent.
ISSUE: Which of the 2 unions should be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees and ultimately recognized to administer and supervise the enforcement of the CBA, the mother union
or the local union.
HELD: the local union, Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, NOT the mother union NAFLU
“to grant to the former mother union (NAFLU) the authority to administer and enforce their collective bargaining
agreement without presumably any members in the bargaining unit is quite absurd”
Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of employees and members of the local union was the principal
party to the agreement. NAFLU as the “mother union” in participation in the execution of the bargaining
agreement with respondent company acted merely as agent of the local union, which remained the basic unit of the
association existing principally and freely to serve the common interest of all its members, including the freedom
to disaffiliated when the circumstances so warranted as in the present case. **
Corollarily, the “substitutionary” doctrine likewise fully supports petitioner’s stand. Petitioner union to whom the
employees owe their allegiance has from the beginning expressly avowed that it “does not intend to change and/or
amend the provisions of the present collective bargaining agreement but only to be given the chance to enforce the
same since there is a shift of allegiance in the majority of the employees at respondent company.” As was stressed
by the Court in Benguet Consolidated Inc. vs. BCI Employees & W Union-PAFLU-
… This principle, formulated by the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there
occurs a shift in employees’ union allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer,
merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed between employer and
employees thru their agent, the employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind then up to its
expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date.
In formulating the “substitutionary” doctrine, the only consideration involved was the employees’ interest in the
existing bargaining agreement. The agent’s interest never entered the picture. In fact, the justification for said
doctrine was:
… that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the statute, is the true party in interest to the contract,
holding rights through the agency of the union representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is
defeasible at the will of the principal.
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED VS SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and
EXEMPT UNION G.R. No. 146206
Topic: Determination of Appropriate Bargaining Unit; Factors – Unit Determination
QUICKIE FACTS: San Miguel Foods has factory/branches in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis. The employees
from these three branches wanted to form a single bargaining unit. This was opposed by the company as being
against the “one company, one union” policy. SC ruled that applying the mutuality of interest test, there should
only be one bargaining unit.
FACTS:
In the case of San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, the Court held that even if
they handle confidential data regarding technical and internal business operations, supervisory employees 3 and 4
and the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. are not to be considered confidential employees,
because the same do not pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement of grievances.
Consequently, they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the three different plants of San Miguel Corporation
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having community or mutuality of
interests, constitute a single bargaining unit.
A certification election was conducted. On the date of the election, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and
Challenge to Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some
employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of
employer-employee relationship with petitioner.
Based on the results of the election, the Med-Arbiter issued the Order stating that since the Yes vote received 97%
of the valid votes cast, respondent is certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt
employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.
On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary, in the Resolution, affirmed the Order of the Med-Arbiter.
CA affirmed the Resolution of DOLE Undersecretary with modification stating that those holding the positions of
Human Resource Assistant and Personnel Assistant are excluded from the bargaining unit.
Hence, this petition by the San Miguel Foods
ISSUE: W/N CA departed from jurisprudence when it expanded the scope of the bargaining unit.
RULING: No. In San Miguel vs Laguesma, the Court explained that the employees of San Miguel Corporation
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit, which is
not contrary to the one-company, one-union policy. An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees. Their
functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
The Court affirms the finding of the CA that there should be only one bargaining unit for the employees in
Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and
Magnolia Poultry Farms engaged in live chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work,
working conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or
impede their commonality of interest. Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks
of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a
single bargaining unit.
DOCTRINE: An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised
of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
It held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees. Their
functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to
warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
FACTS: The Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification election with
the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc.
(PEPSI).
The Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros
Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions. Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU)
and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).
PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation
of the Union, entitled PCPPI v. PCEU-UOEF on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers
and (b) a supervisors’ union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of
the same company.
ISSUE: Whether or not a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two rank and file
unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended? W/N
confidential employees may join rank and file employee’s union.
HELD: In Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma, 205 SCRA 121 [1992], as members it was ratiocinated:
xxx xxx xx
The prohibition against a supervisors’ union joining a local union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence.
The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors’ wanting to join a rank-and-file
union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a national federation the
members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where,
as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in
their own bargaining unit.
As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file, what
was held in the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) —. . A confidential employee is one
entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the
employer’s property. While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial employee as ineligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are
similarly disqualified.
VICTORIANO V ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION 59 SCRA 54 (1974)
FACTS: Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his affiliation to the
said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated with any labor
organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in their collective bargaining agreement with their
employer that all permanent employees of the company must be a member of the union and later was amended by
Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union
wrote a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed by the
company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be dismissed from the service.
The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily
favors religious sects in providing exemption to be affiliated with any labor unions.
ISSUE: WON RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
HELD: The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the
"right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second,
power, whereby an employee may join or refrain from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union
includes the right to abstain from joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Act is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of
the collective bargaining union. Thus this exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on
freedom of association but instead reinforces it.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) VS THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 85279 JULY 28, 1989
FACTS: Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to
work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike
and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor –
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and
that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union’s demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their
entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and
payment of the children’s allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court
of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed to strike,
and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS’ complaint for damages,
from continuing with their strike.
ISSUE: w/n SSS employees have the right to strike
HELD: No. The 1987 Constitution provides that the State “shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law” [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in the
public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for it provides, after
defining the scope of the civil service as “all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,” that “[t]he right to
self-organization shall not be denied to government employees” [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically,
the Bill of Rights also provides that “[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged” [Art. III,
Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to
organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to
limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do
so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
The SSS is a GOCC with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of
the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS
belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.